The document discusses problems that occurred on Election Day in Kenya in 2013 and in its aftermath. It notes widespread failure of the Electronic Voter Identification system, with estimates that the technology failed in 50-80% of polling stations. This undermined transparency as polling stations then had to rely on paper voter registers, but it was unclear which register was being used. It also discusses other irregularities witnessed by observers such as missing voter names, non-registered people voting, and allegations of voter bribery. The aftermath saw confusion over rejected votes and failure of the electronic transmission of election results, making it impossible to verify the manual vote counts.
Response to questions from the Speakers Commission on Digital Democracy regar...Smartmatic
Online voting using internet enabled devices has been growing in popularity worldwide as governments look to address the ever changing challenges they face in the running of elections.
How to vote in Estonia with the i-voting systemSmartmatic
To vote electronically in Estonia, a citizen needs an internet-connected computer, their ID card or mobile ID, and up-to-date digital signature and antivirus software. They download the voter application from valimised.ee, use their ID to access it, select their preferred candidate, and confirm their vote with a digital signature. The encrypted votes are sent securely over the internet to a central server, and the voter can check their vote was received. On Election Day, votes are decrypted and counted after personal data is removed to ensure secrecy, and voters can change their electronic vote up until the deadline by voting again.
Towards a trusted e election in kuwait requirements and principlesIJMIT JOURNAL
Kuwait is a democratic country that has used paper ballots for its parliament elections for many years.
Although many people are content with the paper ballot, a survey shows that it has drawbacks, which have
made some people lose confidence in the system and would prefer a replacement electronic system.
However, the survey also shows that voters are cautious about electronic voting and are not ready for a full
internet-enabled system. The aim of this paper is to propose a step-by-step approach for introducing
electronic voting system and to define a set of requirements that an e-voting system, which is planned to be
used instead of paper-based voting system in Kuwait, should satisfy.
Georgia-Parliamentary-Election-Final-Report-3Brian Lee
The document is a final election report by the Committee for Open Democracy on Georgia's 2012 parliamentary elections. It summarizes problematic issues observed in the pre-election period including pressure on the media, voter list and ballot fraud, abuse of administrative resources, and selective law enforcement. On election day, some irregularities were seen but the final results generally reflected the will of voters. The report concludes that while democratic progress was made, Georgia needs further electoral reforms particularly regarding enforcement of laws. It provides recommendations such as improving voter lists, liberalizing overseas voting, making the election commission more representative, and preventing politically motivated arrests during campaigns.
Impact of voter registration technology on confidence and trust in electoral ...Smartmatic
A well defined voter registration project:
Reduces the gap between voting age population & registered voters
Increases turnout
Make sure that all key success factors are addressed
Find solution providers that offer a voter register and pay per correctly registered voter with a specified target database accuracy
Make sure that the solution provider assumes responsibility for the end result: the contents of the database
Report of Kreston GCG "Fraud in Ukrainian Business 2017" based on independent survey results obtained from representatives of 130 companies across the entire country.
What journalists should know about the election results transmission systemInternewsKE
The IEBC is implementing an Electronic Results Transmission system to allow provisional election results to be electronically transmitted from polling stations to tallying centers. Presiding officers will use mobile devices to enter results from paper forms into an app, which will transmit the data over mobile networks to the IEBC headquarters for consolidation and publication. The results transmission system is part of the IEBC's overall results management system and will graphically display provisional results online and through APIs for independent analysis.
This document summarizes concerns about Kenya's voter registration process and register of voters ahead of the August 8th election. It notes unexplained increases in registered voters after the 2013 election registration closed. For the 2017 election, some counties again saw small increases in voters after an audit of the register. There are also ongoing questions about the use of an unexplained "green book" and a lack of clarity around the final number of registered voters due to discrepancies between biometric and biographic voter lists. Overall, the document argues many problems from 2013 remain unresolved, calling into question the reliability of the voter registration data and process.
Response to questions from the Speakers Commission on Digital Democracy regar...Smartmatic
Online voting using internet enabled devices has been growing in popularity worldwide as governments look to address the ever changing challenges they face in the running of elections.
How to vote in Estonia with the i-voting systemSmartmatic
To vote electronically in Estonia, a citizen needs an internet-connected computer, their ID card or mobile ID, and up-to-date digital signature and antivirus software. They download the voter application from valimised.ee, use their ID to access it, select their preferred candidate, and confirm their vote with a digital signature. The encrypted votes are sent securely over the internet to a central server, and the voter can check their vote was received. On Election Day, votes are decrypted and counted after personal data is removed to ensure secrecy, and voters can change their electronic vote up until the deadline by voting again.
Towards a trusted e election in kuwait requirements and principlesIJMIT JOURNAL
Kuwait is a democratic country that has used paper ballots for its parliament elections for many years.
Although many people are content with the paper ballot, a survey shows that it has drawbacks, which have
made some people lose confidence in the system and would prefer a replacement electronic system.
However, the survey also shows that voters are cautious about electronic voting and are not ready for a full
internet-enabled system. The aim of this paper is to propose a step-by-step approach for introducing
electronic voting system and to define a set of requirements that an e-voting system, which is planned to be
used instead of paper-based voting system in Kuwait, should satisfy.
Georgia-Parliamentary-Election-Final-Report-3Brian Lee
The document is a final election report by the Committee for Open Democracy on Georgia's 2012 parliamentary elections. It summarizes problematic issues observed in the pre-election period including pressure on the media, voter list and ballot fraud, abuse of administrative resources, and selective law enforcement. On election day, some irregularities were seen but the final results generally reflected the will of voters. The report concludes that while democratic progress was made, Georgia needs further electoral reforms particularly regarding enforcement of laws. It provides recommendations such as improving voter lists, liberalizing overseas voting, making the election commission more representative, and preventing politically motivated arrests during campaigns.
Impact of voter registration technology on confidence and trust in electoral ...Smartmatic
A well defined voter registration project:
Reduces the gap between voting age population & registered voters
Increases turnout
Make sure that all key success factors are addressed
Find solution providers that offer a voter register and pay per correctly registered voter with a specified target database accuracy
Make sure that the solution provider assumes responsibility for the end result: the contents of the database
Report of Kreston GCG "Fraud in Ukrainian Business 2017" based on independent survey results obtained from representatives of 130 companies across the entire country.
What journalists should know about the election results transmission systemInternewsKE
The IEBC is implementing an Electronic Results Transmission system to allow provisional election results to be electronically transmitted from polling stations to tallying centers. Presiding officers will use mobile devices to enter results from paper forms into an app, which will transmit the data over mobile networks to the IEBC headquarters for consolidation and publication. The results transmission system is part of the IEBC's overall results management system and will graphically display provisional results online and through APIs for independent analysis.
This document summarizes concerns about Kenya's voter registration process and register of voters ahead of the August 8th election. It notes unexplained increases in registered voters after the 2013 election registration closed. For the 2017 election, some counties again saw small increases in voters after an audit of the register. There are also ongoing questions about the use of an unexplained "green book" and a lack of clarity around the final number of registered voters due to discrepancies between biometric and biographic voter lists. Overall, the document argues many problems from 2013 remain unresolved, calling into question the reliability of the voter registration data and process.
The document summarizes the Philippines' plans for its first nationwide automated election in 2010. It discusses the history of election automation efforts in the country dating back to 1992. It describes the technologies that will be used, including precinct-count optical scan machines and electronic transmission of results. It outlines security measures like encryption, testing and auditing procedures, and contingency plans for any systems failures during the election.
- The document discusses e-governance and the Right to Information Act of 2005 in India.
- E-governance aims to improve governance through the use of information and communication technologies, providing government services electronically.
- The Right to Information Act was passed in 2005 to increase transparency and accountability in public institutions. It requires them to proactively disclose information on their websites.
Embedded Computer Application Software for Secured Voter Card Transfer: An Ap...Eswar Publications
Voter registration helps to facilitate the credibility of the electoral process by preventing multiple voting as each
person is only allowed to register once. One out of many causes of disenfranchisement of register voter is the failure to transfer their Voter Registration from one place to another when the case arises. That scenario has led to multiple registrations which is a criminal offense in Nigeria context. This research work is to address the difficulty involved in Voter Card Transfer. We design embedded application software proposed to be integrated into the INEC existing website. A flowchart was designed using the procedure for Voter Register Transfer in the INEC website. The prototype of the application was coded with C++. It was tested to meet the demands and objective of the study.
Asian Election Stakeholder Forum III (AESF III)
August 22 – 26, 2016
Bali, Indonesia
"Transparency & integrity for Quality Elections"
General Election Commission Republic of Indonesia
and
General Election Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
The monthly information bulletin of the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform (CPLR) is dedicated to the analysis of state reforms, in particular in the areas of parliamentarianism and elections, constitutional and judicial reforms, civil service, anticorruption, etc. The goal of the publication is to increase the level of expert awareness among the citizens and to strengthen their capacity to influence the government authorities in order to expedite democratic reforms and to establish good governance
in Ukraine.
This document discusses regulatory requirements for medical equipment in Sri Lanka. It provides an overview of Sri Lanka's healthcare system, including demographics, disease patterns, healthcare spending, and regulatory authorities. Key points covered include:
- Sri Lanka has a mixed public-private healthcare system and is experiencing an aging population and epidemiological transition to non-communicable diseases.
- The medical equipment market in Sri Lanka is growing but still dependent on imports, with total market size reaching $40 million in 2008.
- Medical devices must be registered with the Cosmetic Devices and Drugs Authority and the Atomic Energy Authority, which is a multi-step process requiring documents and fees.
- Regulations are generally less stringent than in India, with
Experts analyzed implementation of key judicial reforms in framework of Priority II "Strengthening institutions and good governance". It is publish with the support of European Union and International Renaissance Foundation.
Smartmatic provided technology and services for the 2013 Philippine midterm elections, including voting machines, tallying servers, memory cards, and network infrastructure. They operated a National Support Center that monitored the election process and provided remote technical support. The elections saw over 766 million votes cast to elect over 18,000 positions within 10 hours. Observers and officials praised the elections for their efficiency and transparency.
The document discusses various data sources related to elections in Afghanistan, including a master list of polling centers from the Independent Election Commission, preliminary election results, and complaint data from the Electoral Complaints Commission. It describes how the data can be analyzed and mapped at the district level, including overlaying ethnic distributions and election results to examine voting patterns. Users can interact with the maps to drill down to different regions and levels of data.
There was an increasing trend from 2010 to 2011 motor traffic accidents in Kuwait City, passengers and pedestrians are always at highest risk of being injured or killed on the road. Quantitative and qualitative results indicated that the technical element of the highway construction, irresponsibility, poor management, cell phones, alcohol and drugs, age of the victims and poor condition of services were the causes of traffic accidents in Kuwait. The study recommended that the government should review legislation regarding employment of drivers, and working conditions of police force should be improved, public road safety campaigns should be conducted, and new driving license system should be imposed. The use of cell phones while driving should be restricted. The hospital and police records should be updated with the number of road victims, the hospital staff, traffic police and ambulance personnel should be considered for intensive training on emergency and preparedness, and regular vehicle inspection should be introduced in Kuwait City.
