WBS and Project Schedule for Proposed Project

Project Proposal: WBS and Project Schedule
Overview:
In the assignment due in Week 5, you defined key portions of
your project. Now, it is time to develop a work breakdown
structure (WBS) and project schedule for your project.
Note: Please use your project from the Week 5 assignment to
complete this assignment.
For this assignment, you will create Work Breakdown Structure
(WBS). To create your WBS, you may use MS Word, MS Excel,
Visio, or any other visual format that allows for graphical
elements to be included. (See Figure 4.4 from Chapter 4 of
your Project Management: The Managerial Process textbook).
Alternatively, you may use a coded format using MS Word. (See
Exhibit 4.1 – Coding the WBS from Chapter 4 of your Project
Management: The Managerial Process textbook as an example.
The example is in MS Project format, but the same could be
done in MS Excel).
Instructions
Each of the following should be included in
your WBS submission:
1. Create a WBS which contains graphical elements of the
project scope including project, major deliverables, and
supporting deliverables. WBS should be easy to read and
contain consistent formatting throughout.
2. Create a depiction of the project within the WBS.
· One Level 1 is provided describing the complete project.
· Three Level 2s are provided describing major deliverables.
· Three Level 3s are provided describing supporting
deliverables.
· Two Level 4s providing the lowest manageable responsibility
level.
3. For each of the identified deliverables (identified in the four
levels from item #2), create a project schedule containing all

activities from levels 1–4. Each activity should contain a start
and end date and list resources required to complete the project.
4. Provide a minimum of three pieces of information that need
to be communicated to stakeholders. For each of the three
pieces—which creates an example of a project network— you
should address who will be targeted; when they will receive
the communication; what will be communicated; and how it will
be communicated.
FIGURE 4.4 Work Breakdown Structure
Exhibit 4.1 Coding the WBS
image1.png
image2.png
2
The Five Stages of Growth
W. W. Rostow
Early research on economic underdevelopment suggested that
the
problem was only short-term and that in the end all countries
would
become rich. In this excerpt from W. W. Rostow's classic work.

The
Stages of Economic Growth, Rostow outlines this optimistic
scenario
by positing five stages of economic development all societies
even¬
tually experience as they mature into industrialized developed
coun¬
tries: tradition, the preconditions for takeoff, the takeoff, the
drive to
maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. Although this
tremendously influential publication did not focus specifically
on the
causes of the gaps, the author suggests the reason they arise and
their potential resolution. As a country moves out of the
traditional
stage and prepares for economic takeoff, its economy begins to
grow much faster than the economies of countries that remain in
the
first stage. The gap between rich and poor would then be
explained
by the fact that not all countries enter the development process
at
the same time. Thus the gap between rich and poor countries
would
be expected to disappear as the countries progress into the later
stages of growth. As a country progresses through the stages of
development, those who adopt the new economic rules and suc¬
ceed accumulate the profits of their success and internal
inequality
arises. As more people join the monied economy and play by the
new rules, the extent of the inequality should diminish.
Reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press from
The Stages of
Economic Growth by W. W. Rostow, pp. 4-12. New York:
Cambridge University

Press, 1990.
9
10 W. W. ROSTOW
It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic
dimensions, as lying
within one of five categories: the traditional society, the
preconditions for
take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high
mass-
consumption.
THE TRADITIONAL SOCIETY
First, the traditional society. A traditional society is one whose
structure is
developed within limited production functions, based on pre-
Newtonian
science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards
the physi¬
cal world. Newton is here used as a symbol for that watershed
in history
when men came widely to believe that the external world was
subject to a

few knowable laws, and was systematically capable of
productive manipu¬
lation.
The conception of the traditional society is, however, in no
sense stat¬
ic; and it would not exclude increases in output. Acreage could
be expand¬
ed; some ad hoc technical innovations, often highly productive
innova¬
tions, could be introduced in trade, industry and agriculture;
productivity
could rise with, for example, the improvement of irrigation
works or the
discovery and diffusion of a new crop. But the central fact
about the tradi¬
tional society was that a ceiling existed on the level of
attainable output per
head. This ceiling resulted from the fact that the potentialities
which flow
from modern science and technology were either not available
or not regu¬
larly and systematically applied.
Both in the longer past and in recent times the story of
traditional soci¬

eties was thus a story of endless change. The area and volume
of trade
within them and between them fluctuated, for example, with the
degree of
political and social turbulence, the efficiency of central rule,
the upkeep of
the roads. Population—and, within limits, the level of life—rose
and fell
not only with the sequence of the harvests, but with the
incidence of war
and of plague. Varying degrees of manufacture developed; but,
as in agri¬
culture, the level of productivity was limited by the
inaccessibility of mod¬
em science, its applications, and its frame of mind.
Generally speaking, these societies, because of the limitation on
pro¬
ductivity, had to devote a very high proportion of their
resources to agricul¬
ture; and flowing from the agricultural system there was an
hierarchical
social structure, with relatively narrow scope—but some
scope—for verti¬

cal mobility. Family and clan connexions played a large role in
social orga¬
nization. The value system of these societies was generally
geared to what
might be called a long-run fatalism; that is, the assumption that
the range of
possibilities open to one’s grandchildren would be just about
what it had
been for one’s grandparents. But this long-run fatalism by no
means
excluded the short-run option that, within a considerable range,
it was pos¬
sible and legitimate for the individual to strive to improve his
lot, within his
THE FIVE STAGES OF GROWTH 11
lifetime. In Chinese villages, for example, there was an endless
struggle to
acquire or to avoid losing land, yielding a situation where land
rarely
remained within the same family for a century.
Although central political rule—in one form or another—often
existed
in traditional societies, transcending the relatively self-
sufficient regions,
the centre of gravity of political power generally lay in the

regions, in the
hands of those who owned or controlled the land. The
landowner main¬
tained fluctuating but usually profound influence over such
central political
power as existed, backed by its entourage of civil servants and
soldiers,
imbued with attitudes and controlled by interests transcending
the regions.
In terms of history then, with the phrase ‘traditional society’ we
are
grouping the whole pre-Newtonian world: the dynasties in
China; the civi¬
lization of the Middle East and the Mediterranean; the world of
medieval
Europe. And to them we add the post-Newtonian societies
which, for a
time, remained untouched or unmoved by man’s new capability
for regular¬
ly manipulating his environment to his economic advantage.
To place these infinitely various, changing societies in a single
catego¬
ry, on the ground that they all shared a ceiling on the
productivity of their
economic techniques, is to say very little indeed. But we are,
after all,
merely clearing the way in order to get at the subject of this
book; that is,
the post-traditional societies, in which each of the major
characteristics of
the traditional society was altered in such ways as to permit
regular growth:
its politics, social structure, and (to a degree) its values, as well
as its econ¬

omy.
THE PRECONDITIONS FOR TAKE-OFF
The second stage of growth embraces societies in the process of
transition;
that is, the period when the preconditions for take-off are
developed; for it
takes time to transform a traditional society in the ways
necessary for it to
exploit the fruits of modem science, to fend off diminishing
returns, and
thus to enjoy the blessings and choices opened up by the march
of com¬
pound interest.
The preconditions for take-off were initially developed, in a
clearly
marked way, in Western Europe of the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth
centuries as the insights of modem science began to be
translated into new
production functions in both agriculture and industry, in a
setting given
dynamism by the lateral expansion of world markets and the
international
competition for them. But all that lies behind the break-up of
the Middle
Ages is relevant to the creation of the preconditions for take-off
in Western
Europe. Among the Western European states, Britain, favoured
by geogra¬
phy, natural resources, trading possibilities, social and political
structure,
was the first to develop fully the preconditions for take-off.

The more general case in modem history, however, saw the
stage of
12 W. W. ROSTOW
preconditions arise not endogenously but from some external
intrusion by
more advanced societies. These invasions—literal or
figurative—shocked
the traditional society and began or hastened its undoing; but
they also set
in motion ideas and sentiments which initiated the process by
which a mod¬
em alternative to the traditional society was constructed out of
the old cul¬
ture.
The idea spreads not merely that economic progress is possible,
but
that economic progress is a necessary condition for some other
purpose,
judged to be good: be it national dignity, private profit, the
general welfare,
or a better life for the children. Education, for some at least,
broadens and
changes to suit the needs of modem economic activity. New

types of enter¬
prising men come forward—in the private economy, in
government, or
both—-willing to mobilize savings and to take risks in pursuit
of profit or
modernization. Banks and other institutions for mobilizing
capital appear.
Investment increases, notably in transport, communications, and
in raw
materials in which other nations may have an economic interest.
The scope
of commerce, internal and external, widens. And, here and
there, modem
manufacturing enterprise appears, using the new methods. But
all this
activity proceeds at a limited pace within an economy and a
society still
mainly characterized by traditional low-productivity methods,
by the old
social structure and values, and by the regionally based political
institutions
that developed in conjunction with them.
In many recent cases, for example, the traditional society
persisted side

by side with modem economic activities, conducted for limited
economic
purposes by a colonial or quasi-colonial power.
Although the period of transition—between the traditional
society and
the take-off—saw major changes in both the economy itself and
in the bal¬
ance of social values, a decisive feature was often political.
Politically, the
building of an effective centralized national state—on the basis
of coali¬
tions touched with a new nationalism, in opposition to the
traditional land¬
ed regional interests, the colonial power, or both, was a decisive
aspect of
the preconditions period; and it was, almost universally, a
necessary condi¬
tion for take-off. . . .
THE TAKE-OFF
We come now to the great watershed in the life of modern
societies: the
third stage in this sequence, the take-off. The take-off is the
interval when

