1. BRIEFING NOTE
SOME EVOLVING TRENDS AT THE WORLD BANK:
LENDING, FUNDING, STAFFING
Kevin Currey
Natural Resources and Sustainable Development
The Ford Foundation
May 2014

2. 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This briefing note explores ongoing macro-level changes at the World Bank. It focuses on four major trends: (1) changes in lending, including amount of lending, type of lending, and recipient countries; (2) changes in income sources; (3) the growth of trust funds; and (4) trends in staffing. The findings presented here are intended to help shape future engagements with the Bank by placing its operations in a broader context.
Major findings:
(1) Total World Bank lending has declined in real terms in recent years, driven by a significant decline in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) lending. IBRD commitments averaged more than $25 billion per year during the 1980s and 1990s, but commitments have since declined and are expected to average around $15 billion per year in the near term. This decline is the result of a number of factors, including insufficiently large capital infusions and reduced borrower demand stemming from low global interest rates and the growing availability of alternative funding sources. Declining Bank lending coincides with declining profitability. President Kim has recently announced plans to nearly double IBRD lending over the next several years, but it is not clear how this will be achieved.
(2) International Development Association (IDA) lending has continued to increase in real terms, but IDA funding is increasingly dependent on donor contributions. Declining IBRD income limits the size of the subsidy IBRD can provide to IDA and increases the importance of individual IDA donors.
(3) World Bank Group funding to support the private sector has increased dramatically, both in absolute terms and relative to overall spending. In 2013, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) accounted for 35% of World Bank Group commitments, compared with 18% in 2009 and only 13% in 2000. IFC support for financial intermediaries has also increased rapidly over the last several years. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) commitments have doubled in the past five years, albeit from a low base.
(4) The Bank has always faced a pressure to lend, stemming from structural factors (administrative costs are covered by profits from loans), institutional factors (the real or perceived importance of ‘moving money’ for staff promotions), and external factors (demands from donors and shareholders). But while lending has declined, the pressure to expedite disbursements remains stronger than ever. This is because of the increasing pressure from both clients and donors to be more efficient and because of the increasing availability of alternative funding sources for national governments. While these changes have the potential to make the Bank more responsive and effective, they also pose a potential risk to policies, like the suite of safeguards, which could be perceived as impediments to speedy disbursement.

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(5) IBRD lending is shifting from investment lending toward development policy lending and the newly established Program-for Results (P4R). An evolving development context and changes in client demand are contributing to this shift. Efforts like P4R that seek to reorient the Bank from a ‘compliance focus’ to a ‘results focus’ offer both opportunities and risks.
(6) The influence of individual donors has increased through the rapid rise of trust funds. Trust funds have become increasingly central to the Bank’s efforts to address global public goods problems, but they also present complex management challenges and threaten to reduce the overall coordination of Bank activities.
(7) Declining income at the Bank has triggered reductions in staff costs. This has been accomplished in a variety of ways, including an increased reliance on trust funds to cover some of these costs.
(8) In sum, declining profitability at IBRD places pressure on the Bank to be more competitive with other lenders. This could have the positive effect of helping the Bank strengthen key areas of differentiation, but it could also lead to reduced attention to safeguards and other perceived impediments to efficient lending.
Notes:
Unless otherwise stated, years listed in this report refer to the World Bank Group fiscal year.
The World Bank refers to IBRD and IDA; World Bank Group refers to all five institutions.

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Five institutions make up the World Bank Group: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The first two institutions, IBRD and IDA, are collectively referred to as the World Bank. Table 1 provides an overview of these institutions and their roles.
Table 1: The World Bank Group At-A-Glance Institution Est. Members Cumulative Commitments (billion USD) FY2013 Commitments (billion USD) Purpose International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
1944
188
586.2
15.2
Lends to creditworthy middle- and low-income countries; provides advisory and analytical services International Development Association (IDA)
1960
173
268.5
16.3
Offers highly concessional loans (called credits) and grants for the poorest countries International Finance Corporation (IFC)
1956
184
183.4
18.3
Stimulates private-sector investment in emerging markets through loans, risk-management products, equity finance, and advisory services Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
1988
180
30.0
2.8
Promotes investment in emerging economies by offering guarantees to protect investors and lenders against losses from noncommercial risk International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
1966
150
[282 concluded cases]
[1 concluded case]
Promotes investment by providing facilities to help countries arbitrate investment disputes
Source: IBRD (2013); IDA (2013); IFC (2013); MIGA (2013); ICSID (2013).

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WORLD BANK LENDING
Both the World Bank’s mission and its approach to executing it have evolved considerably over time. Created in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, IBRD‘s initial tasks were to address capital deficiency and stabilize a global economy ravaged by World War II (Phillips 2009). The Bank issued its first loan in 1947, committing $250 million to the French government to support reconstruction. But not long afterward, it turned its focus away from Europe and began to address global poverty.
Since then, the history of the Bank has closely tracked broader trends in international development approaches (trends the Bank itself helped shape). In the 1950s and 1960s, investments in industry and infrastructure dominated the Bank’s portfolio, although later in the period the Bank began investing in capacity and institution building as well. In the 1970s, under the leadership of President Robert McNamera, the Bank veered into more direct approaches to poverty reduction, pioneering strategies like ‘basic human needs’ and ‘integrated rural development.’ During the 1980s, the Bank focused on structural adjustment, macroeconomic policies, debt, and efforts to increase private capital flows. This culminated in the emergence of the so-called Washington Consensus, favoring privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation, fiscal and tax policy reforms, and other hallmarks of neoliberal economic policy. In the 1990s and 2000s, the Bank focused on sustainable development and continued to strengthen its brand as a ‘knowledge bank’ offering technical expertise on a range of development issues. Most recently, the Bank expanded its footprint to address global public goods problems, like climate change. Today, however, the Bank is at a crossroads, and as the next section explains, it is not yet clear how the current existential crisis will be resolved.
A. Amount of lending
More than six decades after Bretton Woods, the World Bank’s cumulative lending now stands in excess of $1 trillion. In 2013, the World Bank Group committed $52.6 billion in total loans, grants, equity investments and guarantees. The World Bank (IBRD and IDA) committed $31.5 billion in loans, credits, grants, and guarantees. This includes $15.2 billion from IBRD, to support 92 operations in 35 countries, and $16.3 billion from IDA, to support 184 operations in 59 countries (IBRD 2013; IDA 2013). Table 2 shows nominal commitments for the World Bank Group institutions over the past five years.
Figure 1 shows real (inflation-adjusted) World Bank lending commitments by year since 1970.
As the graph illustrates, with a few exceptions, IBRD lending has declined in real terms since the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is more clearly demonstrated in table 3. Real IBRD lending commitments averaged around $26 billion per year between 1980 and 1999, but dropped to $16.6 billion per year during the next decade. Growth in IDA lending, on the other hand, has outpaced inflation, but the real rate of growth was higher in the 1970s and 1980s than today.

