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Are electronic signature
assumptions realistic?


      Paweł Krawczyk
         IPSec.pl
The Directive
• Equivalency to handwritten signature
  – Which hadwritten signature?
    • At $10 CC purchase? At wedding contract?
      At car dealer? At notary? At church?
• Sole control of the owner (AdEs 2.2c)
  – Reality – Polish article 47
• Utopia that turned into fetish
Technical standards
• CWA 14170:2004

„A typical environment for the first case might be the home
  or the office, where the individual or the company
  has direct control of the SCS (e.g. an SCS
  implemented in a mobile phone). In this case, the
  security requirements may be met by organisational
  methods put in place or managed by the signer, and the
  technical means to ensure achievement of the
  security requirements may be more relaxed.”
Computer in home or office?
• Direct control??
• In XXI century???
• This could be valid in 70’s
  – Pre-BBS, pre-FidoNet, pre-Internet
• Reality of „direct control”
  – RDP, XDMCP, SSH, PoisonIvy...
  – Direct control from Romania over server
    in Australia with proxy in USA
Results
• The Smartcard
  – €150’000 CC certificate, DPA protection,
    tamper-proof


            Is then inserted into...

• The Signature Creation System
  – Pirated Windows, no patches, on admin
    account and out-of-date antivirus
QCA’s response
• „Attack is possible, but only if using
  software non-compliant with
  recommendations found in „User
  manual” delivered with QCA
  products”
All about antivirus
SEALED 2007
• “Study on the standardisation
  aspects of eSignature”

“The view of PKI taken in these documents
  is still based on the views from the
  1970s and 1980s (an off-line world!)
  that have to some extent failed in the
  1990s for various reasons”
What works out there?
• Username and            • Trusted email – PEC
  password (UK)             (IT), De-mail (DE),
• Server-based              OCES (DK), TSCP
  signature (MobiTrust,     (USA)
  Trusted Profile, OCES   • Risk-based
  II)                       authentication (e-
• SMS password              Deklaracje)
  (banks)                 • 3rd party (EchoSign,
• Software digital          DocuSign)
  signature (UK, DK, PL
  – e-Sąd)
• OTP tokens (banks)

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Are electronic signature assumptions realistic

  • 1. Are electronic signature assumptions realistic? Paweł Krawczyk IPSec.pl
  • 2. The Directive • Equivalency to handwritten signature – Which hadwritten signature? • At $10 CC purchase? At wedding contract? At car dealer? At notary? At church? • Sole control of the owner (AdEs 2.2c) – Reality – Polish article 47 • Utopia that turned into fetish
  • 3. Technical standards • CWA 14170:2004 „A typical environment for the first case might be the home or the office, where the individual or the company has direct control of the SCS (e.g. an SCS implemented in a mobile phone). In this case, the security requirements may be met by organisational methods put in place or managed by the signer, and the technical means to ensure achievement of the security requirements may be more relaxed.”
  • 4. Computer in home or office? • Direct control?? • In XXI century??? • This could be valid in 70’s – Pre-BBS, pre-FidoNet, pre-Internet • Reality of „direct control” – RDP, XDMCP, SSH, PoisonIvy... – Direct control from Romania over server in Australia with proxy in USA
  • 5. Results • The Smartcard – €150’000 CC certificate, DPA protection, tamper-proof Is then inserted into... • The Signature Creation System – Pirated Windows, no patches, on admin account and out-of-date antivirus
  • 6. QCA’s response • „Attack is possible, but only if using software non-compliant with recommendations found in „User manual” delivered with QCA products”
  • 8. SEALED 2007 • “Study on the standardisation aspects of eSignature” “The view of PKI taken in these documents is still based on the views from the 1970s and 1980s (an off-line world!) that have to some extent failed in the 1990s for various reasons”
  • 9. What works out there? • Username and • Trusted email – PEC password (UK) (IT), De-mail (DE), • Server-based OCES (DK), TSCP signature (MobiTrust, (USA) Trusted Profile, OCES • Risk-based II) authentication (e- • SMS password Deklaracje) (banks) • 3rd party (EchoSign, • Software digital DocuSign) signature (UK, DK, PL – e-Sąd) • OTP tokens (banks)