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PART I
(I)
A. In a contract of a lease, there is a stipulation that if the lessor should desire to
sell the leased premises, the lessee shall have a 30-day exclusive option to purchase
the same. In the event however that it is sold to another, the lessor is bound and
obligated to stipulate in the deed of sale that the purchaser shall recognize the lease
and be bound by all the terms and conditions thereof. What right was granted to the
lessee, a right of first refusal or an option contract? Explain. (3%)
Answer:
The lessee was granted a right of first refusal. It is not an option clause or an option
contract.
An option is a contract granting a privilege to buy or sell within an agreed time and at
a determined price. It is a separate and distinct contract from that which the parties may enter
into upon the consummation of the option. It must be supported by consideration. The right
of first refusal is an integral part of the contract of lease. The consideration is built into the
reciprocal obligations of the parties. (Sps. Reynaldo Litonjua and Erlinda Litonjua, et al. vs. L
and R, Corp., et al., G.R. 130722, March 27, 2000).
B. What is the remedy of an aggrieved party like a lessee in case of violation of the
right of first refusal? Explain. (2%)
Answer:
Rescission is the necessary relief arising out of the violation of the right of first
refusal. The reason for the rule is that, if the grantor violates it, the aggrieved party
may have the right to recourse for rescission because there is a breach of an obligation
if the grantor sells it to another.
(II)
Troy, an industrial partner, was sued in his personal capacity by partnership creditor,
Leila. Leila alleged that the partnership property was insufficient to settle the partnership
indebtedness. Troy argued that he is an industrial partner, hence, is not personally liable for
partnership obligations. Is the argument of Troy tenable? (2%)
Answer:
The argument is untenable. All partners, including industrial ones, shall be
liable pro rata with all their property and after all the partnership assets have been
exhausted, for the contracts which may be entered into in the name and for the account
of the partnership, under its signature and by a person authorized to act for the
partnership. Any agreement to the contrary shall be void except among partners.
Although not liable for losses, an industrial partner remains liable to third persons for
partnership obligations. (Arts 1816 & 1817 NCC)
(III)
Pido and Maria were in a romantic relationship for 8 years. Last February 14, 2019,
Pido and Maria got married in articulo mortis without securing a marriage license, when Pido
was accidentally shot during a cross fire between the police officers and bank robbers in
2019 MOCK BAR EXAMINATION ON CIVIL LAW
WITH SUGGESTED ANSWERS

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Makati. The couple has been cohabiting as husband and wife for four years prior to their
marriage. Within a month from the articulo mortis marriage, Pido died.
a. What is the status of the marriage? (2%)
Answer:
The marriage is valid. An articulo mortis marriage is one of the marriages
that are exempt from the marriage license requirement. Although Pido died
only after a month from the marriage, the marriage is still valid considering
that he was at the point of death when the marriage was celebrated.
b. Is Maria entitled to receive legitime? If no, why? If yes, how much is the legitime.
(2%)
Answer:
Maria as surviving spouse is entitled to the legitime being a compulsory
heir of Pido. She will receive 1/3 of the estate by way of legitime because
the marriage was in articulo mortis and Pido died within 3 months after the
celebration of marriage, and their cohabitation did not last for at least five
years.
(IV)
Buddy bought from Ted a tricycle, payable in monthly installments. As a security for
the payment of the purchase price, Buddy constituted a chattel mortgage on the tricycle in
favor of Ted. Buddy later failed to pay three consecutive monthly installments.
a. Aside from foreclosure of chattel mortgage, what other legal remedies are
available to Ted? (2%)
Answer:
Ted has the following remedies aside from foreclosure of mortgage:
1. Exact fulfillment of the obligation through an action for specific
performance in case of failure to pay any installment; or,
2. Rescission or cancel the sale, should the buyer’s failure to pay
cover two or more installments.
b. If Ted decided to foreclose the chattel mortgage over the tricycle, but the proceeds
of the sale were less than the unpaid obligation, can he still collect from Buddy the
deficiency? (2%)
Answer:
If Ted foreclosed the mortgage over the tricycle, he shall have no further
action against Buddy to recover any deficiency. The law expressly provides
that the seller who opted to foreclose the mortgage on the property sold shall
have no further action against the buyer for any unpaid balance of the price.
