This case concerns a lawsuit filed by Enrique Herrera against Gilligan's LLC and Robert Phillipps after Herrera was injured while working for Gilligan's. Gilligan's and Phillipps sought summary judgment claiming immunity under Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act. Herrera argued he was not a covered employee under the Act because he was not legally authorized to work in the U.S. and Gilligan's did not have proper documentation of his work status. The district court initially denied summary judgment finding factual issues but later granted it without explanation. On appeal, the court will review the summary judgment decision de novo to determine if factual issues exist regarding Gilligan's compliance with documentation requirements and immunity under the Act.
This document is a response brief filed by the defendants (Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Leshota) in response to the plaintiff's (Traian Bujduveanu) motion to strike the defendants' response brief to the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's motion to strike should be denied because the defendants properly responded to all discovery requests. The defendants also argue that the plaintiff provides no valid legal basis to strike the defendants' response brief and is simply attempting to argue the merits of the case rather than the discovery issues. The defendants request that the plaintiff's motion be denied and sanctions be granted against the plaintiff.
Defendants dismas charties, inc., ana gispert, derek thomas and adams leshota...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a response brief filed by the defendants (Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Leshota) in response to the plaintiff's (Traian Bujduveanu) motion to strike the defendants' response brief to the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's motion to strike should be denied because the defendants properly responded to all discovery requests. The defendants also argue that the plaintiff provides no valid legal basis to strike the defendants' response brief and is simply attempting to argue the merits of the case rather than the discovery issues. The defendants request that the plaintiff's motion be denied and sanctions be granted against the plaintiff.
1) The parties submitted a joint status report in accordance with local bankruptcy rules regarding an adversary proceeding between Virgie Arthur and Bonnie Gayle Stern.
2) Discovery is ongoing, with the plaintiff anticipating completion in 8-10 months, while the defendant believes discovery could be completed sooner in 3 months if permitted.
3) The plaintiff estimates needing 10-14 days to present their case at trial plus rebuttal, while the defendant anticipates needing 2 days, with the plaintiff intending to call approximately 12 witnesses and the defendant 3-4 witnesses.
Defendants dismas charties, inc., ana gispert, derek thomas and adams leshota...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a response by the defendants to the plaintiff's motion to supplement his motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that they have properly responded to all of the plaintiff's discovery requests. They assert that the purpose of the motion to compel is to compel responses when the other side has not responded, which is not the case here. The defendants believe the plaintiff is trying to force them to change their discovery answers to ones more favorable to the plaintiff through this motion. They request that the court deny the plaintiff's motion.
This document is a response by the defendants to the plaintiff's motion to supplement his motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that their discovery responses have been timely and proper. They assert that the plaintiff's motion is an attempt to argue the merits of the case rather than the sufficiency of the discovery responses. The defendants request that the plaintiff's motion be denied and sanctions be awarded against the plaintiff.
Recent Developments in Rhode Island Law 2015 - State Courts and Civil ProcedureNicole Benjamin
Recent Developments in Rhode Island Law 2015 - State Courts and Civil Procedure, including issues of first impression and issues related to civil and appellate procedure.
This document outlines the pre-trial stipulation for a case between plaintiff Traian Bujduveanu and defendants Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Lashanda. It summarizes the facts of the case, including that the plaintiff was transferred to the Dismas facility to serve out his sentence before release, but was then returned to prison for violating rules. It lists the contested issues to be litigated including whether the defendants violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and whether he sustained damages. It also lists the motions that have been filed, witnesses and exhibits to be presented at the estimated 4-5 day trial.
Recent Developments in Rhode Island Law 2014 - State Courts and Civil ProcedureNicole Benjamin
This document summarizes recent developments in Rhode Island law from 2014, focusing on state courts and civil procedure. Key points include: the launch of electronic filing in civil cases beginning in November 2014; changes to the Providence County civil non-dispositive motion calendar eliminating the call of the calendar; and several issues of first impression addressed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court during the 2013-2014 term related to admiralty law, appellate practice, attorneys, class actions, commercial law, and medical malpractice.
This document is a response brief filed by the defendants (Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Leshota) in response to the plaintiff's (Traian Bujduveanu) motion to strike the defendants' response brief to the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's motion to strike should be denied because the defendants properly responded to all discovery requests. The defendants also argue that the plaintiff provides no valid legal basis to strike the defendants' response brief and is simply attempting to argue the merits of the case rather than the discovery issues. The defendants request that the plaintiff's motion be denied and sanctions be granted against the plaintiff.
Defendants dismas charties, inc., ana gispert, derek thomas and adams leshota...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a response brief filed by the defendants (Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Leshota) in response to the plaintiff's (Traian Bujduveanu) motion to strike the defendants' response brief to the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's motion to strike should be denied because the defendants properly responded to all discovery requests. The defendants also argue that the plaintiff provides no valid legal basis to strike the defendants' response brief and is simply attempting to argue the merits of the case rather than the discovery issues. The defendants request that the plaintiff's motion be denied and sanctions be granted against the plaintiff.
1) The parties submitted a joint status report in accordance with local bankruptcy rules regarding an adversary proceeding between Virgie Arthur and Bonnie Gayle Stern.
2) Discovery is ongoing, with the plaintiff anticipating completion in 8-10 months, while the defendant believes discovery could be completed sooner in 3 months if permitted.
3) The plaintiff estimates needing 10-14 days to present their case at trial plus rebuttal, while the defendant anticipates needing 2 days, with the plaintiff intending to call approximately 12 witnesses and the defendant 3-4 witnesses.
Defendants dismas charties, inc., ana gispert, derek thomas and adams leshota...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a response by the defendants to the plaintiff's motion to supplement his motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that they have properly responded to all of the plaintiff's discovery requests. They assert that the purpose of the motion to compel is to compel responses when the other side has not responded, which is not the case here. The defendants believe the plaintiff is trying to force them to change their discovery answers to ones more favorable to the plaintiff through this motion. They request that the court deny the plaintiff's motion.
This document is a response by the defendants to the plaintiff's motion to supplement his motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that their discovery responses have been timely and proper. They assert that the plaintiff's motion is an attempt to argue the merits of the case rather than the sufficiency of the discovery responses. The defendants request that the plaintiff's motion be denied and sanctions be awarded against the plaintiff.
Recent Developments in Rhode Island Law 2015 - State Courts and Civil ProcedureNicole Benjamin
Recent Developments in Rhode Island Law 2015 - State Courts and Civil Procedure, including issues of first impression and issues related to civil and appellate procedure.
This document outlines the pre-trial stipulation for a case between plaintiff Traian Bujduveanu and defendants Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Lashanda. It summarizes the facts of the case, including that the plaintiff was transferred to the Dismas facility to serve out his sentence before release, but was then returned to prison for violating rules. It lists the contested issues to be litigated including whether the defendants violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and whether he sustained damages. It also lists the motions that have been filed, witnesses and exhibits to be presented at the estimated 4-5 day trial.
Recent Developments in Rhode Island Law 2014 - State Courts and Civil ProcedureNicole Benjamin
This document summarizes recent developments in Rhode Island law from 2014, focusing on state courts and civil procedure. Key points include: the launch of electronic filing in civil cases beginning in November 2014; changes to the Providence County civil non-dispositive motion calendar eliminating the call of the calendar; and several issues of first impression addressed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court during the 2013-2014 term related to admiralty law, appellate practice, attorneys, class actions, commercial law, and medical malpractice.
This document is an order from a United States District Court regarding cross-motions for summary judgment in a case involving a plaintiff who was imprisoned at a halfway house operated by the defendant. The court provides background on the case, including that the plaintiff sued over alleged unlawful seizure of his property and constitutional violations. The court evaluates the motions using the standard for summary judgment, granting the defendant's motion and denying the plaintiff's motion.
This affidavit provides information in support of a motion for summary judgment. It describes the plaintiff's criminal conviction and sentence, his transfer to Dismas Charities halfway house, and the rules he agreed to follow. It states that the plaintiff drove himself to Dismas and had an unauthorized cell phone, violating the rules. As a result, his personal items were confiscated and he was returned to prison to complete his sentence.
