Depledge Striving For No

Striving for No Joanna Depledge

Research Articles
Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the
Climate Change Regime
•
Joanna Depledge

Introduction
A key starting point for the conduct of global negotiations under the UN system
is that delegations are actively seeking an agreement that will meaningfully ad-
dress the problem at hand. Sometimes, however, negotiations must contend
with cases of obstructionism, that is, negotiators who are at the table with the
aim of preventing an agreement. Given that they face no imperative of striking a
deal, governments for whom “no” is the preferred outcome can have a dispro-
portionately high impact on the negotiations, not only by formally blocking
agreements, but on a day-to-day basis by slowing down progress or souring the
atmosphere. This article examines Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the climate
change regime, and argues that the delegation has long played the role of ob-
structionist. This is not the only case of obstruction on the international stage,
or indeed in the climate change regime, but it merits particular analysis for two
main reasons. Firstly, as a strong example of obstruction, Saudi Arabia’s partici-
pation in the climate change negotiations sheds light on this rather under-
studied phenomenon in international relations.1 Secondly, the story of the
Saudi delegation’s role throughout the history of the climate change negotia-
tions remains largely untold in the literature, despite its inºuence on the politi-
cal dynamics of the regime.2
The article begins with a discussion of the nature of obstructionism, be-
fore analyzing the speciªc circumstances of Saudi Arabia, and the setting of the
climate change regime, that have facilitated its emergence as an obstructionist.
The article then examines Saudi Arabia’s participation in the climate change ne-
gotiations, and considers its effectiveness in the pursuit of its goals. Finally, the
article investigates options for addressing obstructionism, and considers possi-
ble signs of change in Saudi Arabia’s approach to climate change and the negoti-
ations.

1. Although see Wallihan 1998; and Zartman and Rubin 2000.
2. Although see Grubb et al. 1999, 57; and Oberthür and Ott 1999, 26, 64 and 84.

Global Environmental Politics 8:4, November 2008
© 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

9

10 • Striving for No

Diagnosing Obstructionism
The study of obstructionism can face a tricky problem of diagnosis.3 It is to be
expected of all negotiators that they will vigorously defend their national inter-
ests. To this end, negotiating strategies can span a wide spectrum, from coopera-
tive, problem solving approaches, to more competitive, aggressive behavior.
Blufªng, posturing, double-blufªng, threatening, bribing, horse-trading, exag-
gerating demands, sealing secret deals—all are integral to global negotiations,
even among negotiators anxious for a strong agreement. To a large extent, there-
fore, obstructionism is a matter of degree. What distinguishes a systematic ob-
structionist from an occasional one, however, is the sustained and aggressive use
of obstructionist tactics over time, applied not just on one or two issues but on
the general thrust of the negotiation process. In essence, obstructionists are ac-
tively seeking as little progress as possible, as late as possible, and would be con-
tent with, and even prefer, no agreement.
Why do governments join a negotiation whose concerns they apparently
do not share, or whose aims they reject? The short answer is because they fear
the agreement that others might reach. In this sense, obstructionism is a particu-
lar feature of large multilateral negotiations on collective action problems, nota-
bly environmental ones, where a state may harbor concerns over the negative
side effects of serious measures to tackle the problem. In such cases, a state may
join a negotiation process not only to promulgate its own concerns, but also in
an attempt to stop others from reaching a strong collective deal, or to delay and
weaken that deal. This is made easier by the fact that the UN system rarely places
constraints on participation in global negotiations, especially on environmental
matters, where maximum involvement is seen as desirable, even from those
who do not share the negotiating aims.
Obstructionist delegations do not need to be large or powerful, in terms of
political, economic or military resources, to exert considerable inºuence over
the course of a negotiation. Downie, for example, refers to an “exploitable
power to destroy,” of which Saudi Arabia would be a prime example, given its
large oil reserves.4 Saudi Arabia, however, does not need to invoke the potential
carbon emissions that lie under its territory in order to obstruct negotiations.
There are many other, more prosaic tools at the disposal of potential obstruc-
tionists. Zartman and Rubin, for example, note that dawdling, blustering, stone-
walling, appealing to rules and “generally making a nuisance” are highly effec-
tive tactics, enabling comparatively weaker states to upstage the more powerful,
especially in a context of consensus decision-making;5 it is, of course, always
easier to block consensus than to advance a new initiative. Fundamentally, how-
ever, the leverage exerted by obstructionists lies in the fact that their negotiating
goal is not a substantively meaningful agreement. As Fisher et al. note in the

3. Wallihan 1998.
4. Downie 1999, 104.
5. Zartman and Rubin 2000, 277.

Joanna Depledge • 11

elaboration of their concept of “best alternative to a negotiated agreement”
(BATNA), “the relative negotiating power of two parties depends primarily
upon how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement.”6 The
very attractive BATNA of obstructionists—that is, they actually prefer non-
agreement—raises their bargaining leverage in the negotiation.
Linked to this, obstructionists tend to be relatively unconcerned about
seeming obdurate or extreme in their positions, thus increasing their room for
maneuver compared with other delegations, for whom maintaining a reputa-
tion for cooperation may be more important. The most active obstructionists
also tend to be those who do not fear domestic opprobrium, either because the
dominant domestic constituencies approve of the policy of obstructionism,
or because the government is not operating within an open political system
with active channels of accountability, such as a free press and strong non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).

Saudi Arabia and the Climate Change Regime
Diagnosis of Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism in the climate change regime is
made easier by the openness of the delegation concerning its aims and tactics.
The Saudi delegation is often very candid in threatening to block progress (see
examples below). Perceptions of Saudi obstructionism are also widely held
among climate change delegates and other observers of the climate negotia-
tions. Oberthür and Ott, for example, claim that “OPEC [Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries] members . . . and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in partic-
ular . . . missed few opportunities to slow down progress”7 during the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations. The environmentalist newsletter ECO agrees that “Saudi
Arabia’s efforts to destroy the Kyoto Protocol are now legendary.”8 Kjellén, a vet-
eran negotiator, speaks of the “sometimes ªlibustering tactics of the Saudis”
that have “undoubtedly slowed down negotiations.”9 Developing country dele-
gates interviewed by Dessai widely perceived OPEC “as having a negative, ob-
structive role in the process.”10 Reporting on negotiations in 2004, the inde-
pendent newsletter the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) wrote of the
“concern” of delegates “at the clear endeavors by oil-producing countries . . . to
wash down all attempts to address future actions and adaptation . . .”11 Re-
porting on the 2007 Bali Conference, the Guardian newspaper (UK) described
Saudi Arabia as “a regular obstructer at such talks.”12
On most days during the climate negotiations, ECO awards a “fossil of the

6. Fisher et al. 1992, 106
7. Oberthür and Ott 1999, 26.
8. ECO 2000.
9. Kjellén 2008, 77.
10. Dessai 2004, 20.
11. ENB 2004e.
12. Adam 2007.


