The document discusses the potential threat of a chemical weapons attack in Europe by the Islamic State. It analyzes IS's history of pursuing chemical weapons, including its predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq's use of chlorine bombs in Iraq. While IS and al-Qaeda have attempted to develop chemical weapons in the past, their efforts have been largely unsuccessful. The document also examines IS's strategy of focusing on nearby enemies in the Middle East rather than directing attacks against the West, though it does inspire lone wolf attacks in Europe. Based on data about previous IS-linked plots in Europe, the attacks have generally been small-scale and low-tech, suggesting IS sympathizers may struggle to successfully use more complex chemical weapons.
The document summarizes the origins and goals of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It discusses how the Taliban formed in response to civil war in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. It also explains that Al Qaeda was founded by Osama Bin Laden and consists mainly of Arab fighters who remained in Afghanistan after the Soviet war. The document then analyzes some major terrorist attacks carried out by Al Qaeda, like 9/11. It concludes by assessing different approaches to dealing with terrorism, including deterrence and the three step solution proposed by Frey.
1. Islam strongly condemns terrorism and promotes peace, justice, and human rights for all.
2. The teachings of Islam aim to build good moral character in individuals based on the example of Prophet Muhammad, emphasizing compassion and forgiveness.
3. An Islamic state is obligated to protect every individual's security, rights, and freedom from harm through law enforcement and if necessary, justly conducted conflict according to Islamic principles of ethics in war.
The document discusses the military tactics of ISIS, comparing them to those of Nazi Germany in the later stages of World War 2. Some key points:
- ISIS relies heavily on offensive operations and brief counterattacks even as they are largely on the defensive. This mirrors Nazi Germany's "cult of the offensive" late in the war.
- Like Nazi Germany, ISIS is tactically skilled but lacks an overall strategy to win. Their tactics involve brief gains followed by unsustainable counterattacks.
- In defending territory, ISIS uses delaying tactics like snipers and booby traps to slow enemy advances before pulling back most fighters. They avoid direct, fixed defenses where they would be vulnerable to air
Understanding the Intensity of Boko Haram's terrorismmuhammad feyyaz
This article discusses the radical Islamist group Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) and argues it may prove more dangerous than ISIS in the long run. While ISIS gains media attention through violence and territory seizure, HuT is slowly spreading its ideology and influence through 50 countries while avoiding direct terrorism. The article warns HuT's strategy of subtle social influence could allow it to develop a more sustainable global network than ISIS, making it a serious future security threat.
Detecting Suicide Bombers, Richard Garrity 2014Richard Garrity
This document provides information on detecting potential suicide bombers, including behaviors and physical characteristics to watch for. It discusses signs of religious preparation for death, pre-attack body motions like maintaining a strong grip on suspicious objects, and how improvised explosive devices can restrict mobility. The document stresses that facilities like transportation hubs, railways, airports, malls and office buildings are most at risk, and that officers should observe suspicious behavior in anyone without profiling based on appearance.
The document discusses the Islamic concept of jihad, contrasting it with non-Islamic concepts of war. It defines jihad as striving or exerting oneself in the cause of Allah. The purposes of jihad are outlined as both spiritual struggles (of the heart, tongue, hands) as well as traditional warfare in defense of Muslims or Muslim lands. Key differences from non-Islamic war are noted as having the cause of Allah, avoiding bloodshed when possible, seeking peace, avoiding treachery, protecting civilians, not destroying infrastructure, and showing mercy to captives. The document provides Quranic verses and hadith to support these Islamic rules of war.
The document provides information on suicide/homicide bombings including identification of bombers, tactics, targets, and interdiction considerations. It notes bombers can be any age, gender, or appearance and use various disguises. Tactics discussed include secondary devices, the use of vehicles and bicycles, and targeting responders. Guidelines are presented for responding personnel including maintaining a safe perimeter and waiting for bomb squads to approach suspects.
Justice, Jihad and Duty: The Qur’anic Concept of Armed Conflict, by Professo...Professor Joel Hayward
The Qur’an is among the most widely read books on earth, yet it is also commonly misunderstood and misquoted. Islam’s critics say that it contains exhortations of violence against non-Muslims and a concept of war that is far more unbridled and indiscriminate than the western Just War theory. This study is not a general overview or critique of the Islamic laws of war, which are the varied and sometimes contradictory opinions of medieval Islamic jurists ― mainly from the ninth to thirteenth centuries CE. Instead, this study analyses only the Qur’anic text itself and, by putting its verses into historical context, attempts to explain its codes of conduct in order to determine what it actually requires or permits Muslims to do in terms of the use of military force. It concludes that the Qur’an is clear: Muslims must not undertake offensive violence and are instructed, if defensive warfare should become unavoidable, always to act within a code of ethical behavior that is closely similar to the western Just War tradition. This study attempts to dispel any misperceptions that Islam’s holy book advocates the subjugation or killing of non-Muslims and reveals that, on the contrary, its key and unequivocal concepts governing warfare are based on justice and a profound belief in the sanctity of human life.
The document summarizes the origins and goals of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It discusses how the Taliban formed in response to civil war in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. It also explains that Al Qaeda was founded by Osama Bin Laden and consists mainly of Arab fighters who remained in Afghanistan after the Soviet war. The document then analyzes some major terrorist attacks carried out by Al Qaeda, like 9/11. It concludes by assessing different approaches to dealing with terrorism, including deterrence and the three step solution proposed by Frey.
1. Islam strongly condemns terrorism and promotes peace, justice, and human rights for all.
2. The teachings of Islam aim to build good moral character in individuals based on the example of Prophet Muhammad, emphasizing compassion and forgiveness.
3. An Islamic state is obligated to protect every individual's security, rights, and freedom from harm through law enforcement and if necessary, justly conducted conflict according to Islamic principles of ethics in war.
The document discusses the military tactics of ISIS, comparing them to those of Nazi Germany in the later stages of World War 2. Some key points:
- ISIS relies heavily on offensive operations and brief counterattacks even as they are largely on the defensive. This mirrors Nazi Germany's "cult of the offensive" late in the war.
- Like Nazi Germany, ISIS is tactically skilled but lacks an overall strategy to win. Their tactics involve brief gains followed by unsustainable counterattacks.
- In defending territory, ISIS uses delaying tactics like snipers and booby traps to slow enemy advances before pulling back most fighters. They avoid direct, fixed defenses where they would be vulnerable to air
Understanding the Intensity of Boko Haram's terrorismmuhammad feyyaz
This article discusses the radical Islamist group Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) and argues it may prove more dangerous than ISIS in the long run. While ISIS gains media attention through violence and territory seizure, HuT is slowly spreading its ideology and influence through 50 countries while avoiding direct terrorism. The article warns HuT's strategy of subtle social influence could allow it to develop a more sustainable global network than ISIS, making it a serious future security threat.
Detecting Suicide Bombers, Richard Garrity 2014Richard Garrity
This document provides information on detecting potential suicide bombers, including behaviors and physical characteristics to watch for. It discusses signs of religious preparation for death, pre-attack body motions like maintaining a strong grip on suspicious objects, and how improvised explosive devices can restrict mobility. The document stresses that facilities like transportation hubs, railways, airports, malls and office buildings are most at risk, and that officers should observe suspicious behavior in anyone without profiling based on appearance.
The document discusses the Islamic concept of jihad, contrasting it with non-Islamic concepts of war. It defines jihad as striving or exerting oneself in the cause of Allah. The purposes of jihad are outlined as both spiritual struggles (of the heart, tongue, hands) as well as traditional warfare in defense of Muslims or Muslim lands. Key differences from non-Islamic war are noted as having the cause of Allah, avoiding bloodshed when possible, seeking peace, avoiding treachery, protecting civilians, not destroying infrastructure, and showing mercy to captives. The document provides Quranic verses and hadith to support these Islamic rules of war.