This document is a reply brief filed by defendants in response to the plaintiff's response brief and in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It summarizes that the plaintiff was transferred to a community corrections facility (Dismas) as a transition from federal prison, and agreed to follow its rules. However, the plaintiff admitted driving without permission and possessing a cell phone, in violation of the rules. As a result, he was returned to federal prison to serve the remaining 68 days of his sentence. The brief argues the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims of false arrest, assault, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligence and constitutional violations, as the plaintiff cannot prove the elements of these claims or that
Defendants’ reply brief in response to plaintiff’s response brief and in supp...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a reply brief filed by the defendants in response to the plaintiff's response brief and in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It summarizes that the plaintiff was transferred to a community corrections facility operated by Dismas Charities as part of his transition from federal prison back into the community. It alleges that the plaintiff violated rules of his placement by driving without permission and possessing a cell phone. As a result, Dismas reported the violations to the Bureau of Prisons, which returned the plaintiff to prison to serve the remaining 68 days of his sentence. The defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's tort claims of false arrest, assault, battery, and malicious prosecution.
Geraldine Redmond opposed Steven Gaggero's motion to seal portions of the court file in her harassment restraining order case against him. Redmond had obtained a temporary restraining order against Gaggero in October 2002 related to incidents at an equestrian facility where they had a business dispute. Gaggero then moved to seal Redmond's petition and a map she drew of his residence that was included in the court file. Redmond argued the file should not be sealed because Gaggero did not establish an overriding privacy interest, that her statements were false or defamatory, or that he would be prejudiced if the file was not sealed.
This document is a petition for review filed with the Supreme Court of California seeking review of two appellate court decisions related to a legal malpractice case. The petitioners (the plaintiff and additional judgment debtors from the underlying case) are asking the Supreme Court to grant review of the present matter and hold it pending the outcome of a related case also pending before the Supreme Court. If the petitioners prevail in the related case, they would be entitled to reversal of the orders in the present matter. Granting review and holding the present matter would prevent those orders from becoming final while the related case is still pending.
Findings and Conclusions awarding damages to Ash Grove against Travelers and Liberty Mutual for breach of duty to defend in connection with Portland Harbor Superfund Site.
Defendants dismas charties, inc., ana gispert, derek thomas and adams leshota...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a brief filed by defendants Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Leshota in response to a motion to compel filed by the plaintiff Traian Bujduveanu. The defendants argue that they have properly responded to the plaintiff's requests for production by agreeing to allow inspection of requested documents at their counsel's office. They also argue that some requested documents, such as surveillance video from relevant dates, do not exist. Finally, the defendants assert that the plaintiff's lawsuit and discovery requests appear aimed at exposing alleged corruption beyond the scope of this case, which involves issues only between the plaintiff and these defendants.
The document is a brief filed by defendants Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Leshota (incorrectly identified) in response to the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that they have properly responded to the plaintiff's requests for production and interrogatories. They provided the requested documents and have no further obligation to compel. The defendants assert the plaintiff is improperly using discovery to harass the defendants and obtain irrelevant personal information. The defendants request the court deny the plaintiff's motion to compel and consider sanctions against the plaintiff.
Fleet v. Bank of America case from California Court of AppealLegalDocsPro
This Fleet v. Bank of America case was recently decided by a California Court of Appeal. This case was decided by Division Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal on August 25, 2014, on September 23, 2014 the Court granted the request of several parties for publication. The case involved allegations by the Fleets of fraud on the part of Bank of America during the loan modification process.
The Court of Appeal reversed the Judgment entered in the case and reversed the order sustaining the demurrer to the cause of action for fraud as to Bank of America and several other individual defendants, as well as reversing the order sustaining demurrers to the breach of contract and promissory estoppel causes of action against Bank of America athough the Court did affirm the order sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend against several other defendants including Recon Trust. The Court also affirmed the order sustaining the demurrer to the cause of action for accounting without leave to amend. This case is very good news in my opinion as this case may represent a turning point as it is the only published case from California that I am aware of in which an appeals Court appears to be at least considering the possibility that the big banks may be engaging in a pattern of fraud and deceit.
1) Girardi & Stanton have a common law retaining lien that allows them to hold Mr. Gibson's files until their outstanding legal fees are paid. However, this lien is passive and does not allow them to withhold the files indefinitely.
2) While Girardi & Stanton are entitled to the outstanding $8,250 fee, they must turn over copies of the files to Mr. Gibson and the new law firm so the case is not prejudiced. Retaining liens should only be asserted as a last resort to avoid harming the client.
3) Mr. Gibson and the new law firm are entitled to receive the files, as withholding them would delay the case against Cerone Sporting
This argument is important in yellow color to illustrate the first.docxchristalgrieg
This argument is important in yellow color to illustrate the first argument that needs some modification and I put the color red and yellow it to illustrate
The second argument is developed by yellow color and needs to work in this argument
Argument
Pricewter house rule.
Explanation of the rule
Barabano case
What happened
The defendant violated the title VII when HIS questions to not hire Ms. Beck was motivated factor to not hire her:
1- The defendant questions were discriminatory because they were unrelated to unrelated to occupational qualification.
This case relates to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins in which the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff after it was found that her gender played a key role in the employment decision process. Maureen E. Barbano v. Madison County 922 F.2d 139 (1990) also relates to this case after the court found out that by the defendant (Madison County) asking the plaintiff (Barbano) questions pertaining to how her husband would react in relation to her taking the job was found to be discriminatory and the court in favor of the plaintiff. Similarly to our case, Firstly, the issue of discrimination arises from the questions that plaintiff was subjected to answer by defendant the first being what her boyfriend would think of her working long hours at the firm and traveling with male attorneys. Secondly, she was asked whether she was planning on having children in the future and if so how would she manage professional and personal responsibilities. Mr. Herrera also stated that he loses at least one attorney each year to “the baby”. In essence, these questions are not in any way part of the interview criteria and more importantly they are discriminatory and unrelated to occupational qualification. However, more importantly, none of the other interviewers cited the derailment in defandent 's questioning as they neither stopped the plaintiff from answering nor did they ask her about her other qualifications. Hence, the interviewing process was entirely discriminatory
1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; SUMMARY case heir and citation, and You should write this in your own way and not copy the case, understanding the subject then write it in your own way and then put a citation from where you took this
or
2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin : SUMMARY case heir and citation, and You should write this in your own way and not copy the case ,understanding the subject then write it in your own way and then put a citation ...
1) Girardi & Stanton has a common law retaining lien that allows them to hold Mr. Gibson's files until their outstanding legal fees of $8,250 are paid. However, this retaining lien is passive and cannot be enforced through legal proceedings.
2) While Girardi & Stanton is entitled to the retaining lien, they must turn over copies of the files to Mr. Gibson and his new counsel to avoid prejudicing Mr. Gibson's legal matter against Cerone Wholesale Sporting Goods, as time is of the essence in that case.
3) Girardi & Stanton's assertion of the retaining lien to refuse to provide any files in this case would violate the rules of professional conduct
I observed a circuit court proceeding involving a criminal case. The defendant was charged with assault and the prosecution called witnesses to testify about the alleged assault. The defense cross-examined the witnesses and called the defendant to testify. The judge ultimately found the defendant guilty based on the evidence presented.
Plaintiff Phillip Lee Walters filed a motion to remand a negligence lawsuit back to state court that was removed to federal court by defendants Samuel Patterson and Keen Transport based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff argues that removal was improper because the defendants did not establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, as is required for diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff notes that the complaint does not specify a damages amount and contends that the defendants rely only on unsupported assumptions to claim the threshold is met rather than providing evidence, as is required. The plaintiff requests that the case be remanded back to state court due to lack of federal jurisdiction.