day” to the delegation deemed to have taken the most environmentally regres-
sive stance that day. Saudi Arabia is a frequent recipient of that award. On
awarding Saudi Arabia a “fossil of the day” at the eighth Conference of the
Parties13 (COP 8) in 2002, ECO commented “never have we seen more success-
fully destructive tactics on their part.”14 In 2004, ECO reported hearing from a
Saudi delegate that the delegation “viewed receipt of the Fossil awards as a mat-
ter of national pride and aspired to get as many as possible to show how effec-
tive (obstructive) it was.”15
The nature and timing of Saudi Arabia’s adherence to the 1992 UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
suggest a possible obstructionist motive for joining the climate change regime.
Saudi Arabia only acceded to the UNFCCC once it had already come into force,
and just in time to enable its full participation in decision-making during the
last few days of the ªrst COP in 1995, where it fought hard—although ulti-
mately in vain—to prevent the launch of negotiations on what became the
Kyoto Protocol. Its accession to the Kyoto Protocol also appears strategic, only
taking place once it became clear that the Kyoto Protocol would enter into force,
following ratiªcation by the Russian Federation. Saudi Arabia acceded in time
to ensure that it would become a Party—and therefore able to fully inºuence
proceedings—at the ªrst session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 1) in November 2005.16 It is
interesting to note that eight OPEC members waited until there was certainty
that the Kyoto Protocol would enter into force, and then acceded to it within a
few months17 (the Protocol had been open for ratiªcation for six years, receiving
128 ratiªcations, before that point).

The Saudi Position on Climate Change
Saudi Arabia’s position on climate change is clearly founded on its fears over the
potential negative impacts of climate change mitigation policies on its econ-
omy. These fears are unsurprising, given Saudi Arabia’s heavy dependence on
the oil sector, which in 2002 accounted for 77 percent of government reve-
nues.18 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ªnds that de-
veloping country oil exporters are the most exposed to efforts to cut greenhouse
gases, and will tend to bear costs higher than those of the mitigating developed
countries.19 Beneath this headline, however, the story is more complex. Re-

13. The annual Conference of the Parties is the regime’s supreme decision-making body.
14. ECO 2002.
15. ECO 2004.
16. The CMP is the main decision-making body under the Kyoto Protocol. Kyoto Protocol non-
Parties may participate as observers, but may not take part in decision-making.
17. Out of the other two OPEC members that are Convention Parties, and therefore eligible to be-
come Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Iran acceded in August 2005 and Libya in August 2006.
18. Saudi Arabia 2005, ªg 3.6.1, p. 20.
19. IPCC 2007, chapter 11.7.5; also Bartsch and Müller 2000.


viewing the literature, the IPCC predicts “lower demand and prices and lower
GDP growth” for oil exporters, but notes that the extent of impacts “depends
strongly on assumptions related to policy decisions and oil market condi-
tions.”20 Predicted economic impacts therefore vary widely.21 What can be said
with certainty is that the choice of instruments to tackle climate change is criti-
cal. Economic modeling shows that emissions trading can signiªcantly lower
negative “spillover” effects on oil exporters, while there is also potential for oil-
price protection policies. The IPCC concludes that studies tend to overstate costs
across the board, because they do not model for non-energy means of tackling
climate change (e.g. forestry measures), as well as policies such as removal of
subsidies on all fuels and energy tax restructuring. At another level, oil markets
are subject to a host of driving forces and, given the lack of readily available al-
ternatives to oil in the transport sector, it is unlikely that climate change policy
will be the major factor determining oil revenues in the foreseeable future (at
the time of writing, oil prices were around the $100 mark). All these analyses
also ignore the economic costs and other impacts of climate change itself. The
situation is therefore complex, inherently uncertain, and subject to considerable
amelioration through policy intervention.
Saudi Arabia, however, has consistently focused on “bad news” in relation
to the costs of mitigation, focusing on studies that predict the most dramatic
economic losses. On announcing that the Kingdom would accede to the Kyoto
Protocol, for example, Minister Al Naimi (Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources), predicted that, by 2010, Saudi Arabia would “lose at least $19 bil-
lion a year as a result of the policies the industrialized nations will adopt to re-
duce their greenhouse gas emissions.”22 This “bad news” interpretation is, in
turn, bound up with wider Saudi discontent over perceived market distortions
in industrialized countries,23 which are seen to disadvantage oil relative to other
fossil fuels (coal still receives considerable support in some developed coun-
tries).
Linked to this, Saudi Arabia has historically adopted a skeptical—or “good
news”—attitude towards climate change science, honing in on uncertainties and
downplaying potential impacts. Its attacks on the IPCC’s 1996 Second Assess-
ment Report, both in the IPCC itself and later in political discussions under the
climate change regime, are legendary.24 Although straight denial of climate
change science is no longer tenable, and Saudi Arabia now states its acceptance
of the reality of the problem,25 this has not stopped the delegation from contin-
uing to seek to water down the conclusions of the IPCC, including in its most
recent fourth assessment report (4AR).26 This skepticism towards the science,
20. IPCC 2007, Summary for Policymakers, para.9, emphasis added.
21. See IPCC 2007, chapter 11.7.5; also Barnett et al. 2004.
22. Reuters 2004.
23. See, for example, Saudi Arabia 2007.
24. Oberthür 1996; Gelbspan 1997; and Leggett 1999.
25. Saudi Arabia 2005; 2007; 2008.
26. See ENB/IPCC 2007a and b; also New Scientist 2007.


coupled with a bad news interpretation of mitigation, means that Saudi Arabia
appears to view action to tackle climate change as more of a threat than the
problem itself. Even today, Saudi Arabia regularly insists that the Convention is
not an energy treaty. While this is self-evident to most delegations, the fact that
Saudi Arabia feels the need to make this point indicates the extent to which it
feels threatened by the regime.
Although such a stance was probably inevitable at the start of the climate
change negotiations, it is remarkable how stable it has remained over time.27
The Saudi position can be contrasted with that of South Africa, another fossil
fuel exporter. Although the South African economy is more diversiªed than that
of Saudi Arabia, it is still highly dependent on the coal sector. South Africa is the
world’s second largest coal exporter, with developed countries accounting for 80
percent of its coal exports.28 South Africa is much poorer than Saudi Arabia, and
coal is more vulnerable to climate policy than oil, given its higher carbon con-
tent and the greater availability of alternatives. South Africa, however, has
adopted a more balanced view of the risks posed by climate change and mitiga-
tion measures, translating into a far more constructive role in the negotiations.
Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism has manifested itself in different ways over
time. In some cases, Saudi Arabia has explicitly argued for proposals that would
directly lead to a weaker or less effective outcome. An example is Saudi Arabia’s
2005 proposal that the compliance system agreed under the Kyoto Protocol
should be adopted by a formal amendment.29 Given that an amendment must
be ratiªed by three-quarters of the Protocol’s Parties before it enters into force,
and is only binding on those Parties having ratiªed it, this would have stalled
the work of the compliance committee and weakened the Protocol’s impact.30
In many other cases, Saudi Arabia has simply sought to prevent or slow down
progress, either on the general thrust of the negotiations, or on speciªc agenda
items. Saudi Arabia was very active, for example, in seeking to stall the adoption
of the emerging Convention in the early 1990s.31 Saudi Arabia then tried hard to
block the 1995 Berlin Mandate that would launch negotiations on what became
the Kyoto Protocol.32 In 1996, Saudi Arabia was again at the forefront of efforts
to stop recognition of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration,33 an important mile-
stone in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. In 1999, Saudi Arabia played an im-
portant role in blocking the appointment of facilitators to help advance negoti-
ations in the run-up to the crucial COP 6 meeting.34 In terms of speciªc agenda
items, key targets for Saudi Arabia have been emissions from international avia-
27. Kjellén 2008. Kjellén suggests that “the policy choice” of obstructionism “was not necessarily
obvious.” During the 1970s oil shocks, the Saudi Oil Minister took the line that, as oil was
bound to become increasingly valuable, it should stay in the ground as long as possible. Kjellén
2008, 75.
28. South Africa 2000, section 3.9.
29. UNFCCC 2005.
30. Wittneben et al. 2006; and Müller 2006.
31. See Kjellén 1994; and Paterson, 1996.
32. See Paterson 1996; and Oberthür and Ott 1995.
33. See Oberthür 1996.
34. ENB 1999, 7.


tion and shipping (“bunker fuels”), debates on the IPCC, compliance under the
Kyoto Protocol, and good practices in policies and measures.

