158 Academy of Management Executive November
mann also found that focused cable firms (i.e.,
firms with no diversification into other lines of
business) were less likely to buy out their compet-
itors than diversified companies.
Most interesting of all, however, was the finding
that, compared to more focused firms, diversified
companies were the least likely to stand still dur-
ing turbulent times. In fact, Eisenmann found that
diversified firms tended to either gobble up cable
assets or to be gobbled up themselves (i.e., to exit
the cable TV business). In other words, diversified
firms were more likely to take things to extremes
(i.e., to take much more or much less risk) than
focused firms. On top of that, CEO equity owner-
ship had a role to play. Eisenmann discovered that
CEOs who owned a smaller slice of diversified
firms were even less likely to stand still than CEOs
who owned bigger slices.
Needless to say, these are complex results. And
a s Eisenmann noted, they underscore the need for
more research to increase our understanding
about why these results might have occurred in the
first place.
But beyond this, what lessons does Eisenmann's
study provide? Among other things, it suggests
that CEOs with a larger ownership stake in their
firms find it easier to ignore how the stock market
reacts to their decisions. In short, they're less likely
to change course when their stock price declines.
Of course, industry liquidity played a major role in
cable industry diversification decisions. Eisen-
mann noted that banks were more than willing to
finance horizontal acquisitions in the cable indus-
try. This allowed CEOs who were also firm owners
to retain control of equity. So different lending
policies might have led to different results. In
short, Eisenmann's findings may not hold across
industries.
Eisenmann does a wonderful job of identifying
factors that may drive the risk-taking behavior of
CEOs. Two concerns, however, should be raised.
First, Eisenmann sidesteps the question of whether
the risks that CEOs take are actually beneficial for
shareholders or not. Ultimately, we need to know
whether the factors driving the behavior of CEOs
lead them to play it safer or take more chances
than shareholders actually prefer.
Second, Eisenmann doesn't provide a specific
roadmap for better aligning CEO thinking with
shareholder interests. Of course, in the past year or
so, a major shift in attitudes has taken place. Be-
fore that, many of us automatically assumed that
awarding stock options was the best way to align
CEO and shareholder interests. No longer. Enron,
Worldcom, and Conseco all relied heavily on stock
options. And look what happened.
Nevertheless, Eisenmann does us a great service
by clarifying what influences CEOs to take or not
take risks. Identifying such factors is an important
first step and should help shareholders better un-
derstand how their CEOs are likely to act. In other
words, examining the level of CEO ownership and
co.
158 Academy of Management Executive Novembermann also foun.docx
1. 158 Academy of Management Executive November
mann also found that focused cable firms (i.e.,
firms with no diversification into other lines of
business) were less likely to buy out their compet-
itors than diversified companies.
Most interesting of all, however, was the finding
that, compared to more focused firms, diversified
companies were the least likely to stand still dur-
ing turbulent times. In fact, Eisenmann found that
diversified firms tended to either gobble up cable
assets or to be gobbled up themselves (i.e., to exit
the cable TV business). In other words, diversified
firms were more likely to take things to extremes
(i.e., to take much more or much less risk) than
focused firms. On top of that, CEO equity owner-
ship had a role to play. Eisenmann discovered that
CEOs who owned a smaller slice of diversified
firms were even less likely to stand still than CEOs
who owned bigger slices.
Needless to say, these are complex results. And
a s Eisenmann noted, they underscore the need for
more research to increase our understanding
about why these results might have occurred in the
first place.
But beyond this, what lessons does Eisenmann's
study provide? Among other things, it suggests
that CEOs with a larger ownership stake in their
firms find it easier to ignore how the stock market
2. reacts to their decisions. In short, they're less likely
to change course when their stock price declines.
Of course, industry liquidity played a major role in
cable industry diversification decisions. Eisen-
mann noted that banks were more than willing to
finance horizontal acquisitions in the cable indus-
try. This allowed CEOs who were also firm owners
to retain control of equity. So different lending
policies might have led to different results. In
short, Eisenmann's findings may not hold across
industries.
Eisenmann does a wonderful job of identifying
factors that may drive the risk-taking behavior of
CEOs. Two concerns, however, should be raised.
First, Eisenmann sidesteps the question of whether
the risks that CEOs take are actually beneficial for
shareholders or not. Ultimately, we need to know
whether the factors driving the behavior of CEOs
lead them to play it safer or take more chances
than shareholders actually prefer.
Second, Eisenmann doesn't provide a specific
roadmap for better aligning CEO thinking with
shareholder interests. Of course, in the past year or
so, a major shift in attitudes has taken place. Be-
fore that, many of us automatically assumed that
awarding stock options was the best way to align
CEO and shareholder interests. No longer. Enron,
Worldcom, and Conseco all relied heavily on stock
options. And look what happened.
