Lone wolf terror attacks

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Lone Wolf Terror Attacks: Emerging Trends and
Analysis - July 2016

Lone Wolf Terror Attacks: Emerging Trends and Analysis — July 2016
Whispering Bell MEA DMCC, PO Box 487151, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Tel: +9714 448 6690
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Contents
Introduction to Lone Wolf Terrorism............................................3
Prominent Lone Wolf and Similar Attacks in the Past Year ....3
Islamic State Background and History .......................................4
Germany Train Attack – 18 July 2016 .........................................5
Nice, France Lorry Attack – 14 July 2016 ...................................6
Bangladesh Bakery Attack – 1 July 2016...................................7
Lone Wolf Terrorism and the Iraq Context ................................8
Implications for Other Regions and the UAE ............................9
About Whispering Bell .................................................................11

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Introduction to Lone Wolf Terrorism
The growing threat of lone wolf terrorism is posing new challenges to security and
intelligence agencies around the world, particularly as terrorist groups such as the
Islamic State (IS) utilize social media and technology to recruit new members and
inspire new attacks. Media reports have increasingly used the term “lone wolf” in
a wide variety of contexts, but this term generally refers to an individual or small
cell inspired to execute an attack in the name of an ideology or terrorist group
independent of any connection to the organization itself. Without direct links to or
communication with a broader network, security and intelligence agencies may
fail to detect and prevent plots from lone wolf terrorists, whose plans only become
apparent once they are underway. Some plots have included one assailant
supported by multiple collaborators sympathetic to the ideology or terrorist group
and can be described in similar terms, even though they may not be pure lone
wolf events—but are still tellingly lacking any direction or communication with the
terrorist hierarchy. Nonetheless, terrorist organizations have encouraged lone
wolves and small groups to execute attacks on their own, and recent trends
suggest these types of attacks are likely to increase in 2016, as they have proven
to be highly effective. While many different ideologies can inspire acts of lone wolf
terrorism, this report primarily focuses on lone wolves in the context of IS and
Islamist extremism.
Prominent Lone Wolf and Similar Attacks in the Past Year
Date Location Description
18 July
2016
Wurzburg,
Germany
A 17-year-old Afghan (possibly Pakistani)
asylum seeker wielding a knife and axe
injured five people on a train. Appears to
have acted independently but in the name
of IS.
14 July
2016
Nice, France A 31-year-old French-Tunisian national drove
a lorry at high speed through a crowd
celebrating Bastille Day, killing 84 and
wounding dozens more. Possible support from
fellow sympathizers but acted independently
and apparently in the name of IS.
1 July
2016
Dhaka,
Bangladesh
Five Bangladeshi gunmen entered the Holey
Artisan Bakery in Dhaka and killed 22 people,
mostly foreigners. Acted in the name of IS but
direct links unclear. Possible support from
existing extremist groups in Bangladesh.
14 June
2016
Magnanville,
France
25-year-old Larossi Abballa stabbed to
death a police commander and his wife
at their home. The assailant had previous
links to Islamist extremist networks but
carried out the attack independently in

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the name of IS.
12 June
2016
Orlando,
Florida, USA
29-year-old American of Afghan descent
Omar Mateen opened fire at the Pulse gay
nightclub in Orlando, killing 49 people. Acted
alone and no direct links to IS have been
determined.
2 Dec
2015
San
Bernardino,
California,
USA
A husband and wife of Pakistani decent
opened fire and killed 14 people and
wounded 22 others during a shooting spree in
San Bernardino, California. The couple
appears to have been inspired to carry out
the attacks by propaganda online. IS later
claimed the couple acted in their name.
4 Nov
2015
Merced,
California,
USA
18-year-old student Faisal Mohammed injured
four people with a knife at the University of
California, Merced. Acted alone and inspired
by IS.
16 July
2015
Chattanooga,
Tennessee,
USA
24-year-old gunman Muhammad Youssef
Abdulazeez opened fire at military
installations and a recruiting center in
Chattanooga, Tennessee, killing five service
members. Appears to have been inspired by
Islamist extremist propaganda online.
Islamic State Background and History
The Islamic State (IS) is a Sunni terrorist organization born out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI), which was active during the US-led occupation following the 2003 invasion
of the country. AQI was initially headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian
Islamist extremist well-known for targeting Shia Muslims—the majority sect of Islam
in Iraq—to exacerbate mistrust and violence between Sunni and Shia
communities. A US airstrike killed Al-Zarqawi in 2006, but the organization
continued to operate in spite of his death.
AQI broke away from core Al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan, such
as Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and renamed itself to operate
independently. IS is currently headed by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi who declared
Raqqa, Syria, its capital; and became one of the wealthiest terrorist organizations
in the world, especially after seizing Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city along with a
sizeable amount of central bank money. IS’s control of substantial amounts of
territory between Iraq and Syria has afforded it the legitimacy required to
proclaim itself an Islamic Caliphate.

