Civil Law Reviewer

ELMER T. RABUYA
2021 EDITION
Professor ofCivil Laws and Bar Reviewer
Arellano University School of Law, De La Salle Lipa,
University ofAsia & Pacific, University of Perpetual Help-Las Pinas,
Polytechnic University ofthe Philippines and Philippine Christian University;
Formerly: University of Santo Tomas, University ofthe East,
Jose Rizal University, Lyceum ofthe Philippines
and Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Pasay
Jurists Bar Review Center, Recoletos Law Center
Villasis Law Center, Legal Edge, Academicus Review Center
CPRS Bar Review Center, Excellent Bar Review Center
Author: The Law on Persons & Family Relations, Property, Obligations &
Contracts, and Civil Law Reviewer, Volumes 1 and 2
LLB, AUSL, Class Valedictorian
A.B. Management Economics, Ateneo de Manila University
PRE-BAR REVIEWER
in
CIVIL LAW
Published & Distributed by
REX Book Store
856 Nlcanor Reyes, Sr. St
Tel. Nos.: 8736-0567/8733-6746
2161-65 Freedom Bldg., C.M. Recto Avenue
Tel. Nos.: 8522-4521/8522-4107
Manila, Philippines
www.rex.com.ph
!
i
.....
S
$
I m
Bft B B h B B

FOR YOU WHO INSPIRED ME:
MELVA,
JOHN DARREL,
HOPE,
NANAY,
AND TO ALL MY STUDENTS
I DEDICATE THIS WORK
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
BOOK I. - PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
A.
B.
C.
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
D.
vii
133
136
138
145
147
153
23
23
33
36
50
53
58
61
64
77
79
85
90
106
116
121
19
19
12
12
1
1
6
MARRIAGE
Requisites For A Valid Marriage
Rules on Validity ofAbsolute Divorces
Void Marriages
Voidable Marriages
Legal Separation
Rights and Obligations ofSpouses
Property Relations In General
Absolute Community and Conjugal Partnership ofGains
Separation of Property of Spouses During the Marriage ..
Property Regimes LinderArticles 147 and 148
Family Relations and Family Home
Paternity and Filiation
Adoption
Legal Support
Parental Authority
Emancipation and Summary Proceedings Under the
Family Code
Funerals
Surnames
Change of First Name and Surname
Change or Correction ofEntry in Civil Register
Absence
HUMAN RELATIONS
Required Norm ofHuman Conduct
CIVIL PERSONALITY
Civil Personality
PRELIMINARY TITLE
Effectivity and Application ofLaws
Basic Conflict ofLaws Rules

BOOK 11. - PROPERTY
BOOK III. - SUCCESSION
viii
156
161
167
172
183
186
196
197
204
211
222
225
232
241
247
251
263
264
268
269
273
282
285
285
288
289
292
292
296
298
298
300
302
306
308
308
308
310
Classification ofProperty: Immovable and Movable Property
Classification of Property: Based on Ownership
Ownership in General
Accession
Quieting ofTitle and Ruinous Buildings and Trees
Co-ownership
Ownership ofWaters
Possession
Usufruct
Easement
Nuisance .............................................
Modes ofAcquiring and Transmitting Ownership
Donation
Basic Principles
Wills in General
Kinds and Formalities ofWills
Codicils and Subsequent Wills
Revocation ofWills
Republication and Revival ofWills
Probate ofWills
Testamentary Succession: Legitime
Reserva Troncal or Reserva Lineal .
Testamentary Succession: Rules Applicable to Disposable
Free Portion
Institution of(Voluntary) Heirs
Preterition
Substitution ofHeirs
Accretion in Testamentary Succession
Condition, Mode, and Term
Legacies and Devises
Vacancies in Succession................................... •.
Predecease
Valid Disinheritance
Capacity and Incapacity to Succeed
Acceptance and Repudiation ofInheritance
Modes ofFilling Up Vacancies
Substitution
Accretion
Right ofRepresentation

313
315
329
BOOK IV. - OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
PART 1: OBLIGATIONS
PART 2: CONTRACTS
BOOK V. - SPECIAL CONTRACTS
PART 1: CONTRACT OF SALE
ix
Concept
Essential Elements and Formalities
Concept
Sources ofObligations
Kinds ofObligations: Civil and Natural
Kinds ofObligations: Real and Personal
Breach of Obligations
Kinds of Obligations: Pure, Conditional, and With a Term
Kinds of Obligations: Alternative and Facultative Obligations
Kinds of Obligations: Joint and Solidary Obligations
Kinds ofObligations: Divisible and Indivisible Obligations....
Kinds ofObligations: Obligations with a Penal Clause
Extinguishment of Obligations: Payment
Extinguishment of Obligations: Loss
Extinguishment ofObligations: Condonation or Remission ...
Extinguishment ofObligations: Merger or Confusion
Extinguishment ofObligations: Compensation
Extinguishment of Obligations: Novation
Basic Concepts
Perfection and Essential Requisites ofContracts
Forms ofContracts, Reformation, and Interpretation ofContracts
Defective Contracts
Classification of Contracts as to Defects
Rescissible Contracts
Voidable Contracts
Unenforceable Contracts
Void or Inexistent Contracts
Intestate or Legal Succession
Simplified Rules of Intestate Succession: Estate of
Legitimate Decedent
Simplified Rules of Intestate Succession: Estate of
Illegitimate Decedent
441
444
395
399
412
418
418
420
427
431
433
332
332
341
343
346
350
357
360
367
368
370
382
385
386
386
389

PART 2: CONTRACT OF LEASE
PART 3: CONTRACT OF COMMON CARRIER
476
Concept
PART 4: CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP
480
Contract ofPartnership
PART 5: CONTRACT OF AGENCY
497
Contract ofAgency
PART 6: CONTRACTS OF LOAN AND DEPOSIT
PART 7: ACCESSORY CONTRACTS
BOOK VI. - TORTS & DAMAGES
PART 1: QUASI-DELICT
PART 2: DAMAGES
x
Obligations ofthe Parties
Pacto De Retro Sale and Equitable Mortgage
Lease ofThings
Contract for Piece ofWork
Contract ofCommodatum
Contract ofMutuum
ContractofDeposit
Contracts ofGuaranty and Suretyship ...
Real Mortgage Contract and Antichresis
Personal Property as Security
Preference and Concurrence ofCredit...
Concept ofQuasi-delict
Vicarious Liability
Special Cases
JointTortfeasors
Kinds ofDamages
Actual or Compensatory
Moral Damages
451
464
467
473
514
519
524
532
543
553
559
562
571
583
586
591
591
596

BOOK VII. - LAND TITLES & DEEDS
xi
Classification ofLands
Modes ofDisposition ofPublic Agricultural Lands
Indefeasibility ofTitle
Certificate ofTitle Not Subject to Collateral Attack
Nominal Damages
Temperate or Moderate Damages
Exemplary or Corrective Damages
Liquidated Damages
Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Expenses
605
609
618
624
598
599
600
601
602

BOOK I. — PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
A.
1)
1.1
c
1
Preliminary Title
Effectivity and Application of Laws
Effectivitv of Laws: (a) When law is silent as to its effectivitv:
It shall take effect “after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of[its] publication either in the Official Gazette, or
in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation in the Philippines.The
effectivity date is on the 16lhday, not on the IS1*1. For example,
if the law is completely published on March 1, then it will
become effective on March 17. (b) When law provides for its
date of effectivitv: It shall take effect on said date provided
that the law is published. Publication of laws is indispensable
and cannot be dispensed with. The reason for this rule is that
the basic constitutional requirement of due process must be
satisfied? As held in Tahada v. Tuvera) the clause “unless it is
otherwiseprovided" refers to the date ofeffectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without its previous publication, (c) When law provides that
it shall take effect “immediately upon approval”: It should be
construed as becoming effective immediately upon its complete
publication? There is nothing in Article 2 ofthe New Civil Code
(NCC), as amended by E.O. No. 200, that prevents a law from
taking effect on a date other than—or even before—the 15-day
period after its publication, and where the law provides for its
own date ofeffectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed in
Article 2?
'Art. 2, New Civil Code (NCC), as amended by E.O. No. 200.
2Taflada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) and Tafiada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986).
'Id.
4La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148 (2004).
5W.