Keyword: Traffic- accidents-Risk Theory-System Theory-Triangulation- method
The document discusses voter registration for the 2013 Kenyan general elections. It notes that the previous voter registration system produced a bloated register with issues like deceased individuals still listed. For 2013, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission implemented biometric voter registration using fingerprint scanning in an attempt to create an accurate register. However, the electronic voter identification kits meant to identify voters on election day failed, forcing officials to rely on the hard copy register. The document raises questions about the accuracy of the final register given inconsistencies in the numbers and the lack of a single, verified register.
The document analyzes and critiques the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission's (IEBC) releases of results from Kenya's 2013 general election. It finds that the IEBC has released progressively less detailed information over time, with the latest April 2014 release only including valid votes by county rather than rejected votes and total votes cast by constituency. Fifteen months after the election, polling station level results are still missing or incomplete for a full public record. The IEBC is not fulfilling its constitutional requirement to administer elections in a transparent manner.
The republic of Kenya comprises of eight (8) provinces now forty-seven counties. The country is located in East Africa and shares land borders with the Republics of Somalia in the East, Uganda in the West, Tanzania in the South and Ethiopia and Sudan (now South Sudan) in the North. The three largest and most influential ethnic groups in Kenya are the kikuyu, Luhya, and Kalenjins. In terms of religion Kenya is roughly split into 80% Christians while the rest are Muslims.
In Kenya, general elections are carried out every after five years where a head of state the President and The National Assembly representatives are elected. They are elected by the people. The national Assembly has about 220 members representing respective constituencies.
In the Local Governments they have the chairman and the Counselor. The counselors are all elected by the people of the state in the respective wards.
That is to say, in any given general elections, Kenyans vote for the president, the members of the National Assembly and the counselors.
Most African Electoral bodies IEBC not an exception right from their inception to date, even with latest advancements in technology, still use a primitive paper based methods during voting; this system is characterized by manual form filling to chose leaders and transfer of the information from manual data capture forms to computerized datasheets, this has led to an excessive number of mistakes making their way into the final vote counts hence leading to confusion at the time of announcing the results. The main advantage of paper-based systems is that ballot papers are easily human auditable. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages for instance the need to print ballot papers is a slow, expensive, inflexible, environmentally hostile process, visual impairments, or literacy limitations and also last minute changes to the voter register are difficult to accommodate among others.
The adoption and challenges of electronic voting technologies within the sout...IJMIT JOURNAL
Literature has shown that countries such as Brazil and India have successfully implemented electronic
voting systems and other countries are at various piloting stages to address many challenges associated
with manual paper based system such ascosts of physical ballot paper and other overheads, electoral
delays, distribution of electoral materials, and general lack of confidence in the electoral process. It is in
this context that this study explores how South African can leverage the opportunities that e-voting
presents. Manual voting is often tedious, non-secure, and time-consuming, which leads us to think about
using electronic facilities to make the process more efficient. This study proposes that the adoption of
electronic voting technologies could perhaps mitigate some of these issues and challengesin the process
improving the electoral process. The study used an on-line questionnaire which was administered to a
broader group of voters and an in-depth semi-structured interview with the Independent Electoral
Commission officials. The analysis is based on thematic analysis and diffusion of innovations theory is
adopted as a theoretical lens of analysis. The findings reveal that relative advantage, compatibility and
complexity would determine the intentions of South African voters and the Electoral Management Bodies
(IEC) to adopt e-voting technologies. Moreover, the findings also reveal several other factorsthat could
influence the adoption process. The study is limited to only voters in Cape Town and these voters were
expected to have some access to the internet. The sample size limits the generalizability of the findings of
this study.
The document provides an after-action report on the April 1, 2014 primary election in Washington D.C. It summarizes election preparation activities including voter outreach, equipment and supply preparation, polling place selection, and election worker training. It also discusses early voting operations and notes some locations had lower than expected turnout. Issues identified during the election are discussed to improve future elections.
This document discusses electronic voting systems and provides background information on voting in Nigeria. It begins by defining electronic voting and describing different types of electronic voting technologies. It then provides details on Nigeria's existing voting system, including that Nigeria elects a president and national assembly. It has over 2000 elective positions across the federal, state and local levels. The document discusses the significance and objectives of studying electronic voting systems for Nigeria, which include improving accessibility, transparency and reducing errors and fraud. It provides definitions for key terms and outlines the scope and limitations of the study.
The document summarizes issues with Kenya's 2013 general elections, including non-transparent procurement of electoral materials, an incomplete and unverified voter register, failure of electronic voting systems, and contradictory election forms. It concludes that the IEBC demonstrated serious gaps in transparency and accountability in managing the elections. The document recommends reforms to address these issues and help ensure free and fair elections in 2017, including improvements to the voter register, oversight of the IEBC, and dispute resolution processes.
NIGERIA 2023 ELECTIONS: VOTERS NEED TO KNOW & INEC PREPAREDNESS.pptxOlatunde Tijani
A presentation by Olatunde Tijani, INEC Facilitator/SPO at the February 2023 Monthly Webinar of Nigeria Computer Society, Ogun State Chapter dated 23rd February, 2023
DCBOE November 2014 After Action ReportDavid Levine
The document provides an after-action report on the November 4, 2014 general election in Washington D.C. It summarizes preparations for the election, including public outreach efforts, early voting, absentee voting, and Election Day operations. The report finds that preparations were extensive, but some errors occurred in pre-election publications. Procedures have since been strengthened to prevent future errors. Overall, the election was well-administered despite some minor issues that will continue to be addressed.
This document proposes a mobile e-voting system for Nigeria's electoral process. It describes a two-level hierarchical architecture including national and state infrastructure. Voters would use electronic voting terminals equipped with smartcard readers to authenticate and cast votes. Votes would be transmitted over a virtual private network on existing mobile networks to centralized tallying servers at the state and national levels. The system aims to improve voter participation and reduce issues like ballot stuffing that have challenged previous elections in Nigeria. Security features like public key infrastructure and voter authentication smartcards are incorporated to protect vote integrity and transparency.
Mobile, Secure E - Voting Architecture for the Nigerian Electoral Systemiosrjce
IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering (IOSR-JCE) is a double blind peer reviewed International Journal that provides rapid publication (within a month) of articles in all areas of computer engineering and its applications. The journal welcomes publications of high quality papers on theoretical developments and practical applications in computer technology. Original research papers, state-of-the-art reviews, and high quality technical notes are invited for publications.
The document summarizes the Philippines' plans for its first nationwide automated election in 2010. It discusses the history of election automation efforts in the country dating back to 1992. It describes the technologies that will be used, including precinct-count optical scan machines and electronic transmission of results. It outlines security measures like encryption, testing and auditing procedures, and contingency plans for any systems failures during the election.
- The document discusses e-governance and the Right to Information Act of 2005 in India.
- E-governance aims to improve governance through the use of information and communication technologies, providing government services electronically.
- The Right to Information Act was passed in 2005 to increase transparency and accountability in public institutions. It requires them to proactively disclose information on their websites.
Embedded Computer Application Software for Secured Voter Card Transfer: An Ap...Eswar Publications
Voter registration helps to facilitate the credibility of the electoral process by preventing multiple voting as each
person is only allowed to register once. One out of many causes of disenfranchisement of register voter is the failure to transfer their Voter Registration from one place to another when the case arises. That scenario has led to multiple registrations which is a criminal offense in Nigeria context. This research work is to address the difficulty involved in Voter Card Transfer. We design embedded application software proposed to be integrated into the INEC existing website. A flowchart was designed using the procedure for Voter Register Transfer in the INEC website. The prototype of the application was coded with C++. It was tested to meet the demands and objective of the study.
Asian Election Stakeholder Forum III (AESF III)
August 22 – 26, 2016
Bali, Indonesia
"Transparency & integrity for Quality Elections"
General Election Commission Republic of Indonesia
and
General Election Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
The monthly information bulletin of the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform (CPLR) is dedicated to the analysis of state reforms, in particular in the areas of parliamentarianism and elections, constitutional and judicial reforms, civil service, anticorruption, etc. The goal of the publication is to increase the level of expert awareness among the citizens and to strengthen their capacity to influence the government authorities in order to expedite democratic reforms and to establish good governance
in Ukraine.
This document discusses regulatory requirements for medical equipment in Sri Lanka. It provides an overview of Sri Lanka's healthcare system, including demographics, disease patterns, healthcare spending, and regulatory authorities. Key points covered include:
- Sri Lanka has a mixed public-private healthcare system and is experiencing an aging population and epidemiological transition to non-communicable diseases.
- The medical equipment market in Sri Lanka is growing but still dependent on imports, with total market size reaching $40 million in 2008.
- Medical devices must be registered with the Cosmetic Devices and Drugs Authority and the Atomic Energy Authority, which is a multi-step process requiring documents and fees.
- Regulations are generally less stringent than in India, with
Experts analyzed implementation of key judicial reforms in framework of Priority II "Strengthening institutions and good governance". It is publish with the support of European Union and International Renaissance Foundation.
Smartmatic provided technology and services for the 2013 Philippine midterm elections, including voting machines, tallying servers, memory cards, and network infrastructure. They operated a National Support Center that monitored the election process and provided remote technical support. The elections saw over 766 million votes cast to elect over 18,000 positions within 10 hours. Observers and officials praised the elections for their efficiency and transparency.
The document discusses various data sources related to elections in Afghanistan, including a master list of polling centers from the Independent Election Commission, preliminary election results, and complaint data from the Electoral Complaints Commission. It describes how the data can be analyzed and mapped at the district level, including overlaying ethnic distributions and election results to examine voting patterns. Users can interact with the maps to drill down to different regions and levels of data.
There was an increasing trend from 2010 to 2011 motor traffic accidents in Kuwait City, passengers and pedestrians are always at highest risk of being injured or killed on the road. Quantitative and qualitative results indicated that the technical element of the highway construction, irresponsibility, poor management, cell phones, alcohol and drugs, age of the victims and poor condition of services were the causes of traffic accidents in Kuwait. The study recommended that the government should review legislation regarding employment of drivers, and working conditions of police force should be improved, public road safety campaigns should be conducted, and new driving license system should be imposed. The use of cell phones while driving should be restricted. The hospital and police records should be updated with the number of road victims, the hospital staff, traffic police and ambulance personnel should be considered for intensive training on emergency and preparedness, and regular vehicle inspection should be introduced in Kuwait City.
Keyword: Traffic- accidents-Risk Theory-System Theory-Triangulation- method
The document discusses voter registration for the 2013 Kenyan general elections. It notes that the previous voter registration system produced a bloated register with issues like deceased individuals still listed. For 2013, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission implemented biometric voter registration using fingerprint scanning in an attempt to create an accurate register. However, the electronic voter identification kits meant to identify voters on election day failed, forcing officials to rely on the hard copy register. The document raises questions about the accuracy of the final register given inconsistencies in the numbers and the lack of a single, verified register.
The document analyzes and critiques the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission's (IEBC) releases of results from Kenya's 2013 general election. It finds that the IEBC has released progressively less detailed information over time, with the latest April 2014 release only including valid votes by county rather than rejected votes and total votes cast by constituency. Fifteen months after the election, polling station level results are still missing or incomplete for a full public record. The IEBC is not fulfilling its constitutional requirement to administer elections in a transparent manner.