the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally
overcome. The
forces making for economic progress, which yielded limited
bursts and
enclaves of modern activity, expand and come to dominate the
society.
Growth becomes its normal condition. Compound interest
becomes built,
as it were, into its habits and institutional structure.
In Britain and the well-endowed parts of the world populated
sub¬
stantially from Britain (the United States, Canada, etc.) the
proximate stim¬
ulus for take-off was mainly (but not wholly) technological. In
the more
general case, the take-off awaited not only the build-up of
social overhead
capital and a surge of technological development in industry
and agricul¬
ture, but also the emergence to political power of a group
prepared to
regard the modernization of the economy as serious, high-order

political
business.
During the take-off, the rate of effective investment and savings
may
rise from say, 5 percent of the national income to 10 percent or
more;
although where heavy social overhead capital investment was
required to
create the technical preconditions for take-off the investment
rate in the
preconditions period could be higher than 5 percent, as, for
example, in
Canada before the 1890s and Argentina before 1914. In such
cases capital
imports usually formed a high proportion of total investment in
the precon¬
ditions period and sometimes even during the take-off itself, as
in Russia
and Canada during their pre-1914 railway booms.
During the take-off new industries expand rapidly, yielding
profits a
large proportion of which are reinvested in new plants; and
these new
industries, in turn, stimulate, through their rapidly expanding

requirement
for factory workers, the services to support them, and for other
manufac¬
tured goods, a further expansion in urban areas and in other
modem indus¬
trial plants. The whole process of expansion in the modem
sector yields an
increase of income in the hands of those who not only save at
high rates but
place their savings at the disposal of those engaged in modem
sector activi¬
ties. The new class of entrepreneurs expands; and it directs the
enlarging
flows of investment in the private sector. The economy exploits
hitherto
unused natural resources and methods of production.
New techniques spread in agriculture as well as industry, as
agriculture
is commercialized, and increasing numbers of farmers are
prepared to
accept the new methods and the deep changes they bring to
ways of life.
The revolutionary changes in agricultural productivity are an
essential con¬

dition for successful take-off; for modernization of a society
increases radi¬
cally its bill for agricultural products. In a decade or two both
the basic
structure of the economy and the social and political structure
of the society
are transformed in such a way that a steady rate of growth can
be, there¬
after, regularly sustained.
. . . One can approximately allocate the take-off of Britain to
the two
decades after 1783; France and the United States to the several
decades
preceding 1860; Germany, the third quarter of the nineteenth
cen¬
tury; Japan, the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century; Russia
and
China the quarter-century or so preceding 1914; while during
the 1950s
India and China have, in quite different ways, launched their
respective
take-offs.

14 W. W. ROSTOW
THE DRIVE TO MATURITY
After take-off there follows a long interval of sustained if
fluctuating
progress, as the now regularly growing economy drives to
extend modern
technology over the whole front of its economic activity. Some
10-20 per¬
cent of the national income is steadily invested, permitting
output regularly
to outstrip the increase in population. The make-up of the
economy changes
unceasingly as technique improves, new industries accelerate,
older indus¬
tries level off. The economy finds its place in the international
economy:
goods formerly imported are produced at home; new import
requirements
develop, and new export commodities to match them. The
society makes
such terms as it will with the requirements of modem efficient
production,
balancing off the new against the older values and institutions,

or revising
the latter in such ways as to support rather than to retard the
growth
process.
Some sixty years after take-off begins (say, forty years after the
end of
take-off) what may be called maturity is generally attained. The
economy,
focused during the take-off around a relatively narrow complex
of industry
and technology, has extended its range into more refined and
technological¬
ly often more complex processes; for example, there may be a
shift in focus
from the coal, iron, and heavy engineering industries of the
railway phase
to machine-tools, chemicals, and electrical equipment. This, for
example,
was the transition through which Germany, Britain, France, and
the United
States had passed by the end of the nineteenth century or shortly
thereafter.
But there are other sectoral patterns which have been followed
in the

sequence from take-off to maturity. . . .
Formally, we can define maturity as the stage in which an
economy
demonstrates the capacity to move beyond the original
industries which
powered its take-off and to absorb and to apply efficiently over
a very wide
range of its resources—if not the whole range—the most
advanced fruits of
(then) modem technology. This is the stage in which an
economy demon¬
strates that it has the technological and entrepreneurial skills to
produce not
everything, but anything that it chooses to produce. It may lack
(like con¬
temporary Sweden and Switzerland, for example) the raw
materials or
other supply conditions required to produce a given type of
output econom¬
ically; but its dependence is a matter of economic choice or
political priori¬
ty rather than a technological or institutional necessity.
Historically, it would appear that something like sixty years was

required to move a society from the beginning of take-off to
maturity.
Analytically the explanation for some such interval may lie in
the powerful
arithmetic of compound interest applied to the capital stock,
combined with
the broader consequences for a society’s ability to absorb
modem technolo¬
gy of three successive generations living under a regime where
growth is
the normal condition. But, clearly, no dogmatism is justified
about the
exact length of the interval from take-off to maturity.
THE AGE OF HIGH MASS-CONSUMPTION
We come now to the age of high mass-consumption, where, in
time, the
leading sectors shift towards durable consumers’ goods and
services: a
phase from which Americans are beginning to emerge; whose
not unequiv¬
ocal joys Western Europe and Japan are beginning energetically

to probe;
and with which Soviet society is engaged in an uneasy
flirtation.
As societies achieved maturity in the twentieth century two
things hap¬
pened: real income per head rose to a point where a large
number of per¬
sons gained a command over consumption which transcended
basic food,
shelter, and clothing; and the structure of the working force
changed in
ways which increased not only the proportion of urban to total
population,
but also the proportion of the population working in offices or
in skilled
factory jobs—aware of and anxious to acquire the consumption
fruits of a
mature economy.
In addition to these economic changes, the society ceased to
accept the
further extension of modem technology as an overriding
objective. It is in
this post-maturity stage, for example, that, through the political
process,

Western societies have chosen to allocate increased resources to
social wel¬
fare and security. The emergence of the welfare state is one
manifestation
of a society’s moving beyond technical maturity; but it is also
at this stage
that resources tend increasingly to be directed to the production
of con¬
sumers’ durables and to the diffusion of services on a mass
basis, if con¬
sumers’ sovereignty reigns. The sewing-machine, the bicycle,
and then the
various electric-powered household gadgets were gradually
diffused.
Historically, however, the decisive element has been the cheap
mass auto¬
mobile with its quite revolutionary effects—social as well as
economic—
on the life and expectations of society.
For the United States, the turning point was, perhaps, Henry
Ford’s
moving assembly line of 1913-14; but it was in the 1920s, and
again in the

post-war decade, 1946-56, that this stage of growth was pressed
to, virtual¬
ly, its logical conclusion. In the 1950s Western Europe and
Japan appeared
to have fully entered this phase, accounting substantially for a
momentum
in their economies quite unexpected in the immediate post-war
years. The
Soviet Union is technically ready for this stage, and, by every
sign, its citi¬
zens hunger for it; but Communist leaders face difficult
political and social
problems of adjustment if this stage is launched.
BEYOND CONSUMPTION
Beyond, it is impossible to predict, except perhaps to observe
that
Americans, at least, have behaved in the past decade as if
diminishing rela¬
tive marginal utility sets in, after a point, for durable
consumers’ goods;
and they have chosen, at the margin, larger families—behavior
in the

16 W. W. ROSTOW
pattern of Buddenbrooks dynamics.1 Americans have behaved
as if, having
been bom into a system that provided economic security and
high mass-
consumption, they placed a lower valuation on acquiring
additional incre¬
ments of real income in the conventional form as opposed to the
advantages
and values of an enlarged family. But even in this adventure in
generaliza¬
tion it is a shade too soon to create—on the basis of one case—a
new stage-
of-growth, based on babies, in succession to the age of
consumers’
durables: as economists might say, the income-elasticity of
demand for
babies may well vary from society to society. But it is true that
the implica¬
tions of the baby boom along with the not wholly unrelated
deficit in social
overhead capital are likely to dominate the American economy
over the
next decade rather than the further diffusion of consumers’

durables.
Here then, in an impressionistic rather than an analytic way, are
the
stages-of-growth which can be distinguished once a traditional
society
begins its modernization: the transitional period when the
preconditions for
take-off are created generally in response to the forces making
for modern¬
ization; the take-off itself; the sweep into maturity generally
taking up the
life of about two further generations; and then, finally, if the
rise of income
has matched the spread of technological virtuosity (which, as
we shall see,
it need not immediately do) the diversion of the fully mature
economy to
the provision of durable consumers’ goods and services (as well
as the wel¬
fare state) for its increasingly urban—and then suburban—
populations.
Beyond lies the question of whether or not secular spiritual
stagnation will
arise, and, if it does, how man might fend it off. . . .

