The strategy is intended to inform $487 billion in cuts to planned defense spending over the next decade, as mandated by the Budget Control Act, which went into effect last August.
Since the review began last year, military analysts have said it would only be a meaningful change if it recommended a disproportionate split of funding among the services.
Obama noted that although the budget will not grow at the pace is has for the past 10 years, it will still increase.
“It will still grow because we have global responsibilities that demand our leadership,” the president said.
President Barack Obama's summit meeting with Gulf leaders at Camp David on May 14 will end in failure if the administration does not propose a substantial upgrade in US-Gulf security relations that is as bold and strategically significant as the nuclear agreement–and likely formal deal–with Iran.
While the summit will not suddenly eliminate mistrust and resolve all differences, it presents an historic opportunity to put back on track a decades-old US-Gulf partnership that has served both sides and the region well, yet lately has experienced deep turbulence. Failure to strengthen these ties will have consequences, the most dramatic of which could be the acceleration of the regional order's collapse.
In a March 2015 Atlantic Council report entitled Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf, we made the case for a mutual defense treaty between the United States and willing Arab Gulf partners. In this issue in focus, we offer a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of the risks, concerns, benefits, and opportunities that would be inherent in such a treaty. We recommend a gradualist approach for significantly upgrading US-Gulf security relations that effectively reduces the risks and maximizes the benefits of more formal US security commitments to willing Arab Gulf states.
Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulfatlanticcouncil
A strategic review of US defense strategy and force posture in the Gulf is long overdue. In Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf, Bilal Y. Saab, Resident Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, and Barry Pavel, Vice President and Director of the Scowcroft Center, analyze how historic changes and developing trends in Washington, the Middle East, and across the globe—along with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and asymmetric threat—are all affecting US defense strategy in the Gulf.
This article aims to explain the new oil crisis and its consequences resulting from drone attacks on two of the main oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter that have heightened tension in the Middle East region, caused a reduction of 5 % of world oil production and rose the price of a barrel on the international market soaring to its highest since the 1991 Gulf War.
Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCC), Military power, between temporary alli...inventionjournals
Since the beginning of the current decade, the pace of political developments and security variables
accelerated in the Middle East dramatically; forcing indicators and the harbingers of a clear point of a
fundamental change in the nature of interests and the quality of alliances that can be formed in the region in
general, and the Arab world in particular. While each state in the region pursues its own approach to security
and faces its own unique challenges, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE all share many
of the same strategic priorities and security interests, and are allied together in the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC). All six states must react to the same major changes now taking place in their strategic environment.
The Gulf War proved" the urgent need for strong collective defenses, in the Gulf region ... it is the security point
of view, is the Kingdom, and its neighbors from the Gulf states, both integrated ... even if there was a military
integration between the Kingdom and the Gulf states, to form the all powerful bloc, we are better to be able to
defend ourselves, but we had the political weight, at the level of the region, but worldwide. The collective
security, at the level of the Gulf States ... is imposed by the current circumstances, that the kingdom plays a
prominent role, because of their greater potential and more numerous and several forces. Arab countries have
become, particularly the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is facing growing threats to national and
regional stability and security, and turned to the potential challenges looming certain risk.
There are several reasons require from the Gulf Cooperation Council building and devote regional and
international alliances States; in view of what these threats of attributes; the most important of all the threats
which surrounding the region.
Gulf Determinants: The extent of success in the Gulf Arab states in achieving greater military cooperation
among them, on a systematic and integrated foundations; as well as self-reliance in building its defense
capabilities through a combination of advanced military technology and the qualified national cadres. In light
of these determinants three scenarios for the future of collective military force to Gulf Arab states, an s follows
Gulf- Gulf alliance: Gulf- Arabic Alliance, Gulf-regional expanded alliance.
Firmness storm" prove the ability of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to carry out the necessary steps to
protect its borders and security.
The strategy is intended to inform $487 billion in cuts to planned defense spending over the next decade, as mandated by the Budget Control Act, which went into effect last August.
Since the review began last year, military analysts have said it would only be a meaningful change if it recommended a disproportionate split of funding among the services.
Obama noted that although the budget will not grow at the pace is has for the past 10 years, it will still increase.
“It will still grow because we have global responsibilities that demand our leadership,” the president said.
President Barack Obama's summit meeting with Gulf leaders at Camp David on May 14 will end in failure if the administration does not propose a substantial upgrade in US-Gulf security relations that is as bold and strategically significant as the nuclear agreement–and likely formal deal–with Iran.
While the summit will not suddenly eliminate mistrust and resolve all differences, it presents an historic opportunity to put back on track a decades-old US-Gulf partnership that has served both sides and the region well, yet lately has experienced deep turbulence. Failure to strengthen these ties will have consequences, the most dramatic of which could be the acceleration of the regional order's collapse.
