Roadmap for Peace in Sudan

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Strategy for Facilitating, Enabling and Sustaining a Mutually Agreed
Transitional Framework in Sudan
Dr Jeremy Ive and Dr Edward A. Christow

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A road map for peacemaking
 The aim of this paper is to sketch out a road map to outline the different forms
of peacemaking, both informal and international,
 In order for them not to undermine one another, but to re-inforce one another
and work together, it is necessary to show both their distinctness and their
inter-relation
Intermediate-level facilitation
•The facilitation of peace and good governance can take place at different levels:
–High-level facilitation moving towards formal mediation
–Intermediate-level facilitation operating on a low profile basis
–The development of inter-communal consensus: people to people
Informal Peace-makers
•Consensus-builders: Build a principled community of understanding
•Catalysts: Address sticking-points behind the scenes and suggest constructive ways
forward.
International Third Party Support for a Settlement
•Intermediaries: Operates as a go-between or mediator
•Sponsors: Put together and deliver linked packages
•Underwriters/Guarantors: Ensure transitional conditions are met
Role of the International Community in the Reconstruction of Sudan
•Embrace and nurture long-term goals
•Ensure provision of resources
•Long-term development assistance
Conclusion
•Informal peace-makers can operate as consensus-builders and catalysts
•International third parties can operate as intermediaries, sponsors and underwriters of
the settlement, which needs to be tightly constructed, phased and linked
•The achievement of peace needs to be seen as a multi-dimensional process
proceeding at different levels and involving the whole range of stakeholders

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Part Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
SUMMARY 3
I. INTRODUCTION 4
II. INFORMAL PEACE-MAKERS: CONSENSUS-BUILDERS
AND CATALYSTS 6
A. THE PRE-NEGOTIATION PHASE 6
1. Consensus Builders:
The formulation and development of a common framework for peace 7
2. Catalysts:
Pre-negotiation confidence-building and the creation of negotiating
space 7
B. THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKERS IN THE NEGOTIATION
PHASE 9
Putting a common framework at the disposal of the principals 9
2. Catalysts:
Acting as an informal facilitating during the negotiating process 9
C. THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKERS DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE SETTLEMENT 10
Helping to sustain the common ethos and moral framework 10
2. Catalysts
Defusing tensions and misunderstandings 10
D. CONCLUSION 10
III. INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT FOR A
SETTLEMENT 14

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A. SUPPORTIVE INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY ROLES IN
THE PRE-NEGOTIATION PHASE 14
1. Intermediaries:
Developing channels as a potential mediator or ‘honest broker’ 14
2. Sponsors:
Assembling packages to provide incentives for negotiations 14
3. Underwriters:
Building up syndicates of potential underwriters for a settlement 14
B. INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT DURING
NEGOTIATIONS 15
1. Intermediaries:
Facilitating negotiations as mediator or in proximity 15
2. Sponsors:
The placing of packages on the table by the sponsors 16
3. Underwriters:
The dual role of the underwriters during negotiations 17
C. SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTIES DURING
THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 17
1. Intermediaries:
The informal continuation of the intermediary’s role after negotiations 18
2. Sponsors:
The delivery of packages in phases by the sponsors 18
2. Guarantors:
The underpinning of the transitional arrangements by the guarantors 18
D. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SUDAN 26
IV. CONCLUSION 29
BIBLIOGRAPHY 31

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SUMMARY
I. There is a need to initiate, enable and sustain the process both internally and
externally. This can be done fruitfully at an intermediate level.
II. Within the country there needs to be a process of catalysis: that is, a behind the
scenes identification of sticking points and ways to resolve them; and consensus-
building: that is an informed, cross-cutting process of education on the basis of
common principles and the movement towards an agreed goal.
III. Outside of the country, the process needs to be supported by the work of
international third parties operating as guarantors (sponsors, underwriters and
intermediaries). These actions need to be distinguished, but it needs to be presented
and implemented as a package in order to achieve the greatest effect.
IV. The two processes are complementary, but a fine balance needs to be struck
between the independence and integrity of the catalysts and consensus-builders on the
one hand, and the concerted action of the international community on the other

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I. INTRODUCTION
Peace and governance are both intra- and inter-state, and it is not possible entirely to
separate the two. A start can be made with those societies in an acute state of conflict.
Both negatively to limit the harm arising out of that situation, and positively, to build
up models of what is possible ("plausibility structures" as Peter Berger calls this) and
to disseminate the values to inform this and other situations. This process can be
conducted in the public arena, as consensus is built up on issues of common concern.
It can however, also be promoted behind the scenes, especially in situations where the
rhetoric and reality of the conflict precludes clear listening and mutual acceptance, or
the recognition of common values which the adversarial nature of debate does not
always make possible. These common values need to be of a transcendent nature, that
is, they need to be able to transcend particular ethnic, cultural, ideological and indeed
party political divisions.
The issue of peace and governance is not something that can be tacked on to the
material assistance of the people, but is an integral prerequisite for development. This
is not something that has been fully taken into account in the West, where, if is it
taken at all seriously, it tends to take the form either of military intervention or
alternatively sanctions or externally imposed conditionality. This is not to deny the
place of these; but as instruments to promote peace and governance they tend to take
up a disproportionate share in the already meagre resources allocated to peace and
governance. Further, even the most benignly intended military intervention, or the
imposition of external sanctions is profoundly ambiguous in nature; and this
ambiguity is heightened if the action is taken in isolation from a more broadly
constructed package (See Section III or a suggested framework for third-party
intervention).
A virtuous cycle of confidence building needs to be set in train, whereby the good
relations achieved at one stage provide a secure platform for the achievement of good
relations at another. The dynamic cycle, which operates on an individual level can be
seen as operating at a social level as well: acceptance leads to sustenance, which
flows out as status and results in achievement. In a social and political context this
means that the parties involved need to accept the credentials of the others as equal
and valid negotiating partners as the first step in process. This needs to then result in
proximity in a safe and secure location where the issues are explored on an open basis
freed from the pressure of the ongoing struggle for power. The outflow of this is that
the parties are given status on an equal and multi-lateral basis with the common
purpose of implementing these common deliberations. The implementation is thus
not the vindication of a particular party's position, but the working out of a culture of
negotiation, which all can celebrate equally.
In the process, there are internal as well as external factors. Internally, there is the
nurturing of crosscutting affiliations especially through encouraging the development
of mediating structures (that is the range of institutions across the nation that can
operate as bridges between individuals and groups). This needs to be opened up by a
vision of the centrality of relationships shared across the different groups, as the
bedrock of a free and dynamic society. The emphasis on individual rights is
important in ensuring that all have a stake in society and are able to enjoy the benefits

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of its overall well being. However, an exclusive emphasis on individual rights without
putting it in the context of the need to nurture the richness and diversity of
relationships and their development can intensify divisions rather than build a stable
but dynamic consensus. Externally, the process can be facilitated by both
governmental and inter-governmental agencies as well as informal bodies acting on a
neutral basis.
The facilitation of peace and good governance can take place at least three levels:
(a) High-level facilitation, which moves towards formal mediation. This of
necessity operates confidentially while in process, but is also high profile,
and therefore still in the public and media gaze. This may also be preceded
or accompanied by secret preparation of the modalities between the
protagonists. The way for this needs to be opened by:
(b) Intermediate-level facilitation, which operates on a low-profile basis. This
is confidential rather than secret, and is an informal process to which the
protagonists do not make overt commitments, and is deniable by them at
any point. Nevertheless it is important in helping to develop ideas and
create space for both (a) as well as:
(c) The development of inter-communal consensus. This can take place
nation-wide or within a particular region. It takes place publicly.
A considerable amount of work has been done in various contexts at level (c) and
there is also a body of emerging accounts of level (a). Level (b) has been much less
practised or understood but is a vital link in the chain of facilitation at various levels.
It is much more flexible than those of the others, but by its nature is invisible in its
process and intangible in its effects. Yet, it is capable of drawing on the experience of
(c) and creating the conditions for (a) to succeed. This can happen without the high-
risk nature of (a) (since should it come to nothing, or becoming public knowledge, it
is not itself a negotiation; and therefore does not bear the political freight of the
negotiation process itself). It is also freer to explore the overarching value framework
that is necessary for any soundly based process of negotiations to succeed.

