1045Fla.GULLIVER SCHOOLS, INC. v. SNAY Cite as 137 So.3d 1045 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2014) prejudice was not concession on the merits and therefore not a judgment or functional equivalent of a confession of judgment un- der section 627.428); O.A.G. Corp. v. Bri- tamco Underwriters, Inc., 707 So.2d 785, 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), abrogated on oth- er grounds by Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So.2d 371 (Fla.2002) (holding that insurer’s voluntary dismissal did not constitute an adjudication on the merits and therefore was not a judgment or the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment un- der section 627.428). IV. CONCLUSION Because GEICO’s payment of the claim to the vehicle lienholder after Do filed suit against it was the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment in favor of Do, the trial court erred in denying an award of attorney’s fees to Do for prosecuting his suit pursuant to section 627.428. Do, however, is not entitled to additional fees for time spent defending GEICO’s counterclaims because the order granting the motions to dismiss for failure to prose- cute was not a judgment, or the functional equivalent of a judgment, in Do’s favor. The order on appeal is therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the trial court for determination of the amount of the fees. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. , GULLIVER SCHOOLS, INC., a Florida corporation, and School Management Systems, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellants, v. Patrick SNAY, Appellee. No. 3D13–1952. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. Feb. 26, 2014. Background: School’s former headmaster filed motion to enforce settlement agree- ment with school, arguing that his state- ment to his college age daughter and her comment on social media, about school paying for her summer vacation, did not constitute a breach of confidentially provi- sion of settlement agreement. The Circuit Court, Miami–Dade County, Peter R. Lo- pez, J., granted motion, and school appeal- ed. Holding: The District Court of Appeal, Wells, J., held that headmaster’s deposi- tion testimony that his conversation with his daughter was that his lawsuit against school was settled and he was happy with the results established a breach of confi- dentially provision of settlement agree- ment, and thus, he was not entitled to enforce the agreement. Reversed. Compromise and Settlement O20(1) Former headmaster’s deposition testi- mony that his conversation with his col- lege age daughter was that his lawsuit against private school was settled and he was happy with the results established a breach of confidentiality provision of set- tlement agreement, and fact that head- master testified that he knew he needed to tell his daughter something did not ex- cuse this breach, and thus, he was not 1046 Fla. 137 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 3d SERIES entitled to enforce the agreement; confi- dentiality provision of agreement stated that neither headmaster nor his wife ...

1. 1045Fla.GULLIVER SCHOOLS, INC. v. SNAY
Cite as 137 So.3d 1045 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2014)
prejudice was not concession on the merits
and therefore not a judgment or functional
equivalent of a confession of judgment un-
der section 627.428); O.A.G. Corp. v. Bri-
tamco Underwriters, Inc., 707 So.2d 785,
787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), abrogated on oth-
er grounds by Caufield v. Cantele, 837
So.2d 371 (Fla.2002) (holding that insurer’s
voluntary dismissal did not constitute an
adjudication on the merits and therefore
was not a judgment or the functional
equivalent of a confession of judgment un-
der section 627.428).
IV. CONCLUSION
Because GEICO’s payment of the claim
to the vehicle lienholder after Do filed suit
against it was the functional equivalent of
a confession of judgment in favor of Do,
the trial court erred in denying an award
of attorney’s fees to Do for prosecuting his
suit pursuant to section 627.428.
Do, however, is not entitled to additional
fees for time spent defending GEICO’s
counterclaims because the order granting
the motions to dismiss for failure to prose-
cute was not a judgment, or the functional

2. equivalent of a judgment, in Do’s favor.
The order on appeal is therefore affirmed
in part, reversed in part and remanded to
the trial court for determination of the
amount of the fees.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART AND REMANDED.
,
GULLIVER SCHOOLS, INC., a Florida
corporation, and School Management
Systems, Inc., a Florida corporation,
Appellants,
v.
Patrick SNAY, Appellee.
No. 3D13–1952.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District.
Feb. 26, 2014.
Background: School’s former headmaster
filed motion to enforce settlement agree-
ment with school, arguing that his state-
ment to his college age daughter and her
comment on social media, about school
paying for her summer vacation, did not
constitute a breach of confidentially provi-

3. sion of settlement agreement. The Circuit
Court, Miami–Dade County, Peter R. Lo-
pez, J., granted motion, and school appeal-
ed.
Holding: The District Court of Appeal,
Wells, J., held that headmaster’s deposi-
tion testimony that his conversation with
his daughter was that his lawsuit against
school was settled and he was happy with
the results established a breach of confi-
dentially provision of settlement agree-
ment, and thus, he was not entitled to
enforce the agreement.
Reversed.
Compromise and Settlement O20(1)
Former headmaster’s deposition testi-
mony that his conversation with his col-
lege age daughter was that his lawsuit
against private school was settled and he
was happy with the results established a
breach of confidentiality provision of set-
tlement agreement, and fact that head-
master testified that he knew he needed
to tell his daughter something did not ex-
cuse this breach, and thus, he was not
1046 Fla. 137 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 3d SERIES
entitled to enforce the agreement; confi-
dentiality provision of agreement stated

