Brendan Riske predicts that Nigeria will face tough challenges in 2015 due to the ongoing conflict with Boko Haram and the recent decline in oil prices. Boko Haram has expanded its control of northern Nigeria, capturing towns and killing thousands of civilians. Meanwhile, falling international oil prices have reduced Nigeria's government revenues since oil funds 83% of the government budget. With less money to support the military, the Nigerian government may lose control of northern areas to Boko Haram if international help is not provided.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
During this week's Invast Insights we cover:
► The impact of Iraq on oil markets
► The depression in mining won’t last forever
► Australian listed energy producer
► S&P500 looks like a good short
GRAB A 4 WEEK INVAST INSIGHTS FREE TRIAL (WEEKLY NEWSLETTER)
http://invast.com.au/insights
CONNECT WITH INVAST TODAY
Facebook ► https://www.facebook.com/invastglobal
Twitter ► http://twitter.com/InvastGlobal
Linkedin ► http://www.linkedin.com/company/invast
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Iraq-Persian Gulf Oil Geopolitics (drafted in 2010)Kevin Kane
In 2010 I forecasted much of what has transpired in the Middle East: with a few themes being very precise... the obsession of the US over keeping Iraq together because of its potential role in global oil production, and the fall apart of Iraq because the notion of Iraq is a fiction: as Iraq is really three nations forced together that have no business together. I also predicted Iraq would collapse into two, no three nations: which is what we have.
Nigeria's Solid Minerals Sector: Alternative Investment OpportunitiesAbove Whispers
Being the text of the keynote address by
H.E. Dr. Kayode Fayemi
Minister of Solid Minerals Development
Federal Republic of Nigeria
at the session organized by the
ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP (APPG) ON NIGERIA
United Kingdom Parliament
London, United Kingdom | Thursday, May 19, 2016
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
The GCC will not be spared, as the region’s governments try to make sense of an untested leader entering at a particularly turbulent time. Yet for all of Mr Trump’s controversy, GCC governments remain tepidly optimistic about his arrival.
The following briefing, put together by our experts in the region, outlines where that optimism comes from and the hidden challenges that the region may face.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
During this week's Invast Insights we cover:
► The impact of Iraq on oil markets
► The depression in mining won’t last forever
► Australian listed energy producer
► S&P500 looks like a good short
GRAB A 4 WEEK INVAST INSIGHTS FREE TRIAL (WEEKLY NEWSLETTER)
http://invast.com.au/insights
CONNECT WITH INVAST TODAY
Facebook ► https://www.facebook.com/invastglobal
Twitter ► http://twitter.com/InvastGlobal
Linkedin ► http://www.linkedin.com/company/invast
Invast ► http://www.invast.com.au
Google+ ► https://plus.google.com/+InvastAu/
Iraq-Persian Gulf Oil Geopolitics (drafted in 2010)Kevin Kane
In 2010 I forecasted much of what has transpired in the Middle East: with a few themes being very precise... the obsession of the US over keeping Iraq together because of its potential role in global oil production, and the fall apart of Iraq because the notion of Iraq is a fiction: as Iraq is really three nations forced together that have no business together. I also predicted Iraq would collapse into two, no three nations: which is what we have.
Nigeria's Solid Minerals Sector: Alternative Investment OpportunitiesAbove Whispers
Being the text of the keynote address by
H.E. Dr. Kayode Fayemi
Minister of Solid Minerals Development
Federal Republic of Nigeria
at the session organized by the
ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP (APPG) ON NIGERIA
United Kingdom Parliament
London, United Kingdom | Thursday, May 19, 2016
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
The GCC will not be spared, as the region’s governments try to make sense of an untested leader entering at a particularly turbulent time. Yet for all of Mr Trump’s controversy, GCC governments remain tepidly optimistic about his arrival.
The following briefing, put together by our experts in the region, outlines where that optimism comes from and the hidden challenges that the region may face.
The strategy is intended to inform $487 billion in cuts to planned defense spending over the next decade, as mandated by the Budget Control Act, which went into effect last August.
Since the review began last year, military analysts have said it would only be a meaningful change if it recommended a disproportionate split of funding among the services.
Obama noted that although the budget will not grow at the pace is has for the past 10 years, it will still increase.