The “Adverse Effects” Agenda
As noted above, Saudi Arabia has understandable concerns about securing its
economic future in a carbon-constrained world. The Convention itself recog-
nizes the special situation of developing countries in a range of circumstances,35
including countries “highly dependent on income generated from . . . fossil fu-
els . . .”.36 The Kyoto Protocol carried through this recognition.37 In the post-
Kyoto negotiations, Saudi Arabia’s concerns have been addressed through a de-
bate on so-called “adverse effects.”38 As part of this debate, Saudi Arabia high-
lights the potential negative impacts of climate policy on oil exporters, and lob-
bies for special provisions, from more research to ªnancial and technical
assistance. Within this agenda, and in the wider negotiating arena, Saudi Arabia
also seeks to uphold the continuing use of oil and promote non-energy means
of tackling climate change, notably carbon capture and storage (CCS), as well as
cleaner fossil fuel technologies, elimination of coal subsidies and tax restructur-
ing.39
The “adverse effects” agenda has an instructive history. In late 1996, in the
heat of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Chairman, frustrated at Saudi Ara-
bia’s continuous complaints over the economic impacts of emission targets,
called for constructive suggestions on how to address these concerns. The result
was a proposal for ªnancial compensation for adverse economic impacts, which
was presented simultaneously by Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates and Venezuela.40 Demands for such compensation were unac-
ceptable to the developed countries who would be taking on targets, and were
interpreted by some as simply a means of narrowing the zone of agreement,
that is, making demands without any real hope that they would be accepted,
but simply in order to block consensus. Whatever the motivation, agreeing a
follow-up analytical process on adverse effects41 was one of the prices paid for
securing OPEC acquiescence to the adoption of the Protocol.42
The post-Kyoto “adverse effects” agenda could have formed the basis for a

35. Article 4.8. The range is so broad—from mountainous territories to land-locked nations—that
one is hard-pressed to identify a developing country not reºected there.
36. Article 4.8h. See also Article 4.10, which refers to all Parties (not just developing countries) po-
tentially adversely affected by response measures.
37. See Articles 2.3 and 3.14.
38. See www.unfccc.int, link on “cooperation and support,” then “response measures,” for a brief
introduction (accessed on 10 September 2008).
39. A more detailed exposition of Saudi Arabia’s negotiating position can be obtained from its sub-
missions to the UNFCCC, reprinted in ofªcial “MISC” documentation, all of which are avail-
able from the UNFCCC website documentation search engine.
40. See UNFCCC 1997. Rumors claimed that the proposal was drafted by a US climate-skeptic
lobby group.
41. See Kyoto Protocol Articles 2.3 and 3.14; decision 3/CP.3.
42. For a negotiating history, see UNFCCC 2000.


more cooperative negotiating strategy on the part of Saudi Arabia. This has hap-
pened to some degree, in the sense that Saudi Arabia has shown itself willing
(albeit reluctantly and often aggressively) to compromise, modify and scale
back its demands on this topic in order to accommodate a consensus. Work-
shops and expert meetings have been held on related issues, and demands for
compensation have been largely superseded by (more realistic) calls for win-
win policies, technical assistance with economic diversiªcation, and help with
ªnancial risk management in order to achieve economic “resilience.”
However, in other respects, the issue of adverse effects has been used by
Saudi Arabia as another platform for obstruction (see examples below). A major
casualty in this respect has been the issue of adaptation to the impacts of cli-
mate change. Early on in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Saudi Arabia sought
to link its situation with the much more widely-held concerns of many other
developing countries over the impacts of climate change itself. By forging and ex-
ploiting this link,43 Saudi Arabia secured sufªcient support from the G-77,
along with the reluctant attention of the industrialized countries, who are com-
mitted to assisting developing countries adapt to the impacts of climate change.
This linkage, however, has been to the profound detriment of negotiations on
adaptation,44 not least because Saudi Arabia has often made its support for
progress on adaptation contingent on progress on its own concerns relating to
response measures.

Political Circumstances and Alliances
Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism is best understood in the broader context of cli-
mate change politics. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia is allied to powerful oil
and coal lobbies within industrialized countries, primarily the US, and also
Australia.45 In this sense, Saudi Arabia represents the more extreme end of a
broad coalition of fossil fuel interests who still oppose strong action on climate
change. The economic and political power held by these interests undeniably
strengthens Saudi Arabia’s hand, and vice-versa. Accounts abound of how Saudi
Arabia and other OPEC members collaborate with lobby groups from the coal
and oil industries in the climate change negotiations.46 OPEC delegates deep in
conversation with well-known industry lobbyists are a familiar sight in the cor-
ridors of the climate change meeting halls, and there is little doubt that well-
funded climate-skeptic lobbyists47 have provided strategic and legal advice to
OPEC delegations. Following the US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol, Saudi
Arabia and the US delegation itself appeared to be working more closely to-

43. See Mwandosya 2000; Dessai 2003 and 2004; and Barnett and Dessai 2002.
44. Dessai 2004.
45. Leggett 1999; Oberthür and Ott 1999; and Dessai 2004.
46. Oberthür and Ott 1999; Leggett 1999; Newell 2000; Gupta 2001; and Dessai 2004.
47. Such as the Climate Council, under the late Don Pearlman.