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How the Court Address or Respect our Rights as Citizens Part 1
How the Court Address or Respect our Rights as Citizens Part 1
a. Summary of Case
Gideon vs. wainwright remains to be one of the most infamous supreme court cases in Judicia history. This Supreme Court case declared that defendants charged with a felony must be provided with a court-appointed attorney by the States. Initially, the Litigation was known as Gideon v. Cochran, but when it reached the Supreme Court, the title changed to Gideon vs. wainwright (Oyez, 2018). This happened due to the replacement of the director of Florida's Division of Corrections from Cochran to Louie Lee Wainwright.
The case commenced when Clarence Earl Gideon was in 1961 charged with a felony for purportedly burgling a Pool Hall in Panama City, FL, and stole some money. Gideon was a poor man, and during his first trial, he requested the Court to appoint an attorney who would represent him. Gideons requests were refuted despite not having the capacity to select a lawyer for himself. The prosecutors had witnesses who had seen Gideon at the crime scene. However, he had not been seen committing the crime (Oyez, 2018). The court ruling sentenced Gideon to five years imprisonment despite the lack of concrete evidence. Gideon considered the detention as unjust and filed a petition to the Florida Supreme court. His claims in the petition were that he did not have an attorney general to defend him during the trial, which made it unconstitutional.
Gideon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Florida was accepted. The judicial system had denied Gideon his 6th amendment rights. In 1963, the case was reassessed, and the Supreme Court ruled out that the judgment that had earlier been made to Gideon was unconstitutional (Greenberg & Page, 2018). The Court ruled that all defendants need to have the assistance of Counsel in their defense, and Gideon was thus set free.
b. Case Outline
1. Title: Gideon vs. wainwright (1963)
2. Facts of the Case
Clarence Earl Gideon was an eighth-grade dropout who had run away from home when he was in the middle class. He was a drifter who spent most of his time in and out of prison. He was charged with a lawful offense of breaking into a Pool room in Florida (Oyez, 2018). He appeared in Court without legal Counsel and requested the Court to appoint one for him. His request was denied. Back then, a lawyer would only be given to an indigent offender in capital cases. The defendant was forced to represent himself in Court, where he was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison (Oyez, 2018). Clarence Earl Gideon appealed his case again to the Supreme Court of the United States. The case was reviewed and resolved.
3. History of the case
Clarence Earl Gideon was found guilty and was sentenced to five years in prison (Oyez, 2018).
4. Legal Questions
The Court needed to determine whether Clarence Earl Gideon was guilty or innocent. If found ...
12How the Court Address or Respect our Rights asEttaBenton28
This summary provides an overview of the key points from the document:
The document discusses the Supreme Court case Gideon v. Wainwright, which established that states are required under the Sixth Amendment to provide legal counsel to criminal defendants who cannot afford an attorney. It summarizes the facts of the case, in which Clarence Earl Gideon was denied legal representation and subsequently convicted, and the Supreme Court's ruling that Gideon's conviction was unconstitutional since he did not have legal counsel. The case set the precedent that all criminal defendants have the right to an attorney regardless of their ability to pay.
[Type text][Type text][Type text] 1Running Head Disci.docxhanneloremccaffery
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Running Head: Disciplinary Assignment
CJUS 520- Disciplinary Assignment
Jasonus Tillery
Liberty University
CJUS 520- Disciplinary Assignment-Part 1
The United States Supreme Court is the absolute highest court in the country. It generally hears cases that involve issues of federal law. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the federal and state courts (Supreme Court of the United States, 2013). When a case is referred to the Supreme Court, the decision that is derived is final because there is no other court to appeal to. Generally, when a case is appealed to the Supreme Court, it usually means that there were issues or controversy involved in the cases in the State or Federal Court. There are three cases that were tried at the Supreme Court level that are of particular interest to this class: Brady vs. Maryland (1963), Giglio vs. United States (1972), and United States vs. Agurs (1976). Each of these cases presented issues, which will be discussed below.
Brady vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
In the Brady vs. Maryland case, Brady the defendant and his companion were convicted of first-degree murder and were sentenced to death. During the trial, Brady admitted to being at the crime scene and participating in the crime, but he stated that his companion was the one who actually committed the murder. Brady’s attorney did not contest the fact that Brady was guilty, he or she only pleaded with the jury to not return with a capital punishment verdict. The defendant’s lawyer however, was not privy to the fact that Brady’s companion had admitted to murdering the victim alone. Prior to the start of the trial, the defendant’s attorney requested to see all the evidence that the prosecutors had in their possession. However, the prosecutors failed to disclose Brady’s companion’s confession. Brady’s attorney was not aware of the confession until after his client’s trial. At that point, Brady had already been convicted and sentenced (Hooper & Thorpe, 2007). The prosecutor is required by law to disclose to the defense any evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Failure to do so denies the defendant to due process of the law. Therefore, there had to be a new trial, but not to determine guilt, rather than to determine Brady’s punishment. Brady had already confessed to his participation in the crime, so the sentence of death was what had to be re-tried. Although many would disagree with the fact that the prosecutor has to disclose information favorable to the defendant, it is still the law. Therefore, violating this law results in a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right.
Giglio vs. United States vs. 150 (1972)
In this case, the defendant Giglio was being prosecuted for forging $2300 in money orders, which at the time was a significant amount of money. The controversy in this case derived from the testimony of Giglio’s Co-conspirator Robert Tal.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota heard a case regarding when the statute of limitations begins for a legal malpractice claim stemming from a criminal trial. James Noske sued his former attorney Joseph Friedberg for legal malpractice, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his 1990 criminal trial where he was convicted. Friedberg argued the suit was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The Court held that Noske's malpractice claim did not accrue until 1999 when he was granted habeas corpus relief overturning his conviction, and Friedberg could still litigate the elements of malpractice.
This document summarizes a court case from the District Court of Queensland regarding an appeal of a magistrate's decision to dismiss an application for leave to proceed with an action. The plaintiff had done building work for the defendants in 1997-98 but was unpaid. The court found that the plaintiff's explanation for the delay in the case was satisfactory. Additionally, the limitation period for the claim had not yet expired. Therefore, the court set aside the magistrate's decision to dismiss the application and granted the plaintiff leave to proceed with the action.
John J. Pankauski is a partner with Pankauski Hauser PLLC in West Palm Beach, Florida. Mr. Pankauski has spent over 20 years of his career handling matters involving wills, trusts, estates, probates, and guardianships. His practice is limited to disputes, trials and appeals of such matters. He is AV Preeminent rated by Martindale Hubel.
This document is an order from a United States District Court regarding cross-motions for summary judgment in a case involving a plaintiff who was imprisoned at a halfway house operated by the defendant. The court provides background on the case, including that the plaintiff sued over alleged unlawful seizure of his property and constitutional violations. The court evaluates the motions using the standard for summary judgment, granting the defendant's motion and denying the plaintiff's motion.
This affidavit provides information in support of a motion for summary judgment. It describes the plaintiff's criminal conviction and sentence, his transfer to Dismas Charities halfway house, and the rules he agreed to follow. It states that the plaintiff drove himself to Dismas and had an unauthorized cell phone, violating the rules. As a result, his personal items were confiscated and he was returned to prison to complete his sentence.
This document is a reply brief filed by defendants in response to the plaintiff's response brief and in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It summarizes that the plaintiff was transferred to a community corrections facility (Dismas) as a transition from federal prison, and agreed to follow its rules. However, the plaintiff admitted driving without permission and possessing a cell phone, in violation of the rules. As a result, he was returned to federal prison to serve the remaining 68 days of his sentence. The brief argues the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims of false arrest, assault, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligence and constitutional violations, as the plaintiff cannot prove the elements of these claims or that
Defendants’ reply brief in response to plaintiff’s response brief and in supp...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a reply brief filed by the defendants in response to the plaintiff's response brief and in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It summarizes that the plaintiff was transferred to a community corrections facility operated by Dismas Charities as part of his transition from federal prison back into the community. It alleges that the plaintiff violated rules of his placement by driving without permission and possessing a cell phone. As a result, Dismas reported the violations to the Bureau of Prisons, which returned the plaintiff to prison to serve the remaining 68 days of his sentence. The defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's tort claims of false arrest, assault, battery, and malicious prosecution.