NOTES
1. In Thomas Mann’s novel of three generations, the first sought
money; the
second, bom to money, sought social and civic position; the
third, bom to comfort
and family prestige, looked to the life of music. The phrase is
designed to suggest,
then, the changing aspirations of generations, as they place a
low value on what
they take for granted and seek new forms of satisfaction.
137© The Author(s) 2020
C. Schmitt (ed.), From Colonialism to International Aid, Global
Dynamics of Social
Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38200-1_6
6
The Colonial Legacy and the Rise
of Social Assistance in the Global South
Carina Schmitt
Introduction
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century there has been a
rapid
rise in social protection initiatives in many low- and middle-
income
countries (LMIC) that can be mainly attributed to a growing
number of

social assistance programs. Nowadays, around 70% of all
developing
countries have at least one social assistance program in place
(Dodlova
et al. 2016, 8). Social assistance programs are public and
noncontribu-
tory schemes funded from general tax revenues to guarantee
access to
essential health care and basic income security to individuals
and families
in need (Leisering and Barrientos 2013; Midgley 1984a). The
recent
spread and expansion of social assistance reflects a shift away
from
contributory- based social insurances implemented in the early
days of
social protection in the Global South, providing benefits for
workers in
C. Schmitt (*)
SOCIUM Research Center on Inequality and Social Policy,
University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-030-
38200-1_6&domain=pdf
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38200-1_6#ESM
mailto:[email protected]
138
the formal labor market. Social insurance, which still is the
predominant
form of social protection, typically covers only a very small,
privileged

group of society. The majority of the people are often excluded
because of
working in the informal labor market or of not being able to pay
contri-
butions. Social assistance as noncontributory social protection
is assumed
to be better able than social insurances to expand coverage to
the more
vulnerable groups of the society and to face poverty and
inequality
(Dodlova and Giolbas 2015, 4; Overbye 2005; Eckert 2004, 472;
Barrientos 2011). Figure 6.1 shows the spread of two main
social assistance
programs across LMIC, namely social pensions (left) and
unconditional
family support programs (right) over the last decades.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World
Bank have also acknowledged the need for social assistance
schemes
and started to promote these programs. However, the active
promotion
0
10
20
30
40
50
N
um
be

r o
f c
ou
nt
rie
s
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Year of introducing social pensions
Social pensions
0
10
20
30
40
50
N
um
be
r o
f c
ou
nt
rie

s
1960 1980 2000 2020
Year of introducing family support schemes
Uncondi�onal family support scheme
Fig. 6.1 The rise of social assistance
C. Schmitt
139
of social assistance1 requires a profound understanding of what
is driving
its introduction and why some countries follow the recent trend
and
adopt social assistance programs and others do not. Studies
analyzing the
spread of social assistance emphasize the importance of
democratic
institutions. Unlike autocratic settings, democratic institutions
exert
pressure on politicians to implement policies from which the
majority of
the population benefits. Since social insurance systems typically
include
only a small segment of society, democratic leaders have an
incentive to
expand social protection via noncontributory social assistance
programs.
However, I argue that this narrative only holds in the case of

certain
institutional preconditions. Whether a country has a social
assistance
program or not also depends on its colonial legacy. The colonial
legacy
has defined and still shapes the opportunities of governments
for social
policy reforms. Colonial empires differed in their imperial
strategies and
in their notions on the role of the state regarding social
protection.
These differences influenced early social protection legislation
and still
have consequences for today’s social policy-making.
Surprisingly, the colonial heritage of social protection has been
almost
completely left out of the equation in comparative social policy
research
(Kpessa and Béland 2013; Overbye 2005; Schmitt et al. 2015).
This is
astonishing considering the fact that most developing countries
have a
colonial history and a great majority of early social protection
programs
in former colonies were introduced before those countries
gained
independence (Schmitt 2015). Literature that discussed the
effect of the
colonial legacy mainly focused on political (Lange 2004) and
economic
development (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Grier 1999; Englebert
2000).
However, the omission of the colonial legacy in the analysis of
determi-
nants and consequences of early and post-independent social

protection
precludes a systematic grasp of contemporary social problems.
To analyze the influence of the colonial legacy on the
contemporary
spread of social assistance, this chapter uses a sample of ca. 100
LMIC
and estimates cross-section and binary time-series cross-section
logit
models. I focus on two of the most important social assistance
programs,
1 Social assistance and noncontributory social protection are
interchangeably used in this chapter.
6 The Colonial Legacy and the Rise of Social Assistance…
140
that is, social pensions and unconditional family support
schemes.2
Moreover, I limit the discussion of the colonial influence to the
British
and French colonial powers. Both were the two main colonizers
in
the twentieth century—when social protection was put on the
global
agenda3 and became actively introduced into the debate on
social affairs
after World War II.
The empirical findings show that the French and British
colonial powers
influenced the social policy configurations of their former

colonies in
each specific way. The French imperial power enforced a strong
social
insurance principle during colonial times which still today
decreases the
likelihood of introducing social assistance programs in former
French
colonies. The effect of the French colonial legacy even
outweighs the pos-
itive influence of democratic political institutions. On the other
hand,
former British colonies very early introduced social assistance
programs,
due to the poor law tradition and the compatibility to the British
Beveridgean notion of the welfare state, which highly inspired
the whole
British Empire. The findings show that the colonial heritage of
a country
has to be taken into account when explaining different pathways
of social
protection in most LMIC. That does not imply that national
factors are
unimportant for social policy-making but rather that the
colonial legacy
influences the effects of domestic conditions. The colonial
heritage is one
factor shaping the possibilities of policy-making and the
institutional
choices a government has nowadays.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section elucidates
the
arguments why the colonial legacy should still have an
influence on the
recent spread of social assistance. The subsequent section
presents details

on the data and method applied. The then following section
analyzes the
2 CCTs (conditional cash transfers) are not considered, as—
unlike unconditional programs—they
are conditional to investments in education or health.
Additionally, they are more heterogeneous
for example, regarding the specific target they aim at and the
policy field they belong to. They
therefore follow a slightly different logic and are not easily
comparable with the two other programs
analyzed in this contribution.
3 Other central colonizers such as Spain abandoned their
imperial projects already in the first half
of the nineteenth century, and therefore before social protection
was put on the global agenda and
the labor question became urgent in the dependent territories.
Further imperial nations such as
Belgium, Portugal, Italy or Germany had only a few colonies or
maintained their colonies for a
much shorter duration, which is why a statistical analysis on
their influence would be less
informative.
C. Schmitt
141
influence of the colonial legacy on the expansion of social
pensions and
unconditional family support programs across the sample of
LMIC. A
final section presents a conclusion.

The Colonial Legacy of Social Assistance
Many studies focusing on the emergence and rise of
noncontributory
social assistance emphasize the role of democratic institutions
(Brooks
2007, 2015; Dodlova et al. 2016). Democratic leaders aiming at
extending
social protection to groups that have been excluded from
contributory
social insurance are assumed to opt for social assistance.
Noncontributory
social protection is often the only available option toward more
inclusive
social protection because of being independent from formal
wage employ-
ment, previous contributions and individual financial
capabilities
(Leisering and Barrientos 2013). Besides studies elucidating the
favorable
consequences of democracy, the diffusion literature emphasizes
the
importance of spill-over effects between neighboring countries.
Countries
are more likely to introduce social assistance if neighboring
countries
have done so before. However, spill-over effects and the
influence of
democracy are only part of the story. I argue that the colonial
legacy has
to be taken into account to obtain a more comprehensive picture
of the
expansion of social assistance and to explain why some LMIC
have intro-
duced social assistance and others have not. In the following, I
first briefly

address why colonial powers became engaged into social policy-
making
at all and afterward elucidate why and how the French and
British colonial
Empires with their general colonial policies and welfare state
principles
do influence contemporary trends in social protection in LMIC.
Colonialism and Social Policy
In the late nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth
century, the
question of how to deal with social risks in the case of income
loss was
mainly restricted to the Western world. During much of this
period,
142
colonial powers typically aimed at exploiting labor in their
colonies and
did not pay much attention to how workers in the colonies were
pro-
tected in the case of work accidents and illness. Hence, colonial
powers
were not involved in the provision of social services in their
colonies
until the first decades of the twentieth century (Midgley and
Piachaud
2011). From the 1930s and 1940s onward, the labor question in
dependent territories became increasingly relevant (Eckert
2004). Labor

movements gained importance in many of the colonies, and a
number
of colonies experienced massive strikes, particularly during
World War
II and the immediate post-war period (Orr 1966). Moreover,
social pro-
tection in the dependent territories increasingly became a topic
of debate
for international organizations, particularly the ILO. In 1944,
the ILO
member states agreed that the basic standards of labor policy
defined by
the ILO should also be applied to non-metropolitan areas (Maul
2012;
Plant 1994; Kott and Droux 2013). In addition, the human rights
declarations of the victorious allies of World War II were an
implicit
challenge to the imperial systems of European states. The
colonial powers
could no longer ignore increasing demands for social protection
and
aimed at a moral upgrade after World War II (Eckert 2004, 479–
480).
In sum, by midway through the twentieth century, not only was
there
pressure on the colonial powers from inside the colonies, in the
form of
rising demands for social protection, but also from the outside,
for
example in the form of soft pressure by international
organizations. As a
consequence, colonial powers became more and more engaged
in social
policies in their colonies.
Two colonial powers highly involved in the debate around

social affairs
after World War II were France and Britain. However, both
differed
widely with respect to their notions and concepts of the state,
the labor
question and social protection (Mahoney 2010). I argue that
these differ-
ences still have consequences for today’s social policy-making
and help to
explain why some countries have introduced social assistance
schemes
and others not, independently, for example, of the economic
prosperity
and quality of democratic institutions.
C. Schmitt
143
British Colonization Strategy and Poor Law Tradition
In the 1940s, questions around social protection and the welfare
of workers
in dependent territories were also discussed in Great Britain.
The debate
in the British Empire was characterized by two main
peculiarities which
not only shaped the post-war debate on social protection in
former
British colonies but also are still relevant for contemporary
social
policy-making.
First, Great Britain practiced a decentralized colonization

strategy and
was committed to a passive view on the role of the state with
regard to
social protection in their colonies. It often incorporated the
local elite
and maintained traditional structures of social service provision,
for
example, for the elderly and other needy groups (Williamson
and Pampel
1991, 23). As a consequence, early social protection legislation
in former
British colonies was more heterogeneous than in many other
empires,
since colonies had a comparably large maneuvering room. For
example,
in the case of retirement schemes, countries and territories such
as India,
Nigeria and Tanzania introduced provident funds, Botswana, the
Seychelles and Jamaica flat rate pensions, and Zambia and
Yemen
wage- related schemes (Schmitt 2015). Against the background
of this
decentralized colonial administrative structure, British officials
did not
force encompassing changes. Legislation was implemented by
local political
leaders in their colonies. The British officials were rather
reluctant to
actively push the implementation of specific social policies, and
the
colonial office often only emphasized the urgency of specific
legislations
(Eckert 2004).
Second, the debate on social protection in the dependent
territories

