Bates Capstone

The Effect of Multilateral Aid Allocations on Government Respect for Human Rights From
1992-2001
by
Taylor Bates
Major: Political Science
Secondary Major: International and Area Studies
Evaluated by: Dr. Michael Flynn
Kansas State University
July 25, 2016
Abstract: This study examines the understudied impact of multilateral aid allocations on human
rights abuses. While most studies focus either on U.S. allocations of foreign aid or the effect of
human rights abuses on the amount of foreign aid distributed, this study emphasizes the
importance of multilateral aid, with the assumption that the motivation behind the allocations
differs from its bilateral counterparts. The timeframe of the study serves to minimize the effect
that conﬂict has on aid allocations, attempting to capture aid that is used to promote democracy,
economic stability and social welfare. Using data collect from the OECD, World Bank, Polity IV
Project, and the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Set, a statistical analysis using scatter
plots and multivariate regression output indicates that while regime type and level of economic
development positively impact human rights, funding by the OECD allocated to promote those
variables has a negative impact on both. Therefore, multilateral aid has a negative impact on
human rights overall. It should be noted that due to data collection limitations, it is unlikely that
the results from this study are generalizable.

Table of Contents
Introduction 2
Literature Review 3-7
Theory 7-14
Figure 1: Theoretical Causal Chain
Research Design 14-20
Table 1: Breakdown of Country Selection All countries, 1992-2001
Analysis 21-31
Figure 2: Total ODA Disbursements 1992-2001, World Map
Figure 3: Effect of ODAAllocations on Physical Integrity Rights 1992-2001
Figure 4: Effect of ODAAllocations on Empowerment Rights Scores 1992-2001
Figure 5: Effect of Regime Type on Physical Integrity Rights 1992-2001
Figure 6: Effect of Regime Type on Empowerment Rights 1992-2001
Figure 7: Effect of GDP Per Capita on Physical Integrity Rights 1992-2001
Figure 8: Effect of GDP per capita on Empowerment Rights 1992-2001
Figure 9: Effect of ODAAllocations on Regime Type 1992-2001
Figure 10: Effect of ODA allocations on GDP Per capita 1992-2001
Figure 11: Logged ODAAllocations and Logged GDP per capita 1992-2001
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Physical Integrity Rights
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Empowerment Rights
Conclusion 31-33
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Introduction
Capital abundant countries are often involved in international organizations such as the
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) whose mission “is to promote
policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the
world.” (OECD (c)). As a result, one of the areas that the OECD focuses on is human rights. The
organization’s commitment to improving human rights around the world is reaffirmed in several
reports published by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) including the Final Report
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance (1997),
Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and Development (2007), and Imagining More
Effective Humanitarian Aid: A Donor Perspective (2014; hereafter IMEFHA). Aside from their
OECD/DAC commitments, DAC countries, who are also signatories of the Charter of the United
Nations, are required to uphold Article 55, as stipulated in Article 56 (Charter of the United
Nations 1945; hereby CUN), which state that the United Nations will promote “human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all” (CUN art. 55 1945) and “pledges” member states to individual
and joint cooperation to carry out Article 55 (CUN art. 56, 1945). Despite these ongoing
commitments, “OECD/DAC donors have been under growing pressure…to prove and improve
their performance…they must demonstrate value for money and tangible results if they are to
maintain their share of the aid budget” (IMEFHA, 2014, 3). The increased pressure does not
seem to be providing many tangible results. As noted in The Swedish Agency for Development
Evaluation’s (SADEV) 2006 report titled Improving Democracy and Human Rights Support:
Recommendations for the Use of Indicators Based on the Case of Mozambique, with regard to
democracy and human rights, “little is known about the actual effects of this
2

support.” (Dawidson, Hulterström 2006, 8) The report goes on to list a variety of indicators that
could be used to measure the success of programs and aid, also notes that the definition and
measurement of both democracy and human rights differ throughout the international community
and indicators should have “substantial room for interpretation and formulation of
objectives” (Dawidso, Hulterström 2006, 9). Therefore, to test the effectiveness of OECD
allocations on human rights, this study examines two different relationships between OECD
allocations and human rights; a direct relationship between the two and an indirect relationship,
where OECD allocations impact regime type or economic development, which in turn affects
human rights. The results show that while democracy and economic development improve
government respect for human rights, ODA allocations have a negative impact on both.
Literature Review
Surprisingly, there is not much data on whether or not foreign aid leads to greater respect
for human rights. Most of the research on these two variables is concerned with whether or not
levels of respect for human rights affects how much development aid a country will receive.
While this is certainly a question worthy of analysis, it only represents one half of a broader
topic, which investigates the relationship between foreign aid and human rights abuses.
Additionally, these studies have only examined the effect that U.S. foreign aid has on human
rights abuses in other countries (Regan 1995, Gibler 2008, Dunning 2004) and they generally
assume that foreign aid is allocated based on a preexisting human rights score, where countries
who have higher human rights scores receive more aid as a reward for their respect and countries
with lower human rights scores are punished with lower levels of aid. Dunning’s study showed
that between “1975 to 1986, no statistically significant relationship emerges between ODA and
3