In a March 2015 Atlantic Council report entitled Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf, we made the case for a mutual defense treaty between the United States and willing Arab Gulf partners. In this issue in focus, we offer a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of the risks, concerns, benefits, and opportunities that would be inherent in such a treaty. We recommend a gradualist approach for significantly upgrading US-Gulf security relations that effectively reduces the risks and maximizes the benefits of more formal US security commitments to willing Arab Gulf states.
Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulfatlanticcouncil
A strategic review of US defense strategy and force posture in the Gulf is long overdue. In Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf, Bilal Y. Saab, Resident Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, and Barry Pavel, Vice President and Director of the Scowcroft Center, analyze how historic changes and developing trends in Washington, the Middle East, and across the globe—along with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and asymmetric threat—are all affecting US defense strategy in the Gulf.
This article aims to explain the new oil crisis and its consequences resulting from drone attacks on two of the main oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter that have heightened tension in the Middle East region, caused a reduction of 5 % of world oil production and rose the price of a barrel on the international market soaring to its highest since the 1991 Gulf War.
Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCC), Military power, between temporary alli...inventionjournals
Since the beginning of the current decade, the pace of political developments and security variables
accelerated in the Middle East dramatically; forcing indicators and the harbingers of a clear point of a
fundamental change in the nature of interests and the quality of alliances that can be formed in the region in
general, and the Arab world in particular. While each state in the region pursues its own approach to security
and faces its own unique challenges, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE all share many
of the same strategic priorities and security interests, and are allied together in the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC). All six states must react to the same major changes now taking place in their strategic environment.
The Gulf War proved" the urgent need for strong collective defenses, in the Gulf region ... it is the security point
of view, is the Kingdom, and its neighbors from the Gulf states, both integrated ... even if there was a military
integration between the Kingdom and the Gulf states, to form the all powerful bloc, we are better to be able to
defend ourselves, but we had the political weight, at the level of the region, but worldwide. The collective
security, at the level of the Gulf States ... is imposed by the current circumstances, that the kingdom plays a
prominent role, because of their greater potential and more numerous and several forces. Arab countries have
become, particularly the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is facing growing threats to national and
regional stability and security, and turned to the potential challenges looming certain risk.
There are several reasons require from the Gulf Cooperation Council building and devote regional and
international alliances States; in view of what these threats of attributes; the most important of all the threats
which surrounding the region.
Gulf Determinants: The extent of success in the Gulf Arab states in achieving greater military cooperation
among them, on a systematic and integrated foundations; as well as self-reliance in building its defense
capabilities through a combination of advanced military technology and the qualified national cadres. In light
of these determinants three scenarios for the future of collective military force to Gulf Arab states, an s follows
Gulf- Gulf alliance: Gulf- Arabic Alliance, Gulf-regional expanded alliance.
Firmness storm" prove the ability of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to carry out the necessary steps to
protect its borders and security.
The State Visit of His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, to India from 24th to 26th January as the Chief Guest of India's 68th Republic Day celebrations marked a momentous occasion in relations between India and the UAE, said a Joint Statement at the conclusion of His Highness Sheikh Mohamed's visit to India.
The GCC will not be spared, as the region’s governments try to make sense of an untested leader entering at a particularly turbulent time. Yet for all of Mr Trump’s controversy, GCC governments remain tepidly optimistic about his arrival.
The following briefing, put together by our experts in the region, outlines where that optimism comes from and the hidden challenges that the region may face.
Global Defense Outlook 2015 Jack Midgley DeloitteJack Midgley
Examines defense budgets and policies of top 50 defense spenders. Reviews trends in cyber risk, global terrorism and battle-related deaths, defense spending.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
Survival of Two Regional Powers at the Expense of the Security of the Middle ...QUESTJOURNAL
ABSTRACT: Many have called the current relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia a cold war. In an article in "The National Interest", Mohammed Ayoob refers to the competition between the two as "a new cold war" [Ayoob, 2013]. The relationship betweenIran and Saudi Arabia for the last three and a half decades has been tumultuous at best, so talk of conflict between these two countries isn’t anything new. The conflict is occasionally given more visibility to the rest of the world by media attention and political analysis, but it’s typically overshadowed by other newsworthy events elsewhere. However, now it looks like their infighting has expanded to full out aggression. The upsizing in military might have major and long-lasting consequences for many of the people that live in the Middle East. Current events related to the conflict between the two countries risk creating a new border system to emerge. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are fully responsible for the birth, development, and shaping of the coming borders. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the background of the conflictbetween Iran and SaudiArabia; a conflict with a Middle Eastern instability and danger of secessions in the region as part of the consequences. It is intended to provide a highlighting of the twocountries’ hugeinternalchallenges and thus the need to externalenemies in the form of intensifying the historicalShia-Sunniconflict.