was influenced by the poor law tradition in Britain. The British
Poor Law
tradition dates back to the Elizabethan Poor Law Act of 1601
(Overbye
2005). It was the first nation-wide poor relief regulation in
modern times,
which aimed at bringing the able-bodied poor to work. In 1834,
a new
poor law was enacted which tightened the old poor law that had
become
too expensive in the course of industrialization. The British
poor laws
resemble very much the current trend of social assistance in the
Global
South. Both are noncontributory in nature, and in both cases
social
144
policy is considered an instrument of poor relief rather than of
income
maintenance. Already in the early twentieth century the British
poor laws
served as a role model and inspired some progressive colonies
which
adopted these ideas and introduced poor relief programs and
social assis-
tance schemes in line with the British model (see Künzler,
Chap. 4, this
volume). For example, Mauritius adopted a poor relief
ordinance in
1902, South Africa introduced a noncontributory and means-

tested old
age pension in 1928 (Seekings 2013, 311), and a poor relief
ordinance
was passed by Trinidad and Tobago in 1931 (Seekings 2013,
312; Midgley
1984b, 22). These social assistance schemes often remained in
place after
decolonization or were even extended by the new governments
and
administrations, for example to colored people (Midgley 1984b,
27).
These two British specifics also shaped the debate on social
protection
in overseas territories in the 1940s. This debate was intensified
by the
Beveridge Report from 1942 which led to the formation of
commissions
on social affairs in several dependent territories across the
entire British
Empire (Surender 2013; Seekings 2008). After World War II, it
was
controversially discussed whether tax-financed social assistance
schemes
could be introduced throughout the British Empire. Some
British
officials, for example, in the Economic Department, favored
noncon-
tributory over contributory schemes (Seekings 2011, 167), while
others
considered an implementation of comprehensive social
assistance too
expensive and therefore impossible to implement. Although the
discus-
sions in the British Empire did not result in any systematic or
uniform

handling of social affairs in overseas territories and finally the
British
officials considered it unrealistic to adopt large scale social
assistance
schemes in all dependent territories, they brought the
introduction of
such schemes into the debate at a very early stage. This highly
influenced
the discourse about the labor question in British overseas
territories.
As a consequence, the implementation of social assistance
programs was
discussed much earlier within the entire British Empire than
anywhere
else. This early presence of ideas about social assistance and the
early exis-
tence of social assistance schemes in the motherland, but also in
some
colonies, were to increase the likelihood of following the recent
policy
trend of introducing social assistance programs in former
British colonies.
C. Schmitt
145
When looking at the specific risks covered within the British
Empire
and in Great Britain itself, social assistance traditionally
focused on
elderly people. For example, in Great Britain the Old Age
Pensions Act of
1908, as the beginning of the system of modern state pension,

stipulated
the entitlement to a tax-funded old age pension for elderly
people lacking
sufficient income (see Seekings, Chap. 5, this volume). This
retirement
scheme is very similar to the current trend of social pensions.
But also the
early social assistance programs in Mauritius, South Africa and
Namibia
addressed the needs of the elderly. In contrast, family
allowances remain
“a contested part of a welfare system” (Pedersen 1993, 415).
Especially in
colonial societies during colonial times, Britain favored male
breadwin-
ner wages. Family allowances were regarded as inefficient in
African societies
by British officials because allowances would not only finance
children
but often many other dependent relatives as well (Lindsay 1999,
802).
In sum, the poor law tradition with its focus on poor relief
rather than
on income maintenance for industrial workers and the early
discussion of
social assistance in the former British Empire were to enhance
the prob-
ability that former British colonies implemented
noncontributory social
assistance programs (Seekings 2013). Moreover, the positive
influence of
the British colonial footprint on the introduction of social
assistance was
to especially apply to social pensions but less to family support
schemes.

French Social Insurance Tradition
In France, as the second major colonial power of the twentieth
century,
the debate regarding social protection also accelerated in the
1940s. Two
main characteristics relevant for contemporary social protection
made
the debate within the French colonial empire different from that
in other
empires.
First, France followed a pro-active colonial policy, emphasizing
the
decisive role of the state in enhancing social and economic
prosperity
(Cooper 1996; Iliffe 1987). French officials held the view that
the
colonies could not develop themselves but rather needed the
initiative of
the French Administrative Authority (MacLean 2002). The
French
colonial power regarded “the colonies simply as a prolongation
of the
146
mother- country beyond the seas” (Fieldhouse 1967, 308). The
French
imperial mission was characterized by the view that the
Republic was one

and indivisible. As a consequence, the French imperial system
aimed at
reproducing the French model in its colonies in all areas (see
Becker,
Chap. 7, this volume). In contrast to Britain, France centralized
its power
and, at least theoretically, made all basic and important
decisions in Paris,
where after 1894 colonial officials were trained in the École
Coloniales
(Fieldhouse 1967, 310). The consequence was an autocratic
system of
colonial government (Grier 1999, 319; Fieldhouse 1967, 308).
Even
though the French appointed Africans in order to fulfill
administrative
functions, these administrative elite owed their positions to
France. The
French aimed at producing an elite population in the colonies
that was
completely committed to the French culture, with a status
comparable to
that of French citizens. However, only a small portion of the
native popu-
lation achieved this status and became citizens (Fieldhouse
1967, 315).
The great majority kept their status as colonial subjects liable to
the Code
de L’Indigénat which determines the inferiority of colonial
people.
Second, one basic characteristic of the French welfare state is
the strong
social insurance tradition (Kaufmann 2013, 155). It is largely
based on
the principle of occupational solidarity. This means that social

protection
is linked to the occupational status of the insured person, his or
her
earnings and in consequence the contribution record (Béland
and Hansen
2000, 512). Earning-related benefits based upon individual
contribu-
tions are only provided to workers and their family in formal
wage
employment. Each risk is separately administered and managed
within
different social insurance schemes and often separated by
different occu-
pational groups (Palier 2000, 116). For example, each
profession has its
own pension scheme, leading to a very fragmented pension
system which
is highly resistant to change. France itself did not have any
comprehen-
sive social assistance system for people in need (Béland and
Hansen 2000,
52). The only exception was family allowances. France
implemented the
Code de la Famille in 1939, as the first “comprehensive
legislation on family
policy anywhere in the world which pays universal benefits to
all French
citizens and residents for the second child and subsequent
children”
(Béland and Hansen 2000, 52). One main reason for this
exceptional
C. Schmitt

147
character of family policy was France’s fear of a power
imbalance and a
military advantage for the German army due to the depopulation
of
France itself (Echenberg 1975, 179).
These two features characterized the debate on the introduction
of
social protection for workers in overseas territories in the
1940s. After a
series of strike waves in French West Africa the French
officials came to
the view that conditions for workers had to be improved. From
1946
onward, after formally abolishing the Code de L’Indigénat, that
is, the
inferiority of the native population, a committee at the Ministry
of
Overseas Territories was working on a plan to extend social
protection to
workers in the colonial states. However, officials had to define
who a
worker was and which rights were associated with this status.
After six
years of debate, the French Code du Travail for overseas
territories was
passed in 1952, as the key milestone of social protection
legislation in the
French colonies. The Code contained many specific regulations
regarding
social protection programs, and it strongly reflected France’s
social insur-
ance tradition. For example, it stated that family allowances and
systems

to protect workers from illness and accidents should be
introduced in the
colonies. However, according to the Code du Travail only those
workers
were included who were part of the formal labor market or were
citizens
(Fieldhouse 1967, 312; Eckert 2004, 481). The Code du Travail
therefore
excluded customary workers, workers on the informal labor
market or
people “compensated by land or crops” (Cooper 1989, 754).
Due to the
centralized approach of France, the Code du Travail applied for
all colo-
nies at the same time. After gaining independence, the former
French
colonies “all maintained the basic text and structure of the Code
du
Travail in 1952” and therefore the strong social insurance
tradition of the
welfare state (Cooper 1996, 464).
Regarding scheme specific differences, also family allowances
played
an exceptional role in the colonies (Eckert 2004, 482). As
family allow-
ances were much more important in the French welfare system
(Lindsay
1999, 810), the Code du Travail also reflects the importance of
support-
ing the nuclear family as part of the social protection of
workers.
In sum, France had a very strong social insurance tradition, and
the
French administration clearly pushed for the establishment of

social
148
security systems similar to the French social insurance model.
As a
consequence, all former French colonies introduced social
protection
schemes which first of all followed heavily social insurance
principles.
This strong social insurance setting was to make it much more
difficult
for former French colonies still today to implement
noncontributory
social assistance. A complete shift from one system to another,
with the
abolishment of the old one, is highly unlikely and would come
along
with high transaction costs. This is illustrated by the fact that
almost no
country has abolished a social insurance scheme once it has
been estab-
lished (ILO 2017). Therefore I assume that under otherwise
equal condi-
tions former French colonies are less likely to have social
assistance
programs. Furthermore and against the background of the
importance of
family allowances and its exceptional character in France itself,
French
colonies are more likely to have introduced noncontributory
family

support schemes than social pensions.
Summary
The main argument is that different imperial powers with
different
notions of the welfare state adopted different colonization
strategies. For
example, the French welfare state is characterized by the
principle of
social insurance and income maintenance rather than by poverty
allevia-
tion as it is the case with the British welfare state. In France,
the social
question was considered a worker’s question, while in Great
Britain it was
more a poverty question (Kaufmann 2013, 100). These
differences result
in different logics of contemporary social policy-making. After
having
gained their independence, all French colonies maintained the
social
insurance nature of social protection that has been characteristic
for the
French notion of the welfare state. The strong social insurance
tradition
in former French colonies, reflecting the principles of the
French welfare
state, would require a complete modification of existing
institutions,
practices and power structures if social assistance schemes were
supposed
to be introduced. The costs of implementing the recent trend of
social
assistance are therefore disproportionally high, as the policy
trend does