The document provides information on suicide/homicide bombings including identification of bombers, tactics, targets, and interdiction considerations. It notes bombers can be any age, gender, or appearance and use various disguises. Tactics discussed include secondary devices, the use of vehicles and bicycles, and targeting responders. Guidelines are presented for responding personnel including maintaining a safe perimeter and waiting for bomb squads to approach suspects.
Justice, Jihad and Duty: The Qur’anic Concept of Armed Conflict, by Professo...Professor Joel Hayward
The Qur’an is among the most widely read books on earth, yet it is also commonly misunderstood and misquoted. Islam’s critics say that it contains exhortations of violence against non-Muslims and a concept of war that is far more unbridled and indiscriminate than the western Just War theory. This study is not a general overview or critique of the Islamic laws of war, which are the varied and sometimes contradictory opinions of medieval Islamic jurists ― mainly from the ninth to thirteenth centuries CE. Instead, this study analyses only the Qur’anic text itself and, by putting its verses into historical context, attempts to explain its codes of conduct in order to determine what it actually requires or permits Muslims to do in terms of the use of military force. It concludes that the Qur’an is clear: Muslims must not undertake offensive violence and are instructed, if defensive warfare should become unavoidable, always to act within a code of ethical behavior that is closely similar to the western Just War tradition. This study attempts to dispel any misperceptions that Islam’s holy book advocates the subjugation or killing of non-Muslims and reveals that, on the contrary, its key and unequivocal concepts governing warfare are based on justice and a profound belief in the sanctity of human life.
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...Professor Joel Hayward
Almost all western and other developed states use Principles of War as guiding ideas for military practitioners (especially those who serve at the operational and tactical levels) on how best to use combat power in order to gain maximum advantage. These Principles of War are virtually ubiquitous in cadet and officer colleges and in doctrine manuals. Islamic law, on the other hand, has nothing comparable, and least nothing from the modern world. It has always seriously and proactively engaged with ideas about how to ensure that war is fought for morally just causes. Yet, since the medieval period, Islam has not updated its thoughts on what principles might best enhance combat effectiveness in order to win battles and wars with the maximum effectiveness, the minimum use of force and the minimum likelihood of harm to the innocent. This study investigates whether one can draw such principles from the Qur’an and the life of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad that might serve as guidelines for Islamic armed forces in the twenty-first century, an era dominated by careless disregard for human life and by what is euphemistically called Collateral Damage. Within the earliest extant Arabic sources, this study identifies nine principles—these being Virtuous Objective, Legitimacy, Unity of Command and Effort, Consultative Decision-Making, Offensive Action, Defensive Security, Morale, Restraint, and Deception—that were integral in the warfighting of the Prophet. The author hopes that the analysis might, if widely read in the right circles, prompt further thought and research within Islamic states and their militaries so that something like an agreed set of Islamic Principles of War could eventually emerge and be of utility.
This document provides an overview and analysis of the Quran's teachings on warfare. It notes that while the Quran contains some verses that seem more militant, the overwhelming majority of verses extol tolerance, forgiveness, peace, and compassion. It argues that a fair reading shows the Quran prohibits offensive violence and requires defensive warfare to be conducted ethically and in accordance with principles like proportionality, last resort, and discrimination. The document aims to dispel misperceptions that the Quran advocates violence against non-believers and to show its concepts of warfare are based on justice and sanctity of human life.
“War is Deceit”: An Analysis of a Contentious Hadith on the Morality of Milit...Professor Joel Hayward
Particularly since that dreadful day in September 2001, when nineteen Muslims hijacked commercial airliners and deliberately crashed them into buildings or the ground in history’s worst terrorist attack, killing almost three thousand people, Islam has become a much-discussed and distrusted religion. Despite the fact that over 1.6 billion Muslims live entirely peacefully alongside or amidst people of other faith and cultural communities, Islam has attracted more ideological opponents than other religions have. In terms of the antipathy towards Islam expressed by these people, only anti-Semites seem as antagonistic towards a world religion.
This monograph is not an attack on Islam’s critics. The author believes that people have the right to like or dislike any or all religions and, regardless of perceived taste, to express their views via peaceful discourse. Islam’s most bitter critics, on the other hand, should not be surprised when their views are challenged. Islam has extraordinarily positive features which its adherents, including this author, believe should be presented as a counterbalance to the claims of its critics.
This monograph is not intended as an all-encompassing critique of Islam-hatred, nor even of its worst aspects. It is merely an attempt to build on the author’s previous work ― which argues that the Qur’an is not inherently martial and has a clear ethical code governing and constraining the use of violence for political purposes ― by analyzing one particular associated claim seemingly endlessly made by Islam’s critics. They assert that, far from being a paragon of virtue, the Islamic prophet Muhammad was deceitful and, indeed, boasted of it in several sayings recalled by followers. “War,” they quote him saying, “is deceit.” They contextualize their criticism of Muhammad’s statement that “war is deceit” by arguing that his unashamed statement proves that he was personally dishonest whenever expedient and that Islam consequently tolerates dishonesty in a way that other religions do not.
This study rejects the view that, in the wars fought by Muhammad, he acted immorally through any acts of wanton personal dishonesty (“deceit”) that constitute severe character imperfections and stain his reputation as a holy man. It argues instead that, in his quest to defeat the forces within Arabia which sought to destroy his fledgling community, Muhammad used ruse and bluff and strategic and tactical deception as a reasonable, necessary and eminently legitimate means of gaining military advantage so as to minimize suffering on both sides. It argues that, if Muhammad is to be condemned for using ruses during warfare, then for consistency and fairness his critics must also consider earlier prophets including Moses, Joshua and David, and all of history’s greatest military leaders, to have been morally corrupt merely because they also esteemed the advantages obtained through ruse.
The document discusses the origins and characteristics of the Islamic State group. It traces IS back to al-Qaeda in Iraq and its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Over time it evolved into various iterations, eventually declaring a caliphate in 2014 led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The document outlines IS's territorial control, revenues, and military capabilities. It also examines the international coalition against IS and the challenges of eliminating the group through both military operations and counter-messaging.
This document is a dissertation submitted for an MA in History that examines the parallels between 19th and 20th century anarchists and contemporary lone-wolf terrorists. The introduction provides context on the rise of lone-wolf terrorism and outlines how the dissertation will compare anarchist terrorists to modern lone wolf cases to identify similarities in tactics and motivations. It will analyze how individual terrorism emerged within anarchist movements and if there are common factors enabling increased lone wolf attacks today.
This document discusses the root causes of terrorism in the UK and challenges the simplistic view of blaming "Wahhabism". It summarizes research showing that extremist ideologues like Bin Laden opposed Saudi Arabia and its scholars, who have consistently condemned terrorism. While "Wahhabism" is a simplistic colonial term, Saudi scholars have warned against and condemned terrorism for years. Blaming ideological groups without evidence helps terrorism, rather than solving the problem.
Genesis of suicide attacks in Pakistani society.
A suicide attack is an attack on a military or civilian target, in which an attacker intends to kill others, and knows that they will either certainly or most likely die in the process.
This document discusses the origins and evolution of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines. It covers:
- The ASG was founded in the 1980s by Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani with the original goal of establishing an Islamic state. However, over time it engaged increasingly in terrorist attacks.
- There is debate around whether the ASG was originally formed by or with the support of the Philippine military, though the ASG denies this.