“It will still grow because we have global responsibilities that demand our leadership,” the president said.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. deployed several dozen troops to Somalia to train and equip Somali and African Union forces fighting against al Shabaab. The arrival of units from the 101st Airborne Division to Mogadishu on April 2 marks the first significant deployment of U.S. ground troops, other than small advisory units, to Somalia since March 1994. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu after Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo declared war on the group on April 6. Al Shabaab will surge in Mogadishu to force Somali forces to concentrate in the capital, allowing al Shabaab to control humanitarian aid delivery in other regions.
2. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is setting conditions to launch a major offensive in Yemen after the month of Ramadan, which begins in late May. The offensive aims to seize al Hudaydah port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast from the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Yemen’s internationally recognized government requested the recall of the UN Resident Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, who opposes the offensive. The al Hudaydah operation will worsen conditions for a population that already faces a severe humanitarian crisis.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) has an opportunity to gain by brokering a ceasefire between warring militias in southwestern Libya. The GNA Ministry of Local Government organized a meeting for mayors from the Fezzan region to discuss military de-escalation. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based primarily in eastern Libya, is attempting to seize military bases and oil sites in the Fezzan. Anti-LNA militias from Libya’s coastal regions deployed to the Fezzan to join the fight, which risks escalating into a larger conflict. The GNA, which was created by a UN agreement, will gain legitimacy if it brokers a deal at the municipal level.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration granted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) the authority to conduct offensive airstrikes against al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, in order to increase pressure on the group. AFRICOM commander General Waldhauser testified that support for the Somali Federal Government (SFG) as it addresses the spreading famine is critical. Al Shabaab, which kidnapped four World Health Organization aid workers on April 3, is already taking steps to control the delivery of aid to areas outside of SFG control.
2. The U.S. and its partners in Yemen may miss an opportunity to gain allies against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. Jeff Davis reported the U.S. has conducted over 70 airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen this year, more than any other year in total. The pace of strikes and potential for collateral damage drove local leaders in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen to meet. The local leaders denounced support for terrorism of any kind, but also condemned civilian casualties and infrastructure.
3. The growing power of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, who leads the force that controls much of eastern Libya, will lead to increased conflict. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is making concessions to bring Haftar into a political deal that would allow him to control Libya’s military. LNA forces are making a play for control of key oil and military sites in central and southwestern Libya. Haftar’s advance will spark backlash from his opponents throughout western Libya, however, and Haftar lacks the military power to win the resultant war.
Descriptive Report on Nigeria | Okoye, David IkechukwuDAVID OKOYE
Nigeria, officially known as the federal republic of Nigeria, is a former British colony. Nigeria has been home to a number of kingdoms and tribal states over the millennia. The modern state originated from British colonial rule beginning in the 19th century, and took its present territorial shape with the merging of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and Northern Nigeria Protectorate in 1914. The administrative and legal structures were set up when the British were practicing indirect rule through traditional chiefdoms. Nigeria became a formally independent federation in 1960. It experienced a civil war from 1967 to 1970. It thereafter alternated between democratically elected civilian governments and military dictatorships until it achieved a stable democracy in 1999, with the 2011 presidential election considered the first to be reasonably free and fair. In 2015, power transferred peacefully from one party to another for the first time when former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari defeated incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit rising instability in Morocco to conduct more frequent attacks in Europe and North Africa. Moroccan security forces, which have prevented ISIS attacks in the country, are struggling to manage a growing protest movement. This civil unrest, paired with the shifting of migrant flows from Libya toward Morocco, will strain the country’s security resources and reduce pressure on ISIS networks there. Instability in Morocco also increases the risk of attacks in Europe, where Moroccan militants participated in recent ISIS attacks in Spain and a suspected ISIS-linked stabbing in Finland. [Read a recent warning on the implications of instability in Morocco.]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh is fracturing. Senior al Houthi leaders accused Saleh of conducting treasonous negotiations with the Gulf States. Saleh denied the accusations and blamed the al Houthis for governance failures in Sana’a. Tensions within the al Houthi-Saleh bloc provide an opportunity for the U.S. to advance a political settlement to the Yemeni conflict. The al Houthi movement lacks the capability to continue the civil war without Saleh’s forces. An elite-brokered peace deal that does not address the grievances driving the war will not end Yemen’s instability, however. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s recommendations for U.S. engagement in Yemen.]
