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Asset and Liability ManagementFin6102Ferriter – Spring 2018.docx

The document discusses asset and liability management focusing on depository institutions, including commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions, as well as securities brokerage firms and investment banks. It highlights the evolution of products offered by financial institutions from 1950 to 2016, emphasizing increased consolidation, changes in regulations, and the impact of technology on banking. Significant trends, regulatory changes, and the financial performance of these institutions over time are also reviewed.

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Asset and Liability Management Fin6102 Ferriter – Spring 2018 Agenda Review Questions from Last Week Depository Institutions Security Brokers and Investment Firms Insurance Finance Companies Overview of Depository Institutions This chapter recognizes three major FI groups: Commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions This chapter discusses depository FIs: Size, structure, and composition Balance sheets and recent trends Regulation of depository institutions Depository institutions performance Ch 2-3 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 3 Products of U.S. FIs Comparing the products of FIs in 1950, to products of FIs in 2016: Much greater distinction between types of FIs in terms of products offered in 1950 than in 2016
Blurring of product lines and services over time and wider array of services (Refer to Tables 2-1A and 2-1B in the text) Ch 2-4 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 4 Specialness of Depository FIs Products offered on both sides of the balance sheet Offer loans Asset side Accept deposits Liabilities side Ch 2-5 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 5 Other Outputs of Depository FIs Other products and services in 1950: Payment services, savings products, fiduciary services By 2016, products and services further expanded to frequently include: Underwriting of debt and equity, insurance and risk management products Ch 2-6 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 6
Size of Depository FIs Consolidation has created some very large FIs Combined effects of disintermediation, global competition, regulatory changes, technological developments, competition across different types of FIs Ch 2-7 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 7 Largest US Depository Institutions Ch 2-8CompanyBanking AssetsHolding Company Assets ($ billions)J.P. Morgan Chase$2,134.1$2,448.0Bank of America1,629.52,152.0Wells Fargo1,629.51,720.6Citigroup1,337.51,829.4U.S. Bancorp414.0419.1PNC Financial Services Corp.343.6354.2Bank of New York Mellon343.6395.3State Street Corp.289.4294.6Capital One254.4310.6TD Bank252.4253.2 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 8 8 Commercial Banks Largest group of depository institutions Differ from other FIs in composition of assets and liabilities, as well as regulatory oversight Large and small commercial banks differ with regards to structure and composition E.g., larger banks make more commercial/industrial loans and
small banks make more real estate loans Mix of very large banks with very small banks Ch 2-9 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 9 Structure and Composition Shrinking number of banks: 14,416 commercial banks in 1985 12,744 in 1989 5,472 in 2015 Mostly the result of Mergers and Acquisitions M&A prevented prior to 1980s, 1990s Consolidation has reduced asset share of smallest banks (under $1 billion) Ch 2-10 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 10 Regulation, Functions & Structure Functions of depository institutions Regulatory sources of differences across types of depository institutions Structural changes generally resulted from changes in regulatory policy Example: Changes permitting interstate branching Riegle-Neal Act, 1994 Ch 2-11 ©McGraw-Hill Education.
11 Ch 2-12 Breakdown of Loan Portfolios ©McGraw-Hill Education. 12 12 Commercial Banks: Asset ConcentrationSize2015 AssetsPercent of Total1984 AssetsPercent of TotalAll FDIC Insured14,679.2100.02,508.9100.0$100M or Less93.56.0404.216.1$100M - $1B1,014.76.9513.920.5$1B - $10B1,336.89.1725.928.9$10B or more12,234.383.4864.834.5 Ch 2-13 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 13 13 Structure and Composition of Commercial Banks Limited powers to underwrite corporate securities have existed
only since 1987 Financial Services Modernization Act 1999 Permitted commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies to merge Ch 2-14 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 14 Composition of Commercial Banking Sector Community Banks Regional or Superregional Access to federal funds market to finance their lending and investment activities Money Center Banks Bank of New York Mellon, Deutsche Bank (Bankers Trust), Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, HSBC Bank USA Ch 2-15 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 15 Balance Sheet and Trends Key trends since 1987 Business loans have declined in importance while securities and mortgages have increased What influences these trends? Increased importance of alternative funding via commercial paper market Securitization of mortgage loans Temporary effects: credit crunch during recessions of 1989-92
and 2001-02 Ch 2-16 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 16 Commercial Banks, June 2015 Primary assets: Real Estate Loans: $3,801.9 B C&I loans: $1,737.6 B Loans to individuals: $1,301.2 B Investment security portfolio: $3,953.0 B Of which, Treasury securities: $2,015.3 B Credit/default risk is a major exposure Ch 2-17 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 17 Commercial Banks, June 2015 Continued Primary liabilities: Deposits: $11,108.4 billion Borrowings: $1,578.2 billion Other liabilities: $339.1 billion Inference:
Maturity mismatch/interest rate risk and liquidity risk are key areas of exposure Ch 2-18 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 18 Terminology Transaction accounts Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts Money Market Mutual Funds Negotiable CDs Ch 2-19 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 19 Equity Commercial bank equity capital 11.26 percent of total liabilities and equity (2015) TARP program 2008-2009 intended to encourage increase in capital Citigroup $25 B BOA $20 B Through 2015: $245 B in capital injections through TARP Ch 2-20 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 20
Off-Balance-Sheet Activities Heightened importance of off-balance-sheet items OBS assets, OBS liabilities Earnings and regulatory incentives Risk control and risk producing Role of mortgage backed securities “Toxic” assets Expansion of oversight to unregulated OTC derivative securities Ch 2-21 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 21 Major OBS Activities Issuing guarantees E.g., letters of credit Typically contain an insurance underwriting element Loan commitments Derivative transactions Futures Forwards Options Swaps Ch 2-22 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 22 Other Fee-Generating Activities
Trust services Correspondent banking Services generally sold as a package Types of services offered: Check clearing and collection Foreign exchange trading Hedging Participation in large loan and security issuances Ch 2-23 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 23 Key Regulatory Agencies FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) Role in preventing contagious “runs” or panics OCC: Primary function is to charter (and close) national banks FRS: Monetary policy, lender of last resort National banks are automatically members of the FRS; state- chartered banks can elect to become members State bank regulators Dual Banking System: Coexistence of national and state- chartered banks Ch 2-24 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 24 Ch 2-25 Bank Regulators
©McGraw-Hill Education. 25 25 Legislation, 1927-1956 1927 McFadden Act: Controls branching of national banks 1933 Glass-Steagall: Separates securities and banking activities, established FDIC, prohibited interest on demand deposits 1956 Bank Holding Company Act and subsequent amendments specifies permissible activities and regulation by FRS of BHCs Ch 2-26 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 26 Legislation, 1970-1978 1970 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act: Extension to one-bank holding companies 1978 International Banking Act: Regulated foreign bank branches and agencies in US Ch 2-27 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 27 Legislation, 1980 - 1982 1980 DIDMCA and 1982 Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act (DIA) Mainly deregulation acts Phased out Regulation Q Authorized NOW accounts nationwide Increased deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000 Reaffirmed limitations on bank powers to underwrite and distribute insurance products Ch 2-28 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 28 Legislation, 1987-1989 1987 Competitive Equality in Banking Act (CEBA) Redefined bank to limit growth of nonbank banks Focus on recapitalization of FSLIC 1989 FIRREA Imposed restrictions on investment activities Replaced FSLIC with FDIC-SAIF Replaced FHLB with Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) Created Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) Ch 2-29 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 29 Legislation, 1991 1991 FDIC Improvement Act Introduced prompt corrective action (PCA) Risk-based deposit insurance premiums Limited “too big to fail” bailouts by federal regulators
Extended federal regulation over foreign bank branches and agencies in FBSEA Ch 2-30 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 30 Legislation, 1994 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act Permits BHCs to acquire banks in other states Invalidates some restrictive state laws Permits BHCs to convert out-of-state subsidiary banks to branches of single interstate bank Newly chartered branches permitted interstate if allowed by state law Ch 2-31 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 31 Legislation, 1999 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act Allowed banks, insurance companies, and securities firms to enter each others’ business areas Provided for state regulation of insurance Streamlined regulation of BHCs Prohibited FDIC assistance to affiliates and subsidiaries of banks and savings institutions Provided for national treatment of foreign banks Ch 2-32 ©McGraw-Hill Education.
32 Legislation, 2010 2010 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Financial Services Oversight Council created Government gained power to break up FIs that pose a systemic risk to the system Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created GAO to audit Federal Reserve activities Nonbinding proxy vote on executive pay Trading via clearinghouse for some derivatives Ch 2-33 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 33 Industry Performance Economic expansion and falling interest rates through 1990s Brief downturn in early 2000s followed by strong performance improvements Record earnings $106.3 billion 2003 Performance remained stable through mid 2000s as interest rates rose Late 2000s: Strongest recession since Great Depression Ch 2-34 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 34
Savings Institutions Comprised of: Savings Associations (SAs) Savings Banks (SBs) Effects of changes in Federal Reserve’s policy of interest rate targeting combined with Regulation Q and disintermediation Effects of moral hazard and regulator forbearance Qualified thrift lender (QTL) test Ch 2-35 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 35 Savings Institutions: Recent Trends Industry is smaller overall Intense competition from other FIs E.g., mortgages Ch 2-36 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 36 Primary Regulators Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) FDIC-DIF Fund FDIC oversaw and managed Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) SAIF and Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) merged in January 2007 to form DIF Same regulatory structure applied to commercial banks Ch 2-37
©McGraw-Hill Education. 37 Credit Unions Nonprofit DIs owned by member-depositors with a common bond Specialize in small consumer loans Exempt from taxes and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Expansion of services offered in order to compete with other FIs Claim of unfair advantage of CUs over small commercial banks Ch 2-38 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 38 Ch 2-39 Composition of Credit Union Deposits, 2015 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 39 39 Global Issues Spread of US financial crisis to other countries Many European banks saved from bankruptcy through support
of governments and central banks Target interest rates at or below 1 percent Links to macroeconomic performance Ch 2-40 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 40 Financial Statement Analysis Return on equity (ROE): measures overall profitability per dollar of equity Return on assets (ROA): measures profit generated relative to assets Equity multiplier (EM): measures extent to which assets are funded with equity relative to debt Profit margin (PM): measures ability to pay expenses and generate net income Asset utilization (AU): measures amount of interest and noninterest income generated per dollar of total assets Ch 2-41 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 41 CAMELS Ratings Composite 1: Institutions are generally sound in every respect Composite 2: Institutions are fundamentally sound, but may reflect modest weaknesses Composite 3: Institutions exhibit financial, operational, or compliance weaknesses Composite 4: Immoderate volume of serious financial weaknesses
Composite 5: Extremely high immediate or near term probability of failure ©McGraw-Hill Education. DIs and Regulators Ch 2-43 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 43 Technology in Commercial Banking Wholesale banking services E.g., account reconciliation, electronic funds transfer, electronic billing, cloud computing, etc. Retail banking services E.g., ATMs, smart cards, online/mobile banking, tablet banking, loyalty programs, etc. Advanced technology requirements Ch 2-44 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 44
Asset and Liability Management Fin6102 Ferriter – Spring 2018 Overview This chapter discusses securities brokerage firms and investment banks Activities of securities firms and investment banks Size, structure, and composition Balance sheets and recent trends Regulation of securities firms and investment banks Global issues Ch 4-2 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 2 Securities Firms and Investment Banks Securities firms Specialize in the purchase, sale, and brokerage of existing securities Retail Investment banks Specialize in originating, underwriting and distributing issues of new securities Advising on M&As and restructuring Commercial Ch 4-3 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 3
Securities Firms and Investment Banks Continued Growth in domestic M&A: Less than $200 billion in 1990 $1.83 trillion in 2000 In US: bottomed out at $458 billion in 2002 ($1.2 trillion worldwide) Topped $1.7 trillion 2007 ($4.5 trillion worldwide) Effects of financial crisis: fell to $687 billion in 2010 ($1.8 trillion worldwide) Worst financial crisis since 1930s, but M&A activity still greater than early 2000s Ch 4-4 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 4 Ch 4-5 Mergers and Acquisitions, 1990-2015 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 5 5 Structural Changes in Recent Years Acquisition of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan Chase Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America Only two remaining major firms:
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley Converted to commercial bank holding companies in 2008 Ch 4-6 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 6 Largest M&A Transactions ©McGraw-Hill Education. 7 7 Size, Structure and Composition Dramatic increase in number of firms from 1980 to 1987 Decline of 37% in the number of firms following the 1987 crash, to year 2006 Concentration of business among the largest firms Ch 4-8 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 8 Size, Structure and Composition Continued Many recent interindustry mergers (i.e., insurance companies and investment banks) Role of Financial Services Modernization Act, 1999 Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs,
and Morgan Stanley gone by end of 2008 Ch 4-9 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 9 Types and Relative Sizes of Firms National full-line firms are largest Service retail and corporate clients Three categories: commercial bank holding companies, national full-line firms, and large investment banks BOA (via acquisition of Merrill Lynch); Morgan Stanley National full-line firms specializing in corporate finance are second in size Goldman Sachs, Salomon Brothers/Smith Barney (Citigroup) Ch 4-10 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 10 Remainder of industry: Regional securities firms (subdivided into large, medium, and small) Specialized discount brokers Electronic trading firms Venture capital firms Other firms E.g., research boutiques, floor specialists, etc. Ch 4-11 Types and Relative Sizes of Firms Continued
©McGraw-Hill Education. 11 Ch 4-12 Top BHCs, 2014 (by brokerage fee income) ©McGraw-Hill Education. 12 12 Key Activities Investment banking Activities related to underwriting and distributing new (IPOs) and secondary (seasoned) issues of debt and equity Public and private offerings Venture Capital Market making Involves creating a secondary market Increasing importance of online trading Technology risk Ch 4-13 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 13 Key Activities (Continued)
Trading Position trading, pure arbitrage, risk arbitrage, program trading, etc. Investing Cash management Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) Back-office and service functions Ch 4-14 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 14 Recent Trends Decline in trading volume and brokerage commissions Particularly since crash of 1987, although some recovery since 1992 Record volumes 1995-2000 Resurgence in market values and commissions during mid-2000s New market value lows in 2008-2009 Commission income also declined Ch 4-15 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 15 Recent Trends (Continued) Pretax net income over $9 billion per year between 1996 and 2000 Pretax profits soared to $31.6 billion in 2000 Curtailed by economic slowdown and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks Worries over securities law violations and loss of investor
confidence E.g., Enron, Merck, WorldCom, etc. Financial crisis, 2008 Profits recovered, 2009 Ch 4-16 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 16 Ch 4-17 Securities Industry Pretax Profits, 1990-2014 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 17 17 Balance Sheet Key assets: Reverse repurchase agreements Receivables from other broker-dealers Long positions in securities and commodities Subject to high levels of market and interest rate risk Ch 4-18 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 18
Balance Sheet Continued Key liabilities: Repurchase agreements are major source of funds Payables to customers Payables to other broker-dealers Securities and commodities sold short Capital levels much lower than in depository institutions Ch 4-19 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 19 Regulation Primary regulator is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Reaffirmed by National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996 Prior to NSMIA, regulated by SEC and each state in which the firm operated Ch 4-20 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 20 Regulation Continued Early 2000s saw erosion of SEC dominance Increased vigilance by state attorney generals Criminal cases brought mainly by states against securities law
violators New York State vs. Merrill Lynch Spring 2003, $1.4 billion in penalties over investor abuses New rules brought by SEC for greater disclosure by analysts of potential conflicts of interest Ch 4-21 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 21 Regulation Concluded Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Handles day-to-day regulation Independent, not-for-profit Authorized by Congress Writes and enforces rules governing security firm activities Enhance transparency in the market Dark pools Ch 4-22 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 22 Extension of Oversight Additional oversight from US Congress Hearings focused on role of investment banks in the financial crisis Goldman Sachs bundling of toxic assets Ch 4-23 ©McGraw-Hill Education.
23 Extension of Oversight Continued 2010 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Financial Services Oversight Council New authority for Federal Reserve to supervise systemically important firms Registration limits for advisors changed Regulation of securitization markets; stronger regulation of credit agencies Authority for government to resolve nonbank FIs Ch 4-24 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 24 Extension of Oversight Concluded Kenneth Feinberg (“pay czar”) given voice as to executive compensation packages Ch 4-25 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 25 Investor Protection and Other Monitoring Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) Protection level of $500,000
October 2003 implementation of provisions of Patriot Act to combat money laundering Scrutiny of individual identities and affiliations with terrorists Ch 4-26 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 26 Global Issues Global nature of securities firms Competition between US and European firms Foreign investors’ transactions in US securities and US investors’ transactions in foreign securities exchanges increased Global concern about capital, liquidity, and leverage following the financial crisis Implications for global competitiveness Strategic alliances Exit from foreign markets Ch 4-27 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 27 Pertinent Websites Federal Reserve NYSE SEC Securities Industry Association SIPC FINRA Ch 4-28
www.federalreserve.gov www.nyse.com www.sec.gov www.sifma.com www.sipc.org www.finra.org ©McGraw-Hill Education. 28 FI 201 Investment Banking * The Role of Investment BankersMiddleman who brings together investors and firms (and governments) issuing new securities. Initial Public Offering (IPO) – First sale of common stock to the general public. *
The Role of Investment BankersUnderwriting – Purchase of an issue of new securities for subsequent sale by investment bankers; the guaranteeing of the sale of a new issue of securities.Originating House – Investment banker who makes an agreement to sell a new issue and forms a syndicate to sell securities. * The Role of Investment Bankers Syndicate – Selling group formed to market a new issue of securities Best efforts agreement – Contract with an investment banker for the sale of securities in which the investment banker does not guarantee the sale but does agree to make the best effort to sell the securities * The pricing of new issues is crucial.If the initial offer price is too high, the syndicate will be unable sell the securities.When this occurs the investment banker has two choices: 1) to maintain the offer price and to hold the securities in inventory until they are sold, or 2) to let the market find a lower price level that
will induce investors to purchase the securities.Neither choice benefits the investment bankers Pricing a New Issue * Marketing New SecuritiesPreliminary prospectus (red herring) – Initial document detailing the financial condition of a firm that must be filed with the SEC to register a new issue of securities.Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) – Government agency that enforces the federal securities laws.Registration – The process of filing information with the SEC concerning a proposed sale of securities to the general public. * A nonpublic sale of securities to a financial institution such as an endowment fund, mutual fund or pension fund. Private Placements *
Regulation- Full Disclosure Laws Securities Act of 1933 – covers new issue of securities Securities Exchange Act of 1934 – devoted to trading in existing securities 10-K Report – Required annual report filed with the SEC by publicly-held firms. Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) – Federal agency that insures investors against failures by brokerage firms – limited to $500,000 per customer. * The independence of auditors and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Corporate responsibility and financial disclosure Conflict of interest and corporate fraud and accountability Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 * Asset and Liability Management Fin6102 Ferriter – Spring 2018 Overview This chapter discusses insurance companies Two major groups:
Life Property-casualty Financial crisis and insurance companies Size, structure, and composition Balance sheets and recent trends Regulation of insurance companies Global competition and trends Ch 6-2 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 2 Insurance and Financial Crisis Insurance companies as investors in securities Subprime mortgage pools fell in value Credit default swaps (CDS) fell AIG was a major writer of CDS securities Potential impact on other FIs that bought CDS from AIG used to justify the bailout Increased risk exposure to banks, investment banks, and insurers Ch 6-3 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 3 Insurance Companies Differences in services provided by: Life insurance companies Property and casualty insurance companies Ch 6-4 ©McGraw-Hill Education.
4 Size, Structure, and Composition Size, structure, and composition of the insurance industry: In 1988: 2,300 life insurance companies with aggregate assets of $1.1 trillion In 2010s: 830 life insurance companies with aggregate assets of $6.5 trillion in 2015 Ch 6-5 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 5 Size, Structure, and Composition Continued 4 largest life insurers wrote 33% of new business in 2014 Most policies sold through commercial banks 18% of all fixed annuities were sold by commercial banks in 2015 Ch 6-6 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 6 Life Insurance Companies Significant merger activity in life insurance industry Not to same extent witnessed in banking E.g., Anthem and Signa, MetLife and American Life Insurance, etc.