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Table 2: Nominal World Bank Group commitments (billion USD), 2009-2013 Institution 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
World Bank
46.9
58.8
43.0
35.4
31.5
IBRD
32.9
44.2
26.7
20.6
15.2
IDA
14.0
14.6
16.3
14.8
16.3
IFC
10.5
12.7
12.2
15.5
18.3
MIGA
1.4
1.5
2.1
2.7
2.8
WBG Total
58.8
73.0
57.3
53.6
52.6
Source: IBRD (2013); IDA (2013); MIGA (2013); IFC (2013)
Figure 1: Real IBRD, IDA, and total World Bank commitments by year (billion 2013 USD)
Note: Amounts adjusted to 2013 USD using the US CPI-All Urban Consumers index (base 1982-1984)
Source: IBRD (2013); IDA (2013)
Table 3: Nominal/ real average yearly lending commitments by decade (billion 2012 USD)
1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 Nominal IBRD
3.9
12.0
16.7
14.2 IDA
1.4
3.6
6.5
9.1 Real IBRD
16.1
26.2
25.6
16.6 IDA
6.1
8.0
9.9
10.6
Source: IBRD (2013); IDA (2013)
$0
$5
$10
$15
$20
$25
$30
$35
$40
$45
$50
$55
$60
$65
2013
2011
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
Billions of 2013 USD
IBRD commitments
IDA commitments
Total World Bank commitments

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The exceptions to this trend are two spikes in lending, in response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. For example, in the four years leading up to the global financial crisis, IBRD commitments averaged about $13.5 billion per year. IBRD dramatically ramped up lending in response to the crisis, making loan commitments of $32.9 billion in 2009 and $44.2 billion in 2010. But as the most immediate threats to global economic stability subside, IBRD lending has steadily declined to pre-crisis levels; after reaching a record high in 2010, IBRD lending commitments stood at $26.7 billion in 2011 and $20.6 billion last year. It declined $5.3 billion in 2013, to $15.2 billion.
Capital adequacy tests and prudent risk management practices place upper limits on IBRD’s lending, but those limits are far from being exceeded (Moody’s 2012). IBRD’s Articles of Agreement set a statutory lending limit of a 1:1 gearing ratio, meaning that outstanding loans may not exceed the sum of subscribed capital, reserves, and surplus (World Bank 2012a).
Outstanding loans and guarantees of $141 billion are currently 57% of the $250 billion lending limit. IBRD currently targets an equity-to-loan ratio of between 23% and 27%. This ratio has decreased since 2010, due to an increase in lending and decrease in useable equity, but it remains at the upper end of the target risk coverage range, at 26.8% (IBRD 2012). The Executive Directors also set Single Borrower Limits that restrict how much individual countries may borrow. In FY2013, this limit was set at $17.5 billion for India and $16.5 for other countries, and this will remain unchanged for FY2014 (IBRD 2013; Moody’s 2012).
There are many interlinked reasons why IBRD lending is declining, including the failure to secure additional capital increases. But a significant factor may be reduced demand for IBRD loans stemming increased competition from other funding sources and low global interest rates. The Bank’s lending has never accounted for more than 5% of total international financial flows (Phillips 2009), but as these flows have rapidly increased, the Bank’s lending had failed to keep pace. Table 4 shows lending commitments from regional development banks as well as the China Development Bank and BNDES, the Brazilian Development Bank. (Capital flows from ODA, remittances, and FDI are included for reference). Lending from the four regional development banks has been increasing significantly, especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
At the same time, middle income countries are increasingly financing their own development. Disbursements at BNDES have grown six-fold since 2000, and net profit has increased more than tenfold. Its lending in 2012 was almost four times more than IBRD lending. The China Development Bank had about $886 billion in loans outstanding in 2011, compared to only $136 billion in outstanding IBRD loans in FY2012. To put this number further in perspective,
China has only $13 billion in loans outstanding from IBRD and has received cumulative loans of only slightly more than $50 billion from the World Bank.
Moreover, China is now a major donor for other developing countries. China does not publish data on its overseas loans, but during the financial crisis, Chinese lending surpassed World Bank lending: the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank committed