democracy”(Dunning, 2004 410). However “from 1987 to 1997, the relationship between aid
and democracy is positive and statistically significant” (Dunning, 2004, 410). Though Dunning’s
study does not actively seek to answer the question posed in this study, his evidence of a
connection between aid and democracy provides valuable evidence that supports the possibility
of an indirect effect of aid on human rights, a theory this study intends to test.
Hyun Ju Lee’s study narrowed the focus to the impact of U.S. foreign aid on human
rights abuses in the post-Cold War world while also focusing his study on countries that have a
relation to the former Soviet Union (Lee, 2011). Lee attempts to answer the same basic question:
“Does the presence of foreign aid increase human rights scores?” For his study, Lee examines
only the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and physical integrity rights from the years
1992-2009. Lee uses similar reasoning to suggest that because foreign aid increases levels of
democracy, as demonstrated by Regan, and democracy leads to a government that is more
responsive to its citizens, which in turn, creates a greater appreciation for human rights, it is
probable that human rights scores will increase as a result of foreign aid. Though Lee ultimately
found that US foreign aid had a negative impact on human rights scores in former USSR
countries, this line of causal reasoning also suggests that there could be an indirect relationship
between foreign aid and human rights.
Lee’s study introduces a second element that may be useful for explaining varying human
rights scores in relation to foreign aid, which is level of economic development. It is known that
there is a relationship between level of economic development and human rights scores (Richard
et al 2001, Gibler, 2008). Like others, Gibler’s study focuses on disbursement of US foreign aid,
not multilateral aid. Gibler suggests that the relationship between US foreign aid and human
4

rights scores is an indirect one, using opportunity cost logic; Gibler argues that because foreign
aid allocations are made public each year, countries with poor human rights “are quite aware of
the monies lost due to repressive human rights practices” (Gibler 2008, 513). This has interesting
implications for this hypothesis because it does show that it is possible that foreign aid has an
indirect effect on human rights. Like others, Gibler works with the assumption that monies are
allocated based on level of respect for human rights by the country. This once again bases levels
of aid on human rights scores instead of human rights scores being affected by levels of aid.
However, the results of his study indicate that “U.S. aid does positively affect human rights
policies abroad” (Gibler 2008, 514). Surprisingly, it is not the allocation of foreign aid that
changes human rights behavior, but the absence of foreign aid. In other words, repressive
governments that do not receive foreign aid modify their behavior after viewing the opportunity
cost of their disrespect for human rights. At the 1993 Vienna Conference, United Nations
members agreed that “there was substantial consensus [that]…democracy, development and
respect for human rights were all pronounced ‘interdependent and mutually
reinforcing’”(UNHCR 1993). This also lends support to the theory that as democracy and levels
of development increase, respect for human rights should also increase.
Richards, Gelling and Sacko’s 2001 study examined the relationship between
development assistance and human rights along with the the relationship between human rights
and other variables such as democracy and economic development and reached the following
conclusion:
“Both models fail to provide evidence that official development assistance influences
government support for human rights. The fact that we found aid to be consistently
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insignificant (over a longer time frame than most other studies) raises serious questions
about the practicality of shaping human rights policies in developing countries through
aid incentives” (Richard et. al 2001, 235).
Their study examined two schools of thought surrounding foreign aid allocations: the
dependency perspective and the neoclassical perspective, the latter of which is relevant to this
study. The neoclassical perspective suggests that “developing countries that make use of the
opportunities provided by foreign investment will quickly raise their economic
standing” (Richard et al, 2001, 221). Furthermore, the theory suggests that along with this
increase in economic standing comes liberalization, democracy, and increased government
respect for human rights. Richards et al. demonstrates the success of this theory with the
economic and political reforms experienced in Thailand beginning in the 1980’s (Richard et al.
2001, 221).
Lastly, it is important to consider the motivation behind aid allocations. There are two
competing frameworks that attempt to explain the motivation for countries to give foreign aid.
The donor-interest model, which is supported by the neoliberal school and the recipient-need
model, which is supported by idealists (Carey 2007, 452). In the donor-interest model, aid is
given on the condition that it promotes national security and strengthens alliances with other
nations. Previous research seems to confirm this theory possibly because most of the previous
research only examines aid allocations from the United States, not from a multinational
organization such as the OECD. In the recipient-need model, aid is given based on some “moral
obligation” (Carey 2007, 452) such as desire to reduce extreme poverty. It is the latter of these
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two theoretical frameworks that the OECD uses to determine aid allocations, focusing on three
motivations: humanitarian, enlightened self-interest, and solidarity (DAC 2006).
One of the reasons that the OECD may be more likely to follow the recipient-need model
is due to the diversity in foreign policy objectives of DAC members. Given the diversity, it
would be more difficult to align the national security and alliance objectives of all donor
countries in order to allocate aid. Additionally, DAC members give aid both bilaterally, outside
of the OECD, and multilaterally through the OECD. If countries were only interested in giving
aid for personal gain, they would have little incentive to reduce their control over the decision
making process by giving aid through international programs such as the OECD.
Theory
Given the previous literature, this study examines the relationship between OECD ODA
disbursements and human rights. One of the primary motivations behind studying this particular
relationship is the general lack of study on the effectiveness of multilateral aid distributions.
According to the OECD multilateral aid is defined as “core contributions from official
(government) sources to multilateral agencies where it is then used to fund the multilateral
agencies’ own programmes.” (OECD(a)). I’ve further divided the relationship between
multilateral aid and human rights into two distinct categories: a direct relationship, and an
indirect relationship. This theory assumes that ODA allocations are made based on the recipient-
need model (Carey, 2007) as well as the neoclassical model (Richard et al. 2001). Therefore,
ODA allocations are given with the needs of the recipients as the primary motivation, with goals
to reduce poverty and promote economic development. In addition to poverty reduction and
7