- Janjalani developed the ASG based on radical Islamic ideology influenced by time spent in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
- The ASG's tactics evolved from bombings and assassinations in the 1990s to include
Al Qaeda is an Islamist extremist group founded in the late 1980s by Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam with the goals of ending foreign influence in the Middle East and achieving a worldwide Islamist government. It is known for catastrophic attacks including the September 11 attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people in New York City in 2001. While its main stronghold was historically the cave networks on the Afghan-Pakistani border, the US War on Terror has left the group destabilized and decentralized, playing a smaller role in terrorism than it once did.
Revisiting the Past: The Value of Teaching Islamic Military History, by Pr...Professor Joel Hayward
This article will argue that Muslim scholars should not feel the slightest awkwardness or embarrassment about Islam’s past martial successes, and should indeed return to writing on Islamic military history, teaching it and ensuring its survival within the curricula of cadet and staff colleges. Far from damaging Islam’s reputation, an objective and fair-minded reading of Islam’s military history (according to the methodology and principles accepted within the discipline of history) will directly counter the current western misperception that Islam is somehow more aggressive and accepting of disproportionate or indiscriminate violence than the other great religions. It will in fact show that the Islamic laws and ethics of war have minimized violence and constrained misconduct and ensured that warfare was fought according to guiding principles which are very similar to those found within western “just war” teachings. And far from lending credence to Jihadist or Islamist assertions that warfare should be used by any Muslims who want to bring about political or social change, an honest and thorough recounting of Islamic military history will demonstrate clearly that recourse to violence had never been the prerogative of any individuals, however disgruntled they may be. It was always a right and responsibility bestowed only upon legitimate national leaders (caliphs, kings, emirs and presidents). The teaching of Islamic history is also replete with examples of strategic brilliance and leadership excellence that make wonderfully illuminating and inspiring case studies for today’s civil and military leaders. It goes without saying that studying the campaigns and commanders of the past will develop a Muslim’s civilizational self-respect and esprit de corps in the same way that any western reader would have their sense of civilizational or cultural pride enhanced by studying the World Wars or the strategies and lives of great commanders like Washington, Wellington, Nelson, Grant, Lee, Haig, Montgomery, and Patton.
The growing threat of lone wolf terrorism is posing new challenges to security and intelligence agencies around the world, particularly as terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) utilize social media and technology to recruit new members and inspire new attacks. Media reports have increasingly used the term “lone wolf” in a wide variety of contexts, but this term generally refers to an individual or small cell inspired to execute an attack in the name of an ideology or terrorist group independent of any connection to the organization itself. Without direct links to or communication with a broader network, security and intelligence agencies may fail to detect and prevent plots from lone wolf terrorists, whose plans only become apparent once they are underway. Some plots have included one assailant supported by multiple collaborators sympathetic to the ideology or terrorist group and can be described in similar terms, even though they may not be pure lone wolf events—but are still tellingly lacking any direction or communication with the terrorist hierarchy. Nonetheless, terrorist organizations have encouraged lone wolves and small groups to execute attacks on their own, and recent trends suggest these types of attacks are likely to increase in 2016, as they have proven to be highly effective. While many different ideologies can inspire acts of lone wolf terrorism, this report primarily focuses on lone wolves in the context of IS and Islamist extremism.
The document summarizes the state of terrorism in the current world. It defines terrorism as violence committed to create fear and achieve political, religious, or ideological goals. It discusses the causes of terrorism, including injustice, poverty, political and religious motives. The history of terrorism is traced back to groups like the Sicarii and Hashshashin from the 1st and 11th centuries. Some of the most terrifying attacks include 9/11 and the Beirut barracks bombing. The current state of terrorism is described as alarming with frequent attacks occurring worldwide. The document lists some of the top terrorist groups today and recent major attacks, including in Paris, Brussels, Nice, and Dhaka. It also discusses terrorism in Bangladesh and some
Violence between the united states and iraqKeith Cavalli
The United States invasion of Iraq destabilized the country and created an environment conducive to violence and terrorism. Insurgents gained valuable combat experience fighting US forces, establishing Iraq as a training ground for terrorists. The US policy of targeted drone strikes against terrorists may have completed a self-reinforcing cycle of violence by creating new militants seeking retribution. Destroyed infrastructure and cultural sites in Iraq serve as constant reminders of fragility and death, strengthening support for violent ideologies. Experienced insurgents from Iraq have spread to other conflicts, and the cycle of US targeted killings and terrorist creation could continue indefinitely.
Does Ksa Preach Intolerence & Hatred In The Uk & The Us Salafi ManhajJasir T
This document examines claims that Saudi Arabia promotes intolerance and hatred in the West. It discusses the views of Saudi religious scholars on non-Muslims, acknowledging that extremism exists in Saudi Arabia as well. It also analyzes the meaning of terms like "kaafir" and "kuffaar" and assesses arguments that Saudi influence hinders community cohesion and tolerance. The document questions the analysis of some critics of Saudi influence.
1) The document discusses common myths about Jihad in Islam, including that it means "holy war" or that Islam was spread by the sword.
2) It explains that Jihad actually means to strive or struggle, and identifies four main types - striving of the soul, against Satan, against enemies, and against injustice.
3) It argues that Islam promotes peace, not a "clash of civilizations", and prohibits violence against civilians like suicide bombings. Muslims are called to be peacemakers who resolve conflicts through dialogue and cooperation between civilizations.
Fred Hof argues that the only way to destroy ISIS is to first remove Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria. As an expert on the Middle East who has worked with the US government, Hof uses his experience and knowledge to persuasively argue that the current strategy of bombing ISIS is not effective and that strengthening governments in Iraq and Syria is essential. While not citing sources, Hof backs his opinion with facts and references other articles that support his view that Assad's removal is necessary to cut off ISIS's support and resources. The article is aimed at changing perceptions of how to address ISIS and convincing the audience of a more aggressive strategy.
Al-Qaeda began in the 1980s during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was led by Osama bin Laden and aimed to attack US interests after bin Laden was displeased by the US military presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Major al-Qaeda attacks against the US included the 1993 WTC bombing, 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa, 2000 USS Cole bombing, and the September 11, 2001 attacks which killed nearly 3,000 people and led the US to launch the War on Terror.
This document provides a biography of Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhaab, an 18th century Islamic scholar from Najd, located in modern-day Saudi Arabia. It discusses his background growing up in Najd and provides context about the region prior to his birth. The author aims to present an impartial analysis of ibn Abdul-Wahhaab's life, teachings, and influence based on reliable historical sources, both Muslim and non-Muslim.
This document discusses the causes and motivations of Islamic terrorism. It argues that Islamic terrorist groups feel inferior to the modern Western world and seek to reclaim glory from the past through violence. Simply killing terrorist leaders will not eliminate the underlying issues and beliefs that fuel terrorism. To effectively combat terrorism, its root causes like feelings of cultural inferiority and strict interpretations of Islam must be addressed by empowering Muslim communities and secularizing aspects of their religion.
This document discusses the concept of jihad in Islam through analyzing verses from the Quran and providing context. It makes three key points:
1) Jihad does not mean "holy war" but rather means striving or struggling, with the "major jihad" referring to internal spiritual struggle and the "minor jihad" to justified armed defense but not aggression.
2) Quranic verses cited to justify violence are often taken out of context, such as verses related to early defensive battles between Muslims and their oppressors in Mecca.
3) Islam teaches Muslims to be strong in self-defense but also to extend peace towards enemies if they are inclined, and true jihad is primarily the
This surf lesson summary covers April 2015. It highlights that great surf lessons were held at various beaches including Middleton, Moana, and Robe over the month. Lessons included surf groms, Easter, and school holidays, resulting in many happy surfers. The company thanks customers and looks forward to seeing them at the beach again both to teach surfing and let them enjoy it.