Any agreement to the contrary is also declared void. (Article 1484, NCC or the
Recto Law)
(V)
Arnel Reyes is an illegitimate child of Susan Reyes with Reynaldo Carpio. Arnel was
was born in year 2000, and his father Reynaldo Carpio had recognized him as his own child
when the latter signed his birth certificate as biological father and informant. Although “Reyes”
is the surname indicated on this birth certificate, Arnel has been using the surname Carpio
since elementary in all his school records, without opposition from his father. Reynaldo Carpio
however died last year, and was survived by his legal spouse Mary, two legitimate children,
Rona and Rony, and Arnel as illegitimate child.

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The legitimate family of Reynaldo wanted to compel Arnel to stop using the surname
Carpio, since he is an illegitimate child who must use the surname of his biological mother.
Does Arnel have the legal right to use the surname of his father? (5%)
Answer:
Yes, Arnel has the right to use the surname of his father. Under Article 176 of
the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, illegitimate children may use the surname
of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In the case, filiation
was recognized by the father in the birth certificate. This gives Arnel the right to use
his father’s surname although he is illegitimate.
(VI)
Troy Sanchez, a limited partner of Tan Lee Sanchez Partnership Ltd., was sued in his
personal capacity by partnership creditor, Leila. Leila alleged that the partnership property
was insufficient to settle the partnership loan obligation. Troy argued that he is a limited
partner, hence, is not personally liable for partnership obligations. Also, he argued that Leila
should sue instead Tony Lee and Mark Tan, both general partners. Can Leila hold Troy
personally liable for partnership obligations? (2%)
Answer:
Yes, Leila may hold Troy liable for partnership obligations.
While general rule is that limited partners shall not be bound by the obligations
of the partnership. However, a limited partner whose surname appears in a partnership
name is liable as a general partner to partnership creditors who extend credit to the
partnership without actual knowledge that he is not a general partner. Troy’s surname
appears in the firm name. If Leila has no actual knowledge that he is a limited partner,
Troy shall be liable as a general partner. (Arts 1843 & 1846 NCC.
(VII)
A. Jose promises (obligates) to give Pedro a speed boat if Pedro will marry Ana in
2014. Pedro marries Ana in July 2014. Pedro now comes to Jose and demands
the prestation to give the speed boat. Jose, realizing the impulsiveness of his
promise and the prohibitive cost of the speed boat, refuses to give the speed boat
to Pedro on the ground that the obligation is POTESTATIVE or solely dependent
on the will of only ONE PARTY. Can Jose validly refuse to comply? Defend your
answer. (3%)
Answer:
No, Jose cannot validly refuse to comply with his obligation to give Pedro
a speed boat. The obligation on the part of Jose to give Pedro a speed boat
is subject to the suspensive condition that Pedro marries Ana in 2014, which
condition was fulfilled by Pedro. A suspensive condition or condition
precedent is a future and uncertain event, the happening of which, rights
arising out of the obligation are acquired. The marriage therefore of Pedro
to Ana brings forth Pedro’s rights to demand the fulfillment of the obligation
from Jose to give him the speed boat.
While the condition imposed may be potestative, the fulfillment of the
condition depends upon the will of the creditor and a third person, thus the
obligation is valid. In this case, the condition was fulfilled by Pedro and
another third person, Ana when they got married.

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B. Prescinding from the above, assume that if Ana a 1st degree cousin of Pedro and
the latter marries his cousin, can Jose refused to give the prestation on the ground
that the condition is contrary to law and public morals. (3%)
Answer:
This time, because the condition is contrary to law, Pedro and Ana, being
first degree cousins cannot validly marry, Jose may refuse to comply with
the condition. According to Art. 1183, impossible conditions, those contrary
to good customs or public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the
obligation which depends on them.