economic development, ODA allocations are awarded with the goal of creating “effective,
democratic and accountable governance [and] the protection of human rights” (DAC 1996, 2).
ODA and human rights: A Direct Relationship
The Deputy Secretary of State in the Carter Administration, Cyrus Vance testified before
the House Committee of Foreign Affairs stating that “foreign assistance programs are an
essential tool in promoting a broad category of internationally recognized human rights” (Regan,
1995, 615). Another way to view this relationship is using the common “carrot and stick”
analogy which states that when attempting to change the behavior of an individual or a country,
the one who seeks change has two options. They can dangle a carrot, an incentive in front of the
country that they wish to modify, or beat them with a stick, in other words punishing them with
the hopes of forcing them into cooperation. Following that logic, a target country should prefer a
reward over punishment and opt to change their human rights practices in return for a reward
over being punished. In practice this is called aid conditionality, which USAID defines as “an
exchange of policy reforms for external resources.” and is “based on the premise that financial
aid works best in a sound policy environment” (Spevacek 2010, 2). Though aid conditionality
was deemed a failure by the OECD in the mid to late 2000’s, it was a common form of economic
reform in the 80’s and 90’s (Mold, Zimmerman, 2008, 1). Given the premise regarding financial
aid, and the prevalence of aid conditionality during the time period being examined, the first
hypothesis examined will examine the direct relationship between ODA and human rights.
8

Hypothesis 1: When comparing the direct relationship between ODA and human rights
scores, ODA has a positive effect on human rights scores from 1992-2001. The first hypothesis
tested will examine the direct relationship ODA and both physical integrity and empowerment
rights scores. A test of the direct relationship of the two is the most simplistic and relies on the
idea that aid functions as a positive incentive for countries to change their human rights
practices. Testing the direct relationship between aid and human rights in this study differs from
most previous studies because the aid that is dispersed in this study is multilateral while previous
studies have generally looked at the effect of US foreign aid on human rights abuses. The major
potential difference between these two types of dispersions lies in what I believe to be the true
intent of the aid. Recalling the donor-interest model cited by Carey, I believe it is more likely that
bilateral aid allocations fall under this model, whereas ODA falls under the recipient-need model.
Since ODA is dispersed by a committee rather than a single nation, individual policy objectives
can be minimized by the presence of multiple countries. In theory, the effect of this would keep
the focus on OECD objectives such as promoting human rights, rather than extraneous policy
agendas held by individual member nations and should lead to an increased respect for human
rights.
ODA and Human Rights: An Indirect Relationship
I suspect that one of the reasons that research is focused on an indirect relationship
between aid and human rights is because political scientists recognize that human interaction is
very complex and usually cannot be explained by a simple causal chain where A leads to B and B
leads to C etc. Working under the assumption that interaction is complex, political scientists have
rightfully studied the effect of aid on a multitude of factors, particularly economic development
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and regime type. Combined with studies that focus on the effect of them on human rights, it
becomes easier to see a connection that could link them all together, resulting in foreign aid
having an indirect effect on human rights. Literature shows that autocracies generally have less
respect for human rights (Gibler 2008). One reason for this is that the position of an autocratic
leader is generally secure because they maintain power by pleasing a select few in the country
that share their interests. In return for money and political favor, these select few maintain order
throughout the country. This can be observed in Soviet Russia, Communist China, and North
Korea. As a result, autocratic leaders are generally unresponsive to a majority of their citizens.
This results in lower scores for empowerment rights such as political participation, freedom of
association, speech, and movement. These countries are also more likely to violate physical
integrity rights such as government sponsored extrajudicial killings, kidnappings and torture as a
way to discipline those who oppose with the ruling party and signal to other dissidents that
certain behavior will not be tolerated. For example news reports indicate that it is common for
troops in North Korea to shoot anyone who attempts to leave on site. (Hiatt, 2012) Furthermore,
high levels of democracy are linked to high levels of respect for human rights.
A blog post on aiddata.org provides support for a link between aid and democracy. While
previous studies yielded “mixed results”, after correcting some design flaws, studies found “a
robust positive link between aid and democracy. In other words, over the course of several
decades, foreign aid has promoted democracy” (Kersting, Kilby, 2014 ). This study provides
evidence of a link between aid and democracy but what about a link between aid and economic
development?
10

