This document summarizes the key events and factors that led to the 1989 revolution in East Germany. It began with peaceful protests in September 1989 in Leipzig that grew significantly over time. Despite an order to shoot protesters, the military did not intervene in October. Honecker resigned in October and the Berlin Wall fell in November. Participation grew rapidly from thousands to hundreds of thousands as people gained confidence. The document examines why using theories of individual behavior and networks. It suggests that high motivation to enact political change, moral obligations, social encouragement from friends critical of the regime, and low costs of participating, like joining Monday demonstrations, encouraged widespread involvement despite risks of repression. Networks of trust among friends were important for sharing political views and

1. Social networks
Individual behavior
strategic interaction
structure

2. Example
Political Action

3. Social Networks
Why was there a revolution
in Eastern Germany in 1989?

4. Summer 1989
The East German government praised (on t.v.) the decision to use
violence against the Tiananmen Square protesters.

5. September 4, 1989
Demonstrations began at St. Nicholas church in Leipzig.

6. October 2, 1989
Eric Honecker issued a shoot to kill order; huge police militia,
Stasi, and work-combat troop presence.

7. October 9, 1989
Biggest peaceful demonstration. Military surrounded the
demonstration but did not take action.

8. October 18, 1989
Honecker had to resign

9. November 19, 1989
Fall of the Berlin wall.

10. October 3, 1990
German reunification

11. Participation in
Monday Demonstration
0
125,000
250,000
375,000
500,000
Sept25 Oct2 Oct9 Oct16 Oct23 Oct30 Nov6
Participants
DATE NUMBER
PARTICIPAN
TS
09-25-89 6,500
10-02-89 20,000
10-09-89 70,000
10-16-89 110,000
10-23-89 225,000
10-30-89 350,000
11-06-89 450,000
Source: Table 1 from Braun, Norman. 1995.
Individual Thresholds and Social Diffusion.
Rationality and Society 7:167-182.

12. Why did
people do this?
To explain the revolution, many (sub)questions need to be answered.
1
Why did officials eventually not
order to shoot to the protestors?
2 Why did Honecker decide to resign?
Why didn’t the soviet army intervene?
(it had happened before)
3
Why did so many people participate in the
protest in Leipzig?
4

13. Why did
people do this?
1
Why did officials eventually not order
to shoot to the protestors?
2 Why did Honecker decide to resign?
Why didn’t the soviet army intervene? (it had
happened before)
3
Why did so many people participate
in the protest in Leipzig?
4
To explain the revolution, many (sub)questions need to be answered.

14. Dissident groups, personal
networks and spontaneous
cooperation: The eastern
German revolution of 1989
Karl-Dieter Opp & Christiane Gern
(Am. Sociol. Rev. 58, 659-680)

15. On the roles of groups and personal networks in
demonstrations in the repressive setting of East Germany
between May and October 1989.
Focus
Observe: a social problem

16. Observe: a social problem
Assumptions:
Societies are like Western Democracies
Ample opportunities exist for forming groups
mobilizing new members
personal networks
cooperation with other groups
Critical communication about the government or political
system can be exchanged without fear of severe repression
1
2

17. These conditions are not met in authoritarian societies
Mobilization is difficult under threat of strong repression
The emergence of protest is unlikely
BUT...
The nonviolent 1989 rebellion in the former German
Democratic Republic (GDR)
Although opposition forces were suppressed by state repression
Protests erupted!!!
3
Observe: a social problem

18. But: Coordination?
Demonstrations in Leipzig and other parts of GDR were
not organized (in contrast to most demonstrations in Western
democracies)
Spontaneous emergence
what happened then?

