Dieke Master project_23feb2016

Final Research Project
Food Systems, Culture and Society
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FOOD VALUE CHAIN INNOVATION: THE MEANING OF
COLLABORATION AND MECHANISMS FOR ENHANCEMENT
STUDENT NAME: Dieke Helder
COURSE NAME: Master’s in Food, Society and International Food Governance
DEPARTMENT: Department of Food Systems, Culture and Society
TOTAL NUMBER OF CREDITS: 6
SUPERVISOR: Kathleen Ann (Kay) Muir Leresche
DATE OF SUBMISSION: 18 02 2016

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CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................................................................4
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................5
FOOD SECURITY ..............................................................................................................................................................5
HOW DOES FOOD GET TO OUR PLATES; A SYSTEMS APPROACH ........................................................................................6
Linear approach.........................................................................................................................................................6
Systems approach.......................................................................................................................................................7
FROM FOOD SYSTEMS TO FOOD VALUE CHAINS ...............................................................................................................8
A SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYSTEM........................................................................................................................................8
INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO UPGRADE FOOD VALUE CHAINS...........................................................................................9
Innovation in a sustainable FVC context ...................................................................................................................9
SUCCESS FACTORS FOR FOOD VALUE CHAIN INNOVATION: CO-INNOVATION ................................................................11
PROBLEM STATEMENT ............................................................................................................................................14
COLLABORATION, COORDINATION AND CO-OPERATION IN A VALUE CHAIN CONTEXT...................................................14
Figure 3 The co-operation, coordination and collaboration pyramid.....................................................................17
PROBLEM STATEMENT...................................................................................................................................................17
ANALYSIS OF THE CRITICAL FACTORS IN VALUE CHAIN COLLABORATION: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE................................................................................................................................................................18
WHY VALUE CHAIN COLLABORATION FAILS?................................................................................................................18
Organizations’ resisting forces, hampering value chain collaboration...................................................................19
THIRD PARTY POWER INTERVENTION (TPPI) AS MECHANISM TO ENFORCE COLLABORATION IN THE FVC INNOVATION
PROCESS........................................................................................................................................................................23
Hypothesis................................................................................................................................................................27
Research methodology hypothesis ...........................................................................................................................27
Case 1: PepsiCo potato crisps food value chain in India ........................................................................................27
Case 2: Citrus value chain in South Africa..............................................................................................................31
Case analysis and conclusion of the hypothesis.......................................................................................................33
THE POTENTIAL FOR INNOVATION BROKERS IN ENHANCING FVC COLLABORATION RESISTING FORCES........................41
CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................................................45
LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH...................................................................47
REFERENCES ...............................................................................................................................................................49
APPENDIX......................................................................................................................................................................54
APPENDIX 1...................................................................................................................................................................54

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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to discover mechanisms that can facilitate the development of efficient food value
chains so as to increase food security. It builds on the advances made for value chain enhancement
and on the relatively new concept co-innovation. Co-innovation implies that successful FVC
innovation processes are characterized by multiple complementary innovations, realized in a
coordinated and collaborative way. This paper argues that the meaning of collaboration and
coordination are not straightforward and are often used interchangeably with the term co-operation.
An analysis of current literature clarifies these terms and resulted in a model describing their
hierarchical relationship. This paper argues that collaboration is most difficult to achieve and is
often underestimated for its importance and complexity. It therefore continued the analysis
specifically on mechanisms to enhance collaboration for food value chain innovations.
A review of empirical examples and developing theory was carried out which led to two potential
mechanisms that could enhance collaboration for food value chain innovations and tested the
hypothesis related to the first: (1) third party power intervention through governmental regulations
and economic incentives; (2) innovation brokers who could mitigate resisting forces hindering
collaboration.
A list of ten success factors for collaboration was generated. Two food value chain innovation
cases were screened for the presence of these success factors. Findings revealed that government
intervention could lead to enhanced collaboration for food value chain innovation and the paper
outlined factors that affect the success of the intervention. Areas for further research were
recommended.

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INTRODUCTION
Food security
This paper focuses on the importance of an efficient value chain in the role of food security. It
builds on the concept of co-innovation but specifically recognizes the importance and complexity of
collaboration. It therefore focuses on mechanisms for enhancing collaboration in upgrading a food
value chain. The meaning of food security has evolved since the first use of the term in the mid
1970’s. Originally the line of thought was centred on food supply, which then gradually expanded
with food access, utility and stability over the years that followed. During the World Food Summit
in 1996 global leaders formally adopted the following definition: “food security exists when all
people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that
meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. (FAO, 2008) Also the
Open University Catalunya (UOC) adopted this definition in its course ‘Food Security and
Frameworks’. However, it also encouraged students to develop a definition that applies specifically
to one’s own country. This led to interpretations where focus on particular aspects of food security
was brought back in again. For example, Helder (2015) shows that a developed country like the
Netherlands might currently not experience severe problems with insufficient food supply or access
like many developing countries do. It can however not be called food secure and improvements are
often needed to enhance food stability (i.e. creating a stimulating environment for continuous
farming activities) and improve food utilization (i.e. making individuals aware of, and responsibly
choosing the right food to meet nutritional standards for a healthy and active life). This shows that
food security is not only a problem in developing countries but also in the more developed
countries.

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How does food get to our plates; a systems approach
In order to address food security problems, it is necessary to understand the underlying mechanisms
that are responsible for getting food to our plates. Such mechanisms can be explained taking a
linear (analytical) approach, or by using a systems approach (holistically). A systems approach
“looks at food from an interdisciplinary, integrated and wider perspective, both in terms of time and
scale”. (Tanyeri-Abur, 2014) In comparison to a linear approach the system approach creates a
more realistic view as it takes into account the context. A good way to illustrate the difference
between a linear approach and a systems approach is a visual presentation of the two approaches
using an example from North America.
Case: A dairy buying club in the USA (shortened version for the purpose of this paper)
In a specific area in the US, consumers have changed their buying habits and now prefer to buy
milk directly from the farm instead of the supermarket. As not all consumers have access to a
nearby farm, a buying club has been set up. This buying club buys milk from three dairy farms and
delivers milk every week to specified locations in different neighborhoods, where the consumers go
and pick up their milk. The milk is delivered to a refrigerator in someone’s garage, usually a
member of the buying club. The farms that supply the dairy club all raise organic pasture fed
animals and supply raw unpasteurized milk.
Source Example taken from UOC specialization Food Systems, B1.012: Food System Analysis, February
2014
Linear approach
The linear model in figure 1 below is developed to specifically demonstrate the difference between
a linear and a systems approach of dairy supply to consumers.
Figure 1 Linear model of the USA dairy case

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Systems approach
Figure 2 contains a system approach to illustrate the mechanism of dairy supply to consumers.
Figure 2 System model of the USA dairy case
Source Helder (February, 2014), UOC course Food System Analysis, activity 2: Dairy case
From the system view above it becomes clear how complex one single food system can be.
However, since a single food system interacts again with other food systems the actual complexity
is even bigger than pictured here. Thus if more consumers buy milk via this system then it has
consequences for the supermarket supply system and also for farmers who may decide to replace
animals or crops for cattle and subsequently land use might also change. Linear chains are visually
less complex as they usually leave out the behavioural or social aspects of these transactions, as
well as the larger impacts. However, the advantage is that it provides a more practical way to
visualize the actual process of transformation and exchange. (Tanyeri-Abur, 2014, p21)

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From food systems to food value chains
Over the last century, several linear based concepts have been developed. For example agribusiness,
filière, supply chain, Porter’s value chain, subsector, and global commodity chain. (Tanyeri-Abur,
2014; FAO, 2014) Since 2000, more system thinking was introduced and resulted in concepts like
net-chain, inclusive business model (IBM), and sustainable food value chains. Concepts taking the
most holistic view are the food system and the landscape system. (FAO, 2014)
In this paper, it is argued that (the more complex) food system view provides the most realistic
picture of our food mechanisms. However, for practical reasons and to stay close to the frequent
used terminology by scholars, this paper will mainly use the term food value chain. In some cases it
also uses the term value chain when it does not necessarily concerns a food related chain.
Furthermore, the term ‘food system’ is used to express the total complex network of multiple food
value chains. With the term food value chain is then meant the mechanism connecting different
processes and actors inside a chain (i.e. farmers, traders, processing manufacturers, retailers and
consumers) but possibly also outside the core chain (i.e. material input suppliers, financial
institutions, governmental organizations). Throughout the remainder of this paper, a food value
chain will be abbreviated with FVC.
A sustainable food system
The overall function or purpose of our food system is to provide nourishment to people. A second
key function is that our food system generates income for about 40% of our global work force
(FAOStat, 2011 in Momagri, 2016) and is thus an important means for people to afford food and
other basic needs (clothing, house and so on). If we want to continue profiting from our food system
it is necessary that we run this system in a sustainable way. The High Level Panel of Experts on
food security and nutrition (HLPE) has defined a sustainable food system as “a food system that
delivers food security and nutrition for all in such a way that the economic, social and