Findings surrounding the effect of aid on economic development are mixed. Therefore it
is unclear whether or not aid will produce positive economic effects. While the OECD suggests
that its “Aid For Trade” program is showing promising results, working papers published by the
International Monetary Fund conclude that “certain types of foreign aid do positively impact
[economic] development though they are unable to determine what types of aid have that
impact” (Minoiu, Sanjay 2009). While no causal mechanism has been identified, constant
reference to the mysterious relationship warrants further investigation.
As a result of the potential indirect relationships between ODA and human rights, four
more hypotheses emerge to be tested, followed by Figure 1, which visually links the hypotheses
with one another.
Hypothesis 2: When comparing the relationship between regime type and human rights
scores, democracy has a positive effect on human rights from 1992-2001. Research indicates that
as countries become more democratic, they have a greater respect for human rights (Howard,
Donnelly 1986). One of the reasons that this occurs can be explained by the selectorate theory
which is described in The Logic of Political Survival. The selectorate theory states that three
groups of people affect leaders: the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate and the winning
coalition (Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, Morrow, 2003). The nominal selectorate is every
individual in a country that has a say in choosing a leader, the real selectorate are the individuals
who choose the leader, and the winning coalition is everyone who supports the winning leader.
The selectorate theory states that the primary goal of a leader is to remain in power, by retaining
the winning coalition. In order to retain the winning coalition, leaders must respond to their
needs and in democracies, the winning coalition is much larger and more diverse than it is in an
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autocracy. According to the theory, regimes with a larger winning coalition and even larger
selectorates pose the greatest risk to a leader’s position because they have to satisfy more
individuals to remain in power (Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, Morrow, 2003). As a result,
widespread abuses of power such as the violation of human rights reduce the size of the winning
coalition, leading to greater instability for the leaders.
Another important feature of democracies with regard to human rights is free press.
When the government has little to no control of the press, their ability to control public
perception is limited. In some ways, the free press can serve as a check on the government’s
power, due to its ability to report on government affairs and hold leaders accountable. Lastly, a
strong, separate legal system is imperative to increase government respect for human rights. Like
the press, legal institutions enforce the laws of the country and ensure that the government does
not overstep its boundaries. An example of this would be the Supreme Court in the United States.
The Court routinely hears cases regarding constitutional freedoms and has the authority to curb
the government when it oversteps. A court must have the ability to check other branches of
government or the court has no real power. Legal systems like this most often accompany
democracies (Reenok, Jeffery, Radean 2012).
Hypothesis 3: When comparing the relationship between level of economic development
and human rights scores, economic development has a positive effect on human rights from
1992-2001. Economic development has several positive effects including poverty reduction,
infrastructure improvement, improved healthcare and higher education levels. As previously
stated there is very little information regarding the exact relationship between economic
12