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more than $110 billion to developing countries from 2008 to 2010, while IBRD and IFC together committed only $100 billion (Dyer et al. 2011).
Finally, private capital flows are becoming increasingly important for development. Remittance flows to developing countries in 2012 were 13 times higher than World Bank lending and three times higher than total ODA; FDI inflows to developing countries were 22 times higher than World Bank lending and almost four times higher than total ODA. These forms of private capital are not perfect substitutes for Bank lending, of course, but they do represent an increased form of at least indirect competition.
Table 4: Loan commitments by development banks Development Bank Commitment (billion USD) Year
World Bank Group
52.6
2013
World Bank (IBRD+IDA)
31.6
2013
IBRD
15.3
2013
IDA
16.3
2013
China Development Bank
163+
2011
BNDES
79.7
2012
Asian Development Bank (ADB)
10.2
2013
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
12.3
2012
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
10.7
2012
African Development Bank (AfDB)
8.5
2011
FDI inflows to developing countries
684
2012
Remittances to developing countries
406
2012
DAC ODA
134.8
2013
Source: IBRD (2012); EBRD (2012), ADB (2012); AfDB (2013); IDB (2011); World Bank (2012d); UNCTAD (2012); OECD (2013)
All of these changes have pushed governments, both borrowers and other shareholders, to pressure the Bank to remove perceived impediments to faster disbursements. And the Bank needs to better ‘compete’ with other international financial institutions for other reasons as well, including the fact that its operating budget is derived from the margin it receives on its lending. The implications of reduced lending, discussed later in this brief, include a reduced subsidy from IBRD to IDA, a push for results-based lending, and pressure to focus on fewer, larger projects with better economies of scale.
Lending, of course, it not the only measure of the Bank’s influence. The Bank also continues to plays a key role as a development policy expert, and other international financial institutions often benchmark their policies and practices against the Bank’s. But declining lending volumes may jeopardize this form of influence as well. As Phillips (2009:11) argues, “the “split between money and knowledge is in fact quite complex, since…money leverages knowledge by

9. 9
providing it with a transition vehicle and a high profile in the eyes of the governments that approve projects.”
To counter these trends, President Kim announced recently that the maximum loan book IBRD can support will increase by $100 billion, reaching $300 billion in a decade (World Bank 2014). This will allow IBRD leading to nearly double, from current levels of around $15 to $26 or $28 billion per year. This increase will not be financed by a capital increase but changes to minimum equity-to-loan ration, allowing the World Bank to take on more loans relative to its total capital. IBRD also plans to increase the single borrower limit by $2.5 billion for Brazil, China, Indonesia, India, and Mexico, while making slight changes to loan terms. In total, World Bank Group lending could increase to $70 billion over the next decade. This increased lending will finance efforts to advance the twin goals advanced in the World Bank’s new corporate strategy: ending extreme poverty and building shared prosperity, and will likely require more rapid disbursement of loans and increased sale of advisory services. President Kim plans to do this while cutting $400 million in costs over three years (about 8% of total spending).
B. Type of Lending
Eligible World Bank members may receive support from IBRD, IDA, or both. Currently, 79 countries are eligible for IBRD lending, 64 countries are eligible for IDA financing, and 17 countries are eligible for a blend of IBRD and IDA financing (IBRD 2013; IDA 2013).
IBRD offers several loan products, but the most common is the IFI Flexible Loan. These loans have maturities of up to 30 years, a lending rate set at 6-month LIBOR plus either a fixed or variable spread, and a front-end fee of 25 basis points. Countries are eligible for concessional IDA financing (credits) or outright IDA grants on the basis of lack of creditworthiness and relative poverty. The current operational cutoff for IDA eligibility is a per capita 2011 GNI of $1,195 (with an exception for small island states). That said, there is no automatic graduation rule linked to per-capita income—the operational cutoff is only a trigger for initiating broader discussions about continuing IDA eligibility.
Table 5 describes the kinds of financing available from IDA. On average, over the last five years, about 20% of IDA’s lending commitments have been in the form of outright grants.
Table 5: IDA loan terms Loan Terms Interest Service Charge
IDA only
40 yrs including 10 yr grace period
0
75 basis points
Blend
25 yrs including 5 yr grace period
1.25%
75 basis points
Blend (hard terms)
25 yrs including 5 yr grace period
1.5%
75 basis points
Source: IDA (2013)
World Bank lending can be differentiated into three categories: investment lending, development policy lending, and results-based lending. Investment lending focuses on

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providing the goods and services needed for development over the longer term. Physical infrastructure was the initial focus of this kind of lending, but investment lending now supports social infrastructure and institutional capacity building as well. Development policy lending or development policy operations (once called adjustment lending), on the other hand, supports reforms to government policy. Initially focused on macroeconomic policy (“structural adjustment”), adjustment lending now supports sectorial, structural, and social reforms.
Adjustment lending is a small part of IDA’s portfolio, typically accounting for less than 20% of its lending and accounting for only $1.9 billion, or 12% of its lending in 2013 (IDA 2013). Adjustment lending has played an increasingly important role at IBRD, however. In 1980, less than 4% of the IBRD portfolio was adjustment lending, a figure that had increased to 11% by 1985. By the early- to mid-1990s, adjustment lending reached 20-25% of total IBRD lending (World Bank 2001). Since then, adjustment lending has continued to increase.
Figure 2 shows IBRD’s lending by lending type over the past 15 years. As the graph shows, the mix of investment and adjustment lending now varies considerably by year, but with no real discernible pattern. Development Policy Operations have averaged 40% of IBRD lending over the past 15 years. In 2013, IBRD committed $8.1 billion in investment lending (53%) and $7.1 billion for development policy operations (46%). For the Bank as a whole, development policy lending accounted for 35% of total commitments in 2012. Table 6 shows the top recipients of this type of lending at the IBRA and IDA in 2013.
Figure 2: IBRD lending by type, 2000-2013
Source: IBRD (2013)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Percent
Program-for-Results
Development Policy
Operations
Investment Lending

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Table 6: Top Recipients of IBRA and IDA Development Policy Lending, 2013 Development Policy Operations: IBRD Country Number Value (million USD)
Brazil
5
1,650
Poland
1
1,308
Turkey
1
800
Colombia
3
600
Morocco
4
593 Development Policy Operations: IDA Country Number Value (million USD)
Myanmar
1
440
Vietnam
3
370
Tanzania
2
175
Rwanda
2
100
Nigeria
1
100
Mozambique
2
100
Malawi
2
100
In January 2012, IBRD and IDA announced a new results-based lending instrument, called Program-for-Results (P4R). The Bank provides funds to governments for programs that support government projects, but the disbursement of funds is linked to the achievement of measureable and verifiable development results. The Bank hopes P4R will help build capacity of partner countries, engender institutional change, reduce fraud and corruption, and enhance overall development effectiveness. Table 7 shows P4R commitments over time, including forecasted commitments for 2014.
Table 7: Program for Results Lending (million USD) Organization 2012 2013 2014
IBRD
300
66
990
IDA
60
710
1,350
Total
630
776
2,350
In response to civil society concerns, the Bank agreed to a two-year pilot program for P4R, capping disbursements at 5% of total lending and prohibiting the use of P4R for Category A projects (those with the highest social and environmental risk). P4R programs do no not require the application of Bank safeguards; instead, they rely on borrowers’ social and environmental management systems to manage risks. While the Bank makes information about each program publically available, each borrower decides what information about particular program activities will be publically available.

