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Howard Shrobe
Program Manager, Information Innovation Office




          Secure Computer Systems


                DARPA Cyber Colloquium
                    Arlington, VA

                      November 7, 2011




             Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Today’s Practice P4: Perimeter Protection, Patch & Pray
      isn’t Convergent with The Threat

                                                      • It’s not about better firewalls
                                                          • It’s not about better virus
Security software
                                                            detection
                                                              • It’s not about better intrusion
                                                                detection
                  Malware:
                                                                 • It’s not about better
                                                                   programmer practices



                                                  It’s about learning from biology
       Attacker
       Effort:
                                                  and societies how to design
                                                  secure, adaptive and resilient
                                                  systems.
              Defender Effort


                        Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Humans Have Two Immune Systems:
        Innate and Adaptive

                           neutrophils

                                                    Fast, but inflexible,
              I            macrophages              covers fixed sets of
              N                                     pathogen that are
              N                                     always present. Supports
              A            dendritic cells          the adaptive immune
              T                                     system.
              E   CD16/    natural killer
                   56      (NK) cells

              A
                           CD3/CD4
              D   CD4
                           T cell                   Slower, learns to
              A                                     recognize new sets of
     thymus
              P                                     pathogens, distinguishes
              T            CD3/CD8
                  CD8
                           T cell                   self from non-self,
              I                                     retains memory to guard
              V                                     against future attacks.
              E   CD19     B cells



At least 20 – 30% of the body’s resources are involved in
constant surveillance and containment.
                     Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Three Big Problems

1. Systems can be easily penetrated

2. Once penetrated, cleanup is prohibitively expensive,
   time-consuming, and unpredictable

3. If one system can be penetrated, then nearly all of
   them can




                    Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Mission-oriented Resilient Clouds

            Using the power of a computational community to protect
            massively shared computational infrastructure
Your Software
  Lives Here



                 Virtual
                 Machine
       Virtual
       Machine
               Virtual
       Virtual Machine
       Machine
                                Your Software Lives On A
                             Network with 100K Other Virtual
                                Machines and No Firewalls




                   Modular Data Center                                 Blade Server       Blade Server
                       Containers                                         Racks             Network
                                   Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Resilient Clouds: A Community that uses the Network as
              a Defensive Amplifier

                TODAY                                           RESILIENT CLOUDS (CRASH++)
Acting as individuals makes the                                Acting as a community makes the
enterprise weaker than the sum of its                          enterprise stronger than the sum of
parts                                                          its parts




•   “Box” Oriented                                             •   Mission Optimized
•   Vulnerable Components                                      •   CRASH-worthy components
•   Static Sitting Duck                                        •   Moving Target
•   Shared Vulnerabilities                                     •   Resilience through Diversity
•   Implicit Trust is Amplifier                                •   Collective Diagnosis is Damper


                                  Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Resilient Clouds Technology Areas

Combined Goal of CRASH
& Resilient Clouds
                                Cyber-Mission Resilience



Resilient Clouds Technologies

              Mission-Aware                                                      Optimizing Mission
               Networking                                                         and Resources


     Innate Distributed         Shared Situational Awareness,                           Manageable & Taskable
          Defense               Trust Modeling, and Diagnosis                                 Diversity



CRASH Technologies

       Innate Immunity                   Adaptive Immunity                             Manageable Diversity


                                                                                                       Information flow
For more info see: http://tinyurl.com/68w9wpf                                                          Control flow
                                Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Secure Computer Systems




                CRASH
Clean-slate design of Resilient, Adaptive, Secure Hosts




                 Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
CRASH Applies Biological Principles to Computation


  Innate Immunity:
  New hardware & operating system architectures
  that eliminate all common technical vulnerabilities

      Adaptive Immunity
      Middleware that:
        • Diagnoses root causes of vulnerabilities and builds
          situational assessment
        • Quickly adapts & reconfigures
        • Learns from previous attacks and gets better at
          self-protection

                 Population Diversity
                 Computational techniques that:
                   • Increase entropy in time and space
                   • Make every system unique
                   • Raise work factor of attacker for each system


            Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Innate Immunity:
                  An Example Hardware Solution
                                    Conventional Computer
         Memory                                          Register File                                                    Result
                                                                                                                          Data
                                                                                     Operand 1

                                                                                                             A
             Data                                              Data                                          L
                                                                                     Operand 2
                                                                                                             U


                                                                                                Tag 1
              Tag                                               Tag                             Tag 2                Trap Signal
                                                                                             Instruction
                                                                                                              Tags
                                                                                                              Unit   Result Tag