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IS’s rapid expansion and military victories over the Iraqi
Army quickly overshadowed the allure of Al-Qaeda, which
has long sought to establish a Caliphate of its own but has
been unable to do so. Moreover, IS adopted new types of
sensational violence recorded and published online to
capture the attention of international and social media
outlets. Their sophisticated messaging and propaganda
over social media has been one of the key distinguishing
factors separating IS from Al-Qaeda, and the two now
compete with each other for media attention, recruits, and
overall relevance worldwide.
Al-Qaeda maintains an active media wing but IS has dominated social media
since coming into existence, allowing it to reach a wider and younger audience
to inspire a new generation of extremists. Tens of thousands of Muslims from Europe,
Africa, Asia and North America have been persuaded to leave their home
countries to fight directly alongside IS in Iraq and Syria. Some have now returned
to their countries with training, experience, and sometimes guidance to plot
terrorist attacks, while others have simply been self-radicalized in their own homes
and inspired by propaganda to carry out “lone wolf” attacks.
It is important to note that IS and Al-Qaeda are only two out of many Sunni terrorist
organizations and that there are dozens of similar groups operating across Africa,
the Middle East, and Asia; which share the same goal of establishing a worldwide
Islamic Caliphate. Often, these local groups have long histories in the countries in
which they operate but have subsequently renamed and rebranded themselves
after pledging their allegiance to IS. These groups provide the foundation for IS to
expand through a ‘franchise’ model, and they also offer existing support networks
to carry out terrorist attacks in many different countries outside of Iraq and Syria.
In other places such as Europe, where it is more difficult for these types of groups
to operate in the open, disenfranchised Muslims may gravitate towards IS’s calls
on social media to carry out lone wolf attacks in their name. This gives the
perception that IS maintains a worldwide presence and continuous expansion
despite its military setbacks in Iraq and Syria, where the core leadership of the
organization is based. Recent attacks in Wuerzburg, Germany; Nice, France; and
Dhaka, Bangladesh; among many other places, have demonstrated how
effective this strategy can be.
Germany Train Attack – 18 July 2016
In the most recent attack in Europe claimed by IS, a 17 year-old Afghan (though
possibly Pakistani based on his Pashto dialect) asylum seeker wielding an axe and
knife attacked passengers on a train in Wuerzburg, Germany, on July 18,
wounding five people. According to media reports, the assailant yelled “Allahu
Akbar,” or ‘God is the greatest’ in Arabic, during the attack. German police
pursued the assailant after he exited the train, eventually shooting and killing him
when he allegedly charged at the officers with his weapons. Soon after, IS
IS adopted new types of
sensational violence
recorded and published
online to capture the
attention of international
and social media outlets.

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claimed responsibility for the attack and released a video of the assailant in which
he claims to be an IS soldier on a “suicide mission.” German authorities also found
a hand painted IS flag in the assailant’s room.
While investigators are still determining whether the
assailant had any direct ties to IS, the latest reports
suggest he was self-radicalized, perhaps from
propaganda online. In the wake of the incident, German
Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere warned the country to
expect more of these types of lone wolf attacks. The
current trends suggest lone wolf attacks are likely to
increase across Europe, as IS can easily disseminate its
propaganda online, particularly over social media or
encrypted messaging services. This will likely inspire more
individuals from disenfranchised Muslim populations in
Europe to carry out attacks in the name of IS. Without any direct connection to
core IS leadership in Iraq and Syria or to any active extremist networks in their own
countries, European security and intelligence services are less likely to identify and
track individuals who might be considering a lone wolf attack.
Nice, France Lorry Attack – 14 July 2016
While the Germany train attack did not cause mass casualties, days earlier on July
14 a 31 year-old French-Tunisian national drove a lorry at high speed through a
crowd celebrating Bastille Day along the promenade in Nice, France, killing
eighty-four people and seriously wounding dozens more. The attack caused
widespread panic and confusion but it was not immediately apparent to
witnesses that a terrorist attack was underway. As the lorry continued along its
path, it became clear it was a deliberate attempt to inflict as much harm as
possible. French security forces responded on the scene and shot and killed the
assailant in the driver’s seat of the lorry while it was stopped on the street. Based
on the method of attack, the assailant likely did not plan to escape and expected
to be killed during the operation.
As the assailant intended, his sensational, mass casualty attack targeting civilians
gained widespread international and social media attention, with IS eventually
claiming responsibility. The use of a lorry may mark an important shift in tactics
used by terrorists, whether lone wolf or explicitly directed by IS, to carry out mass
casualty attacks. Arms and explosives are more difficult to obtain and transport
and could be tracked by the authorities. However, a commonly used lorry
demonstrates the destructive power of an ordinary vehicle on a crowded street.
Future assailants may take note and attempt to use similar unsophisticated
methods—not necessarily involving vehicles but ordinary items, machinery or
equipment—to plan and execute sensational attacks without the risk of alerting
law enforcement and counter-terrorism forces, as they have in Israel for years.
French authorities are still investigating the attack and have apprehended other
potential suspects to determine whether the assailant acted as a lone wolf, had
The current trends
suggest lone wolf attacks
are likely to increase
across Europe, as IS can
easily disseminate its
propaganda online,
particularly over social
media or encrypted
messaging services.