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The Bank is currently undertaking a review of the eight approved P4R projects and the 16 under preparation, with a draft expected by the end of the fiscal year. But experience with P4R has been very limited. As of October 2013, only $19 million had been disbursed against achieved results (World Bank 2013). The Bank hopes P4R will be part of a broader effort to move from ‘compliance’ to ‘results’ and to improve country ownership. It has already proved popular with countries for reducing transaction costs and promoting greater country ownership. Many important questions about P4R remain. It is not yet clear how well results can be measured and verified. The program’s transparency, supervision, and accountability have also been questioned. The Bank’s suite of safeguard systems do not apply to the program, and the operational policy governing P4R does not clearly specify how alternatives at the country level will be applied. Nevertheless, some analysts have suggested P4R could eventually account for 15% to 33% of total lending (BIC 2012).
C. Beneficiaries of Lending
Figure 3 shows the distribution of Bank lending by region. With the exception of smaller flows to the Middle East and North Africa, bank lending is more or less evenly distributed. Africa, however, receives almost no money from IBRD, while Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean receive very little money from IDA.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of Bank projects by region. The picture that emerges is similar, but shows that IDA tends to have more projects with smaller amounts of money.
Figure 3: World Bank Commitments by Geographic Region, 2013
$42
$4,591
$3,661
$4,769
$1,809
$378
$8,203
$729
$2,586
$435
$249
$4,096
$0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
$7,000
$8,000
$9,000
Africa
East Asia and
Pacific
Europe and
Central Asia
Latin America
and Carribbean
Middle East
South Asia
Millions of USD
IBRD
IDA
$8,245
$5,320
$6,247
$5,204
$2,058
$4,474

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Figure 4: World Bank Operations by Geographic Region, 2013
Table 8 shows the top 10 recipients of cumulative IBRD, IDA, and total World Bank lending between 1945 and 2013. Both IBRD and IDA lending has tended to be heavily concentrated in a handful of countries; funding for the 10 largest lending recipients accounts for more than 50% of total cumulative funding.
Table 8: Cumulative Lending, 1945-2013 (millions of USD) IBRD IDA World Bank (IBRD+IDA)
Brazil
56,268
India
44,474
India
93,137
Mexico
52,859
Bangladesh
19,656
Brazil
56,268
India
48,663
Pakistan
15,845
Mexico
52,859
Indonesia
45,423
Vietnam
15,122
China
52,392
China
42,445
Ethiopia
11,499
Indonesia
48,299
Turkey
36,277
China
9,947
Turkey
36,455
Argentina
29,277
Tanzania
9,633
Argentina
29,227
Colombia
19,449
Nigeria
9,573
Pakistan
24,207
South Korea
15,472
Ghana
7,611
Bangladesh
19,702
Philippines
15,102
Kenya
7,341
Colombia
19,469
subtotal
361,235
subtotal
150,701
subtotal
432,015
cumulative lending
586,201
cumulative lending
268,500
cumulative lending
854,701
% of total
61.6
% of total
56.1
% of total
50.5
Source: IBRD (2013)
4
25
24
28
9
2
91
22
18
13
7
33
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Africa
East Asia and
Pacific
Europe and
Central Asia
Latin America
and Carribbean
Middle East
South Asia
Number of Operations
IBRD
IDA
47
42
41
16
35
95

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Table 9 shows the top 10 recipients of IBRD and IDA lending in FY2013. A few differences between table 4 and table 5 are suggestive of broader changes in the recipients of World Bank financing. Korea, for example, no longer takes new IBRD funding. IBRD has stepped up funding for eastern European and central Asian countries like Romania, Poland, and Kazakhstan. In the IDA column, Kenya and Mozambique, two high growth emerging markets in sub-Saharan Africa, replace China (no longer using IDA financing) and Ghana.
Much has been made about the future of the World Bank’s relationship with middle income countries, and this is going to be a key question for the Bank to address going forward. President Jim Yong Kim has expressed strong support for a continued engagement with middle-income borrowers.
Table 10 shows the top IBRD borrowers by share of loans outstanding over the last four years. Seven of the top borrowers this year would have made the same list a decade ago. This table is included to show that the change in composition of principal borrowers is a very slow process.
Table 9: Top 10 new IBRD and IDA commitments 2013 (USD millions) IBRD Amount IDA Amount
Brazil
3,076
Vietnam
1,982
Indonesia
1,721
Bangladesh
1,567
China
1,540
Ethiopia
1,115
Poland
1,308
India
948
Turkey
1,301
Pakistan
744
Colombia
600
Kenya
615
Morocco
593
Tanzania
606
Djibouti
585
D.R. Congo
532
Yemen
500
Myanmar
520
Uruguay
408
Mozambique
337
Source: IBRD (2013); IDA (2013)
Table 10: Top IBRD Borrowers by Share of Loans Outstanding 2013 2012 2011 2010 Country $ bn % Country $ bn % Country $ bn % Country $ bn %
Mexico
14.9
10.5
Mexico
13.6
10.1
China
13
9.8
China
12.9
10.7
Turkey
12.9
9.1
China
13.1
9.8
Turkey
12.9
9.8
Brazil
11.3
9.4
China
12.9
9.1
Turkey
12.7
9.5
Mexico
12.2
9.2
India
10.8
9
Indonesia
12.4
8.7
India
11.7
8.7
India
11.4
8.6
Mexico
10.5
8.7
India
11.9
8.4
Brazil
10.1
7.5
Brazil
10.4
7.9
Turkey
10.2
8.5
Brazil
11.6
8.2
Indonesia
9.9
7.4
Indonesia
8.9
6.8
Indonesia
7.6
6.3
Columbia
7.8
5.5
Columbia
7.5
5.6
Colombia
7.5
5.6
Colombia
7.2
6
Poland
6.7
4.7
Poland
5.6
4.2
Poland
5.6
4.2
Argentina
5.3
4.4
Source: IBRD (2013); Moody’s (2012)

