New techniques in banking fraud are applied not only to malicious binaries, but also to how different cybercriminal groups use these binaries. Criminals always attempt to make the most of their malicious software. An example of this is the broad possibilities offered by HTML code injection. The latest injections discovered in both ZeuS and SpyEye show, once again, their continuous struggle to adapt to the changes and measures put in place to counter them. In the case of ZeuS, one of the latest strategies involves rendering useless the two-factor authentication used in numerous on-line banking operations.Similarly, in a campaign for distributing SpyEye, the group responsible for the malware injected code designed to automatically make fraudulent transfers after dynamically obtaining the destination accounts (mules) from a server. Therefore, the impact of campaigns to spread malware depends not only on the dangerousness of the malicious software itself, but also on how this software is used and the creativity of its criminal owners.

1. [ Banking Fraud Evolution ]
New techniques in real fraud cases
Jose Miguel Esparza

2. [ Agenda ]
• Banking trojans
• Tatanga: a new actor emerges
• Anatomy of an e-banking fraud incident
• The eternal game of cat and mouse
• Real e-banking fraud incidents
• Conclusions

3. [ Banking trojans ]
• …
• ZeuS
• Sinowal (Torpig)
• Gozi
• SpyEye
• Carberp
• Feodo
• …

4. [ Banking trojans ]
Source: abuse.ch

5. [ Banking trojans ]
• Binaries functionalities
– Bot
– Configuration update
– Binary update
– HTML injection
– Redirection

6. [ Banking trojans ]
• Binaries functionalities
– Screenshots
– Capture virtual keyboards
– Credentials theft
– Certificates theft
– System corruption (KillOS)

7. [ Banking trojans ]
• Binaries functionalities
– Screenshots
– Capture virtual keyboards
– Credentials theft
– Certificates theft
– System corruption (KillOS)
Information theft

8. [ Tatanga ]
• Discovered by S21sec in February 2011
• Very low detection
• MarioForever (2008) evolution?
• C++
• No packers
• Modular design
• Anti-VM, anti-debugging
• 64bits support

9. [ Tatanga ]
• Proxys to distribute binaries
• Weak encrypted communication with C&C
• HTML injection
• Man in the Browser
• Records video!!

10. [ Tatanga ]
• Proxys to distribute binaries
• Weak encrypted communication with C&C
• HTML injection
• Man in the Browser
• Records video!!

11. [ Tatanga ]
• Modules: XOR + BZIP2
– HTTPTrafficLogger
– Comm
– ModDynamicInjection
– ModEmailGrabber
– ModAVTrafficBlocker
– ModCrashGuard

12. [ Tatanga ]
• Modules: XOR + BZIP2
– ModMalwareRemover

13. [ Tatanga ]
• Modules: XOR + BZIP2
– SSL Decrypt
– FilePatcher
– IMSender
– HTTPSender
– Coredb
– SmartHTTPDoser

14. [ Tatanga ]
• Control panel
– Statistics: country, browser, OS, AV, injections,
honeypots
– Injections and drops management
– Storing dumps of banking webpages
– Classified versions of droppers and modules
– Dependencies between modules
– DDoS
– FTP iframer
– …

15. [ Tatanga ]

16. [ Tatanga ]

17. [ Tatanga ]

18. [ Tatanga ]

19. [ Tatanga ]

20. [ Tatanga ]

21. [ Tatanga ]

22. [ Tatanga ]

23. [ Tatanga ]

24. [ Anatomy of an e-fraud incident ]
• Infection
• Configuration file update/download
• Interaction with the user
Social engineering!!
HTML injection, Mit(B|M|Mo), Pharming, Phishing…
• Banking credentials theft

25. [ Anatomy of an e-fraud incident ]
• Account spying
– Manual / Automatic
– Getting balance to choose the victim
• Fraudulent transaction
– Manual Mules
– Automatic Man in the Browser (MitB)
• Money laundering

26. [ The game of cat and mouse ]
Virtual keyboard
Code card
OTP Token
SMS : mTAN
PasswordID +
2FA

27. [ The game of cat and mouse ]
Virtual keyboard
screen/video capturing…

28. [ The game of cat and mouse ]
Code card
pharming, phishing, injection…

29. [ The game of cat and mouse ]
Token mTAN
…MITM, code injection

30. [ The game of cat and mouse ]
Virtual keyboard
Code card
OTP Token
SMS : mTAN
PasswordID +
SCREEN-CAPTURING
PHISHING
MITM
CODE INJECTION
FORM GRABBING
KEYLOGGING
PHARMING

31. [ Real e-banking fraud incidents ]
• SpyEye MitB, October 2010
• Automatic fraudulent transfer
– Session of the legit user
– Balance request
– Account selection based on balance
– Getting mules from the server
– Social engineering password request
– Automatic transaction
– Modification of balance and operations