Geraldine Redmond opposed Steven Gaggero's motion to seal portions of the court file in her harassment restraining order case against him. Redmond had obtained a temporary restraining order against Gaggero in October 2002 related to incidents at an equestrian facility where they had a business dispute. Gaggero then moved to seal Redmond's petition and a map she drew of his residence that was included in the court file. Redmond argued the file should not be sealed because Gaggero did not establish an overriding privacy interest, that her statements were false or defamatory, or that he would be prejudiced if the file was not sealed.
This document is a petition for review filed with the Supreme Court of California seeking review of two appellate court decisions related to a legal malpractice case. The petitioners (the plaintiff and additional judgment debtors from the underlying case) are asking the Supreme Court to grant review of the present matter and hold it pending the outcome of a related case also pending before the Supreme Court. If the petitioners prevail in the related case, they would be entitled to reversal of the orders in the present matter. Granting review and holding the present matter would prevent those orders from becoming final while the related case is still pending.
Findings and Conclusions awarding damages to Ash Grove against Travelers and Liberty Mutual for breach of duty to defend in connection with Portland Harbor Superfund Site.
Defendants dismas charties, inc., ana gispert, derek thomas and adams leshota...Cocoselul Inaripat
This document is a brief filed by defendants Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Leshota in response to a motion to compel filed by the plaintiff Traian Bujduveanu. The defendants argue that they have properly responded to the plaintiff's requests for production by agreeing to allow inspection of requested documents at their counsel's office. They also argue that some requested documents, such as surveillance video from relevant dates, do not exist. Finally, the defendants assert that the plaintiff's lawsuit and discovery requests appear aimed at exposing alleged corruption beyond the scope of this case, which involves issues only between the plaintiff and these defendants.
The document is a brief filed by defendants Dismas Charities, Inc., Ana Gispert, Derek Thomas, and Adams Leshota (incorrectly identified) in response to the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses. The defendants argue that they have properly responded to the plaintiff's requests for production and interrogatories. They provided the requested documents and have no further obligation to compel. The defendants assert the plaintiff is improperly using discovery to harass the defendants and obtain irrelevant personal information. The defendants request the court deny the plaintiff's motion to compel and consider sanctions against the plaintiff.
Fleet v. Bank of America case from California Court of AppealLegalDocsPro
This Fleet v. Bank of America case was recently decided by a California Court of Appeal. This case was decided by Division Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal on August 25, 2014, on September 23, 2014 the Court granted the request of several parties for publication. The case involved allegations by the Fleets of fraud on the part of Bank of America during the loan modification process.
The Court of Appeal reversed the Judgment entered in the case and reversed the order sustaining the demurrer to the cause of action for fraud as to Bank of America and several other individual defendants, as well as reversing the order sustaining demurrers to the breach of contract and promissory estoppel causes of action against Bank of America athough the Court did affirm the order sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend against several other defendants including Recon Trust. The Court also affirmed the order sustaining the demurrer to the cause of action for accounting without leave to amend. This case is very good news in my opinion as this case may represent a turning point as it is the only published case from California that I am aware of in which an appeals Court appears to be at least considering the possibility that the big banks may be engaging in a pattern of fraud and deceit.
1) Girardi & Stanton have a common law retaining lien that allows them to hold Mr. Gibson's files until their outstanding legal fees are paid. However, this lien is passive and does not allow them to withhold the files indefinitely.
2) While Girardi & Stanton are entitled to the outstanding $8,250 fee, they must turn over copies of the files to Mr. Gibson and the new law firm so the case is not prejudiced. Retaining liens should only be asserted as a last resort to avoid harming the client.
3) Mr. Gibson and the new law firm are entitled to receive the files, as withholding them would delay the case against Cerone Sporting
This argument is important in yellow color to illustrate the first.docxchristalgrieg
This argument is important in yellow color to illustrate the first argument that needs some modification and I put the color red and yellow it to illustrate
The second argument is developed by yellow color and needs to work in this argument
Argument
Pricewter house rule.
Explanation of the rule
Barabano case
What happened
The defendant violated the title VII when HIS questions to not hire Ms. Beck was motivated factor to not hire her:
1- The defendant questions were discriminatory because they were unrelated to unrelated to occupational qualification.
This case relates to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins in which the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff after it was found that her gender played a key role in the employment decision process. Maureen E. Barbano v. Madison County 922 F.2d 139 (1990) also relates to this case after the court found out that by the defendant (Madison County) asking the plaintiff (Barbano) questions pertaining to how her husband would react in relation to her taking the job was found to be discriminatory and the court in favor of the plaintiff. Similarly to our case, Firstly, the issue of discrimination arises from the questions that plaintiff was subjected to answer by defendant the first being what her boyfriend would think of her working long hours at the firm and traveling with male attorneys. Secondly, she was asked whether she was planning on having children in the future and if so how would she manage professional and personal responsibilities. Mr. Herrera also stated that he loses at least one attorney each year to “the baby”. In essence, these questions are not in any way part of the interview criteria and more importantly they are discriminatory and unrelated to occupational qualification. However, more importantly, none of the other interviewers cited the derailment in defandent 's questioning as they neither stopped the plaintiff from answering nor did they ask her about her other qualifications. Hence, the interviewing process was entirely discriminatory
1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; SUMMARY case heir and citation, and You should write this in your own way and not copy the case, understanding the subject then write it in your own way and then put a citation from where you took this
or
2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin : SUMMARY case heir and citation, and You should write this in your own way and not copy the case ,understanding the subject then write it in your own way and then put a citation ...
1) Girardi & Stanton has a common law retaining lien that allows them to hold Mr. Gibson's files until their outstanding legal fees of $8,250 are paid. However, this retaining lien is passive and cannot be enforced through legal proceedings.
2) While Girardi & Stanton is entitled to the retaining lien, they must turn over copies of the files to Mr. Gibson and his new counsel to avoid prejudicing Mr. Gibson's legal matter against Cerone Wholesale Sporting Goods, as time is of the essence in that case.
3) Girardi & Stanton's assertion of the retaining lien to refuse to provide any files in this case would violate the rules of professional conduct
I observed a circuit court proceeding involving a criminal case. The defendant was charged with assault and the prosecution called witnesses to testify about the alleged assault. The defense cross-examined the witnesses and called the defendant to testify. The judge ultimately found the defendant guilty based on the evidence presented.
Plaintiff Phillip Lee Walters filed a motion to remand a negligence lawsuit back to state court that was removed to federal court by defendants Samuel Patterson and Keen Transport based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff argues that removal was improper because the defendants did not establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, as is required for diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff notes that the complaint does not specify a damages amount and contends that the defendants rely only on unsupported assumptions to claim the threshold is met rather than providing evidence, as is required. The plaintiff requests that the case be remanded back to state court due to lack of federal jurisdiction.
1
2
How the Court Address or Respect our Rights as Citizens Part 1
How the Court Address or Respect our Rights as Citizens Part 1
a. Summary of Case
Gideon vs. wainwright remains to be one of the most infamous supreme court cases in Judicia history. This Supreme Court case declared that defendants charged with a felony must be provided with a court-appointed attorney by the States. Initially, the Litigation was known as Gideon v. Cochran, but when it reached the Supreme Court, the title changed to Gideon vs. wainwright (Oyez, 2018). This happened due to the replacement of the director of Florida's Division of Corrections from Cochran to Louie Lee Wainwright.
The case commenced when Clarence Earl Gideon was in 1961 charged with a felony for purportedly burgling a Pool Hall in Panama City, FL, and stole some money. Gideon was a poor man, and during his first trial, he requested the Court to appoint an attorney who would represent him. Gideons requests were refuted despite not having the capacity to select a lawyer for himself. The prosecutors had witnesses who had seen Gideon at the crime scene. However, he had not been seen committing the crime (Oyez, 2018). The court ruling sentenced Gideon to five years imprisonment despite the lack of concrete evidence. Gideon considered the detention as unjust and filed a petition to the Florida Supreme court. His claims in the petition were that he did not have an attorney general to defend him during the trial, which made it unconstitutional.