Competition from within industry and from other FIs Increased conversion from mutual to stockholder controlled companies Ch 6-7 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 7 Mutual vs. Stock Insurance Companies Ch 6-8 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 8 Biggest Life Insurers ©McGraw-Hill Education. 9 9 Insurance Issues Adverse selection Insured have higher risk than general population E.g., Matt has never had life insurance, but decides to buy some once he finds out he has a terminal illness Alleviated by grouping of policyholders into similar risk pools Problem for both life insurers and property-casualty insurers
Ch 6-10 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 10 Types of Life Insurance Life insurance products: Ordinary life Term life, whole life, endowment life Variable life, universal life and variable universal life Group life Industrial life Credit life Ch 6-11 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 11 Ch 6-12 Distribution of Premiums, 2015 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 12 12 Other Life Insurer Activities Annuities Reverse of life insurance activities
Topped $325.2 billion in 2014 Private pension plans Insurers compete with other financial service companies In 2015, life insurers managed over $2.7 trillion (~40% of all private pension plans) Accident and health insurance Protects against morbidity (i.e., ill health) risk Over 168.7 billion in premiums in 2014 Ch 6-13 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 13 Balance Sheet Assets Need to generate competitive returns on savings components of life insurance policies Focus investment on long-term assets Bonds, equities, government securities Policy loans Liabilities Policy reserves to meet policyholders’ claims Separate account business represented 38.2% of total liabilities and capital in 2015 Ch 6-14 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 14 Recent Trends Impact of financial crisis
Drop in value of securities Capital losses from bonds and stocks exceeded $35 billion Historically low short-term interest rates Adverse impact on ability to lower rates on new policies Incentive to surrender existing policies Dwindling reserves led to Treasury Department extending bailout funds Late 2009 showed improvement Ch 6-15 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 15 Regulation McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 Confirms primacy of state over federal regulation State insurance commissions Coordinated examination system developed by NAIC Federal Reserve Supervises ~1/3 of U.S. insurance industry assets States promote life insurance guarantee funds Ch 6-16 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 16 Recent Regulatory Issues Fear of systemic risk posed by AIG 2009: Proposals to create optional federal life insurance charter Proponents of federal charter argued inconsistent regulation and barriers to innovation inherent in current system 2010: Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
established the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) Ch 6-17 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 17 Web Resources For more detailed information on insurance regulation, visit: NAIC www.naic.org Ch 6-18 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 18 Property-Casualty Insurance Size and Structure Currently about 2,640 companies sell property-casualty insurance Highly concentrated Top 10 firms have 50% of market in terms of premiums written Top 200 firms write over 95% of total premiums M&A activity is increasing concentration Ch 6-19 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 19 Types of P&C Products
Fire insurance Homeowners multiple-peril insurance Commercial multiple-peril insurance Automobile liability and physical damage insurance Liability insurance (other than automobile) Ch 6-20 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 20 Premium Allocation Changing composition of net premiums written, 2014 versus 1960: Fire: 2.3% vs. 16.6% in 1960 Homeowners MP: 15.2% vs. 5.2% in 1960 Commercial MP: 6.9% vs. 0.4% in 1960 Auto L&PD: 38.6% vs. 43% in 1960 Other liability: 12.7% vs. 6.6% in 1960 Ch 6-21 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 21 P&C Balance Sheet Similar to life insurance companies; long-term securities Unlike life insurance companies; requirement for liquid assets Major liabilities: Loss reserves Loss adjustment expenses Unearned premiums Ch 6-22
©McGraw-Hill Education. 22 Loss Risk Underwriting risk may result from: Unexpected increases in loss rates Unexpected increases in expenses Unexpected decreases in investment yields or returns Property versus liability Losses from liability insurance less predictable Example: Claims due to asbestos damage to workers’ health Ch 6-23 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 23 Loss Risk Continued Severity versus frequency Loss rates more predictable on low-severity, high-frequency lines (such as fire, auto, and homeowners) than on high- severity, low-frequency lines (such as earthquake, hurricane, and financial guaranty) Higher uncertainty forces PC insurers to invest in more short- term assets and hold larger capital and reserves than life insurers Ch 6-24 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 24
Insurance Risks Post 9/11 Crisis generated by terrorist attacks forced creation of federal terrorism insurance program in 2002 Federal government provides backstop coverage under Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) Caps losses for insurance companies Ch 6-25 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 25 Long Tail Versus Short Tail Long-tail risk exposure Arises where loss occurs during coverage period but claim is not made until many years later Examples: Asbestos cases and Dalkon shield case Efforts to contain long-tail risks within subsidiaries Example: Halliburton Ch 6-26 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 26 Insurance Costs: Social Inflation Product inflation versus social inflation Unexpected inflation may be systematic or line-specific Social inflation: Unexpected changes in awards by juries Reinsurance Approximately 75 percent of reinsurance by US firms is written by non-US firms, such as Munich Re Ch 6-27
©McGraw-Hill Education. 27 Underwriting Profitability Loss ratios have generally increased Expense ratios have generally decreased Attributed to change in distribution methods Insurers have begun selling directly to consumers through their own brokers rather than independent brokers Combined ratio: Includes both loss and expense experience If greater than 100, premiums are insufficient to cover losses and expenses Ch 6-28 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 28 Investment Yield / Return Risk Operating ratio = combined ratio after dividends minus investment yield Importance of investment income: Causes PC managers to place importance on measuring and managing credit and interest rate risk Ch 6-29 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 29
P&C: Recent Trends Several catastrophes over 1985 - 2015 Hurricane Hugo 1989, San Francisco Earthquake 1991, Oakland fires 1991, Hurricane Andrew 1991 2004 hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan, Jeanne) occurred in rapid succession and generated claims comparable to Andrew Hurricane Katrina, 2005 September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks created an insurance crisis (and heightened demand) Hurricane Sandy, 2011 Potential for crowding out market solutions (catastrophe bonds) via government actions Ch 6-30 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 30 PC Regulation PC insurers chartered and regulated by state commissions State guaranty funds National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) provides various services to state commissions Includes Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) Many lines face rate regulation Criticism over Katrina-related claims Ch 6-31 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 31 Global Issues Insurance industry becoming increasingly global
Worldwide, 2011 was a bad year for both life and PC insurers Japan’s earthquake and tsunami Earthquakes in New Zealand Floods in Thailand Severe tornadoes in US Ch 6-32 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 32 Pertinent Websites A.M. Best Federal Reserve Insurance Information Institute Insurance Services Offices National Association of Insurance Commissioners Ch 6-33 www.ambest.com www.federalreserve.gov www.iii.org www.iso.com www.naic.org ©McGraw-Hill Education. 33
Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Framework Marc Labonte Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy August 17, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44918 Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service Summary The financial regulatory system has been described as fragmented, with multiple overlapping regulators and a dual state-federal regulatory system. The system evolved piecemeal, punctuated
by major changes in response to various historical financial crises. The most recent financial crisis also resulted in changes to the regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA; P.L. 110-289). To address the fragmented nature of the system, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a council of regulators and experts chaired by the Treasury Secretary. At the federal level, regulators can be clustered in the following areas: —Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve for banks; and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) for credit unions; —Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); -sponsored enterprise (GSE) regulators—Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), created by HERA, and Farm Credit
Administration (FCA); and —Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created by the Dodd-Frank Act. These regulators regulate financial institutions, markets, and products using licensing, registration, rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement, and resolution powers. Other entities that play a role in financial regulation are interagency bodies, state regulators, and international regulatory fora. Notably, federal regulators generally play a secondary role in insurance markets. Financial regulation aims to achieve diverse goals, which vary from regulator to regulator: Policy debate revolves around the tradeoffs between these
various goals. Different types of regulation—prudential (safety and soundness), disclosure, standard setting, competition, and price and rate regulations—are used to achieve these goals. Many observers believe that the structure of the regulatory system influences regulatory outcomes. For that reason, there is ongoing congressional debate about the best way to structure the regulatory system. As background for that debate, this report provides an overview of the U.S. financial regulatory framework. It briefly describes each of the federal financial regulators and the types of institutions they supervise. It also discusses the other entities that play a role in financial regulation. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service Contents Introduction
............................................................................................... ...................................... 1 The Financial System ............................................................................................... ....................... 1 The Role of Financial Regulators ............................................................................................... ..... 2 Regulatory Powers ............................................................................................... ..................... 3 Goals of Regulation ............................................................................................... .................... 4 Types of Regulation ............................................................................................... ................... 5 Regulated Entities ............................................................................................... ...................... 7 The Federal Financial Regulators ............................................................................................... ..... 7 Depository Institution Regulators ............................................................................................ 11 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ........................................................................ 14 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ............................................................................ 14 The Federal Reserve
............................................................................................... .......... 15 National Credit Union Administration .............................................................................. 15 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ................................................................................... 15 Securities Regulation ............................................................................................... ............... 16 Securities and Exchange Commission .............................................................................. 16 Commodity Futures Trading Commission ........................................................................ 19 Standard-Setting Bodies and Self-Regulatory Organizations ........................................... 20 Regulation of Government-Sponsored Enterprises ................................................................. 21 Federal Housing Finance Agency ..................................................................................... 21 Farm Credit Administration .............................................................................................. 22 Regulatory Umbrella Groups ............................................................................................... ... 22 Financial Stability Oversight Council ............................................................................... 22 Federal Financial Institution Examinations Council ......................................................... 23 Nonfederal Financial Regulation ...............................................................................................
.... 24 Insurance ............................................................................................... .................................. 24 Other State Regulation ............................................................................................... ............. 25 International Standards and Regulation .................................................................................. 26 Figures Figure 1. Regulatory Jurisdiction by Agency and Type of Regulation .......................................... 10 Figure 2. Stylized Example of a Financial Holding Company ....................................................... 11 Figure 3. Jurisdiction Among Depository Regulators ................................................................... 13 Figure 4. International Financial Architecture ............................................................................... 27 Figure A-1. Changes to Consumer Protection Authority in the Dodd-Frank Act .......................... 28 Figure A-2. Changes to the Oversight of Thrifts in the Dodd- Frank Act ...................................... 29 Figure A-3. Changes to the Oversight of Housing Finance in HERA ........................................... 29
Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service Tables Table 1. Federal Financial Regulators and Who They Supervise .................................................... 8 Table B-1. CRS Contact Information ............................................................................................ 30 Appendixes Appendix A. Changes to Regulatory Structure Since 2008 ........................................................... 28 Appendix B. Experts List ............................................................................................... ............... 30 Contacts Author Contact Information ............................................................................................... ........... 30
Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 1 Introduction Federal financial regulation encompasses vastly diverse markets, participants, and regulators. As a result, regulators’ goals, powers, and methods differ between regulators and sometimes within each regulator’s jurisdiction. This report provides background on the financial regulatory structure in order to help Congress evaluate specific policy proposals to change financial regulation. Historically, financial regulation in the United States has coevolved with a changing financial system, in which major changes are made in response to crises. For example, in response to the financial turmoil beginning in 2007, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) was the last act to make significant changes to the financial regulatory structure (see Appendix A). 1
Congress continues to debate proposals to modify parts of the regulatory system established by the Dodd-Frank Act. In the 115 th Congress, proposals to change the regulatory structure include the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 (H.R. 10), which would modify and rename the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO), change the relationship between the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the regulators, eliminate the Office of Financial Research (OFR, which supports FSOC), and make other changes to how financial regulators promulgate rules and are funded. 2 This report attempts to set out the basic frameworks and principles underlying U.S. financial regulation and to give some historical context for the development of that system. The first section briefly discusses the various modes of financial regulation. The next section identifies the major federal regulators and the types of institutions they
supervise (see Table 1). It then provides a brief overview of each federal financial regulatory agency. Finally, the report discusses other entities that play a role in financial regulation—interagency bodies, state regulators, and international standards. For information on how the regulators are structured and funded, see CRS Report R43391, Independence of Federal Financial Regulators: Structure, Funding, and Other Issues, by Henry B. Hogue, Marc Labonte, and Baird Webel. The Financial System The financial system matches the available funds of savers and investors with borrowers and others seeking to raise funds in exchange for future payouts. Financial firms link individual savers and borrowers together. Financial firms can operate as intermediaries that issue obligations to savers and use those funds to make loans or investments for the firm’s profits. Financial firms can also operate as agents playing a custodial role, investing the funds of savers on their behalf in segregated accounts. The products, instruments, and markets used to facilitate this matching are myriad, and they are controlled and overseen by a complex
system of regulators. To help understand how the financial regulators have been organized, financial activities can be separated into distinct markets: 3 1 For more information, see CRS Report R41350, The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Background and Summary, coordinated by Baird Webel. 2 For more information, see CRS Report R44839, The Financial CHOICE Act in the 115th Congress: Selected Policy Issues, by Marc Labonte et al. 3 A multitude of diverse financial services are either directly provided or supported through guarantees by state or federal government. Examples include flood insurance (through the Federal Emergency Management Agency), (continued...) http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/bdquery/z?d115:H.R.10: Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 2
—accepting deposits and making loans; —collecting premiums from and making payouts to policyholders triggered by a predetermined event; —issuing contracts that pledge to make payments from the issuer to the holder, and trading those contracts on markets. Contracts take the form of debt (a borrower and creditor relationship) and equity (an ownership relationship). One special class of securities is derivatives, which are financial contracts whose value is based on an underlying commodity, financial indicator, or financial instrument; and —the “plumbing” of the financial system, such as trade data dissemination, payment, clearing, and settlement systems, that underlies transactions. A distinction can be made between formal and functional definitions of these activities. Formal activities are those, as defined by regulation, exclusively permissible for entities based on their
charter or license. By contrast, functional definitions acknowledge that from an economic perspective, activities performed by types of different entities can be quite similar. This tension between formal and functional activities is one reason why the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and others, has called the U.S. regulatory system fragmented, with gaps in authority, overlapping authority, and duplicative authority. 4 For example, “shadow banking” refers to activities, such as lending and deposit taking, that are economically similar to those performed by formal banks, but occur in the securities markets. The activities described above are functional definitions. However, because this report focuses on regulators, it mostly concentrates on formal definitions. The Role of Financial Regulators Financial regulation has evolved over time, with new authority usually added in response to failures or breakdowns in financial markets and authority trimmed back during financial booms. Because of this piecemeal evolution, powers, goals, tools, and approaches vary from market to
market. Nevertheless, there are some common overarching themes across markets and regulators, which are highlighted in this section. The following provides a brief overview of what financial regulators do, specifically answering four questions: 1. What powers do regulators have? 2. What policy goals are regulators trying to accomplish? 3. Through what means are those goals accomplished? 4. Who or what is being regulated? (...continued) mortgage insurance (through the Federal Housing Administration and the Department of Veterans Affairs), student loans (through the Department of Education), trade financing (through the Export-Import Bank), and wholesale payment systems (through the Federal Reserve). This report focuses only on the regulation of private financial activities. 4 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Financial Regulation, GAO-16-175, February 2016, at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675400.pdf. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 3 Regulatory Powers Regulators implement policy using their powers, which vary by agency. Powers can be grouped into a few broad categories: understanding the regulatory system is that most activities cannot be undertaken unless a firm, individual, or market has received the proper credentials from the appropriate state or federal regulator. Each type of charter, license, or registration granted by the respective regulator governs the sets of financial activities that the holder is permitted to engage in. For example, a firm cannot accept federally insured deposits unless it is chartered as a bank, thrift, or credit union by a depository
institution regulator. Likewise, an individual generally cannot buy and sell securities to others unless licensed as a broker-dealer. To be granted a license, charter, or registration, the recipient must accept the terms and conditions that accompany it. Depending on the type, those conditions could include regulatory oversight, training requirements, and a requirement to act according to a set of standards or code of ethics. Failure to meet the terms and conditions could result in fines, penalties, remedial actions, license or charter revocation, or criminal charges. rulemaking process to implement statutory mandates. 5 Typically, statutory mandates provide regulators with a policy goal in general terms, and regulations fill in the specifics. Rules lay out the guidelines for how market participants may or may not act to
comply with the mandate. are adhered to through oversight and supervision. This allows regulators to observe market participants’ behavior and instruct them to modify or cease improper behavior. Supervision may entail active, ongoing monitoring (as for banks) or investigating complaints and allegations ex post (as is common in securities markets). In some cases, such as banking, supervision includes periodic examinations and inspections, whereas in other cases, regulators rely more heavily on self- reporting. Regulators explain supervisory priorities and points of emphasis by issuing supervisory letters and guidance. behavior through enforcement powers. Enforcement powers include the ability to issue fines, penalties, and cease and desist orders; to undertake criminal or civil actions in court, or administrative proceedings or arbitrations; and to
revoke licenses and charters. In some cases, regulators initiate legal action at their own bequest or in response to consumer or investor complaints. In other cases, regulators explicitly allow consumers and investors to sue for damages when firms do not comply with regulations, or provide legal protection to firms that do comply. a failing firm by taking control of the firm and initiating conservatorship (i.e., the regulator runs the firm 5 For more information, see CRS Report R41546, A Brief Overview of Rulemaking and Judicial Review, by Todd Garvey. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 4 on an ongoing basis) or receivership (i.e., the regulator winds the firm down). In
other markets, failing firms are resolved through bankruptcy, a judicial process. Goals of Regulation Financial regulation is primarily intended to achieve the following underlying policy outcomes: 6 markets operate efficiently and that market participants have confidence in the market’s integrity. Liquidity, low costs, the presence of many buyers and sellers, the availability of information, and a lack of excessive volatility are examples of the characteristics of an efficient market. Regulators contribute to market integrity by ensuring that activities are transparent, contracts can be enforced, and the “rules of the game” they set are enforced. Integrity generally also leads to greater efficiency. Regulation can also address market failures, such as principal- agent problems, 7 asymmetric information,
8 and moral hazard, 9 that would otherwise reduce market efficiency. that consumers or investors do not suffer from fraud, discrimination, manipulation, and theft. Regulators try to prevent exploitative or abusive practices intended to take advantage of unwitting consumers or investors. In some cases, protection is limited to enabling consumers and investors to understand the inherent risks when they enter into a contract. In other cases, protection is based on the principle of suitability—efforts to ensure that more risky products or product features are only accessible to sophisticated or financially secure consumers and investors. ensure that firms and consumers are able to access credit and capital to meet their
needs such that credit and economic activity can grow at a healthy rate. Regulators try to ensure that capital and credit are available to all worthy borrowers, regardless of personal characteristics, such as race, gender, and location. financial system cannot be used to support criminal and terrorist activity. Examples are policies to prevent money laundering, tax evasion, terrorism financing, and the contravention of financial sanctions. failures in financial markets do not result in federal government payouts or the assumption of liabilities that are ultimately borne by taxpayers. Only certain types of financial activity are explicitly backed by the federal government or by regulator-run insurance schemes that are backed by the federal government, such as the 6
Regulators are also tasked with promoting certain social goals, such as community reinvestment or affordable housing. Because this report focuses on regulation, it will not discuss social goals. 7 For example, financial agents may have incentives to make decisions that are not in the best interests of their clients, and clients may not be able to adequately monitor their behavior. 8 For example, firms issuing securities know more about their financial prospects than investors purchasing those securities, which can result in a “lemons” problem in which low-quality firms drive high-quality firms out of the marketplace. 9 For example, individuals may act more imprudently once they are insured against a risk. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 5 Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) run by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Such schemes are self-financed by the insured firms through premium
payments, unless the losses exceed the insurance fund, and then taxpayer money is used temporarily or permanently to fill the gap. In the case of a financial crisis, the government may decide that the “least bad” option is to provide funds in ways not explicitly promised or previously contemplated to restore stability. “Bailouts” of large failing firms in 2008 are the most well- known examples. In this sense, there may be implicit taxpayer backing of parts or all of the financial system. financial stability through preventative and palliative measures that mitigate systemic risk. At times, financial markets stop functioning well—markets freeze, participants panic, credit becomes unavailable, and multiple firms fail. Financial instability can be localized (to a specific market or activity) or more general. Sometimes instability can be contained and quelled through market actions or policy intervention; at
other times, instability metastasizes and does broader damage to the real economy. The most recent example of the latter was the financial crisis of 2007- 2009. Traditionally, financial stability concerns have centered on banking, but the recent crisis illustrates the potential for systemic risk to arise in other parts of the financial system as well. These regulatory goals are sometimes complementary, but other times conflict with each other. For example, without an adequate level of consumer and investor protections, fewer individuals may be willing to participate in the markets, and efficiency and capital formation could suffer. But, at some point, too many consumer and investor safeguards and protections could make credit and capital prohibitively expensive, reducing market efficiency and capital formation. Regulation generally aims to seek a middle ground between these two extremes, where regulatory burden is as small as possible and regulatory benefits are as large as possible. As a result, when taking any
action, regulators balance the tradeoffs between their various goals. Types of Regulation The types of regulation applied to market participants are diverse and vary by regulator, but can be clustered in a few categories for analytical ease: an institution’s safety and soundness. It focuses on risk management and risk mitigation. Examples are capital requirements for banks. Prudential regulation may be pursued to achieve the goals of taxpayer protection (e.g., to ensure that bank failures do not drain the DIF), consumer protection (e.g., to ensure that insurance firms are able to honor policyholders’ claims), or financial stability (e.g., to ensure that firm failures do not lead to bank runs). requirements are meant to ensure that all relevant financial information is accurate and available to the public and regulators so that the former can make well-informed financial
decisions and the latter can effectively monitor activities. For example, publicly held companies must file disclosure reports, such as 10-Ks. Disclosure is used to achieve the goals of consumer and investor protection, as well as market efficiency and integrity. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 6 markets, and professional conduct. Regulators set permissible activities and behavior for market participants. Standard setting is used to achieve a number of policy goals. For example, (1) for market integrity, policies governing conflicts of interest, such as insider trading; (2) for taxpayer protection, limits on risky activities; (3) for consumer protection, fair lending requirements to prevent discrimination; and
(4) for suitability, limits on the sale of certain sophisticated financial products to accredited investors and verification that borrowers have the ability to repay mortgages. undue monopoly power, engage in collusion or price fixing, or corner specific markets (i.e., take a dominant position to manipulate prices). Examples include antitrust policy (which is not unique to finance), antimanipulation policies, concentration limits, and the approval of takeovers and mergers. Regulators promote competitive markets to support the goals of market efficiency and integrity and consumer and investor protections. Within this area, a special policy concern related to financial stability is ensuring that no firm is “too big to fail.” minimum prices, fees, premiums, or interest rates. Although price and rate regulation is relatively rare in federal regulation, it is more common in state regulation. An
example at the federal level is the Durbin Amendment, which caps debit interchange fees for large banks. 10 State-level examples are state usury laws, which cap interest rates, and state insurance rate regulation. Policymakers justify price and rate regulations on grounds of consumer and investor protections. Prudential and disclosure and reporting regulations can be contrasted to highlight a basic philosophical difference in the regulation of securities versus banking. For example, prudential regulation is central to banking regulation, whereas securities regulation generally focuses on disclosure. This difference in approaches can be attributed to differences in the relative importance of regulatory goals. Financial stability and taxpayer protection are central to banking because of taxpayer exposure and the potential for contagion when firms fail, whereas they are not primary goals of securities markets because the federal government has made few explicit