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II. INFORMAL PEACEMAKERS: CONSENSUS-BUILDERS AND
CATALYSTS
While all are called to be peacemakers, there is a sense, as has been suggested in the
previous section, that there is also a special task of peacemaking. This consists of
building on a common basis for peace for the future, even at the same time as others,
and the peacemakers themselves, are calling prophetically for the eradication of
present evils and injustices. It is this ‘track’ which we shall be exploring is this
section.
We shall talk of “catalysts” and “consensus-builders”. The catalysts operate largely
behind the scenes. They address and suggest ways to deal those sticking points that
need to be overcome in order for peace to be achieved. The consensus-builders build
on the foundations of common relational principles and develop a principled
community of understanding within which a culture of negotiation can be developed.
A. THE PRE-NEGOTIATING PHASE
There are two parallel, and mutually supportive, aspects to the peacemaking process
in the pre-negotiation phase. The first is that of what can be called a ‘consensus-
builder’, namely, the exercise of developing and disseminating a common framework
which can be accepted as right by all the parties. The other ‘catalytic role’, is the
building up of a network and a continuing process of consultation in a confidential
way. This enables contacts to be established across the political divides, and
agreements to be obtained among the principals (that is the major players or political
groupings in Sudan) in order that the peacemaking process should be continued.
1. Consensus Builders: The formulation and development of a common
framework for peace: A framework of principles needs to be developed and
disseminated both nationally and in the communities in order to form a consensus
about the structures of a future dispensation along lines which all can agree. The
framework needs to based on values which bridge the party political divides, and yet
is specific enough to provide a concrete basis for a new and just dispensation. This
alone can serve as a foundation upon which diverse groupings can build together in
order to promote peace in the Sudanese situation.
The consensus-builders need to be able to bear public witness to the fact that a
framework, such as one built on relational principles, can transcend ethnic,
confessional and ideological barriers. Such a framework can at once offer a radical
and transforming critique of injustices in the present order, and yet suggest ways
forward on which all groups can agree.
The aim of the consensus-builders during this phase needs to be twofold. On the one
hand, they are helping to create a climate, through a groundswell of public opinion, so
that there can in fact be a basis on which negotiations between, or among, the
principals can take place. At the same time, they are setting in motion a public debate

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on the issues, with implications for, and contributions from, the principals, so that
when negotiations do take place, there will be a general acceptance in the public
mind, about the sort of outcome there needs to be. Above all, the concept that any
government must rule under the law within an accepted framework of values needs to
be well established.
2. Catalyst: Pre-negotiation confidence building and the creation of negotiating
space
While public opinion is being nurtured and educated, the principal actors, both inside
and outside the country, need to be contacted by the catalysts to gain their
acquiescence for the process to take place. No specific endorsement can be or should
be sought from these actors at this time, for the catalysts merely desire to sow seeds
for the future; and it is vital that the process should not bear too particular a stamp of
any of the principals. The efforts during the pre-negotiation phase must be to establish
direct or indirect contacts with the principals to demonstrate to the parties that an
eventual settlement is in their interest, for it could further their goals. The catalysts
need to suggest to the principals, ways of dealing with sticking points which might
otherwise impede negotiations, thus opening the door for the first steps towards the
respective parties coming to the negotiating table.
The following are examples of the areas that might need to be explored:
(a) Water: The issue of water needs to be addressed in such a way that it is seen how
all the respective interests, Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western, can be promoted
and protected; as well as those of the riparian neighbours.
(b) Oil: The division of oil revenues, as well as the mode and mechanisms for the
exploitation of oil for the whole country need to be assured.
(c) The dominance by any one grouping of the public sector, either nationally or
regionally: There is a need to ensure access by all groupings to positions within the
public sector to guarantee equitable treatment of all. Those groups not represented
need to be equipped with the necessary skills for this purpose. At the same time, the
fears of those who are presently employed within that sector that their positions and
livelihood could be under threat should access to the public sector be widened needs
to be met. Those who may be displaced in this way could be assured of
unemployment gratuities or pensions, or technical education programmes could be
encouraged so that the persons currently working in the public sector would learn new
skills to assist them in supporting themselves in the future.
(d) Problems of political fragmentation
Political fragmentation is highly problematical in achieving a political settlement.
(i) The problem of political fragmentation of the North
The opposition umbrella, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has
attracted a number of the Northern parties, but is itself in the process of
disintegrating, not least with the distancing of Umma Party (UP) from NDA.
This is coupled with the process of fragmentation within the northern
Sudanese parties with UP, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and National

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Congress (NC) splitting into two or more factions.
(ii) The problem of regional institutional breakdown: Darfur West, Nuba and
Beja
Umma is both a party with widespread support throughout the North, as well
as specific regional interest in the West focussed around the former sultanate
emirate of Darfur. Their respective Parties represent Nuba and Beja regions.
(iii) The problem of political fragmentation of the South
Antagonism created by differences of interest, ideology or strategy often
supersede the Southern people’s common bonds and shared values; and this
is strained further by the degree of accommodation with or opposition to the
structures and policies of the Government of Sudan (GOS).
In the light of the escalation of the war it can appear that the only options
currently available to the Southerners in general and the SPLM in particular
are to either come to the table on terms set for them by the GOS or else to
keep enunciating ‘all-or-nothing’ claims.
(e) Addressing issues of State and Religion
These need to be addressed to ensure the confidence of all concerned. If a regional or
two-systems option were taken, this could involved an appropriate framework for
each region acceptable to those in that region.
The aim of the catalysts with respect to the respective groupings is to foster agreement
within the groupings themselves so that unity might be restored. Communication
between the different groupings needs to be encouraged, with an emphasis placed
upon discerning common needs and desires. Catalysts can help to focus energy into
the creation of a broad agenda and into the selection of strategies that would promote
rather than undermine political unity. Disabling hostilities towards one another need
to be overcome, so that the respective political groupings can come to the negotiating
table as a united front. At the same time, confidence needs to be built with the GOS to
encourage the normalisation of the political situation so that leaders and organisations
can re-establish contact with their respective constituencies, as well as with one
another. This would enable them to negotiate with the North on a basis of equality and
thus by acting as genuine representatives of their Southern constituencies, be in a
position to ‘deliver’ peace with justice for the common good. Similarly, greater
consensus in the North and the other regions would enable the process to take place
more smoothly and with more hope of whatever is arrived at staying in place.
The catalysts need to gain the trust of all the principal actors as one clearly guided by
an agenda which is not itself determined by the existing political dynamic, but which
takes its bearings most fundamentally from a concern for the basic principles of
justice itself. They must listen attentively to all disputants, showing concern to each of
them equally. During the first stages of contact they must establish their bona fides
with the principals as they come to recognise their commitment to truth, peace, and
justice in their relationship. Their next step would be to suggest ways forward which
would accommodate their respective concerns in a just manner. Should these terms
not be found acceptable, they must return to their first principles and then work out in
consultation with all the parties concerned how an alternative accommodation might
develop.