19. rational actor model - RCT
Four types of incentives: Public goods motivation
Moral incentives
Social incentives
Repression
Speculate:
use a theory of action
Complete explanation: not only macro
What we will call the micro-macro link

20. Incentives to participate
political discontent
Promotes political action in large groups if actors believe their
participation will make a difference
Dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods
Assumption: Political discontent & perceived political influence
of protest (PG motivation) had a positive effect on participation

21. Moral incentives
Discontent with the political and economic situations was high
Moral obligation to protest may have been particularly salient
Prediction: Moral incentives had positive effect on participation
social incentives
Encouragement by important others to participate
Prediction: Social incentives were salient on participation
Incentives to participate

22. spontaneous cooperation
If demonstrators were not organized, how did individuals
coordinated their actions to produce the demonstrations?
(+) Strong desires to engage in action against the government
(-) Costs of protesting were high
Citizens faced a dilemma:
When and where will sufficient people gather?
coordination problem
Coordinating mechanism

23. Repression has no significant effects
friendship networks are very important
Members of opposing groups were regarded as unrealistic
Protests were not a result of the mobilization of opposing groups
Friends more than work colleagues were of influence
In authoritarian regimes trust is mainly placed on friends
Criticism of the regime, only among friends
Workplace helps mobilization if colleagues are also friends
No repression - Yes networks

24. Cost of participating must be low
Joining a demonstration on Monday prayers had less cost that
other actions (i.e., joining an opposition group)
Strong Situational incentives to
participate
67% reported they joined when others first participated in a
demonstration
Facing severe repression
Higher in more individualized protest actions
Few Incentives needed

25. High public good motivation (feeling that what we do
will have an effect) & having friends critical of the
regime were the main factors inducing participation in
demonstrations
Thus

26. Notice
micro-macro link
To explain social phenomena we need to address issues also at the
individual level (i.e., incentives, preferences, etc.)
Individual behavior
Using a theory of individual behavior (i.e., Rational Choice
Theory) will allow us to make predictions about their choices and
the way they interact
networks
Individuals hardly ever stand in isolation. Their social networks
are essential for the transmission of information and the spread of
behaviors.

27. The course

28. AIMS
of this course
How networks affect our behavior & how our
individual characteristics affect the networks we are
part of.
+ Social phenomena emerges from an integration between the
micro level (individuals) and the macro level (social structure)
+ Social networks are key to understand the way individuals
and their social environment interact
We will cover theoretical, experimental and empirical
discussions about social problems & networks

29. Goal
of this course
Presume no prior knowledge
You don’t need to know anything specific to take this course
More breadth than depth
Introduce you to a variety of approaches to
understanding social phenomena

30. Methodology
of this course
Lectures
Feel free to interrupt, ask, comment or discuss along the lectures
We will play different experimental games
You will earn points in each
There is a winner: One student is randomly chosen from
those students who have points above the average of the class
The winner will receive an Amazon gift card between 50 & 75 euros
Practical

31. Schedule
19:30 - 21:15
Wednesday. August - 21
Thursday. August - 22
9:30 - 12:15
14:30 - 18:15
Friday. August - 23
9:30 - 12:15
Saturday. August - 24
9:30 - 12:15
14:30 - 18:15
Sunday. August - 25
9:30 - 12:15
(1)
(2)
(3)
(2)
(2)
(3)
(1)

32. design
From the individual perspective sometimes is not
straightforward to observe the aggregate outcomes
The visible and the invisible
From the aggregate outcomes we can’t always see
the individual motives that brought them about
Deductive approach
Like in any social explanation we deduce behavior
from general theories
The course is designed such that we go from
general to particular to general again
(macro-micro-macro)

33. BLock 1:
social phenomena
How common sense can be detrimental to our
understanding of the social world
Why social problems are not as intuitive as we
might think they are
What is a good approach to understanding &
explaining social problems

34. BLock 2:
Individual behavior
The theory of Rational Choice (RCT)
How it has been tested & improved via
experimental studies
What are the main findings on individual
behavior & social preferences

35. BLock 3:
strategic interaction
The essentials of rational strategic thinking
Basic concepts and notation of Game Theory

36. BLock 4:
social networks
How do networks emerge (form)?
How do networks influence behavior?

37. Questions?