2 PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW
1.2
1.3
‘Art. 3, NCC.
’Art. 526,3rd par., NCC.
‘Art. 2155, NCC.
’Adong v. Cheong, 43 Phil. 43.
'“Bank ofAmerica, NT & SA v. American Realty Corp., 321 SCRA659 (1999).
"Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014).
"Art. 4, NCC.
"William G. Kwong Management, Inc. v. Diamond Homeowners& ResidentsAssociation,
G.R. No. 211353, June 10,2019.
"Art. 4, NCC.
"Secs. 22 and 10, Art. Ill, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
"Art. 22, Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Presumption of Knowledge of Laws: (a) As to domestic laws:
Everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law. Butthis rule
applies only to our internal or domestic laws. Thus, ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.6 However,
mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be
the basis of good faith’ and may come within the scope of
solutio indebiti.1 (b) As to foreign laws: There is no conclusive
presumption ofknowledge of foreign laws. Hence, foreign laws
must be specially alleged and proved, and our courts cannot
take judicial notice of them.’ If the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
This is known as the doctrine of processual presumption10 or
the doctrine of presumed-identity approach in international
law."
Rule on Operation and Application of Laws: (a) General rule:
In general, laws are to be construed as having only prospective
operation."Lexprospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward, not
backward. This is due to the unconstitutional result ofretroacting
a law’s application: it divests rights that have already become
vested or impairs obligations ofcontract." (b) Exceptions: Laws
may be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) When
the law itselfprovides for its retroactivity,14 unless the retroactive
application ofa statute will make it an ex postfacto law or will
result in the impairment of obligation of contracts, in which
case, it cannot be given retroactive effect;" (2) When a penal
law is favorable to the accused, unless the convicted felon is a
habitual delinquent, in which case, it cannot be given retroactive
application;" (3) When the law is remedial or procedural in

BOOK I. — PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS 3
1.4
1.5
'’Systems Factors Corp. v. NLRC, 346 SCRA 149 (2000).
"W.
'’Narzoles v. NLRC, 341 SCRA 533 (2000).
“Bona v. Briones, 38 Phil. 276 (1918).
2lSanico V. Colipano, 841 SCRA 141 (2017), citing 1 Caguioa, Civil Code ofthe Phil., 13
(1967 ed.). See also Art. 6, NCC.
22CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 531 SCRA436 (2007).
“Agujctas v. CA, 261 SCRA 17 (1996).
24Sec. 21, Chapter 5, Book I, Administrative Code of 1987.
nature, because no vested right may attach to nor arise from
procedural laws;17 hence, statutes regulating the procedure of
the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage—procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent;18 (4) When the law
is curative in character because curative statutes are enacted to
cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which
would otherwise be void forwant ofconformity with certain legal
requirements—curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence,
are retroactive;1’ and (5) When the law creates new substantive
rights, provided it has not prejudiced another acquired right of
the same origin.20
Requisites ForValid Waiver ofRights: (1) thatthe person making
the waiver possesses the right; (2) that he has the capacity and
power to dispose of the right; (3) that the waiver must be made
in a clear and unequivocal manner, although it may be made
expressly or impliedly; and (4) that the waiver is not contrary
to law, public policy, public order, morals, good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.21
Repeal of Laws: (a) Manner of repeal: (1) Express repeal:
An express repeal is that contained in a special provision of
a subsequent law. But the repealing clause must identify or
designate the particular or specific law to be repealed, otherwise
there is no express repeal.22 (2) Implied repeal: It takes place
when the provisions ofthe subsequent law are incompatible with
those of an earlier law and there is no express repeal. There are
two requisites for implied repeals: (i) the laws cover the same
subject matter; and (ii) the latter is repugnant to the earlier.22
(b) Effect of repeal ofrepealing law: (1) In express repeal: When
a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the
law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly
so provided.24 (2) In implied repeal: When a law which impliedly

PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW
4
1.6
repeals a prior law is itselfrepealed, the prior law shall thereby
be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.2’
Effect of Judicial Decisions: (a) Part of legal system: Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.26 The
decisions referred to are only those enunciated by the Supreme
Court,2' becauseonly thedecisions ofthe Supreme Court establish
jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.28 (b) Operation
and application: (1) Rule: retroactive application: The Supreme
Court’s interpretation ofa statute forms part ofthe law as ofthe
date it was originally passed, because the Court’s construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the interpreted law carries into effect.29 Such judicial doctrine
does not amount to the passage ofa new law, but consists merely
ofa construction or interpretation ofa pre-existing one.20 In other
words, in construing the law, the Court merely declares what a
particular provision has always meant. It does not give a new
meaningotherthan whatthe law already carries because the Court
does not have the power to legislate. In this sense, interpretations
oflaw made by the Court necessarily always have a “retroactive”
effect.21 (2) Exception: prospective application: When a doctrine
ofthe Supreme Court is overruled and a differentview is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof.22 (c) Doctrine of stare decisis: Under the
doctrine ofstare decisis, a point of law already established will,
generally, be followed by the same determining court and by all
courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal
“Sec. 22, Chapter 5, Book 1, Administrative Code of 1987.
“Art. 8, NCC.
2,Thc Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Employees Association-NATU v. The Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 (1971).
“Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1066 (1947).
2,PLDT v. Alvarez, 718 SCRA 54 (2014); Republic v. Remman Enterprises, Inc., 717
SCRA 171 (2014); Eagle Really Corporation v. Republic, 594 SCRA 555 (2009).
’“Republic v. Remman Enterprises, Inc., supra, citing Eagle Realty Corporation v.
Republic, supra.
“Team Energy Corporation (formerly: Mirant Pagbilao Corporation and Southern Energy
Quezon, Inc.) v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, 859 SCRA 1 (2018).
“People v. Jabinal, supra: Sps. Benzonan v. CA and DBP, 205 SCRA 515 (1992); Co v.
CA, 227 SCRA 444 (1993).

1.7
issue is raised." The rule on stare decisis promotes stability in the
law and should, therefore, be accorded respect. However, blind
adherence to precedents, simply as precedent, no longer rules.
More important than anything else is that the court is right,” thus
it is the duty ofthe Court to abandon any doctrine found to be in
violation ofthe law in force."
"Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corp-. 346 SCRA 663 (2000).
"Urbano v. Chavez, 183 SCRA 347 (1990).
"Tan Chong v. Sec. of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947).
36CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 531 SCRA 436. 444 (2007); reileratedin CIR
v. Aichi Forging Company ofAsia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010) and Co v. New Prosperity Plastic
Products, 727 SCRA 503 (2014).
”W.
»Z</.
Computation ofLegal Period: (a) Two laws on counting of legal
periods: There are two laws on the counting of legal periods: (1)
Article 13 ofthe NCC; and (2) Sec. 31, Chapter 8, Book I ofthe
1987 Administrative Code of the Philippines. Both laws cover
the same subject matter and the provisions are almost the same,
except in counting a “year.” (b) Implied repeal of Article 13 of
NCC in counting a “year”: Under Article 13 ofthe Civil Code, a
year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regularyearor a leap
year. Hence, the actual number of days is important. Under the
Administrative Code, however, a year is understood to be “twelve
calendar months.” Underthe Administrative Code, the number of
days is irrelevant. Hence, there exists a manifest incompatibility
between the two laws with respect to the counting of a “year.”
Consequently, the Court declared the implied repeal of Article
13 of the NCC by Section 31, Chapter 8, Book 1 of the 1987
Administrative Code, with respect to the counting of a “year.”56
Therefore, under existing law and jurisprudence, a “year” shall
now be understood to be “twelve calendar months.” (c) How
to count “twelve calendar months”: A calendar month is “a
month designated in the calendar without regard to the number
ofdays it may contain. It is the "period oftime runningfrom
the beginning ofa certain numberedday up to, but not including,
the corresponding numbered day ofthe next month, and ifthere
is not a sufficient number ofdays in the next month, then up to
and including the last day of that month. ",s To illustrate, one
calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January
1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; from January 31, 2008. it will be

6
’’Sec. 31, Chapter VIII, Book I, Administrative Code of 1987; Art. 13, NCC.
*W.
’'Art. 14, NCC.
"People v. Galacgac (CA), 54 O.G. 1027.
"Hyde, litlemalional Law, Vol. II, 2nd ed., p. 1266.
"Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249.
Basic Conflict of Laws Rules
Application ofPhilippine Penal Laws: (a) Rule: Philippine penal
laws and those ofpublic security and safely are obligatory upon
all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory.’1 Hence, the penal
lawsofthe Philippines are obligatory not only to its citizens but to
all persons who are within the Philippine territory. This is known
as the principle of generality of criminal laws, (b) Exceptions.
Philippine penal laws shall not apply in the following cases:
(1) if treaty stipulations provide to the contrary; (2) if a law ol
preferential application provides to the contrary; and (3) if a
principle ofpublic international law provides to the contrary. For
example, following the principles of international law, heads ol
State are not subject to Philippine territorialjurisdiction." It is also
a well-established principle of international law that diplomatic
representatives, such as ambassadors or public ministers and their
official retinue, possess immunity from the criminal jurisdiction
of the country of their sojourn, and cannot be sued, arrested, or
punished by the law of that country.’1 However, a consul is not
entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or
minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country
to which he is accredited.’’
from February 1,2008 until February 29,2008; the next calendar
month is from March 1, 2008 until March 31, 2008; and so on
and so forth. Hence, twelve calendar months from December
31, 2007 is December 31, 2008. (d) Other provisions ofArticle
13 still in force: The other provisions of Article 13 of the NCC
remain consistent with the provisions of Sec. 31, Chapter 8,
Book I of the Administrative Code and are, therefore, still in
force. Thus, a “month” is understood to be consisting of thirty
days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month, in which case
it shall be computed according to the number ofdays the specific
month contains; a “day” shall be understood to be consisting of
24 hours; and “night” shall be from sunset to sunrise.39 (e) Rule
in counting periods: The firstday is EXCLUDED. The last day is
INCLUDED*
2)
2.1