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environmental bases to generate food security and nutrition for future generations are not
compromised”. (FAO, 2015)
Unfortunately, various problems exist in our current system, each contributing to (future) food
insecurity in its own way. Some of the key problems are low/nil profitability in one or more parts of
particular food value chains (often at primary production), limited affordability/access to basic food
by part of the consumers, the spillage of raw materials and processed food at different stages
throughout the chain, environmental pollution and resource depletion by the food sector, unethical
labour conditions, unmet consumer demands, food safety issues and so on. As explained earlier,
these problems are not just related to developing regions. Many food value chains have a global
scope. Furthermore, several local food value chains in developed countries are not sustainable
either. Food value chains are dynamic as a result of, for example, changing consumer habits,
changed technology and increased (global) trade possibilities. This dynamic characteristic is likely
to cause new types of problems in future that we are not aware of yet. This paper argues that we are
still far from a sustainable food system and that continuous improvements will always be needed.
Innovative solutions to upgrade food value chains
The existing problems outlined above are of course not new. Worldwide, efforts are made to design
and implement innovative solutions to address these challenges. Such innovations can be activities
ranging from small improvements to radical changes revealed by upgrading of products,
technologies, business models, policy environments and so on. As innovation will be an important
aspect throughout this paper, it is relevant at this stage to provide a more detailed explanation of this
term.
Innovation in a sustainable FVC context
Innovation has been defined in different ways by scholars from various disciplines. The aim of this
paragraph is to give a meaningful definition for innovation in the context of efforts undertaken to

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make food value chains more sustainable. The main input for this paper’s definition of FVC
innovation comes from Baregheh, Rowley and Sambrook (2009). These scholars took a
multidisciplinary approach to innovation. As such they collected and analyzed sixty definitions on
innovations developed between 1950 and 2008 with the aim to develop a generic and integrative
definition. As a result of their analysis they proposed that “Innovation is the multi-stage process
whereby organizations transform ideas into new/improved products, services or processes, in order
to advance, compete and differentiate themselves in their marketplace”. Their analysis resulted in a
framework with six attributes for defining innovations; the nature, type, stages, social context,
means, and aim of innovation.
Table 1 Innovation attributes
Source developed for this paper from the study by Baregheh, Rowley and Sambrook (2009)
Their framework is considered a helpful tool in characterizing food value chain innovations.
Regarding the type of innovation, one often thinks first of products and services. Innovations can
however also be placed in a wider scope (i.e. changes in organizations and institutions). For
example, one could think of a new crop variety which requires less maintenance and delivers higher
yield (product innovation). Or a different sourcing model by retailers which enables less logistical
effort throughout the chain (organizational innovation). Consumers who change their eating habits
or a government changing its policies affecting food value chains are examples of institutional
innovations.

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To indicate the social context of innovation the term ‘network’ is often used. A network can be
defined as “a set of relationships through which the company acquires, assimilates, transforms and
exploits knowledge, thus serving as the medium for the combined transformation of the company’s
internal and external resources into an innovation”. (Zahra and George, 2002; Cowan and Jonard,
2004; Omta, 2004 in Lambrecht, Kühne and Gellynck 2015, p1811)
Innovation efforts aimed at ‘advancing, improving or upgrading’ food value chains so as ‘to make
them more sustainable’ are the focus of this paper. It therefore places some restrictions to the
innovation ‘aim’. Overall, for the purpose of this research, the definition of a ‘food value chain
innovation’ reads as follows:
Food value chain (FVC) innovation: the multi-stage process whereby organizations transform
ideas into new/improved products, services, processes or institutions, in order to advance, improve,
upgrade a food value chains’ economic, social and/or environmental dimension(s) without creating
a negative impact on the other dimension(s) or on other actors in the chain.
Some innovation efforts are successful in improving a particular food value chain while others fail
to have a (lasting) positive impact. It is therefore interesting to get more insight into what factors
contribute to the success of FVC innovations. This will be the high-level issue of this paper.
Success factors for food value chain innovation: Co-innovation
In the past, agricultural innovation efforts mainly focused on discovering and diffusing new
knowledge and technologies to improve agricultural production. (Röling, 2009 in Bitzer and
Bijman, 2015) However, as is now widely recognized amongst scholars, “the conceptualization of
innovation has broadened to go beyond mere technical progress and encompass changes in

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organizations and institutions”. (Cooke et al., 1997; Hall, Bockett and Taylor, 2001; Trienekens et
al., 2008 in Bitzer and Bijman, 2015, p2184)
Bitzer and Bijman argue that successful food value chain innovation requires the innovation process
to be complementary, coordinated and collaborative. Their assertion is based on literature review
(combining the two literature streams ‘innovation systems’ and ‘value chains’) and empirical
evidence. The cases they included in their study all deal with innovative solutions meant to upgrade
a particular food value chain in Africa. Solutions aiming at increasing product quality and
profitability throughout the chain or on including smallholder farmers into a FVC are examples of
such solutions.
Regarding the complementary element, a technical change such as an improved crop variety must
be accompanied by the necessary changes elsewhere in the value chain. For example with
institutional changes such as a new policy to allow the use of a new crop variety or marketing
changes to make the end-market aware of/interested in this innovation. But also organizational
changes such as farmers changing crop maintenance procedures could be needed. Bitzer and Bijman
refer to Biggs (2008) who argues that complementary changes do not come naturally and must
therefore be actively set up by the actors involved.
Coordinated innovation refers to the interconnectedness of production, distribution and
consumption activities throughout the chain. Literature on value chain governance provides
valuable insight into this matter. Within this stream, several scholars have defined and characterized
patterns of inter-firm coordination. For example Gereffi (2005), who identified five types of value
chain governance types, ranging from low to high degrees of explicit coordination and power
asymmetry. Value chains in which buying and selling parties are linked through spot markets exert
little coordination. The opposite are fully vertically integrated value chains characterized by a high
degree of coordination. In between there exist various so-called network forms (hybrids) which do
exert some degree of coordination between parties. In most cases, value chains are characterized by

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a mix of governance structures. For example in FVCs, the upstream part of the chain could be
characterized by spot market structures with little or nil coordination whereas on the downstream
side you might find hybrid, more coordinated linkages between chain parties. The Worldbank
(2007), as referred to by Bitzer and Bijman, argues that innovation is more likely in chains with
high degree of vertical coordination. The reason is that stronger coordination facilitates information
exchange and alignment of operational activities. In the same sense, an increase in for example
quality or logistical requirements in the value chain likely leads to an increase in vertical
coordination. Besides governance structures Bitzer and Bijman also mention the existence of
mechanisms for simultaneous investments as indicator for the existence of coordination in an
innovation process.
The collaborative element is explained by the extent that key actors are included in the innovation
process. Especially important to include are the potential users of any (planned) innovation output.
Furthermore, a collaborative innovation process encompasses the inclusion of different knowledge
sources, distribution of benefits and risks, and joined implementation. Collaborative processes are
characterized by patterns of interactions. For example dynamic engagement processes for
information exchange, knowledge co-creation and joint learning, established through public-private
partnerships (PPP) or innovation platforms.
Bitzer and Bijman place the combination of the three elements (complementarity, coordination and
collaboration) under the term ‘co-innovation’. They developed the following definition for co-
innovation: “joint innovation between different actors, encompassing different chain levels and
involving complementary innovations in technology, organization and institutions”. (Bitzer and
Bijman, 2015, p2184) Assuming that co-innovation is required for FVC innovations to be
successful, it would be interesting, as the authors also state, to better understand how to co-
innovation can be triggered.

