Open Source Software (OSS) and Security MIL-OSS Dr. David A. Wheeler & Jim Barkley August 5, 2010 This presentation contains the views of the author and does not indicate endorsement by IDA or MITRE, the U.S. government, or the U.S. Department of Defense.
OSS & Security Extreme claims “OSS is always more secure”
“Proprietary is always more secure” Reality: Neither OSS nor proprietary always better OSS has many  potential  security advantages
Some  specific  OSS programs  are  more secure than their competitors Evaluate your OSS options!
OSS has many advantages for security (1) Mass peer review It really happens: Linux reviewed-by, OpenBSD, Mozilla Bug Bounty, Debian-audit, ... Multi-tool review (static & dynamic) Vulnerability Discovery and Remediation, Open Source Hardening Project (DHS/Coverity/Stanford)
Fortify’s “Java Open Review Project”
Linux “sparse”
OSS has many advantages for security (2) Better meets “open design” security principle [Saltzer & Schroeder] “ the protection mechanism must not depend on attacker ignorance” Security experts perceive OSS advantage Bruce Schneier: “demand OSS for anything related to security”
Vincent Rijmen (AES): “forces people to write more clear code & adhere to standards”
Whitfield Diffie: “it’s simply unrealistic to depend on secrecy for security” Survey of 6,344 software development managers  favored OSS’ security [BZ Research]
Some OSS security statistics OSS systems scored better on security [Payne, Information Systems Journal 2002]
IE 21x more likely to get spyware than Firefox [U of Wash.]
Faster response: Firefox 37 days, Windows 134.5 days
Browser “unsafe” days in 2004: 98% Internet Explorer, 15% Mozilla/Firefox (half of Firefox’s MacOS-only)
Windows websites more vulnerable in practice 17% (GNU/Linux)  66% (Windows) Defaced 66.75% (Apache)  24.81% (IIS) Deployed websites (by name) 29.6% (GNU/Linux)  49.6% (Windows) Deployed Systems OSS Proprietary Category
DoD cyber security requires OSS “ One unexpected result was the degree to which Security depends on FOSS. Banning FOSS would remove  certain types of infrastructure  components  (e.g., OpenBSD) that currently help support network security.
...  limit  DoD  access  to—and overall expertise in—the use of powerful FOSS  analysis and detection  applications that hostile groups could use to help stage cyberattacks.
...  remove  the demonstrated  ability  of FOSS applications to be  updated rapidly in response to new  types of  cyberattack . Taken together, these factors imply that  banning FOSS would have immediate, broad, and strongly negative impacts  on the ability of many sensitive and security-focused DoD groups  to defend against cyberattacks .” -  Use of Free and Open Source Software in the US Dept. of Defense  (MITRE, sponsored by DISA), Jan. 2, 2003
Why hiding source doesn’t help security Dynamic attacks don’t need source or binary Observing output from inputs sufficient for attack Presumes you can keep source secret Attackers may extract it or legitimately get it Static attacks can use pattern-matches against binaries
Source code can be regenerated by disassemblers & decompilers sufficiently to search for vulnerabilities

Barcamp: Open Source and Security

  • 1.
    Open Source Software(OSS) and Security MIL-OSS Dr. David A. Wheeler & Jim Barkley August 5, 2010 This presentation contains the views of the author and does not indicate endorsement by IDA or MITRE, the U.S. government, or the U.S. Department of Defense.
  • 2.
    OSS & SecurityExtreme claims “OSS is always more secure”
  • 3.
    “Proprietary is alwaysmore secure” Reality: Neither OSS nor proprietary always better OSS has many potential security advantages
  • 4.
    Some specific OSS programs are more secure than their competitors Evaluate your OSS options!
  • 5.
    OSS has manyadvantages for security (1) Mass peer review It really happens: Linux reviewed-by, OpenBSD, Mozilla Bug Bounty, Debian-audit, ... Multi-tool review (static & dynamic) Vulnerability Discovery and Remediation, Open Source Hardening Project (DHS/Coverity/Stanford)
  • 6.
    Fortify’s “Java OpenReview Project”
  • 7.
  • 8.
    OSS has manyadvantages for security (2) Better meets “open design” security principle [Saltzer & Schroeder] “ the protection mechanism must not depend on attacker ignorance” Security experts perceive OSS advantage Bruce Schneier: “demand OSS for anything related to security”
  • 9.
    Vincent Rijmen (AES):“forces people to write more clear code & adhere to standards”
  • 10.
    Whitfield Diffie: “it’ssimply unrealistic to depend on secrecy for security” Survey of 6,344 software development managers favored OSS’ security [BZ Research]
  • 11.
    Some OSS securitystatistics OSS systems scored better on security [Payne, Information Systems Journal 2002]
  • 12.
    IE 21x morelikely to get spyware than Firefox [U of Wash.]
  • 13.
    Faster response: Firefox37 days, Windows 134.5 days
  • 14.
    Browser “unsafe” daysin 2004: 98% Internet Explorer, 15% Mozilla/Firefox (half of Firefox’s MacOS-only)
  • 15.
    Windows websites morevulnerable in practice 17% (GNU/Linux) 66% (Windows) Defaced 66.75% (Apache) 24.81% (IIS) Deployed websites (by name) 29.6% (GNU/Linux) 49.6% (Windows) Deployed Systems OSS Proprietary Category
  • 16.
    DoD cyber securityrequires OSS “ One unexpected result was the degree to which Security depends on FOSS. Banning FOSS would remove certain types of infrastructure components (e.g., OpenBSD) that currently help support network security.
  • 17.
    ... limit DoD access to—and overall expertise in—the use of powerful FOSS analysis and detection applications that hostile groups could use to help stage cyberattacks.
  • 18.
    ... remove the demonstrated ability of FOSS applications to be updated rapidly in response to new types of cyberattack . Taken together, these factors imply that banning FOSS would have immediate, broad, and strongly negative impacts on the ability of many sensitive and security-focused DoD groups to defend against cyberattacks .” - Use of Free and Open Source Software in the US Dept. of Defense (MITRE, sponsored by DISA), Jan. 2, 2003
  • 19.
    Why hiding sourcedoesn’t help security Dynamic attacks don’t need source or binary Observing output from inputs sufficient for attack Presumes you can keep source secret Attackers may extract it or legitimately get it Static attacks can use pattern-matches against binaries
  • 20.
    Source code canbe regenerated by disassemblers & decompilers sufficiently to search for vulnerabilities