not fit to the existing institutional setting. A strong social
insurance tradition
C. Schmitt
149
may therefore be supposed to tremendously decrease the
likelihood of
having a social assistance. In contrast, in former British
colonies the
poor law tradition and the early debate on noncontributory
social
protection make social assistance a concrete, available policy
option, as
early bird countries such as South Africa have shown.
Moreover, British
colonies are more likely to have social pensions than family
support
schemes, since poor laws and early social assistance typically
have focused
on protecting the elderly. Family policy has not been a central
issue of the
British welfare state.
The Rise of Social Assistance in the Global
South: Data and Methods
The empirical analysis proceeds by two steps. First, I estimate
cross-
section logit models to explain which countries have a
noncontributory
social pension or a family support scheme for the most recent
period of

time, since this allows for integrating a broader set of control
variables. In
a second step, I estimate binary time-series cross-section
(BTSCS)
models which additionally allow for an analysis of the time
dimension.
The dependent variable is the introduction of two of the most
impor-
tant and most frequent noncontributory social assistance
schemes,
namely social pensions and unconditional family support
schemes. Social
pensions are noncontributory cash transfers paid regularly to
elderly
people (HelpAge International 2017). They are widely
acknowledged to
be one of the most effective tools to reduce old age poverty and
invest in
human capital development. Data on social pensions are taken
from
HelpAge International which provides a large database on social
pensions
in 107 countries. The information coming from HelpAge
International
is cross-validated with information provided by the ILO (2017)
and
Dodlova et al. (2016). Unconditional family support schemes
are “trans-
fers targeted to low-income households or specifically to
children”
(Dodlova et al. 2016, 9). These schemes “range from a basic
safety net for
those below the poverty line to (universal) child support grants”
(Dodlova
et al. 2016, 9). Data for unconditional family support schemes

are taken
150
from the Noncontributory Social Transfer Database which
includes
information, on a program-basis, about 186 programs in 101
countries
(Dodlova et al. 2016).
In both cases the dependent variable is measured by a binary
choice
variable coded 0 if a country has not yet introduced a social
pension or a
family support scheme and 1 in the year when a country
introduced the
respective program. By now, around 50 LMIC (low- and middle-
income
countries) have a social pension in place, and a comparable
number of
countries are provided with a family support scheme. In the
BTSCS
models the countries are only considered until the event
happens. Once
a specific program has been introduced, the country is excluded
from the
analysis of the respective program. I estimate logit equations
using a stan-
dard maximum likelihood procedure. Ordinary probit or logit
rests on
the assumption that the observations are temporally
independent.

However, the probability of introducing social assistance is not
equal at
any point in time but increases over time. Therefore, ordinary
probit or
logit would be misleading and the standard errors
underestimated. I fol-
low the procedure suggested by Beck et al. (1998) in order to
deal with
time dependence. Beck et al. (1998) show that binary time-
series cross-
section data is identical with grouped duration data. They
suggest esti-
mating the models including cubic splines, as natural cubic
splines
capture the time dependence. The estimated coefficients of the
cubic
splines can be used to trace the path of duration dependence. In
compari-
son to time dummies, cubic splines have the advantage of
providing a
more parsimonious strategy. I alternatively checked t, t2 and t3
as a cubic
polynomial approximation in the estimations (Carter and
Signorino,
2010). Moreover, robust standard errors clustered by country
are used.
In the empirical analyses the influence of the British and French
colo-
nial legacy as a central independent variable is captured by
including
dummies for British or French colonies. Moreover, I include the
real
GDP per capita (log.) as a control variable (Maddison Project
Database
2018) to measure a nation’s level of economic development. In

line with
functionalist theories, it is expected that there is a positive
relationship
C. Schmitt
151
between affluence and the introduction of social protection
(Wilensky
1975). Moreover, I include the level of democracy, which in
many studies
is assumed to drive the introduction and emergence of social
assistance. I
use the polity index which ranges from −10 (autocracy) to 10
(full
democracy) (Marshall et al. 2014). A further key variable is the
dependency
ratio, that is, the number of people above 65 and below 15 in
relation to
the total working-age population (World Bank 2015). A high
depen-
dency ratio should be reflected in a strong demand for
noncontributory
social pensions and family support schemes. Additionally, it can
be
expected that the colonial legacy diminishes over time after
gaining
independence. Hence the longer a country is independent, the
higher is
the probability that it is able to follow the recent policy trend.
Furthermore,
the level of globalization, measured as the total of exports and
imports in

relation to the GDP, might exhibit a negative influence on the
introduc-
tion of social assistance programs, due to the competitive
pressure arising
from embeddedness in the international market.4 As mentioned
above,
international organizations such as the ILO strongly promote
the
introduction of social assistance programs. I therefore include a
dummy
capturing whether a country is an ILO member or not.
Furthermore, it
is checked for ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003). It is
argued
that “ethnic diversity has led to social polarization and
entrenched inter-
est groups in Africa and thereby should decrease the likelihood
that a
country introduces a universal noncontributory social protection
scheme”
(Englebert 2000, 9; Alesina et al. 2003).
In the cross-section analyses, all independent variables are
calculated as
an average across the ten years prior to the information of the
dependent
variable. In the BTSCS estimation I additionally check regional
diffusion
processes by including a spatial lag capturing the number of
countries
with a respective scheme that share a common border with the
focal
country. Basic descriptive statistics of the main variables
included can be
found in the appendix.

4 However, it might also push countries to meet international
standards and introduce basic social
protection programs.
152
Explaining the Existence of Social Assistance
in the Global South
Did the spread of social assistance differ by colonial sphere?
Table 6.1
shows the empirical results of the logit regressions. In models 1
and 2 the
introduction of social pensions is used as a dependent variable,
and in
Table 6.1 Introduction of social assistance—cross-section
analyses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Odds ratio
Social
pension
Social
pension
Family
support
Family

support
Former British colony 6.765∗ ∗ ∗ 1.428
(4.448) (0.748)
Former French colony 0.108∗ ∗ 0.486
(0.118) (0.282)
ILO 1.029 1.024 1.020 1.019
(0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0154) (0.0155)
Globalization 1.011 1.007 0.988 0.988
(0.00769) (0.00746) (0.00771) (0.00756)
Ethnic
fractionalization
1.528 1.758 0.780 0.804
(1.886) (2.136) (0.853) (0.884)
Dependency ratio 0.885∗ ∗ 0.935 0.952 0.969
(0.0525) (0.0502) (0.0461) (0.0475)
GDP per capita 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.000173) (0.000141) (0.000146) (0.000140)
Time since
independence
0.971∗ ∗ ∗ 0.983∗ 1.000 1.002
(0.0109) (0.00988) (0.00881) (0.00869)
Polity 1.171∗ ∗ ∗ 1.146∗ ∗ 1.006 0.997
(0.0662) (0.0614) (0.0439) (0.0445)
Percentage point change in odds

Former British colony 576.5 42.8
Former French colony −89.2 −51.4
Polity 17.1 14.6 0.6 −0.3
Corr classified 80.43% 77.17% 66.30% 65.22%
ML Cox Snell 0.32 0.30 0.11 0.12
Observations 92 92 92 92
Notes: Odds ratio are reported; standard errors in parentheses.
The results for the
cubic splines are suppressed to conserve space ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01,
∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1;
note that standard errors for odds ratio are calculated as
follows: se(OR) =
exp(_b[_var])∗ _se[_var]
C. Schmitt
153
models 3 and 4 it is family support schemes. The first and the
third model
test the influence of the British colonial legacy, and the second
and the
fourth model test the French colonial influence. Odds ratio are
displayed.
The results remarkably confirm the main hypothesis that the
likeli-
hood whether a country has a social pension or an unconditional
family
support program is highly influenced by the colonial legacy.
When look-
ing at the results for social pensions, the probability of a former
British

colony having a social pension is almost 7 times higher than in
all other
LMIC. On the other hand, being a former French colony
decreases the
likelihood of having a social pension scheme by 89.2 percentage
points.
The strong social insurance tradition, especially with regard to
retirement
schemes, seems to heavily influence the contemporary choices
for social
policy-making. The situation is slightly different with regard to
family
support schemes. Even though former French colonies are also
less likely
to implement these programs, the influence is less hampering
than in the
case of social pensions. This reflects the importance of family
support
schemes in the tradition of the French welfare state. In the case
of the
British colonies, the positive role of the colonial legacy for the
introduc-
tion of social pensions is not observable with regard to
unconditional
family support programs. This represents the low British
emphasis on
family policies and the lacking tradition regarding this scheme.
The results regarding the level of democracy are also
interesting. In line
with previous research, democratic institutions seem to push the
intro-
duction of social pensions. The likelihood of having a social
pension
increases by about 17 percentage points with a one unit increase
in the

polity index. However, the positive influence is only observable
in the
case of social pensions, but not in the case of family support
schemes.
Interestingly, the effect of democracy differs by colonial
sphere. To illus-
trate the conditional effect of the colonial heritage, I calculated
the effect
of the regime type on the likelihood of introducing social
pensions in
dependence of the colonial legacy. Figure 6.2 displays the effect
of demo-
cratic institutions for former French (right figure) and former
British
colonies (left figure), each in comparison to the rest of the
sample. In the
right figure it can be observed that an increase from the lowest
possible
value for the polity index (−10) to the highest one (10) only
slightly
enhances the likelihood of a former French colony (right figure,
solid
154
0
.2
.4
.6
.8

Pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
o
f h
av
in
g
a
so
ci
al
p
en
sio
n
−10 −5 0 5 10

Polity
All other LMIC
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
o
f h
av
in
g
a
so

ci
al
p
en
sio
n
−10 −5 0 5 10
Polity
All other LMICFormerly British Formerly French
Fig. 6.2 Effect of democracy by colonial sphere
line) to have a social pension scheme (by around 15 percentage
points) in
contrast to an estimated increase for all other LMIC by 60
percentage
points (right figure, dash line). In the case of former British
colonies
(left figure, solid line), the marginal effect of democratic
institutions on
the predicted probability of having a social pension is similar to
the
non- British colonies (left figure, dash line). However, former
British
colonies have a higher probability of having a social pension
schemes
than all other LMIC, independently of the level of democracy.
Table 6.2 shows the results of the binary time-series cross-
section
analyses.