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B. THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKERS IN THE NEGOTIATION PHASE
As in the pre-negotiation phase, the peacemakers have a parallel role during the actual
conduct of negotiations. They need to have available the common framework which
they have been disseminating in the pre-negotiation phase. At the same time, they
need to be in touch with the principals behind the scenes to help act as informal
channels of communication. They also need to be willing to offer ideas and
suggestions, even if it runs the risk of rejection and even hostility. Unlike the
principals, the peacemakers are not bound by a constituency, only by the bounds of
truth, integrity and the search for peace. As such, there is a freedom of action
motivated by a universal concern, on a non-partisan basis.
1. Consensus Builders: Putting a common framework at the disposal of the
principals: It can be taken as generally true that the National Congress Party together
with Umma, the DUP, the Popular National Congress Party and the Sudan
Communist Party represents the views and interests of the majority of the North.
Similarly, the regional based parties, representing the Beja, Darfur and Nuba areas,
and the range of Southern groupings alongside the SPLM, can be said to reflect the
interests and views of their respective regions.
These are the ‘principals’, and any set of proposals put forward by one will almost
inevitably be denounced and pilloried by the others. This will either be because it is
slanted too much (despite whatever disclaimers may be made) to the interests of one
particular constituency at the expense of others; or the constituency concerned needs
to rally its constituency to demonstrate its political power vis a vis the others. The
simplest and most effective way to do this is to attack or pillory the ‘enemy’.
The consensus-builders, from the work they have done in the pre-negotiation phase,
now have a set of ideas to offer to the principals, which yet does not bear the
imprimatur of any one of them, and thus can be used as the common basis of
discussion. Of course, the principals will be making use of a diversity of ideas, but
their prime aim would be to represent their respective constituencies in the best way
possible. The advantage of such a framework is that in accepting it, neither, or none,
of the principals would have to ‘climb down’ to the others, but can find ways to work
together with their former opponents for the common good.
2. Catalyst: Acting as an informal facilitator during the negotiating process:
During the course of negotiations, stalemates and misunderstandings arise. The
catalysts, as independent agencies trusted by all the principals, can work informally
behind the scenes to help, perhaps on a shuttle basis, to clarify misunderstandings.
They also suggest creative ways around stalemates, taking the risk for failure upon
themselves without prejudice to the bargaining positions of the respective principals.

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C. THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKERS DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE SETTLEMENT
The role of peacemakers does not end with the agreement on a settlement. The
peacemakers need to continue to uphold and secure the settlement in both a public and
a private way.
1. Consensus Builders: Helping to sustain the common ethos and moral
framework: The framework developed in the pre-negotiation phase, and which
helped to inform the principals in coming to a settlement, must continue to be the
basis on which the consensus necessary to sustain the process can be built up. As this
process continues, so must the process of public understanding and debate, so that a
constant sense of living under the protection of law within a constitutional order is
maintained and developed in the consciousness of the public at large.
The framework must also be the basis for developing a proper system of checks and
balances in all areas of life, so that the functions of all institutions: state, and family,
as well as all voluntary associations can function according to their proper role. The
‘covenant’- that is, the authority under which the government is placed in power -
needs always to be brought to the mind of the people as a whole, so that all breaches
of the constitution can be remedied in the courts.
2. Catalyst: Defusing tensions and misunderstandings. The implementation phase
is likely to be full of difficulties and misunderstandings. The catalysts need to be on
hand to help clarify these and build a climate of general confidence and good will. At
the same time they should be drawing attention to those areas where the principles of
the settlement have been moved away from, or where further and subsidiary
settlements need to be reached between conflicting parties.
E. CONCLUSION
Negotiations for the achievement of a new political dispensation may come about in
Sudan in at least one of two ways: either as a result of worsening domestic or
international situations; or as is argued for in this paper, as a result of the parallel pre-
negotiation efforts of the informal peacemakers described here, and concerted
international third-party initiatives (described in Section 3. below); or, most likely, as
a combination of the two scenarios!
The key element of the process described and advocated in the paper is the coming to
agreement on ways to deal with issues, on the one hand, by the principals and on the
other, by the public at large. This will enable a basis to be laid for peace rather than
mutual destruction.
For consensus-building, the backing of a number of key leaders and other public
figures will be needed from across the racial, social, ideological and religious divides.
Just as vital, if not more so, will be the building upwards from within the communities

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themselves, of a general, and easily-grasped set of concepts to inform the debate.
Common frameworks of values and applied to specific areas of the political,
economic and social structures, will need to be widely agreed to as being the right
basis for a future dispensation. Thus when negotiations take place, they will not be
doing so in a vacuum, but there can be a set of basic concepts, of sufficiently non-
partisan character to be adopted by the respective principals without undermining
their bargaining positions.
At the same time, a catalytic process needs to be undertaken, whereby the trust and
confidence of the principal actors is obtained and space within which free discussion
can take place is created. This space takes the form of a general approbation that the
consensus-building process should take place, without any one principal or specific
groupings giving that process their specific imprimatur (since that night prejudice the
approbation of that process by their opposite numbers). It is vital that the catalysts be
well-informed and in touch with the dynamic of the domestic and international
situation, and have close touch with and entree to the principals. The catalysts also
need to be pro-active in addressing the basic concerns of the respective principals and
indicating to them ways in which they might be met. It cannot be a clinical process,
and the catalysts need also to be closely connected to, and deeply empathetic with, all
the major constituencies. At the same time they would retain their credibility as a
genuinely non-partisan contributor to the overall process, guided throughout by a
fundamental concern for truth and justice in the achievement of peace.
The peacemakers, both catalysts and consensus-builders need to gain the trust of all
the principals as being clearly guided by an agenda which is not itself determined by
the existing political dynamic, but which takes its bearings most fundamentally from a
concern for the basic principles of justice based on the prime value of human
relationships.. By seeking peace and by addressing different aspects of an unjust
situation they will come step by step towards their goal. The peacemakers must
attentively listen to all disputants, showing concern to each of them, even to those
with whom they disagree. While they cannot remain morally neutral, indeed they
must not, they must be careful not to allow themselves to be co-opted into the political
strategy of any one political grouping. During the first stages of contact they must
develop trust and credibility as the conflicting persons recognise their commitment to
restoring truth, peace, and justice to the situation. Their next step will be to suggest
ways forward, which will accommodate their concerns in a just manner. Should these
terms not be found acceptable, they must return to their first principles and then work
out in consultation with all the parties concerned how an alternative accommodation
might develop.
Throughout, however, the peacemakers need to be well aware of the limitations of
their role, and that international support may well be necessary if the principals are to
come together (see Section III below). But the final decision and shape of what
ensues must remain with those in Sudan itself. The transformation of thought and
action within a framework of values shaped and worked-out in a considered and
thorough way needs to take place among those within the country.
At present, a negative spiral towards the continuation and escalation of the conflict
exists in Sudan. This spiral needs to be counteracted in a positive way, in that those
issues that lie at the heart of the anger and frustration of the Southern community need

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to be addressed in a radical way. This must involve all groupings working out
together the sort of structures that need to be put into place. For this to happen,
channels need to be created by individuals and informal groups working together to
establish networks of confidence and trust between those representative of the
respective communities. The individuals concerned must do this within terms of a
basic commitment to truth and justice. At the same time a public consensus needs to
be built up about the urgency of reaching a constitutional settlement and the sort of
principles which will establish a new order within which all can live together in
freedom and justice. Both aspects of this peacemaking task are needed now to create
a positive movement towards a just and lasting peace in Sudan.