promises to make payouts in the event of losses and failures. 11 Prudential regulation relies heavily on confidential information that supervisors gather and formulate through examinations. Federal securities regulation is not intended to prevent failures or losses; instead, it is meant to ensure that investors are properly informed about the risks that investments pose. 12 Ensuring proper disclosure is the main way to ensure that all relevant information is available to any potential investor. 10 Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act. For more information, see CRS Report R41913, Regulation of Debit Interchange Fees, by Darryl E. Getter. 11 The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), discussed below, provides limited protection to investors. 12
By contrast, some states have also conducted qualification- based securities regulation, in which securities are vetted based on whether they are perceived to offer investors a minimum level of quality. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 7 Regulated Entities How financial regulation is applied varies, partly because of the different characteristics of various financial markets and partly because of the historical evolution of regulation. The scope of regulators’ purview falls into several different categories: 1. Regulate Certain Types of Financial Institutions. Some firms become subject to federal regulation when they obtain a particular business charter, and several federal agencies regulate only a single class of institution. Depository institutions are a good example: a new banking firm chooses its regulator when it decides which charter to obtain—national bank, state bank, credit union, etc.—and the
choice of which type of depository charter may not greatly affect the institution’s business mix. The Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA) regulates only three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs): Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system. This type of regulation gives regulators a role in overseeing all aspects of the firm’s behavior, including which activities it is allowed to engage in. As a result, “functionally similar activities are often regulated differently depending on what type of institution offers the service.” 13 2. Regulate a Particular Market. In some markets, all activities that take place within that market (for example, on a securities exchange) are subject to regulation. Often, the market itself, with the regulator’s approval, issues codes of conduct and other internal rules that bind its members. In some cases, regulators may then require that specific activities can be conducted only
within a regulated market. In other cases, similar activities take place both on and off a regulated market (e.g., stocks can also be traded off-exchange in “dark pools”). In some cases, regulators have different authority or jurisdiction in primary markets (where financial products are initially issued) than secondary markets (where products are resold). 3. Regulate a Particular Financial Activity. If activities are conducted in multiple markets or across multiple types of firms, another approach is to regulate a particular type or set of transactions, regardless of where the business occurs or which entities are engaged in it. For example, on the view that consumer financial protections should apply uniformly to all transactions, the Dodd-Frank Act created the CFPB, with authority (subject to certain exemptions) over financial products offered to consumers by an array of firms. Because it is difficult to ensure that functionally similar
financial activities are legally uniform, all three approaches are needed and sometimes overlap in any given area. Stated differently, risks can emanate from firms, markets, or products, and if regulation does not align, risks may not be effectively mitigated. Market innovation also creates financial instruments and markets that fall between industry divisions. Congress and the courts have often been asked to decide which agency has jurisdiction over a particular financial activity. The Federal Financial Regulators Table 1 sets out the current federal financial regulatory structure. Regulators can be categorized into the three main areas of finance—banking (depository), securities, and insurance (where state, 13 Michael Barr et al., Financial Regulation: Law and Policy (St. Paul: Foundation Press, 2016), p. 14. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 8
rather than federal, regulators play a dominant role). There are also targeted regulators for specific financial activities (consumer protection) and markets (agricultural finance and housing finance). The table does not include interagency-coordinating bodies, standard-setting bodies, international organizations, or state regulators, which are described later in the report. Appendix A describes changes to this table since the 2008 financial crisis. Table 1. Federal Financial Regulators and Who They Supervise Regulatory Agency Institutions Regulated Other Notable Authority Depository Regulators Federal Reserve Bank holding companies and certain subsidiaries (e.g., foreign subsidiaries), financial holding companies, securities holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies Primary regulator of state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, foreign banking organizations operating in the United States, Edge Corporations, and any
firm or payment system designated as systemically significant by the FSOC Operates discount window (“lender of last resort”) for depositories; operates payment system; conducts monetary policy Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) National banks, U.S. federal branches of foreign banks, and federally chartered thrift institutions Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
Federally insured depository institutions Primary regulator of state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and state-chartered thrift institutions Operates deposit insurance for banks; resolves failing banks National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) Federally chartered or federally insured credit unions Operates deposit insurance for credit unions; resolves failing credit unions Securities Markets Regulators Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Securities exchanges, broker-dealers; clearing and settlement agencies; investment funds, including mutual funds; investment advisers, including hedge funds with assets over $150 million; and investment companies
Nationally recognized statistical rating organizations Security-based swap (SBS) dealers, major SBS participants, and SBS execution facilities Corporations selling securities to the public Approves rulemakings by self-regulated organizations Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Futures exchanges, futures commission merchants, commodity pool operators, commodity trading advisors, derivatives, clearing organizations, and designated contract markets Swap dealers, major swap participants, swap execution facilities, and swap data repositories Government-Sponsored Enterprise Regulators Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks Acting as conservator (since Sept. 2008) for Fannie and Freddie Farm Credit Administration (FCA) Farm Credit System Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 9 Regulatory Agency Institutions Regulated Other Notable Authority Consumer Protection Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Nonbank mortgage-related firms, private student lenders,
payday lenders, and larger “consumer financial entities” determined by the CFPB Statutory exemptions for certain markets Rulemaking authority for consumer protection for all banks; supervisory authority for banks with over $10 billion in assets Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). Financial firms may be subject to more than one regulator because they may engage in multiple financial activities, as illustrated in Figure 1. For example, a firm may be overseen by an institution regulator and by an activity regulator when it engages in a regulated activity and a market regulator when it participates in a regulated market. The complexity of the figure illustrates the diverse roles and responsibilities assigned to various regulators. CRS-10 Figure 1. Regulatory Jurisdiction by Agency and Type of
Regulation Source: Government Accountability Office (GAO), Financial Regulation, GAO-16-175, February 2016, Figure 2. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 11 Furthermore, financial firms may form holding companies with separate legal subsidiaries that allow subsidiaries within the same holding company to engage in more activities than is permissible within any one subsidiary. Because of charter-based regulation, certain financial activities must be segregated in separate legal subsidiaries. However, as a result of the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 (GLBA; P.L. 106-102) and other regulatory and policy changes that preceded it, these different legal subsidiaries may be contained within the same financial holding companies (i.e., conglomerates that are permitted to engage in a broad array of financially related
activities). For example, a banking subsidiary is limited to permissible activities related to the “business of banking,” but is allowed to affiliate with another subsidiary that engages in activities that are “financial in nature.” 14 As a result, each subsidiary is assigned a primary regulator, and firms with multiple subsidiaries may have multiple institution regulators. If the holding company is a bank holding company or thrift holding company (with at least one banking or thrift subsidiary, respectively), then the holding company is regulated by the Fed. 15 Figure 2 shows a stylized example of a special type of bank holding company, known as a financial holding company. This financial holding company would be regulated by the Fed at the holding company level. Its national bank would be regulated by the OCC, its securities subsidiary would be regulated by the SEC, and its loan company might be regulated by the CFPB. These are
only the primary regulators for each box in Figure 2; as noted above, it might have other market or activity regulators as well, based on its lines of business. Figure 2. Stylized Example of a Financial Holding Company Source: CRS. Depository Institution Regulators Regulation of depository institutions (i.e., banks and credit unions) in the United States has evolved over time into a system of multiple regulators with overlapping jurisdictions. 16 There is a dual banking system, in which each depository institution is subject to regulation by its chartering authority: state or federal. Even if state chartered, virtually all depository institutions are federally 14 However, banks are not allowed to affiliate with commercial firms, although exceptions are made for industrial loan companies and unitary thrift holding companies. 15
Bank holding companies with nonbank subsidiaries are also referred to as financial holding companies. 16 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10035, Introduction to Financial Services: Banking, by Raj Gnanarajah. http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d106:FLD002:@1(106+102) Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 12 insured, so both state and federal institutions are subject to at least one federal primary regulator (i.e., the federal authority responsible for examining the institution for safety and soundness and for ensuring its compliance with federal banking laws). Depository institutions have three broad types of charter—commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions. 17 For any given institution, the primary regulator depends on its type of charter. The primary federal regulator for 18
(also known as savings and loans) is the OCC, their chartering authority; -chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System is the Federal Reserve; -chartered thrifts and banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System is the FDIC; reign banks operating in the United States is the Fed or OCC, depending on the type; —if federally chartered or federally insured—is the National Credit Union Administration, which administers a deposit insurance fund separate from the FDIC’s. National banks, state-chartered banks, and thrifts are also subject to the FDIC regulatory authority, because their deposits are covered by FDIC deposit insurance. Primary regulators’ responsibilities are illustrated in Figure 3. 17 The charter dictates the activities the institution can participate in and the regulations it must adhere to. Any
institution that accepts deposits must be chartered as one of these institutions; however, not all institutions chartered with these regulators accept deposits. 18 The Office of Thrift Supervision was the primary thrift regulator until the Dodd-Frank Act abolished it and reassigned its duties to the bank regulators. Thrifts are a good example of how the regulatory system evolved over time to the point where it no longer bears much resemblance to its original purpose. With a charter originally designed to be quite distinct from the bank charter (e.g., narrowly focused on mortgage lending), thrift regulation evolved to the point where there were relatively few differences between large, complex thrift holding companies and bank holding companies. Because of this convergence and because of safety and soundness problems during the 2008 financial crisis and before that during the1980s savings and loan crisis, policymakers deemed thrifts to no longer need their own regulator (although they maintained their separate charter). For a comparison of the powers of national banks and federal savings associations, see Office of the Comptroller (OCC), Summary of the Powers of National Banks and Federal Savings Associations, August 31, 2011, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/other- publications-reports/pub-other-fsa-nb-powers-chart.pdf. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 13 Figure 3. Jurisdiction Among Depository Regulators Source: Federal Reserve, Purposes and Functions, October 2016, Figure 5.3. Whereas bank and thrift regulators strive for consistency among themselves in how institutions are regulated and supervised, credit unions are regulated under a separate regulatory framework from banks. Because banks receive deposit insurance from the FDIC and have access to the Fed’s discount window, they expose taxpayers to the risk of losses if they fail. 19 Banks also play a central role in the payment system, the financial system, and the broader economy. As a result, banks are subject
to safety and soundness (prudential) regulation that most other financial firms are not subject to at the federal level. 20 Safety and soundness regulation uses a holistic approach, evaluating (1) each loan, (2) the balance sheet of each institution, and (3) the risks in the system as a whole. Each loan creates risk for the lender. The overall portfolio of loans extended or held by a bank, in relation to other assets and liabilities, affects that institution’s stability. The relationship of banks to each other, and to wider financial markets, affects the financial system’s stability. Banks are required to keep capital in reserve against the possibility of a drop in value of loan portfolios or other risky assets. Banks are also required to be liquid enough to meet unexpected 19 Losses to the FDIC and Fed are first covered by the premiums or income, respectively, paid by users of those programs. Ultimately, if the premiums or income are insufficient, the programs could affect taxpayers by reducing the
general revenues of the federal government. In the case of the FDIC, the FDIC has the authority to draw up to $100 billion from the U.S. Treasury if the DIF is insufficient to meet deposit insurance claims. In the case of the Fed, any losses at the Fed’s discount window reduce the Fed’s profits, which are remitted quarterly to Treasury where they are added to general revenues. 20 Exceptions are the housing-related institutions regulated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Farm Credit System regulated by the Farm Credit Administration (FCA). Insurers are regulated for safety and soundness at the state level. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 14 funding outflows. Federal financial regulators take into account compensating assets, risk-based capital requirements, the quality of assets, internal controls, and other prudential standards when examining the balance sheets of covered lenders.
When regulators determine that a bank is taking excessive risks, or engaging in unsafe and unsound practices, they have a number of powerful tools at their disposal to reduce risk to the institution (and ultimately to the federal DIF). Regulators can require banks to reduce specified lending or financing practices, dispose of certain assets, and order banks to take steps to restore sound balance sheets. Banks must comply because regulators have “life-or-death” options, such as withdrawing deposit insurance or seizing the bank outright. The federal banking agencies are briefly discussed below. Although these agencies are the banks’ institution-based regulators, banks are also subject to CFPB regulation for consumer protection, and to the extent that banks are participants in securities or derivatives markets, those activities are also subject to regulation by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC). Office of the Comptroller of the Currency The OCC was created in 1863 as part of the Department of the Treasury to supervise federally
chartered banks (“national” banks; 13 Stat. 99). The OCC regulates a wide variety of financial functions, but only for federally chartered banks. The head of the OCC, the Comptroller of the Currency, is also a member of the board of the FDIC and a director of the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. The OCC has examination powers to enforce its responsibilities for the safety and soundness of nationally chartered banks. The OCC has strong enforcement powers, including the ability to issue cease and desist orders and revoke federal bank charters. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the OCC is the primary regulator for federally chartered thrift institutions. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Following bank panics during the Great Depression, the FDIC was created in 1933 to provide assurance to small depositors that they would not lose their savings if their bank failed (P.L. 74- 305, 49 Stat. 684). The FDIC is an independent agency that insures deposits (up to $250,000 for individual accounts), examines and supervises financial institutions, and manages receiverships, assuming and disposing of the assets of failed banks. The FDIC
is the primary federal regulator of state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and state-chartered thrift institutions. In addition, the FDIC has broad jurisdiction over nearly all banks and thrifts, whether federally or state chartered, that carry FDIC insurance. Backing deposit insurance is the DIF, which is managed by the FDIC and funded by risk-based assessments levied on depository institutions. The fund is used primarily for resolving failed or failing institutions. To safeguard the DIF, the FDIC uses its power to examine individual institutions and to issue regulations for all insured depository institutions to monitor and enforce safety and soundness. Acting under the principles of “prompt corrective action” and “least cost resolution,” the FDIC has powers to resolve troubled banks, rather than allowing failing banks to enter the bankruptcy process. The Dodd-Frank Act also expanded the FDIC’s role in resolving other types of troubled financial institutions that pose a risk to financial stability through the Orderly Liquidation Authority.
Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 15 The Federal Reserve The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 as the nation’s central bank following the Panic of 1907 to provide stability in the banking sector (P.L. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251). 21 The system consists of the Board of Governors in Washington, DC, and 12 regional reserve banks. In its regulatory role, the Fed has safety and soundness examination authority for a variety of lending institutions, including bank holding companies; U.S. branches of foreign banks; and state- chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. Membership in the system is mandatory for national banks and optional for state banks. Members must purchase stock in the Fed.
The Fed regulates the largest, most complex financial firms operating in the United States. Under the GLBA, the Fed serves as the umbrella regulator for financial holding companies. The Dodd- Frank Act made the Fed the primary regulator of all nonbank financial firms that are designated as systemically significant by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (of which the Fed is a member). All bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in assets and designated nonbanks are subject to enhanced prudential regulation by the Fed. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act made the Fed the principal regulator for savings and loan holding companies and securities holding companies, a new category of institution formerly defined in securities law as an investment bank holding company. The Fed’s responsibilities are not limited to regulation. As the nation’s central bank, it conducts monetary policy by targeting short-term interest rates. The Fed also acts as a “lender of last resort” by making short-term collateralized loans to banks through the discount window. It also
operates some parts and regulates other parts of the payment system. Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act gave the Fed additional authority to set prudential standards for payment systems that have been designated as systemically important. National Credit Union Administration The NCUA, originally part of the Farm Credit Administration, became an independent agency in 1970 (P.L. 91-206, 84 Stat. 49). The NCUA is the safety and soundness regulator for all federal credit unions and those state credit unions that elect to be federally insured. It administers a Central Liquidity Facility, which is the credit union lender of last resort, and the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, which insures credit union deposits. The NCUA also resolves failed credit unions. Credit unions are member-owned financial cooperatives, and they must be not-for- profit institutions. 22 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Before the financial crisis, jurisdiction over consumer financial protection was divided among a
number of agencies (see Figure A-1). Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act created the CFPB to enhance consumer protection and bring the consumer protection regulation of depository and nondepository financial institutions into closer alignment. 23 The bureau is housed within—but independent from—the Federal Reserve. The director of the CFPB is also on the FDIC’s board of 21 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10054, Introduction to Financial Services: The Federal Reserve, by Marc Labonte. 22 For more information, see CRS Report R43167, Policy Issues Related to Credit Union Lending, by Darryl E. Getter. 23 See CRS Report R42572, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal Analysis, by David H. Carpenter. Who Regulates Whom?
Congressional Research Service 16 directors. The Dodd-Frank Act granted new authority and transferred existing authority from a number of agencies to the CFPB over an array of consumer financial products and services (including deposit taking, mortgages, credit cards and other extensions of credit, loan servicing, check guaranteeing, consumer report data collection, debt collection, real estate settlement, money transmitting, and financial data processing). The CFPB administers rules that, in its view, protect consumers by setting disclosure standards, setting suitability standards, and banning abusive and discriminatory practices. The CFPB also serves as the primary federal consumer financial protection supervisor and enforcer of federal consumer protection laws over many of the institutions that offer these products and services. However, the bureau’s regulatory authority varies based on institution size and type. Regulatory authority differs for (1) depository institutions with more than $10 billion in
assets, (2) depository institutions with $10 billion or less in assets, and (3) nondepositories. The CFPB can issue rules that apply to depository institutions of all sizes, but can only supervise institutions with more than $10 billion in assets. For depositories with less than $10 billion in assets, the primary depository regulator continues to supervise for consumer compliance. The Dodd-Frank Act also explicitly exempts a number of different entities and consumer financial activities from the bureau’s supervisory and enforcement authority. Among the exempt entities are rchants, retailers, or sellers of nonfinancial goods or services, to the extent that they extend credit directly to consumers exclusively for the purpose of enabling consumers to purchase such nonfinancial goods or services; real estate brokers and agents; and
In some areas where the CFPB does not have jurisdiction, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) retains consumer protection authority. State regulators also retain a role in consumer protection. 24 Securities Regulation For regulatory purposes, securities markets can be divided into derivatives and other types of securities. Derivatives, depending on the type, are regulated by the CFTC or the SEC. Other types of securities fall under the SEC’s jurisdiction. Standard-setting bodies and other self-regulatory organizations (SROs) play a special role in securities regulation, and they are overseen by the SEC or the CFTC. In addition, banking regulators oversee the securities activities of banks. Banks are major participants in some parts of securities markets. Securities and Exchange Commission The New York Stock Exchange dates from 1793. Following the stock market crash of 1929, the SEC was created as an independent agency in 1934 to enforce newly written federal securities
laws (P.L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881). Thus, when Congress created the SEC, stock and bond market 24 See the “Other State Regulation” section below. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 17 institutions and mechanisms were already well-established, and federal regulation was grafted onto the existing structure. 25 The SEC has jurisdiction over the following: —firms that issue shares, —investment advisers and investment companies (e.g., mutual funds and private funds) that are custodial agents investing on behalf of clients, -dealers, securities underwriters,
and securitizers) credit rating agencies and research analysts); changes) and market utilities (e.g., clearinghouses) where securities are traded, cleared, and settled; and security-based swaps). The SEC is not primarily concerned with ensuring the safety and soundness of the firms it regulates, but rather with “protect[ing] investors, maintain[ing] fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitat[ing] capital formation.” 26 This distinction largely arises from the absence of government guarantees for securities investors comparable to deposit insurance. The SEC generally does not have the authority to limit risks taken by securities firms, 27 nor the ability to prop up a failing firm.
Firms that sell securities—stocks and bonds—to the public are required to register with the SEC. Registration entails the publication of detailed information about the firm, its management, the intended uses for the funds raised through the sale of securities, and the risks to investors. The initial registration disclosures must be kept current through the filing of periodic financial statements: annual and quarterly reports (as well as special reports when there is a material change in the firm’s financial condition or prospects). Beyond these disclosure requirements, and certain other rules that apply to corporate governance, the SEC does not have any direct regulatory control over publicly traded firms. Bank regulators are expected to identify unsafe and unsound banking practices in the institutions they supervise, and they have the power to intervene and prevent banks from taking excessive risks. The SEC has no comparable authority; the securities laws simply require that risks be disclosed to investors. 25 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10032, Introduction
to Financial Services: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), by Gary Shorter. 26 Securities and Exchange Commission, What We Do, June 2013, at https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 27 Since 1975, the SEC has enforced a net capital rule applicable to all registered brokers and dealers. The rule requires brokers and dealers to maintain an excess of capital above mere solvency, to ensure that a failing firm stops trading while it still has assets to meet customer claims. Net capital levels are calculated in a manner similar to the risk-based capital requirements under the Basel Accords, but the SEC has its own set of risk weightings, which it calls haircuts; the riskier the asset, the greater the haircut. Although the net capital rule appears to be very close in its effects to the banking agencies’ risk-based capital requirements, there are significant differences. The SEC has no authority to intervene in a broker’s or dealer’s business if it takes excessive risks that might cause net capital to drop below the required level. Rather, the net capital rule is often described as a liquidation rule—not meant to prevent failures but to minimize the impact on customers. Moreover, the SEC has no authority comparable to the banking regulators’ prompt
corrective action powers: it cannot preemptively seize a troubled broker or dealer or compel it to merge with a sound firm. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 18 Registration with the SEC, in other words, is in no sense a guarantee that a security is a good or safe investment. Besides publicly traded corporations, a number of securities market participants are also required to register with the SEC (or with one of the industry SROs that the SEC oversees). These include stock exchanges, securities brokerages (and numerous classes of their personnel), mutual funds, auditors, investment advisers, and others. To maintain their registered status, all these entities must comply with rules meant to protect public investors, prevent fraud, and promote fair and orderly markets. The degree of protection granted to investors depends on their level of sophistication. For example, only “accredited investors” that
have, for example, high net worth, can invest in riskier hedge funds and private equity funds. Originally, de minimis exemptions to regulation of mutual funds and investment advisers created space for the development of a trillion-dollar hedge fund industry. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, private advisers, including hedge funds and private equity funds, with more than $150 million in assets under management must register with the SEC, but maintain other exemptions. Several provisions of law and regulation protect brokerage customers from losses arising from brokerage firm failure. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a private nonprofit created by Congress in 1970 and overseen by the SEC, operates an insurance scheme funded by assessments on brokers-dealers (and with a backup line of credit with the U.S. Treasury). SIPC guarantees customer accounts up to $500,000 for losses arising from brokerage failure or fraud. Unlike the FDIC, however, SIPC does not protect accounts against market losses or examine broker-dealers, and it has no regulatory powers.
Some securities markets are exempted from parts of securities regulation. Prominent examples include the following: ing and selling currencies is essential to foreign trade, and the exchange rate determined by traders has major implications for a country’s macroeconomic policy. The market is one of the largest in the world, with trillions of dollars of average daily turnover. 28 Nevertheless, no U.S. agency has regulatory authority over the foreign exchange market. Trading in currencies takes place among large global banks, central banks, hedge funds and other currency speculators, commercial firms involved in imports and exports, fund managers, and retail brokers. There is no centralized marketplace, but rather a number of proprietary electronic platforms that have largely supplanted the traditional telephone broker market. asury securities were exempted from SEC regulation by
the original securities laws of the 1930s. In 1993, following a successful cornering of a Treasury bond auction by Salomon Brothers, Congress passed the Government Securities Act Amendments of 1993 (P.L. 103-202, 107 Stat. 2344), which required brokers and dealers that were not already registered with the SEC to register as government securities dealers, extended antifraud and antimanipulation provisions of the federal securities laws to government securities brokers and dealers, and gave the U.S. Treasury authority to promulgate rules governing transactions. (Existing broker- dealer registrants were simply required to notify the SEC that they were in the government securities 28 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10112, Introduction to Financial Services: The International Foreign Exchange Market, by James K. Jackson.
Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 19 business.) Nevertheless, the government securities market remains much more lightly regulated than the corporate securities markets. Regulatory jurisdiction over various aspects of the Treasury market is fragmented across multiple regulators. The SEC has no jurisdiction over the primary market. 29 exempted from SEC regulation. In 1975, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board was created and firms transacting in municipal securities were required to register with the SEC as broker-dealers. The Dodd-Frank Act required municipal advisors to register with the SEC. However, issuers of municipal securities remain exempt from SEC oversight, partly because of federalism issues. 30
rivate securities. The securities laws provide for the private sales of securities, which are not subject to the registration and extensive disclosure requirements that apply to public securities. However, private securities are subject to antifraud provisions of federal securities laws. Private placements of securities cannot be sold to the general public and may only be offered to limited numbers of “accredited investors” who meet certain asset tests. (Most purchasers are life insurers and other institutional investors.) There are also restrictions on the resale of private securities. The size of the private placement market is subject to considerable variation from year to year, but at times the value of securities sold privately exceeds what is sold into the public market. In recent decades, venture capitalists and private equity firms have come to play important roles in corporate finance. The former typically purchase interests in
private firms, which may be sold later to the public, whereas the latter often purchase all the stock of publicly traded companies and take them private. Commodity Futures Trading Commission The CFTC was created in 1974 to regulate commodities futures and options markets, which at the time were poised to expand beyond their traditional base in agricultural commodities to encompass contracts based on financial variables, such as interest rates and stock indexes. 31 The CFTC was given “exclusive jurisdiction” over all contracts that were “in the character of” options or futures contracts, and such instruments were to be traded only on CFTC-regulated exchanges. In practice, exclusive jurisdiction was impossible to enforce, as off-exchange derivatives contracts such as swaps proliferated. In the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554), Congress exempted swaps from CFTC regulation, but this exemption was repealed by the Dodd-Frank Act following problems with derivatives in the financial crisis, including large
losses at the American International Group (AIG) that led to its federal rescue. The Dodd-Frank Act greatly expanded the CFTC’s jurisdiction by eliminating exemptions for certain over-the-counter derivatives. 32 As a result, swap dealers, major swap participants, swap 29 U.S. Department of Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report: The U.S. Treasury Market on October 15, 2014, July 13, 2015, at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press- releases/Documents/Joint_Staff_Report_Treasury_10-15- 2015.pdf. 30 SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market, July 2012, at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/ munireport073112.pdf. 31 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10117, Introduction to Financial Services: Derivatives, by Rena S. Miller. 32
For more information, see CRS Report R41398, The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title VII, Derivatives, by Rena S. Miller and Kathleen Ann Ruane. http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d106:FLD002:@1(106+554) http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d106:FLD002:@1(106+554) Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 20 clearing organizations, swap execution facilities, and swap data repositories are required to register with the CFTC. These entities are subject to reporting requirements and business conduct standards contained in statute or promulgated as CFTC rules. The Dodd-Frank Act required swaps to be cleared through a central clearinghouse and traded on exchanges, where possible. The CFTC’s mission is to prevent excessive speculation, manipulation of commodity prices, and fraud. Like the SEC, the CFTC oversees SROs—the futures exchanges and the National Futures Association—and requires the registration of a range of industry
firms and personnel, including futures commission merchants (brokers), floor traders, commodity pool operators, and commodity trading advisers. Like the SEC, the CFTC does not directly regulate the safety and soundness of individual firms, with the exception of a net capital rule for futures commission merchants and capital standards pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act for swap dealers and major swap participants. Standard-Setting Bodies and Self-Regulatory Organizations National securities exchanges (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange) and clearing and settlement systems may register as SROs with the SEC or CFTC, making them subject to SEC or CFTC oversight. 33 According to the SEC, “SROs must create rules that allow for disciplining members for improper conduct and for establishing measures to ensure market integrity and investor protection. SRO proposed rules are published for comment before final SEC review and
approval.” 34 Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act gave the SEC and CFTC additional prudential regulatory authority over clearing and settlement systems that have been designated as systemically important (exchanges, contract markets, and other entities were exempted). 35 One particularly important type of SRO in the regulatory system is the group of standard-setting bodies. Most securities or futures markets participants must register and meet professional conduct and qualification standards. The SEC and CFTC have delegated responsibility for many of these functions to official standard-setting bodies, such as the following: —The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority writes and enforces rules for brokers and dealers and examines them for compliance. —The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board establishes rules for municipal advisors and dealers in the municipal securities market; conducts required exams and continuing education for municipal market
professionals; and provides guidance to SEC and others for compliance with and enforcement of MSRB rules. —The National Futures Association develops and enforces rules in futures markets, requires registration, and conducts fitness examinations for a range of derivatives markets participants, including futures commission merchants, commodity pool operators, and commodity trading advisors. —The Financial Accounting Standards Board establishes financial accounting and reporting standards for companies and nonprofits. 33 A list of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) registered with the SEC can be found at https://www.sec.gov/rules/ sro.shtml. 34 SEC, What We Do, June 2013, at https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 35 Title VIII also gave the Fed and the FSOC limited authority to
participate in and override SEC or CFTC regulation of systemically important clearing and settlement systems if they pose risks to financial stability. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 21 CAOB—The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board oversees private auditors of publicly held companies and broker-dealers. These standard-setting bodies are typically set up as private nonprofits overseen by boards and funded through member fees or assessments. Although their authority may be enshrined in statute, they are not governmental entities. Regulators delegate rulemaking powers to them and retain the right to override their rulemakings. Regulation of Government-Sponsored Enterprises Congress created GSEs as privately owned institutions with limited missions and charters to support the mortgage and agricultural credit markets. It also created dedicated regulators— currently, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the
Farm Credit Administration (FCA)—exclusively to oversee the GSEs. Federal Housing Finance Agency The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (P.L. 110- 289, 122 Stat. 2654) created the FHFA during the housing crisis in 2008 to consolidate and strengthen regulation of a group of housing finance-related GSEs: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. 36 The FHFA succeeded the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which regulated Fannie and Freddie, and the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), which regulated the Federal Home Loan Banks. The act also transferred authority to set affordable housing and other goals for the GSEs from the Department of Housing and Urban Development to the FHFA. Facing concerns about the GSEs’ ongoing viability, the impetus to create the FHFA came from concerns about risks—including systemic risk—posed by Fannie and Freddie. These two GSEs were profit-seeking, shareholder-owned corporations that took
advantage of their government- sponsored status to accumulate undiversified investment portfolios of more than $1.5 trillion, consisting almost exclusively of home mortgages (and securities and derivatives based on those mortgages). 37 OFHEO was seen as lacking sufficient authority and independence to keep risk-taking at the GSEs in check. The FHFA was given enhanced safety and soundness powers resembling those of the federal bank regulators. These powers included the ability to set capital standards, to order the enterprises to cease any activity or divest any asset that posed a threat to financial soundness, and to replace management and assume control of the firms if they became seriously undercapitalized. One of the FHFA’s first actions was to place both Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship to prevent their failure. Fannie and Freddie continue to operate, under agreements with FHFA and the U.S. Treasury, with more direct involvement of the FHFA in the enterprises’ decisionmaking.
The Treasury has provided capital to the GSEs (a combined $187 billion to date), by means of preferred stock purchases, to ensure that each remains solvent. In return, the government received warrants equivalent to a 79.9% equity ownership position in the firms and sweeps the firms’ retained earnings above a certain level of net worth. 38 36 For more on government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and their regulation, see CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions, by N. Eric Weiss. 37 Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Report to Congress: 2008 (Revised), at https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/ Reports/ReportDocuments/2008_AnnualReportToCongress_N50 8.pdf. 38 For more information, see CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked (continued...)
Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 22 Farm Credit Administration The FCA was created in 1933 during a farming crisis that was causing the widespread failure of institutions lending to farmers. Following another farming crisis, it was made an “arm’s length” regulator with increased rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement powers by the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-205). The FCA oversees the Farm Credit System, a group of GSEs made up of the cooperatively owned Farm Credit Banks and Agricultural Credit Banks, the Funding Corporation, which is owned by the Credit Banks, and Farmer Mac, which is owned by shareholders. 39 Unlike the housing GSEs, the Farm Credit System operates in both primary and secondary agricultural credit markets. For example, the FCA regulates these institutions for safety and soundness, through capital requirements.
Regulatory Umbrella Groups The need for coordination and data sharing among regulators has led to the formation of innumerable interagency task forces to study particular market episodes and make recommendations to Congress. Three interagency organizations have permanent status: the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council, and the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets. The latter is composed of the Treasury Secretary and the Fed, SEC, and CFTC Chairmen; because the working group has not been active in recent years, it is not discussed in detail. Financial Stability Oversight Council Few would argue that regulatory failure was solely to blame for the financial crisis, but it is widely considered to have played a part. In February 2009, then-Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner summed up two key problem areas: Our financial system operated with large gaps in meaningful oversight, and without
sufficient constraints to limit risk. Even institutions that were overseen by our complicated, overlapping system of multiple regulators put themselves in a position of extreme vulnerability. These failures helped lay the foundation for the worst economic crisis in generations. 40 One definition of systemic risk is that it occurs when each firm manages risk rationally from its own perspective, but the sum total of those decisions produces systemic instability under certain conditions. Similarly, regulators charged with overseeing individual parts of the financial system may satisfy themselves that no threats to stability exist in their respective sectors, but fail to detect systemic risk generated by unsuspected correlations and interactions among the parts of the global system. The Federal Reserve was for many years a kind of default systemic regulator, expected to clean up after a crisis, but with limited authority to take ex ante preventive measures. Furthermore, the Fed’s authority was mostly limited to the banking sector. The Dodd-Frank Act
created the FSOC to assume a coordinating role, with the single mission of detecting systemic stress before a crisis can take hold (and identifying firms whose individual failure might trigger cascading losses with system-wide consequences). (...continued) Questions, by N. Eric Weiss. 39 For more information, see CRS Report RS21278, Farm Credit System, by Jim Monke. 40 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, “Introducing the Financial Stability Plan,” February 10, 2009, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press- releases/Pages/tg18.aspx. http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d099:FLD002:@1(99+205) Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 23 FSOC is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, and the other voting members are the heads of
the Fed, FDIC, OCC, NCUA, SEC, CFTC, FHFA, and CFPB, and a member appointed by the President with insurance expertise. Five nonvoting members serve in an advisory capacity—the director of the Office of Financial Research (OFR, which was created by the Dodd-Frank Act to support the FSOC), the head of the Federal Insurance Office (FIO, created by the Dodd-Frank Act), a state banking supervisor, a state insurance commissioner, and a state securities commissioner. The FSOC is tasked with identifying risks to financial stability and responding to emerging systemic risks, while promoting market discipline by minimizing moral hazard arising from expectations that firms or their counterparties will be rescued from failure. The FSOC’s duties include through the OFR; risks; romote
stability, competitiveness, and efficiency; financial regulators; including “new or heightened standards and safeguards”; standards issued by any standard-setting body; and among council members. The FSOC may not impose any resolution on disagreeing members, however. In addition, the council is required to provide an annual report and testimony to Congress. In contrast to some proposals to create a systemic risk regulator, the Dodd-Frank Act did not give the council authority (beyond the existing authority of its individual members) to respond to emerging threats or close regulatory gaps it identifies. In many cases, the council can only make regulatory recommendations to member agencies or Congress—
it cannot impose change. Although the FSOC does not have direct supervisory authority over any financial institution, it plays an important role in regulation because it designates firms and financial market utilities as systemically important. Designated firms come under a consolidated supervisory safety and soundness regime administered by the Fed that may be more stringent than the standards that apply to nonsystemic firms. (FSOC is also tasked with making recommendations to the Fed on standards for that regime.) In a limited number of other cases, regulators must seek FSOC advice or approval before exercising new powers under the Dodd-Frank Act. Federal Financial Institution Examinations Council The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) was created in 1979 (P.L. 95- 630, 92 Stat. 3641) as a formal interagency body to coordinate federal regulation of lending institutions. Through the FFIEC, the federal banking regulators issue a single set of reporting forms for covered institutions. The FFIEC also attempts to harmonize auditing principles and
supervisory decisions. The FFIEC is made up of the Fed, OCC, FDIC, CFPB, NCUA, and a Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 24 representative of the State Liaison Committee, 41 each of which employs examiners to enforce safety and soundness regulations for lending institutions. Federal financial institution examiners evaluate the risks of covered institutions. The specific safety and soundness concerns common to the FFIEC agencies can be found in the handbooks employed by examiners to monitor lenders. Each subject area of the handbook can be updated separately. Examples of safety and soundness subject areas include important indicators of risk, such as capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. Nonfederal Financial Regulation Insurance42
Insurance companies, unlike banks and securities firms, have been chartered and regulated solely by the states for the past 150 years. 43 There are no federal regulators of insurance akin to those for securities or banks, such as the SEC or the OCC, respectively. The limited federal role stems from both Supreme Court decisions and congressional action. In the 1868 case Paul v. Virginia, the Court found that insurance was not considered interstate commerce, and thus not subject to federal regulation. This decision was effectively reversed in the 1944 decision U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association. In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §1011 et seq.) specifically preserving the states’ authority to regulate and tax insurance and also granting a federal antitrust exemption to the insurance industry for “the business of insurance.” Each state government has a department or other entity charged with licensing and regulating insurance companies and those individuals and companies selling insurance products. States
regulate the solvency of the companies and the content of insurance products as well as the market conduct of companies. Although each state sets its own laws and regulations for insurance, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) acts as a coordinating body that sets national standards through model laws and regulations. Models adopted by the NAIC, however, must be enacted by the states before having legal effect, which can be a lengthy and uncertain process. The states have also developed a coordinated system of guaranty funds, designed to protect policyholders in the event of insurer insolvency. Although the federal government’s role in regulating insurance is relatively limited compared with its role in banking and securities, its role has increased over time. Various court cases interpreting McCarran-Ferguson’s antitrust exemption have narrowed the definition of the business of insurance, whereas Congress has expanded the federal role in GLBA and the Dodd- Frank Act through federal oversight. For example, the Federal Reserve has regulatory authority
over bank holding companies with insurance operations as well as insurers designated as systemically important by FSOC. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act created the FIO to monitor the insurance industry and represent the United States in international fora relating to insurance. Various federal laws have also exempted aspects of state insurance regulation, such as state 41 The State Liaison Committee is, in turn, made up of representatives of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the American Council of State Savings Supervisors, and the National Association of State Credit Union Supervisors. 42 This section was written by Baird Webel, specialist in Financial Economics. 43 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10043, Introduction to Financial Services: Insurance Regulation, by Baird Webel. Who Regulates Whom?
Congressional Research Service 25 insurer licensing laws for a small category of insurers in the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (15 U.S.C. §§3901 et seq.) and state insurance producer licensing laws in the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-1, Title II). Other State Regulation In addition to insurance, there are state regulators for banking and securities markets. State regulation also plays a role in nonbank consumer financial protection, although that role has diminished as the federal role has expanded. As noted above, banking is a dual system in which institutions choose to charter at the state or federal level. A majority of community banks are state chartered. There are more than four times as many state-chartered as there are nationally chartered commercial banks, but state-chartered commercial banks had less than one-half as many assets as nationally chartered banks at the end of 2016. For thrifts, nationally chartered thrifts make up less than half of all thrifts, but have 65%
of thrift assets. 44 Although state-chartered banks have state regulators as their primary regulators, federal regulators still play a regulatory role. Most depositories have FDIC deposit insurance; to qualify, they must meet federal safety and soundness standards, such as prompt corrective action ratios. In addition, many state banks (and a few state thrifts) are members of the Fed, which gives the Fed supervisory authority over them. State banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System are supervised by the FDIC. However, even nonmember Fed banks must meet the Fed’s reserve requirements. In securities markets, “The federal securities acts expressly allow for concurrent state regulation under blue sky laws. The state securities acts have traditionally been limited to disclosure and qualification with regard to securities distributions. Typically, the state securities acts have general antifraud provisions to further these ends.” 45
Blue sky laws are intended to protect investors against fraud. Registration is another area where states play a role. In general, investment advisers who are granted exemptions from SEC registration based on size are overseen by state regulators. Broker-dealers, by contrast, are typically subject to both state and federal regulation. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416) invalidated state securities law in a number of other areas (including capital, margin, bonding, and custody requirements) to reduce the overlap between state and federal securities regulation. States also play a role in enforcement by taking enforcement actions against financial institutions and market participants. This role is large in states with a large financial industry, such as New York. Federal regulation plays a central role in determining the scope of state regulation because of federal preemption laws (that apply federal statute to state- chartered institutions) and state “wild
card” laws (that allow state-chartered institutions to automatically receive powers granted to 44 Statistics are for FDIC-insured institutions. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile, December 2016, at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/qbp/2016dec/qbp.pdf. 45 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation (Thomson Reuters, 2015), Chapter 8.1. http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d114:FLD002:@1(114+1) Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 26 federal-chartered institutions). 46 For example, firms, products, and professionals that have registered with the SEC are not required to register at the state level. 47
International Standards and Regulation Financial regulation must also take into account the global nature of financial markets. More specifically, U.S. regulators must account for foreign financial firms operating in the United States and foreign regulators must account for U.S. firms operating in their jurisdictions. Sometimes regulators grant each other equivalency (i.e., leaving regulation to the home country) when firms wish to operate abroad, and other times foreign firms are subjected to domestic regulation. If financial activity migrates to jurisdictions with laxer regulatory standards, it could undermine the effectiveness of regulation in jurisdictions with higher standards. To ensure consensus and consistency across jurisdictions, U.S. regulators and the Treasury Department participate in international fora with foreign regulators to set broad international regulatory standards or principles that members voluntarily pledge to follow. Given the size and significance of the U.S. financial system, U.S. policymakers are generally viewed as playing a substantial role in setting
these standards. Although these standards are not legally binding, U.S. regulators generally implement rulemaking or Congress passes legislation to incorporate them. 48 There are multiple international standard-setting bodies, including one corresponding to each of the three main areas of financial regulation: regulation, (IOSCO) for securities and derivatives regulation, and for insurance regulation. 49 In addition, the G-20, an international body consisting of the United States, the European Union, and 18 other economies, spearheaded international coordination of regulatory reform after the financial crisis. It created the Financial Stability Board (FSB),
consisting of the finance ministers and financial regulators from the G-20 countries, four official international financial institutions, and six international standard-setting bodies (including those listed above), to formulate agreements to implement regulatory reform. There is significant overlap between the FSB’s regulatory reform agenda and the Dodd-Frank Act. The relationship between these various entities is diagrammed in Figure 4. 46 Michael Barr et al., Financial Regulation: Law and Policy (St. Paul: Foundation Press, 2016), Chapter 2.1. 47 GAO, Financial Regulation, GAO-16-175, February 2016, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675400.pdf. 48 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10129, Introduction to Financial Services: International Supervision, by Martin A. Weiss. 49 As noted above, the insurance industry is primarily regulated at the state level. The Dodd-Frank Act created the
Federal Insurance Office, in part, to act as the U.S. representative in these international fora. See CRS Report R44820, Selected International Insurance Issues in the 115th Congress, by Baird Webel and Rachel F. Fefer. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 27 Figure 4. International Financial Architecture Source: CRS In Focus IF10129, Introduction to Financial Services: International Supervision, by Martin A. Weiss. http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IF10129 Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 28 Appendix A. Changes to Regulatory Structure Since 2008 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 created four new federal entities related to financial regulation—the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), Office of Financial Research (OFR), Federal
Insurance Office (FIO), and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). OFR and FIO are offices within the Treasury Department, and are not regulators. The Dodd-Frank Act granted new authority to the CFPB and transferred existing authority to it from other regulators, as shown in Figure A-1 (represented by the arrows). (With the exception of the OTS, the agencies shown in the figure retained all authority unrelated to consumer protection, as well as some authority related to consumer protection.) The section above entitled “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau” has more detail on the authority granted to the CFPB and areas where the CFPB was not granted authority. Figure A-1. Changes to Consumer Protection Authority in the Dodd-Frank Act Source: CRS. Notes: Blue = existing agency, Orange = eliminated agency, Gray = new agency. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and transferred its authority to the banking regulators, as shown in
Figure A-2. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 29 Figure A-2. Changes to the Oversight of Thrifts in the Dodd- Frank Act Source: CRS. Notes: Blue = existing agency, Orange = eliminated agency, Gray = new agency. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and eliminated the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB). As shown in Figure A-3, HERA granted the FHFA new authority, the existing authority of the two eliminated agencies (shown in orange), and transferred limited existing authority from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Figure A-3. Changes to the Oversight of Housing Finance in HERA Source: CRS. Notes: Blue = existing agency, Orange = eliminated agency, Gray = new agency. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 30 Appendix B. Experts List Table B-1. CRS Contact Information Author Title Telephone Email Regulation of: Darryl Getter Specialist in Financial Economics 7-2834 [email protected] Consumer protection, credit unions
Raj Gnanarajah Analyst in Financial Economics 7-2175 [email protected] Accounting and auditing, deposit insurance Marc Labonte Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy 7-0640 [email protected] Financial stability, Federal Reserve, regulatory structure Rena Miller Specialist in Financial Economics 7-0826 [email protected] Derivatives James Monke
Specialist in Agricultural Policy 7-9664 [email protected] Farm credit David Perkins Analyst in Macroeconomic Policy 7-6626 [email protected] Banking Gary Shorter Specialist in Financial Economics 7-7772 [email protected] Securities Baird Webel Specialist in Financial Economics 7-0652 [email protected] Insurance Eric Weiss Specialist in Financial Economics
7-6209 [email protected] Housing finance Martin Weiss Specialist in International Trade and Finance 7-5407 [email protected] International finance Author Contact Information Marc Labonte Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy [email protected], 7-0640 Acknowledgments This report was originally authored by former CRS Specialists Mark Jickling and Edward Murphy. mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected]
mailto:[email protected] Name: Spring 2019 FIN 6102 Please complete the following problems. Each problem is worth 5 points each. Maximum number of points available is 40. 1. You are looking to purchase a 25 year life insurance policy for $150,000. The policy will pay annually at the end of the year. The current market interest rate is 2.5%. What should the annual payment per year be? 2. You have earned a pension worth $2,000 a month, you think you will live and additional 15 years. The current prevailing interest rate is 2% per year. What is the current market value of your pension? 3. You are attempting to price a 25 year annuity due for your insurance company. Payments of $3,500 for this annuity due start at the beginning of each year. The investment team at your company guarantees a return of 8%. What is the lowest price your company should offer?
4. You start an annuity with $1 million and expect to receive 12 equal payments beginning at the end of the first year. The guaranteed annual interest rate is 6 percent. The annual payments that you expect to collect are? 5. Calculate the annual cash flows of a $2 million, 10-year fixed-payment annuity due earning a guaranteed 8 percent annually if the payments are to start at the beginning of this year. 6. Calculate the college fund required to start a four year college program in 15 years time. The tuition fees are currently 12,000 and are first payable at the start of year 16. Inflation is 4% and the rate of return is 9%. Calculate the lump sum which needs to be invested today to provide the college fund. 7. Mega Millions has reached a record-breaking jackpot of $1.6 billion. Whoever holds the winning lottery ticket will be given
two options: They can collect their winnings as a one-time lump sum that's less than the value of the total jackpot in this case, it would be $904,900,000, or they can receive the full amount in annual installments stretched out over 29 years. The annuity will pay out 1 billion dollars (meaning the present value of all future cashflows). The current inflation rate is 3%. What interest rate would make you indifferent between the annuity and the lump sum payment? 8. Calculate the annual cash flows of a $2 million, 10-year fixed-payment deferred annuity earning a guaranteed 8 percent per year if annual payments are to begin at the end of the sixth (6th) year.

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Asset and Liability ManagementFin6102Ferriter – Spring 2018.docx

  • 1.
    Asset and LiabilityManagement Fin6102 Ferriter – Spring 2018 Agenda Review Questions from Last Week Depository Institutions Security Brokers and Investment Firms Insurance Finance Companies Overview of Depository Institutions This chapter recognizes three major FI groups: Commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions This chapter discusses depository FIs: Size, structure, and composition Balance sheets and recent trends Regulation of depository institutions Depository institutions performance Ch 2-3 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 3 Products of U.S. FIs Comparing the products of FIs in 1950, to products of FIs in 2016: Much greater distinction between types of FIs in terms of products offered in 1950 than in 2016
  • 2.
    Blurring of productlines and services over time and wider array of services (Refer to Tables 2-1A and 2-1B in the text) Ch 2-4 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 4 Specialness of Depository FIs Products offered on both sides of the balance sheet Offer loans Asset side Accept deposits Liabilities side Ch 2-5 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 5 Other Outputs of Depository FIs Other products and services in 1950: Payment services, savings products, fiduciary services By 2016, products and services further expanded to frequently include: Underwriting of debt and equity, insurance and risk management products Ch 2-6 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 6
  • 3.