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...Professor Joel Hayward
Almost all western and other developed states use Principles of War as guiding ideas for military practitioners (especially those who serve at the operational and tactical levels) on how best to use combat power in order to gain maximum advantage. These Principles of War are virtually ubiquitous in cadet and officer colleges and in doctrine manuals. Islamic law, on the other hand, has nothing comparable, and least nothing from the modern world. It has always seriously and proactively engaged with ideas about how to ensure that war is fought for morally just causes. Yet, since the medieval period, Islam has not updated its thoughts on what principles might best enhance combat effectiveness in order to win battles and wars with the maximum effectiveness, the minimum use of force and the minimum likelihood of harm to the innocent. This study investigates whether one can draw such principles from the Qur’an and the life of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad that might serve as guidelines for Islamic armed forces in the twenty-first century, an era dominated by careless disregard for human life and by what is euphemistically called Collateral Damage. Within the earliest extant Arabic sources, this study identifies nine principles—these being Virtuous Objective, Legitimacy, Unity of Command and Effort, Consultative Decision-Making, Offensive Action, Defensive Security, Morale, Restraint, and Deception—that were integral in the warfighting of the Prophet. The author hopes that the analysis might, if widely read in the right circles, prompt further thought and research within Islamic states and their militaries so that something like an agreed set of Islamic Principles of War could eventually emerge and be of utility.
This document provides an overview and analysis of the Quran's teachings on warfare. It notes that while the Quran contains some verses that seem more militant, the overwhelming majority of verses extol tolerance, forgiveness, peace, and compassion. It argues that a fair reading shows the Quran prohibits offensive violence and requires defensive warfare to be conducted ethically and in accordance with principles like proportionality, last resort, and discrimination. The document aims to dispel misperceptions that the Quran advocates violence against non-believers and to show its concepts of warfare are based on justice and sanctity of human life.
“War is Deceit”: An Analysis of a Contentious Hadith on the Morality of Milit...Professor Joel Hayward
Particularly since that dreadful day in September 2001, when nineteen Muslims hijacked commercial airliners and deliberately crashed them into buildings or the ground in history’s worst terrorist attack, killing almost three thousand people, Islam has become a much-discussed and distrusted religion. Despite the fact that over 1.6 billion Muslims live entirely peacefully alongside or amidst people of other faith and cultural communities, Islam has attracted more ideological opponents than other religions have. In terms of the antipathy towards Islam expressed by these people, only anti-Semites seem as antagonistic towards a world religion.
This monograph is not an attack on Islam’s critics. The author believes that people have the right to like or dislike any or all religions and, regardless of perceived taste, to express their views via peaceful discourse. Islam’s most bitter critics, on the other hand, should not be surprised when their views are challenged. Islam has extraordinarily positive features which its adherents, including this author, believe should be presented as a counterbalance to the claims of its critics.
This monograph is not intended as an all-encompassing critique of Islam-hatred, nor even of its worst aspects. It is merely an attempt to build on the author’s previous work ― which argues that the Qur’an is not inherently martial and has a clear ethical code governing and constraining the use of violence for political purposes ― by analyzing one particular associated claim seemingly endlessly made by Islam’s critics. They assert that, far from being a paragon of virtue, the Islamic prophet Muhammad was deceitful and, indeed, boasted of it in several sayings recalled by followers. “War,” they quote him saying, “is deceit.” They contextualize their criticism of Muhammad’s statement that “war is deceit” by arguing that his unashamed statement proves that he was personally dishonest whenever expedient and that Islam consequently tolerates dishonesty in a way that other religions do not.
This study rejects the view that, in the wars fought by Muhammad, he acted immorally through any acts of wanton personal dishonesty (“deceit”) that constitute severe character imperfections and stain his reputation as a holy man. It argues instead that, in his quest to defeat the forces within Arabia which sought to destroy his fledgling community, Muhammad used ruse and bluff and strategic and tactical deception as a reasonable, necessary and eminently legitimate means of gaining military advantage so as to minimize suffering on both sides. It argues that, if Muhammad is to be condemned for using ruses during warfare, then for consistency and fairness his critics must also consider earlier prophets including Moses, Joshua and David, and all of history’s greatest military leaders, to have been morally corrupt merely because they also esteemed the advantages obtained through ruse.
The document discusses the origins and characteristics of the Islamic State group. It traces IS back to al-Qaeda in Iraq and its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Over time it evolved into various iterations, eventually declaring a caliphate in 2014 led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The document outlines IS's territorial control, revenues, and military capabilities. It also examines the international coalition against IS and the challenges of eliminating the group through both military operations and counter-messaging.
This document is a dissertation submitted for an MA in History that examines the parallels between 19th and 20th century anarchists and contemporary lone-wolf terrorists. The introduction provides context on the rise of lone-wolf terrorism and outlines how the dissertation will compare anarchist terrorists to modern lone wolf cases to identify similarities in tactics and motivations. It will analyze how individual terrorism emerged within anarchist movements and if there are common factors enabling increased lone wolf attacks today.
This document discusses the root causes of terrorism in the UK and challenges the simplistic view of blaming "Wahhabism". It summarizes research showing that extremist ideologues like Bin Laden opposed Saudi Arabia and its scholars, who have consistently condemned terrorism. While "Wahhabism" is a simplistic colonial term, Saudi scholars have warned against and condemned terrorism for years. Blaming ideological groups without evidence helps terrorism, rather than solving the problem.
Genesis of suicide attacks in Pakistani society.
A suicide attack is an attack on a military or civilian target, in which an attacker intends to kill others, and knows that they will either certainly or most likely die in the process.
This document discusses the origins and evolution of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines. It covers:
- The ASG was founded in the 1980s by Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani with the original goal of establishing an Islamic state. However, over time it engaged increasingly in terrorist attacks.
- There is debate around whether the ASG was originally formed by or with the support of the Philippine military, though the ASG denies this.
- Janjalani developed the ASG based on radical Islamic ideology influenced by time spent in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
- The ASG's tactics evolved from bombings and assassinations in the 1990s to include
Al Qaeda is an Islamist extremist group founded in the late 1980s by Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam with the goals of ending foreign influence in the Middle East and achieving a worldwide Islamist government. It is known for catastrophic attacks including the September 11 attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people in New York City in 2001. While its main stronghold was historically the cave networks on the Afghan-Pakistani border, the US War on Terror has left the group destabilized and decentralized, playing a smaller role in terrorism than it once did.
Revisiting the Past: The Value of Teaching Islamic Military History, by Pr...Professor Joel Hayward
This article will argue that Muslim scholars should not feel the slightest awkwardness or embarrassment about Islam’s past martial successes, and should indeed return to writing on Islamic military history, teaching it and ensuring its survival within the curricula of cadet and staff colleges. Far from damaging Islam’s reputation, an objective and fair-minded reading of Islam’s military history (according to the methodology and principles accepted within the discipline of history) will directly counter the current western misperception that Islam is somehow more aggressive and accepting of disproportionate or indiscriminate violence than the other great religions. It will in fact show that the Islamic laws and ethics of war have minimized violence and constrained misconduct and ensured that warfare was fought according to guiding principles which are very similar to those found within western “just war” teachings. And far from lending credence to Jihadist or Islamist assertions that warfare should be used by any Muslims who want to bring about political or social change, an honest and thorough recounting of Islamic military history will demonstrate clearly that recourse to violence had never been the prerogative of any individuals, however disgruntled they may be. It was always a right and responsibility bestowed only upon legitimate national leaders (caliphs, kings, emirs and presidents). The teaching of Islamic history is also replete with examples of strategic brilliance and leadership excellence that make wonderfully illuminating and inspiring case studies for today’s civil and military leaders. It goes without saying that studying the campaigns and commanders of the past will develop a Muslim’s civilizational self-respect and esprit de corps in the same way that any western reader would have their sense of civilizational or cultural pride enhanced by studying the World Wars or the strategies and lives of great commanders like Washington, Wellington, Nelson, Grant, Lee, Haig, Montgomery, and Patton.