The republic of Kenya comprises of eight (8) provinces now forty-seven counties. The country is located in East Africa and shares land borders with the Republics of Somalia in the East, Uganda in the West, Tanzania in the South and Ethiopia and Sudan (now South Sudan) in the North. The three largest and most influential ethnic groups in Kenya are the kikuyu, Luhya, and Kalenjins. In terms of religion Kenya is roughly split into 80% Christians while the rest are Muslims.
In Kenya, general elections are carried out every after five years where a head of state the President and The National Assembly representatives are elected. They are elected by the people. The national Assembly has about 220 members representing respective constituencies.
In the Local Governments they have the chairman and the Counselor. The counselors are all elected by the people of the state in the respective wards.
That is to say, in any given general elections, Kenyans vote for the president, the members of the National Assembly and the counselors.
Most African Electoral bodies IEBC not an exception right from their inception to date, even with latest advancements in technology, still use a primitive paper based methods during voting; this system is characterized by manual form filling to chose leaders and transfer of the information from manual data capture forms to computerized datasheets, this has led to an excessive number of mistakes making their way into the final vote counts hence leading to confusion at the time of announcing the results. The main advantage of paper-based systems is that ballot papers are easily human auditable. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages for instance the need to print ballot papers is a slow, expensive, inflexible, environmentally hostile process, visual impairments, or literacy limitations and also last minute changes to the voter register are difficult to accommodate among others.
The adoption and challenges of electronic voting technologies within the sout...IJMIT JOURNAL
Literature has shown that countries such as Brazil and India have successfully implemented electronic
voting systems and other countries are at various piloting stages to address many challenges associated
with manual paper based system such ascosts of physical ballot paper and other overheads, electoral
delays, distribution of electoral materials, and general lack of confidence in the electoral process. It is in
this context that this study explores how South African can leverage the opportunities that e-voting
presents. Manual voting is often tedious, non-secure, and time-consuming, which leads us to think about
using electronic facilities to make the process more efficient. This study proposes that the adoption of
electronic voting technologies could perhaps mitigate some of these issues and challengesin the process
improving the electoral process. The study used an on-line questionnaire which was administered to a
broader group of voters and an in-depth semi-structured interview with the Independent Electoral
Commission officials. The analysis is based on thematic analysis and diffusion of innovations theory is
adopted as a theoretical lens of analysis. The findings reveal that relative advantage, compatibility and
complexity would determine the intentions of South African voters and the Electoral Management Bodies
(IEC) to adopt e-voting technologies. Moreover, the findings also reveal several other factorsthat could
influence the adoption process. The study is limited to only voters in Cape Town and these voters were
expected to have some access to the internet. The sample size limits the generalizability of the findings of
this study.
The document provides an after-action report on the April 1, 2014 primary election in Washington D.C. It summarizes election preparation activities including voter outreach, equipment and supply preparation, polling place selection, and election worker training. It also discusses early voting operations and notes some locations had lower than expected turnout. Issues identified during the election are discussed to improve future elections.
This document discusses electronic voting systems and provides background information on voting in Nigeria. It begins by defining electronic voting and describing different types of electronic voting technologies. It then provides details on Nigeria's existing voting system, including that Nigeria elects a president and national assembly. It has over 2000 elective positions across the federal, state and local levels. The document discusses the significance and objectives of studying electronic voting systems for Nigeria, which include improving accessibility, transparency and reducing errors and fraud. It provides definitions for key terms and outlines the scope and limitations of the study.
The document summarizes issues with Kenya's 2013 general elections, including non-transparent procurement of electoral materials, an incomplete and unverified voter register, failure of electronic voting systems, and contradictory election forms. It concludes that the IEBC demonstrated serious gaps in transparency and accountability in managing the elections. The document recommends reforms to address these issues and help ensure free and fair elections in 2017, including improvements to the voter register, oversight of the IEBC, and dispute resolution processes.
NIGERIA 2023 ELECTIONS: VOTERS NEED TO KNOW & INEC PREPAREDNESS.pptxOlatunde Tijani
A presentation by Olatunde Tijani, INEC Facilitator/SPO at the February 2023 Monthly Webinar of Nigeria Computer Society, Ogun State Chapter dated 23rd February, 2023
DCBOE November 2014 After Action ReportDavid Levine
The document provides an after-action report on the November 4, 2014 general election in Washington D.C. It summarizes preparations for the election, including public outreach efforts, early voting, absentee voting, and Election Day operations. The report finds that preparations were extensive, but some errors occurred in pre-election publications. Procedures have since been strengthened to prevent future errors. Overall, the election was well-administered despite some minor issues that will continue to be addressed.
This document proposes a mobile e-voting system for Nigeria's electoral process. It describes a two-level hierarchical architecture including national and state infrastructure. Voters would use electronic voting terminals equipped with smartcard readers to authenticate and cast votes. Votes would be transmitted over a virtual private network on existing mobile networks to centralized tallying servers at the state and national levels. The system aims to improve voter participation and reduce issues like ballot stuffing that have challenged previous elections in Nigeria. Security features like public key infrastructure and voter authentication smartcards are incorporated to protect vote integrity and transparency.
Mobile, Secure E - Voting Architecture for the Nigerian Electoral Systemiosrjce
IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering (IOSR-JCE) is a double blind peer reviewed International Journal that provides rapid publication (within a month) of articles in all areas of computer engineering and its applications. The journal welcomes publications of high quality papers on theoretical developments and practical applications in computer technology. Original research papers, state-of-the-art reviews, and high quality technical notes are invited for publications.
This document analyzes the mayoral by-elections held in Ferizaj and Kaçanik municipalities in Kosovo in 2013. It summarizes the election observation efforts of Democracy for Development Institute and Initiative for Progress, who deployed observers to all polling stations. While some improvements were noted compared to past elections, the report finds ongoing irregularities including voter intimidation and a lack of voter information. It concludes with recommendations to address issues in polling station management, the voter list, political campaigning and other aspects of the electoral process.
Final draft ideg observation-report_voter-reg-ex 2008 1IDEGGhana
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Between 31st July and 12 August 2008 the Institute for Democratic Governance IDEG
conducted an observation of the 2008 voter registration exercise. To ensure a focused and
effective observation IDEG deployed an observation team comprising 220 Ghanaians who were
deployed into 25 constituencies located in seven out of Ghana’s ten administrative regions
where IDEG maintains Governance Issues Forum Networks (GIFNET).
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BIOMETRIC VOTING TECHNOLOGY IN NIGERIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM...Amani Kanu
This document is a research project submitted to the National Open University of Nigeria in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science. The project examines the effectiveness of biometric voting technology, specifically the use of card readers, in the Nigerian electoral system using the 2015 general election as a case study. It consists of five chapters that introduce the background and objectives of the study, review relevant literature, describe the research methodology, present the results and findings, and provide a conclusion and recommendations. The study aims to evaluate the impact of card readers on election credibility in Nigeria and identify any challenges experienced with their use.
Electronic Voting: Challenges and Prospects in Nigeria’s Democracytheijes
One basic feature of democracy is that it cuts across all divides of people in the act of election. It also encourages individual freedom according to the rule of law; hence people may behave and express themselves as they choose. This paper examines the development and implementation of and Electronic Voting System (EVS) that enables voters to cast their votes online and also enables the officials to register voters and print out the results of the votes casted. It equally provides security such that voters can only vote once with their identification details. The system therefore eliminates common fraud, speed up the processing of results, increase accessibility and make voting more convenient for the citizenry.
EU 2013 Pakistan Election Observation Mission (report)fatanews
ISLAMABAD: The European Union’s Election Observer Mission, in its final report, has said the May 11 polls were much more free and fair than previous elections in the country. It cautioned, however, that not implementing certain legal provisions has left future elections vulnerable to malpractice.
Released at a news conference on Wednesday, the findings of the EU observer mission concluded that despite escalating militant attacks and procedural shortcomings, the May 11 electoral process progressed with a high level of competition, a marked increase in voter participation and overall acceptance of the outcome.
Speaking to reporters, Chief Observer Michael Gahler, however, noted that fundamental problems remain with the legal framework and the implementation of certain provisions.
“Now is the time for the new Parliament, the Election Commission and other stakeholders to demonstrate their commitment to a democratic Pakistan. Legislation can be further developed and every by-election as well as local election is an opportunity for implementing improved practices,” he added.
The 140-member EU observer mission formulated 50 recommendations to help ensure better transparency in future elections. Of these seven require constitutional changes and 17 require changes in the primary legislation, according to Gahler.
The EU observer mission suggested the formation of a special parliamentary committee on elections to review related legislation within a framework of international law commitments. Key issues to address in this regard include candidacy criteria, transparency requirements and mechanisms for effective remedy.
It also recommended that the Election Commission of Pakistan should take full responsibility for the administration of the elections. The commission must fully implement its five-year strategic plan as well, the EU mission noted in its report.
It proposed that ECP should establish a clear regulatory framework for all aspects of the election, including results management, observation and scrutiny, and complaints. The commission should also review and develop procedures to increase checks in the polling and results process, and develop practices to improve the quality of the completed results forms, the report maintained.
The EU observer mission also asked ECP to introduce strong transparency measures, including making all notifications, decisions and election related information immediately and easily available to the public.
“All polling and results information should swiftly be made available to the public on the ECP website.”
It also suggested that the legal framework for media be revised so that it fully supports editorial independence and eliminates opportunities for censorship.
Zimbabwe 2018 biometric voters roll analysis - PacheduPovo News
The document analyzes Zimbabwe's 2018 voter roll and identifies over 250,000 records with inaccuracies or duplication, such as invalid ID numbers, duplicate ID numbers, same names/dates of birth, address anomalies, and records assigned to incorrect districts. It finds statistically improbable surname/ID number combinations for over 122,000 records and over 100,000 records appear to have been copied from the 2013 voter roll. The analysis raises concerns about the integrity of the voter roll and Zimbabwe's upcoming election.
This document provides a final report from the OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission that observed Latvia's parliamentary elections held on 4 October 2014. Some key findings include:
- The elections were administered in an impartial and transparent manner by the Central Election Commission and other election bodies.
- While the legal framework provides a basis for democratic elections, some aspects such as restrictions on candidacy rights and defamation laws could be further improved.
- The campaign environment was open and peaceful, and candidates represented different political views. However, some media outlets were perceived as not fully objective.
- Voting and counting on election day proceeded smoothly and transparently according to observers, although secrecy of the vote was at
Commission to conduct sample audit of resultsSABC News
The Electoral Commission will urgently conduct an audit of results and votes cast in a sample of voting stations to ascertain if double voting occurred. The audit will cover a statistically representative sample of voting stations as well as all voting stations where complaints or allegations of double voting have been received. The final number and selection of the sample will be determined in conjunction with expert statisticians.
The document provides a summary of a policy analysis and county survey results regarding electronic poll books (EPBS). Some key findings include:
- Six counties in Minnesota participated in a 2014 EPBS pilot program, with positive feedback from voters and election judges but also technology and software issues.
- A statewide county auditor survey found 60% of counties foresee using EPBS in the future, with larger counties more likely to adopt them. Barriers to adoption included cost, staffing, and technology access.
- States like Iowa, Michigan, and Ohio have implemented EPBS programs on a statewide or county level with generally positive results, though initial challenges included training poll workers and integrating EPBS with voter registration systems.
