Dissemination Workshop 5th December 2019

1. Dissemination Workshop
5th December 2019

2. Introduction & Agenda
Richard Greaves – NLA International
Projects Director

3. Agenda
• Context & requirements
• Candidate technologies
• Navigation risk
• Conceptual architecture
• Cost benefit analysis
• Roadmap & initial development
plan
• Summary & Next steps

4. Recap – Project Overview
George Shaw - GLA

5. Maritime Resilience & Integrity (R&I) of Navigation
Overview for stakeholder workshop
KTN, 5th December 2019

6. Staged Project Approach
Stage 1:
Solution Concept
Options analysis & CBA
Proof-of-Concept
Demonstrator
R&I Modelling &
Simulation
Validation from
regional test-bed
Three year duration (1 year Stage 1 – possible Stage 2 over 2 years)
Stage 1 commenced 8 January 2019
with 12 months duration
Insights
Stage 2

7. Stage 1 Work Packages

8. MarRINav Participants
Project participants Role
NLAI Ltd Prime, user need coordination
General Lighthouse Authorities Technical lead, performance analysis
KTN User & stakeholder engagement
London Economics CBA
University of Nottingham PNT- EGNOS and integrity
UCL PNT - hybrid solutions & resilience
Terrafix Architectural concept
Taylor Airey CNI, PNT & consultant
BMT Port and pilot analysis

9. Context of the “e-Navigation System-of-Systems”
Core PNT system will be dual frequency multi-constellation (DFMC) GNSS

10. Challenging Marine Environment
Atmosphere
GNSS multipath environment on ships is more variable than for aircraft – user level integrity needs MRAIM

11. § EEZs of UK and Ireland
§ Voyage phases
§ Oceanic
§ Coastal
§ Harbour Approach
§ Port
§ All major ports
§ Traffic Separation Schemes
§ Areas of higher collision risk
§ Blue Economy areas
Coverage Area of Interest

12. Single (core) architecture for many applications
12
Courtesy of CAPITALS project

13. Resilient PNT – maritime core options
• eLoran
• VDES R-mode
• VHF Data Exchange System
• AIS upgrade to VDES
• Precise time base of VDES
• 24/7 capability
• Radar positioning (RaDR)
• Coastal imaging & Dead
Reckoning
• Passive reflectors/e-Racons
• STL (Iridium satellites)
• Integration within Multi
System Receiver (MSR)

14. Concept on vessel
Multi System Receiver (MSR)
• MSC.401(95) Performance
Standard
• IMO generated in 2015
• Accompanying IMO Guideline
At least 2 GNSS constellations
Terrestrial backup systems
Dead Reckoning
14
PRELIM
INARY

15. § What candidate Resilient PNT systems can we deploy in order to meet users’ requirements?
§ How do we integrate multiple systems?
§ Where should the Resilient PNT system’s infrastructure be located to optimise coverage and
performance to meet users’ requirements?
§ Is a UK-only system-of-systems sufficient?
§ How do we control and monitor the system?
§ How much will it cost?
§ How much will it benefit UK CNI and wider users?
§ There are many other questions too!
Questions, questions, questions…

16. Thank you
Contact for further information
George Shaw GLA phone +44 (0)7766 510578 email George.shaw@gla-rad.org
Richard Greaves NLAI phone +44 (0)7894 216188 email richard.greaves@nlaltd.co.uk

17. Context & Requirements
Paul Williams - GLA

18. Context and Requirements: User Needs
Dissemination Workshop
Dr. Paul Williams
General Lighthouse Authorities
5th December 2019

19. § WP1 – Maritime Context and Requirements – Report Deliverable D1 – www.marrinav.com
§ Identifies how dependent shipping, port and hinterland operations are on GNSS and thus the potential
impact of GNSS vulnerabilities
§ Variety applications and operations included – as much of the ecosystem of maritime and associated
activities as possible
§ General Navigation – Ocean, Coastal, Port Approach, Port
§ e-Navigation
§ Autonomous Vessels
§ Blue economy
§ Pilot/Port Operations – Sea Side
§ Port Operations – Land Side
§ Global and European view including plans, timelines of development and technical infrastructure
§ Output is a summary report on the reliance of maritime and port CNI on GNSS
§ One aim is to inform UK Government actions in addressing Recommendation 1 of the Blackett Report:
Operators of CNI should review their reliance on GNSS, whether direct or through other GNSS-
dependent systems, and report it to the lead government department for their sector. The Cabinet Office
should assess overall dependence of CNI on GNSS.
Introduction to Work Package 1