2.2
4iLavadia v. Heirs ofJuan Luces Luna, 730 SCRA 376 (2014).
46Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsem, 744 SCRA 516 (2014).
■"Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001).
4“Art. 26, par. 2, FC; Republic v. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580 (2018).
4,Bayot v. CA, 570 SCRA 472 (2008), citing Llorente v. CA. 345 SCRA 592 (2000).
’“Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114 (2005); Bayot v. CA,supra.
Nationality Principle: (a) Rule: On the matter ofstatus ofpersons,
condition ofpersons, the legal capacity ofpersons, and his family
rights and duties, the applicable law is the national law of the
person concerned. This is known as the “nationality principle”
embodied in Article 15 of the NCC. According to Article 15,
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, orto the status,
condition, and legal capacity ofpersons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, although living abroad.45 By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed
by their national law with respect to family rights and duties,
status, condition, and legal capacity of persons.46 (b) Rules on
validity of absolute divorces: Following the nationality rule, the
validity ofabsolute divorces obtained abroad shall be determined
by the applicable national laws of the parties concerned. Thus:
(1) A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law ofthe alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other fact, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.47 (2) In a mixed
marriage (between an alien and a Philippine national), a decree of
absolute divorce obtained is recognized as valid even insofar as
the Philippine national is concerned so long as the divorce decree
is valid according to the national law ofthe foreigner spouse and
it capacitated the latter to remarry, regardless of who may have
obtained the divorce decree.48 (3) An absolute divorce secured by
a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this
jurisdiction.4'' (4) In determining the nationalities of the parties
for purposes of determining the validity of the divorce decree,
the reckoning point is not the citizenship ofthe divorcing parties
at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.50 (c) Leital capacity:
Generally, it is the national law of the person concerned which

S
!lOrion Savings Bank v. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014).
•’•’Art. 16, par. 1, NCC.
”Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki, supra.
MSec. 7, Article XII, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
”Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsetn, 744 SCRA 516 (2014).
!1W.
applies for purposes ofdetermining his legal capacity. However,
all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property
are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae,5' or the
law of the place where the property is situated.52 This principle
even governs the capacity ofthe person making a deed relating to
immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an
instrumentwill be ineffective to transfertitle to land ifthe person
making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though
under the law of his domicile and by the law ofthe place where
the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.53 For
example, foreigners are not allowed to own or acquire lands in
the Philippines except by way of hereditary succession.54 (d)
Family rights and duties: The obligation to give support to a
child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Insofar
as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of
the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners
such that they are governed by their national law with respect
to family rights and duties. Hence, as to whether a foreigner has
an obligation to provide support, he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law.” If a foreigner, however, has a
minorchild in the Philippines with a Filipino citizen, his national
law will not apply in the Philippines if the same provides that
parents have no obligation to supporttheirchildren, orthat failure
to fulfill such obligation is not punishable by law. In Conflict of
Laws, the forum may refuse to apply the applicable foreign law
ifthe same is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum. Moreover, a foreign law should not be applied when
its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws
of the foreigner father neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.511

2.3
’’Art. 16, par. I, NCC.
’’Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014).
”/</.
“Art. 16, par. 2, NCC.
“Art. 1039, NCC.
"Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 (1967).
MId., citing Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870.
Principle of Lex Rei Sitae (or Lex Situs): (a) Rule: If the issue
involves properties, whether real or personal, the applicable law
is the law of the country where it is situated.” This is known
as the principle of lex rei sitae or lex situs, (b) Rule as to real
property: The application of the foregoing principle is more
pronounced in the case of real or immovable property. Thus, all
matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are
determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can
alone prescribe the mode by which title can pass from one person
to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.
This general principle includes all rules governing the descent,
alienation, and transfer of immovable property and the validity,
effect, and construction of wills and other conveyances.” This
principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed
relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may
be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to
land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei
sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law
of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity
is undoubted.” (c) Exceptions to lex rei sitae - national law of
decedent: It is the national law of the decedent which shall
apply in intestate or testamentary succession, with regard to four
items: (1) the order ofsuccession; (2) the amount ofsuccessional
rights; (3) the intrinsic validity of provisions of the will;" and
(4) the capacity to succeed," whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found." For example, our system of legitimes cannot be
extended to the succession of foreign nationals. If there are no
forced heirs or legitimes under the national law ofthe decedent,
the Philippine laws on legitimes cannot apply." In addition, a
provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored with regard to those matters that Article 16 of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern."

10
2.4
6!Art. 16, par. 2, NCC.
“Art. 815, NCC.
"Art. 819, NCC.
'"Orion Savings Hank V. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014).
7“M.
71Scmpio-Diy, Handbook on Conjlicl ofLaws, p. 114, 2004 ed.
^Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc.,
434SCRA202,214-215(2004).
Principle of Lex Loci Celebrationis: (a) Forms and solemnities
of wills: The forms and solemnities of wills (extrinsic validity)
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.'’7 Hence, when a Filipino is in a foreign country,
he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established
by the country in which he may be.“ Exception: However,
joint wills executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall
not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the
laws of the country where they may have been executed.67 (b)
Forms and solemnities of contracts: The forms and solemnities
of contracts shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.65 This is known as the principle of
lex locicelebrationis. Exception: All matters concerning the title
and disposition ofreal property' are determined by what is known
as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by
which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which
an interest therein can be gained or loss.6’ This general principle
includes all rules governing the descent, alienation, and transfer
of immovable property and the validity, effect, and construction
ofwills and other conveyances.76 Hence, the extrinsic validity of
transactions over real property such as alienations, transfers, and
mortgages are governed by the lex situs,7' especially if the situs
provides for mandatory or prohibitory laws on the matter offorms
and solemnities, (c) Intrinsic validity of contracts: No conflicts
rule on essential validity ofcontracts is expressly provided for in
our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is
that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by the
lex contractus or “proper law of the contract.” This is the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis')
or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the
lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied from such
factors as substantial connection with the transaction, or the
nationality or domicile of the parties.72 As such, the contracting

11
BOOK 1. — PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
2.5
parties are allowed to select the law applicable to their contract,
subject to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or
public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a
substantive relationship to the transaction.7’ In the absence ofsuch
choice, however, there are two possible approaches: (1) to apply
the law ofthat State that “has the most significant relationship to
the transaction and the parties”;74 or (2) the law of the place of
performance or lex locisolutionis ifthe issue relates to all matters
relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and valid
excuses for non-performance.75 For example, on the question of
whether there is a breach ofan agreement, which includes default
or rnora, and the service contract contains no express choice of
the law that would govern it, it was held that the laws of Iraq bear
substantial connection to the transaction, since one ofthe parties
is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq.
Hence, the issue of whether there was default in the obligations
may be determined by the laws of Iraq.76
When Foreign Laws Cannot Be Applied: The Philippines’
prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy,
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.77 A foreign law, judgment, or
contract contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum shall not be applied” when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment, or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles ofConflict of Laws.”
”/</., citing Jovito R. Salonga, Private International Law 356 (1995 ed.).
74M„ citing Salonga, 355.
15Id., citing Jorge R. Coquia & Elizabeth A. Pangalangan, ConflictofLaws 418 (1995 ed.).
,6/<Z
77Art. 17, par. 3, NCC.
’’Del Soceoro v. Van Wilscm, 744 SCRA 516 (2(114), citing Bank ofAmerica, NT and SA
v. American Realty Corporation, 321 SCRA 659 (1999).
^Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. Basso, 771 SCRA 329 (2015).

12
Human Relations
B.
3)
3.1
“An. I9.NCC.
"Custodio v. CA, 253 SCRA 483 (1996).
“Amonoy v. Gutierrez, 351 SCRA 731 (2001).
“An. 430, NCC.
"Custodio v. CA, 253 SCRA483 (1996).
“/</. See also Tanjanco v. CA, 18 SCRA 994
“Albcnson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, 217 SCRA 18 (1993).
"'Philippine Savings Bank v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 170241, April 19,2010, citing MBTC V.
Wong. 359 SCRA 608,618 (2001).
Required Norm of Human Conduct
Norm of Human Conduct: (a) Basic principle: In the exercise
of rights and in the performance of duties, a person is required:
(1) to act with justice; (2) to give everyone his due; and (3) to
observe honesty and good faith.80 If such rules of conduct are
violated, the remedy is an action for damages under Article 20
or 21 of the New Civil Code, (b) Principle of damnun absque
injuria: Under this principle, the proper exercise of a lawful
right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will
lie. although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal
right has been invaded.” Well-settled is the maxim that damage
resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a
loss without injury—damnum absque injuria—for which the
law gives no remedy.” For example, it is within the right of the
owner ofa parcel ofland to enclose and fence his property, ifthe
same is not subject to any servitudes.*3 Such act of constructing
a fence within his lot is a valid exercise ofhis right as an owner,
hence not contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.84
As a consequence, whatever injury or damage may have been
sustained by others by reason ofthe rightful use of the said land
by its owner is damnum absque injuria.** (c) Principle of abuse
of right: A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible.81 This is the principle
of abuse of rights. As explained by the Court, the exercise of a
right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it
is abused especially to the prejudice of others.8’ The elements of
abuse ofrights are the following: (1) the existence ofa legal right