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PROBLEM STATEMENT
In the section above it has been explained that coordination and collaboration are both important
patterns of interaction for successful FVC innovation processes. However, this paper argues that
the meaning of collaboration and coordination are not straightforward and are often used
interchangeably with the term co-operation . Therefore, before formulating the problem statement,
it is assumed relevant to further elaborate on how the concepts collaboration, co-operation and
coordination are related in the context of value chains.
Collaboration, coordination and co-operation in a value chain context
Soosay and Hyland (2015) did a study in which they define supply chain collaboration.
Additionally they touched on the terms co-operation and coordination, as well as possible relations
among these concepts. From the content of their article, it can be assumed that their use of the term
supply chain is similar as the term value chain used for this paper. Therefore, when ideas from their
article are paraphrased in this paper the term value chain is used.
The authors conducted a systematic literature review on value chain collaboration from articles
which were published between 2005 and 2014. For their research Soosay and Hyland selected 207
articles from 69 journals. Their analysis resulted in a structured overview of definitions for value
chain collaboration developed by scholars from different disciplines.
Soosay and Hyland confirm that a number of authors tend to use the term collaboration rather
loosely and that we need to be mindful of the various types of relationships in value chains. Not all
relationships can be called collaboration. This has also been confirmed by Gadja (2004, p66) which
statement is cited by Soosay and Hyland: “In its overuse, the term ‘collaboration’ has become a
catchall to signify just about any type of inter-organizational or inter-personal relationship”.

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Their research furthermore revealed that there exist several publications where authors equate the
word collaboration with co-operation or in some cases also with supply chain integration. Only a
limited number of scholars have made an effort to describe the distinction and/or underlying
relations between collaboration, co-operation and coordination. One of these scholars Soosay and
Hyland refer to are Singh and Power (2009, p190), who argue that “co-operation is when firms
exchange basic information and have some long-term relations with multiple suppliers or
customers”. Coordination is claimed to occur on a higher level where a continuous flow of critical
and essential information takes place using information technology. Collaboration, they contend, is
again a level above coordination and requires a high level of commitment, trust and information
sharing. Other scholars they refer to are Harrison, van Hoek and Skipworth (2014) who define
coordination in terms of established rules or customary practices whereby partners work together.
They advocate that coordination is the indispensible step to value chain integration. Similar to what
Sing and Power advocate, “collaboration goes beyond integration by including long-term
commitments to technology sharing and to closely integrated planning and control systems, where
firms become interdependent and develop common goals and governance processes”. (Harrison,
van Hoek and Skipworth, 2014, p326)
With regard to the aspect ‘interdependence’, multiple forms are described in literature. For the
depth of this paper it is believed relevant to briefly touch upon these. In an article by Kembro
(2015) the author refers to the work by Thompson (1967) on interdependence theory. Thompson
described three levels of inter-firm interdependence: (1) pooled interdependence, where “each part
renders a discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by the whole” (Thompson, 1967,
p54); (2) sequential interdependence, exists when the input of one part is directly dependent on the
output from another; (3) reciprocal interdependence, arises when mutual exchange of inputs and
outputs occurs and whereby each party poses contingency for the other. Based on the earlier

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assertions in this section, it is argued that collaboration can be characterized by the reciprocal type
of interdependence.
Overall, Soosay and Hyland mention that the key elements of supply chain collaboration found in
their study highlight that “mutually beneficial relationships are formed among firms to share
improved outcomes and benefits, which are based on appropriate levels of trust, information
sharing, joint decisions and, where necessary, processes of supply chain integration”. (Soosay and
Hyland, 2015, p617)
An interesting build on above findings is the explanation of collaboration versus co-operation from
a teaching literature point of view. Kozar (2010) explains that there is a significant difference
between co-operation and collaboration in the field of education. From an accumulation of articles,
Kozar creates the understanding that in co-operative work there is a shared goal which is divided in
smaller tasks between participants. Each participant works individually on its task to contribute to
the overall goal. In contrast, collaboration is about working closely together towards a common
goal. This way of working is characterized by a high frequency of discussion, negotiation and equal
contribution of participants. Whereas co-operative work seems to focus on producing the end-
product in an efficient way, the collaborative work style focuses more on creating new insights and
alternative solutions with respect to the end-product. In figure 3 below, the characteristics of the
three concepts and their hierarchical relation are displayed.

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Figure 3 The co-operation, coordination and collaboration pyramid
Source Developed for the purpose of this paper
Problem statement
From the literature review above, it is argued that collaboration between parties is more difficult to
achieve than co-operation or coordination. Furthermore there are only a few examples where some
firms have demonstrated a consistent ability to collaborate and so effective value chain
collaboration is rare. (Fawcett et al., 2015) This paper will therefore focus on mechanisms that can
enhance collaboration in food value chain innovation processes. As such the problem statement
reads as follows:
Problem Statement: what mechanism(s) enhance the collaboration element of co-innovation in a
FVC innovation process

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ANALYSIS OF THE CRITICAL FACTORS IN VALUE CHAIN
COLLABORATION: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Why value chain collaboration fails?
In order to define what mechanisms could enhance value chain collaboration it is helpful to first
understand why such collaboration fails. A study from Fawcett et al. is dedicated to this issue.
They use the term supply chain collaboration as defined by Fawcett, Magnan and McCarter (2008,
p93): “the ability to work across organizational boundaries to build and manage unique value-added
processes”. Furthermore, they depart from the notion that firms collaborate to obtain ‘supernormal
relational rents’. The increased profits can be explained as the additional value arising from
collaboration and which firms could not achieve independently. Such additional value, they
contend, accrues from changed roles and reconfigured resources among firms, which points to
innovative practices as defined earlier in this paper. Though, it must be noted that the collaborative
initiatives taken into account for their study might encompass less sustainable objectives (i.e aiming
at profitability for just part of the chain, ignoring the impact for the total value chain, or relational
rents). Also, from the selection of respondents in their research it can be assumed that their study
does not particularly include food value chains. However, as their findings are based on vertical
chain collaboration it is still assumed a relevant study to create insight into why FVC collaboration
fails and for hinting at mechanisms that generally can enhance food value chain collaboration. For
their empirical research, managers from 91 different companies across Europa and USA were
interviewed over a period of 6 years. The selected companies (retailers, finished good-assemblers,
direct material suppliers and service providers) were all involved in one or more value chain
collaboration initiatives.
From their preceding literature review it is understood that the organizational structure of firms is
often not adapted to collaborate well. Fawcett et al. refers to scholars such as Coase (1937) and

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Williamson (1979) who explained that most firms in the twentieth century used a transactional
approach to buyer-supplier relationships. Strategies were often based on leveraging economies of
scale and mitigating risks. Collaboration strategies however require more tightly coupled chain
relationships and thus many firms failed to collaborate (and ultimately reverted back to traditional,
transactional, relationships). Fawcett et al. integrates the force field theory to explain why firms
have difficulties to transform from a transactional approach towards a more collaborative approach.
This theory, as explained by Lewin (1951 in Fawcett et al.), submits that organizations persist in a
steady state until an external force dictates change. However, an external driving force will only
trigger structural transformation when it is stronger than the organizations’ ‘resisting forces to
change’. (Zand and Sorensen, 1975 in Fawcett et al.) These assertions are an inspiration for this
paper as it gives direction on the type of mechanisms one can think of for enhancing value chain
collaboration. Enhanced collaboration for FVC innovation might be created by exposing these
chains to particular external forces that push change. In addition, collaboration might be enhanced
through offering mechanisms that can mitigate organizations’ resisting forces. The remainder of this
section will outline organizations’ resisting forces as identified by Fawcett et al. The following two
sections will come up with external forces potentially enhancing value chain collaboration and
mechanisms that could possibly mitigate resisting forces hampering value chain collaboration.
Organizations’ resisting forces, hampering value chain collaboration
Fawcett et al. identified four dimensions of resisting forces that hinder organizational
transformation necessary for effective value chain collaboration: structural resistance, sociological
resistance, inadequate organizational routines and inadequate individual skills.
Structural resistors
Structural resistors are embedded within an organization’s design (i.e. routines, rules and roles).
Findings revealed that tension, derived from a functionally designed organization to optimize