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assistance from others in Nice, or whether there were any direct links to IS
leadership in Iraq or Syria. So far, the investigation has not determined any direct
links to IS, suggesting this was another lone wolf attack where he was self-
radicalized from propaganda online. French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve
has stated that the investigation has not uncovered any direct links so far and that
the assailant appears to have been radicalized “very quickly.” The assailant was
previously known by the police for petty crime but was not on any terror watch lists
by the government. Family members have described him as having psychological
problems. The individual motives of lone wolf attackers can vary based on a
multitude of factors, with IS propaganda sometimes acting as a catalyst for action
in a general sense, but not a coordinator or director of specifics.
Bangladesh Bakery Attack – 1 July 2016
On 1 July 2016, five Islamist extremists entered the Holey Artisan Bakery—a
restaurant popular with expats—in Dhaka’s upscale Gulshan neighborhood, killing
customers and taking hostages. After a 10 hour standoff, the assailants began
hacking to death the remaining hostages, perhaps even torturing them first,
before being killed by Bangladeshi security forces. In all, twenty-two foreigners
were killed, including nine Italians, seven Japanese, an American and an Indian,
among others. During the assault, the assailants separated the non-Muslims from
the Muslims and released Bangladeshi nationals. In other words, the assailants
made clear their intent to target non-Muslim foreigners in Bangladesh.
IS has claimed responsibility for the attack on the Holey Artisan Bakery, highlighting
the growing threat of Islamist extremism within the country. Moreover, the attack
occurred in an upscale, diplomatic neighborhood of the capital, long considered
a secure part of the city. Nonetheless, the attack was simply the climax of a series
of smaller but frequent attacks claimed by IS or even Al-Qaeda linked groups. For
more than a year, Islamist extremists with potential links with or inspired by IS or Al-
Qaeda have targeted religious minorities, secular/atheist bloggers, gay rights
activists and foreigners, often hacking to death their victims in the street with
machetes and sharp objects. Most of the assailants likely have connections to or
support from existing Bangladeshi Islamist extremist organizations, such as Jamaat-
ul-Mujahideen (JMB), to carry out attacks on their own or in small groups.
Despite the clear trend of rising Islamist extremism in Bangladesh, the government
has downplayed IS’s influence in the country, though recently initiated a
nationwide security operation to apprehend suspected extremists. IS has been
seeking to expand into Southeast Asia, and has used as a vessel for that
expansion the many Islamist extremist organizations that have operated in the
region for decades. This existing network in Southeast Asia affords IS a pool of
recruits to conduct lone wolf attacks, as well as potential new franchises if they
end up choosing to pledge their allegiance to IS.