Nevertheless, Eisenmann does us a great service
by clarifying what influences CEOs to take or not
take risks. Identifying such factors is an important
first step and should help shareholders better un-
3. derstand how their CEOs are likely to act. In other
words, examining the level of CEO ownership and
company diversification may ultimately help
shareholders make better investment decisions.
Finally, Eisenmann's study serves a s another call
to arms to identify solutions to the governance
issue. And as firms continue to get bigger, fewer
executives will be able to call the company their
own.
Source: Eisenmann, T. R. 2002. The effects of CEO equity
ownership and firm diversification on risk taking. Strategic
Management Journal, 23(6): 513-534.
Strong Corporate Cultures and Firm
Performance: Are There Tradeoffs?
Adam Zuckeiman, International Survey Research
Does your company have a strong culture? In other
words, does widespread understanding and agree-
ment exist among employees about what behav-
iors are important and what attitudes are appro-
priate? Or is there little consensus around such
issues? The answer definitely matters. Research-
ers have found that companies with the strongest
cultures—where values and norms are widely
shared and strongly held—tend to outperform their
peers. Indeed companies with strong cultures tend
to enjoy better returns on investment, higher net
income growth, and bigger increases in share
price than firms with weaker cultures.
Research cultures tend to outperform
their peers.
4. It's easy to understand the performance-enhanc-
ing effects of a strong culture. When values are
clear and broadly accepted, internal controls and
coordination are more effective. Consequently, the
alignment between goals and behavior is greatly
enhanced. Any actions contrary to behavioral
norms can be easily identified and quickly cor-
rected. Moreover, less time is wasted in deciding
what actions to take or how to coordinate actions
across groups. All of this should greatly improve
execution around established routines and pro-
cesses, thereby improving firm performance.
But are any other benefits associated with strong
corporate cultures? And what about limitations?
2002 Isaak 159
Can certain business conditions blunt the positive
impact of strong cultures? A recent study by Jesper
B. Sorensen from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology examined these questions. Sorensen
reasoned that in addition to achieving higher
performance, companies with stronger cultures
should also have more reliable (i.e., less variable)
performance. Having such performance is impor-
tant for several reasons. Reliable performance
helps planning and decision-making. Likewise,
stakeholders such a s suppliers, employees, and
investors clearly prefer reliable performance. And
they have good reason to do so. Companies with
highly variable performance and, in particular,
highly variable cash flow tend to invest less in
worthwhile projects, placing them at a competitive
5. disadvantage. Likewise, such firms tend to have
less of a following among analysts, lower bond
ratings, and higher weighted average costs of cap-
ital than firms with more reliable performance.
Sorensen also sought to pinpoint any critical
limitations inherent in firms with strong cultures.
He theorized that although performance should be
more reliable in such firms, this positive impact of
a strong culture could vanish during periods of
industry volatility. Sorensen reasoned that when
industry volatility is low to moderate, a company's
underlying assumptions and basic procedures re-
main fundamentally sound. As a result, maintain-
ing reliable performance requires only high levels
of communication and coordination, along with oc-
casional incremental adjustments to basic proce-
dures. In short, the key to success in a relatively
stable environment is using the right procedures at
the right time in the right sequences. And this,
Sorensen argued, is the context in which strong
corporate cultures should excel, given their high
level of behavior control and coordination.
The key to success in a relatively
stable environment is using the right
procedures at the right time in the
right sequences.
But once industry volatility becomes substantial,
maintaining reliable performance requires more
than just incremental adjustments to existing pro-
cedures. Instead, a volatile business climate often
demands that firms develop entirely new proce-
dures and embrace an exploration mentality to
survive, if not thrive. Sorensen surmised that firms
6. with strong cultures would have a harder time
undertaking these types of activities precisely
because of the qualities that helped them excel
during calmer periods. When current norms and
values are widely shared and strongly held, em-
ployees are highly committed to the current
"worldview." This makes them less likely to seek
out fundamentally new alternatives to existing
procedures or even recognize the need for radical
change in the first place. Moreover, dissenting em-
ployees whose beliefs do contradict the company's
dominant perspective are less likely to remain,
much less be listened to. Of course, these are the
very employees most likely to facilitate change by
introducing new ideas and novel approaches. This
underscores what some have described a s the dual
nature of strong corporate cultures. In essence, be-
ing clear about who and what you are makes it
tougher to morph into something else.
To examine these issues, Sorensen re-analyzed
data collected in the late 1980s a s part of some
earlier investigations. The data set included infor-
mation on over 150 large, publicly traded compa-
nies representing 19 distinct industries. To assess
corporate performance and performance reliabil-
ity, Sorensen relied on two commonly used mea-
sures: yearly return on invested capital (ROI), and
yearly operating cash flow. Both measures were
examined over a six-year period. Sorensen used
the volatility of stock prices in an industry (relative
to the broader market) a s an indicator of industry
volatility. When industries have to adapt in the
face of wrenching change, investor uncertainty
typically results, bringing with it wider stock price
7. swings among firms in those industries.