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economic value, impedes the emergence of collaborative mechanisms and mindsets. Fawcett et al.
uses the term ‘territoriality’ in situations where, for example, decision makers focus on their own
field of expertise and goals and neglect the environment around it. Or in situations where decision
makers are concerned that others are touching their field or responsibility. Fawcett et al. claim that
territoriality is the most prevalent and problematic resistor and that “exchange partners are often
unduly preoccupied with protecting local, immediate goals and initiatives at the expense of value
co-creation.” In addition to territoriality, Fawcett et al. identified ‘strategic misalignment’ as second
form of structural resistors. They explain this by misalignment of metrics within an organization but
also inter-organizational, so between parties within a supply chain. A third structural resistor
identified is ‘poor systems connectivity’. This arose from research findings pointing at i.e. the
inability to share information due to weak internet technology (IT) systems at chain partners.
Sociological resistors
The authors subdivide sociological resistors in three groups; low trust, information hoarding and
opposition to change. An aspect that was found to impede trust between value chain parties is
asymmetric power. Power asymmetry is present when one organization is dependent on the other
but this is not reciprocal. (Ulstrup, 2013) Blomqvist (2002), as cited by Lambrecht, Kühne and
Gellynk (2015, p1811) states that “asymmetry in relationships concerns not only partners’ size and
power imbalance, but also relevant differences in their managerial systems, culture and values, and
capabilities”. Furthermore, their research revealed that only a few companies know how to build
trust. Inadequate trust and territoriality result in unwillingness to exchange information between
parties. The interviewees in their research confirmed that sharing tactical, order related information
can be enhanced by information technology. But hesitance to share strategically relevant
information such as market entry, product development and technology roadmaps remains.
Regarding the willingness to change, findings showed that managers not only avoid collaborative
change, they even oppose it. This, despite the fact that these same managers noted that the market

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place is changing, which threatens these firms’ long-term survivability. Fawcett et al. refer to
several scholars who explained such behaviour applying the threat-rigidity theory. This theory
explains that individuals react to threatening situations in a maladaptive way. (Staw, Sandelands
and Dutton, 1981) For instance, the threat of change could limit an individual’s ability to acquire
and process information. (Moon and Conlon, 2002) Furthermore, collaboration exposes decision-
makers to vulnerability which makes them unwilling to make investments and take the necessary
risks to create an effective collaborative environment. (McCarter and Northcraft, 2007; Villena,
Gomez-Mejia and Revilla, 2009; Day et al., 2013)
Inadequate organizational routines as resistors
Routines that were found underdeveloped at most firms are ‘relationship intensity’, process
‘integration’ and ‘complexity management’. Regarding relationship intensity, firms lacked skills to
identify the right partners and to build to right partnerships with them. Required skills, they argue,
are the ability to view suppliers as a source of advantage, assess partner collaboration capability,
assess value co-creation potential, dedicate time to collaboration strategies, and share benefits
mutually. With process integration, predominantly issues on companies’ internal roles division
emerged. A lack of clarity between departments, on who is responsible for which activity and
output, creates difficulties to collaborate with parties externally. Concerning complexity
management, four issues have been identified making complexity difficult to manage. First, global
value networks are inherently complex and the decision making process is further complicated by
culture, language, regulatory, political and infrastructure differences. Secondly, when the cost of
complexity is not owned by managers they are not stimulated to reduce this. For example,
marketing adding stock keeping units increases complexity elsewhere in the chain. Third, it can be
difficult for managers to distinguish between needed complexities (i.e. an alternative supplier for
stock safety reasons) and excessive complexity. Fourth, pressure for cost reduction could lead to
rationalization before understanding the value chain dynamics (lacking the system view).

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Inadequate individual skills as resistors
Company leaders often lack the skills to set the tone, commit resources and promote appropriate
risk-taking. Furthermore, their lack of collaboration vision negatively influences the entire
workforce. Research findings showed that “value co-creation will remain rare until managers are
compelled to examine how their decisions and behaviour influence larger-value systems”. (Fawcett
et al., 2015, p658) A holistic approach to building organizational routines and individual skills is a
pre-requisite for effective collaboration.
This section has dealt with possible reasons why collaboration in value chains fails. Table 2
provides a summary of these collaborating resisting forces. As suggestion for future research, it
would be interesting to test whether these resisting forces also apply to collaborative efforts for food
value chain innovation. The next section of this paper will deal with external forces that can enforce
value chain actors to collaborate for innovation. The section thereafter will deal with mechanisms to
mitigate organizations’ resisting forces.
Table 2 Overview resisting forces hindering collaborative behavior in a FVC innovation process
Source Adapted from Fawcett et al. (2015)

23
Third party power intervention (TPPI) as mechanism to enforce collaboration in
the FVC innovation process.
Numerous examples exist where external forces, such as governments, social (non-profit)
organizations and consumers, enforce individuals and organizations to change their behaviour. But
can such external forces also enhance collaboration for upgrading food value chains? According to
Sheu (2014), socio-political forces are able to indirectly enhance the collaborative relationship
amongst dyadic chain members, leading to upgraded value chains. Sheu’s findings are based on
research conducted in the fashionable consumer electronic industry (i.e. personal computers and
mobile phones) and focuses on the collaboration between brand producers and retailers. From a
governance structure perspective, brand producers and retailers included in Sheu’s research were
already linked by contract. From a sustainability point of view, value chain upgrading in Sheu’s
study is mainly related to reducing environmental pollution. Despite the fact that Sheu’s research
does not include food value chains and is limited to collaborative relationships between only two,
directly related chain actors (producers and retailers) it is still assumed a relevant input for this
paper for two reasons. Firstly, Sheu measured value chain innovation performance based on an
inter-organizational level and not on a single-firm’s performance level. Secondly, the author paid
attention in its research to the fact that value chain environmental upgrades were also
complemented with added value for consumers and had not sacrificed actors’ economic
performances. These are both important conditions for FVC innovation within this paper’s
definition. Figure 4 below displays Sheu’s contextual framework.

24
Figure 4 Sheu’s Conceptual framework
Source Sheu (2014)
The author uses the term third party power intervention (TPPI) for “the strategic intervention of any
powerful social or political organization to alleviate goal conflicts between business operations and
environmental protection”. This paper assumes that, besides environmental protection, the
definition also applies to the economic and social dimension of value chain upgrades. Power in this
context is defined as the ability to influence and control goals, decisions and behaviour of people
and organizations. This can be either coercively or non-coercively. Sheu’s study includes two
power sources: political power and social power. Political power is characterized by governmental
intervention through regulatory or economic measures. Economic measurements (or incentives)
could for instance include subsidies, advance recycling fees and penalties for regulatory non-
compliance. Social powers are exerted by non-profit organizations such as Greenpeace and can pose
challenges to value chains by for example publically rating brand producers. An example of TPPI,
in line with Sheu’s research, is the European directives that place the ultimate responsibility for
adequate disposal of fashionable electronic consumer goods with producers and/or with other chain

25
actors. Under such intervention, an organizations’ economic (i.e. sales and profits) and non-
economic (i.e. reputation) performance could be negatively impacted when one organizations’
effort to comply with regulation are counterbalanced by negligent output elsewhere in the value
chain. Basically, the dyadic value chain members rely on each other to reduce the environmental
uncertainty created by TPPI.
Based on the advances in supply chain management and resource dependence theory Sheu asserts
that increased uncertainty in the organizations’ business environment positively affects reciprocal
interdependence and reduces power asymmetry within the value chain context of his study (dyadic
chain members in the fashionable consumer electronics industry). The link to collaborative
behaviour is explained by the assertion that reciprocal interdependence stimulates a high level of
information and knowledge sharing and solving problems and conflicts jointly. Furthermore, the
author argues that mutual trust and commitment of dyadic chain members can be enhanced under
reduced power asymmetry. This likely stimulates these chain members to collaborate by jointly
responding to the increased uncertainty of caused by TPPI. The relations between TPPI, reciprocal
interdependence, power asymmetry and collaboration are displayed by the hypotheses in Sheu
conceptual framework (figure 4). The research findings show that particularly TPPI through
governmental regulation and economic incentives were found to stimulate producers’ and retailers’
awareness of the need to enhance resource and task interdependence. The overall conclusion by the
author reads as follows:
“Overall, analytical results reveal that TPPI induces the dyadic members to move towards a power-
balanced condition characterized by interdependence and power asymmetry reduction, thereby
enhancing the channel collaborative relationship, which leads to superior green supply chain
performance”. (Sheu, 2014, p2862)

26
For the purpose of this paper, it would be interesting to understand whether such TPPI can have a
similar effect on collaboration in and performance of FVC innovation processes? For instance,
could TPPI in the form of governmental regulations enhance reciprocal interdependence and reduce
existing power asymmetry between food processors and retailers? Or stimulate such effect in the
relation between primary producers and food processors or any other set of actors? Additionally,
could TPPI (indirectly) enhance collaborative behaviour amongst a network of more than two actors
within a FVC?
As purely imaginary TPPI example, one could think of a government regulation placing the
responsibility for the sale of truly nutritious and healthy food with both food processors and
retailers. When x% of a retailers’ product assortment consist of unhealthy, low nutritional products
than a retailer and/or food processor would get a financial penalty. Or be rewarded when it meets
the targets. This might increase the interdependence between both actors and might reduce the
power asymmetry. Subsequently, a more balanced power structure between these two actors will be
developed. This, in turn, could enhance collaboration and ultimately lead to an upgraded value
chain (consumers can choose from a healthier and more nutritious product assortment).
It is assumed that the degree to which TPPI enhances interdependence and reduces power
asymmetry will vary depending on the value chain context. Differences in the way TPPI affects
food value chains could be related to for example the competitive environment, trade agreements at
different levels, additional regulatory and economic measures in place, consumer preferences
reflected in price-elasticity, transport possibilities, storage life, cultural values, intellectual property
and so on.
Whether in reality TPPI through governmental regulations and economic incentives can (indirectly)
enhance collaborative behaviour in a FVC innovation process needs to be tested. To my best
knowledge, such research has not been done before. Furthermore, based on Sheu’s evidence found
in the fashionable consumer electronics value chain, it is plausible to ask oneself whether such