20. The Mariner’s Environment: The Present…
River Basin Management Plan
Shoreline
Management
Plans
SSSI
Port VTS
IFCA
WFD and MSFD Marine Plan Areas
Maritime Spatial Planning Directive
Marine
Conservation
Zones
Special
Areas of
Conservation
Regional Flood and Coastal Committee
Regional Development Agencies
Civil Contingencies
MEHRAs
National Contingency Plan – UK
Local Authority Oil Pollution Plans
Environment Agency Special Protection Areas
for seabirds
Special Protection Areas
for seabirds
Special
Areas of
Conservation
IMO PSSA
WETREP
Grid connections
Oil and gas connections
Anchorage and
Pilot boarding
CCS
CCS
STS
International
Comms / power
Aggregates
Wave array
Military firing range
Wreck
Solar
Floating wind
Exercise area
Aquaculture
Reefs

21. The Mariner’s Environment: The Future…

22. § Safety (and Security)
§ Collision
§ Grounding
§ SAR
§ Piracy/Hijack
§ Jamming, spoofing and interference
§ Bridge procedures and passage planning
§ Economy related
§ Fuel efficiency
§ Port value - import and export
§ Blue Economy income
§ Bridge procedures and passage planning
§ Environment related
§ Fuel efficiency
§ SSI
§ MARPOL
§ Coastal protection
§ Bridge procedures and passage planning
Requirements can take a number of forms….
User Requirement Domains

23. Forms of User Requirements
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) parameters (Section 7-Scenario, Section 6.2.4 – Blue Economy)
§ Numerical requirements
§ Accuracy, Integrity, Continuity, Availability
§ Regulatory publications and plans; IMO A.1046, IMO A.915, ERNP, IALA R-129
General Operational User Requirements (Appendix A of D1)
§ Text based requirements
§ How the RPNT system should operate or behave
§ For example, the need for a RPNT system to not be limited in the number of simultaneous users
Geographical Requirements (Assembled in ArcGIS™ MarRINav’s Geographical Information System)
§ Port locations – major ports and economic benefit
§ Locations with higher degrees of collision risk; TSS, Dover Strait, junctions and points of convergence
§ Blue Economy areas; e.g. windfarms, aquaculture
§ UK (and Irish) EEZ
Ideally all these forms of requirement should be met coincidentally.
May be elicited by the analysis of user scenarios to extract Use Cases…

24. The Scenario – Cargo container from ocean to port gate

25. § Focussing on EEZ of UK and Ireland
§ Timescale is 2030
§ All major ports
§ Traffic Separation Schemes
§ Areas of collision risk
§ Blue Economy areas
§ General Navigation voyage phases
§ Oceanic
§ Coastal
§ Harbour Approach
§ Port
§ BREXIT may change traffic patterns
§ UK Land Bridge (to Ireland) may be
removed from the CEF Transport
Network
Geographical Requirements

26. IMO RNP Requirements
Resolution A.915(22)
Adopted on 29 November 2001
(Agenda item 9)
REVISED MARITIME POLICY AND REQUIREMENTS FOR A FUTURE
GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS)
User level requirements.

27. IMO RNP Requirements
Resolution A.1046(27)
Adopted on 30 November 2011
(Agenda item 9)
WORLDWIDE RADIONAVIGATION SYSTEM
§ This Resolution details the requirements for a radionavigation service that is being offered as
part of the IMO’s WWRNS.
§ Systems approved as part of the WWRNS are deemed suitable for navigation on SOLAS vessels.
Voyage Phase Accuracy Continuity Integrity (TTA) Availability
Update
Interval
Ocean Water 100m (95%) N/A
As soon as
possible
99.8% (signal) 2 s
Harbour
Entrances,
Approaches
and Coastal
Waters
10m (95%)
≥99.97%
(15 mins)
10s 99.8% (signal) 2s
“The system shall be considered available when it provides the required integrity for
the given accuracy level.”
System level requirements.
Source: IMO Resolution A.1046