Similar to Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath (20)
This document discusses the challenges and prospects of implementing the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. It outlines some of the underlying governance issues that the new constitution aimed to address, such as negative ethnicity, regional imbalances, unemployment and class disparities.
The document then examines the progress of implementing the constitution through developing new legislation, reviewing existing laws, and reforming institutions. It provides a matrix on implementation progress in areas like leadership, accountability, transparency, and judicial and security reforms. Some of the key challenges to implementation discussed include divisive politics, entrenched impunity, and negative ethnicity. However, the document also notes that continued joint efforts from leadership and civil society can help ensure further constitutional gains and reforms.
The document summarizes Kenya's preparedness for its August 2017 general election. It finds that preparations have been plagued by similar problems as the 2013 election, including delays procuring election technology, rejected bills to reform campaign finance and increase gender parity, and unaddressed issues with the voter registration process. It recommends that the election commission prioritize public communication, address voter registration problems, and enforce existing laws to begin changing the pattern of electoral impunity.
This document provides an overview of public procurement frameworks in Kenya. It begins by defining public procurement and explaining its role and importance, noting that it accounts for a large portion of government spending. It then outlines Kenya's constitutional and statutory procurement framework, including the Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005. The document discusses challenges with corruption and a lack of transparency in Kenya's procurement system. It provides context on procurement performance and issues of absorption rates at the national level. The document aims to review procurement processes in three Kenyan counties based on auditors' reports in order to identify challenges, causes, consequences and make recommendations.
This document discusses the need for constitutional commissions and independent offices in Kenya to decentralize their services to align with the country's devolved system of government established in 2010. It notes that these state agencies must ensure reasonable access to their services across all parts of the country and directly engage with county governments rather than just the national government. The document recommends that these agencies review their mandates and strategies to account for socioeconomic differences between counties and determine the best approach to delivering services at the local level, whether through national offices with county missions or a more permanent county presence. It aims to help these agencies better support Kenya's transition to devolved governance as required by the constitution.
This document provides an overview of Kenya's legal framework for implementing Chapter Six of the 2010 Constitution on leadership and integrity. It discusses key laws like the Constitution, Leadership and Integrity Act, and Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act. The Constitution established standards for public officers to demonstrate integrity, impartiality and accountability. Subsequent laws like the Leadership and Integrity Act were meant to operationalize Chapter Six but had some shortcomings. Overall the framework aims to curb corruption and promote ethical leadership after a history of weak accountability under the previous Constitution.
The document summarizes key findings from a report by ICT experts analyzing IEBC's compliance with a Kenyan Supreme Court order to allow scrutiny of its election technology systems. It finds that IEBC extensively failed to comply with the order, preventing examination of what happened on its networks and servers. Specifically, IEBC did not provide information about system access and security, user activity logs from servers, or data on locations transmitting election results. This lack of transparency means the court could not verify the integrity of IEBC's systems and whether they were compromised in the election process.
This document discusses retirement benefits for senior state officers in Kenya. It provides background on the rationale for providing pensions to public servants, including securing their independence and making public service an attractive career. In Kenya, different categories of civil servants have different pension schemes, and the government has persisted in maintaining multiple schemes. In 2003, Kenya passed a law providing generous retirement benefits for presidents. However, the law has been controversial and subject to attempts at amendment. The document examines issues around the constitutionality and sustainability of retirement benefits for senior officials in Kenya and other countries. It concludes by recommending reforms such as eliminating dual pension schemes and ensuring benefits are legally compliant and economically sustainable.
The document provides background information on a survey conducted in Kenya. It discusses the objectives of the survey which were to ascertain public perceptions of independent commissions, institutions, and governance processes. It outlines the survey methodology, including a sample size of 1,500 respondents across 25 counties, with a margin of error of +/- 2.5. It also discusses the survey findings, including Kenyans being proud of their country due to culture, peace and freedom but some youths not being proud due to issues like unemployment, corruption, and tribalism. The document analyzes Kenyans' values and main sources of information.
Counties in Kenya were given their first budgets to spend from March to June 2013 after devolution began. Most funds were spent on operations and maintenance (41%) and salaries (40%), leaving only 8% for development projects. Some counties spent 11% on unauthorized debts. Spending levels varied greatly between counties, with only 6 using over 90% of funds and 7 using under 50%. Counties faced challenges with weak capacity, financial management systems, and internet connectivity that slowed development spending and civic education.
This document provides an overview and evaluation of county budgets in Kenya for financial years 2012/13 and 2013/14. It finds that while frameworks for devolved governance have been established, counties face various challenges in their budgeting processes. The evaluation examines counties' adherence to principles of transparency, accountability, and public participation. It identifies some shortcomings but also good practices. Overall, the report emphasizes that capacity building for county officers and civic education for the public will be critical to strengthen budgeting and ensure the successful delivery of services under devolution.
The document summarizes the findings of a survey on Kenyan citizens' perceptions of elections, the IEBC, and electoral reforms. Key findings include:
1) 63.3% of Kenyans are willing to participate in future elections, but 36.7% are unwilling or uncertain, mainly due to mistrust in electoral processes. The youngest and those in North Eastern region expressed most unwillingness.
2) Opinions are divided on IEBC impartiality and 2017 election fairness, but 48.8% agree IEBC needs reconstitution. 50.8% believe IEBC allocated inadequate time for voter registration. 59% support electronic voting systems.
3) Focus group discussions found willingness to vote stems
The document summarizes the key findings and recommendations of the Ndung'u Commission, which investigated illegal and irregular allocation of public land in Kenya. The Commission found widespread illegal allocation of urban lands, settlement schemes, forest lands, and other protected areas to political elites. It recommended canceling all illegal land titles and establishing new institutions like a Land Tribunal to implement reforms. However, political support for reforms has been lacking and efforts to enforce the recommendations have largely failed due to weak institutions and lack of political will. While the report was an important first step, fully implementing its recommendations to address land-related injustices in Kenya remains an ongoing challenge.
The document summarizes issues of financial mismanagement at the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) between 1991 and 2007 based on audits by the Controller and Auditor General. It finds that the ECK grossly mismanaged public funds through unwarranted allowances for commissioners, double payments for accommodation, wasteful spending on vehicle hire, and questionable expenditures on vehicle repairs and procurement of supplies. It also notes issues like outstanding imprests and over-expenditure. The report aims to provide lessons on governance for the formation of a new credible electoral body and underscores the importance of financial accountability for delivering free and fair elections.
Sports is widely recognised as a sector with immense economic value. Over and above
the economic potential are the socio-political benefits of sports for reconciliation and as a
carrier for positive messages on issues such as corruption and HIV/Aids for the youth and
society as a whole.
While Kenya is well known as a sporting nation, this success is not reflected in the football
sector, which has been particularly prone to squabbling and corruption.
Corruption in sports is not new. There are concerns the world over about the lack of transparency
and accountability in sports and the resultant social and economic impact. The risk of corruption
has increased dramatically as commercial influences grow1.
This brief is an extract from a forthcoming AfriCOG report which reviews the
effectiveness of the KACC in the fight against corruption. The brief is published
to mark International Anti-Corruption Day 2009. It discusses the investigation,
prevention of corruption, asset recovery and public education functions of the
KACC.-December 2009
The document analyzes the Triton Oil Scandal in Kenya involving the illegal release of 126.4 million liters of oil from the Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC) storage facilities to Triton Petroleum Ltd between 2007-2008 without authorization from financiers. This could cost Kenyan taxpayers over 7 billion Kenyan shillings. The scandal uncovered collusion between KPC officials and Triton and links some political figures to Triton. It highlights the complex oil import system in Kenya and how Triton exploited this through speculative holding of large stocks.
The Fiscal Management Act was enacted by
Parliament as a private bill. The Act is awaiting
Presidential assent pending revisions proposed
by the President. This paper discusses the
contents of the Bill, why the President has
declined to assent to the Bill, the proposed
changes to the Bill and the effect of
implementing these changes.
The ability of an empowered CMA to carry out its supervisory and enforcement
mandate effectively fosters public confidence in the securities industry. An
effective regulator acts in the interest of the public and has processes that are
open and accountable to the public and the regulated entities.
In 2008-2009, AfriCOG responded to a call for stakeholder input into the new
proposed regulations developed by the CMA under the financial and legal sector
technical assistance project. AfriCOG’s response involved a study of the financial
markets, with the capital markets as one of the sectors reviewed.
The document opposes Kenya's request to the UN Security Council for deferral from the ICC, making several arguments: 1) The request does not have full government support as required. 2) The ICC intervened after Kenya failed to establish its own tribunal. 3) Naming suspects protected witnesses. 4) There is no current violence risk to justify deferral. 5) Failure to prosecute would strengthen impunity. The document calls on the UN to reject deferral and support local accountability and reforms.
United Nations World Oceans Day 2024; June 8th " Awaken new dephts".Christina Parmionova
The program will expand our perspectives and appreciation for our blue planet, build new foundations for our relationship to the ocean, and ignite a wave of action toward necessary change.
Combined Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Vessel List.Christina Parmionova
The best available, up-to-date information on all fishing and related vessels that appear on the illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing vessel lists published by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) and related organisations. The aim of the site is to improve the effectiveness of the original IUU lists as a tool for a wide variety of stakeholders to better understand and combat illegal fishing and broader fisheries crime.
To date, the following regional organisations maintain or share lists of vessels that have been found to carry out or support IUU fishing within their own or adjacent convention areas and/or species of competence:
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM)
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO)
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)
North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC)
South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO)
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO)
Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA)
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)
The Combined IUU Fishing Vessel List merges all these sources into one list that provides a single reference point to identify whether a vessel is currently IUU listed. Vessels that have been IUU listed in the past and subsequently delisted (for example because of a change in ownership, or because the vessel is no longer in service) are also retained on the site, so that the site contains a full historic record of IUU listed fishing vessels.
Unlike the IUU lists published on individual RFMO websites, which may update vessel details infrequently or not at all, the Combined IUU Fishing Vessel List is kept up to date with the best available information regarding changes to vessel identity, flag state, ownership, location, and operations.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
How To Cultivate Community Affinity Throughout The Generosity JourneyAggregage
This session will dive into how to create rich generosity experiences that foster long-lasting relationships. You’ll walk away with actionable insights to redefine how you engage with your supporters — emphasizing trust, engagement, and community!
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
2024: The FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulations, Part 42
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
1. a
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
Election Day 2013
and its Aftermath
AfriCOG/KPTJ Election Series
2.
3. i
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
Contents
Foreword............................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction......................................................................................................................................................................... 2
The ElectronicVoter Identification (EVID) System......................................................................................................... 2
Other Problems on Election Day ....................................................................................................................................... 3
Counting andTallying......................................................................................................................................................... 6
Failure of the Electronic ResultsTransmission............................................................................................................... 9
Final Results....................................................................................................................................................................... 11
Confusion over RejectedVotes........................................................................................................................................ 12
Conclusion and Recommendations................................................................................................................................ 13
4. ii
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
List of Acronyms
AfriCOG Africa Centre for Open Governance
AGLI African Great Lakes Initiative
BVR Biometric Voter Registration
CORD The Coalition for Reform and Democracy
CRO County Returning Officer
ECK Electoral Commission of Kenya
ELOG Election Observation Group
EOM European Observer Mission
ERT Electronic Results Transmission
EUEOM European Union Election Observation Mission to Kenya
EVID Electronic Voter Identification
FCPT Friends Church Peace Team
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
IEBC Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
MARS Group The Media Analysis and Research Group Kenya
MP Member of Parliament
MRC Mombasa Republican Council
ODM Orange Democratic Movement
OMR Optical Mark Reader
PO Presiding Officer
PVT Parallel Vote Tabulation
RO Returning Officer
TNA The National Alliance
5. 1
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
Foreword
On March 4, 2013 Kenya held a landmark general election. It was the first national election since the promulgation
of the internationally lauded constitution, which created a devolved system of government. For the first time,
Kenyans voted simultaneously for six elective offices, ranging from president to local ward representative. This
election was also the first to be administered by the newly created Independent Elections and Boundaries
Commission (IEBC), a body which enjoyed over 90 per cent public confidence in the lead-up to the national polls.