Gideon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of Florida was accepted. The judicial system had denied Gideon his 6th amendment rights. In 1963, the case was reassessed, and the Supreme Court ruled out that the judgment that had earlier been made to Gideon was unconstitutional (Greenberg & Page, 2018). The Court ruled that all defendants need to have the assistance of Counsel in their defense, and Gideon was thus set free.
b. Case Outline
1. Title: Gideon vs. wainwright (1963)
2. Facts of the Case
Clarence Earl Gideon was an eighth-grade dropout who had run away from home when he was in the middle class. He was a drifter who spent most of his time in and out of prison. He was charged with a lawful offense of breaking into a Pool room in Florida (Oyez, 2018). He appeared in Court without legal Counsel and requested the Court to appoint one for him. His request was denied. Back then, a lawyer would only be given to an indigent offender in capital cases. The defendant was forced to represent himself in Court, where he was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison (Oyez, 2018). Clarence Earl Gideon appealed his case again to the Supreme Court of the United States. The case was reviewed and resolved.
3. History of the case
Clarence Earl Gideon was found guilty and was sentenced to five years in prison (Oyez, 2018).
4. Legal Questions
The Court needed to determine whether Clarence Earl Gideon was guilty or innocent. If found ...
12How the Court Address or Respect our Rights asEttaBenton28
This summary provides an overview of the key points from the document:
The document discusses the Supreme Court case Gideon v. Wainwright, which established that states are required under the Sixth Amendment to provide legal counsel to criminal defendants who cannot afford an attorney. It summarizes the facts of the case, in which Clarence Earl Gideon was denied legal representation and subsequently convicted, and the Supreme Court's ruling that Gideon's conviction was unconstitutional since he did not have legal counsel. The case set the precedent that all criminal defendants have the right to an attorney regardless of their ability to pay.
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1
Running Head: Disciplinary Assignment
CJUS 520- Disciplinary Assignment
Jasonus Tillery
Liberty University
CJUS 520- Disciplinary Assignment-Part 1
The United States Supreme Court is the absolute highest court in the country. It generally hears cases that involve issues of federal law. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the federal and state courts (Supreme Court of the United States, 2013). When a case is referred to the Supreme Court, the decision that is derived is final because there is no other court to appeal to. Generally, when a case is appealed to the Supreme Court, it usually means that there were issues or controversy involved in the cases in the State or Federal Court. There are three cases that were tried at the Supreme Court level that are of particular interest to this class: Brady vs. Maryland (1963), Giglio vs. United States (1972), and United States vs. Agurs (1976). Each of these cases presented issues, which will be discussed below.
Brady vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
In the Brady vs. Maryland case, Brady the defendant and his companion were convicted of first-degree murder and were sentenced to death. During the trial, Brady admitted to being at the crime scene and participating in the crime, but he stated that his companion was the one who actually committed the murder. Brady’s attorney did not contest the fact that Brady was guilty, he or she only pleaded with the jury to not return with a capital punishment verdict. The defendant’s lawyer however, was not privy to the fact that Brady’s companion had admitted to murdering the victim alone. Prior to the start of the trial, the defendant’s attorney requested to see all the evidence that the prosecutors had in their possession. However, the prosecutors failed to disclose Brady’s companion’s confession. Brady’s attorney was not aware of the confession until after his client’s trial. At that point, Brady had already been convicted and sentenced (Hooper & Thorpe, 2007). The prosecutor is required by law to disclose to the defense any evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Failure to do so denies the defendant to due process of the law. Therefore, there had to be a new trial, but not to determine guilt, rather than to determine Brady’s punishment. Brady had already confessed to his participation in the crime, so the sentence of death was what had to be re-tried. Although many would disagree with the fact that the prosecutor has to disclose information favorable to the defendant, it is still the law. Therefore, violating this law results in a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right.
Giglio vs. United States vs. 150 (1972)
In this case, the defendant Giglio was being prosecuted for forging $2300 in money orders, which at the time was a significant amount of money. The controversy in this case derived from the testimony of Giglio’s Co-conspirator Robert Tal.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota heard a case regarding when the statute of limitations begins for a legal malpractice claim stemming from a criminal trial. James Noske sued his former attorney Joseph Friedberg for legal malpractice, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his 1990 criminal trial where he was convicted. Friedberg argued the suit was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The Court held that Noske's malpractice claim did not accrue until 1999 when he was granted habeas corpus relief overturning his conviction, and Friedberg could still litigate the elements of malpractice.
This document summarizes a court case from the District Court of Queensland regarding an appeal of a magistrate's decision to dismiss an application for leave to proceed with an action. The plaintiff had done building work for the defendants in 1997-98 but was unpaid. The court found that the plaintiff's explanation for the delay in the case was satisfactory. Additionally, the limitation period for the claim had not yet expired. Therefore, the court set aside the magistrate's decision to dismiss the application and granted the plaintiff leave to proceed with the action.
John J. Pankauski is a partner with Pankauski Hauser PLLC in West Palm Beach, Florida. Mr. Pankauski has spent over 20 years of his career handling matters involving wills, trusts, estates, probates, and guardianships. His practice is limited to disputes, trials and appeals of such matters. He is AV Preeminent rated by Martindale Hubel.
This document is a request for entry of default against defendants in a civil rights lawsuit. It states that the plaintiff sued the defendants on July 9th for violations of his civil rights. It then asserts that the defendants were properly served but failed to file a responsive pleading within 20 days as required. As the defendants did not defend the suit in any way, the plaintiff is entitled to have the clerk enter a default against the defendants. The document provides documentation to support the service and argues the procedural requirements for default have been met. The plaintiff requests the clerk enter default in his favor against the defendants.
Using the attached information, you will prepare a Case Brief on a.docxdaniahendric
Using the attached information, you will prepare a Case Brief on a recent United States Supreme Court decision regarding a criminal justice topic. You must include the following sections: caption, facts, procedural history, issue, rule of law, holding, and rationale. The Case Brief must be 1–2 pages. Save your work as a Microsoft Word document and submit it to Blackboard. Prior to submitting the assignment, review the Case Brief Grading Rubric to verify that all components of the assignment have been completed.
(Slip Opinion)
OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United States
v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
SALINAS
v
. TEXAS
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
No. 12–246. Argued April 17, 2013—Decided June 17, 2013
Petitioner, without being placed in custody or receiving
Miranda
warn- ings, voluntarily answered some of a police officer’s questions about a murder, but fell silent when asked whether ballistics testing would match his shotgun to shell casings found at the scene of the crime. At petitioner’s murder trial in Texas state court, and over his objection, the prosecution used his failure to answer the question as evidence of guilt. He was convicted, and both the State Court of Appeals and Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, rejecting his claim that the pros- ecution’s use of his silence in its case in chief violated the Fifth Amendment.
Held
: The judgment is affirmed.
369 S. W. 3d 176, affirmed.
J
USTICE
A
LITO
, joined by T
HE
C
HIEF
J
USTICE
and J
USTICE
K
ENNEDY
,
concluded that petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim fails because he did not expressly invoke the privilege in response to the officer’s question. Pp. 3
−
12.
(a) To prevent the privilege against self-incrimination from shield- ing information not properly within its scope, a witness who “ ‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’ ” at the time he relies on it.
Minnesota
v.
Murphy
, 465 U. S. 420, 427. This Court has rec- ognized two exceptions to that requirement. First, a criminal de- fendant need not take the stand and assert the privilege at his own trial.
Griffin
v.
California
, 380 U. S. 609, 613–615. Petitioner’s si- lence falls outside this exception because he had no comparable un- qualified right not to speak during his police interview. Second, a witness’ failure to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination must be excused where governmental coercion makes his forfeiture of the privilege involuntary. See,
e.g.