or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; and (3) with the sole
intent ofprejudicing or injuring another.” Stated otherwise, when
it becomes manifest that one’s right is exercised in bad faith for
the sole intent ofprejudicing another, an abuse ofright exists.”To
illustrate, when a lot owner fences his property for the purpose of
evicting its occupant whose lease contract had already expired,
said lot owner is liable for damages. He should have resorted to
the proper legal processes (such as filing an action for ejectment)
if he wanted to recover possession of the land.90 (d) Application
ofArticles 20. 21, and 2176: It is Article 20 which applies to both
willful and negligent acts that are done contrary to law. On the
other hand, Article 21 applies only to willful acts done contra
bonos mores.9' With respect to negligent acts or omissions,
Article 20 of the Civil Code concerns "violations of existing
law as basisfor an injury", whereas Article 2176 applies when
the negligent act causing damage to another does not constitute
“a breach of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual
obligation. " In St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. LIVV Construction
Corp.,91 LWV Construction Corporation deployed Jonathan
Raguindin to Saudi Arabia when the latter was cleared and found
to be fit foremployment by St. Martin Polyclinic. However, when
Raguindin had another medical examination in Saudi Arabia, he
tested positive for the Hepatitis C virus. Claiming that St. Martin
was reckless in issuing its medical report, LWV sued the latter
for damages. The MeTC, RTC, and CA found St. Martin liable
for damages under the provisions ofArticles 19, 20, and 21. On
appeal to the SC, it was held that the courts a quo erroneously
anchored their respective rulings on the provisions ofArticles 19,
20, and 21 of the Civil Code because LWV did not proffer (nor
have these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which damages
may be recovered due to St. Martin’s alleged negligent act. As
the claimed negligent act of St. Martin was not premised on the
breach of any law and that no pre-existing contractual relation
was averred to exist between the parties, the Court ruled that the
governing law is Article 2176, and not Articles 19, 20, and 21, of
the Civil Code.
“Tan v. Valeriano, 833 SCRA 649 (2017).
8,Ka Kuen Chua v. Colorlite Marketing Corp., 830 SCRA 81 (2017).
"Villafuerte v. CA, G.R. No. 134239, May 26, 2005
’'St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. LWV Construction Corp., 847 SCRA 378 (2017), citing the
Separate Opinion ofJ. Leonen in Alano v. Magud-Logmao, 731 Phil. 407 (2014).
nSupra.

14
3.2
3.3
"Gashem Sliookat Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115,125 (1993).
w/d. See also Pe v. Pc, 5 SCRA 200 (1962).
’’Tanjanco v. CA, 18 SCRA 994 (1966).
*Id. See also Hermosisima v. CA, 109 SCRA 629 (1960) and Constanlino v. Mendez, 209
SCRA 18(1992).
’’Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 (1964).
"“Buflag, Jr. v. CA, 211 SCRA 440,448 (1992).
Breach ofPromise ofMarriage: (a) Rule: The existing rule is that
a breach ofpromise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.93
The reason behind the rule is because Congress intended the same
not to be actionable (because Congress deleted the provision in
the draft of the New Civil Code making the same an actionable
wrong), (b) When there is seduction: When the man made use of
the promise of marriage as a subtle scheme or deceptive device
to entice the woman to the sexual act, and such promise is the
proximate cause why the woman gave herself unto the man in
a sexual congress but the man had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her, the man is liable for damages under Article 21 of
the Civil Code.94 The essential feature is seduction, that in law is
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power, or abuse ofconfidence on the part ofthe seducer
to which the woman has yielded.95 However, when there is no
seduction and the woman voluntarily gave herself to the man
because of love and mutual passion (or mutual lust), the Court
denied recovery ofdamages underArticle 21 ofthe Civil Code.96
(c) When act is contrary to good customs: When the groom led
the bride to believe that the wedding would push through and
they went through all the wedding preparations but two days
prior to the scheduled ceremony the groom walked out of the
same, the Court held the groom liable for damages to the bride
under Article 21 ofthe Civil Code because his act was contrary
to good customs.9’ In addition, where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents
thereof, the plaintiff has the right to recover money or property
advanced by him or her upon the faith ofsuch promise.''*
Accion In Rem Verso-. (a) Concept and requisites: An action for
recovery of what has been paid or delivered without just cause
or legal ground under Article 22 of the Civil Code is called an
accion in rem verso. The purpose of the action is to prevent
unjust enrichment, which exists when a person unjustly retains a

3.4
3.5
benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property ofanother against the fundamental principles ofjustice,
equity, and good conscience.”In order that such action will
prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant has
been enriched; (2) plaintiffhas suffered a loss; (3) enrichment of
the defendant is withoutjust or legal ground; and (4) plaintiffhas
no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi
delict.'™ (b) Compared with solutio indehiti: (1) Similarities:
(i) In both, the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (ii) In both, the
defendant has been enriched; (iii) In both, the enrichment of
the defendant is without just or legal ground; (iv) In both, the
defendant has the obligation to return what was unduly delivered
or paid to him by the plaintiff; and (v) In both, the objective is
to prevent unjust enrichment. (2) Distinctions: (i) In action in
rem verso, the source of obligation is quasi-contract; while in
solutio indebiti, it is law; and (ii) In solutio indebiti, the delivery
or payment to the defendant is by reason of mistake of fact or
mistake in the application of a doubtful or difficult provision of
law; while in action in rem verso, the delivery or payment is not
due to mistake of fact or mistake in the application of a doubtful
or difficult provision of law.
Liability For Damages Under Article 27: Requisites For
Recovery: (1) that the defendant be a public official charged with
the performance of official duties; (2) that there be a violation
of an official duty in favor of an individual; (3) that there be
willfulness or negligence in the violation of such official duty;
and (4) that there be an injury to the individual.101 But Article 27
presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official is
attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence.lo:
Unfair Competition Under Article 28: (a) Concept under the Civil
Code: The concept of “unfair competition” under Article 28 of
the NCC is very much broader than that covered by intellectual
property laws. Under this article, which follows the extended
concept of “unfair competition” in American jurisdictions,
the term covers even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a
"Land Bank ofthe Philippines v. Ong, 636 SCRA 266 (2010).
'“UP v. Philab Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 152411, Sep. 29, 2004; Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Ong, 636 SCRA 266 (2010).
Ioll Tolentino, Civil Code ofthe Philippines, 1990 ed., p. 113.
'“Philippine Match Co., Ltd. v. City of Cebu, 81 SCRA 99 (1978); Also in Tuzon v. CA,
212 SCRA 739(1992).

PRE-0AR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW
16
3.6
l03Willaware Products Corporation v. Jcsichris Manufacturing Corp., 734 SCRA 238
(2014).
mId.
'“Manantan v. CA, 350 SCRA 387,397 (2001).
competitor, briber}' of his employees, misrepresentation of all
kinds, interferencewiththe fulfillmentofacompetitor’s contracts,
orany malicious interference with the latter’s business.103 What is
being sought to be prevented is not competitionperse but the use
ofunjusLoppressive,orhigh-handedmethods which may deprive
others ofa fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living.
Plainly, what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not
competition where the means used are fair and legitimate."” (b)
Requisites forrecoveryofdamages: There is “unfaircompetition”
underArticle 28 ofthe Civil Code iftwo requisites are satisfied:
(1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and
(2) it must involve acts which are characterized as “contrary
to good conscience,” or “shocking to judicial sensibilities,” or
otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include
force, intimidation, deceit, machination, or any other unjust,
oppressive, or high-handed method. The public injury or interest
is a minor factor; the essence ofthe matterappears to be a private
wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.103
Recovery ofCivil Liability Unon Acquittal ofAccused: (a) When
accused not the author of the crime: If the acquittal is on the
ground that the accused is not the author ofthe act or omission
complained of, there is no civil liability ex delicto. This is the
situation contemplated in Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure106 which provides that “the civil
action based on delict may be deemed extinguished ifthere is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.”
However, Section 2 of Rule 111 applies only to a civil action
arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil
liability referred to in Section 2 of Rule 111 refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act

3.7
'"’Manliclic v. Calaunan, 512 SCRA 642 (2007).
l08Manantan v. CA, supra.
109129 SCRA 558 (1984).
"°Sec. 1(a), Rule 111, Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure.
'"Sec. 2, Rule 111, Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure.
"2ld.
"’Art. 30, NCC.
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused.10’ (b) When acquittal is based on reasonable doubt: If
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused, he is not exempt from civil liability ex delicto which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the NCC where the civil
action for damages is “for the same act or omission.”108 In the
landmark case ofRoy Padilla v. G4,'w it was held that the court
may acquit the accused based on reasonable doubt on his guilt
but at the same time order him to pay civil liability based on the
delict which was already proved in the same case without need of
filing a separate civil action for the said purpose.
Independent Civil Action: (a) Rule of implied institution: When
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged (civil liability
ex delicto') is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party: (1) waives the civil action; (2) reserves the
right to institute it separately; or (3) institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.110 The civil action which has been
reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action."1 If the criminal action is filed
after the civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall
be suspended in whatever stage it may be found beforejudgment
on the merits and the suspension shall last until final judgment
is rendered in the criminal action. However, the civil action
may be consolidated with the criminal action."2 (b) When no
criminal action instituted: When a separate civil action is brought
to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense (civil
liability ex delicto), and no criminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall be sufficient to prove the act complained of."’ (c)
Civil actions not based on delict: When the civil action is based
on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
ofas a felony (not based on delict), such civil action may proceed