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WORLD BANK SOURCES OF FUNDING
The World Bank’s lending, investments, and general operations are funded by equity (paid-in capital and retained earnings) and borrowing (debt issuance).
Equity
Each World Bank Group institution is owned by member countries—its shareholders. Ownership and therefore voting rights are proportional to each shareholder’s capital contributions. Table 11 and Table 12 show the top 15 shareholders of the IBRD and the IDA, respectively.
The World Bank is governed by a Board of Governors (one from each country) and a Board of 25 Executive Directors. By convention, the Executive Directors of IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA are the same. This means that although the top shareholders for each institution may vary, relative voting power based on IBRD contributions tends to determine influence across the World Bank Group.
Table 11: Top 15 Subscriptions to IBRD Capital Stock as of June 30, 2013 # Member Total Subscription Amount (million USD) Paid In (million USD) Callable (million USD) % of Votes
1
United States
35,814
2,229
33,585
15.19
2
Japan
19,958
1,222
18,736
8.48
3
China
12,859
775
12,084
5.47
4
Germany
10,522
652
9,900
4.50
5
France
9,409
853
8,826
4.01
6
United Kingdom
9,409
602
8,807
4.01
7
Canada
7,040
433
6,607
3.01
8
India
6,845
413
6,432
2.93
9
Italy
5,663
351
5,312
2.43
10
Russia
5,529
334
5,195
2.37
11
Saudi Arabia
5,529
335
5,194
2.37
12
Netherlands
4,781
295
4,486
2.05
13
Brazil
4,104
246
3,859
1.77
14
Belgium
3,910
240
3,670
1.68
15
Spain
3,809
233
3,576
1.64
Source: IBRD (2013)

16. 16
Table 12: Top 15 IDA Subscriptions and Contributions as of June 30, 2013 # Member Total Subscription Amount (million USD)
1
United States
46,543
2
Japan
40,890
3
United Kingdom
24,976
4
Germany
24,068
5
France
15,899
6
Canada
10,228
7
Italy
9,552
8
Netherlands
8,201
9
Sweden
7,460
10
Australia
4,077
11
Belgium
4,051
12
Switzerland
3,954
13
Norway
3,642
14
Denmark
3,387
15
Spain
3,161
Source: IDA (2012)
IBRD members purchase shares of the bank, but pay in only 6% of the cost of shares purchased. The rest of the capital remains “on call.” If the IBRD suffers large losses—for example, if several large borrowers defaulted on their loans at the same time—the Bank could collect “on call” capital from its shareholders in order to pay its creditors, although the Bank has never needed to make a call on capital.
In April 2010, World Bank members agreed to the first capital increase 1988 (Beattie 2010). Members authorized a General Capital Increase of $58.4 billion ($3.5 billion paid in) and a Selective Capital Increase of $27.8 billion ($1.6 billion paid in). This will increase the Bank’s authorized capital to $278.4 billion and increase the Bank’s $11 billion of paid-in capital by $5.1 billion. Members also agreed to reforms that will increase the voting power of developing countries, from 44.06% to 47.19%. As part of the deal, China has become the third-largest shareholder, after the United States and Japan. The complements prior reforms enacted in 2008, when the voting power of developing countries was increased by 1.46% and an additional 25th seat on the Board of Executive Directors was added for sub-Saharan Africa, bringing the region’s total number of seats to three.
It is highly unlikely that the Bank will receive another capital infusion in the near future. President Kim recently told reporters that he sees “no appetite” for another capital increase. “It’s a tough environment,” he said. “I think it’s not the time for us to have a serious discussion about a capital increase” (Rastello 2012).

17. 17
IDA raises funds through “replenishments” that occur every three years. The level of funding it receives depends on how much its donors commit. The sixteenth IDA replenishment, finalized in December 2010, netted SDR 32.8 billion ($49.3 billion) for FY2012-2014. The seventeenth IDA replenishment, recently completed, brought in $52 billion. (SDR, or special drawing rights, are a kind of foreign exchange asset created by the IMF; at current rates, 1SDR = $1.53; see IMF 2012.) This amount includes transfers from the IBRD and IFC of $3 billion. Table 13 provides the history of IDA replenishments.
Table 13: IDA Replenishments Replenishment Period Amount (million SDR)
Initial
1961-1964
763
IDA1
1965-1968
924
IDA2
1969-1971
1,428
IDA3
1972-1974
2,738
IDA4
1975-1977
4,218
IDA5
1978-1980
6,193
IDA6
1981-1984
9,549
FY84 Account
1984
1318
Special Account
1984
519
IDA7
1985-1987
8,997
Special Facility for Africa
1986-1988
921
IDA8
1988-1990
1,677
IDA9
1991-1993
14,049
IDA10
1994-1996
16,274
Interim Trust Fund
1997
2228
IDA11
1997-1999
12,395
IDA12
2000-2002
15,312
IDA13
2003-2005
17,833
IDA14
2006-2008
22693
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
2007-2044
22,737
IDA15
2009-2011
27,300
IDA16
2012-2014
32,800
IDA 17
2015-2018
36,550
Source: IDA (2012); Marshall (2008)
Both IBRD and IFC make transfers to IDA on a yearly basis. Over the IDA 17 period, about $3 billion will be transferred from IBRD and IFC, an amount that is equal in real terms to transfers in the prior period. As IBRD profitability declines (see “Operating Income” below), its ability to fund IDA will be constricted. Some of the shortfall could be offset by rising IFC transfers to IDA, but any significant increase in IDA funding will require increasing donor contributions.