development and human rights however there are several references to it throughout the
literature (Mold and Zimmerman 2008, OECD B, Robinson 2000)
Hypothesis 4: When comparing the relationship between ODA and regime type, ODA has
a positive effect on regime type from 1992-2001. Several studies suggest a link between aid and
democracy (Kersting, Kilby 2014, Gibler 2008,) and the development assistance committee has
listed one of its goals as the promotion of democracy (DAC 1996, 2). As a result of this expressly
stated goal, it becomes necessary to test whether or not aid has an effect on regime type. Given
the rhetoric from the DAC, previous studies, and democracy building efforts by global leaders
such as the United States in the Middle East in the 1990’s support a theory that as aid increases,
countries should be more democratic. This is because like economic development’s effect on
human rights scores, aid gives the recipient government more resources to invest in better
government institutions and reduce corruption.
Hypothesis 5: When comparing the relationship between ODA and level of economic
development, as ODA levels increase, so does the level of economic development in sample
countries from 1992-2001.
Miniou and Sanjay suggest that foreign aid does have an impact on human rights, though
further research has yet to determine what type of aid that is. Therefore it is important to test the
relationship between ODA and economic development. One possible explanation is that ODA
has the power to subsidize operating costs that recipient governments face such as costs to
upgrade and strengthen existing government infrastructure, like an independent legal system. In
Richards et al.’s Thailand example, the influx of capital for government programs freed up other
government revenue such as taxes collected for other projects that may not be possible without
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assistance from the OECD. The creation of more or better economic opportunity in a country
may also foster a desire for increased government respect for human rights. Additionally
increased economic development reduces unemployment, increases consumption, and increases
tax revenue for governments. With increased tax revenue comes better government institutions
that have the capability to hold leaders accountable for human rights violations.
Figure 1 further illustrates how hypotheses one through five are related, exemplifying
both the theoretical direct and indirect relationships between official development assistance and
human rights.
Figure 1: Theoretical Causal Mechanisms
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Research Design
In attempt to test for the presence of either a direct of indirect relationship between aid
and human rights, it is imperative to try to isolate the two variables by reducing the impact of
external circumstances that may influence levels of aid such as presence of conflict or
international foreign policy issues such as the Cold War or the global War on Terror. I felt that
the best way to do this was to examine a time period where the influence of those factors would
be minimized. To do this, I did my longitudinal study from the years 1992-2001. I selected 1992
because following the end of the Cold War, donor countries were less bound to the communist/
capitalist divide that guided politics following World War 2. The collapse of the Soviet Union
meant that focus of aid allocations was no longer on containing the opposing economic/political
view and the donors shifted their focus on regional stability and democracy development (Fleck
and Kilby, 2008, 6). I chose an end date of 2001 because evidence suggests that aid levels and
allocations were affected by the War on Terror (Fleck and Kilby 2008).
The next challenge was determining the best way to measure the variables. To measure
human rights abuses I elected to use the CIRI Human Rights Data set because it is used most
often when states are deciding how much foreign aid they want to give to a particular country.
CIRI breaks human rights down into smaller categories as well as additive indexes. I chose to
use the Physical Integrity Rights Index which is “constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial
Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 to
8” (Cingranelli, Richards, Clay 2014). I also used the Empowerment Rights Index which is1
The CIRI Human Rights Data Set codes two different Empowerment Rights Indexes. They are1
labeled Old Empowerment (retired in 2007) and New Empowerment. For this paper I chose to
use the new Empowerment Index.
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“constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of speech, Freedom of
Assembly & Association, Workers’ Rights, Electoral-Self Determination and Freedom of
Religion indicators. It ranges from 0-14”(Cingranelli, Richards, Clay 2014).
To measure regime type I decided to use the Polity IV Project. The polity score captures
this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to
+10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in
a suggested three part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" and "democracies"
(+6 to +10)” (Polity IV). The use of a spectrum of regime type instead of just designating
whether a country is democratic or autocratic allows researchers to observe any changes in
regime type better than classifying them into two groups.
To measure economic development I decided to use each country’s Gross Domestic
Product Per Capita, or GDP per capita. GDP per capita uses Gross Domestic Product, which is
“the value of all final goods and services produced in a country in one year” (World Bank) and is
divided by the country’s midyear population. This information was provided by the World Bank2
in current 2014 dollars. I then translated it into constant 2014 dollars so that the value amounts
would be consistent with the ODA amounts which are also in constant 2014 amounts.
It was my hope to use GDP per capita as a way to show economic development, and
more broadly, quality of life for citizens in each country. One of the problems with GDP however
The World Bank lists the following specific criteria on their website, which details the exact2
methods used to calculate GDP per capita “GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by
midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for
depletion and degradation of natural resources.” (World Bank)
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is that it only measures production, and while increased production may signal a growing
economy, it’s hard to use this statistic to measure the wellbeing of a society. Additionally, as
markets become more complex, some services of great importance such as “education…which
by definition have no market price” (OECD Observer 2004) cannot be accurately captured in
GDP calculations. One of the major criticisms of GDP is that it does not only capture positive
economic growth. For example, following the widespread devastation of hurricane Katrina,
production to rebuild the region increased. GDP captures this production without subtracting the
goods and services that were lost due to the hurricane, causing a temporary spike in GDP for the
region. When looking at aggregate numbers without knowledge of the natural disaster, the
increase in GDP could be confused with an expanding market. Despite its issues, GDP per capita
remains one of the best measures available for this study.
Countries selected for review must first meet the following criteria: They must be an
established country from 1992-2001, they must have human rights, Polity IV, GDP per capita,
and ODA data available for all ten years, and they must also be a non-OECD member state.
Some countries, like Afghanistan for example, seem fitting for this type of study but data was not
present for all 10 years. There are a number of reasons that this data could be missing. For
example, regime type may effect whether or not the information required for CIRI is readily
available. Autocratic regimes like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may not report
some data such as the number of people who have disappeared in a given year. Without this data
CIRI is unable to create a physical integrity index.
Another possible cause for missing data is regional conflict or regime change. When
there is conflict in the region, the regime changes leaders or regime type, records required for
17