28. System and User Level Integrity
Constellation failures
Multipath
Obstruction
Non Line of sight
Interference
§ System level integrity – considers failures external to the vessel.
§ User level integrity – considers system level components, plus the local environment and receiver.
Atmosphere

29. Interdependence of RNP Parameters
§ RNP Parameters
- Accuracy
- Integrity
- Continuity
- Availability
§ They are interdependent
§ User Level integrity is very important for
maritime – RAIM/FDE
§ Resilience in terms of continuity and integrity
Diagram source: J. O. Klepsvik, P. B. Ober, and M. Baldauf, ‘A Critical
Look at the IMO Requirements for GNSS’, ION GNSS 20th International
Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division, Sep. 2007.

30. One Definition of Resilience
The ability to anticipate, mitigate and recover from disruption.
From a maritime perspective the activities of resilience includes:
1. The provision of a user-level integrity guarantee, which makes a GNSS-
derived position solution robust to any arbitrary fault, or disruption, likely to
occur in the real world, e.g. cyber threat, space weather, deliberate jamming
2. The provision of sufficient hold-over capability from alternative systems and
sensors that the continuity guarantee is not undermined by loss of GNSS, for
example due to an integrity-alert, jamming or interference
The mariner just wants to get on with his job…safely and efficiently while protecting the marine environment!
Principle of Resilient PNT:
Using integrity monitoring to effect a seamless handover to an alternative available system that provides
sufficient accuracy with integrity, to ensure the continuity of the mariner’s operation!
Encompasses ALL RNP parameters!

31. Redundant, Backup or Contingency System?
IALA, in Recommendation R.129, defines alternative navigation systems as being able to
provide PNT support at various levels:
§ A redundant system provides the same functionality as the primary system, allowing a
seamless transition with no change in procedures;
§ A backup system ensures continuation of the navigation application, but not necessarily with
the full functionality of the primary system and may necessitate some change in procedures
by the user;
§ A contingency system allows safe completion of a manoeuvre, but may not be adequate for
long-term use.
How long is long-term?

32. RNP Requirements
IALA Recommendation R-129
On GNSS Vulnerability and Mitigation Measures
December 2008
But consider a different point of view…

33. Nav. System
3x10-4 / 15 mins
5x10-5 / epoch
GNSS Alarm
4x10-5
RAIM False-
Alarm
1x10-5
Detection-
thresholds set
accordingly
GNSS Continuity Fault Tree
System Faults
10-5 / hour
4.17x10-7
GPS SPS
Document
Local Faults
3.96x10-5
Unknown!
§ Budget 5x10-5 per epoch
- Equipment failures (small)
- RAIM False-Alarms (10-5)
- GNSS Faults (4x10-5):
§ Rate of GNSS Alarms is
unknown
- Depends on severity of noise /
multipath in marine environment
- System-level faults are rare and
well-defined
- We can only control false-alarm
rates
- Will need an extensive
measurement campaign to
determine risks!
§ This fault tree analysis has
never been done for maritime

34. GNSS Integrity Fault Tree
Nav. System
10-5 / 15 mins
1.667x10-6 / epoch
Fault Free
Case
8.33x10-7
/ epoch
HPL
k-factor 5.29
System Faults
10-5 / hour
4.17x10-7
GPS SPS
Document
Local Faults
3.96x10-5
As continuity
branch, still
Unknown!
RAIM Risk
Reduction
4x10-5
Faulted Case
8.33x10-7
/ epoch
§ Top-level budget 1.667x10-6 per epoch
- 50% to fault-free case (8.33x10-7)
- 50% to faulted case (8.33x10-7)
§ Fault-Free Operation
- Modelled errors used to estimate the amount of error in
the reported position.
- Error scaled by the K-factor (5.29) to create a horizontal
protection level (HPL).
- Fault-free case is the chance of the HPL exceeding the
alert limit.
§ Faulted Case
- Equipment failure (v. small component)
- GNSS Faults mitigated by RAIM
§ System-level (can be mitigated by augmentation)
§ Local faults: (unknown probability!)
§ RAIM requirement depends on local environment
- Need a measurement campaign!