Terrorism in South Asia: Anatomy and the Root Causesiosrjce
This article examines the phenomenon of terrorism in South Asia. As we know that South Asia has a
long history of Conflicts, terrorism and trans-boarder ethnicity. The developmental challenges faced by most of
countries in South Asia leads to unemployment, Socio-economic marginalization, separatism, ethenic
nationalism and religious extremism. The technological threshold is low despite claims of high technology. Over
40 percent of total population are illiterate. There is human rights abuse, unemployment and uncontrolled
corruption. These and other factors make for a complicated crisis history marked by an assortment of events,
political violence and terrorism. South Asia is the most terror affected area of the world. Each country suffers
varying degree of insurgency and terror. In fact all countries are intertwined as far as terror networking is
concerned. The major conflicts in the region between India and Pakistan keep the resolution of terror problem
elusive. With these threats to political stability and territorial integrity, South Asia remains a region with a high
potential for violence and conflict. Terrorism is a disease which needs to be treated rather than fought. We are
not fighting an enemy but mentally sick and misguided who must be brought on course by looking in to their
grievances and aspirations. In order to find a lasting solution for terrorism in south Asia, it is necessary to find
the basic structure (i.e; Anatomy) and Root causes of terrorism in South Asia, so that the problem can be dealt
more effectively. This article also provides a detailed account regarding these complicated issues
Terrorism and political violence in South East AsiaGraeme Cross
While the threat of a terrorist attack is still very real in certain areas of the Asia Pacific, the region has seen several key country risk levels drop or remain low for 2016, according to Aon’s Terrorism and Political Violence Map, created in collaboration with The Risk Advisory Group.
This year Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar all reported a decrease in risk from high to moderate while Australia’s risk level remained low. Terrorism is cited as the main concern in Australia and Thailand and while the political environment in both Philippines and Myanmar has stablished somewhat, civil unrest and political violence are still the principal threats the countries face.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
Es cualquier acto que implique violencia, uso de fuerza, o amenazas, incluyendo cualquier retención forzosa, que tenga como consecuencia daño o lesión física, o coloque a la persona en una situación de posible lesión corporal y que es cometida por una persona contra algún miembro de la familia o del hogar de otra persona. La violencia familiar es cualquier acto de violencia, incluyendo abuso físico, sexual o verbal, acoso, amenazas de daño, o retención forzosa contra una persona por otra en el marco de una relación. La persona abusada habitualmente tiene menos control y menos opciones que la persona que emplea la violencia o las amenazas. La violencia familiar ocurre entre personas casadas, no casadas y parejas del mismo sexo, así como también, entre miembros de la misma familia u hogar.
The State Visit of His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, to India from 24th to 26th January as the Chief Guest of India's 68th Republic Day celebrations marked a momentous occasion in relations between India and the UAE, said a Joint Statement at the conclusion of His Highness Sheikh Mohamed's visit to India.
The GCC will not be spared, as the region’s governments try to make sense of an untested leader entering at a particularly turbulent time. Yet for all of Mr Trump’s controversy, GCC governments remain tepidly optimistic about his arrival.
The following briefing, put together by our experts in the region, outlines where that optimism comes from and the hidden challenges that the region may face.
Global Defense Outlook 2015 Jack Midgley DeloitteJack Midgley
Examines defense budgets and policies of top 50 defense spenders. Reviews trends in cyber risk, global terrorism and battle-related deaths, defense spending.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
Survival of Two Regional Powers at the Expense of the Security of the Middle ...QUESTJOURNAL
ABSTRACT: Many have called the current relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia a cold war. In an article in "The National Interest", Mohammed Ayoob refers to the competition between the two as "a new cold war" [Ayoob, 2013]. The relationship betweenIran and Saudi Arabia for the last three and a half decades has been tumultuous at best, so talk of conflict between these two countries isn’t anything new. The conflict is occasionally given more visibility to the rest of the world by media attention and political analysis, but it’s typically overshadowed by other newsworthy events elsewhere. However, now it looks like their infighting has expanded to full out aggression. The upsizing in military might have major and long-lasting consequences for many of the people that live in the Middle East. Current events related to the conflict between the two countries risk creating a new border system to emerge. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are fully responsible for the birth, development, and shaping of the coming borders. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the background of the conflictbetween Iran and SaudiArabia; a conflict with a Middle Eastern instability and danger of secessions in the region as part of the consequences. It is intended to provide a highlighting of the twocountries’ hugeinternalchallenges and thus the need to externalenemies in the form of intensifying the historicalShia-Sunniconflict.