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CATALYSTS CONSENSUS-BUILDERS
P
H
A
S
E
S
:GAIN TRUST OF THE
PRINCIPALS AND HELP TO
‘CREATE SPACE’ FOR THE
CONSENSUS-BUILDER
DEVELOP AND
DISSEMINATE A COMMON
FRAMEWORK
P
R
E
-
N
E
G
COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS
BE AVAILABLE AS A
COMMUNICATION CHANNEL
AND ‘SCAPEGOAT’ AS
NECESSARY
PUT THE COMMON
FRAMEWORK AT THE
DISPOSAL OF THE
PRINCIPALS
N
E
G
O
T
I
A
T
I
O
N
IMPLEMENTATION OF SETTLEMENT
HELP TO DEFUSE TENSION
AND BUILD COMMON
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
THE PRINCIPALS
HELP TO BUILD A COMMON
ETHOS ON THE BASIS OF THE
COMMON FRAMEWORK
T
R
A
N
S
I
T
I
O
N
A
L
IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL CONSTITUTION
HELPING TO DEVELOP THE
COMMON UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE PRINCIPALS
HELP TO BUILD ON THE
COMMON ETHOS IN TERMS
OF THE COMMON
FRAMEWORK
F
I
N
A
L

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III. INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT
The position of either other states or of international organisations as international
sponsors allows them to play a key role in encouraging a peaceful settlement to the
Sudanese crisis.
No matter what international organisations, states, or individuals take part in securing
a final settlement for Sudan, the significant decisions concerning the outcome must be
made by the Sudanese. Although a third party may open doors that formerly were
closed, the people of Sudan - through their respective leaders - must themselves select
the paths that they wish to take. An outsider cannot dictate the future, but can serve to
stimulate the taking of positive steps towards a settlement, and the securing of such a
settlement on a sound footing.
A. SUPPORTIVE INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY ROLES IN THE
PRE-NEGOTIATION PHASE
There are three ways in which international third parties can prepare the way for the
negotiation process: -
1. Intermediaries: Developing channels as a potential mediator or ‘honest
broker’: The independent status of the third party can allow it to provide a venue for
negotiations and will therefore assist in developing a solid framework for a
constitutional settlement in Sudan.
Such an intermediary will encourage trust and recognition of mutual bonds by
opening channels of communication without public exposure. The intermediatory will
promote creative options for the principals and act as an intermediary so that they
might eventually come together for negotiations.
2. Sponsors: Assembling packages to provide incentives for negotiations: Since
economic pressures could affect the success of a negotiated settlement, economic
support at crucial points will be necessary for persons in need. The objective is to
assure eventual stability and physical security of all Sudanese by working to put
together packages that would go into effect following successful negotiations.
Financial assistance will both encourage them to come to the negotiating table as well
as assist in promoting a smooth transition by relieving some of the apprehension
change will bring. Programmes providing for technical re-training, guaranteed civil
servants’ pensions and unemployment gratuities, as well as the promise of investment
in key sectors in order to facilitate more rapid advancement for Southerners with
alternative employment for Northerners, are potential methods of assuring the support
of the respective principals. Such efforts will help to reduce tension and encourage
communication and understanding, for they will be positive measures with
symmetrical effects. They will be a concrete demonstration of the promises offered by
the facilitator, one that will foster good will between the parties by meeting their basic

17
concerns.
3. Underwriters: Building up syndicates of potential underwriters for a
settlement: There needs to be a syndicate of third-party underwriters to agree to
uphold the settlement once it is agreed upon. The greater the number and the broader
the range of third parties forming the syndicate, the more likely the guarantees will be
acceptable to the principals (especially if the syndicate is well balanced with the
respect to the principals concerned). The promise of such a syndicate will not only
encourage all parties to adhere to the agreement, but will also help to uphold stability
within the region as a whole.
Although the Sudanese themselves must agree upon the actual social, economic, and
political structures that they wish to construct, the third party syndicate can play a
significant role during the early stages of implementation as the guarantor of the
settlement (that is one charged with the specific task of ensuring that the settlement is
implemented in full and with effect on all parties to the settlement; and that none
defaults and so negates the understanding which brought the settlement about).
Effective and verifiable procedures for the implementation of the final agreement
need to be identified: such as the need for an internationally-recognised interim
government overseeing a timed process of transition, the supervision of free elections,
monitoring forces, and an appropriate evaluation process. While the syndicate may
not be able, and should not attempt to underwrite the entire process of transition, or to
implement all of the details, it can help to shape and guide the process by careful
specification of parameters for the implementation of the settlement.
C. INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT DURING
NEGOTIATIONS
If and when the principals choose to ‘turn the corner’ and enter into discussions, the
pre-negotiation work of the international third-parties will have set the stage through
the developing of channels, the assembling of packages of incentives, and the
formation of international syndicates to make possible the transitional process.
1. Intermediaries: Facilitating negotiations as mediator or in proximity: Once the
principal actors decide to come together, the method of locating a mediator is flexible.
Either the peacemaker of the pre- negotiation stage or a trusted party may serve as
mediator. If the participants find it more acceptable, a third party could fill this
position as could of status or a statesman of note. Whoever is selected may or may not
actually chair the negotiations, but will guide the over-all phase according to the
framework and principles set out earlier.
The mediator needs to gain the respect of the parties at the negotiating table, for his
credibility is the key to opening discussions. He or she must demonstrate equal
concern for all sides, creating legitimacy for each by attentively listening to their
anxieties as well as to their desires. A successful settlement hinges upon the
mediator’s ability to gain the trust of the principals. A notable example of this being
President Jimmy Carter’s success in the negotiation of the Camp David accord
between Israel and Egypt in 1978 in which Egypt agreed to recognise Israel’s right to

18
exist in return for the restoration of territory conquered by Israel.
In addition, the mediator must listen so as to take account of the fears and objectives
of each party, allowing each to express themselves within the framework established
to guide negotiations. A successful mediator will create room within which the
parties can manoeuvre, in order to release tension. He will, therefore, allow them to
take credit for any progress made while accepting any blame or negative responses
himself. By acting as a scapegoat, the mediator can reassure and preserve the
integrity of the negotiators.
The rights of all persons and interest groups must be addressed during the first stages
of negotiations. One group must not dominate another either during the negotiations
or in the final agreement. Indeed, the implementation of an extensive bill of rights
and the protection of private property should be considered as a prior step in order to
bring the principals to the negotiating table. The key at this stage is to appeal to the
leaders and to thus gain their commitment to the process, for without their
commitment it will be impossible to carry out a constitutional settlement.
The aim of the mediator is to bring the principals together, to foster communication
and to ensure that plans for discussion are widely canvassed. Creative options for
mutual advantage ought to be promoted by the mediator as well. The mediator will
serve as the link between the principals so that they might eventually come together
and he will initiate movement through both influence and intervention.
As a first step, the mediator needs to contact the leaders, build trusting relationships
with them, lessen misperceptions, build confidence, and set a positive tone to the
proceedings. The next phase involves helping to define the basic issues before the
negotiators and setting a broad agenda. Anything, which is merely peripheral, is to be
disregarded, for the negotiations will address primary issues alone. Specifics will be
dealt with later on, for they tend to stimulate debate and dissension. Strict guidelines
of both behaviour and of procedural matters must be agreed upon at this stage, as
must the method of reaching the final settlement.
Once a broad agenda has been accepted, the mediator needs to work on discovering
common ground and on generating possible measures for mutual advantage. These
measures need to be created and developed in an uncritical atmosphere by the
participants as well, for then they will begin to 'own' the process themselves. Once all
possibilities are suggested, each will be evaluated according to its costs and benefits,
with only those found acceptable remaining before the negotiators. Although each
side must abandon some of its demands, the final settlement must be one in which no
one is defeated - in fact, all will ‘win’ from the stable Sudan which they have assisted
in creating. By indicating how the basic needs of the people can be met (freedom to
have control of their own lives, physical security, the right to well-rounded education,
recognition of basic dignity, and economic well-being) as well as by participating in
discussions, each party is assured that the particular concerns of its constituents will
be addressed and that it will have an assured stake in the outcome.
The mediator must then construct a detailed agenda and a timetable to guide through
every step of negotiations. From the first contact with the principals to the signing of
the final settlement to the implementation of the agreement, a plan of action must be

