This document summarizes a passage from Boethius' "The Consolation of Philosophy" that discusses the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human free will. It presents Boethius' view that foreknowledge seems to preclude free will by imposing necessity on future events. Lady Philosophy responds by arguing that foreknowledge does not impose necessity and does not infringe on free will. She explains that God's knowledge exists outside of time and sees all moments simultaneously. While events can be considered conditionally necessary given God's knowledge, they are not simply necessary, allowing for free will. This resolution reconciles the concepts of foreknowledge and free will.

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Sarah Lesikar
Mr. Clarkson
Great texts
Foreknowledge and Freewill
“Well, the two seem clean contrary and opposite, God’s universal foreknowledge and
freedom of the will. If God foresees all things and cannot be mistaken in any way, what
Providence has foreseen as a future event must happen. So that if from eternity
Providence foreknows not only men’s actions but also their thoughts and desires, there
will be no freedomof will. No action or desire will be able to exist other than that which
God’s infallible Providence has foreseen For if they can be changed and made different
from how they were foreseen, there will be no sure foreknowledge of the future, only an
uncertain opinion: and this I do not think this can be believed of God” (Boethius 119-
120).”
The above passage presents Boethius’ questions about the relationship between
divine foreknowledge and freewill in “The Consolation of Philosophy”. This essay will
examine this question and discuss Lady Philosophy’s response to this conundrum as
discussed in book V. Discussion must encompass many concepts, including an
examination of foreknowledge, the concept that knowledge is to be associated with the
capacity of the knower not the nature of the thing known, the impossibility of the human
mind understanding or achieving the intelligence of God, and the existence of God
outside of time.
In chapter 3 of book five, Boethius wrestles with the seemingly impossible
coexistence of divine Providence and man’s freewill. Boethius defines Providence as
God’s plan for humanity (Boethius 104). But he goes on to link Providence with God’s
knowledge. He explains, “God foresees all things and can’t be mistaken in any way,
what Providence has foreseen as a future event must happen”(Boethius 119). In this
statement we also see two of Boethius’ nonnegotiable truths about God’s knowledge;
God’s knowledge foresees all things, and God’s knowledge is always right. From these

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truths alone he forms striking conclusions. Providence is all knowing, and because God
cannot be mistaken, what Providence knows “must” come to pass. According to
Boethius, Providence’s absolute knowledge instills control over future. There seems to be
no room for freewill, only a certain future outlined by Providence. It is this idea of
certainty that becomes central to Boethius’ second issue with the balance of freewill and
foreknowledge.
Boethius’ second issue revolves around two essential claims regarding knowledge
and freewill. He explains, “if something is destined to happen in such a way that its
occurrence is not certain and necessary, who could foreknow that it is to
happen”(Boethius 121)? According to Boethius, knowledge knows what is certain, not
what is uncertain. While knowledge seems to necessitate certainty, Boethius claims that
freewill seems to necessitate uncertainty. These claims paired with the nonnegotiable
truths of God’s knowledge lead to a serious and unsatisfying conclusion. If God knows
everything and is never wrong, and knowing requires certainty, then everything is certain.
This leaves no room in any thought or action for the uncertainty that freewill requires.
How are the certainty of knowledge and the uncertainty of freewill to be reconciled with
the perfection of God’s knowledge?
Boethius outlines a common answer to this “Gordian knot’, and then proceeds to
argue that this answer fails to stand under the scrutiny of logic. He summarizes the
answer as the idea that, “it is not necessary that what is foreseen must happen, but it is
necessary that what is destined to happen must be foreseen”. In other words, Providence
does not cause events, but because they will happen God knows about them. However,
Boethius argues this places earthly events as the cause of divine knowledge. Among

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Boethius’ nonnegotiable premises is that God’s foreknowledge should not be considered
conditional or dependent. Moreover, his linking of Providence and divine knowledge
means that this solution would effectively render Providence empty. With this possible
solution eliminated there seems to be could be only one, unsatisfying, conclusion: that
“Human thoughts and actions have no freedom because [the knowledge of] the divine
mind in foreseeing all things…binds human thoughts and actions to a single manner of
occurrence”(Boethius 122).
In order to alleviate Boethius’ confusion, Lady philosophy needs to recalibrate his
understanding of foreknowledge. She questions why Boethius insists that foreknowledge
imposes necessity upon the future and infringes free will (Boethius 124). She criticizes
Boethius because his only proof for the predestination of the future is his belief that
“what is foreknown cannot but happen”(Boethius 124). Lady Philosophy disagrees with
his logic, saying “foreknowledge does not impose any predestination on things; the same
freedom of will remains”(124). There can be foreknowledge of an event, and that event
can come to pass, but the actions of the event are not made involuntary. Lady Philosophy
goes on to explain that just like knowledge of what is happening does not impose
necessity on the event, foreknowledge of what will happen does not impose necessity on
an event. Lady Philosophy uses the example of a chariot race. One can have knowledge
of what’s happening in the race, but no necessity forces the charioteers to race the way
one knows them to be racing. This returns us to Boethius’s issue. If an event isn’t
necessary, then it isn’t certain. If something isn’t certain, it can’t be known, but
Providence knows all things. All the pieces are now in place and Philosophy is finally
able to provide the keys to the puzzle.