C. Prescinding from scenario A, assume that Ana was a former concubine of Jose,
who required Pedro, his best friend, his marriage to Ana as a condition for the
giving of the speed boat, would Jose be able to refuse the obligation on the same
ground as contrary to law and public morals? (3%)
Answer:
No, Jose may not be able to escape or refuse the obligation. The
answer will be similar to letter “A”.
(VIII)
Land owner Mr. Sy sold his land to Mr. Ty. After the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, Mr. Ty accepted employment abroad. Two years later, realizing Mr. Ty’s absence from
the country, Mr. Sy sold the same land to Mr. Lee, who planted fruit bearing trees on the
property. 10 years later, Mr. Ty retired from work and went back to the Philippines and
discovered Mr. Lee’s possession of the property. He now seeks recovery of possession of
the property. Who between Mr. Ty and Mr. Lee is the preferred possessor? Reason. (5%)
Answer:
Mr. Ty is the preferred possessor. Possession is acquired by the material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the
action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right
and that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. In the case at bar, the
execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Mr. Ty was equivalent to the delivery
of the thing; hence from that time on, he had possession of the property. Hence, the
later sale in favor of Mr. Lee failed to pass the possession of the property because
there is an impediment — the possession exercised by Mr. Ty.
Question arising from the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are
equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
(IX)
Torre de Manila was constructed in a way that it is blocking the scenery behind the
landmark Rizal’s monument. What is easement of light and view? (5%)
Answer:
An easement of light and view consist of in prohibiting or restraining the
adjacent owner from doing anything which may tend to cut-off or interrupt the light;
with an obligation of refraining from increasing the height of a building, which,
although it constitutes a special easement, has for its object, at times, the prevention

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of any interruption of the light enjoyed by the adjacent owner. (Cortes v. Yu-Tibo 2 Phil.
24 [1903])
(X)
Is there any distinction between earnest money and option money? (2%)
Answer:
Yes. They are the following: (a) earnest money is part of the purchase price, while
option money is given as a distinct consideration for an option contract; (b) earnest
money is given only where there is already a sale, while option money applies to a sale
not yet perfected; (c) when the earnest money is given, the buyer is bound to pay the
balance, while when the would-be buyer gives option money, he is not required to buy.
(Adelfa Properties, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 111238, Jan. 25, 1995, 58 SCAD 462).
(XI)
One of the terms and conditions in a contract of lease is that within one (1) year after
the expiration of the lease, the lessee would have the right and option to buy the leased
premises and should the lessee fail to exercise this option, the improvements shall be
evaluated and thereafter, the lessor shall have the option to buy the improvements within one
(1) year after the expiration of the contract. Should neither of them exercise the option, both
shall be free to look for a buyer for his or her respective property. It was contended that the
option is void for lack of consideration. Is the contention correct? Why? (2%)
Answer
No. In reciprocal contracts, the obligation or premises of each party is the
consideration for that of the other. The consideration for the lessor’s obligation to sell
the leased premises to the lessee, should he choose to exercise his option to purchase
the same, is the obligation of the lessee to sell to the lessor the building or
improvements constructed, if he fails to exercise his option to buy said premises. The
amount of rentals was undoubtedly part of the consideration of his option to purchase
the leased premises.