Terrorism in South Asia: Anatomy and the Root Causesiosrjce
This article examines the phenomenon of terrorism in South Asia. As we know that South Asia has a
long history of Conflicts, terrorism and trans-boarder ethnicity. The developmental challenges faced by most of
countries in South Asia leads to unemployment, Socio-economic marginalization, separatism, ethenic
nationalism and religious extremism. The technological threshold is low despite claims of high technology. Over
40 percent of total population are illiterate. There is human rights abuse, unemployment and uncontrolled
corruption. These and other factors make for a complicated crisis history marked by an assortment of events,
political violence and terrorism. South Asia is the most terror affected area of the world. Each country suffers
varying degree of insurgency and terror. In fact all countries are intertwined as far as terror networking is
concerned. The major conflicts in the region between India and Pakistan keep the resolution of terror problem
elusive. With these threats to political stability and territorial integrity, South Asia remains a region with a high
potential for violence and conflict. Terrorism is a disease which needs to be treated rather than fought. We are
not fighting an enemy but mentally sick and misguided who must be brought on course by looking in to their
grievances and aspirations. In order to find a lasting solution for terrorism in south Asia, it is necessary to find
the basic structure (i.e; Anatomy) and Root causes of terrorism in South Asia, so that the problem can be dealt
more effectively. This article also provides a detailed account regarding these complicated issues
Terrorism and political violence in South East AsiaGraeme Cross
While the threat of a terrorist attack is still very real in certain areas of the Asia Pacific, the region has seen several key country risk levels drop or remain low for 2016, according to Aon’s Terrorism and Political Violence Map, created in collaboration with The Risk Advisory Group.
This year Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar all reported a decrease in risk from high to moderate while Australia’s risk level remained low. Terrorism is cited as the main concern in Australia and Thailand and while the political environment in both Philippines and Myanmar has stablished somewhat, civil unrest and political violence are still the principal threats the countries face.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
Es cualquier acto que implique violencia, uso de fuerza, o amenazas, incluyendo cualquier retención forzosa, que tenga como consecuencia daño o lesión física, o coloque a la persona en una situación de posible lesión corporal y que es cometida por una persona contra algún miembro de la familia o del hogar de otra persona. La violencia familiar es cualquier acto de violencia, incluyendo abuso físico, sexual o verbal, acoso, amenazas de daño, o retención forzosa contra una persona por otra en el marco de una relación. La persona abusada habitualmente tiene menos control y menos opciones que la persona que emplea la violencia o las amenazas. La violencia familiar ocurre entre personas casadas, no casadas y parejas del mismo sexo, así como también, entre miembros de la misma familia u hogar.
NATO heads of state and government meeting in Madrid on Wednesday (29 June 2022) approved a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance, setting out the Alliance’s priorities, core tasks and approaches for the next decade
1National Security Decision Making Capstone Challenge 2021.docxaulasnilda
1
National Security Decision Making Capstone Challenge 2021. Notional exercise material for educational purposes only.
2021 (nspm-1)
2
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The highest priority of the President of the United States is to keep the American people safe. The president is true to our ideals and
values while protecting the homeland against 21stcentury threats. By preventing terrorist attacks on American soil and abroad, contain-
ing rogue states seeking to destabilize the international system, leading multilateral efforts to combat the threat of WMDs by state and
nonstate actors, and meeting the realities of energy and environmental security, our best interests are preserved. In 2021, we face new
strategic rivalries for resource control, energy security, and economic prosperity; and old military rivalries and confl icts in Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia. The United States strives to engage, prevent, and resolve confl icts worldwide through multilateral channels, in-
ternational organizations and preventive diplomacy.
All of our efforts are underwritten by America’s desire and ability to lead where US power is required. We will cooperate with allies and
support respective diplomatic, economic, political, and military capabilities in order to counter today’s challenges, but will reserve the
right to act unilaterally if it is in the interest of the United States.
Our country possesses the attributes that have supported our leadership throughout the past several centuries. These attributes include our
strong alliances, an unmatched military and the resolve to use it to defend America and its allies, the world’s largest economy, a strong
democracy, and a society whose values are being emulated all over the world.
In 2021, America stands strengthened and determined to meet the many challenges of this young century.
We are striving for an international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, sustainability, and opportunity
through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.
NONPROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR SECURITY
There is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of
nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states. The United States will use all means necessary to
protect itself and deny the proliferation of WMDs to these groups and state actors. The United States also remains committed to its
external security guarantees to our allies. To that end, we will not tolerate the transfer of nuclear weapons material or technologies that
may jeopardize the security of the United States, our allies, and partners. During the last decade, the US government has committed itself
to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. To that end, we have reduced our nuclear stockpile and reliance on nuclear deterrence while
ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of our deterrent. We remain committed to multilater ...