gether,48 with the Saudi and US delegations not infrequently the lone voices
holding out against agreement.49
In formal terms, Saudi Arabia operates within the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) and the wider OPEC.50 Although the GCC and OPEC rarely for-
mally speak together, their members do coordinate positions. The GCC, in par-
ticular, is “well-disciplined, with a uniªed policy”51 in the climate change re-
gime, and GCC members can be relied upon to echo Saudi statements in the
negotiations.52 The wider OPEC, however, is a more heterogeneous group. Non-
GCC OPEC states, such as Libya, Nigeria or Venezuela, often support Saudi Ara-
bia, but not automatically so.
A very important dynamic shaping the actions of Saudi Arabia concerns its
relationship with the wider developing country Group of 77, whose 130 plus
members coordinate their negotiating positions in many UN forums. OPEC is a
key player in the G-77, with an OPEC member (but not Saudi Arabia) having
chaired the Group in the UN ªve times in the past decade.53 This has enhanced
OPEC’s inºuence over the G-77 position in the climate change regime, although
the extent to which this has veered towards obstructionism has varied depend-
ing on the G-77 Chair.
One of the puzzles for observers of the climate change regime is why the
G-77 has tolerated Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism for so long, given that so
many of its members are among the most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of
climate change. Alliance of Small Island States, for example, have long called for
aggressive emission cuts in order to stave off sea level rise, while least developed
countries are highly vulnerable to drought, ºoods and other weather extremes.
Of course, it helps that Saudi Arabia is among the best resourced of the develop-
ing countries, and has impressive negotiating capacity and skills. Reportedly,
Saudi Arabia has also offered ªnancial incentives to poorer developing coun-
tries in return for their support in the negotiations.54 More generally, Saudi Ara-
bia has ªnancial ties outside the regime that poorer developing countries will
wish to protect.
Importantly, Saudi Arabia has been able to capitalize on the underlying
mistrust that many developing countries feel towards industrialized countries,
and the strong desire of the G-77 to remain united. The mediocre progress made
by industrialized countries in tackling their emissions, the small sums of money
disbursed to assist developing countries in tackling climate change, the lack of
any serious effort on technology transfer—all these are very real issues, and play

48. Ott 2002.
49. Wittneben et al. 2007, 100.
50. OPEC has 11 members, 10 of which are Convention Parties: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait*,
Libya, Nigeria, Qatar*, Saudi Arabia*, United Arab Emirates*, Venezuela (* indicates GCC
members, which also include Oman and Bahrain).
51. Müller 2003.
52. For an example of the GCC view on climate change, see Arab Times 2007.
53. 1998 (Indonesia), 2000 (Nigeria), 2001 (Iran), 2002 (Venezuela), 2004 (Qatar).
54. Personal communication by a G-77 delegate, 2008.


into the hands of the obstructionists.55 In this sense, Saudi Arabia does genu-
inely articulate many concerns shared (though perhaps not so extremely) by
other developing countries. Its procedural quibbles reºect wider disquiet
among small developing countries over the difªculties they face in effectively
participating in the negotiations. Its emphasis on the negative economic im-
pacts of mitigation policies echoes the (perhaps more nuanced) fears of some
larger developing countries. At times, therefore, Saudi Arabia may act as a partic-
ularly strident mouthpiece behind which others—although rarely the poorest
and weakest—can hide.
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the broader G-77 is a symbi-
otic one. On issues where other powerful developing countries are active, or
where the G-77 as a whole has a well-developed position that extends beyond
the climate change regime, such as technology transfer, ªnancial issues, and de-
veloping country reporting, Saudi Arabia remains largely silent. Similarly, on
the key question of developing country commitments, although Saudi Arabia
has been active in opposing these, it has not needed to take a particularly prom-
inent role, given the strong positions of China, India, Brazil and other large na-
tions. Instead, Saudi Arabia tends to focus on those issues where there is no
uniªed G-77 position (notably adverse effects), or which have traditionally
been of less interest to most other developing countries (notably bunker fuels,
and policies and measures). Just as the G-77 generally tolerates Saudi Arabia,
Saudi Arabia is absolutely dependent on the G-77 for the pursuit of many of its
demands.56 As discussed further below, on the few occasions where Saudi Ara-
bia has been isolated within the G-77, and other inºuential G-77 members have
been prepared to oppose its proposals, it has had to retreat.57
Interestingly, Saudi Arabia tends to be most active during sessions of the
regime’s more technical subsidiary bodies—the Subsidiary Body for Scientiªc
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation
(SBI)—the two Ad Hoc Working Groups,58 and lower-proªle COP and CMP ses-
sions. During the most important sessions, where key decisions are to be
adopted, Saudi Arabia tends to play a less prominent role,59 with its obstruc-
tionism obscured by wider, and higher level, political dynamics. Like delega-
tions from other groups, the G-77 itself is more active and better resourced dur-
ing major negotiating sessions, often with higher-ranking negotiators. Saudi
Arabia’s room for maneuver is therefore more restricted at those times.

55. Kjellén 2008, 77.
56. Kjellén 2008, 77.
57. For more on the inner workings of the G-77, see Mwandosya 2000.
58. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention
(AWGLCA), and the Ad Hoc Working Group on further commitments for Annex I Parties under
the Kyoto Protocol (AWGKP), are negotiating the next set of agreements under the climate
change regime, with a deadline of COP 5/CMP 15 in Copenhagen, December 2009.
59. The formative stages of the negotiations, on the Convention and Berlin Mandate, were an ex-
ception.


The Saudi Delegation
The Saudi delegation is highly skilled. The de facto head of delegation,
Mohamed Al Sabban, is renowned for his ability to spot opportunities to push
his country’s agenda forward. “Brilliant and stubborn,”60 he possesses many of
the traits deemed necessary to exert inºuence in a negotiation: self-assurance, te-
nacity, eloquence, excellent English skills, and profound knowledge and under-
standing of the issue at hand.61 Mr. Al Sabban’s impact on the Saudi delegation,
and on the climate change negotiations as a whole, has been immense. Leggett
describes him as “a man with years of experience of how to frustrate progress
and slow the pace of climate negotiations,”62 while a highly-respected veteran
negotiator, interviewed by the author in 2000, described him as “the main
ªlibuster of the whole exercise.”63 In this respect, it is important to remember
that negotiations are highly socialized and personal processes, where individual
personalities and dynamics can inºuence outcomes as much as national posi-
tions.64
The Saudi delegation is medium-sized, averaging around 13 members
since 2002 at subsidiary body sessions,65 and nearly 18 members at COP/CMP
sessions. This delegation size is roughly what would be expected, given Saudi
Arabia’s population and GDP.66 A striking feature of the delegation, however, is
its consistency. This has undoubtedly helped to increase the effectiveness of the
delegation, as well as contributing to the stability of the Saudi position on cli-
mate change. Mr. Al Sabban, for example, is almost unique among government
delegates in having apparently attended every single climate change negotiating
session since 1991. Moreover, the same minister—Mr. Al Naimi—has repre-
sented Saudi Arabia at all COP sessions since 1998.
Another feature of the Saudi delegation is the sustained dominance of the
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MPMR). Minister Al Naimi and
Mr. Al Sabban hail from the MPMR, which has the largest number of representa-
tives on the delegation. This dominance by an energy ministry is atypical in the
climate change negotiations, where environment ministries tend to enjoy the
greatest representation on the average delegation. Even among the delegations
that deviate from this average, there is generally a more even spread of represen-
tatives among ministries.67
The dominance of the MPMR reºects the early focus of Saudi Arabian cli-
mate change policy on its economic, rather than environmental, dimension. In
this sense, Saudi Arabia could be said to be ahead of the game among develop-

60. Kjellén 2008, 77.
61. See Zartman and Berman 1982; Fisher et al. 1992; and case studies in Kaufmann 1996.
62. Leggett 1999, 227.
63. Depledge 2001, 115.
64. See Kramer and Messick 1995; also Kaufmann 1996.
65. The Bangkok meetings in 2008 were an exception, with a delegation of only 5 members.
66. See analysis in Müller 2003.
67. Müller 2003.


ing countries; several commentators, including a former Executive Secretary of
the climate change secretariat, have called for the greater involvement of eco-
nomic ministries in the negotiations.68 Without such involvement, it is argued,
climate change will only be seen as a soft issue, and not be taken seriously
within national polities. Developing countries, in particular, traditionally sent
delegates from meteorological or other scientiªc departments to the negotia-
tions, rather than the industry or planning ministries who set the policies that
really affect carbon emissions. The structure of the Saudi delegation shows it has
taken the opposite tack; it took the economics of climate change very seriously
almost immediately, focusing almost entirely on the economic implications of
a carbon-constrained world, rather than the negative environmental impacts of
climate change.
Saudi Arabia’s ability to act in an obstructive manner may well be en-
hanced by the nature of its government. The Saudi delegation evidently enjoys a
broad mandate, and is less constrained than, for example, the EU by scrutiny
from a critical media and watchful domestic NGOs. Its comparative wealth
means it can adequately ªnance and support its delegation, certainly more so
than most developing countries, while it can also draw on the resources of the
Vienna-based intergovernmental organization that supports OPEC.