(XII)
Grace, a Filipina, married Junjie, a Japanese national in the Philippines. The couple
stayed in Japan after the marriage. In 2016, Grace filed a petition for divorce before a
Japanese family court in accordance with the law of Japan. The divorce petition was granted
in 2017, and capacitated Junjie to remarry. Grace wanted to file a petition before the
Philippine family court for the recognition of said foreign divorce, cancellation of the marriage
contract between her and Junjie, and for declaration of her capacity to remarry under Article
26 of the Family Code. Could Grace be declared capacitated to remarry under Article 26 of
the Family Code? (5%)
Answer:
Pepe Jr. is a legitimated child. Under the law, a child who was conceived and
born outside a valid marriage of parents who are legally capacitated to marry or whose
only legal impediment to marry is minority, will be legitimated by law upon the marriage
of his or her parents. The marriage of Pepe and Pilar resulted in the legitimation of
Pepe Jr. since their only impediment to marry at the time of conception and birth was
minority. (Art 177, FC, RA 9858)

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PART II
(XIII)
Elsa, a 16-year old Filipina, married her boyfriend Harold, 18 years old and a Filipino
citizen, in a foreign country. The law of said foreign country provides that individuals over 15
years of age, regardless of nationality, can enter into a valid marriage. What is the status of
the marriage? (2%)
Answer:
The marriage is void. Family rights, status, condition and legal capacity of Filipino
citizens are governed by Philippine law although they are living abroad. Under
Philippine law, both contracting parties must be at least 18 years old before they can
contract a valid marriage. Here, the marriage entered into by the parties when Elsa
was still a minor is therefore void although allowed by the law of the place where the
marriage was celebrated. (Article 15, NCC; Article 31 (1) FC; Article 26, FC)
(XIV)
Xander died intestate. His net hereditary estate is Php 1,500,000. His parents,
brothers of full blood, Andy & Bert and half-blood sisters, Amy, Sussie, & Tessie, all
predeceased him. He is however survived by Alakazam & Bulbasaur, legitimate sons of
Andy, Charmeleon, legitimate daughter of Bert, Weedle, illegitimate son of Amy, Pikachu,
adopted son of Sussie, and Tentacool, grandson of Tessie
a. Who are Xander’s intestate heirs? (3%)
Answer: Xander’s heirs are the following: Alakazam, Bulbasur & Charmelon.
b. Who are not his heirs? Why? (3%)
Answer: Weedle cannot inherit from Xander because he is an illegitimate
child and Art. 992 or the iron curtain rule applies. Being an illegitimate, he
cannot inherit from the legitimate relatives of his mother, Amy. Tentacool,
being only a grandnephew will not inherit from Xander, the principle of the
nearer excludes the farther, applies in intestate succession. Pikachu will
also not inherit from Xander because as adopted son of Sussie, he will only
inherit from her and not from the relations of his adopter.
c. Will Alakazam, Bulbasaur, and Charmeleon inherit by right of representation?
Support your answer. (3%)
Answer: Alakazam, Bulbasur & Chamelon will inherit in their own right and
on per capita basis. Art. 975. These is because they do not inherit by right
of representation in view of the absence of their parents who are supposed
to inherit from their Uncle Xander.
d. How much will his heirs inherit from his estate? (3%)
Answer: Alakazam, Bulbasur & Charmelon will inherit P500,000 each in their
own right.
(XV)
Adam purchased a brand new car from car dealer, Brando. Adam paid in checks.
The checks were all dishonored for payment. Can the car dealer, Brando recover the car on
the ground that he was unlawfully deprived of its possession? Reason. (3%)

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Answer:
No, Brando cannot recover the possession of the car on the ground that he was
unlawfully deprived thereof. What transpired between the parties was one of sale of
motor vehicle and delivery of the car effectively transferred the ownership to the buyer
unless the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase
price stipulated to that effect. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or
to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer
ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
(XVI)
A, B, and C were given the usufruct of a parcel of land by X. A and B died, leaving C
alone. What is the effect of A and B’s death on the usufruct? Explain. (3%)
Answer:
The usufruct in favor of C continues until C’s death. Art. 603.
(XVII)
Isko purchased a residential house and lot in year 1980 from Erap which land is
surrounded by Erap’s land on the North, Digong’s land on the South, Nognog’s land on the
East and Pandak’s land on the West. As Isko’s land was enclosed by several lands, he was
granted right of way by Erap. However since 1980, he has been passing through the land of
Digong on the South because the road therein was cemented as this is a subdivision road.