    Size of DepositoryFIs Consolidation has created some very large FIs Combined effects of disintermediation, global competition, regulatory changes, technological developments, competition across different types of FIs Ch 2-7 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 7 Largest US Depository Institutions Ch 2-8CompanyBanking AssetsHolding Company Assets ($ billions)J.P. Morgan Chase$2,134.1$2,448.0Bank of America1,629.52,152.0Wells Fargo1,629.51,720.6Citigroup1,337.51,829.4U.S. Bancorp414.0419.1PNC Financial Services Corp.343.6354.2Bank of New York Mellon343.6395.3State Street Corp.289.4294.6Capital One254.4310.6TD Bank252.4253.2 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 8 8 Commercial Banks Largest group of depository institutions Differ from other FIs in composition of assets and liabilities, as well as regulatory oversight Large and small commercial banks differ with regards to structure and composition E.g., larger banks make more commercial/industrial loans and
  • 4.
    small banks makemore real estate loans Mix of very large banks with very small banks Ch 2-9 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 9 Structure and Composition Shrinking number of banks: 14,416 commercial banks in 1985 12,744 in 1989 5,472 in 2015 Mostly the result of Mergers and Acquisitions M&A prevented prior to 1980s, 1990s Consolidation has reduced asset share of smallest banks (under $1 billion) Ch 2-10 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 10 Regulation, Functions & Structure Functions of depository institutions Regulatory sources of differences across types of depository institutions Structural changes generally resulted from changes in regulatory policy Example: Changes permitting interstate branching Riegle-Neal Act, 1994 Ch 2-11 ©McGraw-Hill Education.
  • 5.
    11 Ch 2-12 Breakdown ofLoan Portfolios ©McGraw-Hill Education. 12 12 Commercial Banks: Asset ConcentrationSize2015 AssetsPercent of Total1984 AssetsPercent of TotalAll FDIC Insured14,679.2100.02,508.9100.0$100M or Less93.56.0404.216.1$100M - $1B1,014.76.9513.920.5$1B - $10B1,336.89.1725.928.9$10B or more12,234.383.4864.834.5 Ch 2-13 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 13 13 Structure and Composition of Commercial Banks Limited powers to underwrite corporate securities have existed
  • 6.
    only since 1987 FinancialServices Modernization Act 1999 Permitted commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies to merge Ch 2-14 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 14 Composition of Commercial Banking Sector Community Banks Regional or Superregional Access to federal funds market to finance their lending and investment activities Money Center Banks Bank of New York Mellon, Deutsche Bank (Bankers Trust), Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, HSBC Bank USA Ch 2-15 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 15 Balance Sheet and Trends Key trends since 1987 Business loans have declined in importance while securities and mortgages have increased What influences these trends? Increased importance of alternative funding via commercial paper market Securitization of mortgage loans Temporary effects: credit crunch during recessions of 1989-92
  • 7.
    and 2001-02 Ch 2-16 ©McGraw-HillEducation. 16 Commercial Banks, June 2015 Primary assets: Real Estate Loans: $3,801.9 B C&I loans: $1,737.6 B Loans to individuals: $1,301.2 B Investment security portfolio: $3,953.0 B Of which, Treasury securities: $2,015.3 B Credit/default risk is a major exposure Ch 2-17 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 17 Commercial Banks, June 2015 Continued Primary liabilities: Deposits: $11,108.4 billion Borrowings: $1,578.2 billion Other liabilities: $339.1 billion Inference:
  • 8.
    Maturity mismatch/interest raterisk and liquidity risk are key areas of exposure Ch 2-18 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 18 Terminology Transaction accounts Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts Money Market Mutual Funds Negotiable CDs Ch 2-19 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 19 Equity Commercial bank equity capital 11.26 percent of total liabilities and equity (2015) TARP program 2008-2009 intended to encourage increase in capital Citigroup $25 B BOA $20 B Through 2015: $245 B in capital injections through TARP Ch 2-20 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 20
  • 9.
    Off-Balance-Sheet Activities Heightened importanceof off-balance-sheet items OBS assets, OBS liabilities Earnings and regulatory incentives Risk control and risk producing Role of mortgage backed securities “Toxic” assets Expansion of oversight to unregulated OTC derivative securities Ch 2-21 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 21 Major OBS Activities Issuing guarantees E.g., letters of credit Typically contain an insurance underwriting element Loan commitments Derivative transactions Futures Forwards Options Swaps Ch 2-22 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 22 Other Fee-Generating Activities
  • 10.
    Trust services Correspondent banking Servicesgenerally sold as a package Types of services offered: Check clearing and collection Foreign exchange trading Hedging Participation in large loan and security issuances Ch 2-23 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 23 Key Regulatory Agencies FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) Role in preventing contagious “runs” or panics OCC: Primary function is to charter (and close) national banks FRS: Monetary policy, lender of last resort National banks are automatically members of the FRS; state- chartered banks can elect to become members State bank regulators Dual Banking System: Coexistence of national and state- chartered banks Ch 2-24 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 24 Ch 2-25 Bank Regulators
  • 11.
    ©McGraw-Hill Education. 25 25 Legislation, 1927-1956 1927McFadden Act: Controls branching of national banks 1933 Glass-Steagall: Separates securities and banking activities, established FDIC, prohibited interest on demand deposits 1956 Bank Holding Company Act and subsequent amendments specifies permissible activities and regulation by FRS of BHCs Ch 2-26 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 26 Legislation, 1970-1978 1970 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act: Extension to one-bank holding companies 1978 International Banking Act: Regulated foreign bank branches and agencies in US Ch 2-27 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 27 Legislation, 1980 - 1982 1980 DIDMCA and 1982 Garn-St. Germain Depository
  • 12.
    Institutions Act (DIA) Mainlyderegulation acts Phased out Regulation Q Authorized NOW accounts nationwide Increased deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000 Reaffirmed limitations on bank powers to underwrite and distribute insurance products Ch 2-28 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 28 Legislation, 1987-1989 1987 Competitive Equality in Banking Act (CEBA) Redefined bank to limit growth of nonbank banks Focus on recapitalization of FSLIC 1989 FIRREA Imposed restrictions on investment activities Replaced FSLIC with FDIC-SAIF Replaced FHLB with Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) Created Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) Ch 2-29 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 29 Legislation, 1991 1991 FDIC Improvement Act Introduced prompt corrective action (PCA) Risk-based deposit insurance premiums Limited “too big to fail” bailouts by federal regulators
  • 13.
    Extended federal regulationover foreign bank branches and agencies in FBSEA Ch 2-30 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 30 Legislation, 1994 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act Permits BHCs to acquire banks in other states Invalidates some restrictive state laws Permits BHCs to convert out-of-state subsidiary banks to branches of single interstate bank Newly chartered branches permitted interstate if allowed by state law Ch 2-31 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 31 Legislation, 1999 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act Allowed banks, insurance companies, and securities firms to enter each others’ business areas Provided for state regulation of insurance Streamlined regulation of BHCs Prohibited FDIC assistance to affiliates and subsidiaries of banks and savings institutions Provided for national treatment of foreign banks Ch 2-32 ©McGraw-Hill Education.
  • 14.
    32 Legislation, 2010 2010 WallStreet Reform and Consumer Protection Act Financial Services Oversight Council created Government gained power to break up FIs that pose a systemic risk to the system Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created GAO to audit Federal Reserve activities Nonbinding proxy vote on executive pay Trading via clearinghouse for some derivatives Ch 2-33 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 33 Industry Performance Economic expansion and falling interest rates through 1990s Brief downturn in early 2000s followed by strong performance improvements Record earnings $106.3 billion 2003 Performance remained stable through mid 2000s as interest rates rose Late 2000s: Strongest recession since Great Depression Ch 2-34 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 34
  • 15.
    Savings Institutions Comprised of: SavingsAssociations (SAs) Savings Banks (SBs) Effects of changes in Federal Reserve’s policy of interest rate targeting combined with Regulation Q and disintermediation Effects of moral hazard and regulator forbearance Qualified thrift lender (QTL) test Ch 2-35 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 35 Savings Institutions: Recent Trends Industry is smaller overall Intense competition from other FIs E.g., mortgages Ch 2-36 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 36 Primary Regulators Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) FDIC-DIF Fund FDIC oversaw and managed Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) SAIF and Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) merged in January 2007 to form DIF Same regulatory structure applied to commercial banks Ch 2-37
  • 16.
    ©McGraw-Hill Education. 37 Credit Unions NonprofitDIs owned by member-depositors with a common bond Specialize in small consumer loans Exempt from taxes and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Expansion of services offered in order to compete with other FIs Claim of unfair advantage of CUs over small commercial banks Ch 2-38 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 38 Ch 2-39 Composition of Credit Union Deposits, 2015 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 39 39 Global Issues Spread of US financial crisis to other countries Many European banks saved from bankruptcy through support
  • 17.
    of governments andcentral banks Target interest rates at or below 1 percent Links to macroeconomic performance Ch 2-40 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 40 Financial Statement Analysis Return on equity (ROE): measures overall profitability per dollar of equity Return on assets (ROA): measures profit generated relative to assets Equity multiplier (EM): measures extent to which assets are funded with equity relative to debt Profit margin (PM): measures ability to pay expenses and generate net income Asset utilization (AU): measures amount of interest and noninterest income generated per dollar of total assets Ch 2-41 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 41 CAMELS Ratings Composite 1: Institutions are generally sound in every respect Composite 2: Institutions are fundamentally sound, but may reflect modest weaknesses Composite 3: Institutions exhibit financial, operational, or compliance weaknesses Composite 4: Immoderate volume of serious financial weaknesses
  • 18.
    Composite 5: Extremelyhigh immediate or near term probability of failure ©McGraw-Hill Education. DIs and Regulators Ch 2-43 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 43 Technology in Commercial Banking Wholesale banking services E.g., account reconciliation, electronic funds transfer, electronic billing, cloud computing, etc. Retail banking services E.g., ATMs, smart cards, online/mobile banking, tablet banking, loyalty programs, etc. Advanced technology requirements Ch 2-44 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 44
  • 19.
    Asset and LiabilityManagement Fin6102 Ferriter – Spring 2018 Overview This chapter discusses securities brokerage firms and investment banks Activities of securities firms and investment banks Size, structure, and composition Balance sheets and recent trends Regulation of securities firms and investment banks Global issues Ch 4-2 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 2 Securities Firms and Investment Banks Securities firms Specialize in the purchase, sale, and brokerage of existing securities Retail Investment banks Specialize in originating, underwriting and distributing issues of new securities Advising on M&As and restructuring Commercial Ch 4-3 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 3
  • 20.
    Securities Firms andInvestment Banks Continued Growth in domestic M&A: Less than $200 billion in 1990 $1.83 trillion in 2000 In US: bottomed out at $458 billion in 2002 ($1.2 trillion worldwide) Topped $1.7 trillion 2007 ($4.5 trillion worldwide) Effects of financial crisis: fell to $687 billion in 2010 ($1.8 trillion worldwide) Worst financial crisis since 1930s, but M&A activity still greater than early 2000s Ch 4-4 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 4 Ch 4-5 Mergers and Acquisitions, 1990-2015 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 5 5 Structural Changes in Recent Years Acquisition of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan Chase Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America Only two remaining major firms:
  • 21.
    Goldman Sachs andMorgan Stanley Converted to commercial bank holding companies in 2008 Ch 4-6 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 6 Largest M&A Transactions ©McGraw-Hill Education. 7 7 Size, Structure and Composition Dramatic increase in number of firms from 1980 to 1987 Decline of 37% in the number of firms following the 1987 crash, to year 2006 Concentration of business among the largest firms Ch 4-8 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 8 Size, Structure and Composition Continued Many recent interindustry mergers (i.e., insurance companies and investment banks) Role of Financial Services Modernization Act, 1999 Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs,
  • 22.
    and Morgan Stanleygone by end of 2008 Ch 4-9 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 9 Types and Relative Sizes of Firms National full-line firms are largest Service retail and corporate clients Three categories: commercial bank holding companies, national full-line firms, and large investment banks BOA (via acquisition of Merrill Lynch); Morgan Stanley National full-line firms specializing in corporate finance are second in size Goldman Sachs, Salomon Brothers/Smith Barney (Citigroup) Ch 4-10 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 10 Remainder of industry: Regional securities firms (subdivided into large, medium, and small) Specialized discount brokers Electronic trading firms Venture capital firms Other firms E.g., research boutiques, floor specialists, etc. Ch 4-11 Types and Relative Sizes of Firms Continued
  • 23.
    ©McGraw-Hill Education. 11 Ch 4-12 TopBHCs, 2014 (by brokerage fee income) ©McGraw-Hill Education. 12 12 Key Activities Investment banking Activities related to underwriting and distributing new (IPOs) and secondary (seasoned) issues of debt and equity Public and private offerings Venture Capital Market making Involves creating a secondary market Increasing importance of online trading Technology risk Ch 4-13 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 13 Key Activities (Continued)
  • 24.
    Trading Position trading, purearbitrage, risk arbitrage, program trading, etc. Investing Cash management Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) Back-office and service functions Ch 4-14 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 14 Recent Trends Decline in trading volume and brokerage commissions Particularly since crash of 1987, although some recovery since 1992 Record volumes 1995-2000 Resurgence in market values and commissions during mid-2000s New market value lows in 2008-2009 Commission income also declined Ch 4-15 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 15 Recent Trends (Continued) Pretax net income over $9 billion per year between 1996 and 2000 Pretax profits soared to $31.6 billion in 2000 Curtailed by economic slowdown and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks Worries over securities law violations and loss of investor
  • 25.
    confidence E.g., Enron, Merck,WorldCom, etc. Financial crisis, 2008 Profits recovered, 2009 Ch 4-16 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 16 Ch 4-17 Securities Industry Pretax Profits, 1990-2014 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 17 17 Balance Sheet Key assets: Reverse repurchase agreements Receivables from other broker-dealers Long positions in securities and commodities Subject to high levels of market and interest rate risk Ch 4-18 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 18
  • 26.
    Balance Sheet Continued Keyliabilities: Repurchase agreements are major source of funds Payables to customers Payables to other broker-dealers Securities and commodities sold short Capital levels much lower than in depository institutions Ch 4-19 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 19 Regulation Primary regulator is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Reaffirmed by National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996 Prior to NSMIA, regulated by SEC and each state in which the firm operated Ch 4-20 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 20 Regulation Continued Early 2000s saw erosion of SEC dominance Increased vigilance by state attorney generals Criminal cases brought mainly by states against securities law
  • 27.
    violators New York Statevs. Merrill Lynch Spring 2003, $1.4 billion in penalties over investor abuses New rules brought by SEC for greater disclosure by analysts of potential conflicts of interest Ch 4-21 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 21 Regulation Concluded Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Handles day-to-day regulation Independent, not-for-profit Authorized by Congress Writes and enforces rules governing security firm activities Enhance transparency in the market Dark pools Ch 4-22 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 22 Extension of Oversight Additional oversight from US Congress Hearings focused on role of investment banks in the financial crisis Goldman Sachs bundling of toxic assets Ch 4-23 ©McGraw-Hill Education.
  • 28.
    23 Extension of OversightContinued 2010 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Financial Services Oversight Council New authority for Federal Reserve to supervise systemically important firms Registration limits for advisors changed Regulation of securitization markets; stronger regulation of credit agencies Authority for government to resolve nonbank FIs Ch 4-24 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 24 Extension of Oversight Concluded Kenneth Feinberg (“pay czar”) given voice as to executive compensation packages Ch 4-25 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 25 Investor Protection and Other Monitoring Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) Protection level of $500,000
  • 29.
    October 2003 implementationof provisions of Patriot Act to combat money laundering Scrutiny of individual identities and affiliations with terrorists Ch 4-26 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 26 Global Issues Global nature of securities firms Competition between US and European firms Foreign investors’ transactions in US securities and US investors’ transactions in foreign securities exchanges increased Global concern about capital, liquidity, and leverage following the financial crisis Implications for global competitiveness Strategic alliances Exit from foreign markets Ch 4-27 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 27 Pertinent Websites Federal Reserve NYSE SEC Securities Industry Association SIPC FINRA Ch 4-28
  • 30.
    www.federalreserve.gov www.nyse.com www.sec.gov www.sifma.com www.sipc.org www.finra.org ©McGraw-Hill Education. 28 FI 201 InvestmentBanking * The Role of Investment BankersMiddleman who brings together investors and firms (and governments) issuing new securities. Initial Public Offering (IPO) – First sale of common stock to the general public. *
  • 31.
    The Role ofInvestment BankersUnderwriting – Purchase of an issue of new securities for subsequent sale by investment bankers; the guaranteeing of the sale of a new issue of securities.Originating House – Investment banker who makes an agreement to sell a new issue and forms a syndicate to sell securities. * The Role of Investment Bankers Syndicate – Selling group formed to market a new issue of securities Best efforts agreement – Contract with an investment banker for the sale of securities in which the investment banker does not guarantee the sale but does agree to make the best effort to sell the securities * The pricing of new issues is crucial.If the initial offer price is too high, the syndicate will be unable sell the securities.When this occurs the investment banker has two choices: 1) to maintain the offer price and to hold the securities in inventory until they are sold, or 2) to let the market find a lower price level that
  • 32.
    will induce investorsto purchase the securities.Neither choice benefits the investment bankers Pricing a New Issue * Marketing New SecuritiesPreliminary prospectus (red herring) – Initial document detailing the financial condition of a firm that must be filed with the SEC to register a new issue of securities.Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) – Government agency that enforces the federal securities laws.Registration – The process of filing information with the SEC concerning a proposed sale of securities to the general public. * A nonpublic sale of securities to a financial institution such as an endowment fund, mutual fund or pension fund. Private Placements *
  • 33.
    Regulation- Full DisclosureLaws Securities Act of 1933 – covers new issue of securities Securities Exchange Act of 1934 – devoted to trading in existing securities 10-K Report – Required annual report filed with the SEC by publicly-held firms. Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) – Federal agency that insures investors against failures by brokerage firms – limited to $500,000 per customer. * The independence of auditors and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Corporate responsibility and financial disclosure Conflict of interest and corporate fraud and accountability Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 * Asset and Liability Management Fin6102 Ferriter – Spring 2018 Overview This chapter discusses insurance companies Two major groups:
  • 34.
    Life Property-casualty Financial crisis andinsurance companies Size, structure, and composition Balance sheets and recent trends Regulation of insurance companies Global competition and trends Ch 6-2 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 2 Insurance and Financial Crisis Insurance companies as investors in securities Subprime mortgage pools fell in value Credit default swaps (CDS) fell AIG was a major writer of CDS securities Potential impact on other FIs that bought CDS from AIG used to justify the bailout Increased risk exposure to banks, investment banks, and insurers Ch 6-3 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 3 Insurance Companies Differences in services provided by: Life insurance companies Property and casualty insurance companies Ch 6-4 ©McGraw-Hill Education.
  • 35.
    4 Size, Structure, andComposition Size, structure, and composition of the insurance industry: In 1988: 2,300 life insurance companies with aggregate assets of $1.1 trillion In 2010s: 830 life insurance companies with aggregate assets of $6.5 trillion in 2015 Ch 6-5 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 5 Size, Structure, and Composition Continued 4 largest life insurers wrote 33% of new business in 2014 Most policies sold through commercial banks 18% of all fixed annuities were sold by commercial banks in 2015 Ch 6-6 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 6 Life Insurance Companies Significant merger activity in life insurance industry Not to same extent witnessed in banking E.g., Anthem and Signa, MetLife and American Life Insurance, etc.
  • 36.
    Competition from withinindustry and from other FIs Increased conversion from mutual to stockholder controlled companies Ch 6-7 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 7 Mutual vs. Stock Insurance Companies Ch 6-8 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 8 Biggest Life Insurers ©McGraw-Hill Education. 9 9 Insurance Issues Adverse selection Insured have higher risk than general population E.g., Matt has never had life insurance, but decides to buy some once he finds out he has a terminal illness Alleviated by grouping of policyholders into similar risk pools Problem for both life insurers and property-casualty insurers
  • 37.
    Ch 6-10 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 10 Typesof Life Insurance Life insurance products: Ordinary life Term life, whole life, endowment life Variable life, universal life and variable universal life Group life Industrial life Credit life Ch 6-11 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 11 Ch 6-12 Distribution of Premiums, 2015 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 12 12 Other Life Insurer Activities Annuities Reverse of life insurance activities
  • 38.
    Topped $325.2 billionin 2014 Private pension plans Insurers compete with other financial service companies In 2015, life insurers managed over $2.7 trillion (~40% of all private pension plans) Accident and health insurance Protects against morbidity (i.e., ill health) risk Over 168.7 billion in premiums in 2014 Ch 6-13 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 13 Balance Sheet Assets Need to generate competitive returns on savings components of life insurance policies Focus investment on long-term assets Bonds, equities, government securities Policy loans Liabilities Policy reserves to meet policyholders’ claims Separate account business represented 38.2% of total liabilities and capital in 2015 Ch 6-14 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 14 Recent Trends Impact of financial crisis
  • 39.
    Drop in valueof securities Capital losses from bonds and stocks exceeded $35 billion Historically low short-term interest rates Adverse impact on ability to lower rates on new policies Incentive to surrender existing policies Dwindling reserves led to Treasury Department extending bailout funds Late 2009 showed improvement Ch 6-15 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 15 Regulation McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 Confirms primacy of state over federal regulation State insurance commissions Coordinated examination system developed by NAIC Federal Reserve Supervises ~1/3 of U.S. insurance industry assets States promote life insurance guarantee funds Ch 6-16 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 16 Recent Regulatory Issues Fear of systemic risk posed by AIG 2009: Proposals to create optional federal life insurance charter Proponents of federal charter argued inconsistent regulation and barriers to innovation inherent in current system 2010: Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
  • 40.
    established the FederalInsurance Office (FIO) Ch 6-17 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 17 Web Resources For more detailed information on insurance regulation, visit: NAIC www.naic.org Ch 6-18 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 18 Property-Casualty Insurance Size and Structure Currently about 2,640 companies sell property-casualty insurance Highly concentrated Top 10 firms have 50% of market in terms of premiums written Top 200 firms write over 95% of total premiums M&A activity is increasing concentration Ch 6-19 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 19 Types of P&C Products
  • 41.
    Fire insurance Homeowners multiple-perilinsurance Commercial multiple-peril insurance Automobile liability and physical damage insurance Liability insurance (other than automobile) Ch 6-20 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 20 Premium Allocation Changing composition of net premiums written, 2014 versus 1960: Fire: 2.3% vs. 16.6% in 1960 Homeowners MP: 15.2% vs. 5.2% in 1960 Commercial MP: 6.9% vs. 0.4% in 1960 Auto L&PD: 38.6% vs. 43% in 1960 Other liability: 12.7% vs. 6.6% in 1960 Ch 6-21 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 21 P&C Balance Sheet Similar to life insurance companies; long-term securities Unlike life insurance companies; requirement for liquid assets Major liabilities: Loss reserves Loss adjustment expenses Unearned premiums Ch 6-22
  • 42.
    ©McGraw-Hill Education. 22 Loss Risk Underwritingrisk may result from: Unexpected increases in loss rates Unexpected increases in expenses Unexpected decreases in investment yields or returns Property versus liability Losses from liability insurance less predictable Example: Claims due to asbestos damage to workers’ health Ch 6-23 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 23 Loss Risk Continued Severity versus frequency Loss rates more predictable on low-severity, high-frequency lines (such as fire, auto, and homeowners) than on high- severity, low-frequency lines (such as earthquake, hurricane, and financial guaranty) Higher uncertainty forces PC insurers to invest in more short- term assets and hold larger capital and reserves than life insurers Ch 6-24 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 24
  • 43.