To measure corporate culture, top executives
from each participating company filled out a sur-
vey assessing firms in the sample that were in
their respective industries. For each firm, execu-
tives were asked about the extent to which: 1) com-
pany managers commonly spoke of their firm's
way of doing things, 2) company values were
clearly stated and serious efforts were made to
have managers follow them, and 3) long-standing
policies and procedures were used beyond those
implemented by the current CEO. Responses to
these items were averaged across executives to
create a "strength of culture" score for each firm.
This approach to assessing cultural strength—one
based on brief evaluations by external observ-
ers—is a limitation inherent in Sorensen's study.
Nevertheless, Sorensen's results were consistent
with his predictions. Using advanced modeling
techniques, he found that firms with strong cul-
tures had better and more reliable financial per-
formance over the 6-year period examined than
firms with weaker cultures. However, as industry
volatility increased, the "reliability advantage" of
firms with stronger cultures decreased and even-
160 Academy of Management Executive November
tually became nonexistent. This outcome is consis-
tent with the idea that having a consensus about
company goals and values provides the biggest
benefit when environments are stable. Although
8. the characteristics present in firms with strong cul-
tures mean that they can efficiently exploit their
established competencies, new competencies and
procedures may be needed when the environment
becomes highly volatile. And that's when firms
with strong cultures may find it difficult to adapt.
Having a consensus about company
goals and values provides the biggest
benefit when environments are stable.
Taken together, these results prompt two ques-
tions. First, what is the relative value of having the
ability to exploit established routines versus hav-
ing the ability to explore new options and cre-
atively adapt to a changing environment? And sec-
ond, can these two sets of abilities really co-exist
in one organization?
Regarding the first question, Sorensen suggests
that exploitation outweighs exploration. Sorensen
argues that the general tendency of firms with
strong cultures to perform better (and more reli-
ably) over time than firms with weaker cultures
implies that exploitation is more valuable. In other
words, exploitation helps firms with strong cul-
tures be successful enough during stable times to
weather more volatile periods.
On the second question, Sorensen doesn't say
how firms can hold on to the benefits associated
with a strong culture without losing the ability to
explore and adapt in the face of volatility. Indeed,
he cautions against drawing a tempting conclu-
sion—that if a strong culture is built around the
value of exploration, then it will permit maximum
9. exploitation as well. Sorensen argues that the ben-
efits associated with strong cultures accrue pre-
cisely because exploitation of established routines
is valued more than exploration.
Whether strong cultures can both exploit and
explore successfully over the long haul remains an
intriguing question for future research. For in-
stance, can companies somehow rebalance their
emphasis on exploitation versus exploration to
match shifts in industry volatility? Does it make
sense for firms to try to strengthen their culture
during quiet times and weaken it during periods of
intense change? If so, how? Overall, Sorensen's
study does us a great service by empirically dem-
onstrating that stronger corporate cultures gener-
ally produce better and more reliable performance.
At the same time, however, his results show that
the positive impact of a strong culture dissipates
as volatility rises. In doing so, Sorensen has un-
derscored the need for more research and given
corporations yet another reason to look in the
mirror.
Source: Sorensen, J. B. The strength of corporate culture and
the reliability of firm performance. 2002. Adminis(ra(ive
Science
Quarterly, 47(1): 70-91.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
10. reproduction prohibited without permission.
Strategy-making: What Works is What Fits
Smith, Brian D
European Business Forum; Spring 2007; 28; ProQuest Central
pg. 32
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Organizational culture and supply
11. chain strategy: a framework for
effective information flows
James Jungbae Roh, Paul Hong and Youngsoo Park
Department of Information Operations and Technology
Management,
College of Business Administration, University of Toledo,
Toledo, Ohio, USA
Abstract
Purpose – Critical information flows in the supply chain reflect
the patterns of organizational culture
and supply chain strategy (SCS). This paper aims to links
organizational culture and SCS using
competing values and an uncertainty framework.
Design/methodology/approach – Anchored at literature review
on organizational culture and
SCS, this paper presents a typology with four patterns of
organizational culture with four types of
corresponding SCS.
Findings – This paper presents diverse requirements for
effective design of supply chain in that for
each pattern of organizational culture, corresponding SCS is
identified: efficient for hierarchical,
risk-hedging for group, responsive for rational, and agile for
developmental culture.
Research limitations/implications – The exploratory nature of
this study requires empirical
research validation. Firms may use this research framework in
design and evaluation of their supply
chain management structure according to their organization’s
12. cultural elements and requirements.