18. 18
Borrowing
The World Bank raises the majority of its capital by issuing debt to both institutional and retail investors. Since 1947, the Bank has issued bonds in 54 different currencies, and in FY2012 it issued bonds in 23 currencies. Funding levels depend on lending activity as well as broader macroeconomic conditions. Bond maturities generally range from 2 to 10 years, and the issue size is typically USD$1-3 billion. Moody’s rates the World Bank Aaa, the highest possible rating. It cites the Bank’s strong capital base, status as a preferred creditor, and sound financial management.
Operating Income
The World Bank’s operating income depends primarily on the margin it makes on the loans it issues (net of funding costs), the return on its investments, and its noninterest expenses, of which the largest is staff costs. Operating income has been positive every year since Moody’s began evaluating the Bank, and it has averaged around $1.1 billion over the past five years. Operating income was $876 million in 2013.
Figure 5 shows the Bank’s real loan income has declined over the past decade. Figure 6 shows that this has translated into a decline in real operating income. As Moody’s notes, “IBRD’s profitability is low relative to historical averages, but for a development-mandated institution Moody’s primary consideration of profitability is not the magnitude, but that it does not contribute to the erosion of the capital base” (Moody’s 2012). Declining operating income is largely a function of declining real lending.
Figure 5: IBRD Loan Income (millions of 2013 USD)
Note: Amounts adjusted to 2013 USD using the US CPI-All Urban Consumers index (base 1982-1984)
Source: IBRD (2013)
$0
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
$8,000
$10,000
$12,000
$14,000
$16,000
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
Millions of 2013 USD

19. 19
Figure 6: IBRD Operating Income (millions of 2013 USD)
Note: Amounts adjusted to 2013USD using the US CPI-All Urban Consumers index (base 1982-1984)
Source: IBRD (2013)
In order to avoid further decreases in operating income given current constraints on lending, the Bank could increase its loan price (not likely given competition from other lending sources), reduce transfers (especially to IDA), reduce overheads (including staffing costs and other administrative expenses), or increase lending volume.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATON
The International Finance Corporation focuses on private sector investment in emerging markets. Its three main lines of business include investment services, advisory services, and asset management. Table 14 shows nominal IFC investments by type over the last five years.
In FY2013, IFC committed $18.3 billion of its own funds in loans and equity investments, an increase of nearly 75% in nominal terms since 2009. President Kim announced recently that IFC lending could double over the next 10 years (World Bank 2014). IFC commitments include both loans (typically with maturities of 7 to 12 years) and equity investments (typically a 5% to 20% stake). IFC also offers guarantees and other forms of structured finance (IFC 2013).
IFC also tracks “core mobilization,” financing from other sources (not IFC money) that becomes available to IFC clients as a result of IFC’s involvement in a project. This includes a variety of financial tools, such as parallel loans (arranged by IFC for a fee, but where IFC is not the lender) and loan participation (IFC acts as the lender of record and administers the entire loan, but the loan includes funding from non-IFC sources). Core mobilization was $6.5 billion in 2013, a nearly 65% increase in nominal terms over the past five years
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
$3,000
$3,500
$4,000
$4,500
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
Millions of 2013 USD

20. 20
Table 13: IFC investments and mobilization by type (millions of USD) Type 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
IFC Commitments
10,547
12,664
12,186
15,462
18,349
Loans
5,959
5720
4,991
6,668
8,502
Equity
2,069
2974
1,968
2,282
2,732
Guarantees/other
2,519
3969
5,227
6,512
7,079
Core Mobilization
3,964
5378
6,474
4,896
6,504
Loan Mobilization
2,401
3,157
4,718
3,505
3,578
AMC
8
236
454
437
768
Other Initiatives
1,555
1,985
1,302
954
2,158
Total
14,511
18,042
18,660
20,358
24,853
Source: IFC (2013)
IFC’s Asset Management Company (AMC) mobilizes and manages third-party capital from institutional investors, like sovereign finds and pension funds. AMC manages seven funds, with $5.5 billion under management. These are (1) the Equity Capitalization Fund and (2) the Sub-Debt Capitalization Fund, which both strengthen banks, (3) the ALAC Fund, investing in a range of sectors across Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, (4) the African Capitalization Fund, investing in commercial banks, (5) the Russian Bank Capitalization Fund, investing in commercial banks, (6) the Catalyst Funds, investing in emerging market private equity funds focused on climate change and resource efficiency, and (7) the Global Infrastructure Fund, making debt and equity investments in emerging market infrastructure.
IFC lending has rapidly increased as a proportion of total World Bank Group lending over the past decade, indicating a strong belief in the importance of private sector investment for international development. Figure 7 demonstrates this. In 2000, IFC commitments accounted for less than 13% of total World Bank Group commitments. This rose to 30% over the next eight years. While IFC lending continued to increase through the global financial crisis, it did not do so at the same rate as IBRD lending, so the share of IFC commitments relative to World Bank Group commitments dropped. But over the last three years, IFC lending has continued to rise as IBRD lending has fallen, and IFC now accounts for nearly 35% of total World Bank Group commitments. If MIGA is included in this calculation, around 40% of World Bank Group investments now support private sector ventures.
A significant portion of IFC’s investments support financial intermediaries (third party financial institutions like banks or private equity funds, and the percentage of IFC’s total investment going into financial intermediaries is also increasing. In 2013, more than 60% of IFC’s commitments supported financial intermediaries. Analysis by the Bretton Woods Project (2014) shows that $36 billion has been invested by the IFC in financial intermediaries since 2009.