In an attempt to rid Kenyan elections of the stigma they incurred after the 2007 debacle, the IEBC announced
its decision to integrate digital technology into voter registration, election day voter identification and results
transmission. In this way, the IEBC hoped to strengthen public confidence – both domestically and internationally
– in the transparency and verifiability of the electoral process.1
Indeed, all eyes were on Kenya in the lead-up to election day. Domestic and international press reports were full of
accounts of sporadic outbreaks of violence in the months preceding the election, with allegations that politicians
were involved in fanning the flames of inter-ethnic hostility. A wider array of peacebuilding organisations worked
to prevent the escalation of tensions, and billboards across the country reminded Kenyans to “vote for peace”.
On election day international and domestic monitors fanned out across the country. By and large, their reports
endorsed the election, congratulating Kenyans for the relatively peaceful atmosphere on election day. While
some irregularities were cited, the general consensus among observers was that these did not subvert the will of
the people.
In commemoration of this historic election, the Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) presents its
own findings related to election day and its aftermath in this report. In line with its commitment to promote
permanent vigilance by citizens over public life and public institutions, AfriCOG provides an account of voters’
experiences at the polling station. In addition, the report details the counting, tallying and results transmission
procedures, noting the varied problems associated with these procedures. Overall, in contrast to many observer
reports, AfriCOG finds that the failure of electoral technology made it impossible to verify the manual counts of
election results. This was compounded by a wide array of problems at the polling station, ranging from names
missing from the voters’register to voter bribery.
To conclude, AfriCOG recommends a series of reforms to ensure that future elections live up to constitutional
standards for transparency and verifiability.
1 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR). February 2013 February 2013, vii. Accessible at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/Monitoring/(February%202013)%20
4TH%20Review%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Preparedness.pdf.
6. 2
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
Introduction
A wide array of problems were noted by Africa Centre
forOpenGovernance(AfriCOG)observersandpartners
on election day. To uncover how systematically these
problems were experienced, AfriCOG commissioned
a national opinion poll to gauge voters’ opinions
regarding the credibility of the electoral process as
well as public confidence in political institutions. The
poll was conducted in May 2013 and surveyed more
than 2,000 respondents across the country.
The results showed that nearly 80 per cent of
respondents experienced at least one irregularity at
their polling stations. This included clear irregularities,
such as names missing from the voters’ register; non-
registered people being allowed to vote; registered
voters being turned away; bribery of voters; coercion
of voters to select particular candidates; violence; and
differences in the declared results as witnessed at
the county/constituency level and those announced
in Nairobi. It also included significant logistical
shortcomings, such as delays in voting because of
long lines; incompetence on the part of staff of the
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
(IEBC); the failure of electoral technology; and
inadequate materials at polling stations. The results
revealed that more than half of those who said they
would not vote again cited lack of faith in the IEBC as
the reason.
The most common problems are detailed below:
The ElectronicVoter Identification
(EVID) System
One of the most striking problems on election day
was the failure of the EVID system, meant to identify
registered voters through the use of a fingerprint
matching system. Just a few hours into election day, it
became clear that EVIDs were malfunctioning. While
failure reports were widespread, the exact rate of
failure is unclear. AfriCOG’s poll results indicated that
only 50% of respondents were identified using the
EVIDs. The Carter Center reported technology failure
in 41 per cent of polling stations and the European
Union (EU) reported technology failure in about half
of all polling stations.2
An investigation by The East
African indicated that the technology failed in at least
80 per cent of polling stations.3
When the EVIDs broke down, IEBC staff turned to
paper copies of the voter register, which included
voters’ photographs but did not include fingerprints.
While this was an improvement over previous
elections, it fell short of fulfilling the “one person,
one vote” standard. Indeed, one pending election-
related petition shows the paper voter register used
was different from the electronic voter register, which
raises questions regarding the validity of whichever
voter register was used.
TheEVIDsystem,alongwiththeelectronictransmission
of results, was considered essential to improving
the legitimacy of the election. By using biometric
information to positively identify a registered voter
and then deleting that name from the list of eligible
voters, the EVID system was designed to prevent
the ills that had plagued previous Kenyan elections,
including multiple voter registration, multiple voting
or stuffing of ballot boxes and other irregularities.
The IEBC’s resort to the paper voter register
undermined transparency, as the multiplicity of voter
registers (detailed in the ‘Voter Registration’ paper in this
series) meant it was difficult to track who was voting
and under which voter register.4
Was the IEBC using
only one voter register on election day and, if so,
which one?
2 European Union Election Observation Mission to Kenya (EUEOM). 2013.“Final Report,”p. 1. The EU deployed 65 observers in total, but it is unclear how many polling stations
these observers visited.
3 The East African. 9 March 2013. “Electronic Systems Meltdown Causes Long Delays, Affects Credibility Of Poll.” Available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/systems-
meltdown-causes-delays-affects-credibility-of-poll/-/2558/1715830/-/view/printVersion/-/ie1djg/-/index.html
4 KPTJ, AfriCOG.“Voter Registration for the 2013 General Elections in Kenya.”March 2014.
7. 3
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
The African Great Lakes Initiative (AGLI)
observers witnessed similar problems and
highlighted the unreliability of the paper
voters’registers:
These registers were not only cumbersome,
slowing down the voting process and creating
long lines, but also ineffective in preventing
duplicate voting. We had several reports of
poorly organised manual registers, of voters’
names missing from registers, of a voter being
on the biometric list but not the manual,
and of voters’ names appearing in a different
polling station’s register than the one in which
they had registered. Additionally, two observers
noted that the IEBC staff either didn’t check
identification cards or let people vote who only
had a receipt from their registration. Given
these problems, it is doubtful that the use of
manual registers provided adequate
voter identification.6
The EU observers reported:
The use of the voter register on election day
did not enable consistently reliable records of
registered citizens, nor of how many had voted.
Following the failure of pollbooks (laptops with
a full voter register and a fingerprint-reading
device), alongside difficulty in identifying voters
in the correct polling stations, four different lists
were used: the register in pollbooks; the lists
printed for individual polling stations; the list
of people whose biometric data had not been
captured, and finally, the entries listed in the
‘green books’ – the manual records of entries
made during voter registration.5
ReasonsfortheEVIDSystemFailure
The IEBC claimed the EVID system failed because of
low batteries, lack of electricity supply and forgotten
passwords. That the EVID machines would require a
steady supply of electricity was not a surprise.The IEBC
had requested generators in its budget, presumably
because there were at least two major pieces of
important technology to be used on election day,
namely EVID system kits and mobile phones, which
would relay results through the electronic results
transmission system.7
It seems surprising then that so
little was done to ensure adequate back-up power. In
some polling stations, batteries died within one hour
of polling stations being opened.8
Many sets of spare
batteries also died.
Moreover, it is questionable that there appears to have
been no password retrieval system. Even if IEBC staff
did forget passwords, the IEBC has not clarified why
there was no system in place to be able to remind
such staff of their passwords or to create new ones.
Such systems are standard for many password-locked
applications and websites.
Other Problems on Election Day 9
LongLinesandDelayedVoting
A number of factors, including names missing from
the register, overcrowded polling stations, and the
failure of technology led to such massive delays in
voting that in some polling stations voting had to
continue through the night. Overall, voters waited
for as long as 13.5 hours and some gave up before
reaching the front of the line.10
5 EUEOM, p. 15.
6 Ossman, Kathy. April 6, 2013.“African Great Lakes Initiative Report on Observation of March 2013 Kenyan National Elections,”p. 8.
7 Menya, Walter. May 16, 2012.“IEBC slashes polls budget by Sh 10 billion.”The Star. Available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-18249/iebc-slashes-polls-budget-sh10-
billion.
8 Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan v. Ahmed Issack Hassan, IEBC, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and William Samoei Ruto. Petition of Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan.
Paragraph 28. Available at http://africog.org/content/civil-society-election-petition.
9 Please note that the examples in this section are taken from a number of sources, including international and domestic observer reports, media stories, social media
conversations, submissions to The People’s Court website and results from an AfriCOG-commissioned opinion poll.
10 See http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke; http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke/voting-experience/165-abdi-sheikh-my-voting-experience.
8. 4
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
IEBCStaffIncompetence
Observer reports and voters relayed anecdotes
including the following examples of IEBC staff
incompetence:
● Clerks had to be reminded of what to do.
“Unprofessionalism was the order of the [day] at
these polling stations.”11
● AGLI observed polling station staff make errors in
manual procedures in 41.5 per cent of observed
stations, including handing out ballot papers
incorrectly and issuing multiple ballot papers to
one voter.12
● Some clerks placed ballots in the wrong boxes.
● There was often confusion regarding whether
queues were organised according to first name
or surname:“Inside the compound there was total
chaos as there was no IEBC staff to guide people
on the division of the streams as per the voters’
names (previously surnames were used). In the
present case we were told it’s the first name used.
So after trying to locate your stream for over 30
minutes one would start queuing.”13
Indeed, observers from the EU recommended better
training of staff, noting the IEBC’s focus on training
senior staff left the bulk of ordinary polling station
agents without enough skills and knowledge.14
VoterRegisterandFailure
Voters had a wide range of problems related to the
voter register on election day. Some of the most
serious issues included the following:
● Voters who had received confirmation that their
details were in the voter register were turned away
by IEBC staff, who said their names could not be
found in the voter register.
● Voters’ names appeared in the electronic version
of the voter register but not in the paper version.
● Voters were allowed to vote, despite their names
not being found in the voter register: at Saint
Andrew polling station in Turbo, 88 voters were
shown to be registered at a different polling
station. After they complained, the IEBC officials
allowed them to vote at a polling station where
they were not registered.15
● Voters were allowed to vote without proper
identification.
● Some polling stations recorded more votes cast
than registered voters.
VoterSecrecy
Examples of a lack of voter secrecy include:
● The EU found the secrecy of the vote was not
sufficiently protected in one-third of stations it
observed. This was mainly because of the way
polling booths were arranged and because
provisions for assisted voting for disabled or
illiterate voters were not adequately applied.16
● The Carter Center, which deployed 38 short-term
observers to 265 polling stations in 34 counties,
identified problems with maintaining secrecy of
the vote in 20 per cent of the polling stations they
visited.17
● “The party agents did not leave voters alone. It was
claimed a majority of the voters could not read,
but it got to a point where the agents even tried
to guide some voters. The secrecy of voting and
the neutrality can seriously be put into question.”18
11 See http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke/voting-experience/181-irregularities-at-polling-station-025-luanda-constituency-vihiga-county-western-province.