,
Miranda
v.
Arizona
, 384 U. S. 436, 467
−
468, and n. 37. Petitioner cannot benefit from this principle
2
SALINAS
v.
TEX.
This document describes a Pennsylvania Superior Court case regarding whether a defendant, Thomas Druce, should receive credit toward his sentence for time spent on bail pending appeal. Druce was subject to electronic home monitoring and an overnight curfew as conditions of his bail. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of credit, finding that electronic monitoring and a curfew do not constitute "custody" under the relevant statute for receiving sentencing credit. The court examined the rules of Druce's electronic monitoring program and determined it did not exert sufficient control or restraint to be considered custody. Druce also challenged the legality of his sentence under Blakely v. Washington, though the lower court did not address this issue.
This document summarizes a court case from the Pennsylvania Superior Court regarding whether a defendant, Thomas Druce, should receive credit toward his sentence for time spent on bail pending appeal. While on bail, Druce was subject to electronic home monitoring and an overnight curfew. The court considered two issues: 1) whether Druce was entitled to credit for time spent on bail and 2) whether his sentence was illegal under Blakely v. Washington regarding judicial fact-finding of aggravating factors. The court affirmed the denial of credit for time on bail and considered the Blakely issue despite it being raised for the first time on appeal, as legality of sentence can be reviewed at any time.
Miles v. deutsche bank national trust company | find lawJustin Gluesing
This document summarizes a court case involving allegations of wrongful foreclosure. It discusses the plaintiff's claims that the loan servicer engaged in fraudulent behavior during loan modification negotiations, including changing the terms of agreements and demanding unnecessary fees. The court found that the plaintiff had adequately stated claims for breach of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of these claims and the granting of summary judgment on the wrongful foreclosure claim, finding factual disputes remained. The court concluded the plaintiff may be entitled to damages beyond just the lost property value if the foreclosure was wrongful.
Defendant's Reply to State's Objection to Motion to Dismiss (Speedy Trial)Rich Bergeron
Here I take the prosecutor from Grafton County to task for all her mistakes and lack of proper legal analysis. Judge O'Neill will still rule in her favor, no matter how lax in her duties she is. I do go overboard and keep insisting the state had no motion pending. There was actually a motion to amend before the court, so I screwed up myself there, but not nearly as badly as Deputy Grafton County Attorney Tara Heater did.
This document is a summary judgment from a United States Tax Court case regarding a taxpayer, Jerry L. Vandagriff, who failed to file a tax return and pay taxes for 2009. The IRS issued notices of deficiency and the taxpayer contested them, arguing he was not subject to US taxation. However, the tax court found the taxpayer's arguments lacked merit and were "tax protester" claims that had been previously rejected. It granted the IRS's motion for summary judgment, upholding the deficiency and additions to tax for failure to file, pay, and pay estimated taxes.
GS Holistic Court Opinion in Trademark DisputeMike Keyes
This document is a court filing that recommends granting in part a motion for default judgment against two defendants, Haz Investments LLC and Hazim Assaf, in a trademark infringement lawsuit. The plaintiff, GS Holistic LLC, alleges the defendants sold counterfeit products bearing GS's trademarks without authorization. As the defendants failed to respond to the complaint, the clerk entered default against them. The court filing analyzes the applicable legal standards and finds default judgment is warranted procedurally and substantively for some of the plaintiff's claims. It recommends awarding $15,000 in statutory damages, $782 in costs, and injunctive relief to the plaintiff.
1. IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2014 WY 118
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2014
September 23, 2014
ENRIQUE HERRERA,
Appellant
(Plaintiff),
v.
ROBERT PHILLIPPS, Individually and as an
employee and representative of GILLIGAN’S LLC,
a Wyoming Company, and GILLIGAN’S LLC, a
Wyoming Company,
Appellees
(Defendants).
S-13-0243
Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County
The Honorable John R. Perry, Judge
Representing Appellant:
C. John Cotton, Cotton Law Office, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.
Representing Appellees:
Patrick T. Holscher, Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.
Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE*, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.
*Chief Justice at time of oral argument.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers
are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming
82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in
the permanent volume.
2. 1
BURKE, Chief Justice.
[¶1] Appellant Enrique Herrera was injured while working for Gilligan’s LLC, under
the supervision of Robert Phillipps. Mr. Herrera filed suit seeking to recover damages for
his injuries. Gilligan’s sought summary judgment on the primary basis that, as
Mr. Herrera’s employer, it was immune from suit pursuant to the Wyoming Worker’s
Compensation Act. Mr. Phillipps also asserted that the Act shielded him from the
negligence claim by Mr. Herrera, and that Mr. Herrera had not presented facts sufficient
to establish Mr. Phillipps’ liability as a co-employee under the Act. Mr. Herrera claimed
that Appellees were not immune because he was not an employee of Gilligan’s under the
statutory definition found in the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act because he was
not legally authorized to work in the United States and Gilligan’s did not have a
reasonable belief that he was authorized to work in the United States. The district court
granted summary judgment for Gilligan’s and Mr. Phillipps. Mr. Herrera challenges that
decision in this appeal. We will reverse.
ISSUES
[¶2] Mr. Herrera presents two issues:
1. Did the District Court err in ruling that Gilligan’s LLC
is entitled to Worker’s Compensation immunity?
2. Did the District Court err in ruling that there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to the co-employee liability
of Robert Phillipps?
Gilligan’s and Mr. Phillipps agree with Mr. Herrera’s statement of the issues, but further
assert that the first issue may be refined as follows:
1.a. Did the Legislature, in enacting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-
14-102(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 2007), contemplate employer
compliance with Federal law regarding documentation of the
work status of employees thereby incorporating the Federal
provisions? And, if the answer to this is “Yes,” then,
1.b. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii), does the
required “documentation in the employer’s possession”
include a properly completed I-9 form as required by the
United States Department of Justice?
FACTS
[¶3] On June 5, 2007, Mr. Herrera was working for Gilligan’s as a pipe fuser. He was
3. 2
working with a crew to clean out a four-inch pipe using a compressor to blow a cleaning
plug, called a “pig,” through the pipe. The pig got stuck in the pipe and Mr. Herrera
suggested they cut the pipe at the T-joint near where it was stuck. Instead, Mr. Phillipps
directed the crew to lift the pipe out of the ditch. When the pipe was out of the ditch,
Mr. Phillipps bent it, told Mr. Herrera to hold it, and walked away. There was an
explosion, the other workers ran, and Mr. Phillipps told Mr. Herrera to let go of the pipe.
Mr. Herrera tried to put the pipe back in the ditch and, when it would not go, he let go of
it and ran. The pipe, still under pressure, twisted and whipped back and forth, striking
Mr. Herrera and injuring him severely. According to Mr. Herrera, Gilligan’s told him
that it would not submit a worker’s compensation claim on his behalf but, instead, would
pay his medical expenses and lost wages. Gilligan’s made the payments for a period of
time but eventually ceased. This litigation ensued.
[¶4] Mr. Herrera initiated this action against Gilligan’s and John Doe I in 2009,
asserting that they were negligent, and that John Doe I acted in reckless disregard of
Mr. Herrera’s safety. Gilligan’s denied the claims and asserted as one of its affirmative
defenses that the complaint was barred because Mr. Herrera was a covered employee
under the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act, and Gilligan’s was immune from suit
by Mr. Herrera. Mr. Herrera filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a
ruling that he was not an employee within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-
102(a)(vii), and Gilligan’s was not entitled to immunity under the Act. Mr. Herrera
contended that he was not authorized to work in the United States, that Gilligan’s was
aware of his employment status, and that Gilligan’s did not have a reasonable belief that
he was authorized to work based upon documentation in its possession.
[¶5] Gilligan’s filed a response in which it sought summary judgment holding that
Mr. Herrera was covered by its worker’s compensation account and his failure to file a
claim did not affect Gilligan’s immunity from suit. Gilligan’s asserted there was no
evidence indicating it knew Mr. Herrera was not authorized to work in the United States,
and that the documentation in its files was adequate to satisfy the requirements of the
Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act.
