Epr

1. Emergency Planning (Preparedness)
Within The Development Of A National
Infrastructure For Nuclear Power
Thomas McKenna
Incident and Emergency Centre
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

2. IEC - Mission Statement
Global Focal Point
for
International Preparedness,
Communication and Response
for
Nuclear and Radiological Safety or
Security Related Incidents,
Emergencies, Threats or Events of
Media Interest

3. IEC – Rational - Why are we needed
TODAY’S WORLD:
Expansion of use of
nuclear power and use of
radiation sources
Treaty obligations
21st century threats

4. IAEA emergency preparedness
requirements and guidance
• Based on an examination of all past
emergencies
• Address what should be in place for an
adequate response
• Clearly reflected by the milestones
3

5. All severe NPP emergencies
Caused –or – made worse by operator
actions:
• TMI
• Chernobyl
• These emergencies essentially stopped
NPP development for 20 years
Because it was assumed it could not happen
– severe – low probability events - not
considered in training and development of
onsite response actions.

6. Lack of local support over time
• Shoreham in 1984 given permission for low
power tests but by the late 1980s local popular,
political and business support collapsed (due to
TMI & Chernobyl).
• In February 1983 local officials declared that
the county could not be safely evacuated.
• Failure to agree on evacuation plan was the
official reason for the plant never being
operated.
• Billion $ plant never operated

7. Emergency preparedness
not just off-site
Need integration of on- and off-site
response. Includes:
• Actions being taken by the operators
• Prevent a severe emergency e.g. EOPs
• Reduce the consequences of an emergency
• Security response. (security response
has interfered with the safety response)
• Off-site response
• Local
• National

8. Some big issues
On-site response should address severe
very low probability events
• Plants can not operate unless severe events
are low probability
• Failure to address contributed to TMI and
Chernobyl

9. Some big issues
What is the basis for off-site
preparedness?
• Based on consequence projection (threat
assessment)
• What probability event should be
considered?
• How is this demonstrated?
• How are advances in design and analysis
reflected? For example size of the emergency ones
8

10. Some big issues
Sustainability: Who is going to pay?
• Are the provisions in place to pay for
emergency response arrangements needed
for both on and off site over the long-term?
• Is this part of license condition?

11. Some big issues
No clear designation of responsibilities
• Who is responsible for making off-site decisions
promptly?
• Who coordinates the total national response
(not the regulatory body)?
• Have all the national and local response
organizations been included?
• £,€,¥, $ involved – who will get the
money?
• Must decide early

12. IEC is the IAEA focal point of EP & R
and is available to assist