    Insurance Risks Post9/11 Crisis generated by terrorist attacks forced creation of federal terrorism insurance program in 2002 Federal government provides backstop coverage under Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) Caps losses for insurance companies Ch 6-25 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 25 Long Tail Versus Short Tail Long-tail risk exposure Arises where loss occurs during coverage period but claim is not made until many years later Examples: Asbestos cases and Dalkon shield case Efforts to contain long-tail risks within subsidiaries Example: Halliburton Ch 6-26 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 26 Insurance Costs: Social Inflation Product inflation versus social inflation Unexpected inflation may be systematic or line-specific Social inflation: Unexpected changes in awards by juries Reinsurance Approximately 75 percent of reinsurance by US firms is written by non-US firms, such as Munich Re Ch 6-27
  • 44.
    ©McGraw-Hill Education. 27 Underwriting Profitability Lossratios have generally increased Expense ratios have generally decreased Attributed to change in distribution methods Insurers have begun selling directly to consumers through their own brokers rather than independent brokers Combined ratio: Includes both loss and expense experience If greater than 100, premiums are insufficient to cover losses and expenses Ch 6-28 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 28 Investment Yield / Return Risk Operating ratio = combined ratio after dividends minus investment yield Importance of investment income: Causes PC managers to place importance on measuring and managing credit and interest rate risk Ch 6-29 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 29
  • 45.
    P&C: Recent Trends Severalcatastrophes over 1985 - 2015 Hurricane Hugo 1989, San Francisco Earthquake 1991, Oakland fires 1991, Hurricane Andrew 1991 2004 hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan, Jeanne) occurred in rapid succession and generated claims comparable to Andrew Hurricane Katrina, 2005 September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks created an insurance crisis (and heightened demand) Hurricane Sandy, 2011 Potential for crowding out market solutions (catastrophe bonds) via government actions Ch 6-30 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 30 PC Regulation PC insurers chartered and regulated by state commissions State guaranty funds National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) provides various services to state commissions Includes Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) Many lines face rate regulation Criticism over Katrina-related claims Ch 6-31 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 31 Global Issues Insurance industry becoming increasingly global
  • 46.
    Worldwide, 2011 wasa bad year for both life and PC insurers Japan’s earthquake and tsunami Earthquakes in New Zealand Floods in Thailand Severe tornadoes in US Ch 6-32 ©McGraw-Hill Education. 32 Pertinent Websites A.M. Best Federal Reserve Insurance Information Institute Insurance Services Offices National Association of Insurance Commissioners Ch 6-33 www.ambest.com www.federalreserve.gov www.iii.org www.iso.com www.naic.org ©McGraw-Hill Education. 33
  • 47.
    Who Regulates Whom?An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Framework Marc Labonte Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy August 17, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44918 Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service Summary The financial regulatory system has been described as fragmented, with multiple overlapping regulators and a dual state-federal regulatory system. The system evolved piecemeal, punctuated
  • 48.
    by major changesin response to various historical financial crises. The most recent financial crisis also resulted in changes to the regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA; P.L. 110-289). To address the fragmented nature of the system, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a council of regulators and experts chaired by the Treasury Secretary. At the federal level, regulators can be clustered in the following areas: —Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve for banks; and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) for credit unions; —Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); -sponsored enterprise (GSE) regulators—Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), created by HERA, and Farm Credit
  • 49.
    Administration (FCA); and —ConsumerFinancial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created by the Dodd-Frank Act. These regulators regulate financial institutions, markets, and products using licensing, registration, rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement, and resolution powers. Other entities that play a role in financial regulation are interagency bodies, state regulators, and international regulatory fora. Notably, federal regulators generally play a secondary role in insurance markets. Financial regulation aims to achieve diverse goals, which vary from regulator to regulator: Policy debate revolves around the tradeoffs between these
  • 50.
    various goals. Differenttypes of regulation—prudential (safety and soundness), disclosure, standard setting, competition, and price and rate regulations—are used to achieve these goals. Many observers believe that the structure of the regulatory system influences regulatory outcomes. For that reason, there is ongoing congressional debate about the best way to structure the regulatory system. As background for that debate, this report provides an overview of the U.S. financial regulatory framework. It briefly describes each of the federal financial regulators and the types of institutions they supervise. It also discusses the other entities that play a role in financial regulation. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service Contents Introduction
  • 51.
    ............................................................................................... ...................................... 1 The FinancialSystem ............................................................................................... ....................... 1 The Role of Financial Regulators ............................................................................................... ..... 2 Regulatory Powers ............................................................................................... ..................... 3 Goals of Regulation ............................................................................................... .................... 4 Types of Regulation ............................................................................................... ................... 5 Regulated Entities ............................................................................................... ...................... 7 The Federal Financial Regulators ............................................................................................... ..... 7 Depository Institution Regulators ............................................................................................ 11 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ........................................................................ 14 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ............................................................................ 14 The Federal Reserve
  • 52.
    ............................................................................................... .......... 15 National CreditUnion Administration .............................................................................. 15 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ................................................................................... 15 Securities Regulation ............................................................................................... ............... 16 Securities and Exchange Commission .............................................................................. 16 Commodity Futures Trading Commission ........................................................................ 19 Standard-Setting Bodies and Self-Regulatory Organizations ........................................... 20 Regulation of Government-Sponsored Enterprises ................................................................. 21 Federal Housing Finance Agency ..................................................................................... 21 Farm Credit Administration .............................................................................................. 22 Regulatory Umbrella Groups ............................................................................................... ... 22 Financial Stability Oversight Council ............................................................................... 22 Federal Financial Institution Examinations Council ......................................................... 23 Nonfederal Financial Regulation ...............................................................................................
  • 53.
    .... 24 Insurance ............................................................................................... .................................. 24 OtherState Regulation ............................................................................................... ............. 25 International Standards and Regulation .................................................................................. 26 Figures Figure 1. Regulatory Jurisdiction by Agency and Type of Regulation .......................................... 10 Figure 2. Stylized Example of a Financial Holding Company ....................................................... 11 Figure 3. Jurisdiction Among Depository Regulators ................................................................... 13 Figure 4. International Financial Architecture ............................................................................... 27 Figure A-1. Changes to Consumer Protection Authority in the Dodd-Frank Act .......................... 28 Figure A-2. Changes to the Oversight of Thrifts in the Dodd- Frank Act ...................................... 29 Figure A-3. Changes to the Oversight of Housing Finance in HERA ........................................... 29
  • 54.
    Who Regulates Whom? CongressionalResearch Service Tables Table 1. Federal Financial Regulators and Who They Supervise .................................................... 8 Table B-1. CRS Contact Information ............................................................................................ 30 Appendixes Appendix A. Changes to Regulatory Structure Since 2008 ........................................................... 28 Appendix B. Experts List ............................................................................................... ............... 30 Contacts Author Contact Information ............................................................................................... ........... 30
  • 55.
    Who Regulates Whom? CongressionalResearch Service 1 Introduction Federal financial regulation encompasses vastly diverse markets, participants, and regulators. As a result, regulators’ goals, powers, and methods differ between regulators and sometimes within each regulator’s jurisdiction. This report provides background on the financial regulatory structure in order to help Congress evaluate specific policy proposals to change financial regulation. Historically, financial regulation in the United States has coevolved with a changing financial system, in which major changes are made in response to crises. For example, in response to the financial turmoil beginning in 2007, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) was the last act to make significant changes to the financial regulatory structure (see Appendix A). 1
  • 56.
    Congress continues todebate proposals to modify parts of the regulatory system established by the Dodd-Frank Act. In the 115 th Congress, proposals to change the regulatory structure include the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 (H.R. 10), which would modify and rename the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO), change the relationship between the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the regulators, eliminate the Office of Financial Research (OFR, which supports FSOC), and make other changes to how financial regulators promulgate rules and are funded. 2 This report attempts to set out the basic frameworks and principles underlying U.S. financial regulation and to give some historical context for the development of that system. The first section briefly discusses the various modes of financial regulation. The next section identifies the major federal regulators and the types of institutions they
  • 57.
    supervise (see Table1). It then provides a brief overview of each federal financial regulatory agency. Finally, the report discusses other entities that play a role in financial regulation—interagency bodies, state regulators, and international standards. For information on how the regulators are structured and funded, see CRS Report R43391, Independence of Federal Financial Regulators: Structure, Funding, and Other Issues, by Henry B. Hogue, Marc Labonte, and Baird Webel. The Financial System The financial system matches the available funds of savers and investors with borrowers and others seeking to raise funds in exchange for future payouts. Financial firms link individual savers and borrowers together. Financial firms can operate as intermediaries that issue obligations to savers and use those funds to make loans or investments for the firm’s profits. Financial firms can also operate as agents playing a custodial role, investing the funds of savers on their behalf in segregated accounts. The products, instruments, and markets used to facilitate this matching are myriad, and they are controlled and overseen by a complex
  • 58.
    system of regulators. Tohelp understand how the financial regulators have been organized, financial activities can be separated into distinct markets: 3 1 For more information, see CRS Report R41350, The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Background and Summary, coordinated by Baird Webel. 2 For more information, see CRS Report R44839, The Financial CHOICE Act in the 115th Congress: Selected Policy Issues, by Marc Labonte et al. 3 A multitude of diverse financial services are either directly provided or supported through guarantees by state or federal government. Examples include flood insurance (through the Federal Emergency Management Agency), (continued...) http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/bdquery/z?d115:H.R.10: Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 2
  • 59.
    —accepting deposits andmaking loans; —collecting premiums from and making payouts to policyholders triggered by a predetermined event; —issuing contracts that pledge to make payments from the issuer to the holder, and trading those contracts on markets. Contracts take the form of debt (a borrower and creditor relationship) and equity (an ownership relationship). One special class of securities is derivatives, which are financial contracts whose value is based on an underlying commodity, financial indicator, or financial instrument; and —the “plumbing” of the financial system, such as trade data dissemination, payment, clearing, and settlement systems, that underlies transactions. A distinction can be made between formal and functional definitions of these activities. Formal activities are those, as defined by regulation, exclusively permissible for entities based on their
  • 60.
    charter or license.By contrast, functional definitions acknowledge that from an economic perspective, activities performed by types of different entities can be quite similar. This tension between formal and functional activities is one reason why the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and others, has called the U.S. regulatory system fragmented, with gaps in authority, overlapping authority, and duplicative authority. 4 For example, “shadow banking” refers to activities, such as lending and deposit taking, that are economically similar to those performed by formal banks, but occur in the securities markets. The activities described above are functional definitions. However, because this report focuses on regulators, it mostly concentrates on formal definitions. The Role of Financial Regulators Financial regulation has evolved over time, with new authority usually added in response to failures or breakdowns in financial markets and authority trimmed back during financial booms. Because of this piecemeal evolution, powers, goals, tools, and approaches vary from market to
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    market. Nevertheless, thereare some common overarching themes across markets and regulators, which are highlighted in this section. The following provides a brief overview of what financial regulators do, specifically answering four questions: 1. What powers do regulators have? 2. What policy goals are regulators trying to accomplish? 3. Through what means are those goals accomplished? 4. Who or what is being regulated? (...continued) mortgage insurance (through the Federal Housing Administration and the Department of Veterans Affairs), student loans (through the Department of Education), trade financing (through the Export-Import Bank), and wholesale payment systems (through the Federal Reserve). This report focuses only on the regulation of private financial activities. 4 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Financial Regulation, GAO-16-175, February 2016, at
  • 62.
    https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675400.pdf. Who Regulates Whom? CongressionalResearch Service 3 Regulatory Powers Regulators implement policy using their powers, which vary by agency. Powers can be grouped into a few broad categories: understanding the regulatory system is that most activities cannot be undertaken unless a firm, individual, or market has received the proper credentials from the appropriate state or federal regulator. Each type of charter, license, or registration granted by the respective regulator governs the sets of financial activities that the holder is permitted to engage in. For example, a firm cannot accept federally insured deposits unless it is chartered as a bank, thrift, or credit union by a depository
  • 63.
    institution regulator. Likewise,an individual generally cannot buy and sell securities to others unless licensed as a broker-dealer. To be granted a license, charter, or registration, the recipient must accept the terms and conditions that accompany it. Depending on the type, those conditions could include regulatory oversight, training requirements, and a requirement to act according to a set of standards or code of ethics. Failure to meet the terms and conditions could result in fines, penalties, remedial actions, license or charter revocation, or criminal charges. rulemaking process to implement statutory mandates. 5 Typically, statutory mandates provide regulators with a policy goal in general terms, and regulations fill in the specifics. Rules lay out the guidelines for how market participants may or may not act to
  • 64.
    comply with themandate. are adhered to through oversight and supervision. This allows regulators to observe market participants’ behavior and instruct them to modify or cease improper behavior. Supervision may entail active, ongoing monitoring (as for banks) or investigating complaints and allegations ex post (as is common in securities markets). In some cases, such as banking, supervision includes periodic examinations and inspections, whereas in other cases, regulators rely more heavily on self- reporting. Regulators explain supervisory priorities and points of emphasis by issuing supervisory letters and guidance. behavior through enforcement powers. Enforcement powers include the ability to issue fines, penalties, and cease and desist orders; to undertake criminal or civil actions in court, or administrative proceedings or arbitrations; and to
  • 65.
    revoke licenses and charters.In some cases, regulators initiate legal action at their own bequest or in response to consumer or investor complaints. In other cases, regulators explicitly allow consumers and investors to sue for damages when firms do not comply with regulations, or provide legal protection to firms that do comply. a failing firm by taking control of the firm and initiating conservatorship (i.e., the regulator runs the firm 5 For more information, see CRS Report R41546, A Brief Overview of Rulemaking and Judicial Review, by Todd Garvey. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 4 on an ongoing basis) or receivership (i.e., the regulator winds the firm down). In
  • 66.
    other markets, failingfirms are resolved through bankruptcy, a judicial process. Goals of Regulation Financial regulation is primarily intended to achieve the following underlying policy outcomes: 6 markets operate efficiently and that market participants have confidence in the market’s integrity. Liquidity, low costs, the presence of many buyers and sellers, the availability of information, and a lack of excessive volatility are examples of the characteristics of an efficient market. Regulators contribute to market integrity by ensuring that activities are transparent, contracts can be enforced, and the “rules of the game” they set are enforced. Integrity generally also leads to greater efficiency. Regulation can also address market failures, such as principal- agent problems, 7 asymmetric information,
  • 67.
    8 and moral hazard, 9 thatwould otherwise reduce market efficiency. that consumers or investors do not suffer from fraud, discrimination, manipulation, and theft. Regulators try to prevent exploitative or abusive practices intended to take advantage of unwitting consumers or investors. In some cases, protection is limited to enabling consumers and investors to understand the inherent risks when they enter into a contract. In other cases, protection is based on the principle of suitability—efforts to ensure that more risky products or product features are only accessible to sophisticated or financially secure consumers and investors. ensure that firms and consumers are able to access credit and capital to meet their
  • 68.
    needs such that creditand economic activity can grow at a healthy rate. Regulators try to ensure that capital and credit are available to all worthy borrowers, regardless of personal characteristics, such as race, gender, and location. financial system cannot be used to support criminal and terrorist activity. Examples are policies to prevent money laundering, tax evasion, terrorism financing, and the contravention of financial sanctions. failures in financial markets do not result in federal government payouts or the assumption of liabilities that are ultimately borne by taxpayers. Only certain types of financial activity are explicitly backed by the federal government or by regulator-run insurance schemes that are backed by the federal government, such as the 6
  • 69.
    Regulators are alsotasked with promoting certain social goals, such as community reinvestment or affordable housing. Because this report focuses on regulation, it will not discuss social goals. 7 For example, financial agents may have incentives to make decisions that are not in the best interests of their clients, and clients may not be able to adequately monitor their behavior. 8 For example, firms issuing securities know more about their financial prospects than investors purchasing those securities, which can result in a “lemons” problem in which low-quality firms drive high-quality firms out of the marketplace. 9 For example, individuals may act more imprudently once they are insured against a risk. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 5 Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) run by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Such schemes are self-financed by the insured firms through premium
  • 70.
    payments, unless thelosses exceed the insurance fund, and then taxpayer money is used temporarily or permanently to fill the gap. In the case of a financial crisis, the government may decide that the “least bad” option is to provide funds in ways not explicitly promised or previously contemplated to restore stability. “Bailouts” of large failing firms in 2008 are the most well- known examples. In this sense, there may be implicit taxpayer backing of parts or all of the financial system. financial stability through preventative and palliative measures that mitigate systemic risk. At times, financial markets stop functioning well—markets freeze, participants panic, credit becomes unavailable, and multiple firms fail. Financial instability can be localized (to a specific market or activity) or more general. Sometimes instability can be contained and quelled through market actions or policy intervention; at
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    other times, instabilitymetastasizes and does broader damage to the real economy. The most recent example of the latter was the financial crisis of 2007- 2009. Traditionally, financial stability concerns have centered on banking, but the recent crisis illustrates the potential for systemic risk to arise in other parts of the financial system as well. These regulatory goals are sometimes complementary, but other times conflict with each other. For example, without an adequate level of consumer and investor protections, fewer individuals may be willing to participate in the markets, and efficiency and capital formation could suffer. But, at some point, too many consumer and investor safeguards and protections could make credit and capital prohibitively expensive, reducing market efficiency and capital formation. Regulation generally aims to seek a middle ground between these two extremes, where regulatory burden is as small as possible and regulatory benefits are as large as possible. As a result, when taking any
  • 72.
    action, regulators balancethe tradeoffs between their various goals. Types of Regulation The types of regulation applied to market participants are diverse and vary by regulator, but can be clustered in a few categories for analytical ease: an institution’s safety and soundness. It focuses on risk management and risk mitigation. Examples are capital requirements for banks. Prudential regulation may be pursued to achieve the goals of taxpayer protection (e.g., to ensure that bank failures do not drain the DIF), consumer protection (e.g., to ensure that insurance firms are able to honor policyholders’ claims), or financial stability (e.g., to ensure that firm failures do not lead to bank runs). requirements are meant to ensure that all relevant financial information is accurate and available to the public and regulators so that the former can make well-informed financial
  • 73.
    decisions and thelatter can effectively monitor activities. For example, publicly held companies must file disclosure reports, such as 10-Ks. Disclosure is used to achieve the goals of consumer and investor protection, as well as market efficiency and integrity. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 6 markets, and professional conduct. Regulators set permissible activities and behavior for market participants. Standard setting is used to achieve a number of policy goals. For example, (1) for market integrity, policies governing conflicts of interest, such as insider trading; (2) for taxpayer protection, limits on risky activities; (3) for consumer protection, fair lending requirements to prevent discrimination; and
  • 74.
    (4) for suitability,limits on the sale of certain sophisticated financial products to accredited investors and verification that borrowers have the ability to repay mortgages. undue monopoly power, engage in collusion or price fixing, or corner specific markets (i.e., take a dominant position to manipulate prices). Examples include antitrust policy (which is not unique to finance), antimanipulation policies, concentration limits, and the approval of takeovers and mergers. Regulators promote competitive markets to support the goals of market efficiency and integrity and consumer and investor protections. Within this area, a special policy concern related to financial stability is ensuring that no firm is “too big to fail.” minimum prices, fees, premiums, or interest rates. Although price and rate regulation is relatively rare in federal regulation, it is more common in state regulation. An
  • 75.
    example at the federallevel is the Durbin Amendment, which caps debit interchange fees for large banks. 10 State-level examples are state usury laws, which cap interest rates, and state insurance rate regulation. Policymakers justify price and rate regulations on grounds of consumer and investor protections. Prudential and disclosure and reporting regulations can be contrasted to highlight a basic philosophical difference in the regulation of securities versus banking. For example, prudential regulation is central to banking regulation, whereas securities regulation generally focuses on disclosure. This difference in approaches can be attributed to differences in the relative importance of regulatory goals. Financial stability and taxpayer protection are central to banking because of taxpayer exposure and the potential for contagion when firms fail, whereas they are not primary goals of securities markets because the federal government has made few explicit
  • 76.
    promises to makepayouts in the event of losses and failures. 11 Prudential regulation relies heavily on confidential information that supervisors gather and formulate through examinations. Federal securities regulation is not intended to prevent failures or losses; instead, it is meant to ensure that investors are properly informed about the risks that investments pose. 12 Ensuring proper disclosure is the main way to ensure that all relevant information is available to any potential investor. 10 Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act. For more information, see CRS Report R41913, Regulation of Debit Interchange Fees, by Darryl E. Getter. 11 The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), discussed below, provides limited protection to investors. 12
  • 77.
    By contrast, somestates have also conducted qualification- based securities regulation, in which securities are vetted based on whether they are perceived to offer investors a minimum level of quality. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 7 Regulated Entities How financial regulation is applied varies, partly because of the different characteristics of various financial markets and partly because of the historical evolution of regulation. The scope of regulators’ purview falls into several different categories: 1. Regulate Certain Types of Financial Institutions. Some firms become subject to federal regulation when they obtain a particular business charter, and several federal agencies regulate only a single class of institution. Depository institutions are a good example: a new banking firm chooses its regulator when it decides which charter to obtain—national bank, state bank, credit union, etc.—and the
  • 78.
    choice of whichtype of depository charter may not greatly affect the institution’s business mix. The Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA) regulates only three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs): Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system. This type of regulation gives regulators a role in overseeing all aspects of the firm’s behavior, including which activities it is allowed to engage in. As a result, “functionally similar activities are often regulated differently depending on what type of institution offers the service.” 13 2. Regulate a Particular Market. In some markets, all activities that take place within that market (for example, on a securities exchange) are subject to regulation. Often, the market itself, with the regulator’s approval, issues codes of conduct and other internal rules that bind its members. In some cases, regulators may then require that specific activities can be conducted only
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    within a regulated market.In other cases, similar activities take place both on and off a regulated market (e.g., stocks can also be traded off-exchange in “dark pools”). In some cases, regulators have different authority or jurisdiction in primary markets (where financial products are initially issued) than secondary markets (where products are resold). 3. Regulate a Particular Financial Activity. If activities are conducted in multiple markets or across multiple types of firms, another approach is to regulate a particular type or set of transactions, regardless of where the business occurs or which entities are engaged in it. For example, on the view that consumer financial protections should apply uniformly to all transactions, the Dodd-Frank Act created the CFPB, with authority (subject to certain exemptions) over financial products offered to consumers by an array of firms. Because it is difficult to ensure that functionally similar
  • 80.
    financial activities arelegally uniform, all three approaches are needed and sometimes overlap in any given area. Stated differently, risks can emanate from firms, markets, or products, and if regulation does not align, risks may not be effectively mitigated. Market innovation also creates financial instruments and markets that fall between industry divisions. Congress and the courts have often been asked to decide which agency has jurisdiction over a particular financial activity. The Federal Financial Regulators Table 1 sets out the current federal financial regulatory structure. Regulators can be categorized into the three main areas of finance—banking (depository), securities, and insurance (where state, 13 Michael Barr et al., Financial Regulation: Law and Policy (St. Paul: Foundation Press, 2016), p. 14. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 8
  • 81.
    rather than federal,regulators play a dominant role). There are also targeted regulators for specific financial activities (consumer protection) and markets (agricultural finance and housing finance). The table does not include interagency-coordinating bodies, standard-setting bodies, international organizations, or state regulators, which are described later in the report. Appendix A describes changes to this table since the 2008 financial crisis. Table 1. Federal Financial Regulators and Who They Supervise Regulatory Agency Institutions Regulated Other Notable Authority Depository Regulators Federal Reserve Bank holding companies and certain subsidiaries (e.g., foreign subsidiaries), financial holding companies, securities holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies Primary regulator of state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, foreign banking organizations operating in the United States, Edge Corporations, and any
  • 82.
    firm or paymentsystem designated as systemically significant by the FSOC Operates discount window (“lender of last resort”) for depositories; operates payment system; conducts monetary policy Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) National banks, U.S. federal branches of foreign banks, and federally chartered thrift institutions Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
  • 83.