Practical implications – Using this integrative framework
business executives may better manage
the informational infrastructures that reflect the rich dynamics
between their particular organizational
cultural traits and supply chain behavioral practices.
Originality/value – This paper expands the concept of
organizational culture in the extended
supply chain network context and identifies information
strategy profiles.
Keywords Supply chain management, Corporate strategy,
Organizational culture, Information systems
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
Rich communications in organizations reflect the intangible
cultural traits and tangible
strategic practices (Canessa and Riolo, 2003; Carmeli and
Tishler, 2004). Effective
information flows require high level of congruence between
organizational culture and
strategic practices (Leisen et al., 2002; Gallivan and Srite,
2005). Outstanding
organizations integrate their organizational value architecture
and strategic
information system (Wagner, 2004; Avison et al., 2004).
Researchers have recognized the importance of strategic fit
between structure and
infrastructure of organizations for their sustainable competitive
advantages (Hill, 2000;
Slack and Lewis, 2003). It is reported that organizational
13. culture is a significant factor
that accounts for the productivity gap between US and Japanese
companies (Denison,
1984). Cabrera et al. (2001, p. 251) state:
Whether or not the organization is able to achieve its strategic
objectives will depend on
whether it can deploy the right kinds of processes and
behaviors, which are in turn
determined by the organization’s architecture.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is
available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1741-0398.htm
Organizational
culture and SCS
361
Journal of Enterprise Information
Management
Vol. 21 No. 4, 2008
pp. 361-376
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1741-0398
DOI 10.1108/17410390810888651
The right kind of organizational process, practices and
behaviors decisions utilize the
14. vital strengths of organizational culture (Schein, 1992).
However, the consistent challenge for researchers is how to
connect organizational
culture in the implementation level of business goals and
practices (Denison and
Mishra, 1995; Flamholtz, 2001). Here lies the need for rigorous
examination of
organization culture in the context of ever expanding strategic
business reality. In
particular, as firms interact and align with the diverse network
of suppliers and
customers as their supply chain partners, rich dynamics of
organizational culture
become more illusive and less understandable. In this sense,
organizational culture in
the context of supply chain strategy (SCS) deserves a careful
research.
This article examines the vital links between organizational
culture and SCS and
addresses three specific research questions:
(1) How critical is the fit between organizational culture and
SCS?
(2) How are patterns of organizational culture and types of SCS
interrelated as an
integrative framework?
(3) How would this framework be useful in design and
implementation of effective
information flows in supply chain?
To explore the above research questions this paper is organized
as follows. The first
15. section identifies four major patterns of organizational culture
based on the competing
value framework (CVF) by Cameron and Quinn (1999). The
second section introduces
the four types of SCS with the uncertainty framework. The third
section delineates an
integrative framework of organizational culture, SCS and
strategic information
profiles. The conclusion derives the managerial implications
from the research
framework.
Organizational culture
The analysis starts with organizational culture because it has
more pervasive and
stable traits than strategy practices do (Al-Khalifa and
Aspinwall, 2001; Stock et al.,
2007; Schein, 1992). Schein (1996) defined organizational
culture as:
the basic tacit assumptions about how the world is and
organization to be that a group of
people share and that determines their perceptions, thoughts,
feelings, and their overt
behaviors.
This definition includes three levels of organizational culture:
artifacts, the espoused
values, and the basic underlying assumptions. Artifacts refer to
primarily visible,
audible, and touchable behaviors taking place in an
organization. Examples are
organizational structures and practices. In the lower level of
artifacts are the espoused
values. The espoused values are “ought to be” in the
organization whereas the artifacts
16. are “what is” (Schein, 1992, 1996). Strategies, goals, and
philosophies exemplify the
espoused values. This definition of organizational culture
suggests that an effective
strategy should be aligned to the organizational culture.
With some exceptions the majority of highly effective supply
chains involve leading
organizations that shape and influence the supply chain
practices. McAfee et al. (2002)
also report the impact of human resource policies of a principal
company on suppliers.
For an example, with its enormous size Wal-Mart’s
organizational culture and SCS
impact how its suppliers and distributors share relevant
information and do business
JEIM
21,4
362
with one another. Hence, organizational culture in this paper
means the overriding
culture in the supply chain that reflects the organizational value
traits of the dominant
company in the supply chain.
By nature the organizational culture is context-specific and its
study therefore
requires careful attention to the contextual details. For this
reason, we choose the CVF
by Cameron and Quinn (1999) for its theoretical validity and
wide acceptance. The CVF
17. has been widely used for the broad range of organizational
culture studies (Quinn and
Kimberly, 1984). According to Al-Khalifa and Aspinwall (2001,
p. 420), CVF is “a useful
model for organizations to adopt in taking a system perspective
of their businesses and
to plan and manage major change.” Although not exhaustively
representing cultural
phenomena, the framework defines key elements and
dimensions of organizational
culture.