In order to make the subdivision exclusive only to the homeowners, Digong built a wall in
2015, which then obstructed the passage way of Isko as he is now going to pass by Erap’s
land which is uncemented and is longer and muddy during the rainy season. Isko resented
this and now goes to court and demands a legal right of way from Digong contending that he
has obtained a right of way from Digong’s land by prescription.
a. Can he demand a legal right of way from Digong? (3%)
Answer:
The problem presents a situation where Isko would like to continue
passing thru the property of Digong because he had done so for a long time
since 1980 and more importantly because it was so convenient for him to
pass thru Digong’s land. The problem also stated that he had already been
granted right of way by Erap, from whom he bought his property. Given the
foregoing circumstances, he can no longer demand a legal right of way from
Digong because he already has an adequate outlet to a public highway. This
case is therefore similar to the case of REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR. vs.
GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., ET AL.
For purposes of academic discussion, I will post herein the pertinent
decision of the SC, viz:
The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to
the plaintiff when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring
him within the ambit of the legal requisite. The Court agree with the
appellate court's observation that the plaintiff should have, first and
foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision
the improvement and maintenance of Lot4133-G-12 as his road right of
way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and
not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To
allow the plaintiff access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue in
spite of a road right of way provided by the plaintiff's subdivision for its

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buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows plaintiff a much
greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to
completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained
through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that
"mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve
as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a
real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it." Considering that the
plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as
aforestated, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the
preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way.
b. What are the requisites of a legal easement of right of way? (2%)
Answer:
To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be
established. These are:
(1) That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) That proper indemnity has been paid;
(3) That the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate;
(4) That the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
The burden of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the
owner of the dominant estate.
(XVIII)
In dire need of funds for the medical expenses of his wife, Sergio obtained a loan from
Rural Bank of Pulang Lupa. As security for the loan, Sergio signed a pledge contract, using
his 5 mountain bikes. Sergio’s friend, Nikko, likewise gratuitously extended assistance by
signing a chattel mortgage contract with the bank over his sedan car. He did not sign the
affidavit of good faith. The mortgage contract was thereafter recorded at the Chattel Mortgage
Register without an affidavit of good faith. Both Sergio and Nikko did not deliver to the bank
the possession of the bikes and car, respectively. When Sergio failed to pay the loan upon
demand, the bank decided to judicially foreclose the chattel mortgage. Nikko opposed the
foreclosure and argued that as an accommodation mortgagor, he is entitled to the benefit of
excussion or exhaustion.
a. Is there a perfected contract of pledge? (2%)
Answer: There is no perfected contract of pledge.
Pledge is a real contract that is perfected only upon delivery. The absence
of delivery of the mountain bikes to the bank prevented the perfection of the
subject pledge. (Art 1316 NCC)
b. Is Nikko entitled to the benefit of excussion? (3%)
Answer:
No, Nikko is not entitled to the benefit of excussion or exhaustion.
Under the law, only a guarantor is afforded the benefit of excussion,
which means that the creditor must firs exhaust the properties of the
principal debtor for the satisfaction of the debt; and, it is only upon
insufficiency of debtor’s properties that a guarantor could be held liable for
the payment of a debt. Nikko however is an accommodation mortgagor in
the case and not a guarantor. (Art 2058 NCC)

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(XIX)
In X’s will, he declared that he is married to Y with two 2 children, A and B. He gave
to his two children and wife their respective legitimes but gave the free portion of his estate
to his mistress, Z, with whom he has lived for the last 25 years or so since he separated from
his wife and children. During the proceedings for the probate of the will, his legitimate family
opposed the institution of Y to the free portion of the estate of the testator, stating that the
same is against public policy and public morals. On the other hand, Z countered by saying
that while indeed she was a mistress, there was no conviction of adultery or concubinage
against her, hence she is not incapacitated to inherit the free portion.
a. Should the will be admitted to probate? Why? (2%)
Answer: Yes, the will may be probated, if executed according to the
formalities required by law.
b. Is the institution of Z to the free portion of the estate valid? Why? Support your
answer with jurisprudence. (2%)
Answer: The institution of Z giving the free portion to her is not valid because
the prohibitions under Art. 739 of the Civil Code on donations also apply to
testamentary dispositions (Article1028, Civil Code), Among donations which
are considered void are those made between persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, Art 739 (1).
c. Can the court consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will? Expound.