35. Integration or a System-of-Systems
§ IMO Multi-System Receiver
§ IMO MSC.401(95) – performance standard
§ IMO MSR Guideline MSC.1/Circ 1575
discusses ways of achieving R&I with MSR
§ No physical implementation actually exists
yet!
§ Methods of integration
- Tightly Coupled - Pseudorange level
- Loosely Coupled - Positioning level

36. RPNT Continuity Fault Tree (MSR)
Nav. System
3x10-4 / 15 mins
5x10-5 / epoch
RAIM False-
Alarm
1x10-5
Detection-
thresholds set
accordingly
MSR
GNSS
Receiver
R-PNT Backup
GNSS Alarm
4.9x10-4
System Faults
10-5 / hour
4.17x10-7
Local Faults
4.9x10-4
Backup allows
for higher rate
of faults
RPNT Credit
(R-Factor 0.05%)
5x10-4
GPS SPS
Document
§ MSR consists of the GNSS
receiver and an independent
backup/contingency/redundant
system
§ On condition of a continuity
breach on the GNSS receiver
the backup system is
automatically engaged
§ Provision of the backup offers a
continuity credit
§ Backup solution does not need
to be as good as the primary to
provide a benefit

37. MSR
GNSS
Receiver
R-PNT
Backup
Nav. System
10-5 / 15 mins
1.667x10-6 / epoch
Fault Free
Case
8.083x10-7
k-factor 5.30
System Faults
10-5 / hour
4.17x10-7/epoch
GPS SPS
Document
Local Faults
4.9x10-4
As continuity
branch, still
Unknown!
RAIM Risk
Reduction
4.9x10-4
Primary
1.616x10-6
Backup
5x10-8
Required
Integrity
10-4
Integrity
requirements
for backup
system
R-Factor
(x/0.05%)
§ Apportion small amount of
budget to the backup
- 5x10-8 for backup
- Majority for primary (GNSS)
§ Integrity risk weighted by
duty-cycle (up-time)
- Backup in use 0.05% of time
- Primary in use 99.95%
- Can afford lower performance
from backup system
§ HAL remains at 25m
- Same accuracy required from
backup (~10m, 95%)
§ New way of thinking about
RPNT
RPNT Integrity Fault Tree (MSR)

38. Summary
The mariner just wants to get on with his job…safely and efficiently while
protecting the marine environment!
Principle of Resilient PNT:
Using integrity monitoring to effect a seamless handover to an alternative
available system that provides sufficient accuracy with integrity, to ensure the
continuity of the mariner’s operation!

39. § A RPNT system should be viewed as preserving continuity for the mariner
§ RNP performance parameters should be specified at the user level, not the system level
because the user environment is very complex with various hazards to signal reception
§ Some of these hazards are difficult to measure and model, e.g. multi-path
§ Using fault trees, we have introduced a way of analysing the required integrity and
continuity performance of an RPNT system
§ Having an RPNT system can mean that less knowledge about this complex environment
is needed because we can cope with higher probabilities of local faults
§ The RPNT system need not have the same capabilities as the core (GNSS) system while
still reducing the need for a high degree of knowledge about the user’s environment
Summary

40. § Resilience capability – is the need for contingency, backup or redundancy?
§ Integrity/continuity capability – how may these user needs evolve in future?
§ What are the future drivers for change?
§ How will autonomy, digital ports and ships, e-Navigation, data sharing impact this?
Questions:

41. Resilience capability – is the need for contingency,
backup or redundancy?
Integrity/continuity capability – how may these user
needs evolve in future?
What are the future drivers for change?
How will autonomy, digital ports & ships, e-Navigation,
data sharing impact this?