The growing threat of lone wolf terrorism is posing new challenges to security and intelligence agencies around the world, particularly as terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) utilize social media and technology to recruit new members and inspire new attacks. Media reports have increasingly used the term “lone wolf” in a wide variety of contexts, but this term generally refers to an individual or small cell inspired to execute an attack in the name of an ideology or terrorist group independent of any connection to the organization itself. Without direct links to or communication with a broader network, security and intelligence agencies may fail to detect and prevent plots from lone wolf terrorists, whose plans only become apparent once they are underway. Some plots have included one assailant supported by multiple collaborators sympathetic to the ideology or terrorist group and can be described in similar terms, even though they may not be pure lone wolf events—but are still tellingly lacking any direction or communication with the terrorist hierarchy. Nonetheless, terrorist organizations have encouraged lone wolves and small groups to execute attacks on their own, and recent trends suggest these types of attacks are likely to increase in 2016, as they have proven to be highly effective. While many different ideologies can inspire acts of lone wolf terrorism, this report primarily focuses on lone wolves in the context of IS and Islamist extremism.
The document summarizes the state of terrorism in the current world. It defines terrorism as violence committed to create fear and achieve political, religious, or ideological goals. It discusses the causes of terrorism, including injustice, poverty, political and religious motives. The history of terrorism is traced back to groups like the Sicarii and Hashshashin from the 1st and 11th centuries. Some of the most terrifying attacks include 9/11 and the Beirut barracks bombing. The current state of terrorism is described as alarming with frequent attacks occurring worldwide. The document lists some of the top terrorist groups today and recent major attacks, including in Paris, Brussels, Nice, and Dhaka. It also discusses terrorism in Bangladesh and some
Violence between the united states and iraqKeith Cavalli
The United States invasion of Iraq destabilized the country and created an environment conducive to violence and terrorism. Insurgents gained valuable combat experience fighting US forces, establishing Iraq as a training ground for terrorists. The US policy of targeted drone strikes against terrorists may have completed a self-reinforcing cycle of violence by creating new militants seeking retribution. Destroyed infrastructure and cultural sites in Iraq serve as constant reminders of fragility and death, strengthening support for violent ideologies. Experienced insurgents from Iraq have spread to other conflicts, and the cycle of US targeted killings and terrorist creation could continue indefinitely.
Does Ksa Preach Intolerence & Hatred In The Uk & The Us Salafi ManhajJasir T
This document examines claims that Saudi Arabia promotes intolerance and hatred in the West. It discusses the views of Saudi religious scholars on non-Muslims, acknowledging that extremism exists in Saudi Arabia as well. It also analyzes the meaning of terms like "kaafir" and "kuffaar" and assesses arguments that Saudi influence hinders community cohesion and tolerance. The document questions the analysis of some critics of Saudi influence.
1) The document discusses common myths about Jihad in Islam, including that it means "holy war" or that Islam was spread by the sword.
2) It explains that Jihad actually means to strive or struggle, and identifies four main types - striving of the soul, against Satan, against enemies, and against injustice.
3) It argues that Islam promotes peace, not a "clash of civilizations", and prohibits violence against civilians like suicide bombings. Muslims are called to be peacemakers who resolve conflicts through dialogue and cooperation between civilizations.
Fred Hof argues that the only way to destroy ISIS is to first remove Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria. As an expert on the Middle East who has worked with the US government, Hof uses his experience and knowledge to persuasively argue that the current strategy of bombing ISIS is not effective and that strengthening governments in Iraq and Syria is essential. While not citing sources, Hof backs his opinion with facts and references other articles that support his view that Assad's removal is necessary to cut off ISIS's support and resources. The article is aimed at changing perceptions of how to address ISIS and convincing the audience of a more aggressive strategy.
Al-Qaeda began in the 1980s during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was led by Osama bin Laden and aimed to attack US interests after bin Laden was displeased by the US military presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Major al-Qaeda attacks against the US included the 1993 WTC bombing, 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa, 2000 USS Cole bombing, and the September 11, 2001 attacks which killed nearly 3,000 people and led the US to launch the War on Terror.
This document provides a biography of Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhaab, an 18th century Islamic scholar from Najd, located in modern-day Saudi Arabia. It discusses his background growing up in Najd and provides context about the region prior to his birth. The author aims to present an impartial analysis of ibn Abdul-Wahhaab's life, teachings, and influence based on reliable historical sources, both Muslim and non-Muslim.
This document discusses the causes and motivations of Islamic terrorism. It argues that Islamic terrorist groups feel inferior to the modern Western world and seek to reclaim glory from the past through violence. Simply killing terrorist leaders will not eliminate the underlying issues and beliefs that fuel terrorism. To effectively combat terrorism, its root causes like feelings of cultural inferiority and strict interpretations of Islam must be addressed by empowering Muslim communities and secularizing aspects of their religion.
This document discusses the concept of jihad in Islam through analyzing verses from the Quran and providing context. It makes three key points:
1) Jihad does not mean "holy war" but rather means striving or struggling, with the "major jihad" referring to internal spiritual struggle and the "minor jihad" to justified armed defense but not aggression.
2) Quranic verses cited to justify violence are often taken out of context, such as verses related to early defensive battles between Muslims and their oppressors in Mecca.
3) Islam teaches Muslims to be strong in self-defense but also to extend peace towards enemies if they are inclined, and true jihad is primarily the
This surf lesson summary covers April 2015. It highlights that great surf lessons were held at various beaches including Middleton, Moana, and Robe over the month. Lessons included surf groms, Easter, and school holidays, resulting in many happy surfers. The company thanks customers and looks forward to seeing them at the beach again both to teach surfing and let them enjoy it.
La tecnología artesanal se refiere a la fabricación a mano de elementos sin el uso de máquinas, utilizando técnicas ancestrales. Los talleres artesanales familiares constituyen las unidades de producción donde el jefe de familia dirige y ejecuta simultáneamente el trabajo para satisfacer las necesidades locales. El proyecto "De Manos y de Palabra" buscó organizar una cadena de valor para la producción textil artesanal en una zona poco industrializada, identificando los roles de los productores, esquiladores, hilanderos y
The document describes two open roles at Talbots, a clothing retailer. The Client Specialist role involves creating relationships with customers to help them look and feel their best each day by understanding their style and needs. The Sales Support Associate role helps create a welcoming store environment for customers and ensures their needs are met while also assisting with visual merchandising, operations, and building customer relationships. Both roles focus on providing exceptional customer experiences at Talbots.
9 produtos que você deve ter em sua casa e que pode servir como remédioJuli Ferreira
O documento lista 9 produtos comuns que podem servir como remédios caseiros: 1) Listerine para fungos e bolhas, 2) iogurte para mau hálito, 3) azeite como hidratante, 4) açúcar para soluços, 5) chiclete de menta ou canela para fadiga, 6) fita adesiva para verrugas, 7) morder lápis para dor de cabeça, 8) vodka para pés fedorentos e 9) tomates para problemas de pele.
The dental procedure involved hemisection of tooth 46, extraction of the medial root, and temporary reconstruction with a Logan + KerrA3 temporary restoration. Further stage work was needed to correct the contours of the tooth and for finishing and polishing with water.
El documento presenta biografías breves de tres importantes figuras en el desarrollo de la tecnología: Bill Gates, fundador de Microsoft; Linus Torvalds, creador del núcleo Linux; y Steve Jobs, cofundador de Apple. Describe sus orígenes, educación, logros profesionales y el impacto de sus innovaciones tecnológicas en la industria y la sociedad.