Procedural Power
A key way in which Saudi Arabia has maximized its impact has been by assum-
ing positions of procedural power within the regime, either for itself, or for fel-
low OPEC countries. Saudi Arabia and OPEC colleagues have, for example, se-
cured continuous representation on the COP Bureau, a group of 10 delegates,
elected on rotation, with responsibility for advising the COP President. Al-
though OPEC does not have a formal seat on the Bureau (these are allocated ac-
cording to the ªve UN regions, with an extra seat for the small-island states),
there is an understanding that it must always be represented through one of the
regional groups. COP Bureau members are privy to the thoughts of the COP
Presidency, as well as advance and conªdential information, so participation is
useful to anyone seeking to inºuence the negotiation process. Having an OPEC
representative on the COP Bureau can also be useful for the Presidency and sec-
retariat, in order to provide advance warning of anything that could provoke ob-
structionist moves. Saudi Arabia has also managed to get itself appointed as is-
sue coordinator for the G-77 on many of the issues it cares about most deeply.
G-77 issue coordinators can exert considerable inºuence over the position of
the Group, as it is their job to liaise with interested developing countries, help
forge a common position, and negotiate on behalf of the Group. In addition, an
OPEC member has often served as the developing country Co-Chair for infor-
mal negotiating groups on the adverse effects agenda. Unsurprisingly, OPEC has
extended this approach to other UN forums where climate change is discussed.

68. Personal communication; also Zammit Cutajar 2004.


Qatar, for example, served as Chair of the Commission on Sustainable Develop-
ment (CSD) during its 15th session in 2007, when climate change and energy
featured as major themes.
Saudi Arabia’s power in the climate change regime is magniªed by the
practice of consensus decision-making. The Parties to the climate regime have
famously been unable to agree on a voting rule for substantive decisions, and ef-
forts to do so have now almost ground to a halt. Saudi Arabia has played a key
stalling role in this respect, thereby ensuring that its preferred decision-making
practice—consensus—has become the default in the regime. The implications
of this have been explored elsewhere.69 The key point, however, is that consen-
sus is an onerous requirement, and one that potentially enables a single country
to block the adoption of a decision, or threaten to do so. This strengthens the
hand of obstructionists, who are most likely to want to block decisions. More-
over, the looseness of the concept—there is no ofªcially recognized deªnition
of consensus—means there is considerable room for a skilful negotiator to out-
wit an unwary Chair (but also, of course, vice-versa).

Obstructionist Tactics
How does Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism manifest itself? Some of the tactics de-
ployed for obstructionist purposes are outlined below. These are not mutually
exclusive and often overlap, or have been employed to varying extents at differ-
ent points in the negotiations. It is also important to stress that these tactics are
not the preserve of Saudi Arabia. Other Parties may be moved, at times, to block
progress through procedural arguments, or invoke implausible excuses for re-
fusing to negotiate. What marks Saudi Arabia out as an obstructionist, however,
is the sustained use of such tactics throughout the regime’s history. It is also
noteworthy that these tactics are often accompanied by a confrontational ap-
proach, which can be unusually aggressive for a UN diplomatic setting. In 2005,
for example, ECO awarded Saudi Arabia a “fossil of the day” for its “rude inter-
ventions targeted at the Chair and other Parties.”70
Although Saudi Arabia was similarly, if not more, active during earlier ne-
gotiations,71 most of the examples below have been taken from the post-Kyoto
period, speciªcally from 1999 onwards, in order to demonstrate the contempo-
rary relevance of the delegation’s role.

Parallel Progress
A key tactic deployed by Saudi Arabia has been to demand “parallel progress.”
That is, the delegation has repeatedly and openly threatened to block progress

69. See Yamin and Depledge 2004.
70. ECO 2005.
71. For brief references to Saudi Arabia’s participation in the Convention and Protocol negotia-
tions, see Mintzer and Leonard 1994; Leggett 1999; Oberthür and Ott 1999; Mwandosya 2000;
and Depledge 2005.


on an item it is less concerned about, if insufªcient progress is made on another
issue that it does care about, usually adverse effects.72 In 1999,73 for example,
Saudi Arabia withdrew its objections to a text on compliance only when agree-
ment was reached in another negotiating forum on adverse effects.74 In 2000, at
the critical COP 6 meeting, Saudi Arabia threatened that, if a “friends of the
chair” group was convened on policies and measures, it would withdraw its sup-
port for a similar group to be established on the ºexibility mechanisms.75 In an-
other example, in 2002, Saudi Arabia “refused to negotiate after a time” on poli-
cies and measures “citing a lack of progress”76 in negotiations on adverse effects.
In 2007, Saudi Arabia warned that, if developed countries did not agree to its
demands on adverse effects, this “could result in issues of importance to certain
other parties being blocked, too.”77
As noted above, the key casualty of “parallel progress” has been the issue
of adaptation. Consideration of the topic has been frequently held up—not just
in the formal negotiations but also internally within the G-77—by insistence on
the part of Saudi Arabia that advances in discussions on adaptation, such as
consideration of a workshop report or debate on new proposed text, be mir-
rored by the same advance in debates on the impacts of response measures.78 In
2008, for example, insistence on symmetrical language relating to funding/
insurance/technology transfer for adaptation to climate change on the one
hand, and for the “impacts of response measures” on the other, was the ªnal
question to be resolved in negotiations on the review of the Protocol.79

Repetition and Propagation
Saudi Arabia has adopted what might be termed a “repetition and propagation”
strategy on adverse effects, that is, repeatedly proposing new agenda items on
the matter and continuously invoking the issue under other agenda items. It has
done so to such an extent that it has, at times, become an obstruction to negoti-
ations on other issues, expending time, energy and goodwill. The opening of ne-
gotiating sessions in the climate change regime have often involved “agenda
ªghts” resulting from Saudi Arabia’s efforts to raise the proªle of adverse ef-
fects.80 Unswerving insistence on a dominant focus on adverse effects under
other agenda items has also frequently thrown the item in question into stale-
mate. At the 2007 Bali Conference, for example, ECO awarded Saudi Arabia a
“fossil of the day” for its aggressive insistence on language relating to adverse ef-