(2%)
Answer: As a general rule, the probate court will only determine the extrinsic
validity of the will. However, where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, or where the will on its face is
intrinsically void, the court will pass upon its intrinsic validity. Case in point
is Nepomuceno vs. CA, where the Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the
probate court which declared the devise in favor of the paramour null and
void.
d. Is the contention of Z valid? Support your answer. (2%)
Answer: No, the contention of Z is not valid. It is not necessary that there be
a criminal conviction. In the same proceedings for the probate of the will, the
guilt may be proved by mere preponderance of evidence.
(XX)
Pepe and Pilar are childhood sweethearts. Pilar got pregnant at the age of 16, and
gave birth to Pepe Jr. Upon reaching the age of majority, the couple got married with all the
essential and formal requisites of the law. What is the status of Pepe Jr.? (2%)
Answer:
Yes, Grace may be declared as capacitated to remarry.
Under the Family Code, the Filipino spouse who is married with a foreign
national may acquire legal capacity to remarry if a divorce decree is secured in
accordance with the national law of the foreign spouse, and such decree capacitated
the foreign spouse to remarry. The law did not distinguish from a Filipino spouse who
is at the receiving end of an alien initiated divorce proceeding from a Filipino who
initiated the divorce petition.
In this case, a divorce decree was obtained in accordance with the laws of
Japan, the national law of Junjie, and said decree capacitated Junjie to remarry. Grace
may therefore be capacitated to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code once
the foreign divorce is recognized by the trial court in the Philippines. (Article 26 FC;

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G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO)
(XXI)
Richard gave a car to his girlfriend Cindy but there was no written donation attendant
to it. After 2 years, they broke off and Cindy married Harry. After 2 more years Richard
marries Lucy but thereafter met an accident which caused his death. It was at this time when
Lucy learned about the car given by her husband. Lucy now demands the return of the car
saying there was no written document to prove the donation hence the donation was
ineffective.
a. What defense/s can you think so that Lucy will not be able to get the car back?
(2%)
Answer: Her acquisition of the car by prescription may be a valid defense.
Considering that she was in possession of the car in good faith and for a title
since the car was delivered to her by her boyfriend, Richard, this may be a
valid defense for she had already acquired the ownership of the car by
prescription.
b. When is there just title? (3%)
Answer: There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession
of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right. (Art. 1129)
(XXII)
Donor, Xander, executed an irrevocable donation in favor of Yanni but providing the
donation will take effect after his (Xander’s) death. Xander also stipulated therein that he will
not dispose of it or take it away from Yanni; but that Xander was not parting with the beneficial
ownership while he lived. The RTC held it to be one of a donation inter vivos but the CA
reserved it and held that it is a donation mortis causa. Is the decision of the CA correct? Why?
(5%)
Answer:
No, because the donation is one of a donation inter vivos, since the donor
intended to part with his ownership during his lifetime.
It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa
depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties
upon the execution of the deed. (Gestopa vs. CA, 342 SCRA 105; Reyes vs. Mosqueda,
187 SCRA 661). It is clear from the donation that the donor intended to part with his
ownership while alive. Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable
character of the donation in the case at bar. In Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 48 Phil. 68, it was
said that when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take
away the property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is
making a donation inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains
beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter vivos despite an
express provision that the donor continues to in possession and enjoyment of the
donated property while he is alive.
The express irrevocability of the same is the distinctive standard that identifies
that document as a donation inter vivos.
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