Final Big Ten Contest Results (Nx Power Lite)mweddi
The document outlines a marketing program from Mike Wedding to leverage the Big Ten Basketball Tournament to increase Gatorade sales. The plan included securing tickets and point-of-sale materials to promote a contest among stores. Top stores increasing Gatorade 8pk sales would win tickets to tournament games. The program resulted in large sales increases for Gatorade products compared to the previous year's tournament period.
La lista enumera varios insectos comunes como la hormiga, la cigarra, la abeja, el piojo, la mariposa, el saltamontes, la mariquita, la libélula, el insecto palo, el escarabajo, la mosca y la mantis.
The document outlines a plan to promote furniture and home decor products in Vietnam. It discusses analyzing the market and exploitation methods, building an effective team, and proposals and plans for implementation. It analyzes potential markets, advertising channels such as online (Google ads, banners, websites), and offline events. It also discusses customer behavior, recommendations for regions, products, and implementing the outlined plans and addressing customer issues.
Este manual fornece diretrizes sobre contagem de carboidratos para auxiliar no controle glicêmico de pacientes com diabetes. Ele explica o que é uma alimentação saudável e como contar carboidratos de forma a promover saúde. Também discute os macronutrientes, suas calorias, efeitos na glicemia e recomendações de ingestão diária. A pirâmide alimentar é apresentada como guia na escolha de alimentos balanceados.
Al Qaeda is an international terrorist organization founded in the late 1980s. It was originally formed to assist veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war but later became known for orchestrating devastating terrorist attacks against Western targets. Al Qaeda operates through a decentralized network of cells rather than a strict hierarchical structure. It is led by a shura council that advises the leader, currently Ayman al-Zawahiri following the death of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda promotes a radical Salafist ideology and seeks to defend and purify Islam through global jihad against those it deems enemies of the faith.
This document provides an overview of terrorism and the global war on terror. It defines terrorism and discusses its origins and history. It outlines different types of terrorism such as civil, political, non-political, and state terrorism. It discusses major terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, and the Taliban. It also covers the 9/11 attacks and modern terrorism. Finally, it outlines the roles of different countries and organizations in the global war on terror, including the US, UN, NATO, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
This document provides a comparative analysis of the leadership, operations, and strategies of three terrorist organizations: ISIS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It discusses the leadership and evolution of each group over time. ISIS emerged stronger in 2013 under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and controls territory in Iraq and Syria. AQAP was formed through a merger in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and is now led by Qasim al-Raymi. AQIM operates in North and West Africa and has expanded beyond Algeria under the leadership of Abdelmalek Droukdel. The document aims to comprehensively understand these
OLLI, Session 3, From Hybrids to Homegrown Terror & Radicalization, Spring 20...DavidMcCuan
al-Qaeda provided financial and military support
- 2013: ISIS leader al-Baghdadi announced that Nusra Front
is under his command now – but Nusra Front refused to
submit to ISIS
- 2014: al-Qaeda broke up with ISIS because of its brutality
and its claim to establish a Caliphate immediately
- Today: Nusra Front is still active in Syria, cooperating with
other rebel groups against Assad
- ISIS established its own terrorist infrastructure in Syria too
The Caliphate
- 2014 June: ISIS declared the establishment of the Caliphate
and named al-Baghdadi as Caliph Ibrahim
- Aim
Jihadism and Islamophobia: challenges for current European youthJuan Carlos Ocaña
This document provides an overview of the history of jihadism and the rise of far-right political parties in Europe. It discusses the ideological roots of modern jihadism in Salafism and the remote historical context of Islamic expansion. Key events and organizations in the history of jihadism are explained, including the mujahideen resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1970s-80s, the formation of Al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the 9/11 attacks, and the emergence and spread of ISIS in the 2010s. The document also examines the growth of Islamophobia and far-right parties in Europe, fueled by terrorist attacks, the refugee crisis, and perceptions of a growing Muslim
Min 350 wordsDescribe the evolution of the leadership and o.docxpoulterbarbara
After the death of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda decentralized into regional affiliates like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This allowed the organization to continue operating in different regions while avoiding direct attacks. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) split from the main group and became the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), adopting a more aggressive strategy of controlling territory in Syria and Iraq and targeting Shiite Muslims. Though weakened, al Qaeda has survived through its decentralized structure and ability to evolve its tactics, continuing to pose a threat through regional affiliates conducting smaller attacks.
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The document provides background information on ISIS, including:
1) ISIS originated from Al-Qaeda in Iraq after the 2003 US invasion, and grew stronger during conflicts in Iraq and Syria between 2004-2014, taking control of Mosul.
2) ISIS is funded through oil sales, taxes, ransom payments, and donations from wealthy supporters, with annual income estimated at $2 billion. The US provided over $200 million in weapons and vehicles when withdrawing from Iraq.
3) The US and allies have conducted over 8,000 airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. ISIS has committed widespread atrocities, especially against women and children, through torture, rape, and brutal killings
ISIS originated in 2004 as Al Qaeda in Iraq and rebranded as ISIS in 2013 after expanding into Syria. It gained strength after the US withdrawal from Iraq and amidst sectarian conflict, capturing territory in Iraq and Syria. ISIS generates revenue from oil, taxes, and other means to fund its goal of establishing a global caliphate through violent expansion and inspiring terrorist attacks abroad. A US-led international coalition has made gains against ISIS but it remains a threat through physical territory and online recruitment for lone wolf attacks in line with its extremist ideology.
ISIS formed in 2004 as Al Qaeda in Iraq and rebranded as ISIS in 2013 after expanding into Syria. It captured territory in Iraq and Syria, implementing strict Sharia law and seeking to establish a global caliphate. The document discusses ISIS's origins, tactics of controlling oil fields and other resources to fund its operations, and goals of erasing borders from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. It also covers military efforts against ISIS and terrorist attacks inspired or conducted by ISIS, including the 2015 Paris attacks.
This was a group project for my Army Combined Arms Service Staff School (CAS3) in 2004. We were asked to conduct research on Terrorism and develop proposals. Warning, graphic photos!
The document discusses ISIS and strategies for collecting intelligence on the terrorist organization. It describes ISIS's origins, leadership, goals of establishing a caliphate, territory controlled in Iraq and Syria, and use of violence. The most effective method of collecting timely data on future attacks is through human intelligence (HUMINT) programs using sources on the ground. The most qualified collectors would be intelligence specialists from the Department of Defense and military who speak Arabic and Farsi and have expertise in communications signals and cryptography. Collected data should be analyzed using strategies like analysis of competing hypotheses to avoid cognitive biases.
ISIS has been growing its territory in the Middle East and recruiting members in Europe, posing a threat. It aims to establish a global caliphate and has carried out attacks across Europe. ISIS developed from earlier groups and declared a caliphate in 2014 under Baghdadi's leadership. It controls territory in Iraq and Syria and funds itself through oil sales, taxation, and criminal activities. Losing ground due to airstrikes, ISIS has shifted focus to inspiring external attacks to maintain relevance amid territorial losses.
1. Assessing the potential for an Islamic State chemical attack in Europe
Since declaring its caliphate in June 2014, the Islamic State (IS) has become the focal-
point of British counter-terrorism efforts. Born out of the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
and catalysed by the on-going civil war in Syria, IS’ strategy has largely been regional in
focus. Distinct from other jihadists groups in that it effectively maintains territory that spans
large swathes of eastern Syria and western Iraq, its continued existence has been difficult
to define. At once an insurgency and a proto-state, its concentration has been on bringing
Muslims into the caliphate and expanding it (Zelin 2015), while largely leaving attacks on
Western targets to lone-wolf sympathisers. However, recent events, including IS’ alleged
downing of the Russian airliner in the Sinai (Withnall 2015) and the co-ordinated attacks in
Paris (Sterbenz, Price and Engel 2015) may suggest a shift to a more direct Western
strategy.
