1 Running Head: The Movie Fight Club: A Master-Slave Dialectic The Movie Fight Club: A Master-Slave Dialectic Hegel’s master/slave dialectic has influenced and opened the doors for later philosophers like Michel Foucault and Fredrich Nietzsche to illuminate and give insight to the cultural norms and values of history. In this essay, I will write about the basis of the master/slave dialectic while first giving the background story which leads up to it. Then, I will connect this story for philosophical insight into the 1999 film Fight Club to put into perspective how the power relations are formed between the master and slave and how fear and no fear, respectively, allow for the agency of allegiance or breed a new type of dominant agency between individuals or collective consciousness. Finally, I will conclude with an answer to the limitation of Hegel’s insights from the fact that the movement as to how one may proceed from fear to no fear (such that one moves from slave to master consciousness and vice versa) is not shown. Without such explicit technical insight, I believe that Hegel’s dialectic may only provide with historical insights and thus cannot be insightful to future presuppositions. From what has so far been said, consciousness now seems to be stuck in despair and pessimism about the knowledge about sense-certainty and perception. Therefore, it looks elsewhere to satisfy its desire; it turns away from external objects and into itself as a self-consciousness being. Consciousness now seeks to destroy external objects as a way to recognize itself as a conscious being as an agent. As Hegel remarks, “it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as the true certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner” (PS, 174) But this endeavor also becomes self-defeating given that self-consciousness will continually need more objects to destroy and without continually doing so, it will not have a constantly definite and permanent satisfaction. So what could consciousness find to provide it with a constant definite and permanent satisfaction? From this point, we may now observe how consciousness attempts to find that lucid and constant certainty for itself in an objective manner in the master-slave dialectic. Afterward, we will move on to its application to a contemporary example to illustrate how insightful Hegel’s dialectic can be to even our everyday thinking. When one self-consciousness meets another, it comes out of itself by the fact that it is being perceived the other self-consciousness; another self-consciousness is essentially objectifying it. Each consciousness is “indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and therefore, its own self-certainty still has no truth.” (PS, 186). For example, self-consciousness A perceives self-consciousness B and vice-versa. When this happens, it becomes apparent to A that his objective self-certainty is n.

1. 1
Running Head: The Movie Fight Club: A Master-Slave Dialectic
The Movie Fight Club: A Master-Slave Dialectic
Hegel’s master/slave dialectic has influenced and opened the
doors for later philosophers like Michel Foucault and Fredrich
Nietzsche to illuminate and give insight to the cultural norms
and values of history. In this essay, I will write about the basis
of the master/slave dialectic while first giving the background
story which leads up to it. Then, I will connect this story for
philosophical insight into the 1999 film Fight Club to put into
perspective how the power relations are formed between the
master and slave and how fear and no fear, respectively, allow
for the agency of allegiance or breed a new type of dominant
agency between individuals or collective consciousness.
Finally, I will conclude with an answer to the limitation of
Hegel’s insights from the fact that the movement as to how one
may proceed from fear to no fear (such that one moves from
slave to master consciousness and vice versa) is not shown.
Without such explicit technical insight, I believe that Hegel’s
dialectic may only provide with historical insights and thus
cannot be insightful to future presuppositions.
From what has so far been said, consciousness now seems to be
stuck in despair and pessimism about the knowledge about
sense-certainty and perception. Therefore, it looks elsewhere to
satisfy its desire; it turns away from external objects and into
itself as a self-consciousness being. Consciousness now seeks to
destroy external objects as a way to recognize itself as a
conscious being as an agent. As Hegel remarks, “it destroys the
independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of
itself as the true certainty, a certainty which has become

2. explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner”
(PS, 174) But this endeavor also becomes self-defeating given
that self-consciousness will continually need more objects to
destroy and without continually doing so, it will not have a
constantly definite and permanent satisfaction. So what could
consciousness find to provide it with a constant definite and
permanent satisfaction? From this point, we may now observe
how consciousness attempts to find that lucid and constant
certainty for itself in an objective manner in the master-slave
dialectic. Afterward, we will move on to its application to a
contemporary example to illustrate how insightful Hegel’s
dialectic can be to even our everyday thinking.
When one self-consciousness meets another, it comes out of
itself by the fact that it is being perceived the other self-
consciousness; another self-consciousness is essentially
objectifying it. Each consciousness is “indeed certain of its own
self, but not of the other, and therefore, its own self-certainty
still has no truth.” (PS, 186). For example, self-consciousness A
perceives self-consciousness B and vice-versa. When this
happens, it becomes apparent to A that his objective self-
certainty is not as he knows it to be, since B is (initially)
perceiving A in his own subjective manner such that A’s self-
certainty becomes “A’s self-certainty” for B. This applies to
self-consciousness B simultaneously. As a result, A’s a
perception that “‘A’s self-certainty’ for B” does not equal nor
correspond with “A’s self-certainty (for A)” and vice-versa.
By not willing and being afraid to stake his own life, the slave
submits to recognize the other as a master to keep his own life.
Due to this fact, he essentially continues his being in absolute
fear and conquest of the master-consciousness. The slave
becomes the object of the master’s desire for recognition of
himself, as his mirror. Also, the master sees its own agency in
the slave; i.e., self-consciousness A (the master) now perceives
himself as he truly is objectively for-himself in self-
consciousness B (the submitted slave). Such that the master now
owns the slave’s agency, the slave may now be viewed as the