    Federally insured depositoryinstitutions Primary regulator of state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and state-chartered thrift institutions Operates deposit insurance for banks; resolves failing banks National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) Federally chartered or federally insured credit unions Operates deposit insurance for credit unions; resolves failing credit unions Securities Markets Regulators Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Securities exchanges, broker-dealers; clearing and settlement agencies; investment funds, including mutual funds; investment advisers, including hedge funds with assets over $150 million; and investment companies
  • 84.
    Nationally recognized statisticalrating organizations Security-based swap (SBS) dealers, major SBS participants, and SBS execution facilities Corporations selling securities to the public Approves rulemakings by self-regulated organizations Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Futures exchanges, futures commission merchants, commodity pool operators, commodity trading advisors, derivatives, clearing organizations, and designated contract markets Swap dealers, major swap participants, swap execution facilities, and swap data repositories Government-Sponsored Enterprise Regulators Federal Housing
  • 85.
    Finance Agency (FHFA) FannieMae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks Acting as conservator (since Sept. 2008) for Fannie and Freddie Farm Credit Administration (FCA) Farm Credit System Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 9 Regulatory Agency Institutions Regulated Other Notable Authority Consumer Protection Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Nonbank mortgage-related firms, private student lenders,
  • 86.
    payday lenders, andlarger “consumer financial entities” determined by the CFPB Statutory exemptions for certain markets Rulemaking authority for consumer protection for all banks; supervisory authority for banks with over $10 billion in assets Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). Financial firms may be subject to more than one regulator because they may engage in multiple financial activities, as illustrated in Figure 1. For example, a firm may be overseen by an institution regulator and by an activity regulator when it engages in a regulated activity and a market regulator when it participates in a regulated market. The complexity of the figure illustrates the diverse roles and responsibilities assigned to various regulators. CRS-10 Figure 1. Regulatory Jurisdiction by Agency and Type of
  • 87.
    Regulation Source: Government AccountabilityOffice (GAO), Financial Regulation, GAO-16-175, February 2016, Figure 2. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 11 Furthermore, financial firms may form holding companies with separate legal subsidiaries that allow subsidiaries within the same holding company to engage in more activities than is permissible within any one subsidiary. Because of charter-based regulation, certain financial activities must be segregated in separate legal subsidiaries. However, as a result of the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 (GLBA; P.L. 106-102) and other regulatory and policy changes that preceded it, these different legal subsidiaries may be contained within the same financial holding companies (i.e., conglomerates that are permitted to engage in a broad array of financially related
  • 88.
    activities). For example,a banking subsidiary is limited to permissible activities related to the “business of banking,” but is allowed to affiliate with another subsidiary that engages in activities that are “financial in nature.” 14 As a result, each subsidiary is assigned a primary regulator, and firms with multiple subsidiaries may have multiple institution regulators. If the holding company is a bank holding company or thrift holding company (with at least one banking or thrift subsidiary, respectively), then the holding company is regulated by the Fed. 15 Figure 2 shows a stylized example of a special type of bank holding company, known as a financial holding company. This financial holding company would be regulated by the Fed at the holding company level. Its national bank would be regulated by the OCC, its securities subsidiary would be regulated by the SEC, and its loan company might be regulated by the CFPB. These are
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    only the primaryregulators for each box in Figure 2; as noted above, it might have other market or activity regulators as well, based on its lines of business. Figure 2. Stylized Example of a Financial Holding Company Source: CRS. Depository Institution Regulators Regulation of depository institutions (i.e., banks and credit unions) in the United States has evolved over time into a system of multiple regulators with overlapping jurisdictions. 16 There is a dual banking system, in which each depository institution is subject to regulation by its chartering authority: state or federal. Even if state chartered, virtually all depository institutions are federally 14 However, banks are not allowed to affiliate with commercial firms, although exceptions are made for industrial loan companies and unitary thrift holding companies. 15
  • 90.
    Bank holding companieswith nonbank subsidiaries are also referred to as financial holding companies. 16 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10035, Introduction to Financial Services: Banking, by Raj Gnanarajah. http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d106:FLD002:@1(106+102) Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 12 insured, so both state and federal institutions are subject to at least one federal primary regulator (i.e., the federal authority responsible for examining the institution for safety and soundness and for ensuring its compliance with federal banking laws). Depository institutions have three broad types of charter—commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions. 17 For any given institution, the primary regulator depends on its type of charter. The primary federal regulator for 18
  • 91.
    (also known assavings and loans) is the OCC, their chartering authority; -chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System is the Federal Reserve; -chartered thrifts and banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System is the FDIC; reign banks operating in the United States is the Fed or OCC, depending on the type; —if federally chartered or federally insured—is the National Credit Union Administration, which administers a deposit insurance fund separate from the FDIC’s. National banks, state-chartered banks, and thrifts are also subject to the FDIC regulatory authority, because their deposits are covered by FDIC deposit insurance. Primary regulators’ responsibilities are illustrated in Figure 3. 17 The charter dictates the activities the institution can participate in and the regulations it must adhere to. Any
  • 92.
    institution that acceptsdeposits must be chartered as one of these institutions; however, not all institutions chartered with these regulators accept deposits. 18 The Office of Thrift Supervision was the primary thrift regulator until the Dodd-Frank Act abolished it and reassigned its duties to the bank regulators. Thrifts are a good example of how the regulatory system evolved over time to the point where it no longer bears much resemblance to its original purpose. With a charter originally designed to be quite distinct from the bank charter (e.g., narrowly focused on mortgage lending), thrift regulation evolved to the point where there were relatively few differences between large, complex thrift holding companies and bank holding companies. Because of this convergence and because of safety and soundness problems during the 2008 financial crisis and before that during the1980s savings and loan crisis, policymakers deemed thrifts to no longer need their own regulator (although they maintained their separate charter). For a comparison of the powers of national banks and federal savings associations, see Office of the Comptroller (OCC), Summary of the Powers of National Banks and Federal Savings Associations, August 31, 2011, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-
  • 93.
    type/other- publications-reports/pub-other-fsa-nb-powers-chart.pdf. Who Regulates Whom? CongressionalResearch Service 13 Figure 3. Jurisdiction Among Depository Regulators Source: Federal Reserve, Purposes and Functions, October 2016, Figure 5.3. Whereas bank and thrift regulators strive for consistency among themselves in how institutions are regulated and supervised, credit unions are regulated under a separate regulatory framework from banks. Because banks receive deposit insurance from the FDIC and have access to the Fed’s discount window, they expose taxpayers to the risk of losses if they fail. 19 Banks also play a central role in the payment system, the financial system, and the broader economy. As a result, banks are subject
  • 94.
    to safety andsoundness (prudential) regulation that most other financial firms are not subject to at the federal level. 20 Safety and soundness regulation uses a holistic approach, evaluating (1) each loan, (2) the balance sheet of each institution, and (3) the risks in the system as a whole. Each loan creates risk for the lender. The overall portfolio of loans extended or held by a bank, in relation to other assets and liabilities, affects that institution’s stability. The relationship of banks to each other, and to wider financial markets, affects the financial system’s stability. Banks are required to keep capital in reserve against the possibility of a drop in value of loan portfolios or other risky assets. Banks are also required to be liquid enough to meet unexpected 19 Losses to the FDIC and Fed are first covered by the premiums or income, respectively, paid by users of those programs. Ultimately, if the premiums or income are insufficient, the programs could affect taxpayers by reducing the
  • 95.
    general revenues ofthe federal government. In the case of the FDIC, the FDIC has the authority to draw up to $100 billion from the U.S. Treasury if the DIF is insufficient to meet deposit insurance claims. In the case of the Fed, any losses at the Fed’s discount window reduce the Fed’s profits, which are remitted quarterly to Treasury where they are added to general revenues. 20 Exceptions are the housing-related institutions regulated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Farm Credit System regulated by the Farm Credit Administration (FCA). Insurers are regulated for safety and soundness at the state level. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 14 funding outflows. Federal financial regulators take into account compensating assets, risk-based capital requirements, the quality of assets, internal controls, and other prudential standards when examining the balance sheets of covered lenders.
  • 96.
    When regulators determinethat a bank is taking excessive risks, or engaging in unsafe and unsound practices, they have a number of powerful tools at their disposal to reduce risk to the institution (and ultimately to the federal DIF). Regulators can require banks to reduce specified lending or financing practices, dispose of certain assets, and order banks to take steps to restore sound balance sheets. Banks must comply because regulators have “life-or-death” options, such as withdrawing deposit insurance or seizing the bank outright. The federal banking agencies are briefly discussed below. Although these agencies are the banks’ institution-based regulators, banks are also subject to CFPB regulation for consumer protection, and to the extent that banks are participants in securities or derivatives markets, those activities are also subject to regulation by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC). Office of the Comptroller of the Currency The OCC was created in 1863 as part of the Department of the Treasury to supervise federally
  • 97.
    chartered banks (“national”banks; 13 Stat. 99). The OCC regulates a wide variety of financial functions, but only for federally chartered banks. The head of the OCC, the Comptroller of the Currency, is also a member of the board of the FDIC and a director of the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. The OCC has examination powers to enforce its responsibilities for the safety and soundness of nationally chartered banks. The OCC has strong enforcement powers, including the ability to issue cease and desist orders and revoke federal bank charters. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the OCC is the primary regulator for federally chartered thrift institutions. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Following bank panics during the Great Depression, the FDIC was created in 1933 to provide assurance to small depositors that they would not lose their savings if their bank failed (P.L. 74- 305, 49 Stat. 684). The FDIC is an independent agency that insures deposits (up to $250,000 for individual accounts), examines and supervises financial institutions, and manages receiverships, assuming and disposing of the assets of failed banks. The FDIC
  • 98.
    is the primaryfederal regulator of state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and state-chartered thrift institutions. In addition, the FDIC has broad jurisdiction over nearly all banks and thrifts, whether federally or state chartered, that carry FDIC insurance. Backing deposit insurance is the DIF, which is managed by the FDIC and funded by risk-based assessments levied on depository institutions. The fund is used primarily for resolving failed or failing institutions. To safeguard the DIF, the FDIC uses its power to examine individual institutions and to issue regulations for all insured depository institutions to monitor and enforce safety and soundness. Acting under the principles of “prompt corrective action” and “least cost resolution,” the FDIC has powers to resolve troubled banks, rather than allowing failing banks to enter the bankruptcy process. The Dodd-Frank Act also expanded the FDIC’s role in resolving other types of troubled financial institutions that pose a risk to financial stability through the Orderly Liquidation Authority.
  • 99.
    Who Regulates Whom? CongressionalResearch Service 15 The Federal Reserve The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 as the nation’s central bank following the Panic of 1907 to provide stability in the banking sector (P.L. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251). 21 The system consists of the Board of Governors in Washington, DC, and 12 regional reserve banks. In its regulatory role, the Fed has safety and soundness examination authority for a variety of lending institutions, including bank holding companies; U.S. branches of foreign banks; and state- chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. Membership in the system is mandatory for national banks and optional for state banks. Members must purchase stock in the Fed.
  • 100.
    The Fed regulatesthe largest, most complex financial firms operating in the United States. Under the GLBA, the Fed serves as the umbrella regulator for financial holding companies. The Dodd- Frank Act made the Fed the primary regulator of all nonbank financial firms that are designated as systemically significant by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (of which the Fed is a member). All bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in assets and designated nonbanks are subject to enhanced prudential regulation by the Fed. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act made the Fed the principal regulator for savings and loan holding companies and securities holding companies, a new category of institution formerly defined in securities law as an investment bank holding company. The Fed’s responsibilities are not limited to regulation. As the nation’s central bank, it conducts monetary policy by targeting short-term interest rates. The Fed also acts as a “lender of last resort” by making short-term collateralized loans to banks through the discount window. It also
  • 101.
    operates some partsand regulates other parts of the payment system. Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act gave the Fed additional authority to set prudential standards for payment systems that have been designated as systemically important. National Credit Union Administration The NCUA, originally part of the Farm Credit Administration, became an independent agency in 1970 (P.L. 91-206, 84 Stat. 49). The NCUA is the safety and soundness regulator for all federal credit unions and those state credit unions that elect to be federally insured. It administers a Central Liquidity Facility, which is the credit union lender of last resort, and the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, which insures credit union deposits. The NCUA also resolves failed credit unions. Credit unions are member-owned financial cooperatives, and they must be not-for- profit institutions. 22 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Before the financial crisis, jurisdiction over consumer financial protection was divided among a
  • 102.
    number of agencies(see Figure A-1). Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act created the CFPB to enhance consumer protection and bring the consumer protection regulation of depository and nondepository financial institutions into closer alignment. 23 The bureau is housed within—but independent from—the Federal Reserve. The director of the CFPB is also on the FDIC’s board of 21 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10054, Introduction to Financial Services: The Federal Reserve, by Marc Labonte. 22 For more information, see CRS Report R43167, Policy Issues Related to Credit Union Lending, by Darryl E. Getter. 23 See CRS Report R42572, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal Analysis, by David H. Carpenter. Who Regulates Whom?
  • 103.
    Congressional Research Service16 directors. The Dodd-Frank Act granted new authority and transferred existing authority from a number of agencies to the CFPB over an array of consumer financial products and services (including deposit taking, mortgages, credit cards and other extensions of credit, loan servicing, check guaranteeing, consumer report data collection, debt collection, real estate settlement, money transmitting, and financial data processing). The CFPB administers rules that, in its view, protect consumers by setting disclosure standards, setting suitability standards, and banning abusive and discriminatory practices. The CFPB also serves as the primary federal consumer financial protection supervisor and enforcer of federal consumer protection laws over many of the institutions that offer these products and services. However, the bureau’s regulatory authority varies based on institution size and type. Regulatory authority differs for (1) depository institutions with more than $10 billion in
  • 104.
    assets, (2) depositoryinstitutions with $10 billion or less in assets, and (3) nondepositories. The CFPB can issue rules that apply to depository institutions of all sizes, but can only supervise institutions with more than $10 billion in assets. For depositories with less than $10 billion in assets, the primary depository regulator continues to supervise for consumer compliance. The Dodd-Frank Act also explicitly exempts a number of different entities and consumer financial activities from the bureau’s supervisory and enforcement authority. Among the exempt entities are rchants, retailers, or sellers of nonfinancial goods or services, to the extent that they extend credit directly to consumers exclusively for the purpose of enabling consumers to purchase such nonfinancial goods or services; real estate brokers and agents; and
  • 105.
    In some areaswhere the CFPB does not have jurisdiction, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) retains consumer protection authority. State regulators also retain a role in consumer protection. 24 Securities Regulation For regulatory purposes, securities markets can be divided into derivatives and other types of securities. Derivatives, depending on the type, are regulated by the CFTC or the SEC. Other types of securities fall under the SEC’s jurisdiction. Standard-setting bodies and other self-regulatory organizations (SROs) play a special role in securities regulation, and they are overseen by the SEC or the CFTC. In addition, banking regulators oversee the securities activities of banks. Banks are major participants in some parts of securities markets. Securities and Exchange Commission The New York Stock Exchange dates from 1793. Following the stock market crash of 1929, the SEC was created as an independent agency in 1934 to enforce newly written federal securities
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    laws (P.L. 73-291,48 Stat. 881). Thus, when Congress created the SEC, stock and bond market 24 See the “Other State Regulation” section below. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 17 institutions and mechanisms were already well-established, and federal regulation was grafted onto the existing structure. 25 The SEC has jurisdiction over the following: —firms that issue shares, —investment advisers and investment companies (e.g., mutual funds and private funds) that are custodial agents investing on behalf of clients, -dealers, securities underwriters,
  • 107.
    and securitizers) credit rating agenciesand research analysts); changes) and market utilities (e.g., clearinghouses) where securities are traded, cleared, and settled; and security-based swaps). The SEC is not primarily concerned with ensuring the safety and soundness of the firms it regulates, but rather with “protect[ing] investors, maintain[ing] fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitat[ing] capital formation.” 26 This distinction largely arises from the absence of government guarantees for securities investors comparable to deposit insurance. The SEC generally does not have the authority to limit risks taken by securities firms, 27 nor the ability to prop up a failing firm.
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    Firms that sellsecurities—stocks and bonds—to the public are required to register with the SEC. Registration entails the publication of detailed information about the firm, its management, the intended uses for the funds raised through the sale of securities, and the risks to investors. The initial registration disclosures must be kept current through the filing of periodic financial statements: annual and quarterly reports (as well as special reports when there is a material change in the firm’s financial condition or prospects). Beyond these disclosure requirements, and certain other rules that apply to corporate governance, the SEC does not have any direct regulatory control over publicly traded firms. Bank regulators are expected to identify unsafe and unsound banking practices in the institutions they supervise, and they have the power to intervene and prevent banks from taking excessive risks. The SEC has no comparable authority; the securities laws simply require that risks be disclosed to investors. 25 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10032, Introduction
  • 109.
    to Financial Services:The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), by Gary Shorter. 26 Securities and Exchange Commission, What We Do, June 2013, at https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 27 Since 1975, the SEC has enforced a net capital rule applicable to all registered brokers and dealers. The rule requires brokers and dealers to maintain an excess of capital above mere solvency, to ensure that a failing firm stops trading while it still has assets to meet customer claims. Net capital levels are calculated in a manner similar to the risk-based capital requirements under the Basel Accords, but the SEC has its own set of risk weightings, which it calls haircuts; the riskier the asset, the greater the haircut. Although the net capital rule appears to be very close in its effects to the banking agencies’ risk-based capital requirements, there are significant differences. The SEC has no authority to intervene in a broker’s or dealer’s business if it takes excessive risks that might cause net capital to drop below the required level. Rather, the net capital rule is often described as a liquidation rule—not meant to prevent failures but to minimize the impact on customers. Moreover, the SEC has no authority comparable to the banking regulators’ prompt
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    corrective action powers:it cannot preemptively seize a troubled broker or dealer or compel it to merge with a sound firm. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 18 Registration with the SEC, in other words, is in no sense a guarantee that a security is a good or safe investment. Besides publicly traded corporations, a number of securities market participants are also required to register with the SEC (or with one of the industry SROs that the SEC oversees). These include stock exchanges, securities brokerages (and numerous classes of their personnel), mutual funds, auditors, investment advisers, and others. To maintain their registered status, all these entities must comply with rules meant to protect public investors, prevent fraud, and promote fair and orderly markets. The degree of protection granted to investors depends on their level of sophistication. For example, only “accredited investors” that
  • 111.
    have, for example,high net worth, can invest in riskier hedge funds and private equity funds. Originally, de minimis exemptions to regulation of mutual funds and investment advisers created space for the development of a trillion-dollar hedge fund industry. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, private advisers, including hedge funds and private equity funds, with more than $150 million in assets under management must register with the SEC, but maintain other exemptions. Several provisions of law and regulation protect brokerage customers from losses arising from brokerage firm failure. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a private nonprofit created by Congress in 1970 and overseen by the SEC, operates an insurance scheme funded by assessments on brokers-dealers (and with a backup line of credit with the U.S. Treasury). SIPC guarantees customer accounts up to $500,000 for losses arising from brokerage failure or fraud. Unlike the FDIC, however, SIPC does not protect accounts against market losses or examine broker-dealers, and it has no regulatory powers.
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    Some securities marketsare exempted from parts of securities regulation. Prominent examples include the following: ing and selling currencies is essential to foreign trade, and the exchange rate determined by traders has major implications for a country’s macroeconomic policy. The market is one of the largest in the world, with trillions of dollars of average daily turnover. 28 Nevertheless, no U.S. agency has regulatory authority over the foreign exchange market. Trading in currencies takes place among large global banks, central banks, hedge funds and other currency speculators, commercial firms involved in imports and exports, fund managers, and retail brokers. There is no centralized marketplace, but rather a number of proprietary electronic platforms that have largely supplanted the traditional telephone broker market. asury securities were exempted from SEC regulation by
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    the original securitieslaws of the 1930s. In 1993, following a successful cornering of a Treasury bond auction by Salomon Brothers, Congress passed the Government Securities Act Amendments of 1993 (P.L. 103-202, 107 Stat. 2344), which required brokers and dealers that were not already registered with the SEC to register as government securities dealers, extended antifraud and antimanipulation provisions of the federal securities laws to government securities brokers and dealers, and gave the U.S. Treasury authority to promulgate rules governing transactions. (Existing broker- dealer registrants were simply required to notify the SEC that they were in the government securities 28 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10112, Introduction to Financial Services: The International Foreign Exchange Market, by James K. Jackson.
  • 114.
    Who Regulates Whom? CongressionalResearch Service 19 business.) Nevertheless, the government securities market remains much more lightly regulated than the corporate securities markets. Regulatory jurisdiction over various aspects of the Treasury market is fragmented across multiple regulators. The SEC has no jurisdiction over the primary market. 29 exempted from SEC regulation. In 1975, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board was created and firms transacting in municipal securities were required to register with the SEC as broker-dealers. The Dodd-Frank Act required municipal advisors to register with the SEC. However, issuers of municipal securities remain exempt from SEC oversight, partly because of federalism issues. 30
  • 115.
    rivate securities. Thesecurities laws provide for the private sales of securities, which are not subject to the registration and extensive disclosure requirements that apply to public securities. However, private securities are subject to antifraud provisions of federal securities laws. Private placements of securities cannot be sold to the general public and may only be offered to limited numbers of “accredited investors” who meet certain asset tests. (Most purchasers are life insurers and other institutional investors.) There are also restrictions on the resale of private securities. The size of the private placement market is subject to considerable variation from year to year, but at times the value of securities sold privately exceeds what is sold into the public market. In recent decades, venture capitalists and private equity firms have come to play important roles in corporate finance. The former typically purchase interests in
  • 116.
    private firms, whichmay be sold later to the public, whereas the latter often purchase all the stock of publicly traded companies and take them private. Commodity Futures Trading Commission The CFTC was created in 1974 to regulate commodities futures and options markets, which at the time were poised to expand beyond their traditional base in agricultural commodities to encompass contracts based on financial variables, such as interest rates and stock indexes. 31 The CFTC was given “exclusive jurisdiction” over all contracts that were “in the character of” options or futures contracts, and such instruments were to be traded only on CFTC-regulated exchanges. In practice, exclusive jurisdiction was impossible to enforce, as off-exchange derivatives contracts such as swaps proliferated. In the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554), Congress exempted swaps from CFTC regulation, but this exemption was repealed by the Dodd-Frank Act following problems with derivatives in the financial crisis, including large
  • 117.
    losses at theAmerican International Group (AIG) that led to its federal rescue. The Dodd-Frank Act greatly expanded the CFTC’s jurisdiction by eliminating exemptions for certain over-the-counter derivatives. 32 As a result, swap dealers, major swap participants, swap 29 U.S. Department of Treasury et al., Joint Staff Report: The U.S. Treasury Market on October 15, 2014, July 13, 2015, at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press- releases/Documents/Joint_Staff_Report_Treasury_10-15- 2015.pdf. 30 SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market, July 2012, at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/ munireport073112.pdf. 31 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10117, Introduction to Financial Services: Derivatives, by Rena S. Miller. 32
  • 118.