Figure 1 presents a typology of the CVF. It constitutes two-
dimensional space that
reflects different value orientations (Denison and Spreitzer,
1991):
(1) the degree to which the organization emphasizes change or
stability (the
flexibility-control axis); and
(2) the nature of business strategic initiatives orientation (the
internal-
external-axis).
A flexibility orientation suggests adaptability and spontaneity,
while a control
orientation indicates stability, control, and order (Stock and
McDermott, 2001) An
internal orientation displays a focus on the sustenance and
enhancement of the existing
organization, while an external orientation reflects an emphasis
on competition,
interaction and growth with the external environment (Stock et
al., 2007). An
organization that shows internal orientation may allocate its
18. resources for maintenance
and improvement goals. In contrast, an organization that
stresses a high level of
market orientation may invest more resources in impacting
market environments
(Stock and McDermott, 2001). The combination of these two
dimensions produces four
types of culture: hierarchical, rational, group, and
developmental.
Table I is a summary of four patterns of organizational culture.
These four patterns
of organizational culture show differences in terms of focus,
leadership styles, criteria
Figure 1.
The competing value
framework
Organizational
culture and SCS
363
C
a
te
g
o
ry
H
53. characteristics
JEIM
21,4
364
for effectiveness, management of employees, organizational
glue and criteria of success
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Hierarchical culture emphasizes
stability or control with
high level of internal focus. This orientation is characterized by
uniformity,
coordination, internal efficiency, and a close adherence to rules
and regulations.
Developmental culture would be its opposing contrast in that it
underlines flexibility
and external orientation toward changes. Creativity, innovation,
and external growth
are emphasized in response to the changing demands of the
external environments
(e.g., competitors and customers). Group culture is similar to
hierarchical culture in that
it stresses the internal aspects of an organization, but different
in that an emphasis is
given more on the flexibility dimension. In this culture,
employees are empowered and
encouraged to participate in enhancing and optimizing internal
resources and business
processes. Rational culture is externally oriented with a stress
on control and stability.
Organizations with rational culture accentuate productivity and
achievement with
well-defined objectives against external competitions (Stock et
54. al., 2007).
It should be noted, however, that these patterns of cultures are
not mutually
exclusive (Al-Khalifa and Aspinwall, 2001). No organization
may show only one
cultural pattern. Rather, an organization is comprised of the
mixed set of the four
cultures. This classification of four patterns of organizational
culture is for the purpose
of comparison. The relative intensity of particular cultural traits
defines the pattern of
organization culture in a value chain (Denison and Spreitzer,
1991).
SCS
Different types of SCS have received increasing attention from
both researchers and
practitioners. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the focus was on
the “lean” paradigm
modeled after the successful experiences in Toyota (Womack et
al., 1990; Womack and
Jones, 1996). The core concept of lean supply chain is in
eliminating waste from
production to delivery (Womack et al., 1990). In the late 1990s,
the new approach of SCS
was the “agile” paradigm in response to turbulent market
environments (Mason-Jones
et al., 2000). In this way, context-specific SCS has become
more appealing than general
SCS. Fisher (1997), for example, presented a typology based on
types of products (i.e.,
functional and innovative) and SCS (i.e., efficient and
responsive). Afterward, Lee
(2002) put forth a demand and supply uncertainty framework
that produces four types
55. of SCS: efficient, risk-hedging, responsive, and agile.
A specific type of SCS indicates the stable sets of business
practices that are deeply
ingrained in organizational culture (i.e. management
philosophies, patterns of
organizational routines and behavioral norms). Table II is the
summary of four
different types of SCS based on its inherent characteristics. A
firm may pursue efficient
supply chains (ESC) when a market is mature and competitive
advantage is achieved
primarily through low cost and high productivity. Firms take
ESC strategy mainly to
manufacture quality products efficiently and to provide
customers with reliable
services. Risk-hedging supply chains (RHSC) are adopted when
a supply chain is
evolving with the presence of uncertainty whereas its market
demand is stable and
predictable. Hydro-electric power and some food producers are
examples of this
category (Lee, 2002). To leverage supply uncertainties, a firm
would increase buffer
stock for its core products or components and attempt to share
the cost of the safety
stock with other companies. This strategy is often used in the
retail industry or
dealerships. A firm that adopts responsive supply chain (RSC)
offers a variety of
Organizational
culture and SCS
365
90. through product innovation and improvement. In order to
accommodate constantly
changing customer demands, this supply chain may postpone
making the final form of
a product until the demand becomes specifically disclosed.