It is the core purpose of the Atlantic Council to foster bipartisan support for policies that promote the security of the United States and the transatlantic community. The signatories of this piece have either served in Afghanistan, been involved in the formation of US policy in government, or otherwise devoted considerable time to Afghan affairs. They have come together to register a broad, bipartisan consensus in support of certain principles that they believe should guide policy formation and decision-making on Afghanistan during the remainder of the Obama administration and the first year of a new administration, of whichever party. It is critical that the current administration prepare the path for the next. A new president will come into office facing a wave of instability in the Islamic world and the threat from violent extremism, which stretches from Asia through the Middle East to Africa. This will continue to pose a considerable challenge and danger to American interests abroad, and to the homeland. The signatories support the continued US engagement required to protect American interests and increase the possibilities for Afghan success.
F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 5N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y .docxssuser454af01
F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 5
N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y
S T R AT E G Y
T H E W H I T E H O U S E
WASHINGTON
Today, the United States is stronger and better positioned to seize the opportunities of a still new century
and safeguard our interests against the risks of an insecure world.
America’s growing economic strength is the foundation of our national security and a critical source
of our influence abroad. Since the Great Recession, we have created nearly 11 million new jobs during
the longest private sector job growth in our history. Unemployment has fallen to its lowest level in 6
years. We are now the world leader in oil and gas production. We continue to set the pace for science,
technology, and innovation in the global economy.
We also benefit from a young and growing workforce, and a resilient and diversified economy. The
entrepreneurial spirit of our workers and businesses undergirds our economic edge. Our higher education
system is the finest in the world, drawing more of the best students globally every year. We continue
to attract immigrants from every corner of the world who renew our country with their energy and
entrepreneurial talents.
Globally, we have moved beyond the large ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that defined so much of
American foreign policy over the past decade. Compared to the nearly 180,000 troops we had in Iraq and
Afghanistan when I took office, we now have fewer than 15,000 deployed in those countries. We possess
a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivaled in human history. We have
renewed our alliances from Europe to Asia.
Now, at this pivotal moment, we continue to face serious challenges to our national security, even as
we are working to shape the opportunities of tomorrow. Violent extremism and an evolving terrorist
threat raise a persistent risk of attacks on America and our allies. Escalating challenges to cybersecurity,
aggression by Russia, the accelerating impacts of climate change, and the outbreak of infectious diseases
all give rise to anxieties about global security. We must be clear-eyed about these and other challenges
and recognize the United States has a unique capability to mobilize and lead the international community
to meet them.
Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and advance our national security
interests must begin with an undeniable truth—America must lead. Strong and sustained American
leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as
well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is never whether America should lead,
but how we lead.
Abroad, we are demonstrating that while we will act unilaterally against threats to our core interests, we
are stronger when we mobilize collective action. That is why we are leading international coalitions to
confront the acute challenges posed by aggression, terrori ...
BAKER DONELSON - IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT FINDINGSVogelDenise
17 USC § 107 (LIMITATIONS On EXCLUSIVE Rights - FAIR USE)
BUILDING THE CASE:
For those who KNOW about the United States DESPOTISM Government Regime that appears is RUN/CONTROLLED by the KLAN’s and JEW’s/ZIONIST’s Law Firm of Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, it is IMPORTANT for the PUBLIC/WORLD to see for themselves (IF they WANT to SEE) and KNOW who the STRING-PULLER(S) are in the release of the FALSE “The Iraq Study Group Report”- - none other than the Law Firm of Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz – When the United States is CONFRONTED on such TERRORIST/CRIMINAL Acts, it ALWAYS “THROW” their SCAPEGOATS out to TAKE THE FALL rather than TAKE RESPONSIBILITY for their CRIMES. This document has been prepared for CASE BUILDING PURPOSES for those who want to see that the United States DESPOTISM Government Regime Officials are BROUGHT TO JUSTICE and PROSECUTED for their DOMESTIC and INTERNATIONAL Terrorist Acts!
Presentation Pakistan Regional Apparatus; Challenges & ResponseShahid Hussain Raja
The prime objective of a state is to improve the quality of life of its citizens. For this, the state formulates a comprehensive set of interdependent policies.