19
strictly adhered to. The structure of the negotiation must be in such a manner that a
chain-linkage from one agreement to another is formed. This is so that agreement on,
for example, the final constitution will lead naturally to the consideration of the
transitional arrangements and then to the resolution of the present conflicts; and once
agreement is reached on one point, none of the principals must be allowed to
backtrack from it.
As the participants recognise their own particular stakes in the settlement, they will
more easily accept each point discussed. By participating in each step, the parties will
become more involved in the process and are thus less likely to renege on earlier
promises. Carefully worked-out plans for discussion, clear goals, and a strong
chairman who will maintain momentum of the process are essential. The chairman’s
task is to break the issues down so they are more attainable as well as to move the
talks ahead with the help and support of the key external parties, to conduct tough
one-on-one bargaining, and strictly to allocate discussion time.
2. Sponsors: The placing of packages on the table by the sponsors. A package of
aid and assistance can be assembled and placed on the table, or at least made known
to the principals either definitely or by implication, as an inducement to begin and
continue the negotiation process. However, as is the case with the guarantors, the
sponsors of the resulting settlement need to be able to restructure their package of
assistance so that it can be applied specifically to overcome possible sticking points in
the negotiation or implementation of the agreement, or be planned so that its delivery
in phases be linked to the successful implementation to crucial provisions of that
settlement.
3. Underwriters: The dual role of the underwriters during negotiations: The
syndicates of underwriters, which have been built up during the pre-negotiation phase
can be brought into play in two ways. Individual states or groupings of states need to
be brought together with an interest in encouraging and sustaining the negotiation
process itself. These intermediate guarantors need to be ready to bring pressure on the
respective principals so that the parties can be encouraged to come to the table in the
first place, and that obstacles encountered at the different stages of the process can be
overcome. Underwriters also need to be at hand to guarantee the implementation, in
stages, of the settlement itself.
The pressures on the principals before they may take part in negotiations needs be
structured in such a way that each of them will face equally negative measures should
they decide to obstruct or unilaterally withdraw from the agenda and timetable agreed
upon by the principals in commencing the negotiations. There will need to be a
symmetry of penalties applicable to the principals, so that all have an equal interest in
the success of the talks; so that none of the principals will, for the sake of tactical
advantage, be tempted to stall or break off the negotiation process. All the principals
need to be equally committed to avoid the collapse of the discussion or a reneging on
either the intermediate agreements or the final settlement. In the case of a deadlock,
the chairman may find it necessary to threaten the parties that he will settle for a
‘second best’ option and the intermediate guarantors need to be at hand to help him
put this contingency plan into effect.
The prospective guarantors of the settlement itself need to be close at hand during the

20
course of the negotiations, so that they can be ready to underwrite the provisions of
the settlement as they are agreed upon. Modern communications mean that the
consent of the underwriters to the guarantees can be obtained quickly and at the
highest possible level. The leading underwriters will have their representatives in
close proximity to the discussions; but their brief should be defined in such a way that
the guarantees which the underwriters provide can be tailored to fit the successive
provisions of the settlement as they are shaped by the principals.
C. SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTIES DURING THE
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE
In many African countries where there has been a far-reaching transfer of power, this
has been preceded by a transitional period to allow this to take place in an orderly
way. Arrangements need to be agreed upon which allow the power-holders to move
towards a thoroughgoing transfer of power without losing face, or allowing a
breakdown of law and order or the rise of an order which is directly antithetical to
their fundamental concerns.
Although a dramatic transformation is desired in Sudan, those involved must be
willing to adopt a realistic strategy to ensure that the new situation is an improvement.
Once a settlement is reached, the question of how to implement, monitor, enforce, and
evaluate it comes into play. Rigid control by the interim government and the division
of the agreement into short-term goals rather than long-tern objectives may make the
accommodation more obtainable. Such a plan, which prepares for the transitional
changes which the future might bring, provides for further options for peace and for
guaranteeing the success of the actual settlement itself.
The transition period may begin with a cease-fire monitored by outside forces, the
establishment of an interim government and fair elections. The final phase
commences with the transfer of sovereignty to the new state and its government. The
transition in Sudan will be one of developing and accepting a framework, and then
implementing it with the backing of guarantors and sponsors dedicated to ensure the
full and scrupulous implementation of the settlement.
The achievement of a constitutional settlement does not guarantee the elimination of
conflict, for it does not abolish all conflict but simply reduces and channels it. Two
basic factors, however, will add to the chances for maintaining peace within Sudan:
constructing a firm foundation for the settlement and creating a climate of good will
amongst the parties agreeing to the plan. The establishment of a solid, just and
balanced structure will especially help make for a peaceful transition, as will the
participation directly and indirectly by all parties involved internally or externally in
the present conflict. All participants will need to make sacrifices, so that all may ‘win’
and none may suffer total defeat. Such an accommodation will prepare the people of
Sudan for a peaceful and prosperous future.
1. Intermediaries: The informal continuation of the intermediatory’s role after
negotiations: The intermediatory’s role strictly ends with the signing of the

21
agreement by the principals, and the support for the implementation of the settlement
then passes to the guarantors of the settlement. However, the intermediatory can
remain on hand in an informal capacity by maintaining informal contacts with the
transitional government and the guarantors in order to clarify any misunderstanding
which may arise in the implementation of the settlement.; and They will thus help to
suggest, by a process of informal representations to the parties concerned, ways in
which the terms of the settlement can be upheld and enhanced, say, by the application
of further aid to overcome obstacles in the implementation of the settlement, which
might not have been foreseen during the negotiation process.
2. Sponsors: The delivery of packages in phases by the sponsors. Packages of aid
need to be delivered in phases and linked as far as possible to the implementation of
the settlement. This is to encourage and support the working out of the terms of the
settlement by all the principals, and the strict honouring of both its spirit and letter by
the transitional government. Unlike the trusteeship of the settlement by the
guarantors, which ends strictly with the completion of the transitional phase, the
sponsors need not cease their delivery of aid with the ending of the transitional period.
Although, the strict rationale for continued assistance, namely as an incentive to carry
out the terms of the settlement, would no longer apply. In fact, aid can be targeted
specifically to follow the achievement of the final stage, and further delivery of aid
can, explicitly or implicitly in terms of the settlement, be negotiated in order to
overcome any unforeseen obstacles in either the transitional or final stages of the
implementation of the settlement.
The following areas are those in which the international sponsors can promote the
implementation of the interim settlement.
(a) Resettlement and Re-integration of combatants
Once the combatants have been discharged they would be transported to their
destination of their choice and they would be provided with financial and technical
assistance in the form of cash, food, clothing and medical care for a period ranging
from several months to one year. Since this effort requires large amounts of money,
the sponsors would have to ensure that adequate financial and material resources as
well as technical assistance are made available to all former combatants on an equal
basis and for a uniform duration.
Once the combatants have settled in at their destination, the international community
and the interim authority would have to ensure that the local community is made
aware of the special needs of these individuals. In order for the combatants to become
fully integrated into their society they would have to become actively involved in
their community and be able to contribute economically. The success of this process
would depend both on the skills that the combatant might have acquired through the
training programme during the re-insertion period and also on the macro-economic,
political and social stability of Sudan.
Throughout the de-mobilisation process special attention must be paid to child and
women soldiers, as well as to the wives of ex-combatants who would require special
counselling, and support. In some of these cases, women and children would require
access to special medical facilities. Children might have to undergo special vocational
training courses and they should also have access to learning facilities. The

22
international sponsors have a vital role to play throughout the whole process through
the extension of financial resources and technical assistance to the institutional
structure of the interim authority.
(b) De-mining
According to the UN, in 1998 there were two to three million landmines in the Sudan
covering some 800,000 square kilometres or 32 percent of the country.1
These
landmines have generated three basic problems for the Sudanese population. They
are responsible for the increased civilian and military death toll as well as the loss of
livestock and wild animals. The mine survivors have been directly affected by the
pain and cost of their treatment and the loss of employment opportunities, which in
turn has affected the livelihood of their families.
During the interim period the international community could support the interim
authority in three ways. Firstly, the international sponsors could help increase the de-
mining capacity of the Sudanese military. Currently, the Sudanese military have
engineer units that are used in de-mining but they are not used in large-scale de-
mining operations. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNAMIS) could train
Sudanese combatants in de-mining actives and act as a central point for co-ordinating
all mine clearance activities by Sudanese and international bodies.
Secondly, the international sponsors could help the interim authority in running mine
awareness programmes with the help of International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the
HALO Trust and other non government organisations (NGOs). These activities
would alert the Sudanese people of the dangers of mines and would inform
communities of mined areas to be avoided.
Thirdly, the international sponsors could provide victims’ assistance to people in need
of medical and psychological rehabilitation so that they could become productive
members of their communities. One of these activities might include the
establishment of artificial prosthetics and limbs factories in every affected Sudanese
State.
(c) Military Conversion
After the conflict has ended the international sponsors could assist Sudan to convert
some its military industries into civilian manufacturing facilities. This would not only
reduce the cost of military spending in the country but would direct scarce resources
to more productive uses. Military conversion is an expensive task that requires careful
planning, prior experience and knowledge of the military conversion process. The
international sponsors could assist the Sudanese interim authority in retraining people
and in converting the military facilities to peaceful use. For example, the mechanical
ammunition factories could be converted into agricultural machinery facilities.
1
Landmines Magazine. Sudan: conflict and development, De-mining News from the United Nations,
Vol. 2, No. 3, October 1997 and US State Department. Hidden Killers: 1998: The Global Landmine
Crisis, Washington, 20 January 2001.