12 Shah, Seema. April 13, 2013. “Numbers in the Voter Registration Just Won’t Add Up”The Star. Available at <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-116530/numbers-voter-
registration-just-wont-add>.
13 See http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke/voting-experience/145-philip-ogunda-my-voting-experience.
14 EUEOM, p.12-13.
15 Ibid.
16 EUEOM, p. 30.
17 The Carter Center. October 16, 2013. “Observing Kenya’s March 2013 National Elections,” p.46. Available at <http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_
publications/election_reports/kenya-final-101613.pdf>.
18 See http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke/voting-experience/207-anonymous-observer-report-2-gatundu-south.
9. 5
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
Bribery
● AGLI observers noted eight cases of bribery at six
of the observed polling stations.19
Violence
Despite reports to the contrary, polling itself was not
free of violence. On the coast, two attacks allegedly
by the secessionist group known as the Mombasa
Republican Council (MRC) killed at least 13 people,
including six police officers.20
Uchaguzi reports
indicated the violence had started the previous
night and that there were more casualties than were
reported by the press.21
In at least one area, violence resulted in no voting.
On the coast, armed violence attributed to the MRC
is reported to have killed approximately 20 people.
The MRC had threatened to disrupt the elections,
in response to what they believed was inadequate
government action on unemployment and other
grievances in coastal areas. In Chumani, the MRC is
accused of killing five people, including three police
officers and two civilians. Uchaguzi reported that
no voting had taken place in Chumani.22
Its crowd-
sourced report stated the following:
At 3 pm on March 4th tension is still very high in the
area. Reports from the area state: 1. The number of
casualties is higher than official figures; 2. Hearing
gunfire for around an hour overnight; 3. Police
collected bodies of fallen officers; 4. Two bodies have
not been collected and are still lying in the bushes;
5. The two bodies lying in the bushes have red
headbands which usually indicates affiliation with the
Mombasa Republican Council (MRC); 6. The presence
of uncollected bodies is increasing tension in the area;
7.The local community is not collecting the bodies, as
it does not recognise them. They are strangers in the
area.23
It is unclear whether Chumani residents were ever
able to cast their ballots. It also remains unclear how
IEBC handled the final tallies if there were no votes
from this area.
OtherProblems
Other problems included:
● Clerks failed to ink voters’fingers.24
● Clerks did not allow access to accredited
observers.25
● A voter in Mount Elgon reported to AGLI/FCPT
interviewers doing a follow-up that he had been
issued with ten presidential ballot papers. He
stated he had refused to take nine of them, but
reported to us that a police officer who was voting
was given 30 presidential ballots.26
● One candidate reported there were several cases
in which voters were issued multiple ballots (for
the same elective office) at Bulanda AC Primary
School. The candidate reported the problem to
the presiding officer, who also acknowledged the
problem.27
● Clerks failed to assist illiterate voters.
● Staff slept on the job.
● Staff refused to allow observers to look at ballot
paper books.
● Some IEBC staff told voters who to vote for.
● A presiding officer (PO) refused to read political
symbols to illiterate voters.28
19 Ossman, p. 6.
20 Smith, David. March 4, 2013.“Kenyan elections marred by Mombasa violence.”The Guardian. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/04/kenyan-elections-
marred-mombasa-violence.
21 See https://uchaguzi.co.ke/reports/view/1671.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ossman, p. 8.
25 See http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke/downloads1/cat_view/4-observer-reports.
26 Ossman, p. 15.
27 See http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke/voting-experience/166-phillip-maina-my-voting-experience.
28 See http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke/voting-experience/181-irregularities-at-polling-station-025-luanda-constituency-vihiga-county-western-province.
10. 6
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
There was a significant lack of transparency at every
stage of the process, beginning at the polling station.
The European Union reported that in nearly half of
all stations observed, party agents were not all given
a copy of the results forms. In some cases, this was
because there were no copies. In other cases, party
agentsdidnotaskfortheforms.30
TheCommonwealth
Observer Group noted instances in which polling
stations were too small to accommodate party
agents.31
Observers from the African Great Lakes
Initiative reported that agents had insufficient space
for observation, such that they could not be sure that
IEBC staff were crossing names off the manual register
as voters appeared.32
The fundamental problem with the counting and
tallying process in 2013 was the lack of credible and
verifiable polling station tallies, as recorded on Forms
34. These forms, on which each polling station’s
votes for all presidential candidates were recorded,
constitute the foundational record of presidential
election results. The Forms 34 were meant to be the
basis of both what was relayed via the electronic
results transmission (ERT) system and the final, verified
results.
AfriCOG’s analysis of these forms noted the following
categories of problems:33
● In at least 138 polling streams, the numbers on
the forms do not add up. For instance, valid votes
plus rejected votes do not equal votes cast
● In at least 28 polling streams, the number of
votes cast exceeded the number of registered
voters.
● In at least 27 polling streams, the number of
registered voters, as recorded on the forms, was
different from the number of registered voters as
published by the IEBC before the election.
One voter said the following about his
overall experience, which captures much
of the frustration around the country on
election day:
I have voted in the previous elections since
1997 at the same polling station and this was
the worst experience I ever went through. I
thought voting should be made easy and not
a torture like it was on March 4th, 2013! I had
so much faith in the IEBC going by how they
conducted the referendum and other by-
elections and also from the constant media
briefings but I was disappointed by their lack
of professionalism in conducting the elections-
the staff were inexperienced, discourteous and
there was a general lack of organisation on
their part.
In an election it’s not a must that your
candidate wins but at least you should feel that
though your candidate lost the elections were
free and fair. In this case am still bitter and feel
that the elections were not free and fair and
furthermore justice did not prevail!
IEBC can waste tax payers’ money as they like
by asking us to move on and accept the results
but that will not change the fact that they
failed to deliver a credible election.29
Counting andTallying
The problems did not end with voters’ personal
experiences as they attempted to cast their ballots.
Indeed, the counting and tallying process revealed
another set of serious inconsistencies.
29 See http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke/voting-experience/145-philip-ogunda-my-voting-experience.
30 EUEOM, p. 30.
31 Commonwealth Secretariat. 2013.“Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group,”p. 27.
32 Ossman, p. 8
33 These observations are based on reports from AfriCOG’s agents who observed the court-ordered scrutiny of forms. AfriCOG’s agents were unable to observe the scrutiny of
all forms. This catalog represents observations from approximately ten agents.
11. 7
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
forms, the results of which were to inform their ruling.
As was detailed in Voter Registration brief in this
series, this scrutiny identified many of the problems
listed above.
The problems with the forms were magnified at the
constituency level, where the results from Forms
34 had to be amalgamated and recorded onto
Forms 36, which tallied presidential results at the
constituency level. AfriCOG’s analysis showed that
Forms 36 had many of the same problems as Forms
34, including numbers failing to add up, multiple
copies of the same form, forms without IEBC
signatures, forms showing more than 100 per cent
turnout and forms with missing entries. AfriCOG also
found discrepancies in the numbers of registered
voters and results for individual candidates between
the two forms. For example, in Buuri, the difference
between the recorded and officially published
numbers of registered voters was 3,897. In Chesumai,
this difference was 5,239 voters. AfriCOG found such
differences in at least 82 constituencies. There were
also significant differences in results for individual
candidates, as they were recorded on various
pages of the same Form 36. For example, Form 36
for Balambala constituency shows two different
results for Odinga, which differ by 23,233 votes. In
Maragwa A, results in various parts of Form 36 show
a difference of 6,203 in votes for Uhuru Kenyatta.
It is unclear whether these were the result of human
error or whether the changes were wilfully made.
International observers reported it was difficult to
monitor work at the tallying centres. “European
Observer Mission (EOM) observers reported that
although they and party agents had access to
constituency and county tally centres, neither their
appointed place nor the disposition of election staff
enabled them to follow closely enough how tallying
was carried out.”37
● In at least 80 polling streams, Forms 34 were
missing.
● In at least 64 polling streams, numbers on the
forms had been changed without an authorising
signature.
● In at least 71 polling streams, forms had illegible
numbers.
● In at least 37 polling streams, some forms were
irregular (they did not match the formatting of the
other forms; one was simply hand-written on a
piece of paper).
● In at least 46 polling streams, there were
non-identical copies of some forms, without an
indication of which version of the numbers was
final.
Inaddition,therewereseveralcomplaintsthatpolitical
party agents did not receive copies of these forms,
and contrary to the law, the Carter Center noted in
nearly one-quarter of the polling stations observed,
polling station officers did not post the completed
Forms 34 on the doors of the polling stations.34
The
Carter Center noted the failure to post the forms
contributed to “the undermining of an important
safeguard for the transparency of the counting and
tabulation process.”35
Given that a significant number
of counting operations did not reconcile the number
of ballot papers properly or at all, the failure to post
the forms made the process all the more opaque and
questionable.36
In mid-March 2013, the Coalition for Reform and
Democracy (CORD) candidate Raila Odinga, and civil
society, represented by AfriCOG and the Kenyan Asian
Forum, filed petitions challenging the integrity of the
presidential election process. Both petitions based
many of their claims on the myriad problems with
Forms 34. Indeed, these problems were so apparent
that the Supreme Court ordered a scrutiny of all the
34 EUEOM, p. 31
35 Carter Center, p. 47.
36 Ibid.
37 EUEOM, p. 31.
12. 8
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
In September 2013, the Media Analysis and Research
(MARS) Group completed an audit of all publicly
available Forms 34. They found there are 2,585 Forms
34 still missing from the public record. Forms are
missing from all but two counties (Tana River and
Samburu), and the number of missing forms per
county ranges from one (Taita Taveta, Kwale and
Elgeyo Marakwet) to 228 (Kitui). According to their
audit, those forms must contain 943,520 votes for the
IEBC’sofficialtallytobecorrect.TheMARSGroupnoted
the widely different standards across the country
and urged the IEBC to take note for future elections.
“The audit reveals widely disparate standards in the
recording of results in Form 34 by presiding officers.
The future contracting of presiding officers who
served in the 2013 elections should be predicated on
an assessment of the accuracy of their work in 2013.
The audit has been able to capture presiding officers
who should not in any future election work for IEBC,
and those whose work is commendable.”40
Additionally, some results announced at the county
level differed from those announced at the National
Tallying Centre. Discrepancies were shown in results
announced by returning officers (ROs) in Nyeri,
Othaya, Kieni and Makueni, among others. In Nyeri
alone, over 1,000 extra votes had appeared by the
time the results were read out at the National Tallying
Centre.41
CORD also reported its political party agents had
discovered several worrying errors, including the
IEBC’s failure to include votes from 11 constituencies
to the tally.42
The Carter Center remarked:
Firsthand access to information is integral
to conducting credible and impartial
observation…However, the national tally
centre did not provide enough transparency
for observers or party agents to assess the
overall integrity of tally of presidential results.