18
3.8
"4Art. 31, NCC.
"’Sec. 3, Rule 111, Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure.
"‘Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp., 575 SCRA 23 (2008).
"’Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 (1955).
"'Id.
"’Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 (1983).
“PhilippineAgila Satellite, Inc. v. Sec. Lichauco, 496 SCRA 588 (2006).
l!lSec. 7, Rule 111, Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure.
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result ofthe latter."4 (d) Independent civil actions: The offended
party is authorized to bring an independent civil action in the
cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action.11’ (1) Article
32, NCC: An individual can hold a public officer personally
liable fordamages on account ofan act or omission thatviolates a
constitutional rightonly ifitresults in a particular wrong or injury
to the former."6 (2) Article 33. NCC: In Article 33, “defamation”
and “fraud” are used in their ordinary sense;"7 while the term
"physical injuries" is understood to mean bodily injury, not the
specific crime of physical injuries."8 Hence, the term includes
the crimes of physical injuries, frustrated homicide, attempted
homicide, or even death. Note that the civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings even if the crime
charged is “homicide thru reckless imprudence.”119
Prejudicial Question: (a) Concept: A prejudicial question is
the issue raised in a pending civil case, the resolution of which
determines whether or not a criminal action may proceed or
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Section 6 of
Rule 111 ofthe Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure directs that
the proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that
it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of
the judge alone or the investigating officer.120 (b) Requisites: In
order for a prejudicial question to exist, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.121
(c) Nature of pending actions: Generally, a prejudicial question

c.
4)
4.1
comes into play only in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former
an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because the resolution of the civil
action is determinativejuris el dejure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case.122 Exception: The foregoing,
however, is not an ironclad rule. It is imperative that the Court
consider the rationale behind the principle ofprejudicial question,
i.e., to avoid two conflicting decisions, prudence dictates that the
principle underlying the doctrine should be applied, regardless
of the fact that the pending cases are not civil and criminal.125
In Abacan, Jr. v. Northwestern Universit)’, lnc.,'u for example,
the Court applied the principle ofprejudicial question even when
there was no criminal case involved therein. The cases involved
were a case for nullification of election of directors before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a civil case for
damages and attachment before the RTC.
l22Alsons Development and Investment Corp. V. The Heirs of Romeo D. Confesor, G.R.
No. 215671, Sep. 19, 2018, citing Abaean, Jr. v. Northwestern University, Inc.. 495 Phil. 123, 137
(2005).
125Alsons Development and Investment Corp. v. The Heirs ofRomeo D. Confesor, supra.
,24495 Phil. 123 (2005).
,2!Art. 37, NCC.
mld.
Civil Personality
Civil Personality
Concent: (a) Definition: Civil personality is synonymous to
“juridical capacity,” the latter being defined as “the fitness to
be the subject of legal relations.”125 In other words, it is simply
the aptitude to be the subject of rights and obligations. In the
absence of civil personality, no rights may be acquired and no
obligations may be incurred, (b) Distinguished from capacity
to act: Capacity to act, on the other hand, is the power to do
acts with legal effect.126 Juridical capacity and capacity to act
are distinguished, as follows: (1) the former is inherent in every
natural person, while the latter is not inherent but may only be
acquired; (2) the former may only be lost (in the case of natural
person) through death; while the latter may be lost through other
means; and (3) the former cannot be limited or restricted; while
the latter can be limited or restricted.

20
4.2 Civil Personality of Natural Persons: (a) What determines
civil personality in natural persons: It is birth that determines
civil personality.127 But the fetus is considered bom for civil
purposes only when: (1) It is alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother’s womb (or after the cutting of the
umbilical cord), if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of at least
seven months; or (2) It survives for at least 24 hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb, if it had an intra
uterine life of less than seven months.128 (b) Civil personality
of conceived child: A conceived child, although as yet unborn,
has a limited and provisional personality.129 Its personality is
essentially limited because it is only for purposes favorable to
the child. Its personality is provisional because it depends upon
the child being bom alive later under the conditions mentioned
above, (c) Consequences ofcivil personality ofconceived child:
It can acquire rights but it cannot incur obligations. A conceived
child enjoys the following rights: (1) the right to be a donee of
simple donations, but acceptance shall be made by persons who
would legally represent him if he were already bom;130 (2) the
right to receive support from his progenitors;131 (3) he may not
be ignored by his parents in their testament; otherwise, it may
result in preterition ofa forced heir that annuls the institution of
the testamentary heir, even ifsuch child should be bom after the
death ofthe testator.132 Under the law, a child already conceived
at the time ofthe death ofthe decedent is capable ofsucceeding
provided it be bom later under the conditions prescribed in
Article 41 ofthe Civil Code.113 (4) Lastly, a conceived child may
be designated as beneficiary in an insurance policy, (d) When
necessary to determine personality of conceived child: There is
a need to establish the civil personality of the unborn child if
his juridical capacity is the issue involved. Thus, ifthe question
before the court is whether the unborn child acquired any rights
or incurred any obligations prior to his/herdeath that were passed
on to or assumed by the child’s parents, then there is a need to
12,Art. 40, FC.
'“Art. 41, FC.
l29Quimiguing v. Icao, 34 SCRA 132(1970).
'“Art. 742, NCC.
'’’Quimiguing V. Icao, supra.
mld.
131Art. 1025, par. 2, NCC.

4.3
m2 SCRA801 (1961).
”’603 SCRA621 (2009).
”6Art. 42, NCC.
’’’Gaffney v. Butler, 844 SCRA 570 (2017) and Ventura v. Militante, 374 Phil. 562(1999).
’’’Art. 44(2), NCC.
l4°Sec. 18, par. 3, R.A. No. 11232 or Revised Corporation Code ofthe Phil.
establish the civil personality ofthe unborn child. An example is
the case of Geluz v. C/1,'14 where the legal question is whether or
not the father has the right to file a derivative action for damages
on account ofthe death ofthe conceived child, for and on behalf
of the child. The Court ruled that since the child cannot file the
action for lack of civil personality, the action filed on his behalf
may not prosper. On the other hand, there is no need to establish
the civil personality of the unborn child if his/her juridical
capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue and the
case is not whether the unborn child has acquired any rights or
incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed
on to or assumed by the child’s parents. An example is the case
of Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Montano,'11
where the issue is whether or not the father of the conceived
child is entitled to the financial assistance for the death of the
conceived child, as provided for under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, (e) Effect of death upon civil personality: The
civil personality of a natural person is extinguished by death.”6
Consequently, a deceased person does not have the capacity to be
sued and may not be made a defendant in a case.”7
Civil Personality of Juridical Persons: Rules: (a) State and its
political subdivisions: Their personality begins as soon as they
have been constituted according to law.”8 (b) Other corporations,
institutions, and entities for public interest or purpose, created
by law: Their personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law.'” (c) Private corporations: A
corporation formed or organized under the Corporation Code
of the Philippines commences to have corporate existence and
juridical personality and is deemed incorporated from the date
the Securities and Exchange Commission issues a certificate
of incorporation under its official seal.1,10 (d) Partnership: To be
considered ajuridical person, a partnership must comply with the
following requisites: (1) Two or more persons bind themselves
to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund;

22
4.4
'*'Tocao v. CA, 342 SCRA20 (2000).
'"Art. 1773, in relation to Art. 1771, NCC.
,45Juasing Hardware v. Hon. Mendoza, 201 Phil. 369 (1982); Yao Ka Sin Trading v. CA,
209 SCRA 763 (1992).
and (2) Intention on the part ofthe partners to divide the profits
among themselves.'*' However, when immovable or real rights
are contributed, an inventory of the said properties signed by
the parties and attached to the public instrument is required;
otherwise, the partnership is void.'42 (e) Sole proprietorship:
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the
enterprise.'*’
Rules on Survivorship: (a) If issue is succession: Article 43
of the Civil Code is the applicable law when the question of
survivorship is important for purposes of resolving issues
concerning transmission of successional rights between the
persons involved. Hence, in order for Article 43 of the Civil
Code to apply, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) The question
ofsurvivorship involves persons who are called to succeed each
other, whetherthesuccession is by reason ofawill orby operation
of law; and (2) the issue involves transmission of successional
rights between them. If both requisites are present, Article 43
provides for the following rules: (i) whoever alleges the death of
one priorto the othershall prove the same; and (ii) in the absence
of proof, the law presumes that both had died at the same time
and that there shall be no transmission ofrights from one to the
other, (b) If issue is not succession: Where the issue involved •
is not transmission of successional rights, e.g., the question of
survivorship is between the insured in a life insurance policy
and his beneficiary, the same shall be resolved by applying the
presumption ofsurvivorship under the Rules ofCourt. Under the
Rules of Court, when two persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown
who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes,
according to the following rules: (1) If both were under the age
of 15 years,the olderis deemed to have survived; (2) Ifboth were
above the age of60, the younger is deemed to have survived; (3)
Ifone is under 15 and the other above 60, the former is deemed
to have survived; (4) Ifboth be over 15 and under 60, and the sex