Foreign policy is one such policy formulated to achieve the above objectives by utilising the foreign relations of a country
This presentation attempts to explain foreign policy challenges of Pakistan in its rapidly changing regional apparatus and how to respond to them
Kindly do read Part 1 & 2 of this series for acquainting yourself with the basic concepts of foreign policy and history of foreign relations of Pakistan
Working Group: Reframing a Regional Approach to South Asia: Demilitarization,...Dr. Nyla Ali Khan
Nine scholars of South Asia – Amrita Basu, Shah Mahmud Hanifi, Nyla Ali Khan, David Ludden, Zia Mian, Senzil Nawid, Sahar Shafqat, Kamala Visweswaran, and Chitralekha Zutshi – met at New York University’s Institute of Public Knowledge on March 6, 2009, to discuss the politics of knowledge concerning South Asia as it connects academic and policy work in the US.
https://www.nyu.edu/ipk/files/docs/misc/6152154314a0d91053299c.pdf
Armar a las masas revolucionarias, concepto amparado por la necesidad de combatir, al poderoso y vencerlo
Gracias
http://stolpkin.net/IMG/pdf/Armar-a-las-masas-revolucionarias-construir-el-ejercito-revolucionario_Vo-Nguyen-Giap.pdf
Conflicto y guerra sociologia historica (raymon aron)
Defense strategic guidance
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7. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense 1
Introduction
The United States has played a leading role in transforming the international system over the
past sixty-five years. Working with like-minded nations, the United States has created a
safer, more stable, and more prosperous world for the American people, our allies, and our
partners around the globe than existed prior to World War II. Over the last decade, we have
undertaken extended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to bring stability to those countries
and secure our interests. As we responsibly draw down from these two operations, take
steps to protect our nation’’s economic vitality, and protect our interests in a world of
accelerating change, we face an inflection point. This merited an assessment of the U.S.
defense strategy in light of the changing geopolitical environment and our changing fiscal
circumstances. This assessment reflects the President’’s strategic direction to the Department
and was deeply informed by the Department’’s civilian and military leadership, including the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Combatant
Commanders. Out of the assessment we developed a defense strategy that transitions our
Defense enterprise from an emphasis on today’’s wars to preparing for future challenges,
protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department’’s
efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of deficit
reduction through a lower level of defense spending.
This strategic guidance document describes the projected security environment and the key
military missions for which the Department of Defense (DoD) will prepare. It is intended as
a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020, providing a set of precepts that will help guide
decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent program and budget
cycles, and highlighting some of the strategic risks that may be associated with the proposed
strategy.
A Challenging Global Security Environment
The global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and
opportunities to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied.
The demise of Osama bin Laden and the capturing or killing of many other senior al-Qa’’ida
leaders have rendered the group far less capable. However, al-Qa’’ida and its affiliates
remain active in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. More broadly,
violent extremists will continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, partners, and the homeland.
The primary loci of these threats are South Asia and the Middle East. With the diffusion of
destructive technology, these extremists have the potential to pose catastrophic threats that
could directly affect our security and prosperity. For the foreseeable future, the United
States will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring the
activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish
control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and
individuals when necessary.
8. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense 2
U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc
extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South
Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S.
military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance
toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationships with Asian allies and key partners are
critical to the future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize our existing
alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. We will also expand
our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure
collective capability and capacity for securing common interests. The United States is also
investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a
regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.
Furthermore, we will maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula by effectively working with
allies and other regional states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea,
which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this
dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and
presence. Over the long term, China’’s emergence as a regional power will have the
potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two
countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a
cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China’’s military power must be
accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in
the region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that
we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty
obligations and with international law. Working closely with our network of allies and
partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures
underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism,
and constructive defense cooperation.
In the Middle East, the Arab Awakening presents both strategic opportunities and
challenges. Regime changes, as well as tensions within and among states under pressure to
reform, introduce uncertainty for the future. But they also may result in governments that,
over the long term, are more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of their people, and are
more stable and reliable partners of the United States.
Our defense efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at countering violent extremists and
destabilizing threats, as well as upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. Of
particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf security, in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation
Council countries when appropriate, to prevent Iran’’s development of a nuclear weapon
capability and counter its destabilizing policies. The United States will do this while
standing up for Israel’’s security and a comprehensive Middle East peace. To support these
objectives, the United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military
presence in –– and support of –– partner nations in and around this region.
Europe is home to some of America’’s most stalwart allies and partners, many of whom have
sacrificed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Europe is our principal
partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable
9. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense 3
future. At the same time, security challenges and unresolved conflicts persist in parts of
Europe and Eurasia, where the United States must continue to promote regional security and
Euro-Atlantic integration. The United States has enduring interests in supporting peace and
prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO, which is
critical to the security of Europe and beyond. Most European countries are now producers
of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and
Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military
investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future
capabilities. In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must
also evolve. As this occurs, the United States will maintain our Article 5 commitments to
allied security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations.