42. Candidate Technologies
Paul Williams - GLA

43. Candidate Technology Review:
Integrity and Resilience
Dr. Paul Williams
General Lighthouse Authorities
5th December 2019

44. § WP3 – PNT R&I Technologies and Integration – Report Deliverable D4 – www.marrinav.com
§ Review the broad range of options for PNT that can provide Resilience and Integrity as previously
identified by the GLA and other studies, analysing the potential contribution of each option (Blackett
Report Recommendation 6)
CNI Operators should make provision – with guidance from NCSC and CPNI – for the loss of GNSS by
employing GNSS-independent back-up systems.
§ Complementary and dissimilar wide area and local area systems
§ Integration to form a hybrid system-of-systems (as mentioned in LE report)
§ Data communications systems as CNI that support RPNT, including the MCP
§ Consider coverage of entire UK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
§ Interference monitoring at ports (Blackett Report Recommendation 5)
CNI operators should assess – with guidance from the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) – whether they need to monitor interference o
GNSS at key sites such as ports. Where operators do monitor, data should be shared with the relevant lead
government department.
Introduction to Work Package 3

45. Candidate Systems for RPNT
§ Report on performance of options for RPNT and their integration performed by UCL in 2017
§ MarRINav WP3 pro-forma document to capture information on candidate options

46. Candidate Systems Identification
§ Systems included in exploration of UK architecture
- eLoran
- VDES/AIS R-Mode
- Radar absolute positioning (Radar SLAM, or RaDR)
- Dead Reckoning
§ In addition the following will be assumed:
- LOCATA – for ports – Very local - operational
- STL (Satelles) – for Ocean Voyage Phase – global
§ MF R-Mode is not considered as part of the UK RPNT architecture,
but it is included in WP3 should technical difficulties be solved
Picture © Chris Rizos, LOCATA Corporation
Picture © Iridium Satellite Communications

47. MF R-Mode
Estimated MF R-Mode coverage area and accuracy considering the GLA DGPS
stations only (excluding signal strength floor, SNR limit and interference from other
stations in the band) – modelled to a maximum error of 100 m (95%).
§ TRL 5 - Component, integration and system
testing in a relevant environment to show
that targets are achievable in a realistic
scenario
§ Problems with skywave interference at
night
§ Issues surrounding signal ambiguity
resolution at the frequency separation
used in Europe
- Would need reference to another system
or,
- Cycle counting method
- Could work 24 hours at short range

48. eLoran
§ Tighter specification version of Loran-C signal in space
- Standardised by SAE (9990)
§ All-in-View receivers
- uses all available transmitters
- single transmitter provides time
- 3 transmitters: 2D position and time
§ Precise synchronisation, locked to UTC
- independent of GNSS
- 2-way satellite time transfer (TWSTT)
- radically different from Loran-C
§ no ‘chains’
§ no 2-way terrestrial time transfers
- supports autonomous control and monitoring by each
nation

49. eLoran for Maritime Applications
§ eLoran for Port Approach better than ~10m (95%) accuracy
performance
§ Signal propagation corrections
- Additional Secondary Factors (ASFs)
- compensate propagation delay over land
- one-off coastal survey per port approach
- database in eLoran receiver
§ Differential Loran (DLoran)
- local reference stations for harbour approach
- real-time corrections for temporal variations
§ eLoran Data Channel (9th Pulse and/or Eurofix)
- Standardised by ITU and SAE
- integrity alerts within time to alarm
- transmit DLoran corrections
§ TRL 7 – Prototype Demonstration - Full or near full-scale
demonstration in an operational environment to demonstrate
targets can be met in the real-world
DLoran Ref
Station
Loran
Station
ASF Map
Anthorn SyltSylt
LessayLessay
VaerlandetVaerlandet
Soustons
Ejde
15 ° W 10 ° W 5° W 0 ° 5° E 10° E
45 ° N
50 ° N
55 ° N
60 ° N
65 ° N
Accuracy,R95[m]
fornoisevaluesnotexceeded95%ofthetime
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35+

50. VDES R-Mode
• Network of accurately synchronised VDES base
stations – assumed to be upgraded AIS stations
• Passive (pseudo)ranging based on VDES messages
• Positioning by multilateration: all-in-view
• 3 range measurements would provide an
unambiguous 2D position fix
• Other positioning modes are possible with pros
and cons
• TRL 5 - Component, integration and system
testing in a relevant environment to show that
targets are achievable in a realistic scenario
You are here
Time

51. Radar Absolute Positioning
§ Radar absolute positioning – a system mostly based aboard ship
§ Radar image correlation with a conspicuity map to provide
Radar Dead Reckoned solution (RaDR) by Radar SLAM
§ TRL 3 - Proof of concept: Analytical studies & laboratory
experiment modelling to establish application & concept
feasibility & benefit
§ eRacons, or even passive reflectors, can add integrity in regions
of poor radar conspicuity
§ eRacons also can be used in an alternative positioning system,
but this could be expensive
RADAR SLAM conspicuity map of the Harwich peninsular.