3. U.S. President Donald Trump criticized Pakistan for harboring terrorist groups during a speech announcing a new U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan on August 21. A Pakistani army spokesman dismissed the criticism and stated that Pakistan has taken action against militant groups in its terrain. Pakistan will likely intensify counter-militancy operations near the Afghan border to safeguard its relationship with the U.S. Pakistan may also increase support for militant groups in the disputed Kashmir territory to counteract U.S. engagement with India. [Read Frederick W. Kagan’s “Trump outlines the foundation of a changed approach in Afghanistan.”]
Boko Haram and its Impact on the Nigerian Economy By A.docxAASTHA76
Boko Haram and its Impact on the Nigerian
Economy
By Angus Gillespie
Despite emerging from the murky shadows within Nigeria just a dozen years ago,
Boko Haram has quickly earned itself an infamous reputation for being one of the
most callous and violent radical Islamist groups in African history. In fact, it’s
already been tagged a terrorist group by western countries such as the United
States. Over the past 12 to 15 months, Boko Haram has unleashed a massive
wave of violence, fear and chaos throughout the northern African country – so
much so, that it’s know seen by many as having a noticeable impact on the way
the country operates, and by extension, is hindering its economic well being to a
widening degree.
Founded in 2002, Boko Haram is an ultra extremist Islamic cult focusing primarily
on the edict that Western education is forbidden. Military operations were
launched in 2009 to support their cause in creating an independent Islamic state.
It also has roots that can be traced to the northern part of Cameroon and parts of
Niger. The Boko Haram leadership has international connections to Al-Qaeda.
Suspected Boko Haram militants have killed dozens of Nigerians in recent weeks
and there is no sign of the violence abating. In one attack, gunmen disguised as
soldiers fired on a crowd in a church compound. The radical sect is known for
attacking churches, schools, and police stations. Tourists are also considered fair
game. Violence linked to the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in an
estimated 12,000 killings since 2002, although that figure has gone up
considerably since 2009 when the group began to heavily arm itself as a militia.
Making matters worse for the Nigerian government of Goodluck Jonathan is that
some of the attacks come amidst reports some army generals have been aiding
the rebel militants, on the belief that a national coup is going to take place.
Nigerian media sources have reported that as many as 10 generals and five
other senior military officers have already been tried before the courts for
supplying arms and information to Boko Haram. However, at least one Nigerian
military spokesman called the reports “falsehoods”.
This contradicted Interior Minister Abba Moro said it was “good news” that the
army had identified soldiers who were undermining the fight against the
insurgents, and that it sent a strong message to other serving officers.
Boko Haram has waged an increasingly bloody insurgency since 2009 in an
attempt to create an Islamic state in Nigeria.
One small town that has been hard hit by the violence is Attagara, where the
village church came under attack leaving at least 20 people dead.
Nigeria’s government has been facing mounting pressure both at home and
abroad to do more to tackle the group and bring about the release of more than
300 schoolgirls kidnapped by the group on April 15.
President Jonathan originally declared a state of emergency in May of ...
This paper traces the development of Boko-Haram from two perspectives (Socio-economic and Political), it exposes the reasons for the re-emergence of insecurity in Nigeria, precisely Northern zone which shares the same culture with Northern Cameroon. The paper equally explores the various groups threatening Nigerian sovereignty and countries of the Lake Chad Basin. It also outlines some responses to adapt to the changing modus operandi of the terrorist organization.
PART 1 COUNTRY SELECTION AND EVALUATION1.A. Country Selection.docxkarlhennesey
PART 1: COUNTRY SELECTION AND EVALUATION
1.A. Country Selection
The table below is a country selection matrix that compares the medical markets of five Africa countries: Nigeria, Cameroon, Ghana, South Africa, and Kenya. Our client, Devon, is looking to introduce their negative pressure wound therapy device to Nigeria. Yet, before entering we did a quick analysis of four other markets within Africa that could potentially be a better alternative.
Each country was given a weighted score based on 13 criteria which all fell under four main categories: market size, geographic indicators, economic indicators, and ease of doing business. These categories and criteria were based on relevancy to the medical industry as well as relevancy to the product Devon is looking to introduce. Each criteria was scored on a scale of 10.
The scores were produced based on the rankings each country had within Africa. The math involved taking the county’s rank in Africa minus the total and divide that number by the total to get the score. For example, for South Africa their rank in GDP is 7 out of 55 countries ranked. Thus we would take 7-55= 48. We would then take this number and divide it by 55 to get .872 which would come to 8.72.
