2. FACTS:
• Before the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Justice Roberto Abad,
the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the
said position.
• Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza was one of the nominees. His
nomination however was questioned by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno
on account of questions to the former’s integrity involving the handling of an
international arbitration case for the government, alleged extra-marital affair
and acts of insider-trading.
• He thereafter received a call from Court of Appeals Associate Justice Aurora
Lagman informing him that the Chief Justice would invoke Rule 10, Section 2
of JBC-009. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available" before
the JBC on June 30, 2014, to inform him of the objections to his integrity.
3. • During the JBC meeting on June 30, 2014, Jardeleza was asked by Chief
Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against integrity issues
raised against him.
• He answered yes, provided that due process is observed. He also
requested that Chief Justice Sereno and Associate Justice Carpio execute a
sworn statement specifying their objections and that he be afforded the
right to cross-examine them.
• When asked to explain further, he refused to do so as this equates to a
waiver of rights. Jardeleza then requested the JBC to defer its meeting but
it was denied and the JBC proceeded with the deliberations.
• In the shortlist of nominees, Jardeleza’s name was not included due to
failure to obtain a unanimous vote as stipulated in Rule 10, Section 2 of
the JBC rules.
4. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutional right to due process is available
in JBC proceedings
2. Whether or not the observance of due process is discretionary on
the part of JBC
3. Whether or not the application of the “unanimity rule” violated
Jardeleza’s constitutional right to due process
5. RULING:
1) Yes. Notwithstanding being "a class of its own," the right to be heard and to
explain one’s self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where
an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due
process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to
recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the
nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who
vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest,
the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby
guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of
information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of
evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to
hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for
the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Whether or not the constitutional right to due process is available in JBC proceedings
6. 2) No. It is unsound to say that, all together, the observance of due process is a part
of JBC’s discretion when an opposition to an application is made of record. While it
may so rely on "other means" such as character clearances, testimonials, and
discreet investigation to aid it in forming a judgment of an applicant’s qualifications,
the Court cannot accept a situation where JBC is given a full rein on the application
of a fundamental right whenever a person’s integrity is put to question. In such
cases, an attack on the person of the applicant necessitates his right to explain
himself.
Whether or not the observance of due process is discretionary on the part of JBC
7. The JBC’s own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The subsequent issuance of
JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBC’s deference to the grave import of the right of the
applicant to be informed and corollary thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-
010, per se, provide that:
• any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten
(10) days thereof
• the complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies
• the Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or
opposition against him
• the candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file his comment
to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires
• and the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
Whether or not the observance of due process is discretionary on the part of JBC
8. The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under the
rules of statutory construction, bears great weight in that:
1] it covers "any" complaint or opposition;
2] it employs the mandatory term, "shall"; and
3] most importantly, it speaks of the very essence of due process.
While JBC-010 does not articulate a procedure that entails a trial-type
hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces "any complaint or opposition," the
right to answer the accusations against him. This constitutes the minimum
requirements of due process.
Whether or not the observance of due process is discretionary on the part of JBC
9. 3) Yes. After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the
application of the “unanimity rule” on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his
right to due process.
Whether or not the application of the “unanimity rule” violated Jardeleza’s constitutional right to due
process
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always
and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. Even as Jardeleza was verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting,
these circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind
of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same would
be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any
complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10)
days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates
10. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti,
that the 10-day period is only applicable to the public, excluding the JBC members
themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation of the first ground in the
June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members
of the Council expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the
application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was only during the
next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by
telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day when a resource person
would shed light on the matter.
Whether or not the application of the “unanimity rule” violated Jardeleza’s constitutional right to due
process
11. What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of
requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those
who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so?
The answer is yes, in the context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he
given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to
appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It
would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts
of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues
became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the
idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances
preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to explain oneself is given, not
to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable opportunity and
sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an
idle and futile exercise.
Whether or not the application of the “unanimity rule” violated Jardeleza’s constitutional right to due
process