Fashion apparel, computers
and pop music industries are representative of this strategy
(Lee, 2002). The agile
supply chain (ASC) is the most flexible and the most market-
oriented strategy because
a firm in this category faces uncertainty from both demand and
supply sides. A firm
surrounded by high uncertainty endeavors to adjust promptly to
volatile market and
unstable supplier conditions. The firm responds sensitively to
the highly uncertain
demand via a variety of products with features such as high
quality, high performance,
and excellent customer service. The firm will also hedge the
risk arising from suppliers
such as supplier disruptions by leaving room for flexibility. The
firms that implement
ASC could be found in high-end computers and semiconductor
industries.
Competitive priorities and organizational culture
Competitive priorities of a supply chain are expressed in terms
of cost, quality,
flexibility and innovation. Managing competitive priorities
requires focusing on
particular goals over others and deploying organizational
resources according to these
priorities. In this sense, competitive priorities reflect elements
of organizational culture
that thrive on espoused values and goals of organizations
(Youndt et al., 1996). Table III
91. is the summary of competitive priorities and organizational
culture elements.
Organizational culture and SCS
Culture comprises three components: basic assumptions, values,
and visible artifacts
(Schein, 1992). An organization derives its visible artifacts
from the values, and the
values are based on assumptions that the organization takes.
Thus, assumptions are
more fundamental and aggregated than strategies are. Therefore,
it implies that SCS
should be aligned with organizational culture for effective
implementation. Some
Competitive
priorities Organizational culture elements Literature
Cost Minimize the impact of individual
differences, standardization, repetitive
and predictable environment, internal
effectiveness, economy of scale,
bureaucracy
Youndt et al. (1996); Hofstede (1980);
Panayotopoulou et al. (2003);
Panayotopoulou and Papalexandris
(2004)
Quality Knowledge work/sharing, skill
acquisition and development,
continuous improvement, teamwork,
empowerment
Deming (1982); Youndt et al. (1996)
92. Flexibility High technology, adaptable workforce,
creativity and imitative, unpredictable
environment, internal and external
effectiveness
Upton (1995); Parthasarthy and Sethi
(1992); Youndt et al. (1996)
Innovation Creativity, adaptation, open
communication and continuous learning,
autonomy
Cameron and Quinn (1999); Youndt et al.
(1996); Schuler and Jackson (1987)
Table III.
Competitive priorities
and organizational
culture
Organizational
culture and SCS
367
researches recognized the importance of the strategic fit
between organizational
culture and SCS. Chorn (1991) and Gattorna and Walters (1996)
explained the
importance of strategic alignment between organizational
culture and strategy.
McAdam and Brown (2001) attempted to tackle the alignment
between organizational
93. culture and strategy with an exploratory quantitative case study
approach in the Steel
industry in the UK and Ireland. Mello and Stank (2005) studied
the relationship
between organizational culture and supply chain success by
using Schein’s (1992)
theoretical framework. They found that organizational culture
plays an important role
in forming suppliers’ behaviors. Tummala et al. (2006) also
emphasize the
compatibility of supplier’s cultures in developing long-term
relationships.
Figure 2 shows the integrative framework that combines the two
parameters (i.e.,
demand and supply uncertainty) from the SCS uncertainty
framework (Lee, 2002) with
those (i.e., internal-external and control-flexibility orientation)
from the CVF
framework (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). this framework
identifies SCS with
corresponding organizational culture.
High demand uncertainty occurs in the market environment in
which volatile
demand and fluctuating customer order patterns are the norm.
Innovative products
usually show such a demand pattern. On the other hand, low
demand uncertainty
refers to the market environment with predictable demand and
stable customer order
practices. Functional products with mature product life cycles
display such low
demand uncertainty. High supply uncertainty refers to a supplier
network that is fairly
new and not yet well-established and where the supply patterns
94. are not so stable. In
contrast, low supply uncertainty is possible in supplier network
that has many
suppliers with stable production capabilities.
A specific SCS may be more fitting to a particular organization
culture. ESC (low in
both demand uncertainty and supply uncertainty) operates in
organizations that are
characterized with hierarchical culture. Hierarchical culture,
with the low level of
external orientation, focuses on the internal process for
stability. This culture is
characterized by standardization, internal efficiency and
organizational routines
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999). This hierarchical culture naturally
supports efficient SCS
practices that are built on mechanistic and internal control
mechanisms.
RHSC (low in demand uncertainty but high in supply
uncertainty) operates in
organizations that are classified as group culture. Group culture
is characterized with
the human relations model of organizational theory. Group
culture, with its emphasis
Figure 2.
Organizational culture and
supply chain strategy
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95. on interpersonal trust and rich internal participative mechanisms
fits to RHSC
practices that utilize the high level of cross-functional
coordination and focus on
internal resource allocations.
RSC (high in demand uncertainty and low in supply uncertainty)
operates in
organizations that are characterized with rational culture.