Unfortunately, the Center regrets the IEBC
decision to confine party agents and observers
to the gallery of the national tally centre,
making effective and meaningful observation
impossible.38
The inconsistencies on Forms 34 then transferred to
other tallying forms. For example, Forms 34, 35 and 36
for Makueni Constituency, signed by the same County
Returning Officer (CRO), Joseph Kamandi Kittony,
applied the following different figures for registered
voters:39
Elective Office
Total Registered
Voters
Number of registered voters
in the Principal (Electronic)
Register, on the 2nd
Respondent’s website
64,708
President 64,708
Governor 64,877
Senator 64,879
Member of National
Assembly
64,976
38 Carter Center, p. 52.
39 Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan v. Ahmed Issack Hassan, IEBC, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and William Samoei Ruto. Petition of Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan.
Paragraph 22. Available at http://africog.org/content/civil-society-election-petition.
40 MARS Group. September 3, 2013. “Mars Group Kenya Audit Report on 2013 Kenyan Presidential Election Results.” Available at http://blog.marsgroupkenya.org/2013/09/03/
mars-group-kenya-report-audit-report-on-2013-kenyan-presidential-election-results/#more-3166.
41 Kaberia, Judie. March 27, 2013. “Video Evidence Shows Glaring Flaws in Poll.” Capital FM. Available at http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/03/video-evidence-shows-
glaring-flaws-in-poll/?wpmp_switcher=mobile.
42 Menya, Walter. March 8, 2013.“CORD Lodges Complaint with IEBC.”The Star. Available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-111209/cord-lodges-complaint-iebc.
13. 9
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
In addition to the fact that observers had trouble
accessing the critical areas within the tallying centres,
as noted above, all observers were eventually evicted
from the National Tallying Centre. The IEBC claimed
those removed had been unruly, but a formal
statement to this effect was never released. This move
only added to the worrying secrecy of the IEBC, which
consistently failed to issue explanations or assurances
to the public over concerns raised before, during and
after election day.43
It was also in violation of the law,
which states that agents are to be allowed into the
counting venue.44
The IEBC announced its final presidential results on
March 9, 2013. Notably, even this announcement
contained conflicting numbers of registered voters.
The grand total, as recorded on the announcement,
does not correspond to the total of all registered
voters in all counties.
After the announcement of the results, a total of 186
election petitions were filed in various courts across
the country.45
Many of these petitions revealed glaring
anomalies across the country.
In a petition filed by Kibwezi legislator Kalembe
Ndile contesting the election of Patrick Musimba
as member of parliament (MP) for Kibwezi West, a
recount ordered by the court indicated Ndile had
indeed won the election.46
In Kisumu, testifying in
a case filed by the National Agenda Party of Kenya
gubernatorial candidate, William Oduol, Returning
Officer (RO) Rose Obare told the court she noticed
discrepancies in which Form 35 showed the petitioner
had 81 votes while Form 36 indicated only one vote.47
Makadara MP Benson Kangara testified before
court that National Assembly results for Makadara
constituency had corrections, yet those of President,
Governor, Senator and Woman Representative had
none. He said the two forms showing the Makadara
parliamentary results given to him by the IEBC RO
Florence Kwamboka were different.48
In a recent submission in court an ODM (Orange
Democratic Movement) political party agent claimed
that he, along with the other political party agents
at his polling station, were asked by the Presiding
Officer (PO) to sign a blank Form 35 before the ballot
count had been completed.49
Problems with tallying
forms have also been the focus of several other cases,
including the challenge to Nairobi Governor Evans
Kidero, Kisii Senator Chris Obure, MP Zebedeo Opore,
Bomet Senator Wilfred Lesan, Machakos Governor
Alfred Mutua and others.
Failure of the Electronic Results
Transmission
The tallying forms became even more critical in
the wake of the failure of the electronic results
transmission (ERT) system. Without a full set of
electronically transmitted provisional results, the IEBC
was left to rely solely on the paper forms, which, as
has been detailed above, were severely flawed.
In the lead-up to the election, the IEBC explained that
polling station staff would use a specially designed
mobilephoneapplicationtosecurelytransmitresultsto
the IEBC tallying centres upon completion of counting.
43 Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan v. Ahmed Issack Hassan, IEBC, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and William Samoei Ruto. Petition of Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan.
Paragraph 33. Available at http://africog.org/content/civil-society-election-petition.
44 The Elections (General) Regulations 2012, 74 (4) (f).
45 The Daily Nation. April 16, 2013. “Poll Petitions Hit 180 Mark.” Available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Poll-petitions-hit-180-mark/-/1064/1749594/-/n4dibbz/-/
index.html.
46 Nzia, Daniel. July 3, 2013.“Kibwezi West Vote Recount Shows Kalembe Ndile Won Election.”The Standard. Available at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=200008733
7&story_title=kibwezi-west-vote-recount-shows-kalembe-won-election.
47 Odiwuor, Maureen. June 26, 2013. “Returning Officer acknowledges irregularities.” The Standard. Available at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000086781&sto
ry_title=returning-officer-acknowledges-irregularities.
48 Limo, Lucianne. June 11, 2013.“Makadara MP Benson Kangara admits to poll discrepancies.”The Standard. Available at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=20000857
26&story_title=makadara-mp-admits-to-poll-discrepancies.
49 Namuliro, Alex. June 26, 2013. “Witness: I was told to sign a blank Form 35.” The Standard. Available at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000086782&story_
title=Kenya-witness-i-was-told-to-sign-a-blank-form-35.
14. 10
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
In a February 2013 statement, the IEBC
said:
Provisional results will be transmitted
electronically from the polling station to the
constituency, county and national tallying
centres. Priority will be given to presidential
results, and preferably followed by those
of the Governor, Senator, County Woman
Representative, Member of Parliament and
County Assembly Ward Representative, in
that order. The results will be displayed on
big screens mounted in all the 338 tallying
centres. Presidential results will be tallied at the
National Tallying Centre, those of the Governor,
Senator and Woman Representative will be
relayed at the County level while winning
Members of Parliament and County Assembly
Ward Representatives will be declared at the
Constituency tallying centre. The electronic
results transmission application runs on a
mobile phone and can be sent through GSM
or satellite networks. These will however be
provisional results and confirmed results will
be announced by respective returning officers
once the statutory electoral forms, co-signed
by party agents, have been delivered and
verified.50
remaining largely constant. During the 12-hour period
before the alleged crash, for instance, Kenyatta’s
percentage of votes stayed between 49.72 per cent
and 51.28 per cent, a range of 1.56 per cent. Odinga’s
percentage of votes remained between 42.15 per
cent and 43.77 per cent, a range of 1.58 per cent.
Given that the results were supposed to be coming
in randomly, as various polling stations around the
country finished their counting, it is difficult to give
credence to this apparent consistency in results in
a country with pronounced regional variations in
voting patterns.51
At approximately 9:30pm on March 4, IEBC Chief
Executive Officer James Oswago announced that
the IEBC’s server, responsible for receiving electronic
results, was experiencing problems related to disc
space.52
Five days later, IEBC Chair Isaak Hassan
admitted the electronic transmission system had
failed in totality, necessitating the use of the manual
system.53
The electronic results transmission system also
suffered due to the failure of many of the mobile
phonesthroughwhichresultsweretobesent.Reports
indicated the application for results transmission
was inaccessible due to forgotten passwords, low
batteries and problems connecting to the network. In
many instances, the applications necessary to run the
programme had not been uploaded to the mobile
phones provided to IEBC officials.54
Some of these problems were not altogether
unexpected. IEBC had held a“test-run”of its electronic
transmission system in February 2013. The media
reported the test’s less-than-inspiring results.
Once transmitted, those results would be shown via
a live results presentation system. As polling streams
concluded their counting on the evening of March
4, results did begin coming in. However, soon after
the electronic results began to be aired, it became
clear that the gap between Kenyatta and Odinga was
50 IEBC. February 4, 2013.“Media taken through results transmission process.”Available at http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/news-archive/281-february-2013/457-media-taken-
through-results-transmission-process.
51 Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan v. Ahmed Issack Hassan, IEBC, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and William Samoei Ruto. Petition of Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan.
Paragraph 32. Available at http://africog.org/content/civil-society-election-petition.
52 Matata, Lydia. March 5, 2013. “IEBC Assures Public Over Transmission Hitches.”The Star. Available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-110570/iebc-assures-public-over-
transmission-hitches.
53 The East African. March 9, 2013. “Electronic Systems Meltdown Causes Long Delays, Affects Credibility Of Poll.” Available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/systems-
meltdown-causes-delays-affects-credibility-of-poll/-/2558/1715830/-/view/printVersion/-/ie1djg/-/index.html.
54 Bowman, Warigia and Longwe, Brian Munyao. March 29, 2013. “Technology, Transparency and the Kenyan General Election of 2013” Al Jazeera. Available at http://www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/2013329135519365308.html; Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan v. Ahmed Issack Hassan, IEBC, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and
William Samoei Ruto. Petition of Gladwell Wathoni Otieno and Zahid Rajan. Paragraph 30(c). Available at http://africog.org/content/civil-society-election-petition.
15. 11
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
Only one of the five sample polling station mobile
phones was able to connect and electronically
transmit its results.55
Furthermore, questions were
raised as to why the IEBC set up the authentication
system on a GPRS platform. GPRS data transmission
rates of 56-114 kbps are far slower than other higher
performance, locally available platforms such as EDGE
(200 Kbps) or 3G (above 200 kbps).56
Although the electronically transmitted results were
supposed to reflect a particular polling station’s total
tally for each candidate, in some constituencies the
final result from all polling stations for a particular
candidate was lower than the result that had
previously been transmitted electronically from only
a fraction of the polling stations. In some cases, it was
revealed that what was recorded on Form 34 from
a particular polling station differed from what was
electronically transmitted from that same polling
station.57
AfriCOG conducted an in-depth analysis of
the results reported for Kenyatta and Odinga. This
analysis revealed that in several cases, what was
recorded on Form 34 from a particular polling station
differed from what was electronically transmitted
from that same polling station. Examples are detailed
below (see page 16).
AlternateServer
During the election petition evidence was presented
that a server with IP address 196.1.26.40 was hosted
by the Kencall company, and that it was used by
both IEBC and The National Alliance (TNA) party for
purposes of collecting and recording election results.
Notably it appears that the registered users for
both the IEBC and TNA databases were the same,
indicating that the same staff were able to access both
databases. Finally, the technology used to collect and
record the results was characterised by a web-based
manual override system, which allowed users from
both databases to see and alter results as they wished.
Final Results
To date, the IEBC has not released polling station-level
results for any offices. Instead, the IEBC has chosen
only to release aggregated results for constituency
and county levels, some of which are still incomplete.
Even within the released results, the IEBC has only
shown the number of valid votes per candidate.
Constituency-level rejected votes and votes cast have
not been provided.
The EU Observer Mission stated:
Published presidential results were only
disaggregated to constituency level, making
it difficult for stakeholders to trace results they
had collected. Although in a positive move the
IEBC put all polling station results forms on
its website, disaggregation down to polling
station results is the only way to ensure that
figures are easily traceable and verifiable.58
55 Elderkin, Sarah. March 7, 2013.“IEBC Must Fix the Results Transmission System Fast.”The Star. Available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-108148/iebc-must-fix-results-
transmission-system-fast.
56 Maina, Wachira. April 20, 2013. “Verdict on Kenya’s presidential election petition: Five reasons the judgment fails the legal test.” The East African. Available at < http://www.
theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/Five-reasons-Kenya-Supreme-Court-failed-poll-petition-test/-/434750/1753646/-/view/printVersion/-/e8srqh/-/index.html>.