4. that neither headmaster nor his wife
would either directly or indirectly disclose
to anyone (other than their lawyers or
other professionals) any information re-
garding the existence or the terms of the
parties’ agreement.
Cole, Scott & Kissane, Scott A. Cole and
Kristen A. Tajak, Miami, for appellants.
Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weisel-
berg Keechl, Jonathan M. Streisfield,
David L. Ferguson and Scott J. Weisel-
berg, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and WELLS
and SCALES, JJ.
WELLS, Judge.
Gulliver Schools, Inc. appeals from a
trial court order granting plaintiff Patrick
Snay’s motion to compel enforcement of
settlement agreement. The school main-
tains Snay is precluded from enforcing the
agreement because he violated a material
term, the non-disclosure clause, when he
disclosed to his daughter that his case
against Gulliver was settled and he was
happy with the result. We agree with the
school and reverse.1
When Gulliver did not renew Snay’s
2010–2011 contract as the school’s head-
master, Snay filed a two count complaint
asserting causes of action for age discrimi-

5. nation and retaliation under the Florida
Civil Rights Act. On November 3, 2011,
the parties executed a general release and
a settlement agreement for full and final
settlement of Snay’s claims, with the
school to pay $10,000 in back pay to Snay
with ‘‘Check # 1’’; $80,000 to Snay as a
‘‘1099’’ with ‘‘Check # 2’’; and $60,000 to
Snay’s attorneys with ‘‘Check # 3.’’
Central to this agreement was a detailed
confidentiality provision, which provided
that the existence and terms of the agree-
ment between Snay and the school were to
be kept strictly confidential and that
should Snay or his wife breach the confi-
dentiality provision, a portion of the settle-
ment proceeds (the $80,000) would be dis-
gorged:
13. Confidentiality TTT [T]he plaintiff
shall not either directly or indirectly,
disclose, discuss or communicate to any
entity or person, except his attorneys or
other professional advisors or spouse
any information whatsoever regarding
the existence or terms of this Agree-
ment TTT A breach TTTwill result in
disgorgement of the Plaintiffs portion of
the settlement Payments.
Only four days after the agreement was
signed, on November 7, 2011, Gulliver noti-
fied Snay that he had breached the agree-
ment based on the Facebook posting of

6. Snay’s college-age daughter, wherein she
stated:
Mama and Papa Snay won the case
against Gulliver. Gulliver is now offi-
cially paying for my vacation to Europe
this summer. SUCK IT.2
1. Our standard of review is de novo. Gray v.
D & J Indus. Inc., 875 So.2d 683, 683 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2004) (‘‘The construction of a contract is
a question of law for the courts to determine
where the language used in the written con-
tract is clear, unambiguous, and susceptible
of only one interpretation.’’); see also Abel
Homes at Naranja Villas, LLC v. Hernandez,
960 So.2d 891, 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
(same).
2. Snay’s position was that he never told the
daughter that he had ‘‘won’’ the case and the
daughter did not go to Europe that summer,
nor had she planned to do so. This, however,
does not change our analysis.
1047Fla.GULLIVER SCHOOLS, INC. v. SNAY
Cite as 137 So.3d 1045 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2014)
This Facebook comment went out to ap-
proximately 1200 of the daughter’s Face-
book friends, many of whom were either
current or past Gulliver students.

7. Although the settlement agreement ex-
pressly accorded Snay the unilateral right
to revoke the agreement within seven days
of its execution (that is, by November 10),
Snay took no action to revoke the agree-
ment despite Gulliver’s notification of
breach.
On November 15, 2011, Gulliver sent a
letter to Snay’s counsel, stating that it was
tendering the attorney’s fees portion of the
parties’ agreement but was not going to
tender Snay’s portion because he had
breached the confidentiality provision.3
That letter included a Joint Stipulation for
Dismissal which reconfirmed in part that
‘‘the parties have settled this action,’’ and
Snay signed off on it and returned it to
Gulliver. The action was dismissed with a
reservation of jurisdiction for enforcement
of the settlement agreement.
On June 9, 2012, Snay filed his motion to
enforce the settlement agreement, arguing
that his statement to his daughter and her
comment on Facebook did not constitute a
breach. After giving Gulliver an opportu-
nity to take the depositions of the Snays
and their daughter, the court below con-
ducted a hearing at which the parties
agreed to rely on deposition testimony for
the purposes of determining whether there
had been a breach of the confidentiality
provisions of the settlement agreement.
Following that hearing, the court below