52. Integration with Dead Reckoning
§ Traditional speed log and gyro based DR shows very slow and
steady error-growth over time – possibly better than IMU
§ IMU good over the short term – minutes!
§ We envisage ALL systems will be integrated with DR system
§ For example, RADAR SLAM technique can constrain the error
growth of the DR system

53. Integration or a System-of-Systems
§ IMO Multi-System Receiver
§ IMO MSC.401(95) – performance standard
§ IMO MSR Guideline MSC.1/Circ 1575
discusses ways of achieving R&I with MSR
§ No physical implementation actually exists
yet!
§ Methods of integration
- Tightly Coupled - Pseudorange level
- Loosely Coupled - Positioning level

54. § What candidate Resilient PNT systems can we deploy in order to meet users’ requirements? (WP1,
WP2, WP3)
§ Where do we put our Resilient PNT system’s infrastructure to optimise coverage and performance to
meet users’ requirements? (WP2, WP3, WP4)
§ How will it perform?
§ How do we integrate multiple systems? (WP2 – D6)
§ How do we control and monitor the system? (WP3,WP4)
§ How much will it cost? (WP3, WP4, WP5)
§ How much will it benefit UK CNI? (WP1, WP5)
Questions for us!
UK DGPS Radiobeacon at Flamborough Head.
Picture Courtesy www.ndblist.info; Photographer Bob Coomer

55. § What are the barriers to users (ports and ships) using such systems?
§ What are the impacts on human factors, training and skill levels?
Questions for you!

56. What are the barriers to users (ports and ships)
using such systems?
What are the impacts on human factors,
training and skill levels?

57. Navigation Risk
Cdr Lee Hardy OBE - NLAI

58. Lee Hardy OBE
NLA International Associate Director

59. Lee Hardy OBE
Lee.hardy@nlaltd.co.uk
+44 7490 236689
Thank You.

60. Conceptual Architecture
Mike Fairbanks – Taylor Airey

61. Architecture and Coverage
5 December 2019

62. Navigation risk
62

63. Traffic density &
complexity
Derived from AIS reports
Hotspots drive criticality of navigation
performance
• Dense traffic routes
• Crossing points
63

64. Collision risk
Developed using IALA’s IWRAP software
Hotspots drive criticality of navigation
performance
• Container ports
• Dover Strait & beyond
• Constrained channels
64

65. Areas of high
economic value
Ports contributing to UK economic
performance
Locations where navigation failures will have
highest economic impact
• Ports themselves
• Routes leading to and from those ports
65

66. Conceptual architecture
66

67. GNSS at the core of the concept
67
INDICATIVE

68. EGNOS has the potential to provide some GNSS
integrity
68
EGNOS V2 provides system level integrity
EGNOS V3 planned to provide user level integrity

69. M-RAIM within the MSR will complete the
provision of integrity
69
The multipath environment experienced in the maritime
sector can be extremely complex. This includes the port
example above where reflections off nearby structures with
and without line-of-sight to the satellite. It also includes
reflections off the superstructure of the vessel itself and
on-deck cargo such as containers
Provision of integrity at user level is challenging
M-RAIM (Maritime – Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring) is an adaptation for maritime conditions of one
of the RAIM algorithms now widely employed in airborne
receivers

70. Conceptual
architecture for
resilience
System-of-systems to supplement GNSS
• eLoran
• VDES R-mode
• STL
• Locata
• Radar positioning
• Multi-system receiver
• Onboard systems
70