23
(d) Reintegrating War-affected Population
After the Sudan Peace agreement has been signed, the international sponsors would
need to assist the Sudanese interim authority with the repatriation, resettlement and
reintegration of the four million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 478,427
Sudanese refugees, and the qualified Sudanese nationals who are abroad.2
(e) Repatriation and Resettlement
The repatriation and resettlement of the Sudanese population would require immense
financial, logistical and technical resources and capacities. This effort would need to
involve at least three UN agencies. The UNHCR would be responsible for repatriating
Sudanese refugees who are based abroad, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) would be responsible for the resettlement of IDPs, and the
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) would be responsible for the return of
qualified Sudanese nationals. This repatriation and resettlement programmes would
require the close involvement and co-ordination of all concerned stakeholders, the
interim authority, international organisations, domestic and international NGOs and
representatives of the three groups to be resettled. Prior to repatriation and
resettlement all IDPs, refugees and returnee-qualified nationals should receive
orientation and be briefed thoroughly.
(f) Economic and Social Integration
Once people have been repatriated to the location of their choice, the Sudanese
interim authority and the international sponsors should aid their economic and social
integration. The process of economic reintegration would entail assisting all returnees
to become economically self-sufficient and productive members of their communities.
If the returnees are engaged in agriculture then the international community would
have to assist the interim authority in establishing a land-tenure framework which
would resolve any outstanding land rights issues. The international community could
also provide a number of agricultural extension services in the form seeds and tools.
Other methods would include the provision of micro-credit services to enable people
to start-up small enterprises and the extension of training courses to provide or
augment specialised skills. If the returnees are highly qualified nationals, the IOM
could assist both the individuals and their family in finding jobs as well as the
institution that would employ them. This assistance could be in the form of grants to
individuals, who would receive salary supplement for 12 months, and institutional
grants that would provide further resources to the employing institution.
The process of social integration would entail assisting all returnees within their
social, religious and ethnic communities. This process would involve both the
returning individuals and the communities to which they are returning. During this
period the interim authority would have to be aided by the international community in
the community building efforts, which must involve everyone. These community
building efforts might include the resolution of ethnic or communal disputes, the
restoration of trust through equitable access to resources and power, and the
elimination of social exclusion.
2
United Nation’s High Commission for Refugees, Provisional Statistics on Refugees and Others of
Concern to UNHCR for the year 2000, Geneva, 2001.

24
In some regions this would entail the establishment or expansion of new services or
facilities which could follow-up this whole process on the ground and act as a source
of advice and confidence amongst all stake holders.
During the re-integration of the war-affected population special attention must be paid
to the needs of three vulnerable groups: women, children and the elderly. Each of
these three groups would have their own particular needs that the interim authority
and the international sponsors must meet. For example children may need
psychological counselling and access to special medical facilities. The elderly would
need to be repatriated with care, assisted in finding their family and relatives and
provided with social benefits and community support. Women may need to take on
non-traditional roles and become the bread earners so as to ensure the economic
security of their families.
(g) Assisting the Interim Authority(ies)
During its work the interim authority would face challenges as it seeks to fulfil its
mandate. Some of the biggest challenges would be consequences of the past conflict
and would include impaired socio-economic structures and institutions, and damaged
physical infrastructure. These factors would prove a challenge to the interim authority
as it seeks to carry out its programme of resettlement, re-integration and referendum.
The role of the international sponsors in the socio-economic reconstruction during the
interim period could not be overstated. Some of the most important areas in which the
interim authority would require assistance are listed below.
(i) Institution and Infrastructure (Re)building
The interim authority(ies) capacity would determine to a large extend how
effective and efficient it would be discharging its duties. That is why it would
be essential that the institutional capacity of the interim authority be (re)built
and the physical infrastructure be rehabilitated. The international sponsors
could rebuild the institutional capacity of the interim organs by identifying the
various skill shortages as well as the frameworks, processes and equipment
which need to be put in place. Once the above task is completed, the
rehabilitated interim institutions would be able to perform their functions
effectively, efficiently and sustainably.
The Sudanese civil war has impaired the country’s health, water, sanitation,
transportation, communication, education and utility networks. Some of these
projects such as the rehabilitation of damaged roads, bridges, hospitals,
schools and dams might be beyond the financial means of the interim
administration because they require large capital investments and specialist
know-how. The international sponsor could help the interim authority to
resolve this dilemma by prioritising and sequencing of projects and by co-
ordinating, directing and concentrating resources to the most urgent
programmes.

25
(ii) Debt Relief
According to the World Bank, in 1998, Sudan’s debt stood at $15.9 billion.
Out of this total, $6.3 billion was short-term and outstanding debt.3
If the
interim authority is to have the means to implement its interim programme it
should not be constrained by the country’s large debt. The international
sponsors could help the interim authority by writing-off some of Sudan’s debt.
They could also help reschedule and reduce the country’s debt through the
Paris Club and provide new loans for the interim authority to use in servicing
its debt.
(iii) 0fficial Development Assistance (ODA)
Throughout the 1980s, Sudan received high levels of official development
assistance (ODA), which peaked in 1985 at $1.9 billion. By 1996, ODA
dropped to $100 million with 80 percent of donor resources going to relief and
emergency operations and only 20 percent to development. This, coupled with
the servicing of the national debt, has curtailed national development
programmes and has generated such a situation whereby 90 percent of
ongoing development programmes are financed by the UN system.4
In order to rectify this situation, the international sponsors must increase the
levels of their relief and development assistance and help the interim authority
in three ways. Firstly, the international sponsors would have to ensure that the
interim authority would have enough resources to deal with any ongoing
emergency operations arising from droughts, floods and famines. Secondly,
they would have to assist the interim authority’s food security programmes
through their support for sustainable rural development. Thirdly, they would
have to strengthen the authority’s capacity in planning, resources mobilisation,
implementation, monitoring and review of relief and rehabilitation
programmes.
(iv) Restructuring the Economic Sector
Another important area in which the international sponsors can play a vital and
active role would be in the area of the economic reconstruction of the Sudan.
The assistance that the partners would provide to the interim authority must be
tailored to the specific strategy, devised by the authority. This strategy would
have to seek to balance the macro-economic restructuring of the country with
its political stability. The areas in which the interim authority could receive
financial, material and technical assistance are as follows: fiscal, monetary and
inflation planning and policies, foreign exchange policy, savings and
investment strategy, foreign and domestic trade, regional economic integration
and structural adjustment.
For example, the IMF could help the interim authority to reduce Sudan’s
inflation, stabilise the exchange rate and renew debt servicing. The World
Bank and the African Bank for Development could assist the interim authority
in establishing and streamlining its regulatory framework, push forward with
privatisation and accelerate the implementation of export promotion policy.
3
World Bank, Country Profile -- Sudan, Washington, 2000.
4
UNDP, First Country Co-operation Framework for the Sudan: 1997-2000, New York, 23 June 1997,
p.3.