72. Dessai 2004.
73. To improve readability, reference is made to the dates of negotiating sessions, rather than their
formal names.
74. ENB 1999, 10.
75. ENB 2000e, 3.
76. ENB 2002c, 14.
77. ENB 2007a, 13.
78. Personal communication by a G-77 delegate, 2008.
79. ENB 2008b, 16; and UNFCCC 2008.
80. E.g. see ENB 2002a; ENB 2002c, 3; and ENB 2007a, 3 and 13;


fects in negotiations on the review of the Protocol.81 Such aggressive insistence
happened again on the same issue in 2008, as noted above. In this case, “min-
imization of adverse effects” already appeared as a core issue to be considered in
the Protocol review, but Saudi Arabia argued that “impacts of response mea-
sures” should also be added to a new list of “other issues,” in parallel with pro-
posed language on adaptation.82
Most notably, the slow progress in negotiations on policies and measures
over the past few years can be largely attributed to Saudi Arabia’s determination
that discussions should focus overwhelmingly on adverse effects. The item on
policies and measures was ªnally removed from the SBSTA’s agenda in 2008. Al-
though this was, ostensibly, to avoid duplication, there is little doubt that it rep-
resented a victory for OPEC countries, which have long sought to sideline the is-
sue.
The tactic of “repetition and propagation” has, at times, backªred. In
2006, for example, Saudi Arabia called for an item on Kyoto Protocol Article
3.14 (minimizing impacts of emission targets) to be added to the SBI agenda.83
This was a perfectly legitimate move, given that CMP 1 had adopted a decision
on this topic the previous year. However, an item on Kyoto Protocol Article 2.3
(minimizing impacts of policies/measures) also featured on the SBSTA agenda
(in addition to another SBI item covering adverse impacts under the Conven-
tion). Developed countries, highlighting duplication, insisted that the items on
Articles 2.3 and 3.14 should be addressed together. Saudi Arabia, leading the G-
77, refused, arguing that the two items should be dealt with separately in differ-
ent groups. The result was no substantive discussion under either item. Finally,
in 2008, Saudi Arabia acquiesced to the discussion of the two items in a single
contact group,84 with its willingness to compromise no doubt motivated by the
closure of the agenda item on policies and measures.

Postponement and Delay
A common means of obstructing proceedings is to seek postponement and de-
lay. The IPCC, policies and measures, and bunker fuels agenda items have been
the main focus of Saudi Arabia’s efforts in this respect. At COP 7 in 2001, for ex-
ample, Saudi Arabia held up agreement on follow-up work on the IPCC’s Third
Assessment Report (TAR), calling for postponement until the next session.85 In
doing so, it gained important concessions on other points. Earlier in 2001, at
the resumed COP 6, Saudi Arabia called, ultimately unsuccessfully, for the post-
ponement of work on policies and measures until after COP 7.86 Then, in 2002,
it insisted, successfully, on delaying the adoption of any substantive conclusions

81. ECO 2007.
82. ENB 2008b, 16; and UNFCCC 2008.
83. UNFCCC 2006, paragraph 5; and ENB 2006b, 15.
84. ENB 2008b, 15.
85. ENB 2001b, 8.
86. ENB 2001a, 9.


on the topic until the following session.87 In 2006 (with the US and Australia),
it objected to a proposed roundtable, and argued instead for removing the item
on policies and measures from the agenda for four years (a two-year postpone-
ment was agreed).88
A similar approach has been used on bunker fuels. In 2002, for example,
Saudi Arabia called for further work on the topic to be set back by two years (a
one year postponement was agreed).89 In 2005, the delegation, with other
OPEC states, successfully prevented the launch of a process on bunker fuels.90 In
2006, it proposed to delete the entire agenda item; although this was not ac-
cepted, no substantive conclusions could be agreed, leading Norway to make
the unusual comment that “no progress was made due to ‘small number of par-
ties’ objections.”91 An almost identical scenario took place in 2007.92 In 2008,
Saudi Arabia claimed that discussion on further action to tackle bunker fuels
would require an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. The delegation then suc-
cessfully insisted that the Chair’s summary of views on this particular issue (but
not on others) be placed in square brackets, despite the intent of the Chair’s
summary to reºect all views.93

Refusal to Negotiate
A related means of delaying proceedings is to refuse to negotiate, invoking (un-
likely) excuses. There are many examples of Saudi Arabia doing this, including
when serving as G-77 coordinator (see below). In 1999, for example, Saudi Ara-
bia repeatedly missed small-group meetings on bunker fuels, despite its posi-
tion as G-77 coordinator, citing the improbable cause of the smallness of its del-
egation; it then refused to consider text presented to plenary, on the grounds
that it had not been able to participate in the talks.94 In 2000, in the run-up to
the crucial COP 6 meeting, Saudi Arabia was serving as G-77 coordinator on re-
porting/review provisions under the Kyoto Protocol. Day after day, and each
time new text was presented, Saudi Arabia claimed that the G-77 had had
insufªcient time to consider the issues and therefore refused to participate fully
in negotiations.95 In 2002, when Saudi Arabia was serving as G-77 coordinator
on policies and measures, the delegation claimed that the G-77 “had not had
enough time”96 to consider the text and refused to negotiate. It did so again in
2004, repeatedly asking for more time to consider a secretariat document.97

87. ENB, 2002c, 6.
88. ENB 2006a, 12.
89. ENB 2002b.
90. ENB 2005a, 5.
91. ENB 2006b, 9.
92. ENB 2007a, 12.
93. ENB 2008b, 7.
94. ENB 1999, 15; and ECO 1999.
95. ENB 2000a, b, c, d.
96. ENB 2002c, 6.
97. E.g. ENB 2004b.


Holding Out
Saudi Arabia is well known for holding out—that is, refusing to join the consen-
sus, either alone or with a small number of supporters—for as long as possible.
In 2004, for example, proceedings were delayed for many hours by Saudi Ara-
bia’s insistence (and that of the Russian Federation) on the inclusion of its pro-
posals in conclusions on the IPCC TAR, despite the fact that these had already
been debated at length in an informal group.98 At a previous session of the
SBSTA, Saudi Arabia alone had held up agreement with its objections to conclu-
sions on the TAR, on the grounds that the negotiation process had been “un-
fair.”99 When the IPCC’s subsequent 4AR was presented to the climate change
regime, Saudi Arabia insisted (successfully) on the deletion of text inviting min-
isters to consider that report in their statements to the forthcoming Bali Confer-
ence.100 Even on technology transfer, which is not usually a focus for Saudi Ara-
bia, the delegation held up agreement in 2004 by insisting on a paragraph on
fossil-fuel technologies.101 In 2003, Saudi Arabia allegedly went back on its word
given in an informal group that it would support a text on adverse effects.102 This
was especially signiªcant, as a key norm of global negotiations is that text ex-
plicitly agreed by a delegation in an informal group will not then be reopened
once it reaches plenary. In negotiations preceding the 2007 Bali Conference, is-
sues relating to the possible adverse spillover effects of climate mitigation mea-
sures, along with references to the lowest emission stabilization scenarios (the
latter opposed by Saudi Arabia), were the ªnal questions holding up the close of
the session.103