71. Time dissemination is a key part of the concept
71
Need time to be disseminated to multiple,
geographically dispersed sites
NPL provides two main methods of time
dissemination:
• Dark Fibre and Precise Time Protocol
(PTP) with timestamping routers – ~ns
level over 100 km or so
• TWSTFT – ±1.5 ns
eLoran
• TWLFTT

72. Common conceptual architecture for terrestrial
systems
72

73. Service coverage
73

74. EGNOS V2 appears to meet A.1046 system-level
requirements
74
Availability Continuity

75. Limited monitoring over ocean areas potentially
limits EGNOS performance
75
Snapshot of Monitored/Not Monitored status of
ionospheric grid points (IGPs)
With contour map of IPP density
10 degree and 15 degree visibility circles at 55N,
15W (extreme edge of EEZ)
Large proportion of IGPs ‘Not Monitored’ means
degraded performance

76. UK only eLoran –
positioning
76
Current Anthorn site
Additional sites using TV transmitters
Meets needs at most of the major ports but
struggles to meet requirements at critical points

77. eLoran UK + Sylt –
positioning
77
Better performance, meets needs at all ports, but still does not
meet the 10m requirement in all geographies
Mothballed station
located at Sylt

78. eLoran - timing
78
Coverage of a timing service from Anthorn with an
externally mounted antenna with differential-
Loran, but a one-off ASF calibration at any location
Coverage of a timing service from Anthorn. Assuming
an internally mounted antenna no differential-Loran,
but a one off ASF calibration at any location
Timing performance distributed
from Anthorn depends strongly on
the location of the receiving
antenna, and the availability of ASF
and differential corrections
Benefits to the maritime sector and
also potentially large benefits to
other users of precise timing

79. AIS stations give a potential platform for VDES R-mode
79
Good performance
when the stations are
on the outside of the
coverage area looking
in but more limited
performance where the
stations are on the
inside of the coverage
area looking out,
especially at Dover
VDES R-mode based on
the current AIS
network provides no
benefit in the critical
eLoran coverage gaps

80. VDES R-mode with
additional stations
around Dover
Additional stations in the UK and France
• Thames Maritime Rescue Coordination
Centre (MRCC), RAF Bradwell, Sheerness,
North Foreland, Dover MRCC,
Dungeness, Fairlight
• Gris Nez, Calais, Dunkirk
80

81. Coupled VDES R-mode
and eLoran
Dungeness, Fairlight
• Gris Nez, Calais, Dunkirk
81
Includes additional stations in UK and France
Loose or close coupling
Improves accuracy performance in critical
areas to better than 10m

82. Relative radar absolute positioning
82

83. Emerging messages
83

84. Emerging conclusions
• UK eLoran based on the Anthorn transmitter with additional stations located at current TV transmitters gives
good positioning performance (nine of 10 major ports) but with some gaps in critical locations
• UK eLoran based on Anthorn alone with appropriate augmentation provides a high accuracy UK-wide timing
source
• VDES R-mode based on current UK AIS infrastructure alone does not give benefits
• UK eLoran with the mothballed station at Sylt in Germany enhances coverage but still does not deliver the
required performance around the Dover Strait
• VDES R-mode with additional local stations in the UK and France fills most of the coverage gap in the Dover
Strait with improved coverage if eLoran and VDES R-mode are integrated
• Radar absolute positioning has the potential to meet accuracy requirements close to the coast but not at all
critical locations
A UK-only fully resilient PNT solution covering all critical areas is very difficult to achieve
84

85. Do you perceive the same risks?
Are risk areas adequately covered?
Does the architecture make sense?

86. Cost Benefit Analysis
Rasmus Flytkjaer - London Economics

87. CBA results
Dissemination workshop 05/12/2019
Rasmus Flytkjaer, London Economics

88. Benefits
Economic loss from loss of GNSS
without MarRINav: £601.4m
(only maritime container traffic considered)
(less)
Economic loss from loss of GNSS
with MarRINav: £180.4m
(only maritime container traffic considered)
(equals)
Benefits of MarRINav: £421m
Benefits are defined as the reduction in
economic loss resulting from unavailability of
GNSS for a period of five consecutive days.
The MarRINav System-of-Systems reduces
the loss relative to the situation without it.
It is assumed that one five-day outage occurs
in the next 10 years.
88