1.B. Country Evaluation
1.B.1 Geography
Officially, Nigeria is a West African state that borders Niger in the north; Cameroon in the east; Benin in the west, & Chad in the northeast, all by water. Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe connect by sea (OEC, 2017). The nation is the most crowded in Africa. The Niger River enters the nation in the northwest and streams southward through tropical downpour woodlands and bogs to its delta in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria weighs nearly six times Georgia's size; marginally more than twice California's size. Nigeria stretches over 923,768 square kilometers of land and water, and covers 853 kilometers of coastline (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019). Nigeria has the Bonny Inshore Terminal, Calabar, and Lagos as it’s three principal ports. These ports offer substantial export prospects for the tools and services of NPWT’s devices and products, and particularly for trade. Nigeria has a seasonal, warm and rainy tropical climate (Britannia, 2018). Nigeria's climate usually consists of two seasons: wet and dry. The wet season (summer) is typically April through October and the dry season (winter) is between November and March. Nigeria can be classified into three regions by weather zones- the far South, the far North, and the rest of the country. The far South is marked by a rainforest tropical climate with average rainfall between 60 and 80 inches per year. Although the far north is wilderness-like, precipitation is less than 20 inches. Savannah distinguishes the rest of the country between the far North and far South with precipitation of 20 and 60 inches per year. Most of the year it is hot and humid in the southeast, but chilly in the south west. The north and west is domina ...
The strategy is intended to inform $487 billion in cuts to planned defense spending over the next decade, as mandated by the Budget Control Act, which went into effect last August.
Since the review began last year, military analysts have said it would only be a meaningful change if it recommended a disproportionate split of funding among the services.
Obama noted that although the budget will not grow at the pace is has for the past 10 years, it will still increase.
“It will still grow because we have global responsibilities that demand our leadership,” the president said.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. deployed several dozen troops to Somalia to train and equip Somali and African Union forces fighting against al Shabaab. The arrival of units from the 101st Airborne Division to Mogadishu on April 2 marks the first significant deployment of U.S. ground troops, other than small advisory units, to Somalia since March 1994. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu after Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo declared war on the group on April 6. Al Shabaab will surge in Mogadishu to force Somali forces to concentrate in the capital, allowing al Shabaab to control humanitarian aid delivery in other regions.
2. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is setting conditions to launch a major offensive in Yemen after the month of Ramadan, which begins in late May. The offensive aims to seize al Hudaydah port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast from the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Yemen’s internationally recognized government requested the recall of the UN Resident Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, who opposes the offensive. The al Hudaydah operation will worsen conditions for a population that already faces a severe humanitarian crisis.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) has an opportunity to gain by brokering a ceasefire between warring militias in southwestern Libya. The GNA Ministry of Local Government organized a meeting for mayors from the Fezzan region to discuss military de-escalation. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based primarily in eastern Libya, is attempting to seize military bases and oil sites in the Fezzan. Anti-LNA militias from Libya’s coastal regions deployed to the Fezzan to join the fight, which risks escalating into a larger conflict. The GNA, which was created by a UN agreement, will gain legitimacy if it brokers a deal at the municipal level.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration granted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) the authority to conduct offensive airstrikes against al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, in order to increase pressure on the group. AFRICOM commander General Waldhauser testified that support for the Somali Federal Government (SFG) as it addresses the spreading famine is critical. Al Shabaab, which kidnapped four World Health Organization aid workers on April 3, is already taking steps to control the delivery of aid to areas outside of SFG control.
2. The U.S. and its partners in Yemen may miss an opportunity to gain allies against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. Jeff Davis reported the U.S. has conducted over 70 airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen this year, more than any other year in total. The pace of strikes and potential for collateral damage drove local leaders in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen to meet. The local leaders denounced support for terrorism of any kind, but also condemned civilian casualties and infrastructure.
3. The growing power of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, who leads the force that controls much of eastern Libya, will lead to increased conflict. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is making concessions to bring Haftar into a political deal that would allow him to control Libya’s military. LNA forces are making a play for control of key oil and military sites in central and southwestern Libya. Haftar’s advance will spark backlash from his opponents throughout western Libya, however, and Haftar lacks the military power to win the resultant war.