21. 21
Figure 7: IFC commitments as percentage of total World Bank Group commitments
Source: IFC (2013)
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY
The goal of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is to stimulate foreign direct investment into developing countries. It does this providing political risk insurance (guarantees) to protect against expropriation, breach of contract, non-honoring of financial obligations, currency inconvertibility, terrorism and civil disturbance, and other non- commercial risks. In 2013, MIGA issued $2.8 billion in guarantees, with an additional $3.5 million issued under MIGA-administered trust funds (MIGA 2013). This is double (in nominal terms) the $1.4 billion in guarantees issued five years ago, in 2009.
Over the past five years, MIGA has supported about 27 new projects and 33 total projects per year, and it supported 30 total projects and 26 new projects in 2013. By financing volume, nearly three quarters of MIGA guarantees issues in 2013 supported IDA-eligible counties, including more than 40% to conflict-affected states. Nearly 55% supported projects in Sub- Saharan Africa. Recently, MIGA support has shifted to infrastructure (46% of new volume in 2013) and oil and gas (23% of new volume), moving away from the financial sector (17% of volume in 2013 versus 89% following the 2008 financial crisis).
MIGA’s strategy for 2014-2017 calls for work on infrastructure, power generation, transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and finance. MIGA will work to expand its product line and reach a broader client base. It will continue to prioritize work in IDA-eligible countries and fragile and conflict-affected states.
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
Percent of total WBG lending

22. 22
TRUST FUNDS
Trusts funds were initially designed to give bilateral donors a mechanism for co-financing specific projects. For example, the first World Bank trust fund, established in 1960, allowed co- financing of the Indus Basin Project in Pakistan. In the 1990s, the trust fund model expanded as the Bank took on new roles, particularly in the environmental arena. But truly explosive growth in trust funds has happened only over the last half decade. Since 2007 alone, the total value of World Bank Group trust funds has increased almost 73%, growing from $17.3 billion to $29.2 billion (World Bank 2012c). Trust funds are especially important part of the Bank’s strategy for addressing global public goods issues, like immunization or climate change, that are not easily addressed through the Bank’s traditional lending instruments.
The increasing importance of trust funds at the World Bank mirrors broader changes in global aid design, particularly the rise of so-called “multi-bilateral aid”—bilateral funding earmarked for a particular purpose that is funneled through multilateral agencies. Multi-bi aid increased from $9 billion in 2007 to $16.7 billion in 2010, and it now accounts for around 12% of gross ODA (excluding debt relief). Multi-donor trust funds constitute about 50% of all Bank trust funds, compared to 30% just five years ago. About a quarter of all multi-bi aid flows through the World Bank.
Table 15 provides a snapshot of the World Bank Group’s three major types of trust funds categories: IBRD/IDA trust finds, financial intermediary funds (FIFs), and the IFC trust funds.
Table 16 shows how the World Bank Group’s trust funds changed between 2008 and 2012, in absolute terms and as a percentage change from 2008.
Table 15: Overview of World Bank Group Trust Funds, 2012
Source: World Bank (2012c)
Table 16: Change in World Bank Group Trust Funds, 2012 v. 2008
Number Funds Held (USD billions) FY12 Contributions (USD billions) FY12 Disbursements (USD billions) IBRD/IDA TFs
-37 (-4.8%)
+1.0 (+11.5%)
+0.4 (+10.0%)
+1 (+30.3%) FIFs
+5 (+10.2%)
+7.2 (+67.9%)
+2.7 (+60%)
+2 (+62.5%) IFC TFs
+47 (+22.0%)
+0.5 (+100%)
+0.1 (+50%)
+0.1 (+50%) TOTAL
+45 (+4.4%)
+8.5 (+41%)
3.2 (+36.2%)
+3 (+44.7%)
Source: World Bank (2012c)
Number Funds Held (USD billions) 2012 Contributions (USD billions) 2012 Disbursements (USD billions) IBRD/IDA TFs
720
9.7
4.4
4.3 FIFs
54
17.8
7.2
5.2 IFC TFs
290
1
0.3
0.3 TOTAL
1064
29.2
11.9
9.7

23. 23
A. IBRD/IDA Trust Funds
IBRD/IDA trust funds account for 33% of World Bank Group trust funds by value. Since 2008, funds held in trust in IBRD/IDA trust funds have increased from $8.7 billion to $9.7 billion, cash contributions have increased from $4.0 billion to $4.4 billion, and disbursements have increased from $3.3 billion to $4.3 billion (World Bank 2012c; IEG 2011). Ongoing efforts to consolidate trust funds caused the overall number of IBR/IDA trust funds to decline to 720 in 2012, down from a peak of 780 in 2010. While 84 new trust funds were established, 122 existing funds were closed (World Bank 2012c).
The IBRD and IDA use two types of trust funds: Bank-Executed Trust Funds (BETFs) and Recipient-Executed Trust Funds (RETFs). BETF disbursements directly support Bank programs, typically in ‘knowledge activities’ like non-lending technical assistance. A significant portion of BETF disbursements are used to support Bank supervision of RETF-funded projects. BETF expenditures reached $646 million in 2012, equal to 23% of total World Bank administrative expenditures.
Funds in RETFs, on the other hand, are passed on to third parties for development activities that are usually monitored and evaluated by the Bank. RETF disbursements reached $3.6 billion in 2012, up 13% from the year before. They accounted for 10% of the World Bank’s total project financing (a 9% increase from 2011). Two thirds of RETF disbursements support activities in IDA countries.
B. FIFs
The World Bank’s role in financial intermediary funds is as a trustee: it receives, holds, invests, and transfers funds, often to multiple implementing agencies. As a trustee, the World Bank does not supervise the use of funds, but it may serve as a partner in implementation. The Bank may also provide additional administrative or financial services or serve as the Secretariat. FIFs typically support global programs, on topics like health (51% of FIFs) and the environment and climate change (32% of FIFs) (World Bank 2011c).
FIFs account for 61% of World Bank Group trust funds by value, and they are also the major source of trust fund growth at the Bank. Over the past six years, funds held in trust in FIFs have more than doubled, from $8.9 billion in 2007 to $17.8 billion in 2012. Cash contributions from donors have also more than doubled over the same period, and transfers to implementing agencies and beneficiaries have increased by more than 50%. Some 96% of contributions are from governments. The United States is the largest donor, with cumulative contributions of $6.4 billion over the last five years. Other big contributors are the UK ($3.2 billion), France ($2.9 billion), and Japan ($2.3 billion).
As table 17 illustrates, the four largest FIFs hold 86% of all FIF funds. Still, three new FIFs were established in 2012: the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean Financial Intermediary Trust Fund