[¶6] In 2011, Mr. Herrera filed a new lawsuit against Gilligan’s, and added
Mr. Phillipps as a defendant. He alleged that Gilligan’s and Mr. Phillipps were negligent,
and that if the Worker’s Compensation Act applied, Mr. Phillipps’ conduct was
intentional and he was therefore liable as a co-employee. The district court consolidated
the two cases. It then denied the parties’ motions for summary judgment, concluding that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Gilligan’s reasonably believed
Mr. Herrera was working legally in the United States at the time he was hired and on the
date of his injury, as provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii). The district court
stated, however, that any party could renew a motion for summary judgment “if the
4. 3
discovery process should reveal something that would warrant it.”1
[¶7] Mr. Herrera renewed his motion for partial summary judgment. Gilligan’s and
Mr. Phillipps also moved for summary judgment in their favor. This time, without
explanation, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gilligan’s and
Mr. Phillipps.2
Mr. Herrera filed a timely appeal to this Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶8] We review a district court’s order on summary judgment de novo, using the same
1
In June of 2012, Mr. Herrera filed a motion pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11 asking the district court to certify
the case to this Court to answer whether, as a matter of law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii)
contemplates employer compliance with federal law regarding documentation of the work status of
employees and whether the words “documentation in the employer’s possession” used in the foregoing
statute include a properly completed I-9 form as required by the United States Department of Justice. The
district court granted the motion. We declined to answer the certified questions because they did not
appear to be determinative of the action.
2
The Order Granting Summary Judgment consists of three short paragraphs, the critical one reading as
follows:
The court has reviewed the file and the extensive submissions of the
parties. Further, the court has spent substantial time considering the facts
set forth and finds that for the purposes of defendants’ motion, there are
no material facts at issue. No specific basis for the granting of summary
judgment is required by the district court. After careful consideration
and deliberation, the court specifically elects not to set forth further
specific bases.
(Internal case citations omitted.) We would once again emphasize that the failure of the district court to
provide any factual basis or legal analysis to support its decision significantly handicaps our review, and
would once again encourage district courts to provide that analysis. See, e.g., Berthel Land and Livestock
v. Rockies Express Pipeline LLC, 2012 WY 52, ¶ 16 n.1, 275 P.3d 423, 431 n.1 (Wyo. 2012):
The summary judgment order did not provide findings of fact . . . or a
rationale for the decision. This has complicated our review, and likely
the district court’s consideration of the issues that went to trial. For these
reasons, we take this opportunity to again encourage district courts to
provide findings of fact and their reasoning when ruling on summary
judgment motions. Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388, 394 (Wyo. 1988)
(“Absence from the record of a specific basis upon which summary
judgment was sought or granted is a handicap to the reviewing court,
although specific bases are not mandatory under the rule.”) (quoting
Centrella v. Morris, 597 P.2d 958, 962 (Wyo. 1979)); Weaver v. Blue
Cross—Blue Shield of Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984, 986 (Wyo. 1980) (“[W]e
would prefer that the reasons for granting a motion for summary
judgment appear clearly in the record.”).
5. 4
materials and following the same standards as the district court. Gheen v. State ex rel.
Department of Health, 2014 WY 70, ¶ 11, 326 P.3d 918, 922 (Wyo. 2014) (citing
Michael’s Constr., Inc. v. American Nat’l Bank, 2012 WY 76, ¶ 8, 278 P.3d 701, 704
(Wyo. 2012); Grynberg v. L & R Exploration Venture, 2011 WY 134, ¶ 16, 261 P.3d
731, 736 (Wyo. 2011)). W.R.C.P. 56(c) allows summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
We view the facts from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the
motion, and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be
drawn from the record. Gheen, ¶ 11, 326 P.3d at 922.
DISCUSSION
[¶9] The rights and remedies afforded injured employees under the Wyoming Worker’s
Compensation Act “are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer.”
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104. Under the Act, employers are immune from suit by their
employees, and employees are barred from suing their employers. Mauch v. Stanley
Structures, 641 P.2d 1247, 1251 (Wyo. 1982). As we have explained:
In return for their contributions to the compensation fund,
employers were granted immunity from suits. In return, for
relinquishing their right to common-law actions against the
employers [for] work-related injuries, the employees received
speedy relief for such injuries, regardless of lack of fault on
the part of the employer and without cost and delay attendant
to legal action.
Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Wyo. 1982) (footnote omitted). The Act defines
the term “employee” to include:
any person engaged in any extrahazardous employment under
any appointment, contract of hire or apprenticeship, express
or implied, oral or written, and includes legally employed
minors, aliens authorized to work by the United States
department of justice, office of citizenship and immigration
services, and aliens whom the employer reasonably believes,
at the date of hire and the date of injury based upon
documentation in the employer’s possession, to be
authorized to work by the United States department of
justice, office of citizenship and immigration services.
6. 5
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) (emphasis added).
[¶10] It is undisputed that Mr. Herrera is an alien who was not authorized to work in the
United States, both at the time he was hired by Gilligan’s and at the time of his injury.
The parties do not agree on whether Gilligan’s reasonably believed, based upon
documentation in its possession, that Mr. Herrera was authorized to work in the United
States.
[¶11] The district court’s grant of summary judgment for Gilligan’s necessarily rests on
the conclusion there is no genuine dispute as to the material fact that Gilligan’s
reasonably believed Mr. Herrera was authorized to work in the United States.
Mr. Herrera contends, to the contrary, that the facts undisputedly demonstrate that
Gilligan’s did not have and could not have had that reasonable belief. He asserts that he
is entitled to partial summary judgment on this issue. His argument is based largely upon
an incomplete “Form I-9” found in Gilligan’s records.3
[¶12] The first section of the I-9 is to be filled out and signed by the employee.
Mr. Herrera signed the document. Someone else filled in the information on his behalf,
although the mandatory “Preparer and/or Translator Certification” was left blank. The
second section of the form is to be completed and signed by the employer after
examining certain specified documents relating to the employee’s authorization to work
in the United States. The second section of Mr. Herrera’s I-9 is entirely blank, and
contains no signature on behalf of Gilligan’s.
[¶13] Mr. Herrera emphasizes that the statute requires an employer’s belief about an
employee’s authorization to work in the United States to be “based upon documentation
in the employer’s possession.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vii). Because the I-9 is
incomplete, he maintains that Gilligan’s did not have any documentation in its possession
from which it could form any reasonable belief that Mr. Herrera was authorized to work
in the United States. On that basis, he asserts that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in Gilligan’s favor, and instead should have ruled in his favor on that
issue.
[¶14] Mr. Herrera’s argument, taken to its logical limit, is that an employer must have a
properly completed I-9 in its possession in order to prove that it had a reasonable belief
that an employee is authorized to work. The statutory language does not allow such an
3
According to the federal government’s website, “Employers must complete Form I-9 to document
verification of the identity and employment authorization of each new employee (both citizen and
noncitizen) hired after November 6, 1986, to work in the United States.”
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-9.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
7. 6
interpretation. The statute requires a reasonable belief “based upon documentation in the
employer’s possession,” that an employee is authorized to work. The statute does not
specify that the documentation in the employer’s possession must be a completed I-9,
indicating that other documents could also provide the basis for a reasonable belief.
[¶15] However, the fact that Gilligan’s did not have a properly completed I-9 for
Mr. Herrera, viewed from the vantage point most favorable to Mr. Herrera, is evidence
suggesting that Gilligan’s did not have a reasonable belief that Mr. Herrera was
authorized to work in the United States. The inference can reasonably be drawn that
Gilligan’s failed to inquire about Mr. Herrera’s status, or even that it knew he was not
authorized to work in the United States and purposely avoided completing the I-9.