23
D.
5)
5.1
The Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, as amended)
144Sec. 3(jj), Rule 131, Rules ofCourt.
145Art. I, FC.
146Tilar v. Tilar, 831 SCRA 116 (2017), citing Mariategui v. CA, 282 Phil. 348,356 (1992).
See also Tuazon v. CA, 256 SCRA 158, 169 (1996).
14,Sec. 12, Art. II, 1987 Constitution; see also Hernandez v. CA, 320 SCRA 76 (1999).
148Tilar v. Tilar, supra, citing Sec. 1, Art. XV, 1987 Constitution.
14’M
15°Sec. 1, Art. XV, 1987 Constitution.
Marriage
Requisites For A Valid Marriage
Concent of Marriage: (a) Dual concept: (1) As a contract: It
is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life.145 (2) As a social institution: Our
Constitution clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it
is a new relation, an institution the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested.146 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and affords protection to the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.147 Thus, the State is mandated to
protect marriage, being the foundation ofthe family, which in turn
is the foundation of the nation.148 (b) Constitutional provisions
protecting marriage and family: (1) The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.14’
(2) The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.150 (3) Marriage, as an
The Family Code ofthe Philippines
be different, the male is deemed to have survived; ifthe sex be
the same, the older; and (5) Ifone be under 15 or over 60, and the
other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.144

24
5.2
“'Sec. 2, Art. XV, 1987 Constitution.
“’Art. 1, FC.
“’831 SCRA 116(2017).
154Scc. 3(aa), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court; Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43
(1922).
“’Balogbog v. CA, 269 SCRA 267 (1997).
“‘Hernandez v. CA, 320 SCRA 76 (1999).
“’Art. 26, par. 1, FC.
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.151 (c) Marriage governed bv law:
(1) Rule: The nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by the Family Code.152 (2)
Doctrine of separation of Church and State, not applicable: In
Tilar v. Tilar,m where the RTC refused to take cognizance of a
petitionfordeclaration ofnullity ofthe marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity because the marriage was solemnized
pursuant to the Canon Law, the Court ruled that the principle of
separation ofChurch and State is inapplicable because the nature,
consequences, and incidents ofmarriage are all governed by law.
In upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the petition for
declaration ofnullity ofmarriage solemnized by a Catholic priest
and held in a church, the Court ruled that, while such marriage
is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and
legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code, (d)
Presumptions favoring marriage: (1) That ifa man and a woman
deport themselves as husband and wife, they are presumed, in
the absence of counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married;154 (2) That the law favors the validity
ofmarriage155 and the burden ofproof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon the party seeking its nullity.156
Requisites For Valid Marriage: (a) For marriages celebrated
abroad: (1) Rule: All marriages involving Filipino citizens
solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, shall also
be valid in the Philippines.15’ (2) Exceptions: The following
marriages shall remain void even if solemnized outside the
Philippines and valid in the place ofcelebration: Those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38. (b) For
marriages celebrated in the Philippines: (1) Requirement of five

25
“‘Arts. 2 and 3, FC.
“’Art. 4, par. 1, FC.
160Art. 35(2), FC.
“'Art. 3, NCC.
'“715 SCRA6O5 (2014).
'“476 SCRA461 (2005).
requisites: These marriages must strictly comply with the five
requisites for a valid marriage: two are classified as essential
requisites, while three are classified as formal requisites. The
essential requisites are: (i) legal capacity, and (ii) consent. The
formal requisites are: (i) authority of the solemnizing officer,
(ii) a valid marriage license, and (iii) a marriage ceremony.1”
(2) Effect of absence ofrequisites: In the absence ofeither legal
capacity, authority of the solemnizing officer, or valid marriage
license, the marriage is void.159 However, in case of absence of
authority of the solemnizing officer, the marriage is perfectly
valid when either or both parties believed in good faith that the
solemnizing officerhad the legal authority to do so.160 The basis of
such beliefin good faith must be mistake offact and not mistake
of law.161 Ifwhat is absent, however, is consent, there is in fact
no marriage because marriage is also a contract. For example,
in Republic v. Olaybar,'61 where Merlinda Olaybar was not the
one who gave consent to the marriage because her identity and
personal circumstances were used by someone else in contracting
a marriage to a Korean national, it was ruled that there was no
void marriage involving Merlinda Olaybar as there was no
marriage to speak of. If what is absent is marriage ceremony,
there is also no marriage to speak of because the State is a party
in interest in all marriages. For example, in Morigo v. People,'61
where the man and woman simply signed a marriage contract
privately and without the presence of an authorized solemnizing
officer, it was ruled that there was no void marriage because
there was no marriage to speak of. (3) Distinctions between void
marriage and no marriage: (i) According to Olaybar, if there is
in fact no marriage, the proper remedy is not to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of the marriage but a petition
for correction and/or cancellation of entry in the civil registry
under Rule 108. (ii) On the other hand, if the marriage is void,
a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage.
According to Braza v. The City Civil Registrar ofHimamaylan

26
5.3
'"607 SCRA 638 (2009).
'“Art. 4, par. 3, FC.
'“Art. 15, NCC.
'"Art. 21, par. 1,NCC.
'“Art. 5, FC.
'“Art. I, FC.
City. Negros Occidental,IM the proper remedy is a Petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and the marriage
cannot be dissolved by the mere expedient of changing the
entry ofmarriage in the civil registry, (iii) According to Morigo,
if there is in fact no marriage, the requirement of obtaining a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the marriage prior to
contracting another marriage in Article 40 of the Family Code
does not apply. On the other hand, if a marriage was in fact
celebrated but it is void ab initio, the requirement of Article
40 of the Family Code applies. (4) Effect of defect in consent:
According to paragraph 2 of Article 4, a defect in any of the
essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. However,
only consent is susceptible of becoming defective but not legal
capacity. (5) Effect of irregularity in formal requisite: Ifthere is
irregularity in any ofthe formal requisites, the marriage remains
perfectly valid but the party/parties responsible for the same shall
be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.'65
Legal Capacity To Contract Marriage: (a) Requisites for legal
capacity: (1) For Foreigners: Governed by their national law.'66
Hence, they must submita certificate oflegal capacity to contract
marriage issued by their respective diplomatic or consular
officials.'6’ (2) For Filipinos: To be capacitated to contract
marriage, the parties must be: (i) a male and a female; (ii) at least
18 years of age; and (iii) must not be suffering from any legal
impediment mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 ofthe FC.'6" Hence,
ifone ofthe parties is below 18, or ifthere is a legal impediment,
such as those enumerated in Articles 37 and 38, or a previous
valid marriage (Art. 35[4]), the marriage is void ab initio, (b)
Sexes ofthe parties: (1) Validity ofsame-sex marriage: Same-sex
marriage is not recognized as valid here in the Philippines, even
if the marriage is solemnized abroad and valid there as such. In
fact, the same is noteven considered a marriage under Philippine
laws because marriage is defined in the Family Code as a special
contract ofpermanent union between a man and a woman only.'69

27
5.4 Consent: (a) Effect of absence of consent: There is in fact no
marriage. Hence, the remedy is not a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity because there is no marriage that may be declared
void. Instead, the proper remedy is a petition for correction and/
™G.R. No. 217910, Sep. 3,2019.
’”537 SCRA 373 (2007).
172Art. 15.NCC.
’’’Republic V. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72 (2008).
In Falcis, III u Civil Registrar General,™ Atty. Jesus Falcis III
questioned the constitutionality ofArticles 1,2, 46(4), and 55(6)
of the Family Code because said provisions limit the definition
of marriage as only between a man and a woman. He argued
that said provisions violate the equal protection clause since there
is no substantial distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex
couples. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the petition
based on procedural grounds, without ruling on the merits of
the petition. (2) Effect of sex reassignment sureerv: In Silverio
v. Republic,'1' it was held that in this jurisdiction there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment and its effects. Citing the
Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753), the Court held that the sex
ofa Filipino is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of
the infant. Ifthe determination ofa person’s sex made at the time
ofhis or her birth is not attended by error, the same is immutable
and may not be changed by reason of sex reassignment surgery.
However, the ruling in Silverio will not apply if the person
who underwent sex reassignment surgery is a foreigner and his
national law allows him to have a change of sex by reason of
sex reassignment surgery. In determining the sex ofa person, he/
she is to be governed by his/her national law because the matter
of status, condition, and legal capacity of a person, as well as
his family rights and duties, shall be governed by the national
law of the person concerned.'72 (3) Effect if doubt in genitals is
bv reason of nature: Ifthe reason for the doubt in the genitals is
nature, as when the body of the person has female chromosome
but also producing high levels of male hormones (congenital
adrenal hyperplasia), the Court ruled that the determining factor
in the gender classification would be what the individual, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex 173

28
5.5
'"Republic v. Olaybar, 715 SCRA 605 (2014).
175Art. 4, par. 2, FC.
’’“Republic v. Albios, 707 SCRA 584 (2013).
I77W.
l7*Art. 4, in relation to Art. 35(3), FC.
mld.
'“Alcantara v. Alcantara, 531 SCRA 446 (2007). Also in Vitangcol v. People, 780 SCRA
598 (2016).
or cancellation ofentry in the civil registry under Rule 108.174 (b)
Effect of defect in consent: The marriage is voidable.175 Those
defects are enumerated in Article 45 of the FC. (c) Meaning of
consent: “Consent” in marriage is simply the personal declaration
made by the groom and the bride during the marriage ceremony
that they are taking each other as husband and wife. If such
consent is given during the marriage ceremony and the same is
not defective, the marriage is perfectly valid, regardless of the
absence oflove and the purpose, intent, and motive ofthe parties
in contracting a marriage. The absence oflove does not affect the
validity ofthe marriage. Likewise, the fact that the marriage was
entered into for other purposes other than what the law or the
Constitution declares does notmake marriage void.'76 In Republic
v. Albios,177 where a citizen ofthe Philippines got married to an
/American citizen solely for the purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of a sum of money, the Court ruled
that that there is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes otherthan what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition offoreign citizenship.
Valid Marriage License: (a) Effectofabsence ofmarriage license:
If the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license, the
same is void.171 Ifthe marriage license was spurious or fake, the
marriage is also void.'7’ To be considered void on the ground of
absence ofa marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract,
oratthevery least, supported by acertification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.'"0
A certification issued by the local civil registrar that their office
has no record ofthe alleged marriage license is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license in the absence of any
circumstance of suspicion. It enjoys probative value, the local
civil registrar being the officer charged under the law to keep a