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Lone Wolf Terrorism and the Iraq Context
IS is clearly on the back foot in Iraq and Syria, having lost more than half the
territory it originally seized in Iraq, 20 percent of its peak territory in Syria, and over
50 percent of its oil production. These significant military and territorial losses have
been accompanied by a large increase in guerrilla tactics, including spectacular
attacks on high profile targets in Iraq, most likely with direction and support from IS
commanders. Both the reduction in oil revenues and in
territory make this shift the obvious strategic step to take,
as the group seeks both to shift to lower-cost endeavors, as
well as ones that are not predicated on territorial control.
Pure lone wolf attacks are less likely in Iraq and Syria given
the proximity of IS leadership to the actual frontlines of the
conflict, where they can recruit directly, draft operational
plans and strategically select targets. However, lone wolf
attacks may be an appealing method in regions of the
country considered more stable and secure, such as Erbil
and other parts of Iraqi Kurdistan, where international
businesses have interests and operations. Kurdish security forces have proven
more capable at preventing IS coordinated attacks that emanated from outside
of their territory, but would have difficulty detecting and dismantling a lone wolf
plot within their borders.
The detonation of a suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) in the majority Shia
neighborhood of Karrada in central Baghdad on July 3 likely had a direct
connection to IS leadership. The attack was the deadliest in Iraq since 2003 and
resulted in more than 250 people killed. The overall shift in IS strategy – from its
previous conventional military focus on retaining territory, to more of an
insurgency and terror focus – will become more apparent as Iraqi military forces
continue their advance. Essentially, it would seem that even in Iraq on the ground,
IS is generally a waning force. This is not to rule out the possibility of another
spectacular attack like the record July 3 Karrada attack, but it does seem that the
overall conventional threat of IS is diminishing.
In terms of outlook, we would assert that going forward, as IS loses further ground
in Iraq and Syria, it will continue to lose its revenue and operational base. This will
mean two things. First, the funding of direct attacks, both in Iraq and abroad, is
likely to wane. IS will lose more and more of the funding that is tied to its territorial
control – oil revenues, smuggling, extortion of the local population, etc. Further, it is
likely to lose some of its appeal among boosters abroad who may have supported
IS as the re-emergence of the Islamic Caliphate. However, this support will not
disappear entirely, as there will still be others who continue to believe in IS as the
strongest and most well known terror entity in the world.
The second thing that the shift in Iraq and Syria implies is that IS will lose
operational space to stage further conventional attacks. This also means that
conventional and directly coordinated asymmetrical attacks may wane, as IS has
fewer bases where it can equip and train its operatives, build IEDs, place them in
vehicles for transport to their targets, etc. It is this latter element that implies that
The most recent indicator
of IS’s new focus on
asymmetric attacks was
the detonation of an
SVBIED in the majority
Shia neighborhood of
Karrada in central
Baghdad on July 3

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over time, while the spectacular, directly coordinated IS attacks may fall off more
quickly, lone wolf type attacks may in fact become relatively more important for IS.
Lone wolf attacks would allow IS to maintain the perception they can strike
anywhere, such as against the Kurds within their own borders or Shia majority
regions, despite military setbacks and loss of territory. The question will be whether
lone wolf attacks too will fall off over time as IS becomes fundamentally weaker;
on the other hand, they could in fact increase, if IS finds that disseminating
propaganda encouraging lone wolf attacks in Iraq is more effective and a more
sustainable strategy over the long term.
In either event, we would say that there is plenty of space in the 3-6 month time
frame for continued asymmetric attacks coordinated directly by IS leadership in
Iraq. It may be that the largest, most spectacular of these types of attacks will
begin to wane, but in the case of lone wolf attacks, there is space for them to
increase in certain parts of the country as the situation changes on the ground.
Implications for Other Regions and the UAE
As military pressure mounts on IS forces in Iraq and Syria, the likelihood of lone wolf
terrorism is expected to increase in other regions. Lone wolf attacks are
increasingly appealing to terrorist groups such as IS because they do not require
planning, funding, or execution by leadership in distant locations. Directly
coordinated attacks are much riskier and require more time, sophistication, and
resources. Security and intelligence agencies can much more easily detect and
disrupt plots connected to a wider network. However, by encouraging individuals
or small groups to act independently in the IS name, they can claim responsibility
for more attacks and give the perception of maintaining a global network
capable of striking anywhere. Their ideology and message can reach
disenfranchised populations in the US, Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East,
prompting individuals and small groups to take action to further their goals. Since
lone wolves may lack the skillset and expertise necessary to attack hard targets,
they are more likely to focus on softer targets, such as hotels, schools, restaurants,
nightclubs, or anywhere else ordinary civilians may congregate in large numbers.
Lone wolves can cause dozens or hundreds casualties with relative ease and in a
short period of time before security forces can respond to the scene.
Amid the rising trend, the Middle East will also be vulnerable to attacks, especially
countries with significant expat populations. In the UAE, lone wolf terrorism has
already occurred in the past, albeit on a smaller scale. In Dec 2014, an Emirati
woman completely covered in a black niqab stabbed and killed a Hungarian-
American kindergarten teacher in the restroom of a mall in Abu Dhabi. The
assailant fled the scene, drove to the home of an Egyptian-American doctor and
planted a crudely made explosive device at his door but it failed to detonate.
Police eventually identified and apprehended the assailant and determined she
was radicalized by propaganda online, perhaps from IS or similar extremist groups.
While the UAE has a robust security apparatus, past experience in the US, Europe
and other regions around the world highlight the limitations of intelligence
agencies in disrupting lone wolf attacks by radicalized individuals and small cells.

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Like other countries facing this threat, the UAE will not be immune to lone wolf
attacks inspired by propaganda disseminated online.

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