3. one who works and does the bidding of the master while the
master sits back and does nothing as he is content with the
recognition he desires. However, since the slave is not an equal
of the master, the master cannot become fully recognized
because his identity should depend on a genuine mutual
recognition for it to be pure. The slave, as an alienated other
and as a lesser and differing type than the master, cannot offer a
genuine mirror for the master’s recognition. The master self-
consciousness thus diminishes the slave and becomes unfulfilled
with the recognition not being indeed what it is; the master
would instead want a mutual recognition because that would be
more harmonious and coherent than from an alienated and
inauthentic master/slave relationship. In what follows, we will
discover how the slave’s position may become more fruitful
towards the discovery of objective self-recognition.
The movie unfolds as an unnamed protagonist (named Jack in
the credits) looks for a way to change his boring life of
insomnia; Jack meets Tyler Durden, and they create together an
underground club which seeks to complete missions according
to Tyler’s desires. More attention will be made to the
relationships in the movie that exhibit the master/slave dialectic
for a more enriching experience of entertainment. These
relationships are those between Tyler and the Jack, and their
sub relationship of Jack and the subordinates of Fight Club. The
reason why it’s a sub-relationship is that at the end of the
movie, Tyler was Jack’s schizophrenic-alter-ego. In the
relationship between Jack and his schizophrenic-alter-ego, Tyler
only exists as Jack gives him recognition. Tyler, by receiving
recognition from Jack can hold the master position of their
relationship. We can see Jack’s alter-ego as the one who is in
control and Jack as the one who submits and obeys to “Tyler.”
In the movie, their first confrontation where they fight each
other “for fun” may symbolize their “fight to the death” where
that relationship of Tyler as master and Jack as a slave is
materialized. Through this relationship, the alter-ego Tyler
controls Jack’s agency and uses his labor to start the Fight Club

4. franchise through the country. Tyler (through and towards the
actual agency of Jack) holds control of his recognition of master
by proving that he is the only one who is willing the most to
risk his life. Examples may be seen in the movie from the self-
mutilation of his hand and the joy of being beaten up by the bar-
owner to keep the unground venue. By doing so, he gains the
respect of those who can’t match his fearlessness, and from this
respect, they become his subordinates of Fight Club through
that recognition.
Besides an adoration of the bravery and fearlessness of the
leader, the subordinates find meaning in the work that they do.
It gives them a sense of agency like no other; they work as they
are told with a dissolved sense of desire which allows for a pure
recognition of self through their labor, even if that recognition
is banal. Now, Jack as the direct “slave” of Tyler eventually
begins to recognize his labors as he “turns in” on himself.
Towards the end of the film, he begins to realize that it has been
he who has been working under “Tyler” in creating all the
franchises and missions in the world around him. He also
realizes that Tyler has been his schizophrenic-alter ego but
cannot get rid of him no matter how hard he tries. Jack knows
and is confident that he wants to live with his self-certainty and
not the one that is defiled by Tyler. It leads to Jack willing to
risk his life for the death of Tyler Durden, and the only way
would be his attempt at suicide, and this is what he does to
regain control of his self-certainty. His self-respect is thus won
from staking his whole life; the ability to risk one’s life is a
legit tender for respect and recognition in not only the
master/slave dialectic but also Fight Club.
In conclusion, the end of the film is left ambiguous. Who knows
if Tyler will return to? Control Jack? Who is Jack after his
dominant alter-ego has deceased? It may thus be fair to suppose
that Jack only gets stronger through work and fearlessness; this
is the technicality of winning the “fight-to-the-death.” Jack
defeated Tyler in the final fight because he worked the hardest
and thus his self-certainty held such integrity that it could risk

5. its life to destroy another if it ever came down to it. Also, I
would say that, in the movie "Fight Club," we can see us feeling
tired of reality and always living under pressure of desire. As
we live our lives, we learn that we need more rationality than
emotion to adapt to society. In the movie, Tyler always lives
under pressure of desire. He cannot say what he wants to say,
but he cannot say what he wants. I wonder if we are the same as
Tyler who is living in the world now.
References
Durham, Meenakshi Gigi, and Douglas M. Kellner, eds. Media
and cultural studies: Keyworks. Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.
Fincher, D., Milchan, A., Uhls, J., Linson, A., Chaffin, C., Bell,
R. G., Pitt, B., ... Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment,
Inc.,. (2002). Fight club.
Giroux, Henry A. "Private Satisfactions and Public Disorders:"
Fight Club", Patriarchy, and the Politics of Masculine
Violence." jac (2001): 1-31.