Rational culture corresponds
to the rational goal model that is high on external-orientation
and control-mechanisms.
Rational culture, with its strong focus on results and competent
decision-making
mechanisms, is well-aligned to a responsive supply chain that
has high value emphasis
on achievement, market leadership and competitiveness (Stock
et al., 2007).
ASC (both high in demand uncertainty and supply uncertainty)
operates in
developmental culture. Developmental culture, adopting the
open system model, is
characterized with creativity and passion for innovative
problem-solving mechanisms.
Developmental culture supports ASC practices that are high on
resource acquisitions,
product leadership and entrepreneurship (Stock et al., 2007).
Information system, SCS and organizational culture
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, this integrative
framework of
organizational culture and SCS is further extended to
identifying styles of strategic
96. information system as caretakers, defenders, analyzers and
prospectors. This
classification is adapted from the works of Miles and Snow
(1978) and Apigian etal. (2006).
Tables IV-VI shows the integration framework for information
flows, SCS and
organizational culture. The design of information system
considers the fit between the
organization’s culture and strategic focus. Effective information
flows enable firms to
better create, process and deliver products and services that
their ultimate customers
value.
Four styles of strategic information system deserve even a brief
explanation.
Caretakers have a consistent and stable internal focus that
processes organizational
routines with great efficiency. Defenders try to protect their
particular strategic
resources and markets. Analyzers are highly organized
according to their goal-driven
results. Prospectors continue to seek and locate new market
opportunities while
sustain their current markets with resilience. The strategic
information system has a
profile in the context of integrative framework of SCS and
organizational culture.
The ESC focuses on obtaining low cost and good quality to win
in the market. The
ESC is adopted usually in a predictable and mature market
where the manufacturing
process is characterized as rules and regulations,
standardization and repetition for
97. optimized processes and for the economy of scale. To attain this
goal, an organization
would attempt to minimize the impact of individual differences
and increase the
internal effectiveness the most by developing hierarchical and
mechanistic culture
(Nahm et al., 2003, 2004). The relationship with suppliers
would be transactional-based
and control-oriented. The stability and control emphasis through
internal efficiency go
along with hierarchical culture. Therefore, ESC adopts the
practices of caretakers in its
information process and system flows.
Information strategy style Caretakers Defenders Analyzers
Prospectors
SC management SC integration SC coordination SC
collaboration SC alignment
Table IV.
Information system
Organizational
culture and SCS
369
S
u
p
p
139. The RHSC is employed when demand is stable and yet suppliers
are uncertain. Since
demand is stable and predictable, firms in this environment
would more concentrate its
resources on optimizing internal resources and the
manufacturing and procuring and
delivering processes. But the uncertainty driven from suppliers
leads the firms to
respond more flexibly in dealing with suppliers. They may make
efforts to build a
long-term and collaborative relationship with suppliers. For
this, they may also
empower employees to do knowledge/work sharing, skill
acquisition, teamwork and
continuous improvement (Youndt et al., 1996; Parthasarthy and
Sethi, 1992). The
flexibility and internal efficiency are suited for the group
culture. Therefore, RHSC
adopts the practices of defenders in its information process and
system flows.
The RSC aims to compete through offering a variety of
innovative products to
customers with an affordable price (Frohlich and Dixon, 2001;
Cagliano et al., 2005). To
be innovative and keep up with market needs, a firm must be
sensitive to the external
environment and foster creativity, adaptation, continuous
learning, and autonomy
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999). However, in dealing with
suppliers, it is more
control-oriented because suppliers are well-built. For example,
for the efficiency sake, a
dominant firm may attempt to integrate suppliers as much as it
can. For this, it may
utilize postponement strategy. It may put off making the final
140. form of products until
the demands become clearer. In this case, although market-
orientation is emphasized,
control-orientation for supplier aspects is also given weight. In
this supply chain,
productivity, goal achievement, and competition would be of
importance, which are
similar to the features appearing in rational culture. Therefore,
RSC adopts the
practices of analyzers in its information process and system
flows.
Organizations with emphasis on the ASC try to employ
differentiation from others
by pursuing excellence on multiple fronts such as quality,
product design and
performance, deliveries, and after-sales service (Frohlich and
Dixon, 2001). The
orientation demands quick adaptation to external changes and
stresses growth,
creativity stimulation, resource acquisition, and innovation. The
supplier uncertainty
may require organizations to be more flexible and market-
oriented. Developmental
culture is fit for organizations implementing the ASC.
Therefore, ASC adopts the
practices of prospectors in its information process and system
flows.
Managerial implications
Effective information flows are the important enablers of supply
chain performance
outcomes. Successful supply chain outcomes require strategic
approaches, and thus
SCS matters. SCS is about making values and goals of an
organization’s network
141. explicit; therefore, an effective strategy may not ignore
organizational culture. We now
summarize a few managerial implications of our integrative
framework here.