Descriptive Report on Nigeria | Okoye, David IkechukwuDAVID OKOYE
Nigeria, officially known as the federal republic of Nigeria, is a former British colony. Nigeria has been home to a number of kingdoms and tribal states over the millennia. The modern state originated from British colonial rule beginning in the 19th century, and took its present territorial shape with the merging of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and Northern Nigeria Protectorate in 1914. The administrative and legal structures were set up when the British were practicing indirect rule through traditional chiefdoms. Nigeria became a formally independent federation in 1960. It experienced a civil war from 1967 to 1970. It thereafter alternated between democratically elected civilian governments and military dictatorships until it achieved a stable democracy in 1999, with the 2011 presidential election considered the first to be reasonably free and fair. In 2015, power transferred peacefully from one party to another for the first time when former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari defeated incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit rising instability in Morocco to conduct more frequent attacks in Europe and North Africa. Moroccan security forces, which have prevented ISIS attacks in the country, are struggling to manage a growing protest movement. This civil unrest, paired with the shifting of migrant flows from Libya toward Morocco, will strain the country’s security resources and reduce pressure on ISIS networks there. Instability in Morocco also increases the risk of attacks in Europe, where Moroccan militants participated in recent ISIS attacks in Spain and a suspected ISIS-linked stabbing in Finland. [Read a recent warning on the implications of instability in Morocco.]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh is fracturing. Senior al Houthi leaders accused Saleh of conducting treasonous negotiations with the Gulf States. Saleh denied the accusations and blamed the al Houthis for governance failures in Sana’a. Tensions within the al Houthi-Saleh bloc provide an opportunity for the U.S. to advance a political settlement to the Yemeni conflict. The al Houthi movement lacks the capability to continue the civil war without Saleh’s forces. An elite-brokered peace deal that does not address the grievances driving the war will not end Yemen’s instability, however. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s recommendations for U.S. engagement in Yemen.]
3. U.S. President Donald Trump criticized Pakistan for harboring terrorist groups during a speech announcing a new U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan on August 21. A Pakistani army spokesman dismissed the criticism and stated that Pakistan has taken action against militant groups in its terrain. Pakistan will likely intensify counter-militancy operations near the Afghan border to safeguard its relationship with the U.S. Pakistan may also increase support for militant groups in the disputed Kashmir territory to counteract U.S. engagement with India. [Read Frederick W. Kagan’s “Trump outlines the foundation of a changed approach in Afghanistan.”]
Boko Haram and its Impact on the Nigerian Economy By A.docxAASTHA76
Boko Haram and its Impact on the Nigerian
Economy
By Angus Gillespie
Despite emerging from the murky shadows within Nigeria just a dozen years ago,
Boko Haram has quickly earned itself an infamous reputation for being one of the
most callous and violent radical Islamist groups in African history. In fact, it’s
already been tagged a terrorist group by western countries such as the United
States. Over the past 12 to 15 months, Boko Haram has unleashed a massive
wave of violence, fear and chaos throughout the northern African country – so
much so, that it’s know seen by many as having a noticeable impact on the way
the country operates, and by extension, is hindering its economic well being to a
widening degree.
Founded in 2002, Boko Haram is an ultra extremist Islamic cult focusing primarily
on the edict that Western education is forbidden. Military operations were
launched in 2009 to support their cause in creating an independent Islamic state.
It also has roots that can be traced to the northern part of Cameroon and parts of
Niger. The Boko Haram leadership has international connections to Al-Qaeda.
Suspected Boko Haram militants have killed dozens of Nigerians in recent weeks
and there is no sign of the violence abating. In one attack, gunmen disguised as
soldiers fired on a crowd in a church compound. The radical sect is known for
attacking churches, schools, and police stations. Tourists are also considered fair
game. Violence linked to the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in an
estimated 12,000 killings since 2002, although that figure has gone up
considerably since 2009 when the group began to heavily arm itself as a militia.
Making matters worse for the Nigerian government of Goodluck Jonathan is that
some of the attacks come amidst reports some army generals have been aiding
the rebel militants, on the belief that a national coup is going to take place.
Nigerian media sources have reported that as many as 10 generals and five
other senior military officers have already been tried before the courts for
supplying arms and information to Boko Haram. However, at least one Nigerian
military spokesman called the reports “falsehoods”.
This contradicted Interior Minister Abba Moro said it was “good news” that the
army had identified soldiers who were undermining the fight against the
insurgents, and that it sent a strong message to other serving officers.
Boko Haram has waged an increasingly bloody insurgency since 2009 in an
attempt to create an Islamic state in Nigeria.