The results of the BTSCS (binary time-series cross-section)
models,
which take the time dimension into account, confirm the results
of the
cross-section analyses. Being a former French colony decreases
the likeli-
hood of introducing a social pension by around 90 percentage
points. By
contrast, ex-colonies of the British Empire introduce social
pension
schemes very early in comparison to all other LMIC (besides of
French
ex-colonies). More democratic countries are more likely to
adopt social
C. Schmitt
155
Table 6.2 Introduction of social assistance—binary time-series
cross-section
analyses
Odds ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social
pensions
Social
pensions

Family
support
Family
support
(Former) British colony 2.459∗ ∗ 1.496
(0.938) (0.489)
(Former) French colony 0.0923∗ ∗ 0.117∗
(0.0947) (0.130)
Neighbors with social
pensions
1.696∗ ∗ ∗ 1.696∗ ∗ ∗ 2.233∗ ∗ ∗ 2.233∗ ∗ ∗
(0.248) (0.248) (0.665) (0.665)
Polity 1.186∗ ∗ ∗ 1.159∗ ∗ ∗ 1.022 1.065
(0.0470) (0.0445) (0.0282) (0.0560)
GDP per capita 1.000∗ 1.000 1.000∗ ∗ 1.000∗
(8.21e-05) (7.93e-05) (0.000105) (0.000206)
Dependency ratio 0.967 0.927 0.985 0.999
(0.0561) (0.0537) (0.0587) (0.0626)
Observations 3895 3895 4157 4157
Number of countries 99 99 111 111
Notes: Odds ratio are reported; standard errors in parentheses.
The results for the
cubic splines are suppressed to conserve space ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01,
∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1;
note that standard errors for odds ratio are calculated as
follows: se(OR) =

exp(_b[_var])∗ _se[_var]
pension schemes, while this relationship does not hold in the
case of
family support schemes. The consideration of the time
dimension
allows testing for regional diffusion processes. The results
strongly cor-
roborate the importance of regional diffusion. The likelihood
that a
country introduces social assistance increases with the number
of sur-
rounding countries with the respective scheme.
Conclusion
Social assistance is one of the most recent policy trends in the
Global
South, raising many expectations. Since social assistance is not
based on
individual contributions, it is assumed to be an effective
instrument for
reducing poverty and inequality and for expanding social
protection to
the most vulnerable groups of society. Indeed, there is some
evidence of
156
these positive effects of social assistance. This evidence
motivates interna-
tional organizations such as the ILO or the World Bank to

promote the
introduction of social assistance in developing countries.
When explaining the recent trend of social assistance, studies
have par-
ticularly emphasized the role of democratic institutions.
However, I have
argued that this only holds in the case of certain institutional
precondi-
tions which depend on the colonial legacy. Colonial empires
differed in
their imperial strategies and in their notions on the role of the
state
regarding social protection. These differences have influenced
early social
protection legislation and institutions but have still
consequences for
today’s social policy-making.
By analyzing the spread of social pensions and unconditional
family
support programs as two of the most important social assistance
schemes
in LMIC in a quantitative framework, I can show that former
British
colonies are more likely to introduce social assistance than all
other
LMIC. This reflects the British Poor Law tradition and the
decentralized
imperial strategy of Britain, which have led to a very early
diffusion of
ideas on social assistance across the Empire. In contrast, in the
early days
of social protection in the Global South all former French
colonies imple-
mented social insurances in line with the strong social insurance

tradition
that characterizes the French welfare state. A shift from
insurance-based
social protection to tax-financed noncontributory social
assistance would
require a complete restructuring of existing institutions and
would come
along with tremendous costs. As a consequence, former French
colonies
did not follow the recent trend of introducing social assistance
programs.
The French colonial legacy even outweighs the positive
influence of dem-
ocratic institutions for which many studies have produced
evidence.
These findings show that it is very important to take the
colonial legacy
into account when analyzing early but also contemporary social
protection in
the Global South. The results also demonstrate that it is not
sufficient to
simply promote a specific strategy of social protection but
rather
to consider the historical context to come to a better
understanding of
the causes and consequences of early and contemporary social
protection.
However, the results do not imply that national conditions are
not important
for policy-making but rather that domestic conditions unfold
different
effects depending on the historical context of a country.
C. Schmitt

157
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson.
2001. The Colonial
Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation. American
Economic Review 91: 1369–1401.
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly,
Sergio Kurlat, and
Romain Wacziarg. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic
Growth
8: 155–194.
Barrientos, Armando. 2011. Social Protection and Poverty.
International Journal
of Social Welfare 20: 240–249.
Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998.
Taking Time
Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary
Dependent
Variable. American Journal of Political Science 42: 1260–1288.
Béland, Daniel, and Randall Hansen. 2000. Reforming the
French Welfare
State: Solidarity, Social Exclusion and the Three Crises of
Citizenship. West
European Politics 23: 47–64.
Brooks, Sarah M. 2007. When Does Diffusion Matter?
Explaining the Spread
of Structural Pension Reforms across Nations. The Journal of

Politics
69: 701–715.
———. 2015. Social Protection for the Poorest: The Adoption
of Antipoverty
Cash Transfer Programs in the Global South. Politics and
Society 43: 551–582.
Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. Back to the
Future: Modeling
Time Dependence in Binary Data. Political Analysis 18: 271–
292.
Cooper, Frederick. 1989. From Free Labor to Family
Allowances: Labor and
African Society in Colonial Discourse. American Ethnologist
16: 745–765.
———. 1996. Decolonization and African Society. The Labor
Question in French
and British Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dodlova, Marina, and Anna Giolbas. 2015. Regime Type,
Inequality, and
Redistributive Transfer in Developing Countries. GIGA
Working Paper Series
no. 273, May 2015.
Dodlova, Marina, Anna Giolbas, and Jann Lay. 2016. Non-
Contributory Social
Transfer Programmes in Developing Countries: A New Data Set
and Research
Agenda. GIGA Working Paper Series no. 290, August 2016.
Echenberg, Myron J. 1975. Paying the Blood Tax: Military
Conscription in

French West Africa, 1914–1929. Canadian Journal of Political
Science
9: 171–192.
Eckert, Andreas. 2004. Regulating the Social: Social Security,
Social Welfare and
the State in Late Colonial Tanzania. The Journal of African
History 45: 467–489.
158
Englebert, Pierre. 2000. Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial
States, and
Economic Development in Tropical Africa. Political Research
Quarterly 53: 7–36.
Fieldhouse, David K. 1967. The Colonial Empires: A
Comparative Survey from the
Eighteenth Century. New York: Delacorte Press.
Grier, Robin M. 1999. Colonial Legacies and Economic Growth.
Public Choice
98: 317–335.
HelpAge International. 2017. Social Pension Database.
http://www.pension-
watch.net/social-pensions-database/social-pensions-
database%2D%2D/.
Iliffe, John. 1987. The African Poor. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
International Labour Organisation. 2017. World Social

Protection Report.
Building Economic Recovery, Inclusive Development and
Social Justice.
Geneva: ILO.
Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver. 2013. Variations of the Welfare State:
Great Britain,
Sweden, France and Germany between Capitalism and
Socialism. Berlin: Springer.
Kott, Sandrine, and Joëlle Droux, eds. 2013. Globalizing Social
Rights. The
International Labour Organization and Beyond. Basingstoke:
Palgrave
Macmillan.
Kpessa, Michael W., and Daniel Béland. 2013. Mapping Social
Policy
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Policy Studies 34: 326–
341.
Lange, Matthew K. 2004. British Colonial Legacies and
Political Development.
World Development 32: 905–922.
Leisering, Lutz, and Armando Barrientos. 2013. Social
Citizenship for the
Global Poor? The Worldwide Spread of Social Assistance.
International
Journal of Social Welfare 22: 50–67.
Lindsay, Lisa A. 1999. Domesticity and Difference: Male
Breadwinners,
Working Women, and Colonial Citizenship in the 1945 Nigerian
General

Strike. The American Historical Review 104: 783–812.
MacLean, Lauren. 2002. Constructing a Social Safety net in
Africa: An
Institutionalist Analysis of Colonial Rule and State Social
Policies in Ghana
and Cote d’Ivoire. Studies in Comparative International
Development
37: 64–90.
Maddison Project Database. 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar,
Herman de Jong,
and Jan Luiten van Zanden. Rebasing ‘Maddison’: New Income
Comparisons
and the Shape of Long-run Economic Development. Maddison
Project
Working paper 10.
Mahoney, James. 2010. Colonialism and Postcolonial
Development: Spanish
America in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
C. Schmitt
http://www.pension-watch.net/social-pensions-database/social-
pensions-database--/
http://www.pension-watch.net/social-pensions-database/social-
pensions-database--/
159
Marshall, Monti G., Ted R. Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2014.
Polity IV Project:
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2012.