analysis may go missing or be destroyed. It is likely that conflict is the reason that GDP per
capita is missing in countries such as Kuwait and Iraq; both countries involved in Gulf War and
its aftermath in the early 90’s. It is also possible that when agencies were collecting data during
a particular year, there was no installed government and therefore no data could be collected.
Regardless of the reasoning, countries with missing data cannot be included because without the
data it is difficult to determine whether or not the independent variables, development aid,
regime type or economic development have any effect on human rights scores. Lastly, countries
that were examined were non-OECD member states. Once a country failed to meet the
dependent variable requirements, it was removed from the study entirely and its ability to meet
the independent variable requirements was not assessed.
One of the most difficult aspects of this research was collecting information across the
different databases. Information regarding GDP, OECD allocations, regime type and human
rights scores came from four separate databases, The World Bank, OECD, the Polity IV Project,
and the CIRI Human Rights Dataset, respectively. Each database or organization sets their own
criteria for what constitutes a state, which determines whether or not data will be collected. For
example, the Polity IV project does not collect data for countries with a population under
500,000 in the most recent year (Center for Systemic Peace). As a result, a number of countries
had to be excluded because they were not listed across all the databases. Due to this, it is possible
that the results of this study may be impacted by their exclusion.
The next challenge was determining how to measure the aid each country received. Aid
allocations are rarely marked as “humanitarian aid” and packaged with a nice neat bow. Since I
decided to focus my research on the OECD, I began researching different ways in which they
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allocated aid. I settled on Official Development Assistance which is dispersed by the
Development Assistance Committee, due to its multilateral nature. ODA must be “concessional
and convey a grant element of at least 25%”. The DAC was composed of 29 members during the
time of the study and members were (and continue to be) assessed using a variety of measures
ranging from “the existence of appropriate strategies” to “the existence of a system of monitoring
and evaluation” (OECD(c)). I used the OECD’s Query Wizard for International Development
Statistics (QWIDS) to pull the ODA disbursements from all donors from the years 1992-2001 for
the predetermined countries. An OECD country is defined as any member of the OECD that
obtained its membership status before 2001. A complete list of OECD countries and countries
included in this study can be found in Table 1.
After compiling a list of countries that satisfied dependent variable criteria requirements,
I pulled the ODA disbursements for those countries and examined them. In some cases, ODA
raw data indicated that the aid values for some countries in particular years was “..”(QWIDS).
Any cases where aid data was noted with this was assigned an aid value of ‘0’. Next I removed
any countries that had negative aid values. After removing all countries that did not meet the
selection criteria for either the dependent or independent data I was left with 80 countries.
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Table 1: Breakdown of Country Selection
All countries, 1992-2001
Countries for Analysis Countries Excluded OECD Member States
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burma/Myanmar,
Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Chile, China, Republic of
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Israel,
Jordan,Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Libya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali
Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Rwanda, Singapore,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam,
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Failed to Meet Dependent Variable
Criteria:
Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola,
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Bosnia/Herzegovina,
Burundi, Cape Verde, Columbia,
Comoros, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, Djibouti,
Dominica, East Timor, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Georgia, Grenada,
Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Kosovo,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia,
Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Maldives,
Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Palau,
Qatar, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino,
Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia,
Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, South Sudan, Suriname,
Tonga, Tuvalu
Failed to meet Independent
Variable Criteria:
Belize, Bolivia Brazil, Brunei,
Cambodia Costa Rica, Cote d’ivore,
Croatia Dominican Republic,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Iran,
Iraq Jamaica, Kuwait Latvia,
Lithuania, Malaysia, Nigeria
Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Slovenia, Taiwan, Trinidad and
Tobago, United Arab Emirates.
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States
20

Analysis
I have chosen to organize the analysis section by analyzing each hypothesis individually,
in the order that they were originally presented. Next, I’ll examine the multivariate regression
data.
To begin the analysis, I created a map detailing the total amount of ODA disbursed to
each country in the study over ten years. Figure 2 has been included to provide a visual
representation of all countries that are being assessed as well as their total aid values. Darker
shades of purple indicate that a country received more total aid during the study. One important
feature of this map is that it indicates that aid is clustered in two major areas: South Asia and
Africa. While there is some aid given to South America, it should be noted that important
21
Figure 2: Total ODA Disbursements 1992-2001, World Map

developing countries such as Brazil are absent from aid allocations, and a majority of Eastern
Europe is missing, despite documented changes in aid allocations during the time of this study
(Lee 2011). The reason for this is that data for those countries that is required for this study is
either missing or incomplete. Therefore, it should be noted that the absence of those countries
may affect the outcome of this study.
I began the analysis by creating scatterplots regarding ODA and physical integrity rights,
as well as ODA and empowerment rights. I chose to use scatter plots for my analysis because
scatter plots provide a visual representation of the correlation between the two variables. In other
words, the scatter plot demonstrates the relationship between the two variables being examined.
Given my theory, I expect to find a positive relationship in all of the scatter plots meaning that as
the independent variable increases, the dependent value also increases.
22
Figure 3: Effect of ODA Allocations on Physical Integrity
Rights 1992-2001
PhysicalIntegrityRights
-2
0
2
4
6
8
ODA allocations in millions of 2014 constant dollars
0 1250 2500 3750 5000
y = -0.0012x + 4.6938
R² = 0.0809
Physical Integrity Rights

Figures 3 and 4 both indicate a negative relationship between ODA allocations and physical
integrity rights and empowerment rights respectively. ODA allocations have larger negative
impact on physical integrity rights than they do on empowerment rights as indicated by the slope
of each of the linear trend lines. For every $1 increase in aid, physical integrity rights decrease
by 1.2 points whereas for empowerment rights, every $1 increase leads to a .8 decrease in
empowerment rights. Therefore, the data provided suggests that there is a negative relationship
between ODA allocations and human rights.
Figures 5 and 6 analyze the effect of regime type on both physical integrity rights and
empowerment rights.
Both figures indicate a positive relationship between regime type and human rights
meaning that as a country becomes more democratic, the more respect it has for human rights.
23
Figure 4: Effect of ODA Allocations on Empowerment
Rights Scores 1992-2001
EmpowermentRights
0
3.5
7
10.5
14
ODA Allocations in Millions of 2014 Constant Dollars
0 1250 2500 3750 5000
y = -0.0008x + 7.7762
R² = 0.0121 Empowerment Rights