One small town that has been hard hit by the violence is Attagara, where the
village church came under attack leaving at least 20 people dead.
Nigeria’s government has been facing mounting pressure both at home and
abroad to do more to tackle the group and bring about the release of more than
300 schoolgirls kidnapped by the group on April 15.
President Jonathan originally declared a state of emergency in May of ...
This paper traces the development of Boko-Haram from two perspectives (Socio-economic and Political), it exposes the reasons for the re-emergence of insecurity in Nigeria, precisely Northern zone which shares the same culture with Northern Cameroon. The paper equally explores the various groups threatening Nigerian sovereignty and countries of the Lake Chad Basin. It also outlines some responses to adapt to the changing modus operandi of the terrorist organization.
PART 1 COUNTRY SELECTION AND EVALUATION1.A. Country Selection.docxkarlhennesey
PART 1: COUNTRY SELECTION AND EVALUATION
1.A. Country Selection
The table below is a country selection matrix that compares the medical markets of five Africa countries: Nigeria, Cameroon, Ghana, South Africa, and Kenya. Our client, Devon, is looking to introduce their negative pressure wound therapy device to Nigeria. Yet, before entering we did a quick analysis of four other markets within Africa that could potentially be a better alternative.
Each country was given a weighted score based on 13 criteria which all fell under four main categories: market size, geographic indicators, economic indicators, and ease of doing business. These categories and criteria were based on relevancy to the medical industry as well as relevancy to the product Devon is looking to introduce. Each criteria was scored on a scale of 10.
The scores were produced based on the rankings each country had within Africa. The math involved taking the county’s rank in Africa minus the total and divide that number by the total to get the score. For example, for South Africa their rank in GDP is 7 out of 55 countries ranked. Thus we would take 7-55= 48. We would then take this number and divide it by 55 to get .872 which would come to 8.72.
1.B. Country Evaluation
1.B.1 Geography
Officially, Nigeria is a West African state that borders Niger in the north; Cameroon in the east; Benin in the west, & Chad in the northeast, all by water. Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe connect by sea (OEC, 2017). The nation is the most crowded in Africa. The Niger River enters the nation in the northwest and streams southward through tropical downpour woodlands and bogs to its delta in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria weighs nearly six times Georgia's size; marginally more than twice California's size. Nigeria stretches over 923,768 square kilometers of land and water, and covers 853 kilometers of coastline (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019). Nigeria has the Bonny Inshore Terminal, Calabar, and Lagos as it’s three principal ports. These ports offer substantial export prospects for the tools and services of NPWT’s devices and products, and particularly for trade. Nigeria has a seasonal, warm and rainy tropical climate (Britannia, 2018). Nigeria's climate usually consists of two seasons: wet and dry. The wet season (summer) is typically April through October and the dry season (winter) is between November and March. Nigeria can be classified into three regions by weather zones- the far South, the far North, and the rest of the country. The far South is marked by a rainforest tropical climate with average rainfall between 60 and 80 inches per year. Although the far north is wilderness-like, precipitation is less than 20 inches. Savannah distinguishes the rest of the country between the far North and far South with precipitation of 20 and 60 inches per year. Most of the year it is hot and humid in the southeast, but chilly in the south west. The north and west is domina ...
Developing the Nigeria Manufacturing sector is a route to opening up a new frontier for the expansion of trade, productivity & competitiveness
• Currently, Industrial capacity is very low with critical industries within the real sector performing below expectations
• The contribution of manufacturing to Nigeria’s GDP is less than 10%
• This is very sad given the fact that retail and wholesale trade are growing at a very fast rate
• And given the fact that Agriculture account for almost 24% of Nigeria’s GDP, there are indications that if a proper framework is put in place, Nigeria’s manufacturing can begin to witness phenomenal growth
• Part of the factors that will help shore up local production and reduce the cost of doing business in Nigeria are:
• The Power Sector reforms - this needs to be fine-tuned
• The strengthening of a policy framework which removes double taxation and encourages investment in the vertical integration of primary sector, Agriculture to secondary sector, production
• Such policies must be backed with the right fiscal policies which give a measure of comfort to infant industry against global competition
www.hasnainmraza.com
Africa has infinite potential. With numerous resources, an improving business climate and better economic governance, the numbers showing growth have been very positive. This presentation covers topics that speak on Africa's growth and where it can go. Here's a few stats that show how well the continent is doing:
A report from the African development bank said 33% of Africa's countries have GDP growth rates higher than 6%.