First, senior executives may better understand the contextual
differences of an
organizational culture and supply chain. Theories of supply
chain management have
examined diverse patterns of supply chains. However, many
supply chain studies
implicitly assume that SCS might be implemented without any
consideration of
organizational culture. However, increasingly critical
challenges of supply chain
management are to:
. define the organizational cultural context of a particular
supply chain;
. formulate relevant SCS; and
. implement supply chain practices through effective
information flows.
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The research framework presented in this paper might be useful
for managers to
consider different strategic contexts from organizational culture
perspectives.
142. Second, supply chain executives also may be aware of the
linkage between SCS and
organizational culture. The concept of strategic fit has been
well discussed in the
management strategy literature. Strategic fit refers to the extent
of congruency
between organizational resources and market/customer
requirements. Organizational
resources are not automatically allocated to satisfy customer
needs. It is fulfilled
through a deliberate and concerted effort of applying resources
to meet customer
requirements. Such deliberate and concerted efforts make
strategic practices possible.
However, if a particular strategy has little relevance to proper
usage of resources for
desirable outcomes, it indicates a misfit. Such a misfit may
occur when SCS is
implemented without the support of effective information
system flows that provide
the rich strategic contexts.
Third, information executives may design and manage their
strategic information
flows based on the contexts of SCS and organizational culture.
Firms invest a great
amount of resources on IT system development. Design issues
of an information
system are important in that much of the resources committed in
design stages may
not be easily changeable or replaceable in the implementation
stages. More effort has to
be made in the areas of strategic design of information flows.
With keen understanding
of their organizational culture and strategic practices,,
143. information executives may
better define the requirements of their strategic information
systems. This integrative
framework can be a useful guide for building strategic and
effective information
infrastructure in the context of supply chain management.
Conclusion and future issues
Despite the acknowledgement of the vital role of organizational
culture in SCS
formulation and implementation, scant research has been carried
out on the
relationship between SCS and organizational culture. This study
develops a research
model that attempts to link SCS and organizational culture
based on the uncertainty
framework by Lee (2002) and CVF by Cameron and Quinn
(1999).
In a rapidly changing business environment, although the
formation of networks is
important, the cultural patterns are less clear and more
undistinguishable. Firms may
not easily grasp the complexity that exists between
organizational culture and SCS.
However, a successful formulation and implementation of SCS
may need to consider
deeply-held cultural traits and intangible behavioral response
patterns of supply chain
participants. In this sense, this paper clarifies how a particular
type of organizational
culture may fit better to a particular SCS and furthermore
suggests an appropriate
style of strategic information system.
An effective design of supply chain information infrastructures
144. requires solid
understanding of the underlying organizational cultural traits,
strategic priorities and
behavioral practices. This paper suggests that the organizational
culture of a dominant
or principal organization influences the suppliers and
distributors in the same supply
chain. However, the dynamic interactions between a dominant
organization and many
participating organizations might not be so straightforward and
therefore deserve
their complex relations deserve further examination. The
exploratory nature of this
study requires much more empirical research for theoretical
validation. Even so, this
conceptual paper may still be useful for theory development and
practical applications.
Organizational
culture and SCS
373
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About the authors
James Jungbae Roh is a PhD Student at the University of
Toledo. Mr Roh holds an MA in
Economics and an MBA from the University of Toledo. He also
holds a BA in Economics from
Dongguk University, Seoul, Korea. His research interests are in
supply chain management,
manufacturing strategy, e-procurement and RFID adoption
strategy. His article has been
published in Journal of Enterprise Information Management.
Paul Hong is an Associate Professor of Operations Management
at the University of Toledo,
USA. Dr Hong holds a doctoral degree in Manufacturing
Management and Engineering from the
University of Toledo. He also holds an MBA and an MA in
Economics from Bowling Green State
University, USA and a BA from Yonsei University in Seoul,
Korea. His articles have been
published in professional journals, including European Journal
of Innovation Management,
International Journal of Operations and Production
Management, Journal of Operations
Management, Journal of Enterprise Information Management,
Journal of Knowledge and
Information Management, International Journal of Quality and
Reliability Management, Korean
Journal of Tourism Research, and Tourism Culture and Science.
His research interests are in
operational strategy and global supply chain management. Paul
Hong is the corresponding
author and can be contacted at: [email protected]
Youngsoo Park is a PhD Student at the University of Toledo. Mr
Park holds an MA in
153. Economics from Sogang University and an MS in Industrial
Engineering from Virginia Tech. He
also holds a BA in Economics from Sogang University, Seoul,
Korea. His research interests are in
supply chain management, manufacturing strategy, and human
resource management practices.
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