This presentation by Ajinkya M Tulpule, Senior Legal Counsel, Ferrero, was made during the discussion “Blockchain and Competition” held at the 129th meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 8 June 2018. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/2gx.

1. Enforcement & Compliance
with Blockchain Technology
Ajinkya M Tulpule
8 June 2018

2. Introduction
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It is not the type of evidence that is decisive. It is the solidity of the evidence that counts.
Laitenberger, December 2017
Most datasets are “incomplete or otherwise imperfect.”
DGCOMP Staff Working Paper

3. Importance of Data
• Competition matters are fact intensive and involve:
ocollecting data,
oanalyzing data, and
odrawing inferences from data.
• Right data at the right time = less resource consumption + more informed
decisions
• Vigour vs Rigour (Laitenberger)
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4. Enforcement using Blockchains

5. Key Elements
• Blockchain based data will better populate the target dataset and speed up data collection
• Granularity coupled with reliability
• Resolve information asymmetry
• A more informed, robust and accurate competition assessment
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6. Example – Merger Review
Olympic/Aegean Airlines
• Poor quality, incomplete and/or inaccurate market data available from Parties
• Ferry operators’ database are not as developed as the sophisticated systems/ databases
used by airlines
• Decision states three preconditions for data:
oAll necessary data must be available to implement the chosen empirical
methodology and the available data must be of adequate quality
odata needs to be a good indicator of the likely impact on future competition, and
osufficient variability in the data to identify references for comparison.
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7. Example – Cartel Enforcement
Retail Tobacco case (OFT)
• OFT evidence was limited to one expert report, some key correspondence, corporate leniency statements and one
witness statement
• ITL’s evidence included empirical analysis based on 36 million price data points, 12 witness statements and several
expert reports. Empirical evidence helped prove lower price increases during the cartel period than afterwards

8. Example – Monitoring Commitments
Microsoft’s failure to comply with commitments
• Did not offer a “choice screen” allowing consumers “to choose in an informed and
unbiased manner which web browser(s) they wanted to install.”
• Penalty of €561 million
• Smart contracts based on blockchain technology could have avoided the infringement
Examples from other countries that are adding binding commitments to their arsenal
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9. Where do we go next?
• More complex Theories of Harm
• Better monitoring of commitments (sg has commitments for agreements and conduct)
• Better data and more robust decisions
• Improved Toolkit for NCAs
• Cartel Detection?
• Live data feed?
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10. Compliance using Blockchains

11. Key Elements & Examples
• Compliance Programs: Governance and Control
• Live Monitoring of market shares, vertical agreements and supplier quotes
• Pricing Control across jurisdictions
• Trade Associations: Information gathering and aggregation without direct involvement
• Reduced time/costs for responding to RFIs (?)
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12. Concluding Remark

13. A Road Not Easy
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• Several hurdles to be crossed:
‒ Nascent Technology
‒ Limited real world examples
‒ Impact on procedure is unclear
‒ Reliability of Permissioned Blockchains
‒ Impact on private competition enforcement?

14. What to expect
• Harder Theories of Harm
• Better Decisions
• Faster Enforcement/Resolution
• Stronger Compliance
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