Dataset
Users’ Manual.
Maul, Daniel. 2012. Human Rights, Development and
Decolonization: The
International Labour Organization, 1940–1970. Houndmills:
Palgrave
Macmillan.
Midgley, James. 1984a. Diffusion and Development of Social
Policy: Evidence
from the Third World. Journal of Social Policy 13: 167–184.
———. 1984b. Poor Law Principles and Social Assistance in
the Third World:
A Study of the Perpetuation of Colonial Welfare. International
Social Work
27: 19–29.
Midgley, James, and David Piachaud, eds. 2011. Colonialism
and Welfare. Social
Policy and the British Imperial Legacy. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Orr, Charles A. 1966. Trade Unionism in Colonial Africa.
Journal of Modern
African Studies 4: 65–81.
Overbye, Einar. 2005. Extending Social Security in Developing
Countries: A
Review of Three Main Strategies. International Journal of
Social Welfare
14: 305–314.
Palier, Bruno. 2000. “Defrosting” the French Welfare State.
West European

Politics 23: 113–136.
Pedersen, Susan. 1993. Family, Dependence, and the Origins of
the Welfare State.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Plant, Roger. 1994. Labour Standards and Structural
Adjustment. Geneva:
International Labour Office.
Schmitt, Carina. 2015. Social Security Development and the
Colonial Legacy.
World Development 70: 332–342.
Schmitt, Carina, Hanna Lierse, Herbert Obinger, and Laura
Seelkopf. 2015.
The Global Emergence of the Welfare State: Explaining Social
Policy
Legislation, 1820–2013. Politics and Society 43: 503–524.
Seekings, Jeremy. 2008. Welfare Regimes and Redistribution in
the South. In
Divide and Deal: The Politics of Distribution in Democracies,
ed. Ian Shapiro,
Peter A. Swenson, and Daniela Donno. New York: New York
University.
———. 2011. British Colonial Policy, Local Politics, and the
Origins of the
Mauritian Welfare State, 1936–1950. Journal of African History
52: 157–177.
———. 2013. Social Policy. In Routledge Handbook of African
Politics, ed. Nic
Cheeseman, David Anderson, and Andrea Scheibler. London:
Routledge.

Surender, Rebecca. 2013. The Role of Historical Contexts in
Shaping Social
Policy in the Global South. In Social Policy in a Developing
World, ed. Rebecca
Surender and Robert Walker. Edward Elgar: Northampton.
160
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the
Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution
and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit
to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons licence and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are
included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise
in a credit
line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s
Creative
Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regula-
tion or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from
the copyright holder.

Wilensky, Harold L. 1975. The Welfare State and Equality.
Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Williamson, John B., and Fred C. Pampel. 1991. Ethnic
Politics, Colonial
Legacy, and Old Age Security Policy: The Nigerian Case in
Historical and
Comparative Perspective. Journal of Aging Studies 5: 19–44.
World Bank. 2015. World Development Indicators. Washington,
DC: World Bank.
C. Schmitt
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Part II: The
Influence of the Colonial Legacy and Cold War on Social
Protection6: The Colonial Legacy and the Rise of Social
Assistance in the Global SouthIntroductionThe Colonial Legacy
of Social AssistanceColonialism and Social PolicyBritish
Colonization Strategy and Poor Law TraditionFrench Social
Insurance TraditionSummaryThe Rise of Social Assistance
in the Global South: Data and MethodsExplaining the Existence
of Social Assistance in the Global SouthConclusionReferences
3
G
1
Anti-Globalization: Why?

lobalization first became a buzzword. Davos and the New York
Times columnist Thomas Friedman celebrated its virtues, its
inevitability. But then came the anti-globalizers. Globalization
then became a more conventional four-letter word. The Ruckus
Society
and the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu proclaimed its vices,
its
vincibility.
As this dialectic has unfolded, it is tempting to think that there
is a
primeval curse on the phenomenon. After all, if you care to
count, glo-
balization is in fact a thirteen-letter word. It has become by now
a phe-
nomenon that is doomed to unending controversy, the focal
point of
always hostile passions and sometimes violent protests. It is
surely a de-
fining issue as we move further into the new century. The
reasons this
has happened cry out for comprehension. Without such
understanding,
and then informed refutation of the fears and follies that
animate the
anti-globalizers, we cannot adequately defend the globalization
that many
of us seek to sustain, even deepen.1
What is the globalization that is in contention? Globalization
can
mean many things. Here, however, I plan to focus exclusively
on eco-
nomic globalization; indeed, that is what I shall mean when I

simply say
“globalization” throughout this book. Economic globalization
consti-
tutes integration of national economies into the international
economy
through trade, direct foreign investment (by corporations and
multina-
tionals), short-term capital flows, international flows of workers
and
humanity generally, and flows of technology: phenomena
defined and
treated more fully below.
Economic globalization is the favored target of many of the
critics
of globalization. It is distinct from other aspects of
globalization, such
4 K COPING WITH ANTI-GLOBALIZATION
as cultural globalization (which is affected, as I shall discuss in
Chapter
9, by economic globalization) and communications (which is
among
the factors that cause the deepening of economic globalization).
Why are the critics of globalization agitated? What bothers
them?
There are two main groups that need to be distinguished, and I
shall
develop this distinction and build systematically on it below.
First, there
is a multitude of hard-core protesters who have deep-seated
antipathy

to globalization. They come from different intellectual and
ideological
directions and do not all share the same ideas and sentiments.
But many
buy into a linked trilogy of discontents that take the form
successively of
an ethos composed of an anti-capitalist, anti-globalization, and
acute
anti-corporation mind-set.2 These views are interlinked because
global-
ization is seen as the extension of capitalism throughout the
world,
whereas multinational corporations are seen as the B-52s of
capitalism
and its global reach.3 Beyond understanding where their
discontents come
from, as I do presently, there is little that one can do to enter
into a dia-
logue with them.
Second, however, there are the critics of globalization whose
dis-
contents are well within the parameters of mainstream dissent
and dis-
course. In their essence, these discontents translate into the
arguments
that economic globalization is the cause of several social ills
today, such
as poverty in poor countries and deterioration of the
environment world-
wide. These critiques, which amount in my view to a gigantic
non sequi-
tur, are of a very different order from the hard-core criticisms,
which
reflect implacable hostility to globalization. The former are
susceptible

to, indeed invite, reasoned engagement. These critiques need an
extended
and careful response. I provide that in several chapters in Part II
by dem-
onstrating that, in fact, the various social causes that we all
embrace,
such as advancement of gender equality and reduction of
poverty, are
advanced, not set back, by globalization.
Am I leaving the prince out of Hamlet by not giving center
stage to
the critiques of international institutions such as the World
Bank (which
concerns itself with development), the International Monetary
Fund (deal-
ing with stabilization of economies in the grip of financial
crises), the
World Trade Organization (which oversees the world trading
system and
its progressive liberalization), bilateral aid agencies such as the
U.S.
Agency for International Development, and trade treaties such
as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)? These
institutions have
often been targeted at their annual meetings by demonstrators
who ob-
ject to their “conditionalities” for assistance or their ambition to
liberal-
ize trade, depending on the institution being attacked.
Anti-Globalization: Why? k 5

But these demonstrations are mainly a clever guerrilla tactic, as
I
argue later: with thousands of newspaper and television
reporters present,
violence and ingenuity in street theater make a splash around
the world.
The specific critiques are what need to be addressed, rather than
sweep-
ing condemnations. These I do take seriously and examine fully
at dif-
ferent places in the book as they relate to areas of concern, such
as in
Chapter 7, when I consider the complaint of some women’s
groups
that International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities have
harmed
women.
I also consider, in appropriate places throughout the book, the
charge
that globalization is a result of the iron fist of conditionality
(i.e., pre-
conditions for getting aid or trade opportunities) wielded by
bilateral
and multilateral aid agencies. Whether the conditionalities are
effective
and binding (as the critics believe) or are loose and often
evaded (as I
argue) and whether trade liberalization is “forced” by these
institutions
(as is alleged) or is often embraced by nations because they
believe it is
good for them to abandon costly protectionism (as I contend)
are mat-
ters that I deal with, particularly in Chapters 16 and 18.

As for the charges of hypocrisy, double standards, and unfair
trade
that are passionately leveled today at these international
institutions and
also at the rich nations—in particular, that they maintain
protection for
themselves while they force others into free trade—these
charges have
been made by reputable non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) such
as Oxfam and by the World Bank in its occasionally desperate
get-them-
off-our-backs mode. But, as I have written extensively
elsewhere with
documentation and only sketch in this book, these beliefs and
allega-
tions are often little more than rubbish.4
In particular, the average industrial protection in the poor coun-
tries is still significantly higher than in the rich countries; the
chart in
Chapter 16 shows this clearly. That chapter also considers the
reasons,
which have nothing to do with hypocrisy, why protection in the
rich
countries has not been reduced more on labor-intensive
industrial prod-
ucts. In agriculture, there are extensive tariffs in the importing
poor coun-
tries as well. Moreover, significant subsidies, often through
heavily
subsidized inputs such as water and electricity, can be found in
agricul-
ture even in poor countries such as India and Mexico.
Besides, only an ignoramus would coach the poor countries to

talk
of “unfair trade,” for this is the code phrase used by the
protectionists in
rich countries to cut off imports from the poor countries by
alleging
that they obtain their competitiveness in ways that amount to
unfair
competition and unfair trade. Trade experts of all political
persuasions
have spent decades exposing the cynical use of this phrase and
decrying
its usage, but then in come the know-nothings, who persuade the
un-
suspecting poor countries to embrace it.5 When it comes to the
two sets
of nations, poor and rich, battling it out as to who is the worse
unfair
trader, do not be surprised when the poor nations find
themselves at a
disadvantage.
If all this were of no relevance, I would grin and bear it.
Regrettably,
many of the leaders in the poor countries have now come to
believe that
the trading system is unfair and hypocritical, and therefore they
can fo-
cus on others’ protectionism and forget about their own. That
their
protectionism, currently at average levels higher than in the rich
coun-

tries, can only hurt their own prosperity and therefore the war
against
poverty will be demonstrated in Chapter 5. Causing harm to the
poor
countries cannot have been the intention of Oxfam, yet the road
to hell
is paved with good intentions. Oxfam knows a little, but not
enough,
about trade policy, I am afraid, and I have been moved to
remark, not
just in this instance, that mission creep, even by non-creeps, is
often not
a good idea.6 Their overreach subtracts from the great good that
they
have done when they concentrate on what they do best.
So much then for conditionalities, double standards, unfair
trade,
and hypocrisy. Let me turn instead to the central tasks that I
have set out
to explore in this book: the sources of anti-globalization
sentiments, the
concerns that globalization lacks a human face, the reality that
it does
have one, and the governance that must accompany
globalization once
one recognizes that it is generally a benign force for social
agendas.
Exaggerating the Perils of Globalization
At the outset, it is necessary to recognize that the perils of
globalization
happen to be exaggerated because of what I like to call the
fallacies of
aggregation.