57 See http://www.thepeoplescourt.co.ke/case/results-reports.
58 EUEOM, p. 32.
Without these results, it is impossible to verify the final
counts and tallies. Moreover, the exit poll conducted
by James Long, Karuti Kanyinga, Karen Ferree and
Clark Gibson, shows that neither Kenyatta nor
Odinga passed the 50 per cent mark. While it is true
that the exit poll done by the Elections Observation
Group (ELOG) shows that the IEBC’s results fall within
its margin of error, that margin is so wide that it
inspires little confidence in such a close election.
ELOG’s parallel vote tabulation (PVT) projection was
16. 12
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
that Kenyatta received 49.7 per cent of the vote
and Odinga received 43.4 per cent of the vote. The
margins of error in both cases were more than 2.5 per
cent which means that there is a significant possibility
that no candidate passed the 50 per cent threshold.
Confusion over RejectedVotes
By March 5, 2013, the IEBC was already reporting
alarmingly high figures of rejected votes. By 11 am
on that day, 284,232 of the roughly 4.8 million votes
that had been counted had been rejected. This
represented more than the combined vote totals for
all candidates except for Odinga and Kenyatta.
Hassan’s response to concerns was:
It is true it is quite a big number. These are
basically the votes which have been cast
and which are now rejected… because they
were wrongly marked. He also said that the
“complexity” of the election could have been a
factor as voters were electing six candidates.59
Kenya of being “in cahoots with Maina Kiai…
canvassing to deny outright victory to Uhuru
Kenyatta.”60
This objection baffled many who
considered the law to be clear on what constitutes“all
votes cast.” The previous Constitution said the only
votes that counted were the “valid votes cast.” The
new Constitution says unambiguously that it is“votes
cast”that count.”61
On March 7th, 2013 Hassan announced that the huge
number of rejected votes was the result of a computer
bug, which was causing each rejected vote to be
multiplied by a factor of eight. After fixing this alleged
error, the percentage of rejected votes plummeted
from six per cent to around one per cent of the total
votes cast. Instead of reassuring the Kenyan people,
Hassan’s announcement sparked accusations of fraud
and raised numerous questions.62
Indeed, the Carter Center stated:
The IEBC wrongly attributed the high number
of rejected ballots on March 5 to the complexity
of a simultaneous vote for six different
positions, only later to state that the original
high number was the product of a server
malfunction that multiplied spoiled votes by a
factor of eight. This controversy signalled that
the IEBC poorly managed the vote counting
process and undermined public confidence
in their capacity to tally final results with
accuracy.63
Tensions heightened after a visibly shaken Hassan
announced rejected votes were to be included in “all
votes cast,” significantly lowering each candidate’s
percentage of votes won. In response, the Jubilee
coalition held a press conference claiming it was
unconstitutional for the rejected votes to be included.
It also accused the British High Commissioner to
59 Ngirachu, John. March 5, 2013. “Rejected Votes Worrying, Says Hassan.” Daily Nation. Available at http://elections.nation.co.ke/news/Rejected-votes-worrying-says-IEBC-
chairperson/-/1631868/1712046/-/ju23imz/-/index.html.
60 Mojtehedzadeh, Sara. March 6, 2013. “Kenya Election: Kenyatta Team Criticises UK.”Sky News. Available at http://news.sky.com/story/1061036/kenya-election-kenyatta-team-
criticises-uk.
61 Maina, Wachira. April 20, 2013.“Verdict on Kenya’s presidential election petition.”The East African. Available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/Five-reasons-
Kenya-Supreme-Court-failed-poll-petition-test/-/434750/1753646/-/item/3/-/2659o8/-/index.html.
62 BBC. March 8, 2013.“Kenya Election: Computer Bug Blamed for Vote Error.”BBC News. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21707152. (full stop was added)
63 Carter Center, p. 51.
17. 13
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
Conclusion and Recommendations
One year after the 2013 Kenyan elections, voters do not
have access to information about many of the most
fundamental election-related events. It is impossible
for members of the public or civil society to verify the
IEBC’s count of the results, because polling-station
tallying forms are not publicly accessible. It is only
forms in relation to the presidential elections that have
been made public, and even that record is incomplete.
Moreover, it is apparent that voters faced a broad range
of problems at the polling station, casting doubts over
the integrity of the process. What remains unclear,
however, is the effect of these problems on the final
results. Not unlike the 2007 election, the sheer number
of irregularities makes it difficult to conclusively
determine who won the 2013 election.
Withrespecttothe2013election,werecommend
thefollowingtotheIEBC:
■ Release the missing 2,585 missing Forms 34 so that
there is a complete public record of the polling
station- level presidential results.
■ Release all polling station-level results for all
positions.
■ Explain how and why results shown on Forms 36 do
not correspond to the corresponding Forms 34.
■ Explain how and why final presidential results were
announced without the results from ALL Forms 34.
■ Provide a detailed explanation as to why the
number of rejected votes changed so drastically
and why attempts to divide the results by eight did
not result in whole numbers, as would be expected
if a computer error had multiplied them eightfold.
Withrespecttofutureelections,werecommend
thefollowingtotheIEBC:
■ Schedule advance training in operation of the
EVIDs for all polling station staff, with opportunities
for trainees to ask questions and practice
troubleshooting.
■ Ensure that all polling stations are equipped with
generators or extra batteries for EVID operation.
Make sure that all machines are fully charged and
operational before polling stations open.
■ Review IEBC staff training procedures and create
new procedures, where necessary, in order to
ensure that all polling station staff know the details
of the voting procedure and the laws relevant to
managing and assisting voters.
■ Consider a new plan for staffing the polling stations
so that officers are not operating without sleep.
Multiple presiding officers might, for instance, work
in alternating shifts.
■ Train staff to position voting booths in a way that
prioritizes ballot secrecy.
■ Clarify and publicly explain the rules regarding the
register and voting, so that the public understands
what happens if a name cannot be found on the
register and under what circumstances, if any, a voter
can vote if his/her name does not appear.
■ Reorganize the management of polling stations
such that it is clear how queues are categorized (by
first name or by surname). Ensure that all polling
station queues are organized in the same way and
signage and staffing is adequate to direct voters.
■ Consider either adding more polling stations or
redistributing the number of voters assigned to
polling stations so that voting is more efficient and
voters do not wait for several hours.
Withregardtotransparencyofvoting,counting
andtallyingprocedures:
■ Ensure that observers and agents can watch
counting and tallying in a manner that allows them
to witness events and also allows staff to complete
their tasks.
■ Make sure that all completed Forms 34 are posted
on the polling station door.
■ Organize and implement multiple pre-election
tests of the ERT system, at least one of which should
be open to the public. Provide public explanations
regarding how the system works and its security
features.
■ Publicly explain how electronically transmitted
results will be collected and counted. This
explanation should include details about the IEBC’s
server and who has access to it.
18. 14
Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
■ Review the manual counting and tallying
procedures with a view to streamlining them. This
includes:
• Ensuring that only formatted and serialized forms
are printed and distributed, in sufficient quantities,
to all polling stations and counting centres,
• Ensuring that there is a clear, traceable chain of
command of staff who have authority to handle
and authorize the forms,
• Ensuring that the forms used to calculate the
results are made available to the public in an
efficient and easily accessible manner.
Withrespecttofutureelections,werecommend
thefollowingtopoliticalparties:
■ Appoint and train your agents early so that they
are familiar with all relevant electoral laws and
procedures.
■ Recruit enough agents to cover every single polling
station.
■ Instruct all agents not to leave the polling station
without copies of tallying forms.
Withrespecttofutureelections,werecommend
thefollowingtoelectionobservers:
■ Study previous Kenyan elections in order to
be knowledgeable about common problems
experienced in previous elections.
■ Adopt statistical tests whose results are sufficiently
meaningful and thus inspire public confidence.
ERTResultsv.Forms34Results:UnresolvedDiscrepancies
Presidential
Candidate
Constituency Electronic
Results
Total Votes
Final
Results as
Reported
by IEBC
Difference
(IEBC Less
Electronic
Results)
Total
Number
of Votes
Lost
Differences between
electronic result and Form
34
Kenyatta Masinga 2,605 2,507 -98 98
Odinga Masinga 33,780 33,361 -419 419 ● Wamboo Primary School
form 34: 380;
electronic register: 280.
● Muthesya Primary School
form 34: 639;
electronic register: 630.
● Muthamwaki Primary
School
form 34: 279;
electronic register: 275.
● Several forms also appear
to have been edited
(Ndelekeni Primary School,
Muri Farm Primary School,
Mukameni Primary School,
Mbusyani Primary School,
Kivuthi Primary School,
Kiambani Primary School
and Eendei Primary
School). See attached
annexe.
Ruiru 142 43 -99
Masinga 319 308 -11
Nyeri Town 279 120 -159
19.
20. Election Day 2013 and its Aftermath
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We thank Seema Shah of AfriCOG.
Further, thanks are due to team members Charles Wanguhu,
Beatrice Odallo, Stephanie Wairimu, Maureen Kariuki,
Anyona Obutu, Carole Theuri, James Gondi, Noëlle Okoth,
Kadenge Kidiga, Noreen Wahome and Maureen Gachomo
for their commitment to our work.
The production of this publication has been made possible
by the support of the Drivers of Accountability Programme
of the Government of the United Kingdom’s Department for
International Development (DFID), DANIDA and CIDA.
We are also grateful to the Open Society Initiative for East
Africa (OSIEA) and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands for their support to our work.
The views expressed in this report are those of AfriCOG
alone.
A publication of the Africa Centre for Open Governance
(AfriCOG) which houses the secretariat for KENYANS FOR
PEACE WITH TRUTH & JUSTICE (KPTJ).
KENYANS FOR PEACE WITH TRUTH & JUSTICE (KPTJ) is
a coalition of citizens and organisations working in the
human rights, governance and legal fields that came
together during the crisis over the disputed results of
the 2007 presidential election and the violence that
followed. Members include: Africa Centre For Open
Governance (AfriCOG), Bunge La Mwananchi, Centre for
the Development of Marginalised Communities (CEDMAC),
Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION),
Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD), Centre for Rights,
Education and Awareness for Women (CREAW), The CRADLE
- The Children’s Foundation, Constitution and Reforms
Education Consortium (CRECO), East African Law Society
(EALS), Fahamu, Foster National Cohesion (FONACON),
Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya (GALCK), Haki Focus,
Hema la Katiba, Independent Medico-Legal Unity (IMLU),
Innovative Lawyering, Institute for Education in Democracy
(IED), International Commission of Jurists (ICJ-Kenya),
International Centre for Policy and Conflict, Kenya Human
Rights Commission (KHRC), Kenya Leadership Institute
(KLI), Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
(KNCHR), Kituo cha Sheria, Mazingira Institute, Muslim
Human Rights Forum, the National Civil Society Congress,
National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), RECESSPA,
Release Political Prisoners Trust, Sankara Centre, Society for
International Development (SID), The 4 Cs, Urgent Action
Fund (UAF)-Africa, Youth Agenda.
Editorial: KPTJ, AfriCOG www.africog.org
March 2014
Africa Centre for Open Governance
P.O. Box 18157-00100, Nairobi, Kenya
Telephone: +254 20-4443707/0737463166
Email: admin@africog.org
Website: www.africog.org