The document discusses examples of coordination between governments and international relief organizations during disaster response. It describes how India initially restricted aid and delayed accepting international assistance after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, hindering relief efforts. In contrast, Thailand had established relationships that allowed rapid acceptance and coordination of international military and humanitarian assistance. The document advocates for pre-disaster agreements and cultural sensitivity to facilitate effective relief.

1. Disaster Management Discussion
Question: Research and provide an example of the success between a government and the
international response community. First: MO To start, India was criticized for restricting aid
to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which allegedly prolonged the suffering of the people
there who were left without assistance (Margesson, 2005). The country also initially turned
down offers of international aid despite widespread death and destruction that was
obviously out of the league of their emergency management capabilities (Margesson, 2005).
The country eventually accepted offers of aid; however, the response was unnecessarily
delayed (Margesson, 2005). Once relief supplies made their way into the country, the
government allegedly seized them and distributed them in a discriminatory fashion (India
has a caste system) according to a few large NGOs, like the Red Cross (Margesson, 2005).
Overall, the response of the Indian government was widely inefficient and might have been
hindered by local corruption (Margesson, 2005). In the future, relationships and
agreements between vulnerable countries and the international community should be made
before a disaster to allow for the useful and timely administration of relief efforts. When
composing these agreements, the international community should be sensitive to the
recipient’s potential desire to restrict the military operations of other countries, since it
could be viewed as an opportunistic occupation of the affected nation. In contrast, Thailand
allowed immediate intervention from the international community (Margesson, 2005). The
decision to allow unrestricted access of the country to the US military forces was likely due
to previously established good relationships between the two countries, which extended to
other relief organizations as well. Other entities, including Japan, Singapore, the UN, the
World Food Program, and the World Health Organization, were expediently welcomed into
the country to assist how they could (Margesson, 2005). During the summer courses, we
were told that networking is critical in emergency management and that the worst time to
work with someone for the first time is during a disaster. The concept extends to countries
as well – and the relationships built between Thailand and members of the international
relief community probably facilitated relief efforts. Cultural sensitivity, when responding to
international humanitarian events, is paramount. The history of the country and the wishes
of its government cannot be ignored, but neither can the needs of its citizens. It presents an
interesting ethical dilemma for both NGOs and developed nations with robust international
response capabilities. Political exploitation and experiences with imperialism may prevent
countries from accepting aid from the international community, which is why I think the
facilitator role that the United Nations has is critical. They can send a United Nations

2. Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams to affected areas, which can be seen
as a relatively neutral force and facilitate acceptance of further international involvement
(UNOCHA, 2019). Knowing the limitations of local disaster management capabilities is
crucial for the coordination of a smooth and appropriate response. In the future, I’d like to
see countries accept and engage in humanitarian efforts altruistically and put aside political
motivation. It’s a lofty goal, but one that would help save lives in the immediate aftermath of
a devastating event. Margesson, R. Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian
Assistance and Relief Operations (2005). Retrieved from
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a461370.pdf United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). (2019, April 16). UN Disaster Assessment
and Coordination (UNDAC). Retrieved from https://www.unocha.org/our-
work/coordination/un-disaster-assessment-andcoordination-undac. Second: Fai
Humanitarians play a pivotal role in reinstating normalcy when crises occur. Disaster
management requires proper coordination of activities between the relief agents and other
support groups, such as the government (Alexander, 2015). Humanitarian operations
include many participants. Some of them belong to the affected country, and others
originate from other countries. They work in the same area to fulfill a common objective.
However, cooperation among them is often constrained. There are instances of
misunderstandings between humanitarians and the host nations. Besides, the lack of
collaboration between relief agents and other aid partners during disaster operations
occurs. For example, international humanitarians and security personnel may lack
coordination. Therefore, what are the incidences where humanitarians fail to coordinate
with either the host government or other relief stakeholders? Conflicts have engulfed
humanitarianism in some host countries. Relief agencies provide health and food assistance
in disaster-stricken areas in the world (Saavedra & Clarke, 2015). Nevertheless, they have
been linked to odd actions that have resulted in conflicts with host states. For instance,
conflicts erupted between International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and
Sudan during the civil wars. There was a lack of transparency about the credentials of staff
hired by INGOs (Jayasinghe, 2011). Frequently, the hired INGOs staff assumed critical
duties, such as providing healthcare services and ensuring human rights. This enabled them
to interact with many individuals from different backgrounds. They easily influenced the aid
recipients. The intensity of their influence made them be seen as interfering with the
national politics of Sudan. This condition caused conflicts between INGOs and Sudan and
has led to complicated work relationships between them. Humanitarians have ascended to
power in the nations where they provide aid. Over time, the donors have risen to power and
have finances that exceed budgets of some developing nations (Role governments in
humanitarian response to disasters, 2010). While providing aid in poor nations, they change
a country’s policies to suit their working conditions. For instance, there was an emphasis by
some donor groups to spearhead malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis treatment only, yet
the help may not be the prioritized initiative in the specific countries. These interventions
were selective since they provided specific health services. In such circumstances, the host
government and the donors do not cooperate effectively due to power contests. There is a
lack of cooperation between the relief aids and other response partners while working in