         Bounds
          Type                                                    Thread’s
                                                                  Principal                                Access Rules
       Provenance

Software and hybrid solutions are   Meta-computing System
also possible (e.g. PROCEED)

                                      Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Adaptive Immunity

                                     System                                       4. System model is adapted with
                                      Model                                          new attack-specific detector




                                                     3. System model is used to perform diagnosis
                                                        (e.g. localization and characterization)




                      2. Software system
                         analog of adaptive
1. Hardware analog       immune system is                    5. Adaptive immune
   of innate immune      signaled                               system synthesizes plan
   system detects                                               to get around problem
   anomaly                                                      and patch to remove
                                                                specific vulnerability

                           Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Dynamic Diversity Makes a Single Host Different from
                       Moment to Moment
Address Space Randomization                                                        Instruction Set Randomization
                                                                                                Disk            Memory            ICache

                                         Code and/or data blocks                         Instruction-1        Encrypted-1       Instruction-1
                                         are periodically                                Instruction-2        Encrypted-2       Instruction-2
                                         repositioned in memory so
                                         that attacker has to work                       Instruction-3        Encrypted-3       Instruction-3
                                         harder to find a target.
                                         Garbage-collected memory                        Instruction-4        Encrypted-4       Instruction-4
                                         has the property inherently,
                                         new methods may optimize                        Instruction-5         Injected-1       Encrypted-1
                                         for increased entropy.                          Instruction-6         Injected-2       Encrypted-1

                                                                                                              Encrypted-5       Instruction-5

                                                                                                              Encrypted-6       Instruction-6
Functional Redundancy & Decision
Theoretic Dispatch                                                                                     Code is encrypted as it enters
                                                                                                       memory and Decrypted as it enters
 There are multiple methods                                      Goali                                 the instruction cache (or translation
 for achieving each goal                                                                               buffer). Injected code in native
 (“n-version programming”).                                                                            instruction set is then encrypted
 Each distinct method has                                                                              and not executable. Encryption key
 different qualities of service.                                                                       can be varied by process and time.
 Method selection is driven        Methodij                         QoSij
 both by preferences over
 QoS and by need for
 unpredictability.


                                         Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Turn the Tables: Make The Attacker Do The Work


                 x                                             x

   Attacker                       Attacker                                       Attacker
   Effort:                        Effort:                                        Effort:


          Defender                              Defender                                Defender
          Effort                                Effort                                  Effort

Innate Immunity          Adaptive Immunity                                   Dynamic Diversity


• Novel Hardware        • Policy Weaving                                    • Compiler generated
                                                                              Diversity
• Separation OS’s       • Automatic Patching
                                                                            • Algorithmic
• Information Flow      • Selective Playback                                  Diversity

• Formal Methods        • Symbiotes                                         • Instruction Set
                                                                              Randomization
                     Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
An opportunity…
            Smartphone > PC shipments within 2 years

Implies very rapid, land grab evolution of internet access




                        Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
Our goal…


…is to get CRASH & MRC technologies into your machines.


• If you make computers, operating systems, middleware…
• If you use these and can influence the people who make them
• If you think there’s a great startup opportunity

• Then we want to talk with you about how to transition our
  technologies into the real world.
• Contact us at CrashInquiries@darpa.mil




                       Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.

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Secure Computer Systems (Shrobe)