The costs of starting a business dropped upwards of 66% over the last 7 years.
The continent's middle class is growing at a very quick rate - approximately 350 million Africans now earn between $2 and $20 a day.
The share of the population living below the poverty line in Africa has dropped from 51% in 2005 to 39% in 2012.
Africa's collective GDP was $1.6 trillion in 2008, which was roughly equal to Brazil and Russia's GDP.
www.hasnainmraza.com
1. Brendan Riske
Nigeria, Boko Haram, and the Oil Price Decline
The year 2014 saw several positives for Nigeria. Revisions to their economic statistics
lead to them being declared the largest economy in Africa. In the midst of the worst Ebola
outbreak in history, the Nigerian government was able to quarantine the virus among a few
people and eventually rid the country of its presence. However, in my opinion, Nigeria will have
tough challenges to face in 2015. This article will address the reasons for my prediction.
The largest setbacks for Nigeria in 2014 come from the government’s ongoing battle with
a group known as Boko Haram. Nigeria has a long history of ethnic and religious tensions, and
was ruled by a strong military dictatorship for most of its modern history. One consequence of
democratization during this century in Nigeria has been the resurgence of Islam as a political
factor. Muslim groups, primarily concentrated in the north of the country, have generated support
by appealing to Islamic values and Islamic social institutions. In many areas sharia law has been
instituted. Thus regional politicians have clashed with nationalists, who support western values
and institutions brought in by the British during their colonial rule. The lack of government
support and high corruption have caused many Nigerians to reject the national government, and
the popularity of regional groups has been inversely related to that. This has been combined with
political instability, with President Goodluck Jonathan’s reelection seen as a violating of the
power sharing agreement between groups in the predominantly Muslim north and the Christian
south. Thus, I would argue that a poor functioning government was a key in building support for
Islamists in northern Nigeria.
Originally known as “Jamā‘atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da‘wati wal-Jihād” or “People
Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad”, Boko Haram has expanded
rapidly over the last 15 years. Boko Haram, which means “no to western education”, is the name
adopted by the organization. Although it was founded in 2002, it was not until 2009 that the war
between Boko Haram and the government began in earnest. That year saw the first clashes and
attacks between these organizations. The original leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was
killed fleeing arrest after the government launched a crackdown called Operation Flush. This
started a gradually worsening conflict. Boko Haram began using suicide bombings as a tactic to
fight the Nigerian government. Politicians and police officers were the first targets, but the
campaign has become one of general violence and chaos over time. Then Islamists built up their
military forces in the North, where they had support. In the last several years Boko Haram rebels
have launched a military campaign in northern Nigeria, capturing towns and enforcing their
control. Thousands of civilians have been killed, and hundreds of thousands have fled to other
parts of Nigeria and neighboring counties. The year 2014 saw the worst fighting since the
conflict began. The group gained international notoriety following its capture of a large group of
2. schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria, in April. The leadership also declared a “caliphate” in the
territory they control in northern Nigeria. Large portions of Borno state, the region of the country
where the movement began, are considered under their control, although the capital Maiduguri
remains in government hands. Recently, the town of Baga, and its army base, was seized by
Boko Haram. This resulted in the largest killing of civilians in one place since the war began,
with claims of over 2,000 dead. It also represents a serious defeat for the Nigerian military, who
were forced to flee after running out of ammunition and supplies. They had previously retaken
the town after its capture early in the civil war by rebels. The government has thus far been
unable to retake the town.
This year has also seen another major development in Nigeria, a major decline in the
price of oil internationally. Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa, and a member of OPEC.
The country is estimated as the 12th largest oil producer in the world, with roughly 2.5 million
barrels produced per day and 2.3 million barrels exported. The government relies heavily on
revenue from the export and sale of oil to fund itself. It is estimated that oil revenue makes up
83% of the Nigerian government’s revenues. Exports of goods and services, including crude oil,
make up 49% of the country’s GDP, and oil is the primary source of foreign exchange. Crude oil
is also makes up 95% of the value of exports from Nigeria. Over the course of the last several
months, the average price of oil internationally has fallen by over 50%, going from over $100 a
barrel to slightly less than $50 today. The cause of this decline is currently undetermined, but it
is likely that in the short run the price will continue to decline, and that prices will stay in the
range of $40-80 dollars for at least several years.