26
The principal challenge of the restructuring of the economic sector would be
to create a stable economic environment that is conducive to local and foreign
investment under political and social pressure. The restructuring of this sector
would be accomplished if the interim authority has the necessary capacity to
plan, implement and co-ordinate its economic adjustment programme.5
(h) Promoting Good Governance
During the interim period one of the challenges of the interim authority would be to
promote good governance through transparency, accountability, rule of law,
participation and combating corruption. These actions would strengthen public
institutions, legitimise the interim authority in the eyes of the people and build
confidence in the interim process.
In each of these cases the international sponsors could provide technical know how
and resources to encourage interim officials to disclose all information so that it
would be known by the public. This could be achieved either through press releases or
through yearly statistical reports. Furthermore, the interim authority should be
accountable to ombudsmen, to ensure that it would be operating within a legal
framework and would be involving the private sector and civil society. The
international sponsors could help in the review of the existing mechanisms,
institutions and capacities before deciding on what package could best augment the
current capacity. This could take the form of the establishment of new institutions like
ombudsmen, training of government officials and the introduction or enhancement of
powers of specialist bodies.6
The interim administration could also be aided in tackling government corruption
through the review of the existing structures and regulations and the introduction and
enhancement of new guidelines, policies, procedures for reporting, provisions for
disclosure of financial or other interests as well as training and assessment of
government officials. The international sponsors could provide technical expertise to
the interim administration to strengthen its capacity to monitor the awarding of public
contracts, the allocation of subsidies, licensing, levying fees, privatisation and cross-
border transactions.7
(i) Creating an enabling Environment for the Private Sector and Civil Society
According to the CIA World Factbook 2000 -- for Sudan, in 1996 only 6% of the
country’s labour force was employed by the government, whilst the unemployment
rate during 1992/93 was estimated at 30%.8
This underlies the fact that although the
Sudanese government is the biggest economic force in the country; it is not the only
one. Once the peace agreement has been signed, the private sector could play an
important role in the development of the Sudan by generating employment, wealth,
tax revenue and hard currency for the interim authority. In order for this to happen the
international sponsors would aid the interim authority in fostering sustainable private
5
Carbonnier, Giles, Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy, United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development, 1998.
6
Overseas Development Council, Making Peace Work -- Lessons for the International Development
Community, ODC Conference Report, 1996.
7
OECD/PUMA, Survey on Anti-corruption Measures in Public Sector in OECD Countries, Paris,
1997.
8
CIA, The World Factbook 2000 -- Sudan, Washington, 2000, pp. 6-7.

27
sector development through a number of activities. Some of these activities would
include the following:
 Establishing a stable micro-economic environment through balanced financial,
monetary, and fiscal policies
 Ensuring that the private sector has easy access to credit with low interest rates
 Providing incentives for domestic and foreign investment through tax breaks and
elimination of red tape
 Encouraging and co-ordinating the work of foreign and domestic NGOs in
establishing micro-credit and vocational training facilities in the country
 Enforcing the rule of law through anti-corruption programmes
 Developing the country’s physical infrastructure
The above mentioned programme would need to go hand in hand with a broader
policy of nurturing the institutions of civil society, including a free and responsible
press, voluntary associations and free civic interaction. This would help to promote
social and economic initiative and dynamism and build a positive network of
relationships for the future prosperity of the country as a whole.
According to the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), 213 non- government
organisations (NGOs) operated in the country in 1994. In 1997, the Sudan Council of
Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA), published a directory which listed 101 Sudanese and
72 foreign NGOs working in northern Sudan.9
In addition, there are more than 40
foreign NGOs working in southern Sudan. These agencies have been playing a vital
relief, rehabilitation and development role in the country.
During the interim period, the international sponsors could aid the HAC and the
Sudanese NGOs, financially and technically. On the one hand, the international
sponsors could strengthen HAC’s regulatory framework by providing consultants to
work alongside and/or advice the commission, as well as through briefings, training
seminars and physical facilities. On the other hand, the international sponsors could
develop the capacity of local NGOs through the provision of necessary office and
field equipment, and through the development of their human resource capacity.
The development of civil society would not only augment the development of Sudan,
but would also provide checks and balances on government power and monitor
government corruption. The international sponsors could also aid the work of
Sudanese human rights organisations that could assist the ombudsmen in collecting
information about human rights violations. For example, the international sponsors
could help Sudanese NGOs in running human rights training for police, military and
judiciary.
3. Guarantors: The underpinning of the transitional arrangements by the
guarantors: During the implementation phase, the guarantors must be available to
intervene to the exact extent as has been agreed upon by the principals in reaching the
settlement. To that extent, the principals will have chosen to limit the sovereignty of
the successor state established by the settlement for the length of time agreed to in the
settlement.
9
SCOVA, Directory of the NGOs Working in Sudan, Khartoum, July 1997.

28
There are two key areas that the international guarantor would need to underpin: that
of the holding of the referendum and that of the implementation of the cease-fire.
These need to be put in place at the same time as the monitoring elements, be it
specified observers at times of elections, or the presence of an international force to
oversee the re-organisation of the army. They must be of such a nature that it is
genuinely balanced and non-aligned with respect to all the principals at the time of
reaching the settlement. De facto checks and balances, as well as de jure limitations
must be built into the terms under which any intervention to uphold the settlement is
to take place. For example, any monitoring force could be of a balanced nature, half
comprised of elements nominated by one set of principals, and half nominated by the
other, each being able to veto nominations made by the other.
(a) Monitoring the Referendum
The international guarantors have an important role to play before, during and after
the referendum. Their support and involvement in this process could be a powerful
confidence-building force that would help enhance the legitimacy of the interim
authority. The support of the international guarantors could take two forms. The first
could be in the form of technical support prior to the referendum. The second wcould
be the monitoring and reporting of the referendum.
The Sudanese referendum would be an expensive and challenging undertaking,
requiring political and financial support from both the transitional authority and the
country as a whole. The vastness and destruction of the country’s transportation and
communication networks would complicate the task even further.
First, the international guarantors could aid the transitional authority to assess whether
the interim treaty and electoral system are clearly and adequately framed so as to
ensure the free and popular participation of the electorate. If this is not so then the
international guarantors, through the United Nations, could provide assistance to the
interim authority to draft such legislation.
Second, the international guarantors would have to work with the transitional
authority in the establishment of an independent Referendum Commission, in
accordance with the interim regulations. If this is not the case the international
guarantors could extend financial assistance to the interim authority and train its staff.
The Referendum Commission must also be provided with the necessary equipment
for the referendum, which would primarily include, ballot boxes, ballot papers,
polling booths, etc.
Third, the international guarantors could assist in the registration of the political
parties and voters. This could take in the form of direct financial assistance to the
Referendum Commission that would have to be provided with the resources and
capacity to undertake this effort throughout the whole country. This process would be
particularly challenging for Southern Sudan and some areas in the Eastern, Western
and Central Sudan which would not have in place the same administrative structures
and capacity. The international guarantors would also be challenged by the four
million internally displaced people and by one million Sudanese refugees.
Fourth, the international guarantors could assist the Referendum Commission and
civil society organisations in their endeavours to familiarise the electorate with the
purpose of the referendum as well as ensuring that they would know how to vote. If