    For more information,see CRS Report R41398, The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title VII, Derivatives, by Rena S. Miller and Kathleen Ann Ruane. http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d106:FLD002:@1(106+554) http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d106:FLD002:@1(106+554) Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 20 clearing organizations, swap execution facilities, and swap data repositories are required to register with the CFTC. These entities are subject to reporting requirements and business conduct standards contained in statute or promulgated as CFTC rules. The Dodd-Frank Act required swaps to be cleared through a central clearinghouse and traded on exchanges, where possible. The CFTC’s mission is to prevent excessive speculation, manipulation of commodity prices, and fraud. Like the SEC, the CFTC oversees SROs—the futures exchanges and the National Futures Association—and requires the registration of a range of industry
  • 119.
    firms and personnel,including futures commission merchants (brokers), floor traders, commodity pool operators, and commodity trading advisers. Like the SEC, the CFTC does not directly regulate the safety and soundness of individual firms, with the exception of a net capital rule for futures commission merchants and capital standards pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act for swap dealers and major swap participants. Standard-Setting Bodies and Self-Regulatory Organizations National securities exchanges (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange) and clearing and settlement systems may register as SROs with the SEC or CFTC, making them subject to SEC or CFTC oversight. 33 According to the SEC, “SROs must create rules that allow for disciplining members for improper conduct and for establishing measures to ensure market integrity and investor protection. SRO proposed rules are published for comment before final SEC review and
  • 120.
    approval.” 34 Title VIII ofthe Dodd-Frank Act gave the SEC and CFTC additional prudential regulatory authority over clearing and settlement systems that have been designated as systemically important (exchanges, contract markets, and other entities were exempted). 35 One particularly important type of SRO in the regulatory system is the group of standard-setting bodies. Most securities or futures markets participants must register and meet professional conduct and qualification standards. The SEC and CFTC have delegated responsibility for many of these functions to official standard-setting bodies, such as the following: —The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority writes and enforces rules for brokers and dealers and examines them for compliance. —The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board establishes rules for municipal advisors and dealers in the municipal securities market; conducts required exams and continuing education for municipal market
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    professionals; and provides guidanceto SEC and others for compliance with and enforcement of MSRB rules. —The National Futures Association develops and enforces rules in futures markets, requires registration, and conducts fitness examinations for a range of derivatives markets participants, including futures commission merchants, commodity pool operators, and commodity trading advisors. —The Financial Accounting Standards Board establishes financial accounting and reporting standards for companies and nonprofits. 33 A list of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) registered with the SEC can be found at https://www.sec.gov/rules/ sro.shtml. 34 SEC, What We Do, June 2013, at https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 35 Title VIII also gave the Fed and the FSOC limited authority to
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    participate in andoverride SEC or CFTC regulation of systemically important clearing and settlement systems if they pose risks to financial stability. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 21 CAOB—The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board oversees private auditors of publicly held companies and broker-dealers. These standard-setting bodies are typically set up as private nonprofits overseen by boards and funded through member fees or assessments. Although their authority may be enshrined in statute, they are not governmental entities. Regulators delegate rulemaking powers to them and retain the right to override their rulemakings. Regulation of Government-Sponsored Enterprises Congress created GSEs as privately owned institutions with limited missions and charters to support the mortgage and agricultural credit markets. It also created dedicated regulators— currently, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the
  • 123.
    Farm Credit Administration (FCA)—exclusivelyto oversee the GSEs. Federal Housing Finance Agency The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (P.L. 110- 289, 122 Stat. 2654) created the FHFA during the housing crisis in 2008 to consolidate and strengthen regulation of a group of housing finance-related GSEs: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. 36 The FHFA succeeded the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which regulated Fannie and Freddie, and the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), which regulated the Federal Home Loan Banks. The act also transferred authority to set affordable housing and other goals for the GSEs from the Department of Housing and Urban Development to the FHFA. Facing concerns about the GSEs’ ongoing viability, the impetus to create the FHFA came from concerns about risks—including systemic risk—posed by Fannie and Freddie. These two GSEs were profit-seeking, shareholder-owned corporations that took
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    advantage of theirgovernment- sponsored status to accumulate undiversified investment portfolios of more than $1.5 trillion, consisting almost exclusively of home mortgages (and securities and derivatives based on those mortgages). 37 OFHEO was seen as lacking sufficient authority and independence to keep risk-taking at the GSEs in check. The FHFA was given enhanced safety and soundness powers resembling those of the federal bank regulators. These powers included the ability to set capital standards, to order the enterprises to cease any activity or divest any asset that posed a threat to financial soundness, and to replace management and assume control of the firms if they became seriously undercapitalized. One of the FHFA’s first actions was to place both Fannie and Freddie in conservatorship to prevent their failure. Fannie and Freddie continue to operate, under agreements with FHFA and the U.S. Treasury, with more direct involvement of the FHFA in the enterprises’ decisionmaking.
  • 125.
    The Treasury hasprovided capital to the GSEs (a combined $187 billion to date), by means of preferred stock purchases, to ensure that each remains solvent. In return, the government received warrants equivalent to a 79.9% equity ownership position in the firms and sweeps the firms’ retained earnings above a certain level of net worth. 38 36 For more on government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and their regulation, see CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions, by N. Eric Weiss. 37 Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Report to Congress: 2008 (Revised), at https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/ Reports/ReportDocuments/2008_AnnualReportToCongress_N50 8.pdf. 38 For more information, see CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked (continued...)
  • 126.
    Who Regulates Whom? CongressionalResearch Service 22 Farm Credit Administration The FCA was created in 1933 during a farming crisis that was causing the widespread failure of institutions lending to farmers. Following another farming crisis, it was made an “arm’s length” regulator with increased rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement powers by the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-205). The FCA oversees the Farm Credit System, a group of GSEs made up of the cooperatively owned Farm Credit Banks and Agricultural Credit Banks, the Funding Corporation, which is owned by the Credit Banks, and Farmer Mac, which is owned by shareholders. 39 Unlike the housing GSEs, the Farm Credit System operates in both primary and secondary agricultural credit markets. For example, the FCA regulates these institutions for safety and soundness, through capital requirements.
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    Regulatory Umbrella Groups Theneed for coordination and data sharing among regulators has led to the formation of innumerable interagency task forces to study particular market episodes and make recommendations to Congress. Three interagency organizations have permanent status: the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council, and the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets. The latter is composed of the Treasury Secretary and the Fed, SEC, and CFTC Chairmen; because the working group has not been active in recent years, it is not discussed in detail. Financial Stability Oversight Council Few would argue that regulatory failure was solely to blame for the financial crisis, but it is widely considered to have played a part. In February 2009, then-Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner summed up two key problem areas: Our financial system operated with large gaps in meaningful oversight, and without
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    sufficient constraints tolimit risk. Even institutions that were overseen by our complicated, overlapping system of multiple regulators put themselves in a position of extreme vulnerability. These failures helped lay the foundation for the worst economic crisis in generations. 40 One definition of systemic risk is that it occurs when each firm manages risk rationally from its own perspective, but the sum total of those decisions produces systemic instability under certain conditions. Similarly, regulators charged with overseeing individual parts of the financial system may satisfy themselves that no threats to stability exist in their respective sectors, but fail to detect systemic risk generated by unsuspected correlations and interactions among the parts of the global system. The Federal Reserve was for many years a kind of default systemic regulator, expected to clean up after a crisis, but with limited authority to take ex ante preventive measures. Furthermore, the Fed’s authority was mostly limited to the banking sector. The Dodd-Frank Act
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    created the FSOCto assume a coordinating role, with the single mission of detecting systemic stress before a crisis can take hold (and identifying firms whose individual failure might trigger cascading losses with system-wide consequences). (...continued) Questions, by N. Eric Weiss. 39 For more information, see CRS Report RS21278, Farm Credit System, by Jim Monke. 40 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, “Introducing the Financial Stability Plan,” February 10, 2009, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press- releases/Pages/tg18.aspx. http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d099:FLD002:@1(99+205) Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 23 FSOC is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, and the other voting members are the heads of
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    the Fed, FDIC,OCC, NCUA, SEC, CFTC, FHFA, and CFPB, and a member appointed by the President with insurance expertise. Five nonvoting members serve in an advisory capacity—the director of the Office of Financial Research (OFR, which was created by the Dodd-Frank Act to support the FSOC), the head of the Federal Insurance Office (FIO, created by the Dodd-Frank Act), a state banking supervisor, a state insurance commissioner, and a state securities commissioner. The FSOC is tasked with identifying risks to financial stability and responding to emerging systemic risks, while promoting market discipline by minimizing moral hazard arising from expectations that firms or their counterparties will be rescued from failure. The FSOC’s duties include through the OFR; risks; romote
  • 131.
    stability, competitiveness, and efficiency; financialregulators; including “new or heightened standards and safeguards”; standards issued by any standard-setting body; and among council members. The FSOC may not impose any resolution on disagreeing members, however. In addition, the council is required to provide an annual report and testimony to Congress. In contrast to some proposals to create a systemic risk regulator, the Dodd-Frank Act did not give the council authority (beyond the existing authority of its individual members) to respond to emerging threats or close regulatory gaps it identifies. In many cases, the council can only make regulatory recommendations to member agencies or Congress—
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    it cannot imposechange. Although the FSOC does not have direct supervisory authority over any financial institution, it plays an important role in regulation because it designates firms and financial market utilities as systemically important. Designated firms come under a consolidated supervisory safety and soundness regime administered by the Fed that may be more stringent than the standards that apply to nonsystemic firms. (FSOC is also tasked with making recommendations to the Fed on standards for that regime.) In a limited number of other cases, regulators must seek FSOC advice or approval before exercising new powers under the Dodd-Frank Act. Federal Financial Institution Examinations Council The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) was created in 1979 (P.L. 95- 630, 92 Stat. 3641) as a formal interagency body to coordinate federal regulation of lending institutions. Through the FFIEC, the federal banking regulators issue a single set of reporting forms for covered institutions. The FFIEC also attempts to harmonize auditing principles and
  • 133.
    supervisory decisions. TheFFIEC is made up of the Fed, OCC, FDIC, CFPB, NCUA, and a Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 24 representative of the State Liaison Committee, 41 each of which employs examiners to enforce safety and soundness regulations for lending institutions. Federal financial institution examiners evaluate the risks of covered institutions. The specific safety and soundness concerns common to the FFIEC agencies can be found in the handbooks employed by examiners to monitor lenders. Each subject area of the handbook can be updated separately. Examples of safety and soundness subject areas include important indicators of risk, such as capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. Nonfederal Financial Regulation Insurance42
  • 134.
    Insurance companies, unlikebanks and securities firms, have been chartered and regulated solely by the states for the past 150 years. 43 There are no federal regulators of insurance akin to those for securities or banks, such as the SEC or the OCC, respectively. The limited federal role stems from both Supreme Court decisions and congressional action. In the 1868 case Paul v. Virginia, the Court found that insurance was not considered interstate commerce, and thus not subject to federal regulation. This decision was effectively reversed in the 1944 decision U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association. In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §1011 et seq.) specifically preserving the states’ authority to regulate and tax insurance and also granting a federal antitrust exemption to the insurance industry for “the business of insurance.” Each state government has a department or other entity charged with licensing and regulating insurance companies and those individuals and companies selling insurance products. States
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    regulate the solvencyof the companies and the content of insurance products as well as the market conduct of companies. Although each state sets its own laws and regulations for insurance, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) acts as a coordinating body that sets national standards through model laws and regulations. Models adopted by the NAIC, however, must be enacted by the states before having legal effect, which can be a lengthy and uncertain process. The states have also developed a coordinated system of guaranty funds, designed to protect policyholders in the event of insurer insolvency. Although the federal government’s role in regulating insurance is relatively limited compared with its role in banking and securities, its role has increased over time. Various court cases interpreting McCarran-Ferguson’s antitrust exemption have narrowed the definition of the business of insurance, whereas Congress has expanded the federal role in GLBA and the Dodd- Frank Act through federal oversight. For example, the Federal Reserve has regulatory authority
  • 136.
    over bank holdingcompanies with insurance operations as well as insurers designated as systemically important by FSOC. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act created the FIO to monitor the insurance industry and represent the United States in international fora relating to insurance. Various federal laws have also exempted aspects of state insurance regulation, such as state 41 The State Liaison Committee is, in turn, made up of representatives of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the American Council of State Savings Supervisors, and the National Association of State Credit Union Supervisors. 42 This section was written by Baird Webel, specialist in Financial Economics. 43 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10043, Introduction to Financial Services: Insurance Regulation, by Baird Webel. Who Regulates Whom?
  • 137.
    Congressional Research Service25 insurer licensing laws for a small category of insurers in the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (15 U.S.C. §§3901 et seq.) and state insurance producer licensing laws in the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-1, Title II). Other State Regulation In addition to insurance, there are state regulators for banking and securities markets. State regulation also plays a role in nonbank consumer financial protection, although that role has diminished as the federal role has expanded. As noted above, banking is a dual system in which institutions choose to charter at the state or federal level. A majority of community banks are state chartered. There are more than four times as many state-chartered as there are nationally chartered commercial banks, but state-chartered commercial banks had less than one-half as many assets as nationally chartered banks at the end of 2016. For thrifts, nationally chartered thrifts make up less than half of all thrifts, but have 65%
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    of thrift assets. 44 Althoughstate-chartered banks have state regulators as their primary regulators, federal regulators still play a regulatory role. Most depositories have FDIC deposit insurance; to qualify, they must meet federal safety and soundness standards, such as prompt corrective action ratios. In addition, many state banks (and a few state thrifts) are members of the Fed, which gives the Fed supervisory authority over them. State banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System are supervised by the FDIC. However, even nonmember Fed banks must meet the Fed’s reserve requirements. In securities markets, “The federal securities acts expressly allow for concurrent state regulation under blue sky laws. The state securities acts have traditionally been limited to disclosure and qualification with regard to securities distributions. Typically, the state securities acts have general antifraud provisions to further these ends.” 45
  • 139.
    Blue sky lawsare intended to protect investors against fraud. Registration is another area where states play a role. In general, investment advisers who are granted exemptions from SEC registration based on size are overseen by state regulators. Broker-dealers, by contrast, are typically subject to both state and federal regulation. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416) invalidated state securities law in a number of other areas (including capital, margin, bonding, and custody requirements) to reduce the overlap between state and federal securities regulation. States also play a role in enforcement by taking enforcement actions against financial institutions and market participants. This role is large in states with a large financial industry, such as New York. Federal regulation plays a central role in determining the scope of state regulation because of federal preemption laws (that apply federal statute to state- chartered institutions) and state “wild
  • 140.
    card” laws (thatallow state-chartered institutions to automatically receive powers granted to 44 Statistics are for FDIC-insured institutions. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile, December 2016, at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/qbp/2016dec/qbp.pdf. 45 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation (Thomson Reuters, 2015), Chapter 8.1. http://www.congress.gov/cgi- lis/bdquery/R?d114:FLD002:@1(114+1) Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 26 federal-chartered institutions). 46 For example, firms, products, and professionals that have registered with the SEC are not required to register at the state level. 47
  • 141.
    International Standards andRegulation Financial regulation must also take into account the global nature of financial markets. More specifically, U.S. regulators must account for foreign financial firms operating in the United States and foreign regulators must account for U.S. firms operating in their jurisdictions. Sometimes regulators grant each other equivalency (i.e., leaving regulation to the home country) when firms wish to operate abroad, and other times foreign firms are subjected to domestic regulation. If financial activity migrates to jurisdictions with laxer regulatory standards, it could undermine the effectiveness of regulation in jurisdictions with higher standards. To ensure consensus and consistency across jurisdictions, U.S. regulators and the Treasury Department participate in international fora with foreign regulators to set broad international regulatory standards or principles that members voluntarily pledge to follow. Given the size and significance of the U.S. financial system, U.S. policymakers are generally viewed as playing a substantial role in setting
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    these standards. Althoughthese standards are not legally binding, U.S. regulators generally implement rulemaking or Congress passes legislation to incorporate them. 48 There are multiple international standard-setting bodies, including one corresponding to each of the three main areas of financial regulation: regulation, (IOSCO) for securities and derivatives regulation, and for insurance regulation. 49 In addition, the G-20, an international body consisting of the United States, the European Union, and 18 other economies, spearheaded international coordination of regulatory reform after the financial crisis. It created the Financial Stability Board (FSB),
  • 143.
    consisting of thefinance ministers and financial regulators from the G-20 countries, four official international financial institutions, and six international standard-setting bodies (including those listed above), to formulate agreements to implement regulatory reform. There is significant overlap between the FSB’s regulatory reform agenda and the Dodd-Frank Act. The relationship between these various entities is diagrammed in Figure 4. 46 Michael Barr et al., Financial Regulation: Law and Policy (St. Paul: Foundation Press, 2016), Chapter 2.1. 47 GAO, Financial Regulation, GAO-16-175, February 2016, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675400.pdf. 48 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10129, Introduction to Financial Services: International Supervision, by Martin A. Weiss. 49 As noted above, the insurance industry is primarily regulated at the state level. The Dodd-Frank Act created the
  • 144.
    Federal Insurance Office,in part, to act as the U.S. representative in these international fora. See CRS Report R44820, Selected International Insurance Issues in the 115th Congress, by Baird Webel and Rachel F. Fefer. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 27 Figure 4. International Financial Architecture Source: CRS In Focus IF10129, Introduction to Financial Services: International Supervision, by Martin A. Weiss. http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IF10129 Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 28 Appendix A. Changes to Regulatory Structure Since 2008 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 created four new federal entities related to financial regulation—the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), Office of Financial Research (OFR), Federal
  • 145.
    Insurance Office (FIO),and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). OFR and FIO are offices within the Treasury Department, and are not regulators. The Dodd-Frank Act granted new authority to the CFPB and transferred existing authority to it from other regulators, as shown in Figure A-1 (represented by the arrows). (With the exception of the OTS, the agencies shown in the figure retained all authority unrelated to consumer protection, as well as some authority related to consumer protection.) The section above entitled “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau” has more detail on the authority granted to the CFPB and areas where the CFPB was not granted authority. Figure A-1. Changes to Consumer Protection Authority in the Dodd-Frank Act Source: CRS. Notes: Blue = existing agency, Orange = eliminated agency, Gray = new agency. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and transferred its authority to the banking regulators, as shown in
  • 146.
    Figure A-2. Who RegulatesWhom? Congressional Research Service 29 Figure A-2. Changes to the Oversight of Thrifts in the Dodd- Frank Act Source: CRS. Notes: Blue = existing agency, Orange = eliminated agency, Gray = new agency. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and eliminated the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB). As shown in Figure A-3, HERA granted the FHFA new authority, the existing authority of the two eliminated agencies (shown in orange), and transferred limited existing authority from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
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    Figure A-3. Changesto the Oversight of Housing Finance in HERA Source: CRS. Notes: Blue = existing agency, Orange = eliminated agency, Gray = new agency. Who Regulates Whom? Congressional Research Service 30 Appendix B. Experts List Table B-1. CRS Contact Information Author Title Telephone Email Regulation of: Darryl Getter Specialist in Financial Economics 7-2834 [email protected] Consumer protection, credit unions
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    Raj Gnanarajah Analyst in Financial Economics 7-2175[email protected] Accounting and auditing, deposit insurance Marc Labonte Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy 7-0640 [email protected] Financial stability, Federal Reserve, regulatory structure Rena Miller Specialist in Financial Economics 7-0826 [email protected] Derivatives James Monke
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    Specialist in Agricultural Policy 7-9664[email protected] Farm credit David Perkins Analyst in Macroeconomic Policy 7-6626 [email protected] Banking Gary Shorter Specialist in Financial Economics 7-7772 [email protected] Securities Baird Webel Specialist in Financial Economics 7-0652 [email protected] Insurance Eric Weiss Specialist in Financial Economics
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    7-6209 [email protected]Housing finance Martin Weiss Specialist in International Trade and Finance 7-5407 [email protected] International finance Author Contact Information Marc Labonte Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy [email protected], 7-0640 Acknowledgments This report was originally authored by former CRS Specialists Mark Jickling and Edward Murphy. mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected]
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    mailto:[email protected] Name: Spring 2019FIN 6102 Please complete the following problems. Each problem is worth 5 points each. Maximum number of points available is 40. 1. You are looking to purchase a 25 year life insurance policy for $150,000. The policy will pay annually at the end of the year. The current market interest rate is 2.5%. What should the annual payment per year be? 2. You have earned a pension worth $2,000 a month, you think you will live and additional 15 years. The current prevailing interest rate is 2% per year. What is the current market value of your pension? 3. You are attempting to price a 25 year annuity due for your insurance company. Payments of $3,500 for this annuity due start at the beginning of each year. The investment team at your company guarantees a return of 8%. What is the lowest price your company should offer?
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    4. You startan annuity with $1 million and expect to receive 12 equal payments beginning at the end of the first year. The guaranteed annual interest rate is 6 percent. The annual payments that you expect to collect are? 5. Calculate the annual cash flows of a $2 million, 10-year fixed-payment annuity due earning a guaranteed 8 percent annually if the payments are to start at the beginning of this year. 6. Calculate the college fund required to start a four year college program in 15 years time. The tuition fees are currently 12,000 and are first payable at the start of year 16. Inflation is 4% and the rate of return is 9%. Calculate the lump sum which needs to be invested today to provide the college fund. 7. Mega Millions has reached a record-breaking jackpot of $1.6 billion. Whoever holds the winning lottery ticket will be given
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    two options: Theycan collect their winnings as a one-time lump sum that's less than the value of the total jackpot in this case, it would be $904,900,000, or they can receive the full amount in annual installments stretched out over 29 years. The annuity will pay out 1 billion dollars (meaning the present value of all future cashflows). The current inflation rate is 3%. What interest rate would make you indifferent between the annuity and the lump sum payment? 8. Calculate the annual cash flows of a $2 million, 10-year fixed-payment deferred annuity earning a guaranteed 8 percent per year if annual payments are to begin at the end of the sixth (6th) year.