In the aftermath of the attacks, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls warned parliament that
there is a risk of a jihadist chemical weapons (CW) attack in France. (Telegraph 2015)
Although he did not cite any specific threat, it served as a stark warning. It is alleged that
IS possess CWs in Iraq and Syria, using them against civilians (Chivers 2015) and the
Kurdish peshmerga (Guardian 2015). Although terrorist attacks in Europe are a deep
cause for concern, CW attacks on urban populations are incredibly rare. This essay will
assess the likelihood of an IS linked CW attack in Europe, approaching it from three
distinct but interlinked angles: the history of jihadist attempts to weaponise chemicals, how
IS views the west as a target, and the difficulties associated with developing CW.
Historical attempts to develop chemical weapons by al-Qaeda and AQI
When assessing the interest that IS may have in CWs, it’s important to look at the history
of jihadist CW procurement. IS’ evolution is closely linked with al-Qaeda, particularly al-
Qaeda in Iraq, which can be said to be IS’ predecessor (Byman and Williams 2015).
The first reported attempts of al-Qaeda attempting to purchase CWs emerged in 1996
(Cole 2011, 60), while in 1998 a US airstrike took out a factory in Sudan, alleged to be an
al-Qaeda CW production facility (Cole 2011, 104). The aftermath of 9/11 saw a flurry of al-
Qaeda statements regarding its interest in CBRN weaponry, with reference often made
specifically to CWs. In June 2002, al-Qaeda spokesman Sulayman Abu Ghayth stated that
2. Muslims have the “right to kill” up to four million Americans “with chemical and biological
weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted the Muslims
because of the [Americans’] chemical and biological weapons.” (McNerney 2009, 456)
Although the extent and capabilities of al-Qaeda’s CWs programme was highly
exaggerated, it nonetheless created a fear factor and became an issue for western
governments. In 2002 a video emerged of al-Qaeda members using an unspecified gas on
dogs, which killed them. (Robertson 2002) Also in 2002 the Pentagon assessed that lab
equipment found in Kandahar, Afghanistan, was likely used by al-Qaeda for “a very limited
production of biological and chemical agents.” (Miller 2002)
Perhaps more significant, is the use of CWs by al-Qaeda-core affiliate, al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI). In 2004 the leader of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
formally aligned with Osama bin Laden to form AQI. The bin Laden-Zarqawi relationship
was often fractious, with AQI’s violence on Shia muslims a source of contention. Although
al-Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike in 2006, the group continued to exist and expand,
before eventually splitting with al-Qaeda in 2013 and becoming the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham, now IS. Indeed, when current IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the
caliphate in June 2014 he said that the group would continue along ‘the path that [Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi] trod … we God Willing, are following in his footsteps” (Lister 2015,
122). Indeed, much of the takfir ideology of IS is spawned from AQI and Zarqawism, in
particular its adherence to the teachings of the jihadist manual “The Management of
Savagery”. (Weiss and Hassan 2015, 40) (Crook 2014)
Before the recent allegations levelled at IS (Chivers 2015), AQI had been the only jihadist
organisation known to have used CWs. In April 2004, it became apparent that al-Zarqawi
was directly involved in the making of CWs, when US officials linked him to a ricin and
cyanide lab in Kirma, Iraq. (McInerney and Rhodes 2009, 425) Later that year, 3kg of
cyanide was found at the Baghdad house of Zarqawi aid Ahmad Fadhl Nazzal al-
Khalayila. (McInerney and Rhodes 2009, 440) In 2005, Zarqawi was ostensibly linked to a
planned chemical attack in Europe. (DW 2005) AQI’s most significant use of CWs though,
came in 2006 and 2007, when a series of car bombs containing chlorine gas were used on
Iraqi civilians and coalition forces. The chlorine was stolen rather than developed in a lab
(Binder and Moodie 2009, 143) The first attacks used roughly 100 pounds of chlorine,
which largely evaporated in the explosion. Later attacks used less explosive and up to one
tonne of chlorine, ensuring the chlorine had an effect on those AQI targeted. This suggests
3. a learning curve among the jihadists about the use of chlorine in attacks. (Binder and
Moodie 2009, 143) However, while the attacks caused deaths and mass casualties, it’s
unlikely that any deaths were as a result of chlorine exposure rather than the explosions
themselves.
While improvised chlorine bombs were arguably a successful attack, the bombs were
extremely crude and the chlorine was not utilised in such a way as to be properly effective.
Although the risk of an IS chemical attack exists, it’s important to note that a jihadist
organisation has never had a great deal of success attempting to develop such weapons.
The near and far enemy
Having looked at the history of CW procurement attempts by both core al-Qaeda and AQI,
it is important to understand their differing strategies, and how closely AQI’s strategy
influences IS today. In the early to mid 2000s, when core al-Qaeda was at its strongest, it
had a largely international focus on the “far enemy” that is the West. (Byman 2015)
Conversely, AQI’s remit was comparatively local. It rarely, if ever, sought to carry out
attacks in the West, preferring instead to tackle the “near enemy”, (Byman 2015) which
included coalition forces and the Shia-dominated government of Iraq, with attacks against
the West being of secondary concern. (Byman 2015)
IS largely follows the “near enemy” strategy of its predecessor, (Byman 2015) albeit with
caveats. So-called “apostate regimes” are what it considers its primary enemy, chiefly the
Assad regime and Iraqi government (Byman 2015). Its takfirism also sees it battle with
many other groups, including Hezbollah, Ahrar al-Sham, moderate rebels, and Jabhat al-
Nusra.
Sympathisers, foreign fighters, and the threat at home
Indeed, its strategy so far has been largely an insurgency and state-building project,
seeking to draw Muslims into its caliphate, rather than send them to Europe to wreak
havoc. (Zelin 2015) However, IS still employs strong rhetoric against the West.
Mohammad Emwazi, recently killed in a US drone strike, embodied this rhetoric, as many
of his videos threatened attacks against the West. (Jerusalem Post 2015) Research has
suggested that although IS focuses on a “near enemy” strategy, it prefers to inspire
4. sympathisers in the West to carry out “individual jihad” there, rather than using a
centralised approach. Two months before the Paris attacks, Thomas Hegghammer and
Petter Nesser, of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, authored a paper
(2015) assessing how IS views attacking the west. They found that there have been two IS
sympathiser attacks per month in the west since September 2014. Over the period
January 2011 to June 2015, they found evidence of 30 IS connected plots, 11 of which
(37%) were executed. Non-IS connected plots however, had a lesser execution rate of
(21%), but had a higher death rather at 2.9 deaths, compared to 1.4 deaths for IS
connected plots.
Furthermore, the authors found that 16 of the total 69 plots that they examined contained
at least one returned foreign fighter, and all but one of those plots occurred in Europe. Of
those 16 plots, 9 contained foreign fighters who had been to Syria. The authors conclude
that the rate of returning foreign fighter who plots an attack to be quite insignificant, at 1 in
360 who goes to Syria.