27
relation also exists in a food value chains. Therefore, the first hypothesis for this paper reads as
follows:
Hypothesis
TPPI through governmental regulation and economic incentives can indirectly enhance
collaboration for the FVC innovation processes.
Research methodology hypothesis
Hypothesis one will be tested on the basis of two selected cases, an FVC innovation in India and
one in South Africa. These cases have been selected based on two grounds. Firstly, both cases have
been used in other scientific literature as example of successful FVC innovation. Secondly, in both
these FVCs some level of governmental pressure was exerted in an effort to stimulate innovation
and more effective food value chains. Whether these FVC innovations can indeed be called
successful is not further assessed or argued in this paper. The remainder of this section will display
the two cases. Afterwards, each case will be analysed separately, followed by an overall conclusion
on the hypothesis.
Case 1: PepsiCo potato crisps food value chain in India
The PepsiCo potato crisps food value chain in India
This case is an example of FVC innovation in India. It is taken from the FAO’s document
“Developing sustainable food value chains: guiding principles” (2014) and completed with
additional information from a FAO report from 2009. The case originally focused on the potato
crisps chain in India, and is adapted here with more information on governmental regulations that
have played an important role in stimulating multinational PepsiCo to engage with smallholder
farmers and other stakeholders in the value chain.
Horticulture produce in India is largely marketed through traditional channels, as displayed in figure

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1. In an effort to stimulate innovation and more effective food value chains, PepsiCo was required
to export products and to work with smallholder farmers in return for obtaining government
permission to produce and sell its drinks in India. Typically, in the traditional supply chain where
the produce of several farmers is aggregated, there is no premium for quality produce. Hence the
farmer is not motivated to focus on quality issues. Since export requires a higher quality produce
and clear quality parameters, PepsiCo had to set up activities to increase the farmers’ output quality
and develop quality parameters.
Figure 1: traditional value chain for horticulture in India
Source: FAO (2009)
PepsiCo started operation in the 1980’s in collaboration with the (Punjab) State Government.
Additionally, it started a collaboration initiative with the Punjab Industries Corporation and Punjab
Agricultural University. It also linked up with the Central Potato Research Institute (CPRI) for
support in developing the agronomic practices suitable for growing new varieties.
With contract farming as main business model, PepsiCo gradually increased its interaction with
farmers. For example, PepsiCo introduced new varieties that have helped boost the state's tomato
crop from 18 000 tonnes in 1988 to 300 000 tonnes in recent years. PepsiCo has also been involved
in other production improving innovations including a Punjab government requirement to provide
four million sweet orange trees for Tropicana juices by 2008 and developing a seaweed crop for a
food gelling agent on 4 000 rafts off the South Indian coast. The company has introduced Punjab
farmers to high-yielding varieties of other crops such as basmati rice, mango, potato, chilli, peanut,
and barley, which it uses for its Frito Lay snacks or sells to domestic and international buyers. The
export obligation expired in 1993-1994. However, exports have continued to increase significantly
over the years; governmental regulations can thus be seen as the stimulus for PepsiCo to export.
PepsiCo is currently one of the largest food and beverage companies in the country. Potato is the
largest crop under contract farming to produce potato crisps. In order to better understand how
PepsiCo’s business model functions, the remainder of this case discusses the PepsiCo potato crisps
value chain in more detail.

29
The PepsiCo’s potato crisp value chain in India
Processing and quality requirements: The quality parameters for crisp potatoes set in place through
the chain are driven by the buyer requirements and specific requirements for processing.
Traditionally grown table potatoes in India have high sugar content and fewer solids. However,
processing requires potatoes with no sugar content and high solids. Apart from these requirements,
the company is HACCP- and ISO certified, which requires stringent quality control at all levels in
the chain. Specific requirements are met by ensuring quality compliance at every stage, research
and development, farming, storing, processing, and packaging. Therefore, farmers were required to
plant new potato varieties and to adopt new farming methods and post-harvest practices.
Research and development: Before introducing the varieties to the farmers, extensive trials of
various varieties were undertaken. A package of agronomic practices suitable to the local agro
climatic conditions has also been developed in collaboration with the Central Potato Research
Institute (CPRI).
Farm inputs and crop/weather insurance: PepsiCo ensures the availability of inputs to farmers
working in the area under contract. A local vendor takes care that the farmers falling under his or
her supervision have all the required inputs at the right time. Apart from providing inputs, PepsiCo
had also introduced crop insurance by the Agricultural Insurance Company (AIC) and weather
insurance from ICICI Lombard. Generally, the transaction cost of insurance companies is high
when dealing with many individual farmers. If the farmers are linked with a company like PepsiCo,
the transaction costs are significantly lowered. Hence the company was able to negotiate special
premium rates with AIC for its contract farmers. Furthermore, clearance of claims is also much
faster because of the company’s involvement instead of each individual farmer dealing with the
insurance company.
Farm production: In order to produce specific potato varieties and to enhance productivity PepsiCo
is very closely involved with its potato contract farmers. The company has employed a team of
agricultural graduates, who work with the farmers to provide technical input and to monitor the
production of the farmers in their specified area. One technical expert deals with approximately 100
farmers. Farmers reported that because of the technical information provided by company
agronomists the use of chemicals and fertilizers is much more timely and effective. The
agronomists regularly monitor the fields at the time of planting, spraying, harvesting, etc. If there is
expectation of an outbreak of any disease or pest, they inform the farmers about timely spraying.
Any major problems are attended to in priority, with inputs from the company researchers if

30
necessary. Regular scouting helps early identification of infestation by pests and diseases. This
significantly helps to reduce crop loss. It is not only the PepsiCo contract farmers but all potato
growers who benefit from early detection of diseases, which can be considered as a positive
externality of the company’s operations.
Harvesting and packaging: Traditionally, jute bags have been used for packaging potatoes. Instead
of jute bags, the company has propagated the use of plastic bags for packaging as it ensures better
storage. Grading and sorting: At the company’s unloading dock, the potatoes are mechanically
graded for size. There is also visual inspection for damaged potatoes. Sample tests are also
undertaken for solid content. Potatoes that do not meet the requirements are rejected.
Storage: Critical factors in successful storage include variety, methods of culture, harvest, field
curing, temperature and humidity control, storage and sprouting inhibition. Potatoes are stored at
12°C to control conversion of starch into sugar. At this temperature potatoes can be stored up to
four months. Potatoes are also treated to limit sprouting.
Processing centre: The selected produce is taken to the processing plant and is subjected to washing
and peeling. Peeled potatoes are subject to metal detection and inspection for physical damages and
discoloration
Benefits: A very strong extension network by PepsiCo helps to monitor and maintain quality at
every level. Evidently the farmers working as contract growers benefit on several fronts: there is
extensive training and education of farmers for proper timing and method of sowing, harvesting and
other field operations; farmers’ overall management capabilities are enhanced by meetings and
visits by agricultural experts from time to time. Gross margins for contract farmers are higher
compared to farmers growing traditional potatoes. Furthermore, because the company announces
prices ahead of the production season, they are sure of covering at least their production costs and
can invest in agrochemicals and other inputs, which in turn leads to enhanced productivity. Other
risks from crop infestation and weather changes are also minimized as the company’s extension
agents are constantly working with the farmers to give timely input on these issues. Finally, weather
insurance is also available for the company contract farmers, which further minimizes risks.
For PepsiCo, the advantage is getting an assured quantity and quality for crisp making to enable
utilization of the processing plant at optimal capacity. Direct involvement with farmers enables
good communication to ensure availability of produce which meets the specific quality
requirements for processing and indicators for the company’s HACCP and ISO certification.
There are clear signals that the traditional potato value chain is also modernizing, likely in part as

