Logan Jones of Airbus presented on the development of Runway Overrun Prevention Systems (ROPS) to increase safety during landings. ROPS continuously monitors aircraft position and calculates the distance needed to safely stop, alerting pilots if the remaining runway is insufficient. Feedback from pilots and operators helped optimize ROPS, which is now installed on over 400 aircraft with more on backorder. Standardization efforts aim to mandate ROPS for increased safety.

1. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
An Active Safety Net
for Runway Overruns
Presented by Logan JONES
Airbus Flight Operations Solutions
7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016

2. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Agenda
1 – Overview of Safety at Landing
2 – Designing ROPS
3 – Feedback
4 – Conclusion
7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 2

3. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 3
Overview of Safety at Landing
Hull loss and
significant damage
Data Source: IATA Runway Safety, Accident Analysis Report, 2010-2014
0
5
10
15
20
25
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number
of
Accidents
Runway Excursion Accidents
0
5
10
15
20
25
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number
of
Accidents
Runway Excursion Accidents
Jet Turboprop
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Total
Jet Turboprop
56
%
44
%
Overrun
Veer-Off

4. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 4
Overview of Safety at Landing
Including Minor
incidents
Real occurrence rate is underestimated when using accident
statistics as many events resulted in only minor damage
From May 2015 to May 2016,
at least runway overruns
of commercial jet aircraft
17
Data Source: Various internet sources

5. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
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Page 5
Overview of Safety at Landing
Runway Friction 10% worse than expected
Each additional 3s delay applying max reverse
Each additional 1s delay of pedal braking
Each additional 1s of flare over 7s
Each additional 10ft above threshold over 50ft
5kt Tail-Wind
Nominal In-Flight Landing Distance
5% 10% 15%
0%
15% safety factor
Small
deviations
can have
large
impacts on
the landing
distance

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Page 6
Overview of Safety at Landing
Provide the right tools to the
flight crew, to make the right
decision at the right time
How can we enhance safety at landing?

7. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Agenda
1 – Overview of Safety at Landing
2 – Designing ROPS
3 – Feedback
4 – Conclusion
7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 7

8. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 8
Designing ROPS
 ROPS functions by continuously monitoring the aircraft’s
position and calculating the distance needed to safely stop the
aircraft.
 If at any time, this distance becomes longer than the remaining
runway length, ROPS triggers an alert.

9. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 9
Designing ROPS
400ft
Clear alerts with associated
Airbus Procedure

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Page 10
Designing ROPS
Consistency
Airbus ROPS is built on the same hypotheses used for the
Airbus In-Flight landing distances. All of which are based on
the recommendations from the TALPA ARC working group
and recommended by the FAA in AC 25-32

11. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
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Page 11
Designing ROPS
Prototype - 2004
A380 - 2009
A320 - 2013
A350 - 2014
A330 - 2015
Research
Oct. 1998 - Feb. 2002
Incremental
Design
2009 Dry/Wet Runways – Autobrake Only
2010 Dry/Wet Runways – All Braking Modes
2014 Dry/Wet Runways with Runway State Selector
2017 Contaminated Runways with Runway State Selector

12. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Agenda
1 – Overview of Safety at Landing
2 – Designing ROPS
3 – Feedback
4 – Conclusion
7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 12

13. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 13
It is Airbus’ practice to limit the installation of
new functions to a limited number of companies
in order to gain operational feedback.
Feedback
Controlled
Entry-into-Service
Airbus setup a dedicated team of ROPS
experts to closely follow ROPS introduction and
act as an interface between the design team
and the customer
ROPS
Support

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Page 14
Important to have open dialogue between the
airline companies and Airbus.
Feedback
Open Dialogue
Data Exchange
Data is key
not only in understanding issues but also to
test future design optimizations. There should
be effective means for data exchange for
safety
…

15. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
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Feedback – An Example of Data Exchange and Dialogue
What the Pilot Sees What ROPS Sees
ROP Low
Speed
Alerts
Data
Exchange
Airbus
Analysis
Debrief with
Airline
Design
Optimization

16. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
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Page 16
Feedback
Runway Database &
Airport AIP Data
Accurate, reliable and up-to-
date information in the runway
database is key to correct
functioning of ROPS.
Photo by PH2(NAC) David Sanner [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

17. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
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Page 17
Need to ensure the end-users, the pilots,
understand the system.
Feedback
Flight Crew
Understanding
Provide the right tools to the flight crew, to make the
right decision at the right time
Documentation Training Guidance
Material

18. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Agenda
1 – Overview of Safety at Landing
2 – Designing ROPS
3 – Feedback
4 – Conclusion
7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 18

19. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 19
233
153
20
13
ROPS Status on Airbus Fleet As of March 2016
ROPS is operating
on 419 aircraft
1700+ on backlog
38
Operators

20. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
EASA RMT.0570 – Reduction of Runway Excursions
The objective of this task remains to increase the level of safety by reducing the
number of runway excursions through mandating ROAAS on-board certain large
aeroplane categories to be determined
EUROCAE Working Group 101 - Runway Overrun Awareness and Alerting
Systems
International representation working together to create a
Minimum Operational Performance Standard
7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 20
Global Standardization
The industry is working together towards global standardization

21. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. 7-8 June 2016
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Page 21
Safety Nets add an additional layer of security but are only one part of
the solution.
Aircraft operators, civil aviation authorities, aerodromes and ANSPs all
have an important role to play
Together we can reverse the trend of runway overruns and
improve safety at landing.
A Global Success

22. © AIRBUS all rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
© AIRBUS (Airbus S.A.S., Airbus Operations S.A.S., Airbus Operations GmbH, Airbus Operations LDT, Airbus Opeartions SL, Airbus China LTD, Airbus (Tianjin) Final Assembly Company LTD, Airbus (Tianjin) Delivery Centre LTD). All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary
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7-8 June 2016
Eurocontrol Safety Forum 2016
Page 22