  • 1. Howard Shrobe Program Manager, Information Innovation Office Secure Computer Systems DARPA Cyber Colloquium Arlington, VA November 7, 2011 Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 2. Today’s Practice P4: Perimeter Protection, Patch & Pray isn’t Convergent with The Threat • It’s not about better firewalls • It’s not about better virus Security software detection • It’s not about better intrusion detection Malware: • It’s not about better programmer practices It’s about learning from biology Attacker Effort: and societies how to design secure, adaptive and resilient systems. Defender Effort Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 3. Humans Have Two Immune Systems: Innate and Adaptive neutrophils Fast, but inflexible, I macrophages covers fixed sets of N pathogen that are N always present. Supports A dendritic cells the adaptive immune T system. E CD16/ natural killer 56 (NK) cells A CD3/CD4 D CD4 T cell Slower, learns to A recognize new sets of thymus P pathogens, distinguishes T CD3/CD8 CD8 T cell self from non-self, I retains memory to guard V against future attacks. E CD19 B cells At least 20 – 30% of the body’s resources are involved in constant surveillance and containment. Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 4. Three Big Problems 1. Systems can be easily penetrated 2. Once penetrated, cleanup is prohibitively expensive, time-consuming, and unpredictable 3. If one system can be penetrated, then nearly all of them can Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 5. Mission-oriented Resilient Clouds Using the power of a computational community to protect massively shared computational infrastructure Your Software Lives Here Virtual Machine Virtual Machine Virtual Virtual Machine Machine Your Software Lives On A Network with 100K Other Virtual Machines and No Firewalls Modular Data Center Blade Server Blade Server Containers Racks Network Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 6. Resilient Clouds: A Community that uses the Network as a Defensive Amplifier TODAY RESILIENT CLOUDS (CRASH++) Acting as individuals makes the Acting as a community makes the enterprise weaker than the sum of its enterprise stronger than the sum of parts its parts • “Box” Oriented • Mission Optimized • Vulnerable Components • CRASH-worthy components • Static Sitting Duck • Moving Target • Shared Vulnerabilities • Resilience through Diversity • Implicit Trust is Amplifier • Collective Diagnosis is Damper Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 7. Resilient Clouds Technology Areas Combined Goal of CRASH & Resilient Clouds Cyber-Mission Resilience Resilient Clouds Technologies Mission-Aware Optimizing Mission Networking and Resources Innate Distributed Shared Situational Awareness, Manageable & Taskable Defense Trust Modeling, and Diagnosis Diversity CRASH Technologies Innate Immunity Adaptive Immunity Manageable Diversity  Information flow For more info see: http://tinyurl.com/68w9wpf  Control flow Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 8. Secure Computer Systems CRASH Clean-slate design of Resilient, Adaptive, Secure Hosts Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 9. CRASH Applies Biological Principles to Computation Innate Immunity: New hardware & operating system architectures that eliminate all common technical vulnerabilities Adaptive Immunity Middleware that: • Diagnoses root causes of vulnerabilities and builds situational assessment • Quickly adapts & reconfigures • Learns from previous attacks and gets better at self-protection Population Diversity Computational techniques that: • Increase entropy in time and space • Make every system unique • Raise work factor of attacker for each system Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 10. Innate Immunity: An Example Hardware Solution Conventional Computer Memory Register File Result Data Operand 1 A Data Data L Operand 2 U Tag 1 Tag Tag Tag 2 Trap Signal Instruction Tags Unit Result Tag Bounds Type Thread’s Principal Access Rules Provenance Software and hybrid solutions are Meta-computing System also possible (e.g. PROCEED) Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 11. Adaptive Immunity System 4. System model is adapted with Model new attack-specific detector 3. System model is used to perform diagnosis (e.g. localization and characterization) 2. Software system analog of adaptive 1. Hardware analog immune system is 5. Adaptive immune of innate immune signaled system synthesizes plan system detects to get around problem anomaly and patch to remove specific vulnerability Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 12. Dynamic Diversity Makes a Single Host Different from Moment to Moment Address Space Randomization Instruction Set Randomization Disk Memory ICache Code and/or data blocks Instruction-1 Encrypted-1 Instruction-1 are periodically Instruction-2 Encrypted-2 Instruction-2 repositioned in memory so that attacker has to work Instruction-3 Encrypted-3 Instruction-3 harder to find a target. Garbage-collected memory Instruction-4 Encrypted-4 Instruction-4 has the property inherently, new methods may optimize Instruction-5 Injected-1 Encrypted-1 for increased entropy. Instruction-6 Injected-2 Encrypted-1 Encrypted-5 Instruction-5 Encrypted-6 Instruction-6 Functional Redundancy & Decision Theoretic Dispatch Code is encrypted as it enters memory and Decrypted as it enters There are multiple methods Goali the instruction cache (or translation for achieving each goal buffer). Injected code in native (“n-version programming”). instruction set is then encrypted Each distinct method has and not executable. Encryption key different qualities of service. can be varied by process and time. Method selection is driven Methodij QoSij both by preferences over QoS and by need for unpredictability. Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 13. Turn the Tables: Make The Attacker Do The Work x x Attacker Attacker Attacker Effort: Effort: Effort: Defender Defender Defender Effort Effort Effort Innate Immunity Adaptive Immunity Dynamic Diversity • Novel Hardware • Policy Weaving • Compiler generated Diversity • Separation OS’s • Automatic Patching • Algorithmic • Information Flow • Selective Playback Diversity • Formal Methods • Symbiotes • Instruction Set Randomization Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 14. An opportunity… Smartphone > PC shipments within 2 years Implies very rapid, land grab evolution of internet access Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.
  • 15. Our goal… …is to get CRASH & MRC technologies into your machines. • If you make computers, operating systems, middleware… • If you use these and can influence the people who make them • If you think there’s a great startup opportunity • Then we want to talk with you about how to transition our technologies into the real world. • Contact us at CrashInquiries@darpa.mil Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.