In this resource-constrained era, we will also work with NATO allies to develop a ““Smart
Defense”” approach to pool, share, and specialize capabilities as needed to meet 21st
century
challenges. In addition, our engagement with Russia remains important, and we will
continue to build a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest and encourage it to be a
contributor across a broad range of issues.
Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the
costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the
security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations ––
including those in Africa and Latin America –– whose interests and viewpoints are merging
into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will
develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security
objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.
To enable economic growth and commerce, America, working in conjunction with allies and
partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global
commons –– those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective
tissue of the international system. Global security and prosperity are increasingly dependent
on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea. State and non-state actors pose potential
threats to access in the global commons, whether through opposition to existing norms or
other anti-access approaches. Both state and non-state actors possess the capability and
intent to conduct cyber espionage and, potentially, cyber attacks on the United States, with
possible severe effects on both our military operations and our homeland. Growth in the
number of space-faring nations is also leading to an increasingly congested and contested
space environment, threatening safety and security. The United States will continue to lead
global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global
commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by
maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.
The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology has the potential
to magnify the threats posed by regional state actors, giving them more freedom of action to
challenge U.S. interests. Terrorist access to even simple nuclear devices poses the prospect
of devastating consequences for the United States. Accordingly, the Department of Defense
will continue to enhance its capabilities, acting with an array of domestic and foreign
partners, to conduct effective operations to counter the proliferation of WMD.
10. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense 4
Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces
To protect U.S. national interests and achieve the objectives of the 2010 National Security
Strategy in this environment, the Joint Force will need to recalibrate its capabilities and
make selective additional investments to succeed in the following missions:
Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. Acting in concert with other means of
national power, U.S. military forces must continue to hold al-Qa’’ida and its affiliates and
adherents under constant pressure, wherever they may be. Achieving our core goal of
disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qa’’ida and preventing Afghanistan from ever
being a safe haven again will be central to this effort. As U.S. forces draw down in
Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed
and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance.
Reflecting lessons learned of the past decade, we will continue to build and sustain
tailored capabilities appropriate for counter terrorism and irregular warfare. We will also
remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as
Hezbollah.
Deter and Defeat Aggression. U.S. forces will be capable of deterring and defeating
aggression by any potential adversary. Credible deterrence results from both the
capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the
complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor. As a nation
with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and
defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces
are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere. Our planning envisages forces that
are able to fully deny a capable state’’s aggressive objectives in one region by conducting
a combined arms campaign across all domains –– land, air, maritime, space, and
cyberspace. This includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a
transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing
forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces. Even when U.S.
forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of
denying the objectives of –– or imposing unacceptable costs on –– an opportunistic
aggressor in a second region. U.S. forces will plan to operate whenever possible with
allied and coalition forces. Our ground forces will be responsive and capitalize on
balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain
prepared for the several areas in which such conflicts could occur.
Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges. In order to credibly deter
potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United
States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom
to operate are challenged. In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric
capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles,
advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational
calculus. States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to
counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated
weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U.S.
military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access
11. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense 5
and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint
Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new
stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the
resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. U.S. forces conduct a range of activities aimed
at preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
These activities include implementing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar)
Program, and planning and operations to locate, monitor, track, interdict and secure
WMD and WMD-related components and the means and facilities to make them. They
also include an active whole-of-government effort to frustrate the ambitions of nations
bent on developing WMD, to include preventing Iran’’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability. In partnership with other elements of the U.S. Government, DoD will
continue to invest in capabilities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use,
should preventive measures fail.
Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space. Modern armed forces cannot conduct
high-tempo, effective operations without reliable information and communication
networks and assured access to cyberspace and space. Today space systems and their
supporting infrastructure face a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, or destroy
assets. Accordingly, DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies
and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational
capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.
Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. As long as nuclear
weapons remain in existence, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective
arsenal. We will field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an
adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries
and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’’s
security commitments. It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a
smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our
inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.
Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. U.S. forces will
continue to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors. We will
also come to the assistance of domestic civil authorities in the event such defense fails or
in case of natural disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or even
catastrophic event. Homeland defense and support to civil authorities require strong,
steady––state force readiness, to include a robust missile defense capability. Threats to the
homeland may be highest when U.S. forces are engaged in conflict with an adversary
abroad.
Provide a Stabilizing Presence. U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence
operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training
exercises. These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and
competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense,
strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence. A reduction in resources will
12. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense 6
require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner
interoperability and building partner capacity. However, with reduced resources,
thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of these
operations.
Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. In the aftermath of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and
military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for
significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless
be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required,
operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will
retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities
that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to
conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. The nation has
frequently called upon its Armed Forces to respond to a range of situations that threaten
the safety and well-being of its citizens and those of other countries. U.S. forces possess
rapidly deployable capabilities, including airlift and sealift, surveillance, medical
evacuation and care, and communications that can be invaluable in supplementing lead
relief agencies, by extending aid to victims of natural or man-made disasters, both at
home and abroad. DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response
options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities. U.S. forces will also
remain capable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for American
citizens overseas on an emergency basis.
The aforementioned missions will largely determine the shape of the future Joint Force. The
overall capacity of U.S. forces, however, will be based on requirements that the following
subset of missions demand: counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat
aggression; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; and defend the
homeland and support civil authorities.
Toward the Joint Force of 2020
To ensure success in these missions, several principles will guide our force and program
development. First, given that we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve
with absolute certainty, we will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the
aggregate, offer versatility across the range of missions described above. The Department
will make clear distinctions both among the key sizing and shaping missions listed above
and between these mission areas and all other areas of the defense program. Wholesale
divestment of the capability to conduct any mission would be unwise, based on historical
and projected uses of U.S. military forces and our inability to predict the future. Likewise,
DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that
might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and
rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.
13. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense 7
Second, we have sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made
today and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a
course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the
strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres. Accordingly, the concept of
““reversibility”” –– including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people,
our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis –– is a key
part of our decision calculus.
Third, we are determined to maintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce our
overall capacity. We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force
structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, were deemphasized
over the past decade. An ill-prepared force will be vulnerable to corrosion in its morale,
recruitment, and retention. Unless we are prepared to send confident, well-trained, and
properly equipped men and women into battle, the nation will risk its most important
military advantage –– the health and quality of the All-Volunteer Force.
Fourth, the Department must continue to reduce the ““cost of doing business.”” This entails
reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, finding further efficiencies in overhead and
headquarters, business practices, and other support activities before taking further risk in
meeting the demands of the strategy. As DoD takes steps to reduce its manpower costs, to
include reductions in the growth of compensation and health care costs, we will keep faith
with those who serve.
During the past decade, the men and women who comprise the All-Volunteer Force have
shown versatility, adaptability, and commitment, enduring the constant stress and strain of
fighting two overlapping conflicts. They have also endured prolonged and repeated
deployments. Some –– more than 46,000 men and women –– have been wounded, and still
others –– more than 6,200 members of the Armed Forces –– have lost their lives. As the
Department reduces the size of the force, we will do so in a way that respects these
sacrifices. This means, among other things, taking concrete steps to facilitate the transition
of those who will leave the service. These include supporting programs to help veterans
translate their military skills for the civilian workforce and aid their search for jobs.
Fifth, it will be necessary to examine how this strategy will influence existing campaign and
contingency plans so that more limited resources may be better tuned to their requirements.
This will include a renewed emphasis on the need for a globally networked approach to
deterrence and warfare.
Sixth, the Department will need to examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve
Component (RC) elements best suited to the strategy. Over the past decade, the National
Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make
sustained contributions to national security. The challenges facing the United States today
and in the future will require that we continue to employ National Guard and Reserve forces.
The expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a significant driver in
determining an appropriate AC/RC mix and level of RC readiness.
Seventh, as we transition out of Iraq and draw down in Afghanistan, we will take extra
measures to retain and build on key advancements in networked warfare in which joint
14. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense 8
forces have finally become truly interdependent. This imperative will shape a number of
Departmental disciplines, ranging from establishing warfighting requirements to the way our
forces train together.
Finally, in adjusting our strategy and attendant force size, the Department will make every
effort to maintain an adequate industrial base and our investment in science and technology.
We will also encourage innovation in concepts of operation. Over the past ten years, the
United States and its coalition allies and partners have learned hard lessons and applied new
operational approaches in the counter terrorism, counterinsurgency, and security force
assistance arenas, most often operating in uncontested sea and air environments.
Accordingly, similar work needs to be done to ensure the United States, its allies, and
partners are capable of operating in A2/AD, cyber, and other contested operating
environments. To that end, the Department will both encourage a culture of change and be
prudent with its ““seed corn,”” balancing reductions necessitated by resource pressures with
the imperative to sustain key streams of innovation that may provide significant long-term
payoffs.
Conclusion
The United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military
forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U.S. national power. Our
global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail. The balance between
available resources and our security needs has never been more delicate. Force and program
decisions made by the Department of Defense will be made in accordance with the strategic
approach described in this document, which is designed to ensure our Armed Forces can
meet the demands of the U.S. National Security Strategy at acceptable risk.