31
the result of a spillover effect from the development of schemes such as PepsiCo. (FAO, 2014)
Trust: In the absence of a legal framework, and even if there were a regulatory mechanism, trust
between both parties is important for success in contract farming. The company field officers have
close interactions with farmers to discuss issues and problems in potato production. This has
enabled them to develop trust in the company overtime. The company announces prices for potatoes
in advance, which is a critical factor in maintaining farmer loyalty. However, there is always a risk
of farmers selling to the open market when market prices are high. This issue can be addressed in
time by developing a long-term relationship with farmers. Furthermore, the company encourages
farmers to plant part of their crop for processing and a part for selling to the open market, so
farmers can capitalize on the rise of open market prices.
Sources: FAO (2009); FAO (2014)
Case 2: Citrus value chain in South Africa
The citrus value chain in South Africa
This case is an example of FVC innovation in South Africa. It is taken completely and in its original
form from the article by Bitzer and Bijman (2015) “From innovation to co-innovation? An
exploration of African agrifood chains”.
Citrus production in South Africa is strongly export oriented, and participation requires a high level
of skills to meet the high-quality demands of international buyers. Small-scale farmers are excluded
from these export chains due to smaller production volumes and their inability to comply with high-
quality requirements (Mather and Greenberg, 2003). As this exclusion mostly concerns black
“emerging” farmers, post-apartheid policies specifically aim at facilitating their inclusion into
mainstream agricultural markets.
Since the mid-2000s, governmental efforts have increasingly centred on the use of strategic
partnerships between emerging farmers, local agribusinesses and government departments based on
the recognition that first, emerging farmers do not manage to gain access to high-value markets
without external support and, second, export oriented agribusinesses are well positioned to provide
this support as they have both the knowledge of and access to production and processing factors
(Lahiff et al., 2012). By participating in strategic partnerships, local agribusinesses also signal their

32
willingness to society to contribute to broader goals of black economic empowerment and social
transformation (Fraser, 2007). The proliferation of strategic partnerships represents an explicit
departure from the historically low levels of co-operation between emerging farmers and mostly
white agribusinesses in South Africa. Hence, they constitute an institutional innovation, establishing
new norms for collaboration and support. Initial research suggests that strategic partnerships indeed
help emerging farmers with access to high-quality export markets (Louw et al., 2008).
First, market access is facilitated by introducing a set of complementary on-farm innovations as a
direct response to rising quality demands of global buyers (Bitzer and Bijman, 2014). Most of these
innovations do not represent radical changes, but rather incremental changes. At the core lie
technical changes like new cultivars and organisational changes for new farm management
practices. These organisational changes are a prerequisite for further institutional changes, such as
the introduction of standards, formal quality control and contract-based forward sales. The different
types of changes at the production level enable emerging farmers to meet international quality
requirements and decrease their competitive disadvantage compared to large farms (Bitzer and
Bijman, 2014). Second, the creation of institutionalised linkages between knowledge holders
(agribusinesses) and targeted innovation users (emerging farmers) has been critical to bring about
the required changes for accessing export markets. However, these linkages are spun between
partners that are highly uneven in terms of resources and power. Formal knowledge transfer and
interaction occurs in a one-way direction from agribusinesses to emerging farmers, making
agribusinesses the key actors who identify and organise the spaces for co-innovation (Lahiff et al.,
2012). In addition, the asymmetric power relations affect the type of innovations introduced. To
ensure that production output is increased and export standards are met, partnerships focus on a
standardised set of changes, which seems to neglect the need of emerging farmers for enhanced
innovation capacity (Bitzer and Bijman, 2014).
Finally, the alignment of on-farm changes to fit the demands of international buyers is facilitated by
the high degree of vertical coordination along the citrus export chain (see figure 1), including
contract-based governance structures and direct procurement via preferred supplier schemes by
retailers (Louw et al., 2008). Such a high degree of coordination serves to ensure that buyer-specific
and increasingly demanding quality standards are met and upheld at all stages throughout the chain.

33
Figure 1: citrus chain in South Africa
As partnerships are based on the participation of export-driven agribusiness, they facilitate
innovation through trickling down effects of market integration and the demands posed by foreign
customers. Whereas previously emerging farmers were largely excluded from export chains due to
the lack of quality products, partnerships address these challenges by creating market linkages,
bringing in the necessary knowledge and resources, and introducing different types of
complementary innovations (Bitzer and Bijman, 2014).
The citrus case from South Africa shows that a new type of institutional arrangement, such as
strategic partnerships, can act as catalyst for co-innovation for quality improvement by assisting
farmers in making the necessary technical and organisational changes required for international
market access. However, beyond the question of market access, these partnerships still need to
show their ability to contribute to poverty alleviation (Fraser, 2007; Lahiff et al., 2012).
Case analysis and conclusion of the hypothesis
Both cases have been reviewed for the existence of the three value chain co-innovation elements;
complementary, coordination and collaboration. The remainder of this analysis section will
however elaborate on the collaboration aspect only as that is the focus of this paper. It is therefore

34
expected to be sufficient to mention here, without any further elaboration, that the existence of
compementarity and coordination were found in both cases. For analysing the existence of value
chain collaboration both cases are scanned for the characteristics of collaboration as identified
earlier in the sub-section ‘Collaboration, coordination and co-operation in a value chain context’
and repeated in the table below for convenience. After both case analyses, this section provides a
conclusion on the hypothesis; whether TPPI through governmental regulation can (indirectly)
enhance value chain collaboration. Each case analysis starts with a short description of the TPPI
practiced by the countries’ government.
Table 3 Success factors for value chain collaboration
Source Developed for this paper, based on the earlier sub-section ‘Collaboration, coordination and co-
operation in a value chain context’
Analysis case 1: the PepsiCo’s potato crisps value chain in India
In the case on PepsiCo’s potato crisps value chain in India, government exerted third party power
intervention by requiring PepsiCo to export fifty percent of its revenues and to work with
smallholder farmers. For the necessary upgrading of these farmers’ quality output, PepsiCo sought
support from various stakeholders, mainly outside the core value chain. This has led to several
projects with governmental, scientific and private organizations. For example, for the development

35
of agricultural practices for farmers PepsiCo worked with the Central Potato Research Institute
(CPRI).
From a collaboration viewpoint, the case information reveals that a certain level of trust between
farmers and PepsiCo has been created (with local vendors and PepsiCo’s agronomists in between).
For the period that government required PepsiCo to work with smallholder farmers, power
asymmetry was likely reduced as PepsiCo’s allowance to operate was dependent on working with
these farmers. This might have helped to build trust initially. Since contract farming is currently still
successfully applied, it is expected that trust has remained also after the governmental requirements
ended. There also exist a degree of reciprocal interdependence between PepsiCo and farmers;
PepsiCo’s performance is dependent on the farmers’ output whilst farmers’ performance is
dependent on PepsiCo for providing input material and agronomists’ support. Benefits are
explained to be greater for farmers under the PepsiCo grower scheme compared to farmers selling
potatoes solely through the traditional value chain. Also farmers’ under this scheme perceive less
risk and are not legally bound to continue growing under this scheme. For PepsiCo there is a
relatively secure supply of quality potatoes for its processing plants. This could point at a situation
where benefits and risks are shared. However, it is unclear whether there is an equal distribution of
benefits and risks. The case shows that there is a relative high level of information sharing between
PepsiCo, state governments, research institutes and industry cooperatives. Information sharing
between PepsiCo and farmer went likely one-direction by informing farmers about the buyers’
quality requirements, and teaching them new techniques. The development of common goals and
the new value chain governance structure (more vertically integrated) happened most likely at the
project level between the above mentioned organizations and PepsiCo. It is not expected, nor visible
from the case information, that farmers had any influence on this. With respect to the level of joint
decision making, the case is not explicit about whether the ultimate business model has been
decided on jointly. Regarding the commitment to share technology, it is likely that there exist a