One of the reasons this may occur is that democracies are generally supported by strong judicial
institutions (Reenock, Staton, Radean, 2012). Strong legal institutions along with the free press
make it easier for countries to draw attention to, and punish public officials who commit human
rights violations. Furthermore, there is a strong connection between regime type and
empowerment rights specifically, where every one point increase on the Polity IV scale leads to a
24
Figure 5: Effect of Regime Type on Physical
Integrity Rights 1992-2001
0
2
4
6
8
Polity IV score
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
y = 0.0795x + 4.248
R² = 0.0631
Integrity
Figure 6: Effect of Regime Type on Empowerment
Rights 1992-2001
EmpowermentRights
0
3.5
7
10.5
14
Polity IV Score
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
y = 0.466x + 7.2766
R² = 0.622
Empowerment

.466 increase on the empowerment rights scale. This is to be expected since democracies place
such high value on the freedoms included in the empowerment rights index.
An analysis of the effect of economic development on human rights scores (Figures 7 and
8) also yielded results that were consistent with the hypothesis. The evidence suggests that
increase in GDP per capita leads to a marginal increase in physical integrity rights and a minimal
25
Figure 7: Effect of GDP Per Capita on Physical Integrity
Rights 1992-2001
0
2
4
6
8
GDP per capita in constant 2014 dollars
0 10000 20000 30000 40000
y = 6.226E-5x + 4.0977
R² = 0.0281
Integrity
Figure 8: Effect of GDP per capita on Empowerment
Rights 1992-2001
EmpowermentRights
0
3.5
7
10.5
14
GDP per capita in Constant 2014 dollars
0 10000 20000 30000 40000
y = 1.899E-5x + 7.4224
R² = 0.0008 Empowerment

positive impact on empowerment rights. However, given the size of the increases, 6.266E-5 and
1.899E-5, respectively, its difficult to ascertain whether or not the results are actually due to a
relationship between the two variables or if the results appeared by chance.
At first, the results of Figure 9 seems to be damaging to the hypothesis however, there is
at least one explanation that explains the trend seen in the scatter plot below. Changes in regime
type rarely, if ever occur over night. Even transitions under the best circumstances take time,
often years to fully implement. The data in this set only covers a period of 10 years. It is possible
that over a longer time period, ODA disbursements may actually foster democratization, but the
process occurs so slowly that it is not captured in such a short time period. Using this data set
and model, it appears that ODA has an extremely small, negative relationship with regime type,
however it is also possible that this result is due to the countries included in the sample. While
26
Figure 9: Effect of ODA Allocations on Regime Type
1992-2001
PolityIVscore
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
ODA allocations Millions of constant 2014 US Dollars
0 1250 2500 3750 5000
y = -0.0001x + 0.4694
R² = 0.0001
Polity IV Scores

the purpose of this paper is to look at the aggregate results, it would also be beneficial to look at
countries that receive the most ODA individually over a longer period of time and monitor
changes in regime type over time for a clearer picture of the effects of ODA on regime type.
The results of figure 10 indicate that ODA does not increase the level of economic
development. In theory, the addition of ODA should for lack of a better phrase, make the
governments’ pie bigger. In other words, additional funds give recipient countries more money to
work with, allowing better allocation of resources, thus allowing for more economic production
in a country. While the “pie” may be getting bigger, it doesn’t appear that citizens of these
countries are seeing benefits from this increase in terms of economic development.
27
Figure 10: Effect of ODA allocations on GDP Per capita
1992-2001
GDPpercapitaconstant2014dollars
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
ODA Allocations 2014 constant US dollars
0 1250 2500 3750 5000
y = -1.1986x + 3389.6
R² = 0.0117
GDP Per Capita Constant 2014 dollars

It is entirely possible that since wealth isn’t equally distributed, that the addition of aid to
these countries minimally improves the lives of the poorest citizens however that improvement is
too small to be seen in aggregate data. Lastly it is also possible that this scatterplot is skewed due
to the presence of outliers. As a result, Figure 11 examines the logged data and arrives at the
same conclusion, that ODA has a negative effect on economic development. Taking the log of
both the ODA data and the GDP per capita data reduces the effect of outliers on the scatterplot.
In figure 10, higher values skew the data set in a positive direction, indicating that negative
relationship between the two variables is smaller than it is after the effect of outliers has been
reduced.
28
Figure 11: Logged ODA Allocations and Logged GDP per
capita 1992-2001
LoggedGDPpercapita
0
1.25
2.5
3.75
5
Logged ODA Allocations
-1 0 1 2 3 4
y = -0.2745x + 3.683
R² = 0.1881 GDP per capita

Summary statistics provide further support for the preliminary evidence in the scatter
plots. Using multivariate regression I was able to control each independent variable (ODA,
regime type, and GDP per capita) and examine their individual effect on both physical integrity
rights and empowerment rights separately. With the independent variables being controlled it
allows us to examine the impact of each one individually, to help determine which one of the
independent variables has the greatest effect on the dependent variable. Tables 2 and 3 provide
the multivariate regression outputs for physical integrity rights and empowerment rights,
respectively.
Table 2: Summary
Statistics
Integrity Rights
Multiple R 0.396
R Square 0.156
Adjusted R2 0.153
Standard Error 1.886
Observations 800
Integrity
Rights
Coefﬁcients Standard
Error
t Stat P-Value Lower 95% Upper
95%
Intercept 4.511 0.091 49.335 2.62E-244 4.331 4.690
ODA -0.001 0.0001 -8.244 6.837E-16 -0.001 -0.0008
Polity IV 0.076 0.010 7.303 6.8453E-13 0.0552 0.096
GDP per
capita
4.3536E-05 1.2203E-05 3.568 0.0004 1.9581E-05 6.7491E-05
29