Exploiting the Position of G-77 Coordinator
There is evidence that Saudi Arabia has exploited its position as G-77 coordina-
tor on particular agenda items, notably bunker fuels, and policies and measures.
On these issues, Saudi Arabia has been accused—including by fellow G-77
delegates—of articulating a distorted G-77 position, claiming a common G-77
position where there is none, failing to attend meetings or comment on circu-
lated text, and neglecting to keep the wider G-77 informed of developments.104
In 2003, for example, other G-77 members, notably Samoa, objected that “one
party” had adopted “more than a liberal interpretation”105 of the mandate given
to it by the G-77 on policies and measures. This happened again on the same is-
sue in 2004, when Saudi Arabia’s claim to speak for the G77 was challenged by
the group of least developed countries.106 At the same session in 2004, there was
98. ENB 2004d.
99. ENB 2002b.
100. ENB 2007a, 7.
101. ENB 2004c.
102. ENB 2003b.
103. ENB 2007b, 4.
104. Dessai 2004.
105. ENB 2003a.
106. ENB 2004a, 6.


also disquiet at the stance taken by Saudi Arabia as G-77 coordinator on bunker
fuels, whereby it had opposed any future work on the topic. In the ªnal plenary,
Argentina and the Alliance of Small Island States (G-77 members), contested
Saudi Arabia’s claim to speak for the Group, but no substantive text could be
agreed.107

Procedural Blockage
A classic obstructionist tactic is to invoke procedural rules to delay the negotia-
tions, crossing the ªne line that exists between lodging genuinely held concerns
over procedural issues in good faith, and deliberately using ªne print to frus-
trate the negotiation process. Saudi Arabia has undoubtedly sought to interpret
particular rules in such a way as to stall the regime’s progress, although this is a
tactic that has been less used in recent years. For example, during the Kyoto Pro-
tocol negotiations, Saudi Arabia put forward an interpretation of the Conven-
tion’s rules whereby the complete text of the protocol under negotiation would
have to be circulated six months before its adoption, and then remain un-
changed. This interpretation was clearly unworkable, and would have brought
the negotiations to a halt. It was eventually dismissed by an alternative opinion
from the UN Ofªce of Legal Affairs.108 More routine procedural rules that have
been invoked by Saudi Arabia mostly concern demands for interpretation and
translation, as well as objections to the convening of small groups and insis-
tence on the completion of meetings exactly on schedule. Interpretation and
translation are of great importance to all non-Anglophone delegates, especially
small developing countries. However, at critical points in a negotiation process,
lapsing into English-only is usually tolerated, if reluctantly, as the only way to
strike a deal. Similarly, an established practice in the climate change regime lim-
its the number of meetings that can take place simultaneously to two. However,
when negotiations are at their most intense, a proliferation of negotiating fo-
rums is usually endured.109 Saudi Arabia has sometimes taken an opportunist
stance to these rules and practices, choosing to raise procedural objections spe-
ciªcally when it would advance its aims in relation to particular agenda items.
For example, in negotiations to design a compliance system for the Kyoto Proto-
col, Saudi Arabia (and other OPEC states) refused to proceed with a ªrst reading
of a draft text, on the grounds that it was circulated only in English.110 Objec-
tions by the G-77 on procedural grounds were also an important feature of COP
6 in The Hague, where negotiations eventually collapsed. On just one day of ne-
gotiations, for example, Saudi Arabia itself objected to proposals to convene
small groups on reporting, policies and measures, and compliance.111 Although

107. ENB 2004a, 4.
108. See Depledge 2005.
109. See Depledge 2005.
110. ECO 1999.
111. ENB 2000e.


not the primary cause of collapse, such procedural blockage undoubtedly con-
tributed to that session’s failure.

The Effectiveness of Obstructionism
To what extent has Saudi Arabia been successful in its obstructionism? The an-
swer is complex. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia has failed to stop the develop-
ment and strengthening of the climate change regime, including the adoption
and entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and Marrakesh Accords, and the
launch of a new round of negotiations in Bali in 2007. Indeed, the only case so
far when negotiations actually collapsed, at COP 6, was not primarily caused by
Saudi Arabia, but by disputes among the industrialized countries. It is therefore
important not to overstate Saudi Arabia’s inºuence. In Bali, for example, it was
the political struggle between the US and the largest developing countries—
notably China, India and South Africa—that decided the ªnal outcome, not
Saudi Arabia. This conªrms the observation that Saudi Arabia tends to be more
active during lower-proªle negotiating sessions, rather than the landmark con-
ferences.
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia has been extremely successful in diverting the
agenda and debates of the climate change regime away from those issues it op-
poses, and towards those it supports. In this respect, the glacial pace of progress
on its key targeted agenda items—especially bunker fuels and policies and mea-
sures—is striking compared with the increasing time and energy devoted to ad-
verse effects. Another consequence has been to spoil the atmosphere of the cli-
mate change negotiations on a day-to-day basis, taking up valuable time and
generally fraying the nerves of delegates. Perhaps most signiªcant is the exacer-
bation of mistrust between industrialized and developing countries. Many in-
dustrialized country delegates ªnd it difªcult to understand why, as they see it,
the G-77 indulges Saudi Arabia in this way, and the lack of comprehension,
even irritation, felt by some increases the alienation between the two groups.112
By pushing the broader G-77 to support, or at least acquiesce to, many of its de-
mands, Saudi Arabia has made it more difªcult to reconcile industrialized and
developing country positions. Misrepresentation of the G-77 position has been
particularly problematic. In this sense, Saudi Arabia’s actions have probably
held back the emergence of more constructive alliances and relationships across
industrialized and developing countries.
Ironically, although Saudi Arabia may have scored some success in ad-
vancing its interests, its tactics may eventually backªre. By adopting such ex-
treme and aggressive positions, Saudi Arabia has alienated other delegations, in-
cluding donor countries, and has mostly failed to persuade others of its case.
Instead, Saudi Arabia has largely become a caricature in the climate change re-

112. Kjellén 2008, 77.


gime, with its demands and complaints almost summarily dismissed by many
others as predictable and unreasonable.

Tackling Obstructionism
Tackling obstructionism is not easy, because of the ªne line between it and legit-
imate hardball bargaining. The presumption of good faith held by both aca-
demics and practitioners also means they largely lack the tools to analyze or
deal with the problem. The veneer of courtesy and diplomacy that pervades a
global negotiation in all but its most heated moments makes it difªcult to con-
demn obstructionists. To publicly accuse a country of obstructionism is a very
serious charge, and one that diplomats are loath to level at one another. Even
when tempers have snapped and delegates have denounced obstructionism,
they have tended not to actually name the parties involved (see, for example, the
Norwegian statement cited above).
Obstructionism can be managed in a variety of ways. One is through
strong and judicious chairing, whereby the chair of the negotiations can distin-
guish cases of obstructionism from good faith grievances, in order to expose
and isolate these in an authoritative manner, and then to defuse them in various
ways. Examples of such skilled chairs include Raul Estrada-Oyuela, Chair of the
Kyoto Protocol negotiations, and Espen Ronneberg, Chair of the post-Kyoto
compliance negotiations.113
A second effective means of tackling obstructionism has been through the
unity of the G-77, which has also been helped by skilful chairing of the Group.
On the few occasions where Saudi Arabia has been isolated within the G-77, it
has been compelled to back down. The classic example of this occurred at COP
1, where India led the majority of the G-77 to break away from OPEC and en-
dorse a mandate to launch negotiations on what became the Kyoto Protocol.
This led to a split in the G-77, which has never been repeated since.114 A less dra-
matic, but still important, example was the incident in 1999, where Saudi Ara-
bia’s refusal to endorse a decision on compliance was ªnally resolved partly be-
cause Iran, a fellow and inºuential OPEC member, appealed to Saudi Arabia to
join the consensus.115 Something similar happened at CMP 1 in 2005, where
lack of support from the G-77 encouraged Saudi Arabia to eventually back
down from its insistence that the compliance system should be adopted only by
way of an amendment.116 Kjellén, co-chair of the post-Kyoto negotiations on ad-
verse effects, recalls that “it was striking how Dr. Al Sabban could change his po-
sition very rapidly, if G 77 consensus risked being jeopardized.”117 A further ex-