3. disaster response settings. For instance, there lacks coordination between humanitarians
and military personnel during disaster management operations. Increasing the number of
foreign security personnel during humanitarianism makes it challenging to distinguish
between the militaries and relief agencies. Scrutinization of the Hurricane Mitch response in
Central America is a good illustration. There was poor cooperation between the
humanitarians and the military. Also, a similar scenario occurred in Haiti during the 2010
earthquake (Haysom & Gordon, 2012). It was disastrous to manage the numerous
humanitarians who were present during the incident. Besides, their cooperation with the
military was frail. Therefore, in some incidences, integrating the donors with other close
partners is complicated due to lack of coordination; hence, it has a significant impact on the
aid operations. In conclusion, some factors hinder the smooth delivery of humanitarian aid
due to lack of coordination and conflicts with the host government and also with other relief
donors during disaster response. Some aid agencies conflict with the host country due to
power disputes like in the case of INGOs and Sudan. Correspondingly, there is a lack of
cooperation among relief donors. These factors adversely affect integration between
humanitarians with either the host government or with other relief parties. References
Alexander, D. (2015). Disaster and emergency planning for preparedness, response, and
recovery. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science.
doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.013.12 Haysom, S., & Gordon, S. (2012). Trends and
challenges in humanitarian civil–military coordination. Retrieved from
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/7679.pdf
Jayasinghe, S. (2011). Erosion of trust in humanitarian agencies: what strategies might help?
Global Health Action, 4(1), 8973. doi:10.3402/gha.v4i0.8973 The role of national
governments in international humanitarian response to disasters (26). (2010). Retrieved
from https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/26-
meetingbackground-paper.pdf Saavedra, & Clarke, K. (2015). Working together in the field
for effective humanitarian response (30). Retrieved from
https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/alnap-30-am-paper-
workingtogether.pdf Third: Ibra There are many examples of effective responses between
many governments around the globe and the international response community. In this
post, however, I will focus only on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) model of
coordination response with the international community to prevent, protect from, and
respond to Ebola virus diseases (EVD). The DRC Model of International Coordination
Response Since the Ministry of Health in Congo (MOH) confirmed a new EVD in 2018, the
DRC government represented by its MOH has coordinated with the World Health
Organization (WHO), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the
International Rescue Committee (IRC) to effectively respond to the Ebola outbreak (World
Health Organization, 2018). This coordination response will likely maximize the effort of
preventing and responding to this outbreak. For instance, while the WHO deploys Regional
Emergency Directors, who evaluate and support the response actions, the UNHCR is
responsible for protecting and assisting refugees and ensuring that these refugees are in
safe places. In 2018, for example, the UNHCR hosted and protected over 35,000 refugees in
Congo (World Health Organization, 2018). The IRC is also partnering with MOH to support

4. many priority health facilities in responding to EVD (The IRC, 2019). According to the IRC
(2019), there are more than 50 local health clinics led by the IRC’s Ebola response team to
focus on protecting the populations from EVD and preventing this disease from spreading.
This organization also has established triages zones in health centers and hospitals around
the areas in which the Ebola outbreak has been seen. The purpose of this triage is to screen
all incoming patients for symptoms of Ebola, and if there is any symptom, these patients will
be isolated immediately. Hence, this integration model has been an effective response to
protect the affected populations in the DRC, and I think this integration response will likely
support this country financially to expand the level of response to such this disease
outbreak. To my mind, I believe that funds play a crucial function in minimizing, protecting,
and responding to infectious diseases. Thus, with the support of the United Nations, the DRC
will likely receive much budget to provide such as medical equipment, infection control
activities, and building community capacities in hazard zones (World Health Organization,
2018). Furthermore, when these organizations aim to establish a strategic response plan,
they will likely rely on how much funds will be needed to create this strategic approach. For
example, in 2019, the WHO estimated that the activities of the Response Plan for the next
six months would likely require more than $250 million. The Results of This Effective
Coordination Response Although encountering difficulties in responding to EVD in the DRC,
the international response has responded to this outbreak successfully. This international
effort has focused on implementing epidemiologic surveillance and published daily updates,
and weekly situation reports to evaluate what has been done and ensuring that all actions
are active and in progress (Kalenga et al., 2019). I thus believe that with such effective
organizing, the international response will likely enhance the level of responding to EVD.
Here are some definite objectives that will likely be accomplished with this effective
integration response and based on the updated reports: 1- Developing and establishing a
new strategic response plan. 2- Strengthening political responsibility, security, and
operational support to improve acceptance of the reaction and access insecure areas 3-
Developing the healthcare system and collaboration of the actions of local and international
partners. 4- Increasing the level of preparedness across the surrounding provinces and
neighboring countries prevent spreading EVD. References International Rescue Committee.
(2019). What it will take to tackle Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved
October 23, 2019, from https://www.rescue.org/article/what-it-will-take-tackle-ebola-
democratic-republic-congo Kalenga, O., Moeti, M., Sparrow, A., Nguyen, V., Lucey, D., &
Ghebreyesus, T. (2019). The Ongoing Ebola Epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
2018-2019. (Report). The New England Journal of Medicine, 381(4), 373–383. Retrieved
from https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMsr1904253 World Health Organization.
(2018). Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of Congo: External Situation Report 9.
Retrieved from
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/272785/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20180608
eng.pdf World Health Organization. (2019). Strategic Response Plan for the Ebola Virus
Disease Outbreak in the Provinces of North Kivu and Ituri Democratic Republic of the Congo
(July – December 2019). Retrieved from https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/documents/drc-srp49august2019.pdf?sfvrsn=679e4d26_2