Upon review of the coefficients, I found that for both physical integrity rights and
empowerment rights, the Polity IV indicator, which measures regime type, had the greatest
effect. Like Figures 5 and 6, this coefficient indicates that as Polity IV scores increase, indicating
that a country is more democratic, respect for both sets of human rights also increases.
Additionally, an examination of the P-Values indicate that the observed results are significant at
the .99 confidence interval.
Contrary to my original hypothesis, ODA has a negative impact on physical integrity
rights. Furthermore, both GDP per capita and a direct relationship between ODA and human
rights have a negative, statistically significant effect on empowerment rights, indicating that
instead of improving empowerment rights scores, they actually have a very small, negative
impact on them. According to analysis the results for all three independent variables for both
Table 3: Summary
Statistics
Empowerment Rights
Multiple R 0.797
R Square 0.636
Adjusted R2 0.634
Standard Error 2.314
Observations 800
Empowerment Coefﬁcients Standard
Error
t Stat P-Value Lower 95% Upper
95%
Intercept 7.685 0.112 68.513 0 7.465 7.906
ODA -0.0008 0.0002 5.11 4.0441E-07 -0.001 -0.0005
Polity IV 0.468 0.013 36.910 1.363E-174 0.443 0.493
GDP per capita -3.81E-05 1.4972E-05 -2.545 0.011 -6.749E-05 -8.712E-06
30

physical integrity rights and empowerment rights are statistically significant at the 95%
confidence interval, indicating that the null hypotheses which state that there is no relationship
between the variables must be rejected. While the results observed are statistically significant,
the limitations for country selection make it difficult to suggest that these results are unbiased.
Conclusion
This study examined two possible relationships between foreign aid and respect for
human rights during the interwar period. Research on the topic has yielded mixed results and
several developed nations question whether or not aid they are giving has the intended effects.
The first, a direct relationship between the two, hypothesizes that the OECD’s official
development aid positively effects human rights scores. Both the scatter plots (figures 3 and 4)
and the multivariate regression analysis (Tables 2 and 3) provide evidence that contradicts this
theory, indicating that the aid has a negative impact on both physical integrity and empowerment
rights. The second relationship, an indirect one, hypothesizes that official development aid may
have an indirect effect on respect for human rights by positively impacting either regime type or
GDP per capita. Once again, this study finds evidence to contradict this theory. Figures 9-11 
suggest that aid has a negative effect on regime type and GDP per capita, even after the impact
of outliers has been reduced (Figure 11). This study found evidence that supports the theory that
GDP per capita and regime type positively effect human rights scores (Figures 5-9), though the
multivariate regression suggests that GDP per capita has a negative effect on empowerment
rights (Table 3).
The next question of interest is why does aid fail? One of the reasons that aid may fail in
this study is due to the countries selected. This study unintentionally focuses on Southeast Asia
31

and Africa, neglecting large parts of Eastern Europe and South America due to the selection
criteria. Modifying the selection criteria by including all countries may change the results of the
study. Dr. Christopher Coyne, F.A. Harper Professor of Economics at George Mason University
examines this question in his book Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Aid Fails.
Coyne asserts that several problems plague the humanitarian system including bureaucracy,
incentives, political institutions, what he coins as “‘planner’s problem’ which refers to the
inability of non market participants to access relevant knowledge on how to allocate resources in
a welfare maximizing way” (Coyne 2013 43). The planner problem feeds into another problem,
that those who carry out the humanitarian aid, such as Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO’s)
don’t have the knowledge required to meet the goals specified. Lastly, Coyne states that
“humanitarian action is often not compatible with the incentives of those in political
power” (Coyne 2013 15).
Coyne’s approach to humanitarian aid address both indirect relationships examined in
this study. If aid resources are not allocated in an efficient way, then economic growth is stifled.
One of the reasons that aid resources are not allocated in an efficient way is because the aid
giving process removes the supply and demand aspect that is prevalent in capitalist markets.
Since aid is given in such repeatedly large sums, there is a constant influx of capital into a
country regardless of how it is used. This is different from a capitalist market because in a
capitalist market, bad ideas, businesses, and products are flushed out of the system as they run
out of capital. The lack of capital scarcity prevents the efficient allocation of resources.
Furthermore, regarding regime type, if respecting human rights does not benefit the leader in
power, then they have no incentive to respect them. As previously discussed, authoritarian
32

regimes do not benefit from gaining the support of average citizens, as the elite keep them in
power. Despite the aid given to foster democratization, an authoritarian leader is not likely to
follow through with reform because such reform would oust them from power forcing them to
either hide or be killed.
Overall, this study provides discouraging results for those who advocate for increased
foreign aid as a way to promote human rights. Future studies should focus on including more
countries to ensure a representative sample of all regions and increase the length of time studied
while still controlling for factors that may influence aid allocations such as conflict.
33

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36

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