24. 24
(EBSM), the Global Partnership for Education Fund (GPEF), and the Green Climate Fund Trust Fund.
Table 17: The Four Largest FIFs Fund Established Cumulative Funding (USD billions)
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)
2002
22.5
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
1991
11.3
Debt Relief Trust Fund (DRTF)
1996
7.7
Climate Investment Funds (CIF)
2008
5.2
Other
---
7.4
Total
---
54.1
Source: World Bank (2012c); World Bank (2011c)
C. IFC TFs
IFC trust funds account for only about 1% of the total value of the World Bank Group’s trust funds, but they are important because they support 80% of IFC’s advisory services. IFC offers these services to businesses and governments in four categories: access to finance, investment climate, public-private partnerships, and sustainable business.
The number of IFC trust funds increased from 213 in 2008 to 290 in 2012, and the total value of IFC trust funds doubled over that same period, from $0.5 billion to $1 billion. Disbursements peaked at $1 billion in 2010, but are typically around $0.3 billion per year (World Bank 2012c).
Over the past five years, the United Kingdom has been the largest donor to IFC trust funds, providing 25% of all contributions. The MasterCard Foundation was the 4th largest donor in 2012, providing $37.5 million for the Partnership for Financial Inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa.
D. Trust Fund Reform
From the perspectives of the World Bank, development donors, and development recipients, trust funds have both advantages and disadvantages (see World Bank 2012c; World Bank 2011c; IEG 2011).
Advantages: Trust funds…
 Help fill gaps in existing development efforts by, for example, providing funds to post- disaster or post-conflict countries that are ineligible for IBRD/IDA support or by catalyzing investment in global public goods like climate change mitigation
 Promote the coordination/harmonization of bilateral aid efforts and support the formation of new development partnerships
 Secure broader support for and complement existing Bank work

25. 25
 Allow doors to use the broader capacities of multilateral institutions
 Reduce transaction and administrative costs and provide economies of scale
Disadvantages: Trust funds…
 Are often not well-integrated into other Bank efforts and activities or into existing country programs
 Often do not allow recipient countries to participate in their design and use, particularly for global funds
 Reduce the visibility of individual donors and therefore the credit they receive
 Reallocate existing ODA but do not increase it
 Reduce transparency, especially because data is difficult to compile and sources conflict
 Are not (or are not as easily) subjected to World Bank safeguards
In 2010, the Independent Evaluation Group undertook an evaluation of the World Bank’s trust fund portfolio and proposed a variety of changes, some of which are now being implemented (IEG 2011). For example, the World Bank is creating Umbrella Facilities in an effort to better align the interests of trust fund donors with existing Bank priorities. Only a few such facilities have been established so far.
STAFFING
By the time of the first annual World Bank meeting in Savannah, Georgia in 1946, the World Bank had 38 member countries and 72 staff members (Phillips 2009). By the 1960s, as Bank lending began to pick up, so did the growth in the size of its staff. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of professional staff more than tripled over the decade, growing from 283 to 917 (Mallaby 2004). Staff growth continued in the 1970s as President Robert MacNamara added new departments and responsibilities: the Rural Development Department in 1973, the Urban Population Department in 1975, and the Population, Health, and Nutrition Department in 1979.
Jim Wolfensohn also oversaw growth in the Bank’s staff as it expanded to new areas, especially the environment (in 1985 the Bank had only five environmental staff). Wolfensohn also oversaw a push to move staff out of the Washington, D.C. headquarters and into the field. In 1995, for example, none of the Bank’s country directors were based outside of Washington. By 2003, 71% of them were. Today, the World Bank employs some 10,000 people, around 40% of whom work in field offices in 110+ countries.
The Bank does not publish detailed data on its staff, but it is possible to make some observations based on its financial statements. Staff costs are lower now than they were in the 1990s, but the Bank is increasingly reliant on outside consultants for its work. The average staff cost over the last four years has been $490 million per year. In the first four years of the 1990s, by comparison, the average staff cost was more than $660 million per year (or more than $1100 million per year in real terms). Consulting costs in the early 1990s, though, averaged $84

26. 26
million per year (or $130 million per year in real terms). In 2012, the Bank spent more than $250 million on consultants. Of course, it is not clear from existing data to what extent changes in staff costs correlate with the number of staff or reflect instead cuts to salaries and benefits. It is also not clear how changes in staff costs have impacted staff quality.
An ongoing reorganization and restructuring process is leading to the creation of 14 global practices, working on areas like agriculture, environment and natural resources, and governance. These global practices replace the previous “sector” structure and are designed to reduce silos that prevented collaboration and exchange of knowledge and learning across regions and World Bank group institutions. The Bank will also have “cross cutting solution areas: climate change, gender, jobs, public private partnerships, and fragility, conflict, and violence (Harding 2014; FT 2014). The reorganization has also brought the departure of several senior Bank managers.
A recent staff survey illustrates the Bank staff feel uncertainty about the direction in which the Bank is headed (Gillison 2014). Among the findings are that 60% of staff think the Bank places more emphasis on the “number and volume of transactions” than on development. Some 58% do not understand the direction chosen senior management, and 68% do not think senior management acts as a unified team. Less than 40% of Bank staff thinks that they are rewarded according to their job performance. It remains to be seen whether President Kim can successfully shepherd the World Bank through this reorganization process and what sort of institution will emerge when this is completed.

27. 27
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