Simultaneously, the value of the Nigerian currency, the Naira, has dropped. It has seen a
decline from 159 Naira per USD at the beginning of the year to a low of 187NGN/USD, with a
new average around 180NGN/USD. Within the last week it began to hit its upper emergy bound
of 200NGN/USD. This is the result of a lower demand for the Naira to buy Nigerian oil whose
price continues to fall. While the fall in the exchange rate in the short run helps the Nigerian
government balance its budget, as lower revenues are offset by getting more Naira per dollar,
over the long term this will have a major negative effect on Nigeria. It needs to import a large
amount of goods and services, whose cost will increase due to the exchange rate. Thus the
decline in oil prices signals a time of difficulty for the Nigerian economy and the government’s
budget. Not only could Nigeria see its GDP decline, but it could also see the government make
drastic cutbacks to services or raise taxes. Either of these methods will likely have a negative
impact on the economy, especially the raising of taxes. Services in Nigeria are already of poor
quality due to low levels of funding and corruption. It is unlikely that Nigerians will want to see
a cutback in these already meager services. It is also unlikely that productive Nigerians will be
willing to pay more taxes to support to a corrupt and poorly functioning government. Thus it is
unclear how the current crisis will be resolved, but mathematically government costs must fall or
taxes must rise to compensate for the loss of revenue from oil. To bridge the gap the country may
turn to international loans, however this is not a long term solution to an unbalanced budget.
3. As the conflict continues into the New Year, I predict the situation will take a turn for the
worse. Already, the Nigerian Military has only had mixed success against Boko Haram. During
the early years of the war they were able to drive Boko Haram fighters out of territory they
captured and back into the mountains along the Cameroon and Niger borders. However, the army
was unable or unwilling to pursue them further. The terrain of these areas and their remoteness
make operations difficult. This is combined with an overall drop in effectiveness of the Nigerian
military. Corruption has always been a problem, but now faced with a real foe it may cause the
collapse of the Nigerian military. Nigeria has a long military tradition, and military leaders have
ruled the country during most of its post-colonial existence. However, the current army is in bad
shape, in terms of equipment and morale. Reports indicate that much of the military budget ends
up lining the pockets of commanders, instead of buying new equipment or paying salaries. This
leads to a low morale, as well as a loss of fighting effectiveness as new vehicles and weapons are
not purchased. Even ammunition supplies may not be adequate. Thus when this army faces Boko
Haram militants, it is unable to successfully carry out operations. The main advantage the
Nigerian military still has is its technological superiority. The Nigerian military has many air
assets, as well as armored vehicles and heavy artillery. Using these weapons in conjunction to
support infantry advances has been the primary tactic thus far against the rebels. This tactic is
needed because the infantry has not been effective against Boko Haram on its own. Thus the
little battlefield success the Nigerians have had thus far relies on expensive high tech weaponry.
This leads me to the crux of the matter. Nigeria needs money to keep its military going. It
primarily funds its military with oil revenues. As the oil price declines, these revenues will also
decline. Already tight money for supplies and salaries will be reduced. In the recent massive
Boko Haram assault against Baga, Nigerian troops ran out of supplies and ammunition and were
forced to retreat. The attack on Baga is the largest Boko Haram attack to date, and is likely
indicative of future larger operations to be carried out by the group. It is also a harbinger of what
may happen in future battles between government forces and rebels. With low morale and few
supplies, the Nigerian military may be unable to even hold its current territory against Boko
Haram, let alone recapturing areas of the country taken by the rebels. As the government loses
revenue due to the oil price decline, these issues will only get worse. The worst case scenario
would see a Nigerian government unable to pay its military and thus losing control of the
northern section of the country to Boko Haram. I would even argue that this is likely if
international military help does not come.
4. Sources:
General Information on Nigeria
http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf
NairaExchange Rate:
http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=NGN&to=USD&view=1Y
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-01-21/oil-producers-currency-collapse-continues-
nigerias-naira-crashes-200
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-11-25/nigeria-raises-rates-devalues-defend-collapsing-
currency-oil-price-blowback-spreads
BokoHaram:
Name and historyinformation: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11410.doc.htm
Name information: http://www.megatchad.net/publications/Newman-2013-Etymology-of-
Hausa-boko.pdf
NigerianMilitary:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/09/us-nigeria-military-insight-
idUSBREA4809220140509
Oil IndustryInformation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_industry_in_Nigeria
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ni