29
this is not the case the international guarantors should extend financial and technical
assistance to the Referendum Commission and the civil society organisations. They
would also have to ensure that those vulnerable groups such as the internally
displaced people, the illiterate, women and the demobilised soldiers would be able to
fully participate in the referendum.
Fifth, the international guarantors must ensure that all political parties would be able
to get their message across to all voters. This effort might entail the organisation of
training seminars and the extension of financial and technical assistance to all parties.
The international guarantors could also organise training seminars for the media
personnel and ensure that all parties would have an equal access to the radio,
newspapers and television
In order to ensure that the Sudanese referendum would take place in a free and
unbiased environment, the international guarantors could send a team of observers to
make an impartial assessment of the referendum, train the Referendum Commission
and other bodies in monitoring and reporting on the referendum process.
After the international observer team has established its presence on the ground they
would begin reporting on the whole referendum process, how registration is
proceeding in each region, whether all parties have access to the media and how the
Referendum Commission is coping with the process. Concurrently, the observer team
would train local referendum observers to supervise the referendum.
During the referendum the international and national observer teams would visit
different locations to assess voting procedures and the security of the ballot. They
would also monitor to see whether there is intimidation at the polling booths and
whether the referendum officials have been impartial. Once the voting is completed,
the observer team would issue its report that would declare how the process took
place and whether there should be re-voting. The observer team could also forward its
recommendations to be followed up by the Referendum Commission and other
interested organisations.
(b) Policing the Cease-fire
Re-establishing security throughout Sudan would be the second major task of the
guarantors. The multiplicity and number of armed groups and the proliferation of
small arms throughout the country would compound this problem. According to the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in 1997 Sudan’s armed forces
numbered 79,700 troops, some 85,000 reservists and 15,000 active irregulars in the
paramilitary People’s Defence Forces militia. In 1997, IISS estimated the SPLA to
number 20,000-30,0000 troops, Sudan Allied Forces less than 2,000 and 500 Beja
Congress combatants 500. In addition to these armed groups, there are a number of
other forces operating in Southern Sudan such as the South Sudan Defence Forces
which is under the South Sudanese Co-ordinating Council and a number of southern
trial militias which are either allied to the government or to the rebels.10
Once the Sudan Peace Treaty is signed, a joint Cease-fire Commission would be
established, from the representatives of all armed movements in the country. This
10
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-1998, London, 1998, p. 260.

30
commission would be under the interim authority and would liase with the
international peacekeeping force, which could be sent to the Sudan at the request of
the interim authority. In line with UN doctrine and the size of Sudan, the UN force
should not be less than 5,000 and it should have a clear and limited mandate with a
defined exit strategy and adequate resources to discharge its responsibilities.
Once the cease-fire treaty takes effect, the belligerent forces should be accommodated
in separate barracks in designated regions and out of range of one another. At this
point the armed forces would transfer control of their weapons and military arsenals
to the UN peacekeeping force. The UN peacekeeping forces would maintain control
of all or part of these weapons either throughout the whole time or for a limited period
only. Prior to being discharged combatants would undergo medical examination and
orientation sessions, to inform them about the reinsertion segment.
The period of trusteeship of the settlement by the guarantors falls away with the
ending of the transitional period.
D. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SUDAN
Peace building is a comprehensive and integrated process made up of a myriad of
relationships, roles, goals, structures and functions rather than a single activity. The
work of the international sponsors would not end with the publication of the
referendum report but would be transformed to meet the new challenges of the new
polity. Whilst the time dimension of the interim period would be quite short, the long-
term reconstruction of the Sudan would be much longer.
As a first step the international sponsors would have to embrace and nurture the long-
term desirable structural, systemic and relational goals, articulated by the Sudanese
people. These goals might include for instance, sustainable peace and development,
self-sufficiency, equitable social structures that meet basic human needs, and
respectful and interdependent relationships.
As a second step the international sponsors would have to ensure that the provision of
resources for the reconstruction and transformation of Sudan is not just a matter of
giving money, but also involves an interactive partnership between all stakeholders in
a strategic commitment.
As a third step, the international community would have to aid Sudan in not only
meeting people’s basic needs but also in beginning to replace relief and rehabilitation
assistance with long-term development assistance to restore and (re)build local and
national capacities and the human, physical and financial infrastructure of the country
into an infrastructure of peace.

31
IV. CONCLUSION
The roles of the informal peacemakers and those of international third parties are
complementary and mutually re-inforcing, but it is vital that they be kept distinct.
The informal peacemaker needs to be free from institutional links both with the
principals within the situation in question, and also with the international third-parties
involved. The strength of an informal peacemaker lies in its freedom from such links,
since any association will tend to compromise the neutrality which is key to its
success.
The informal peacemakers operate as either catalysts or consensus-builders, or a
mixture of both. For the purpose of clarifying the different ways in which
peacemakers operate, the two roles need to be distinguished, but they are inter-
dependent and mutually re-inforcing.
International third-parties can operate in one or more of three roles: underwriters,
sponsors and intermediaries. As with informal peacemakers, these roles take different
forms in each of the different phases of the negotiation process. These roles can either
be exercised directly or through intermediate actors, agencies or associations.
The achievement of peace cannot be done exclusively at any one level or be achieved
by any one actor or agency. Rather, it needs to be seen as a multi-dimensional
process, proceeding at many different levels and involving the whole range of
stakeholders at the same time. The key is that the different roles and agencies should
not be seen as in competition, but each needs to re-inforce the other according to the
distinctive contribution which each can make. They need to be co-ordinated diffusely
by a process of careful consultation across the network of different actors and
agencies, including both the informal peacemakers: the international third party actors
and the principals themselves. By this cumulative and diffuse process, based on a
foundation of common relational principles, true and just peace can be achieved.

32
SPONSORS UNDERWRITERS INTERMEDIARIES
P
H
A
S
E
S
:
F
i
g
u
r
e
2
:
ASSEMBLE
FINANCIAL
PACKAGES AS
INCENTIVES TO
THE PRINCIPALS
AND TO
OVERCOME
OBSTACLES IN
THE
IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE
SETTLEMENT
FORM
SYNDICATES TO
GUARANTEE THE
NEGOTIATION
PROCESS AND
THE FINAL
SETTLEMENT
KEEP CHANNELS
OF
COMMUNICATION
OPEN
P
R
E
-
N
E
G
O
T
I
A
T
I
O
N
COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS
PUT FINANCIAL
PACKAGES ON
TABLE AS
INCENTIVES TO
REACH
AGREEMENT
PROVIDING
SYMMETRICAL
GUARANTEES
FOR THE PROCESS
AND TAILORING
THE
GUARANTEES
WITH THE
AGREEMENT OF
THE PRINCIPALS
AS CONVENOR /
CHAIRMAN OR TO
BE IN PROXIMATE
SUPPORT
N
E
G
O
T
I
A
T
I
O
N
IMPLEMENTATION OF SETTLEMENT
DELIVERING OF
AID IN PHASES
POLICING THE
IMPLEMENTATIO
N OF THE
SETTLEMENT
ENDS HERE
T
R
A
N
S
I
T
I
O
N
A
L
IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL CONSTITUTION
FURTHER AID AS
NECESSARY TO
HELP OVERCOME
OBSTACLES
ENDS HERE
F
I
N
A
L

33
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carbonnier, Giles, Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy, United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development, 1998.
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2000 -- Sudan, Washington, 2000.
CSIS, U.S. Policy to End Sudan’s War, Report of the CSIS Task Force on U.S.-Sudan
Policy, Washington, February 2001.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-1998, London,
1998.
Landmines Magazine. Sudan: conflict and development, De-mining News from the
United Nations, Vol. 2, No. 3, October 1997.
OECD/PUMA, Survey on Anti-corruption Measures in Public Sector in OECD
Countries, Paris, 1997.
Overseas Development Council, Making Peace Work -- Lessons for the International
Development Community, ODC Conference Report, 1996.
Rothchild, Donald, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for
Co-operation, Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
SCOVA, Directory of the NGOs Working in Sudan, Khartoum, July 1997.
UNDP, First Country Co-operation Framework for the Sudan: 1997-2000, New
York, 23 June 1997.
United Nation’s High Commission for Refugees, Provisional Statistics on Refugees
and Others of Concern to UNHCR for the year 2000, Geneva, 2001.
US State Department. Hidden Killers: 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis,
Washington, 20 January 2001.
World Bank, Country Profile -- Sudan, Washington, 2000.

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