36
level of commitment and exchange between the participating research institutes and PepsiCo. This
assumption is based on the fact that potato variety development and food processing techniques are
both relatively capital intensive and long term projects. Mutual alignment would be ideal. However,
it is not clear whether these parties have also legally signed a commitment to use their respective
technologies. Between PepsiCo and the farmers, it is assumed a one-way flow of technological
knowledge. The case does not provide much clarity on the amount of discussions and negotiations
between parties. It is possible that farmers are just being informed about the crop prices and no long
negotiation takes place. It is assumed that more negotiation takes place between PepsiCo,
government and industry organizations about the long term directions and farmers’ compensation.
But there is no evidence for these assumptions. New insights and alternative solutions for end
products are assumed to be developed by PepsiCo internally or perhaps together with the retailer.
However, the case does not provide any information about specific collaboration between PepsiCo
and retailers. It is also not known whether retailers are in any way involved in the project. Overall,
there is evidence that collaboration takes place in the PepsiCo value chain and that it is upgraded
economically (higher revenue throughout the chain) and socially (higher quality for consumers)
compared to the traditional potato value chain.
Analysis case 2: the citrus value chain in South Africa
In the South African citrus case, government exerted third party power intervention through its
post-apartheid policies. As such, governmental efforts focus on setting up strategic partnerships
between emerging black farmers, local agribusiness (exporting companies) and government
departments with the aim to facilitate the inclusion of black emerging farmers into mainstream
agricultural markets. As such, it said to have created institutionalised linkages with new norms for
collaboration and support. However, from the case it also becomes clear that power asymmetry in
terms of resources and power still exists within the citrus value chain despite the strategic

37
partnership. It is therefore likely that trust between farmers and local agribusiness is still low.
Whether there exists reciprocal interdependence within the value chain is difficult to say. Emerging
farmers are clearly more dependent on the knowledge and network of local agribusiness for their
performance. Contract-based forward sales do create interdependence between the farmers (the
sellers) and local agribusiness (the, intermediary, buyers). Some degree of interdependence could
also have been established through the mentioned ‘preferred supplier network’ construction.
However, more information regarding the content of such contracts and the actual commitment of
international buyers to preferred suppliers would be needed to tell if this leads to reciprocal
interdependence or rather increased risk for one or more parties. It is also unclear whether black
empowerment policies require local agribusinesses to take up a certain minimum amount of citrus
produce, or to buy from a minimum number of emerging farmers. This would create reciprocal
interdependence as agribusinesses’ performance is again influenced by the quality and quantity of
emerging farmers output. The case does not disclose any numbers about how many farmers have
increased their revenue, capacity and supply network as a result of governmental supported strategic
partnerships. Nor does it tell whether farmers’ costs and risks have changed by working under this
vertically more integrated value chain. The asserted image improvement for local agribusiness has
also not been supported with facts. It is therefore difficult to make any assumption on whether
benefits and risks are (equally) shared between value chain members. Information sharing is rather
one way, from local agribusiness to emerging suppliers. New governance processes have been
established, resulting in a more vertically integrated value chain. It is however not mentioned
whether emerging farmers have had influence on this new governance structure. These new
constructions are likely driven by international buyers and local agribusiness. This is also expected
to be the case for making joint decisions on any other important value chain development. Closer
planning and control systems have been established at least one-way to ensure that buyers’ quality
standards are met and upheld at all stages throughout the chain. Long term commitment regarding

38
technology sharing is assumed not really relevant in this case since changes in agricultural practices
are rather incremental. Furthermore export of fresh fruit does not involve high processing
technologies. Whether there exist high frequency of discussion and negotiation is not clear from the
case. It might be the case that a relative high level of discussion and negotiation takes place within
the strategic partnerships between agribusiness and government, and outside the partnerships
between agribusiness and international buyers. It is not clear whether emergent farmers are heavily
involved in discussions and negotiations on prices, new crops and practices. But as it is not
described in the case, it is assumed that they have minimal influence on the outcome. Finally,
whether the strategic partnerships focus on new insights and alternative solutions with regard to the
end product is unclear from the case. It speaks about incremental innovations in farmers’ practices
and crop varieties and a more vertically integrated value chain governance structure. But it does not
provide any examples of innovations concerning the end-product (for example solutions developed
together with the emerging farmers by which they can add unique value to the citrus fruit leading to
a higher market value). All in all, from the above analysis on the citrus case in South Africa not
many aspects of true collaboration are visible in this value chain.
Conclusion hypothesis, based on the analysis of case 1 and 2
In order to accept the hypothesis, the case analysis should reveal that: (1) TPPI has been exerted
through governmental regulations or economic incentives on the particular FVC; (2) collaboration
within this FVC has increased due to this TPPI. A third relation which is important but not included
in this hypothesis, is whether enhanced collaboration has led to FVC innovation in terms of
economic, social or environmental value chain improvements. Based on only two cases it is not
possible to say with certainty whether the hypothesis should be accepted or rejected. Also, it should
be mentioned that there was relatively little information available on the South African citrus value
chain, which could lead to an incomplete case and therefore a biased output. However, even if

39
marginal, the two cases do provide some relevant information from which a cautious conclusion can
be drawn.
With respect to the first aspect, TPPI through governmental regulation did take place in both cases.
Though, this paper argues that the requirement to export goods of a determined value and to provide
farmers a fixed number of trees in India is a more obvious form of TPPI than the governmental
requirement of building strategic partnerships in South Africa. But it might well be that the South
African government also applied more strict regulations that are however not described in the case
used for this paper.
Regarding the second part of the hypothesis, there is some evidence that collaboration has been
enhanced through TPPI. In the PepsiCo potato crisps value chain three characteristics for successful
collaboration have been detected with some certainty: trust, reciprocal interdependence and sharing
benefits and risk. Compared to the traditional potato value chain in India, which is characterized by
mainly spot market governance structures (in which co-operation, coordination and collaboration
are likely nil), it is argued that TPPI has contributed to this collaborative behaviour. Furthermore,
increased reciprocal interdependency and reduced power asymmetry (which positively affects trust)
were also the two elements found to enhance value chain collaboration in the more extensive
empirical research carried out by Sheu. On the other hand, this paper argues that, in the citrus value
chain in South Africa, there is not found sufficient evidence to assert a positive relation between
TPPI and enhanced value chain collaboration. It is therefore necessary to better understand under
which circumstances TPPI through governmental regulations and economic incentives can enhance
value chain collaboration, and when not. Looking at the different value chain contexts between
India and South Africa, some aspects could be considered to affect the relation between TPPI and
collaboration in FVC innovation processes.
For example the length of time might play a role. This does not only concern the period during
which a specific regulation is exerted but also the time it takes to develop value chain collaboration

40
(which can be called an institutional innovation). Especially the former apartheid regime in South
Africa might still cause difficulties for the predominantly white agribusinesses and black emerging
farmers to work together collaboratively. By “establishing new norms for collaboration and
support” behaviour might not change overnight. A relevant article to refer to for this matter is that
of Williamson (2000) on the New Institutional Economics (NIE). Williamson asserts that
innovations in the formal institutional environment (i.e. polity, judiciary and bureaucracy) could
take ten to hundred years. Changes in informal institutions, customs, traditions and religious norms
could even take up hundred to thousand years. Williamson has placed his assertions in a clear visual
overview, included in appendix 1 of this paper.
Another possible influencing factor is who are targeted by the TPPI. For example in India state
government placed obligations to a multinational food processor. In the case of the citrus value
chain in South Africa, local agribusiness was targeted. Would we have found different results on
FVC collaboration when international retailers were required to join these strategic partnerships?
A third point would be the type of regulations and economic measures. Were requirements to form
strategic partnerships or to place export requirements the most effective regulations to enhance
collaborative behaviour in these contexts?
Fourth, the freedom for national governments to design regulations and economic incentives needs
to be within global and regional trade agreements. As the trend is to liberalize markets, it would be
interesting to understand how this places restrictions in using TPPI as mechanism to enhance
collaboration for FVC innovations.
Overall, I would conclude that the case analysis did reveal some evidence that TPPI in the form of
export requirements and direct smallholder farmer support, targeted at a multinational processor,
does enhance collaboration in the potato crisps value chain in India.