32. [ Real e-banking fraud incidents ]
• Tatanga MitB, February 2011
• Automatic fraudulent transfer using OTP
– Session of the legit user
– Balance request
– Account selection based on balance
– Getting mules from the server
– Social engineering password request
– Social engineering OTP request
– Automatic transaction
– Modification of balance and operations

33. [ Real e-banking fraud incidents ]
• Tatanga MitB, February 2011

34. [ Real e-banking fraud incidents ]
• ZeuS Man in the Mobile (MitMo)
– September 2010, Spain
– February 2011, Poland

35. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]

36. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
Each day we try to improve your security. Lately we have
noticed many mobile SIM cloning attacks that result in
fraudulent transfers. Due to the increase of these incidents,
we have implemented a new mobile identification method,
using a digital certificate. The certificate works in
smartphones and is an additional method of protection.
This application ensures that only you can access your
online account.
Please click here to start the installation

37. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
Source: http://niebezpiecznik.pl/post/zeus-straszy-polskie-banki/

38. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
Please choose your mobile manufacturer and model
and add your mobile number.
The digital certificate installation link will be sent via
SMS. Please download and install the application

39. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
Source: http://niebezpiecznik.pl/post/zeus-straszy-polskie-banki/

40. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
The certificate installation program link will be sent
by SMS. Once received, please download and
install the aplication.

41. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
Spoofed SMS Sender ID
ID Token
(remember this for later!)

42. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
Serial Number:
BF43000100230353FF7915
9EF3B3
Revocation Date:
Sep 28 08:26:26 2010 GMT
Serial Number:
61F1000100235BC2794380
405E52
Revocation Date:
Sep 28 08:26:26 2010 GMT

43. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
http://dtarasov.ru/smsmonitor_lite.html

44. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
Spoofed SMS
Sender ID
ID Token (remember
this for later! It is
important)
…sent to a UK mobile phone.

45. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
ON / OFF
SET ADMIN
ADD
REM
SET
…sent from the “bad guy” mobile phone.
SENDER ALL

46. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]

47. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]

48. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
if ($urlPathExt == ’sis') {
$oGate->addHeader('Content-Type:
application/vnd.symbian.install');
if ($data['mobile_os_type'] == OS_SYMBIAN_78)
$oGate->outputFile('./symbian/cert_78.sis.txt');
else if ($data['mobile_os_type'] ==OS_SYMBIAN_9)
$oGate->outputFile('./symbian/cert_9.sis.txt');}
if ($urlPathExt == 'cab') {
$oGate->addHeader('Content-Type: application/cab');
if ($data['mobile_os_type']==OS_WINDOWS_MOBILE_2K)
$oGateoutputFile('./wm/cert_uncompress.cab.txt');else if
($data['mobile_os_type']=OS_WINDOWS_MOBILE_GR5)
$oGate->outputFile('./wm/cert_compress.cab.txt');
if ($urlPathExt == ’cod') {$oGate->addHeader('Content-Type:
application/vnd.rim.cod');if ($data['mobile_os_type'] == OS_BLACKBERRY_41)
$oGate->outputFile('./blackberry/cert_41.cod.txt'); else if
($data['mobile_os_type'] == OS_BLACKBERRY_GR44)

49. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
Remember the token ?
mysql_unbuffered_query(“
UPDATE sms_list SET
mobile_os_version=$mobile_os_version,
is_downloaded='YES',
ts_downloaded=$ts_downloaded WHERE
token='$token'");

50. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
ZeuS infected

51. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
ZeuS infected

52. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
ZeuS infected
ID + PASSWORD

53. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
ZeuS infected
ID + PASSWORD
Mitmo Infected

54. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
ZeuS infected
ID + PASSWORD
Mitmo Infected
COMMANDS

55. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
ZeuS infected
ID + PASSWORD
Mitmo Infected
COMMANDS

56. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
ZeuS infected
ID + PASSWORD
Mitmo Infected
COMMANDS

57. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
OTP: 0023424
COMMANDS
ZeuS infected
ID + PASSWORD
Mitmo Infected

58. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
ZeuS infected
ID + PASSWORD
Mitmo Infected
GAME OVER
OTP: 0023424
COMMANDS

59. [ DEMO TIME!! ]

60. [ Conclusions ]
• Successful attacks: not binary dependent
• Social engineering
– HTML injections + extras
• Innovation
• Underground market
– User dependent
• Monitoring injections
• Sharing information

61. [ Questions? ]

62. [ Thank You!! ]
Jose Miguel Esparza
jesparza s21sec.com
@eternaltodo