Mr. Herrera testified in his deposition that he was not asked to fill out any paperwork
when he began working for Gilligan’s. He also testified that the supervisor who drove
him to the hospital after the injury asked, “You’re illegal, aren’t you?” According to
Mr. Herrera, this question indicates that Gilligan’s was aware of his status, and could not
have had a reasonable belief that he was authorized to work in the United States.
[¶16] Gilligan’s emphasizes evidence favorable to its position and unfavorable to
Mr. Herrera’s, including the fact that Mr. Herrera was listed as covered under Gilligan’s
worker’s compensation account. Gilligan’s also points out that the incomplete I-9 for
Mr. Herrera still includes his signature verifying that he is a lawful permanent alien.
Gilligan’s contends that this is a document in its possession upon which it based a
reasonable belief that Mr. Herrera was authorized to work. Gilligan’s also relies on
Mr. Herrera’s admission that he had a forged alien registration card and a social security
card. While Mr. Herrera does not remember presenting this documentation to Gilligan’s
when he started work, he admits that he had the documents with him at the time. This
and other evidence, according to Gilligan’s, supports its claim to have had a reasonable
belief of Mr. Herrera’s status based on documents in its possession. Gilligan’s therefore
asserts that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in its favor.
[¶17] What Gilligan’s argument actually establishes, however, is that it has provided
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary
judgment in favor of Mr. Herrera. But as we have previously discussed, Mr. Herrera has
presented evidence conflicting with that of Gilligan’s. When “the evidence leads to
conflicting interpretations or if reasonable minds might differ, summary judgment is
improper.” Jasper v. Brinckerhoff, 2008 WY 32, ¶ 10, 179 P.3d 857, 862 (Wyo. 2008)
(citing Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, ¶ 12, 101 P.3d 446, 452
(Wyo. 2004)). Summary judgment should not have been granted in this case. Genuine
issues of material fact exist. At trial, the fact finder must determine whether Gilligan’s
had a reasonable belief, based on documentation in its possession, that Mr. Herrera was
authorized to work in the United States. If the fact finder determines that it did have a
reasonable belief, then Mr. Herrera fits within the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act
definition of an employee, and Gilligan’s is immune from his claims. If Gilligan’s did
not have such a reasonable belief, then Mr. Herrera is not an employee under the
8. 7
Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act, and Gilligan’s is not immune from his claims.
[¶18] In his second issue, Mr. Herrera challenges the grant of summary judgment to
Mr. Phillipps on Mr. Herrera’s claim against him. Under the Wyoming Worker’s
Compensation Act, co-employees are immune from claims of ordinary negligence, but
may be held liable if they “intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the
injured employee.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a). In Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003
WY 50, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d 627, 632 (Wyo. 2003), we said that the statutory standard for co-
employee liability set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) – that is, “intentionally act
to cause physical harm or injury” – is the equivalent of willful and wanton misconduct.
We explained further:
Willful and wanton misconduct is the intentional doing of an
act, or an intentional failure to do an act, in reckless disregard
of the consequences and under circumstances and conditions
that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know
that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability,
result in harm to another.
Bertagnolli, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d at 632 (emphasis omitted). We also said that we have
“consistently held the requirements of the statute and the standards of willful and wanton
misconduct were met when the evidence demonstrated the co-employee had knowledge
of the dangerous condition and demonstrated a disregard of the risks through intentional
acts.” Id., ¶ 19, 67 P.3d at 634.
[¶19] We note again that the evidence is viewed from a vantage point favorable to
Mr. Herrera. Gheen, ¶ 11, 326 P.3d at 922. Reviewing the record in this way, we
conclude that Mr. Herrera’s evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to Mr. Phillipps’ knowledge of the dangerous condition and whether he acted
intentionally in disregard of known risks. Mr. Herrera relies on Gilligan’s written policy
concerning pigging, which provides:
NO MORE THAN 3 PEOPLE ARE REQUIRED FOR
PIGGING. . . . WHEN PIGGING[,] THE PIPE BEING
PIGGED WILL HAVE NO MORE THAN 4 [FEET]
EXPOSED[.] ALL PIPE WILL BE ANCHORED,
CHAINED OR SECURED SO NO MOVEMENT CAN
EXIST EVEN UNDER PRESSURE. ALL EQUIPMENT
AND [PERSONNEL] WILL [BE] EVACUATED . . . AT
LEAST 150 YARDS FROM END OF PIPE. [PERSONNEL]
OPERATING PRESSURE END WILL WATCH PSI
GAUGE FOR SPIKES OR DROPS AT WHICH TIME,
ESPECIALLY SPIKES OR FAST INCREASES IN
PRESSURE WILL TURN OFF AIR COMPRESSOR TO
9. 8
SEE IF PSI LEVELS OFF. NEVER EVER MESS
AROUND WITH PRESSURIZED PIPE.
(Capitalization and emphasis in original.) There is evidence that Mr. Phillipps had been
provided a copy of this policy, and an inference can be fairly drawn that he had
knowledge of the dangers inherent in pigging operations. There is evidence that, contrary
to the policy, approximately 200 feet of the pipe remained exposed. There is evidence
that, contrary to the policy, the exposed pipe was not anchored, chained, or secured.
There is evidence that when Mr. Phillipps ordered the crew, including Mr. Herrera, to lift
a section of pipe out of the trench and kink it to put pressure on the pig, Mr. Herrera
suggested that they should instead turn off the pressure and cut the T-joint to remove the
pig. According to Mr. Herrera, Mr. Phillipps told him “‘I am the boss, and you will do
what I say,’ or words to that effect.” Mr. Phillipps also told the compressor operator not
to turn off the compressor. This evidence, if believed by the fact finder, is sufficient to
support findings that Mr. Phillipps knew of the dangers, but acted intentionally in
disregard of the risks.
[¶20] Mr. Phillipps points out that the evidence relied on by Mr. Herrera is not
uncontroverted. But that is precisely why all of the evidence must be evaluated by the
fact finder in this case, and why summary judgment is not appropriate. Mr. Phillipps also
asserts that the evidence in this case is more like that in Formisano v. Gaston, 2011 WY
8, ¶ 12, 246 P.3d 286, 290 (Wyo. 2011), where the employee was injured in a car crash
when his co-employee fell asleep at the wheel. We noted that a co-employee is not liable
if he is “merely negligent,” but admitted that the “trouble this Court has repeatedly faced
over the years” was in “trying to draw the line—somewhere beyond negligence—that
results in liability.” Id., ¶ 16, 246 P.3d at 290. Given the evidence in Formisano,
however, we had little trouble concluding that the co-worker’s admitted negligence in
falling asleep while driving simply did not rise to the level of misconduct envisioned by
the exception to immunity in the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act. Id., ¶ 28, 246
P.3d at 293.
[¶21] When the evidence is viewed favorably to Mr. Herrera, however, his case is more
in line with Bertagnolli than with Formisano. In Bertagnolli, ¶ 16, 67 P.3d at 633, we
discussed the injured employee’s assertion that:
the key factors in finding co-employee liability under § 27-
14-104(a) are a co-employee with (1) knowledge of the
hazard or serious nature of the risk involved,
(2) responsibility for the injured employee’s safety and work
conditions, and (3) willful disregard of the need to act despite
the awareness of the high probability that serious injury or
death may result.
We stated that our “jurisprudence in this area is consistent with these factors.” Id. We
10. 9
then evaluated the evidence in substantial detail, and concluded there was evidence of the
supervisors’ knowledge of the dangers, their responsibility for the employee’s safety, and
their willful disregard of the dangers, which was sufficient to preclude summary
judgment in favor of the supervisors. Id., ¶¶ 25, 26, 67 P.3d at 635. In Mr. Herrera’s
case, we have already noted the presence of evidence that Mr. Phillipps was aware of the
dangers, and that when he instructed Mr. Herrera to perform his work, Mr. Phillipps acted
in intentional disregard of those dangers. The evidence is sufficient to preclude summary
judgment for Mr. Phillipps.
[¶22] We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Gilligan’s
and Mr. Phillipps, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.