89. Costs
Costs include CAPEX and OPEX for all the
systems included as part of the MarRINav
System-of-Systems:
• eLoran
• Radar absolute positioning
• VDES R-mode
• LOCATA
• ePelorus
89
System CAPEX (£’000) OPEX (£’000/y) Units
eLoran
eLoran Transmitters 4,000 250 6
eLoran control centres 1,000 100 2
Differential loran reference stations 60 3 10
Integrity monitor stations 3 3 1
ASF surveys 31 Negligible 10
Radar absolute positioning
eRacon 30 Negligible 12
VDES-R module
Conversion AIS station to VDES 50 Negligible 10
LOCATA
LocataLite 30 Negligible 1,050
Rover 10 Negligible 700
Control centre Update existing Negligible 10
On-shore infrastructure: Total: £80m
Shipborne equipment: Total: £120m
System CAPEX (£’000) OPEX (£’000/y) Units
eLoran
Marine eLoran receiver 1 Negligible 5,200
Radar absolute positioning
IMU 18 Negligible 5,200
GNSS-compass (included in IMU) Negligible Negligible 5,200
VDES R-mode
VDES receiver 1 Negligible 5,200
ePelorus
ePelorus 3 Negligible 5,200

90. Results
Not in scope:
• Non-container traffic
• Non-maritime transport
• Terrestrial timing/synchronisation users
90
Benefits and costs Value (£m)
Benefits (avoided loss) 421
Loss without MarRINav 601
Loss with MarRINav 180
Costs 200
Costs of on-shore infrastructure 80
Costs to shipowners 120
Net Present Value +221
Benefit-cost ratio 2.2

91. Roadmap & Development Plan
Jimmy Slaughter NLAI

92. WP 7
Roadmap and Planning

93. Approach

94. Staged Project Approach
Stage 1:
Solution Concept
Options analysis & CBA
Proof-of-Concept
Demonstrator
R&I Modelling &
Simulation
Validation from
regional test-bed
Three year duration (1 year Stage 1 – possible Stage 2 over 2 years)
Stage 1 commenced 8 January 2019
with 12 months duration
Insights
Stage 2

95. Development Process
Mid 2020 Mid 2022

96. Location Factors
• Vessels in coastal, port approach and port voyage phases, associated with a major port
with adjacent high risk navigational areas. Possible examples include the ports of
Dover, Felixstowe, Liverpool and Southampton.
• Adequate eLoran coverage offered by reasonable geometry of the two sightlines to the
transmitters - Anthorn and one or two additional transmitter(s) at an existing TV mast -
from receivers in the test-bed area.
• Potential for good VDES R-mode coverage within at least a localised area of the test-
bed, affording line-of-sight transmissions to the vessel and sites for R-Mode stations
with adequate geometry of sightlines from the receiver to the transmitters.
• Participation of a small number of cooperative vessels (e.g. THV Galatea) with
accommodation for trials personnel, observers, prototype MSR, PNT displays and data
recorders.
• Ease of access for trials personnel, equipment and VIP observers at demonstrations.
• Potential for future test-bed extension to a wider set of e-Navigation prototype
services.

97. By 2032 ensure the resilience and integrity of the UK critical
national infrastructure relating to maritime and port PNT and
communications are underpinned with an appropriate network of
systems taking account of international practice
Roadmap Vision

98. Key Recommendations
• Create a wide-reaching consensus for the future development
of a resilient and high-integrity PNT system-of-systems,
meeting the needs of the future UK CNI
• Engage further with legislators, regulators, standards
agencies, industry bodies and manufacturers
• Identify an appropriate source of funding to enable the
MarRINav project be progressed to Phase 2, to build on the
conceptual solution, adding design detail, and undertake
field-scale proof-of-concept demonstration

99. Technology Development
MarRINav Phase 2

100. Ship’s Equipment
Technology Standards
MarRINav Phase 2

101. Emerging Technology
MarRINav Phase 2

102. External Influences
MarRINav Phase 2

103. Funding
MarRINav Phase 2

104. Is the timeline sensible?
Where should we conduct our trials/test bed?

105. Summary & Next Steps
Richard Greaves NLAI