Much can be gleaned from these numbers, particularly when assessing the potential for a
CW attack in Europe. First of all, and worryingly, most of the plots examined occurred in
Europe (54%). Indeed, most of the plots the came to execution were in Europe (12), and
most of the plotters were also in Europe (80 out of 120 examined). Interestingly, plots
connected to IS tended to be less deadly but more successful. The authors note that these
types of plots tended to be small and low tech, involving stabbings and handguns, which
would suggest that IS connected plotters would be less likely to successfully use CBRN
weaponry, given the crudeness of IS-related attacks and the relative complexity of
developing and delivering CWs (discussed below). The authors also come to the
conclusion that IS sympathisers were a larger threat than returning foreign fighters, who
accounted for a relatively small threat: 1 out of every 360 who goes to Syria, though this
point may need to be reconsidered after the recent attacks in Paris.
The authors make clear that they hesitate to make predictions on future attacks from their
data. Nonetheless, while the vast majority of IS plots and executed attacks occur in
Europe, they’re relatively small in scale and lethality, which suggests the level of planning,
effort, and financial expense required for a chemical attack has so for not been mirrored in
any conventional weapons plots planned or carried out. For example, the vast majority of
attacks are lone wolf attacks, such as the Copenhagen attacks (Chrisafis 2015) and the
5. decapitation attack in Lyon (BBC 2015). Given the inherent difficulties of developing and
deploying CWs, and given jihadist history of being unable to do so, the trends of small,
low-tech IS-related attacks we have seen so far may suggest that a chemical attack is
unlikely.
Nonetheless, the threat of a CW attack still exists, and as such we must examine how a
chemical attack in Europe might come about.
Difficulties associated with producing a chemical weapon
Although we can argue that the threat of a chemical attack in Europe is small, given the
trend of unsophisticated methods of attacks so far (Hegghammer and Nesser), along with
jihadists’ poor track record for developing CWs, the threat still remains. Given this, it’s
worth discussing the different methods of obtaining a CW and which ones are most likely
to be used in the event of an attack.
It is quite likely that IS already possess CWs in Iraq and Syria, and likely acquired these
through theft. There are several incidents of alleged IS CWs use, but the most damning is
arguably the mustard attack on Marea in the Syrian province of Aleppo (Chivers 2015),
which wounded around thirty and likely caused the death of a baby girl. It is unclear how
IS would have come into possession of mustard agent, although in 2014 IS seized a
disused CW site at Muthanna, near Baghdad (BBC 2014), which manufactured sulphur
mustard (CIA 2007). Furthermore, despite a joint highly publicised OPCW-UN mission in
2013 to remove Syria’s declared CWs, there is evidence that the regime did not declare all
its sites and still possesses CWs such as sarin, and possibly mustard. (Entous and
Bendavid 2015) It is possible, that IS may have gained access to CWs from an undeclared
Assad regime CW site, though evidence thus far does not exist to suggest this.
Regardless, it seems unlikely that IS would be able to smuggle sufficient quantities of
chemical agent into Europe to carry out a large scale attack, although further investigation
on this possibility ought to take place.
Domestic production of CWs seems a more likely scenario for a jihadist attack in Europe,
particularly given that Hegghammer and Nesser’s findings saw that IS sympathisers
accounted for almost twice as many attacks as returning foreign fighters. In the past,
6. security services in Europe have foiled several jihadist plots to use CWs, including a 2001
plot to use sarin gas in London (Hastings and Bamber), and a 2002 plot to use cyanide to
attack the US embassy in Rome (BBC). In 2006, a second nerve gas plot in London was
broken up. (Alderson, Rayment and Hennessy). However, CWs have never been
successfully weaponised for an attack in Europe and no IS plots have been revealed
publicly.
According to Binder and Moodie (2009, 137), “[i]n heavily industrialised societies such as
Europe, obtaining the necessary equipment for small-scale batch production of CW agents
should not be an insurmountable obstacle”. However, while the production of CWs may be
possible, it will likely be to a small-scale and the real task is in improving the yield of the
product and scaling up the process to produce larger quantities, which would be required
for a mass-attack (Cole 2011, 42). Aum Shinrikyo are a good example of the difficulties
surrounding production of sufficient quantities and purities of chemical agent. Despite
several years of attempting to develop CW such as VX and sarin, their success rate was
poor. Although the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway killed 12 people, Aum Shinrikyo
suffered from severe delivery issues, which impacted the effectiveness of their CWs.
(Danzig et al 2011, 35).
While the Aum Shinrikyo case proves that manufacture and weaponisation of nerve
agents is inherently difficult, other agents may not be as difficult. Hydrogen cyanide, the
chemical widely assumed to have been used in the execution of dogs by al-Qaeda, can
possibly be weaponised using a crude device called the mubtakkar. It was the device to be
used for a chemical attack on the New York subway, before al-Qaeda deputy leader
Ayman al-Zawahiri abruptly called it off. (Salama and Bursac 2009, 110) However, Pita
(2007, 491) contends that hydrogen cyanide makes for a poor CW due to its “low
gas/vapor density, short persistence, and low thermal stability, all of which make it difficult
to weaponize in munitions”. Furthermore, Binder and Moodie (2009, 137) argue that the
production of blood agents such as hydrogen cyanide in suitable quantities is “unlikely”
due to substantial infrastructure required.
Vesicants, such as mustard sulphur, are also unlikely to be considered as suitable
weapons for a chemical attack in an urban area, due to the fact that they lack lethality,
their slow effectiveness and the large quantities of chemical required. (Binder and Moodie
2009, 137) In WWI for example, only 3% of mustard injuries were fatal. (Kaszeta 2014)
7. Indeed, given the track history among IS sympathisers for low-level attacks, it would seem
that the use of ready-made toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) such as chlorine, phosgene
and ammonia would be most likely chemicals used in an attack. IS’ predecessor, AQI
previously used chlorine attached to conventional explosives in Iraq in 2006 and 2007. For
a jihadist, the drawback of TICs compared to conventional CWs is that for lethality, a much
larger volume of TIC is required to cause significant casualties. However, due to the fact
that TICs have several other legal uses, they are prevalent in industrialised societies and
would most likely be the easiest chemicals to attain either through theft or purchase. A TIC
attack would likely be very crudely weaponised and only be used as a contaminant rather
than a lethal attack. (Cole 2011, 58) In the context of an IS-linked attack in Europe, where
the purpose of the attack would be to cause mass panic and fear, a contaminant attack
might serve a purpose.
Conclusion
It is clear from the empirical literature that jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliate
AQI have never successfully weaponised a CW, despite various attempts to do so. The
use of chlorine in Iraq in 2006 and 2007 and them manner in which it was used suggests
that members of AQI had a poor knowledge of how best to utilise chlorine for attacks, and
also possibly its lack of lethality in such quantities.
In terms of the potential for a chemical attack in Europe, we can draw several conclusions.
Although the Paris attacks may represent a shift in strategy (it is too soon to tell), the vast
majority of IS-linked plots and attacks in Europe have been low-tech, low lethality attacks,
often by lone wolf sympathisers. Shootings and stabbings are a trend among these
groups, which require relatively little planning and expertise. It can be argued that this is
largely a feature of IS’ “near enemy” strategy, which contrary to al-Qaeda in the 2000s,
places the west as a secondary enemy. In terms of the potential for a chemical attack, the
risk appears quite low in this respect, given the inherent difficulties, and financial
constraints, associated with producing sufficient quantities of chemical agent and
weaponising them successfully. Aum Shinrikyo’s limitations serves as a good case study
in this respect.
8. In light of this, a sophisticated IS driven CW seems unlikely. However, if one were to take
place, the use of stolen or purchased TICs would be the most likely choice for would-be
terrorists. Using TICs as a CW is a relatively low-tech pursuit, although large quantities of
chemical would likely be required, and the numbers of deaths would likely be quite low.
Still, an attack such as this in Europe would generate much publicity and spark fear and
panic.
In conclusion, in seems unlikely that an IS associated mass chemical attack will be
launched in the near future.
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