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Lady Philosophy reveals, “Everything that is known is comprehended not
according to its own nature, but according to the ability to know of those who do the
knowing”(Boethius 126). This she demonstrates through examination of the various
capacities to know: perception, imagination, reason, and intelligence. Perception belongs
to immobile animals, imagination belongs to mobile animals with the power to choose
and avoid, reason belongs only to the human race and intelligence belongs only to
divinity. These capacities know different things, and most importantly “the superior
manner of knowledge includes the inferior”. For example, the imagination is capable of
being aware of matter but perception isn’t capable of forming universal concepts.
Additionally, each considers a form in terms of its own capabilities. For example, reason
forms the universal concept that man is a biped rational animal. While this concept can
be both imagined and perceived, reason considers it through rational comprehension
(Boethius 128).
Just as the imagination of an animal cannot understand or achieve the reason of
man, the reason of man cannot understand or achieve the intelligence of God. Reason
creates universal concepts. It is a step-by-step process of struggling make out truths.
Intelligence is that complete understanding which grasps a truth in its fullness and
simplicity. While man possesses reason, only God possesses intelligence (130). Like
imagination cannot understand reason, our reason cannot understand God’s intelligence.
He knows at a level at which we cannot know. It is the greatness of God’s intelligence
leads to the reconciliation freewill and Providence. Suddenly, the uncertain can be
known with certainty. It can be known with knowledge that is not like limited opinion,
but “the boundless immediacy of the highest form of knowing”(131).

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In order to understand the manner of God’s knowledge, Lady philosophy must
examine the nature of God, because, as it has already been explained, something is
known according to the nature of the knower. Because God is eternal, this examination
naturally leads to the consideration of the nature of eternity, because, philosophy says,
“this will make clear to us both the nature of God and his manner of knowing”(Boethius
132). As apposed to eternity, whatever exists in time is bound to an ever shifting present,
unable to “embrace the full extent of its life.” Even if something is able to exist without
beginning or end, while existing in time it is bound to the present moment, possessing
neither a past that has left nor a future yet to arrive. Eternity, however, is “the complete,
simultaneous and perfect possession of everlasting life.” There is no movement from
past to future, but an immediate, unchanging, simultaneous present. This means that the
knowledge of God “transcends all temporal change”, grasping all the events of time and
viewing them “in the immediacy of its knowing as though they [were] happening in the
present” (Boethius 134). Lady philosophy explains that foreknowledge does not see the
future so much as it sees a “never ending present” (Boethius 134). All that will be and
has been is seen through the lens of an unchanging cohesive present. This means there
can be no change of events that evades foreknowledge or changes it. It is inescapable
and complete in its power.
When Boethius presses this issue of freewill and necessity, Philosophy admits
that, strictly speaking, something can be considered necessary by God’s knowledge.
However, it is important to recognize two different kinds of necessity. There is simple
necessity, meaning a thing cannot be other than what it is. There is also conditional
necessity, meaning that when something is known it is necessary that it actually be as it is

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known. For example, if one knows a man is walking, the man must actually be walking.
A future event can be considered conditionally necessary because of God’s knowledge of
it, but it cannot be considered simply necessary. It is such simple necessity that would
impinge freewill, because then actions would be predetermined in nature. Free of simple
necessity, acts of freewill are able to exist is harmony with foreknowledge. Free will is
by nature free from all necessity, and foreknowledge remains all knowing, non-
contingent, unchanging, and certain.
Lady Philosophy’s journey through the concepts of foreknowledge, the
association of knowledge with the knower, the unreachable capacity of God’s knowledge,
and God’s existence outside of time, leads Boethius to a long awaited enlightenment
regarding the relationship between freewill and foreknowledge. Boethius’s original
conclusions about the incompatibility of these forces are finally replaced by a rewarding
reconciliation.
Citations

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Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. Victor Watts. London: Penguin Books,
1999. Print.