41
Table 4 Analysis output case 1 and 2
Source Table developed for this paper
The potential for innovation brokers in mitigating FVC collaboration resisting
forces
In many cases, value chain innovation projects involve an intermediary body to facilitate the
process. It would be interesting to understand if and how such intermediary agents can play a role in
mitigating resisting forces hampering collaboration in food value chain innovation processes. This
section will first provide a general understanding of intermediary agents and the services they can
bring. Additionally, it will include findings from scholars on how intermediary agents brought value
to FVC innovation processes. Finally, a link is made between these findings and the resisting forces
that are listed in the sub-section ‘Why value chain collaboration fails?’.
Literature contains several terms indicating an innovation intermediary such as: innovation broker,
change agent, network orchestrator, network broker, systemic broker, and catalytic intermediary

42
body (Batterink et al., 2010; Klerkx, Hall and Leeuwis, 2009; Kilelu, Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2013;
Roy and Whelan, 1992) However, in defining the term multiple articles cite Howells (2006, p720)
who defines an innovation intermediary as “an organization or body that acts as an agent or broker
in any aspect of the innovation processes between two or more parties”. This paper will use the term
‘innovation broker’ (shortened ‘broker’) and adopts as well the definition provided by Howells.
Just as diverse the existing terms are, so varied are the characteristics of innovation brokers
identified by scholars. For example, a broker can work independently as specialist or being linked
to a governmental body, research centre, non-governmental organization (NGO), commodity board
or other institute. Furthermore, the broker function can also be played by a large and dominant firm
that is part of the original network (a so-called commercial hub). (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006 in
Batterink, 2010) There exists brokers who solely focus on providing services to individuals (i.e. to
farmers), to a cluster of homogenous actors (i.e. farmer organizations, industry) or serve a more
complex network (i.e. a network including farmers, industry, government and knowledge institutes).
Broker services can be offered through human interaction or via online portals (i.e. databanks
providing agricultural data). Some innovation brokers are regional experts and work in either
developed or developing countries and on particular issues only, whereas others participate in
global innovation projects and possess multiple skills and expertise. (Klerkx, Hall and Leeuwis,
2009)
The definition of innovation broker adopted in this paper is rather broad and as such does not
provide much clarity on a brokers’ role and activities. There is however abundant literature on this
issue. Kilelu (2013), whose study focuses on innovation brokers supporting Small and Medium
Enterprises (SME), argues that brokers can help resolve issues like cognitive distance between SME
and external actors, high transaction costs and information asymmetry. Other scholars provide more
detailed lists of functions which could be divided over three basic aggregate functions: demand
articulation, network composition and innovation process management. (Batterink, 2010; Klerkx,

43
Hall and Leeuwis, 2009) Table5 is a summary of functions as provided by different scholars,
grouped under these three basic functions.
Table 5 Overview of brokers’ functions in value chain innovation processes
Source Table developed for this paper
There are however also negative aspects attached to innovation brokering in value chain innovation
processes. Klerkx, Hall and Leeuwis (2009) describe three types of risks and drawbacks: neutrality
tension, functional ambiguity, and invisible effects which can cause unwillingness to pay.
Neutrality tension refers to the situation where brokers face difficulties to stay impartial and take in
an independent position. This can happen when stakeholders (i.e. financers or participants) put
pressure on the broker to steer a project towards their individual objectives. Functional ambiguity
can happen when a broker acts in several different projects and as such has overlapping functions.
Participants might see a broker as a competitor instead of facilitator. The added value of typical

44
broker services are difficult to evaluate through the traditional methods aimed at ‘hard’ facts (for
example SMART). Willingness to (continue) paying an innovation broker can therefore be an issue.
(Klerkx, Hall and Leeuwis, 2009)
Despite these drawbacks, could an innovation broker enhance collaboration for FVC innovation
processes? As mentioned at the beginning of this section, it is expected that innovation brokers
might play a role in mitigating the collaborating resisting forces as listed in table 2. Comparing
these resisting forces with the different functions described in table 5, theoretically, innovation
brokers could have a mitigating effect on quite a number of resistors.
- Territoriality
- Strategic misalignment
- Low trust
- Information hoarding
- Opposition to change
- Relationship intensity
- Complexity management
It is therefore recommended that future research test the hypotheses that
Innovation brokers have a mitigating effect on collaborating resisting forces, thereby enhancing
collaboration for FVC innovation processes.

45
CONCLUSION
The literature study in this paper is an attempt at providing additional insight into how food value
chains can be made more efficient in their role of contributing to food security. Upgrading a food
value chain implies change, which is why an innovation approach has been taken for this paper. The
theoretical foundation for this paper is the co-innovation concept, which implies that successful
FVC innovation processes are characterized by multiple complementary innovations, realized in a
coordinated and collaborative way.
This paper argues that the collaborative aspect is not always correctly interpreted within science and
practice and is therefore underestimated in its practicability. This paper concentrated first on
clarifying the term collaboration in relation to co-operation and coordination. The literature review
resulted in a set of ten characteristics for successful collaboration and the notion that there exists a
hierarchical relation between co-operation, coordination and collaboration. Furthermore, it is argues
that, from the three concepts, collaboration is the most difficult to achieve. Consequently, the
ultimate focus for this paper has been on defining mechanisms that can enhance the collaborative
element of co-innovation in a FVC innovation process.
Indications from the field force theory, which has not been further elaborated on, hinted at two
possible mechanisms that could possibly enhance collaboration in FVC innovation processes: (1)
third party power intervention (TPPI); (2) innovation brokers. For both factors a hypothesis has
been created. However, only the hypothesis on TPPI has been tested in this paper. The hypothesis
on innovation brokers has been developed as suggestion for future research.
The hypothesis, that TPPI through governmental regulation and economic incentives can indirectly
enhance collaboration for FVC innovation processes, is based on empirical evidence from the
fashionable consumer electronics. The underlying explanation is that TPPI could create

46
uncertainties within organizations’ business environment. This in turn is expected to increase
reciprocal interdependence and reducing power asymmetry between dyadic chain members, which
might lead to collaborative behaviour. The hypothesis has been tested by means of two existing
cases extracted from literature, one FVC innovation from India and one from South Africa. The
findings presented some evidence for accepting the hypothesis. However, as this is only based on
two cases extracted from literature, future research is necessary to support this conclusion.
The hypothesis left untested in this paper asserts that innovation brokers have a mitigating effect on
collaborating resisting forces, thereby enhancing collaboration for FVC innovation processes. This
hypothesis has been developed by combining two topics of research. First, it has looked at a study
that researched factors of value chain collaboration failures. This study described eleven factors that
are seen as resisting forces hindering organizations to collaborate for value chain innovation
processes. For example, territorial behaviour, strategic misalignment, opposition to change and
information hoarding. In a second step, this paper then looked at whether innovation broker
activities could mitigate such collaboration resisting forces. Literature review resulted in an
extensive list of typical innovation broker functions. For example, facilitating in solving conflicts,
stimulate change, articulating an innovation vision and making external relations available to a
network of actors. By comparing the eleven resisting forces with the list of functions that innovation
brokers typically are engaged in it is expected that, theoretically, multiple resisting forces could be
mitigated by innovation brokers. This then could subsequently enhance collaboration for FVC
innovation processes. Whether this theoretical assertion is valid in practice needs to be tested in
future research.
So how does this paper contribute to insight into how FVCs can be made more efficient? Firstly,
this paper has developed a definition for FVC innovation that distinguishes innovations for the
purpose of developing sustainable food value chains with those innovations aimed to upgrade only

47
part of a food value chain. Secondly, the Indian FVC innovation case included in this paper for
testing this paper’s hypothesis adds to the credibility of the co-innovation concept. With that, this
paper stresses the usefulness of the, relatively recent, co-innovation concept as guide in developing
and analysing FVC innovation processes. Third, this paper brings the importance and complexity
of collaboration for FVC innovation processes to the attention. Fourth, it has laid a foundation for
further research into mechanisms that can enhance collaboration for FVC innovation processes.
From a policy perspective it is important to understand that there might be a relation between TPPI
and innovation broker brokerage efforts on collaborative behaviour in FVC innovation processes.
Limitations of this study and suggestions for further research
The study for this paper has a number of limitations. Firstly, the hypothesis has been tested based
on only two cases retrieved from literature. Credibility would increase when more cases would be
added. Furthermore, it is argued that analyzing the presence of success factors for collaboration
delivers more insight when done through interviews with key actors involved in a FVC innovation
process. Secondly, the success factors for value chain collaboration used for the hypothesis testing
are likely a mix of criteria and characteristics. This neglects the possibility that some factors could
have a reinforcing effect on the other factors. A third limitation is that the relation between TPPI
and collaboration has been based on only one earlier study done in the fashionable consumer
electronics sector. It would be better to have a profound theoretical understanding of how exactly
TPPI through governmental regulation and economic incentives can affect collaboration for FVC
innovation processes.
Suggestions for future research are therefore as follows. More research would be required into how
TPPI affect collaboration and subsequently lead to successful FVC innovation. Also, it would be
worthwhile to investigate which type of governmental regulations and economic incentives would

48
be most effective in enhancing collaboration and furthermore at whom in the value chain such
measurements should be targeted. Besides governmental intervention, third party power could also
be caused by for example social (non-profit) organizations, consumers and natural catastrophes.
Therefore, extending research with different third party powers could be valuable. Finally, as the
hypothesized mitigating effect of innovation brokers on collaboration resisting forces has not been
tested in this paper, this would be another suggestion for future research.

49
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APPENDICE
Appendix 1
Source Williamson (2000)

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