113. Depledge 2005, chapter 4.
114. See Mwandosya 2000, for an account of how this G-77 Chairman maintained the Group’s
unity.
115. ENB 1999.
116. ENB 2005b, 12–13.
117. Kjellén 2008 , 77.


ample occurred in 2005, when Saudi Arabia had to withdraw its objections to
the SBSTA agenda when the G-77 spokesperson and several individual develop-
ing countries refused to support its demands.118
Another strategy that has, at times, averted obstructionism has been side
payments, or trade-offs, made outside the regime. One intriguing question is
why Saudi Arabia did not object to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, when it
could have declared no consensus, or objected on (perfectly valid) procedural
grounds (e.g. absence of interpretation at the point of adoption). Judicious
chairing provides some explanation, as does the possible reluctance of Saudi
Arabia to block major decisions at the point of adoption, despite its threats to
do so. Probably just as important, however, were the promises that were report-
edly made to Saudi Arabia by Japan to purchase oil, along with other pledges.119
Examples of such trade-offs are, of course, difªcult to pin down with any cer-
tainty, but a possible more recent case is worth mentioning. The 2008 Bangkok
meetings saw a breakthrough of sorts on bunker fuels, with Saudi Arabia quietly
scaling down its participation in the negotiations, and in so doing, enabling a
substantive discussion on the topic for the ªrst time in many years.120 A few
weeks previously, following a visit to Riyadh by the Norwegian Oil and Energy
Minister, Norway and Saudi Arabia had agreed to work together to promote
the inclusion of CCS technology under the clean development mechanism
(CDM).121 Norway is at the vanguard of CCS technology, which is, as noted
above, an area of considerable interest to Saudi Arabia. It is difªcult to dismiss
the thought that Saudi Arabia’s less obstructive stance on bunker fuels at that
session may have been connected to its new found alliance with Norway, one of
the strongest supporters of action on that issue.
Generally, the parties to the climate change regime have shown remark-
able tolerance towards Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism. This partly reºects the
pervasive view in the global environmental arena that regimes should be all-
inclusive and embrace even the most reluctant participant, even if this slows
down the regime. This view, in turn, is founded on the liberal institutionalist be-
lief that learning promoted by regimes—through the diffusion of information
and exchange of views—will eventually soften extreme positions and persuade
reluctant participants to modify their approach. In the case of Saudi Arabia,
there have been moves to persuade the Kingdom away from its bad news stance,
notably by seeking to demonstrate that oil markets are unlikely to be seriously
threatened by climate policy.122 Addressing the 2007 Third OPEC Summit, for
example, the UNFCCC Executive Secretary used energy data to argue that cli-
mate change mitigation could open up economic opportunities, and that “for
the coming decades—possibly longer—oil is here to stay.” Tellingly, he advised

118. ENB 2005a, 3.
119. See Oberthür and Ott 1999.
120. See ENB 2008a.
121. Reuters 2008.
122. E.g., see Grubb et al. 1999, 57, footnote 18.


OPEC delegates that “your opportunity lies in becoming key to the solution,
rather than being perceived as part of the problem.”123 As argued throughout this
paper, however, Saudi Arabia’s position has remained remarkably stable and
consistent over the past 15 years. Part of the problem may be that, while endur-
ing Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism, other delegations have not really taken its
concerns seriously and genuinely sought to address them. Certainly, oil-import-
ing industrialized countries have dealt inconsistently with Saudi Arabia, speak-
ing to the Kingdom in one voice in the climate change regime, and with another
in forums where they seek stable and plentiful supplies of oil.124

Conclusion: Beyond Obstruction?
Saudi Arabia’s ªrst national communication to the Convention,125 submitted in
2005, hints at a possible reorientation of the Saudi approach. This report, pre-
pared under the responsibility of the Presidency of Meteorology and Environ-
ment, presents a more balanced approach than that propounded by the delega-
tion in the negotiations. Although the report maintains that responding to
climate change will badly harm the Saudi economy, it takes for granted the po-
tential severity of climate change, acknowledges that “Saudi Arabia is particu-
larly vulnerable”126 to its impacts, presents a detailed discussion of that vulnera-
bility, and puts forward a reasoned and measured case for assistance with
economic diversiªcation. Another development in 2006 was the convening, at
Saudi Arabia’s initiative, of an international conference on the CDM.127 This
suggests growing recognition within Saudi Arabia of the economic opportuni-
ties presented by the CDM and the pragmatic calculation that these should not
be squandered. There is certainly great potential for external investment in car-
bon mitigation in Saudi Arabia, given its large per capita emissions—especially
if CCS activities are included in the future. Despite concerns over its economic
costs, environmental implications, and technical feasibility, CCS is an area with
potential for constructive cross-over between the interests of Saudi Arabia and
some other industrialized nations, as illustrated by the case of cooperation with
Norway discussed above.
In late 2007, Saudi Arabia hosted the Third OPEC Summit, where envi-
ronmental concerns featured as one of the primary themes. The Declaration em-
anating from the Summit displays a clear acceptance of human-induced climate
change, and the responsibility of OPEC countries to address the problem.128 As
would be expected, it emphasizes technological responses to climate change,
along with non-energy sectors such as forestry, and the special circumstances of

123. UNFCCC 2007, emphasis added.
124. Zammit Cutajar 2004.
125. Saudi Arabia 2005.
126. Saudi Arabia 2005, 51.
127. See http://www.cdm-saudiconference.com/cdm/home.do; and report at IISD 2006.
128. OPEC 2008.


oil-dependent countries. It does so, however, in a constructive manner. At the
Summit, Saudi Arabia pledged $300 million for research on energy, environ-
ment and climate change, with other OPEC countries also pledging funds.129 In
a possible parallel to the (very gradual) evolution of thinking within the George
W. Bush US Administration, these developments may suggest that Saudi Arabia,
and other OPEC nations, are at last starting to “catch up” with most of the rest
of the world in moving towards a response to climate change focused on con-
structive solutions tailored to their national circumstances, rather than obstruc-
tion and denial.
The question is whether, and if so how, these developments will eventu-
ally feed through to changes in the Saudi delegation’s approach to the negotia-
tions themselves, especially leading up to the landmark Copenhagen meeting in
December 2009. For now (up to the June 2008 sessions), any signs of a soften-
ing in the Saudi negotiating position remained well hidden.

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