8. entered an order finding that neither
Snay’s comments to his daughter nor his
daughter’s Facebook comments constitut-
ed a breach of the confidentiality agree-
ment. We disagree and reverse.
A settlement agreement must generally
‘‘be interpreted like any other contract.
That is, absent any evidence that the par-
ties intended to endow a special meaning
in the terms used in the agreement, the
unambiguous language is to be given a
realistic interpretation based on the plain,
everyday meaning conveyed by the
words.’’ McIlmoil v. McIlmoil, 784 So.2d
557, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
It is axiomatic that the clear and unam-
biguous words of a contract are the best
evidence of the intent of the parties.
See Murry v. Zynyx Mktg. Communica-
tions, Inc., 774 So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA
2000). Where contracts are clear and
unambiguous, they should be construed
as written, and the court can give them
no other meaning. See Institutional &
Supermarket Equip., Inc. v. C & S Re-
frigeration, Inc., 609 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla.
4th DCA 1992). In construing a con-
tract, the legal effect of its provisions
should be determined from the words of
the entire contract.
Khosrow Maleki, P.A. v. M.A. Hajianp-
our, M.D., P.A., 771 So.2d 628, 631 (Fla.

9. 4th DCA 2000); see Walgreen Co. v. Habi-
tat Dev. Corp., 655 So.2d 164, 165 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1995) (‘‘When a contract is clear and
unambiguous, the court is not at liberty to
give the contract ‘any meaning beyond
that expressed.’ ’’ (quoting Bay Mgmt. Inc.
v. Beau Monde, Inc., 366 So.2d 788, 791
(Fla. 2d DCA 1978))); see e.g. Spring Lake
NC, LLC v. Figueroa, 104 So.3d 1211, 1214
(Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (‘‘If a contract provi-
sion is clear and unambiguous, a court may
not consider extrinsic or parol evidence to
change the plain meaning set forth in the
contract.’’ (quoting SCG Harbourwood,
LLC v. Hanyan, 93 So.3d 1197, 1200 (Fla.
2d DCA 2012))).
In this case, the plain, unambiguous
meaning of paragraph 13 of the agreement
between Snay and the school is that nei-
ther Snay nor his wife would ‘‘either di-
3. It later tendered the back wages ($10,000) portion of the
agreement.
1048 Fla. 137 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 3d SERIES
rectly or indirectly ’’ disclose to anyone
(other than their lawyers or other profes-
sionals) ‘‘any information’’ regarding the
existence or the terms of the parties’
agreement.
Because Snay’s deposition testimony

10. that ‘‘[m]y conversation with my daughter
was that it was settled and we were happy
with the results,’’ establishes a breach of
this provision, the court below should have
denied his motion for enforcement of the
agreement.4 The fact that Snay testified
that he knew he needed to tell his daugh-
ter something did not excuse this breach.
There is no evidence that he made this
need known to the school or to his or its
attorneys so that the parties might ham-
mer out a mutually acceptable course of
action in the agreement. Rather, before
the ink was dry on the agreement, and
notwithstanding the clear language of sec-
tion 13 mandating confidentiality, Snay vi-
olated the agreement by doing exactly
what he had promised not to do.5 His
daughter then did precisely what the confi-
dentiality agreement was designed to pre-
vent, advertising to the Gulliver communi-
ty that Snay had been successful in his age
discrimination and retaliation case against
the school.
Based on the clear and unambiguous
language of the parties’ agreement and
Snay’s testimony confirming his breach of
its terms, we reverse the order entered
below granting the Snays’ motion to en-
force the agreement.
Reversed.
,

11. Ronald L. FOX, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D13–3609.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Second District.
Feb. 26, 2014.
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R.App. P.
9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Polk
County; Michael E. Raiden, Judge.
Ronald L. Fox, pro se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tal-
lahassee, and, Cerese Crawford Taylor,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
Appellee.
4. The significance of this provision is evi-
denced by the fact that Snay’s entitlement to a
significant sum of money is expressly condi-
tioned on his compliance with this provision.
It is also highlighted by the ramifications vis-
ited on Gulliver as a consequence of Snay’s
breach/disclosure when his daughter commu-
nicated to 1200 people, many associated with
Gulliver, that Snay had been justified in his
discrimination and retaliation claims.

12. 5. According to Snay he knew the litigation
was important to his daughter and he knew
he would have to tell her something about its
resolution. So moments after signing the
agreement, he had a conversation with his
wife, and they agreed to inform their daugh-
ter that the case was settled and they were
happy with the result.
Snay explained:
What happened is that after settlement my
wife and I went in the parking lot, and we
had to make some decisions on what we
were going to tell my daughter. Because
it’s very important to understand that she
was an intricate part of what was happen-
ing. She was retaliated against at Gulliver.
So she knew we were going to some sort of
mediation. She was very concerned about
it. Because of what happened at Gulliver,
she had quite a few psychological scars
which forced me to put her into therapy.
So there was a period of time that there
was an unresolved enclosure for my wife
and me. It was very important with her.
We understood the confidentiality. So we
knew what the restrictions were, yet we
needed to tell her something.