29
record ofall data relative to the issuance ofa marriage license.181
In Sevilla v. Cardenas,"12 it was ruled that to be sufficient proof
of the non-issuance of a marriage license, the certification to be
issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that
the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry
could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Ifthere
is no showing that the local civil registry exerted diligent efforts
to locate the records of the said marriage license, the marriage
cannotbe declaredvoid byreason ofabsenceofamarriage license,
(b) Effect of irregularity in issuance of marriage license: Ifthere
is a mere irregularity in the issuance of the marriage license, the
validity of the marriage shall not be affected but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally,
and administratively liable.183 In Alcantara v. Alcantara,184 the
Court ruled that the issuance of a marriage license in a city
or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence
ofpublication or prior to the completion ofthe 10-day period for
publication, are mere irregularities in a formal requisite that do
not affect the validity ofthe marriage, (c) Marriages exempt from
requirement ofmarriage license: ()Articulo mortis marriages.185
The marriage remains valid even ifthe ailing party subsequently
survives.186 (2) Marriages among Muslims or members of ethnic
cultural communities, provided that the same are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites, or practices.18’ (3) Marriages
where the residence of either party is so located that there is no
means oftransportation to enable such party to appear personally
before the local civil registrar.188 (4) Marriages involving a man
and a woman who have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage and who, during the
said period, were not suffering from any legal impediment to
marry each other.18’ The five-year period must be: (a) continuous
or uninterrupted; (b) counted backwards from the day of the
""Carillo v. Carino, 351 SCRA 127 (2001); Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA257 (1994).
I82497 SCRA 428 (2006).
I8'M
,84531 SCRA 446 (2007).
185Art. 27, FC.
I86M.
187Art. 33, FC.
188Art. 28, FC.
'“’Art. 34, FC.

30
5.6
'"Niftal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000); Republic v. Dayot, 550 SCRA 435 (2008).
"'Supra.
'”545 SCRA 162 (2008).
*"763 SCRA 54 (2015).
'"Art. 35(2), FC.
mId.
'"Art. 3, NCC.
'"Art. 4, par. 3, FC.
'"Navarro v. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129 (1996); Beso v. Daguman, 323 SCRA 566 (2000);
Arafles v. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402 (2002).
'”860 SCRA216 (2018).
celebration ofthe marriage; and (c) characterized by exclusivity,
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the
five years.'" In Republic v. Dayot,'9' the Supreme Court ruled
that the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where
the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for
lack ofa marriage license. In De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro,'91
the Court further clarified that the falsity ofthe affidavit cannot
be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. However, the Court held in Santiago v. People'91 that
the falsity ofan affidavit ofcohabitation in the second marriage
CANNOTbe used as a defense in the crime ofbigamy, for it will
be the height ofabsurdity to allow the accused to use her illegal
actto escape criminal conviction.
Authority of Solemnizing Officer: (a) Effect of absence of
authority: The marriage is void.'" However, if either or both the
contracting parties believed in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so the marriage is perfectly
valid.'” But the beliefin good faith must be based on a mistake of
fact and not mistakeoflaw.'96 (b) Effect ofirregularity in exercise
ofauthority: The marriage remains valid but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable.'” Forexample, the Courtruled thatwhere
a judge solemnized a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction,
this is a mere irregularity in the formal requisite. While it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, it may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.'“ In Keuppers v. Murcia,'99 the
jurisdiction ofthe MTCCjudge was limited to the Island Garden
City of Samal, but the judge solemnized the marriage in Davao
City, or outside of the court’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled that
a municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside his

31
5.7
““Art. 7(1), FC.
201Art. 7(2), FC.
202Arts. 7(3) and 31, FC.
203Art. 31, FC.
204Arts. 7(4) and 32, FC.
205Arts. 7(5) and 10, FC.
206Sec. 444(b)(l)(xviii), R.A. No. 7160, the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
207Art. 6, FC.
territorial jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the Family Code,
and is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and should be properly sanctioned,
(c) Persons authorized to solemnize marriages: (1) Incumbent
members of the Judiciary.200 (2) Religious solemnizing officers:
Requisites: (i) must be duly authorized by his respective church
or sect in writing; (ii) his written authority must be duly registered
with the Civil Registrar General; (iii) he must act within the
limits of such written authority; and (iv) at least one of the
contracting parties must belong to his church or sect.201 (3) Ship
captain or airplane chief pilot: Requisites: (i) marriage must be
in articulo mortis (at the point of death); and (ii) marriage must
be between passengers and/or crew members.202 Such authority
may be exercised not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is
in flight but also during stopovers at ports of call.203 (4) Military
commanders of a unit: Requisites: (i) must be a commissioned
officer, or an officer in the armed forces holding rank by virtue
ofa commission from the President; (ii) assigned chaplain to his
unit must be absent; (iii) marriage must be in articulo mortis;
and (iv) marriage must be solemnized within the zone ofmilitary
operations.204 The contracting parties need not be members ofthe
armed forces. They can be civilians. (5) Consul-General, consul,
or vice-consul: Requisites: (i) marriage must be celebrated
abroad in the country where the consul holds office; and (ii)
marriage must be between Filipino citizens.203 (6) Mayors:206
After the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 and
before the effectivity ofthe Local Government Code (January 1,
1992), mayors did not have authority to solemnize marriages.
MarriageCeremony: (a)Whatconstitutes a “marriage ceremony":
No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
the marriage is required.207 However, the law sets the minimum
requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should
be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, their personal declaration in

32
Ronulo v. People, 728 SCRA 675 (2014).
2wArt. 6, FC.
2l0Art. 26, par. 1,FC.
!"M.
2l2Art 6, FC.
mId.
2l4Infante v. Arenas, CA-G.R. No. 5278-R, June 29, 1951.
™Id.
’“Arts. 2(2) and 6, FC.
!l,Morigo v. People, 422 SCRA 376 (2004).
!“728 SCRA 675 (2014).
the presence ofthe solemnizing officer that they take each other
as husband and wife.205 (b) Requisites for marriage ceremony
to exist: (1) Personal appearance by the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer.200 Thus, a marriage celebrated
thru video conferencing where either or both parties do not
appear personally before the solemnizing officer is not valid if
celebrated in the Philippines. Ifcelebrated abroad, however, and
valid there as such, it shall likewise be considered as valid in
the Philippines.210 Likewise, a marriage by proxy, ifcelebrated in
the Philippines, is not valid. However, ifcelebrated abroad and
valid there as such, it shall likewise be considered as valid in the
Philippines.2" (2) Personal declaration by the contracting parties
that they are taking each other as husband and wife.212 However,
there is no prescribed form or religious rite.213 Hence, the failure
of the solemnizing officer to ask the parties whether they take
each other as husband and wife cannot be regarded as a fatal
omission ifthe parties nonetheless signed the marriage contract
in the presence of the solemnizing officer.214 A declaration by
word of mouth ofwhat the parties had already stated in writing
would be a mere repetition, so that its omission should not be
regarded as a fatal defect.21’ (3) Such personal declaration by the
parties must be done in the presence ofthe solemnizing officer.216
Hence, there is no marriage ceremony if what transpired was a
mere private actofsigning a marriage contract by the contracting
parties, without the presence of the solemnizing officer.217 In
Ronulo v. People;215 a solemnizing officer from the Aglipayan
Church was charged with violation of Article 352 of the RPC
for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony because
he solemnized the marriage knowing fully well that the parties
did not have a marriage license. The accused contended that he
merely conducted a “blessing” and that in order for a marriage

33
5.8
6)
6.1
ceremony to exist, the law requires the verbal declaration
that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a
marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing
which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to
by the solemnizing officer. In holding that the accused indeed
performed a marriage ceremony, the Court ruled that the law sets
the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony:
first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting
parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration
in the presence ofnot less than two witnesses that they take each
other as husband and wife. Both requirements were present in
this case.
2l,Villanueva v. CA, 198 SCRA 472 (1991).
22OM.
“'Balogbog v. CA, 269 SCRA 259 (1997).
222 People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).
™ld.
224Trinidad v. CA, 289 SCRA 188 (1998); Sarmiento v. CA, 305 SCRA 138 (1999).
Marriage contract: (a) Importance of marriage contract: It is
the best documentary evidence of a marriage.21’ Its existence
renders unnecessary the presumption that “a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.”220 (b) Effect ofabsence ofmarriage
contract: Its absence is not, however, proof that no marriage
took place because other evidence may be presented to prove
the fact of marriage.221 Thus, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate
said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites
for its validity are present.222 The forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate to the registry of marriage is not one of
said requisites.22’ (c) Other proofs of marriage: (1) testimony
of a witness to the matrimony; (2) the couple’s public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock;
(3) the birth and baptismal certificates of children bom during
such union; and (4) mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.22,1
Rules on Validity ofAbsolute Divorces
Summary of Rules on Absolute Divorce: The rales on divorce
prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: (1)
Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence,

34
6.2
6.3
the courts cannot grant the same; (2) consistent with Articles 15
and 17 ofthe Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipino
citizenscannot be dissolved even by an absolutedivorce obtained
abroad; (3) an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and
(4) in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the
former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.225
Rule as to Divorce Between Filipinos: Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it224 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because ofArticles 15 and
17 of the Civil Code.227 Such divorce between Filipinos is void
and ineffectual225 because it is contrary to our public policy and
morality.22’ This rule has remained even under the Family Code,
even ifeither or both parties are residing abroad.250
Rule in Mixed Marriages: (a) Requisites: In a mixed marriage
involving a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, the Family Code
allows the former to remarry in case the divorce is "validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry. "2JI The following elements must concur in order
for said law to apply, namely: (1) that there is a valid marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;252 and (2)
that avalid divorce is obtained abroad, regardless ofwho between
thespouses initiatedthedivorceproceedings.255 Thus, pursuant to
Republic v. Manalo,m foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify
“‘Morisono v. Morisono, G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018; see also Garcia V. Recio, 366
SCRA437 (2001).
“‘Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA437 (2001).
™Id.
“Lavadia v. Heirs ofJuan Luces Luna, 730 SCRA 376 (2014).
22’Bayot v. CA, supra.
250Lavadia v. Heirs ofJuan Luces Luna, supra.
“'Art 26,2" par., FC.
“’Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114 (2005).
“’Republic v. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580 (2018); Racho v. Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515, June
25, 2018; Morisono v. Morisono, G.R. No. 226013, July 2,2018; Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R.
No. 224015, July 23, 2018; and Nullada V. Civil Registrar ofManila, G.R. No. 224548, January
23,2019.
luSupra

35
"’Morisono v. Morisono, supra.
"‘472 SCRA 114(2005).
”7Quita v. CA, 300 SCRA 406 (1998); see also Llorente V. CA, 345 SCRA 592 (2000).
""Corpuz v. Slo. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010).
"’859 SCRA 98 (2018).
"°856 SCRA 548 (2018).
marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already
be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless ofwho between the
spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party
petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree—
presumably the Filipino citizen—must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it."’ (b) Reckoning point in determining citizenship: In
determining whether it is a case of a mixed marriage, the Court
ruled in Republic v. Orbecido IIP* that the reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry. Once it is proven that a party was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from his Filipino spouse, the
rule in Article 26, par. 2 ofthe Family Code would be applicable.
In other words, the validity of the divorce will be determined
based on the law ofthe country ofwhich he is a citizen at the time
the valid divorce is obtained."7 (c) Article 26, 2nd par, applicable
only to Filipino spouse: Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph ofArticle 26 ofthe Family Code,while the alien
spouse can claim no right under said provision. The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his
or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Thus, ifthe Filipino spouse invokes the second paragraph
ofArticle 26 of the Family Code, the action is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that
the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage."8 (d) When Filipino spouse regains capacity to
remarry: In Republic v. Cote,239 the Court made a pronouncement,
by way of obiter dictum, that the Filipino spouse who likewise
benefits from the effects of the divorce (obtained in a mixed
marriage) cannot automatically remarry; before the divorced
Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must file a petition for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce. In Sarto v. People,
however, the Court ruled that the "[r]ecognition ofthe divorce

36
7)
7.1
decree, however, need not be obtained in a separate petition
filedsolelyfor thatpurpose. Philippine courts may recognize the
foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an
integral aspect ofhis claim or defense." The author believes that
Sarto is the better rule. In other words, once it has been proven
that the divorce obtained abroad is valid, and that it capacitated
the foreign spouse to remarry, the Filipino spouse also regains
his or her capacity to remarry at the same time that the foreign
spouse reacquires his or hercapacity to remarry. Thus, even ifthe
Filipino spouse immediately contracted a subsequent marriage
after the divorce and prior to its judicial recognition, he or she
is not automatically liable for bigamy, (e) Principle applied to
foreign judgment involving bieamv: The principle in Article 26
of the Family Code is also applicable to a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Court
explained that the principle in the second paragraph of Article
26 ofthe Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after
the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated
to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.241 (f) Retroactive application
of rule: In San Luis v. San Luis,2*2 the Court held that there is
no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code because there is
sufficientjurisprudential basis to apply the rule embodied in said
law to absolute divorces obtained by the foreign spouse prior to
the effectivity ofthe Family Code, as exemplified by the cases of
Van Doni v. Romillo, Jr.,2,2 Pilapil v. lbay-Somera,2U and Quito v.
Court ofAppeals.™
24lFujiki v. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 (2013).
242514 SCRA 294 (2007).
WI39 SCRA 139 (1985).
i<4174 SCRA 653 (1989).
24!300 SCRA 406 (1998).
2“J. Vitug, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Mercado v. Tan, 337 SCRA 122, 135
(2000).
Void Marriages
Concept and Characteristics of Void Marriages: (a) Nature: (1)
Rule: It is inexistent from the very beginning.246 Hence, as a

37
247J. Carpio, Concurring Opinion in Abunado v. People, 426 SCRA 562,572 (2004).
248Art. 40, FC; Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
"’Cariilo v. Cariilo, 351 SCRA 127, 134(2001).
"“Abunado v. People, supra', Mercado v. Tan, 337 SCRA 122 (2000) and Marbella-Bobis
v. Bubis, 336 SCRA 747 (2000).
"'Klinal V. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122, 134 (2000).
™ld.
m/d.
“*545 SCRA 666 (2008).
"’351 SCRA 127 (2001).
“‘702 SCRA 707 (2013).
“’607 SCRA 638 (2009).
The Family Code of the Philippines
rule, ifthe marriage is void ab initio, it is ipsofacto void without
need of any judicial declaration of nullity.247 (2) Exception: For
purposes ofremarriage, even ifthe prior marriage is void ab initio
ajudicial declaration ofits nullity is required before a subsequent
marriage can be contracted;248 otherwise, the subsequent
marriage is in itself void ab initio™ and the second marriage is
contracted during the existence of the first marriage resulting in
the crime of bigamy."0 (b) Can be attacked collaterally: A void
marriage can be attacked collaterally."1 For other purposes, such
as, but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy,
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case."2 The clause “on the basis ofafinal
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not
be obtained only for purpose of remarriage."3 Hence: (1) In De
Castro v. Assidao-De Castro,354 it was held that the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage in an
action for support. (2) In Carino v. Carino,"5 the Court ruled that
it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death
benefits. (3) In Garcia-Quiason v. Belen,336 the Court allowed a
marriage to be declared void ab initio for being bigamous in a
Petition for Letters ofAdministration filed by a compulsory heir.
HOWEVER, the Court ruled in Braza v. The City CivilRegistrar
ofHimamaylan City, Negros Occidental,"’ that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction ofentry under Rule 108 ofthe Rules of

38
B8Ninal v. Bayadog, supra.
“’Enrico v. Heirs ofSps. Mcdinaceli, 534 SCRA418 (2007).
•“Ninal v. Bayadog, supra', Carlos v. Sandoval, 574 SCRA 116(2008); Ablazav. Republic,
628 SCRA 27 (2010); and Garcia-Quiason v. Belen, 702 SCRA 707 (2013).
261Art. 39, FC.
2S2A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
“’Sec. 2(a), A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Court. Since the cause ofaction is actually to seek the declaration
ofthe second marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn
the child’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not
by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on
March 15, 2003, and Art. 17lof the Family Code, respectively,
it was held that the proper remedy is a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity ofthe marriage before the Family Court. [NOTE:
In Braza, the marriage is void. Hence, the proper remedy is
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of the void marriage.
In Olaybar, however, there is no marriage to speak of. Hence,
the proper remedy is a petition for cancellation of entry in the
civil registry under Rule 108.] (c) Can be questioned even after
death: A void marriage can be questioned even after the death
ofeither party?1 Ifthe void marriage was celebrated during the
effectivity of the FC, therefore covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, a petition for declaration ofabsolute nullity can only be filed
during the lifetime ofthe spouses. After the death of one of the
spouses, the validity of the marriage may still be questioned by
way of a collateral attack in the proceeding for the settlement
ofthe estate of the deceased spouse?’ Ifthe void marriage was
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, it can be
questioned even after the death of one of the spouses either by
way of a direct action or a collateral attack in the proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse.240 (d)
Imprescriptible: The action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity ofa marriage is imprescriptible?' Qualification:
A petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage can only be
filed during the lifetime ofthe parties, ifthe marriage is covered
byA.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (or celebrated during the effectivity of
the Family Code)?2 (e) Who can question: (1) By direct action
(or filing a petition for declaration of absolute nullity), only the
husband or the wife can file the petition if the marriage was
celebrated during the effectivity ofthe Family Code.2" However,
if the ground is bigamy, even the aggrieved spouse in the prior

Civil Law Reviewer

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Similar to Civil Law Reviewer

Similar to Civil Law Reviewer (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Civil Law Reviewer