Different Aspects of Globalization
Recall that globalization, even in its economic aspects, has
many dimen-
sions. It embraces trade and long-term direct foreign investment
by
multinationals as well as flows of short-term portfolio capital
whose
rapidity and size have caused havoc in places ranging from
Bangkok to
Buenos Aires. But it also should include now-sizeable
migrations, legal
and often illegal, across borders. And it extends to the diffusion
and trans-
fer of technology (such as AIDS-fighting drugs) among
producing and
consuming nations. Such economic globalization, in turn, is
distinct from
globalization, say, on dimensions such as increased
international acces-
sibility of print and other media (e.g., Internet access to
newspapers and
magazines, and the reach of CNN and the BBC today) or
growing en-
rollments of foreign students.
Yet the popular discourse on globalization has tended to blur
the
lines between these different dimensions and to speak of
globalization

and its merits and demerits as if it were a homogeneous,
undifferenti-
ated phenomenon. Indeed, recent years have seen many polls on
attitudes
toward “globalization,” some of which I discuss below, and
practically all
of them are marred by a failure to specify which aspect of even
eco-
nomic globalization they are polling the respondent about. So
we have
no way of finding out what exactly the respondent has in mind
when
she says that globalization is good for herself or for the poor or
for her
country.
In fact, the rot goes even deeper. In particular, in the many
debates
that I have had with Ralph Nader and other opponents of freer
trade
before, during, and after the 1999 ministerial meeting of the
World Trade
Organization in Seattle (which broke up in mayhem as a result
of vio-
lent demonstrations by anti-globalization groups), the critics
have in-
variably strayed into the financial crisis that devastated East
Asia in the
latter half of the 1990s. They argue as if the case for freer trade
had been
exposed as illusory by this financial crisis. But openness to
trade had
been at the heart of the East Asian “miracle,” whereas
imprudent and
hasty freeing of financial flows was at the heart of the brutal
interrup-

tion of this miracle. To throw beneficial trade out of the
window be-
cause financial flows have caused a crisis is surely illogical.7
The case for free trade and the argument for free capital flows
have
important parallels. But the differences are yet more pointed.
The free-
ing of capital flows in haste, without putting in place
monitoring and
regulatory mechanisms and banking reforms, amounts to a rash,
gung-
ho financial capitalism. It can put nation-states at serious risk
of experi-
encing massive, panic-fed outflows of short-term capital funds,
which
would drive their economies into a tailspin.
The freeing of trade can hardly do this. If I exchange some of
my
toothpaste for one of your toothbrushes, we will both have
whiter teeth,
and the risk that we will have our teeth knocked out by this
exchange is
negligible. By contrast, the proper analogy for capital flows is
playing
with fire. When Tarzan sets a fire to roast his kill, he feeds
himself and
has little to fear: a forest fire is hard to set off. But when he
returns to
England as the long-lost Earl of Greystoke, he can carelessly
and easily
set his ancestral home on fire.

Yet, manifest as this asymmetry is to any but the most
ideological
economists, it is a common affliction even among highly
educated mem-
bers of the public such as Ralph Nader. Indeed, they assume
that if one
is for free trade, one must be for free direct investment, for free
capital
flows, for free immigration, for free love, for free everything
else! I must
confess that while the case for free trade suffers from this
fallacy, making
our business of defending the merits of free trade more
precarious, I
myself have profited from it. Thus, when I wrote in 1998 of this
asym-
metry between free trade and free capital flows in the magazine
Foreign
Affairs, right after the East Asian financial crisis had broken
out, alerting
all to it, that turned out to be newsworthy. That I—widely
complimented
or condemned, depending on your viewpoint, as the “world’s
foremost
free trader”—had “admitted” that unfettered capital flows could
be dan-
gerous was considered to be a heresy worthy of the greatest
attention.
While a few others, such as my new (Columbia) colleague
Joseph Stiglitz
and my old (MIT) student Paul Krugman, had also registered
their reser-
vations in their own way, I was the one who became the poster
boy for

many who were fearful of “globalization.” And yet, in all truth,
I had thought
that I was saying the obvious; I had in fact never thought
otherwise!
The North-South Divide: An Ironic Reversal
The debate on globalization is overlaid and overwhelmed by yet
another
fallacy that asserts that the disillusionment with globalization,
typified
by the street theater and the campus protests, is worldwide and
reflects a
majoritarian discontent. But this belief is not true.
In fact, anti-globalization sentiments are more prevalent in the
rich
countries of the North, while pluralities of policy makers and
the public
in the poor countries of the South see globalization instead as a
positive
force. This was the finding of the World Economic Forum’s
extensive
poll on global public opinion on globalization, carried out by
the Cana-
dian polling firm Environics International, with twenty-five
thousand
urban respondents in twenty-five countries, and presented at the
WEF’s
annual meeting in New York in early 2002.8
I call this an ironic reversal since the situation was exactly the
other
way around in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time the rich
countries were
busy liberalizing their trade, investments, and capital flows.

They saw
international integration as the magic bullet that would bring
them pros-
perity, and it did produce the golden age of rising tides that
lifted all
boats until the OPEC-led explosion of oil prices unsettled the
world
economy beginning in the mid-1970s. But the poor countries
were fear-
ful of international integration.
Raúl Prebisch, the Argentinian economist, talked then of the
dan-
gers to the “periphery” from the “center” in international
interactions.
The sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil invented
the
dependencia thesis, arguing that the poor countries would be
relegated
to a dependent status in the international economy. The Chilean
soci-
ologist Osvaldo Sunkel used the striking phrase “integration
into the
international economy leads to disintegration of the national
economy.”
President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, whom the CIA helped
dislodge,
wrote of “neo-colonialism”: the embrace by the former colonial
powers
of innocent-looking instruments such as aid that would
intentionally

create a crypto-colonialism.
I characterized these fearful attitudes at the time as “malign
impact”
and “malign intent” paradigms, contrasting with the economist’s
con-
ventional thinking that international integration would benefit
all, rich
and poor, and was therefore a “benign impact” phenomenon
(which
need not have benign intentions motivating it), whereas aid and
other
assistance were “benign intent” policies (which of course might
none-
theless have unintended malign outcomes).9
Many poor countries that bought into these fearful ideas and
turned
away from using international trade and investment flows as
opportu-
nities to be seized turned out to have made the wrong choice.
Their fail-
ures, and the example of the success of the countries of the Far
East that
used international opportunities to great advantage instead, have
proven
salutary. The result has been a turn by the South toward more
globaliza-
tion. The sociologist Cardoso, who had warned of dependencia,
became
President Cardoso of Brazil, seeking to take Brazil into more,
not less,
globalization. The WEF poll on globalization was simply
recording this
swing of sentiment.10

By contrast, the fearful “malign impact” ideas have come to
haunt
several groups, among them the labor unions, in the rich
nations. And
this reversal, this contrast with the poor countries, is exactly
what the
WEF poll was picking up. The rich tapestry of reasons why this
has hap-
pened is of both interest and concern, and I will address it
shortly.
But before doing that, it is worth also noting that recent polls
show
a waning, rather than an enhancement, of the acute anti-
globalization
of the 1990s. The WEF poll found also that the positive views
of global-
ization (as an omnibus and ill-defined phenomenon) had become
more
positive in North America and Europe, even while they
remained lower
than those in the countries of the South, big pluralities of whose
resi-
dents continued to express high expectations of globalization.
This is
also the finding from polls conducted by the Center on Policy
Attitudes
of the University of Maryland: “Overall, Americans tend to see
global-
ization as somewhat more positive than negative and appear to
be grow-

ing familiar with the concept and more positive about it. A large
majority
favors moving with the process of globalization and only a
small minor-
ity favors resisting it.”11 The most recent poll by the Pew
Global Atti-
tudes Project, under the guidance of President Clinton’s
secretary of state,
Madeleine Albright, of thirty-eight thousand people interviewed
in forty-
four countries found that “majorities in every nation surveyed
say grow-
ing business and trade ties are at least somewhat good for their
country
and for themselves” and that while social and economic
discontent can
be found everywhere, “yet for the most part they are not
inclined to
blame such troubles on growing interconnectedness.”12
But it may be too optimistic to go by these polls, as they may
also
reflect changed circumstances in national economic
performance. Good
times dampen anti-globalization attitudes, while bad times
deepen them.
The WEF poll is revealing on this: the lowest pluralities in
favor of glo-
balization among the poorer nations are in Indonesia, Turkey,
and Ar-
gentina, where economies have been through turmoil. And so
the task
of understanding the anti-globalization sentiments, and
responding to
them if globalization is to be successfully maintained and
managed, re-

mains pressing.
Globalization Today: Different from Yesterday
If globalization’s perils tend to be exaggerated in the ways I
just dis-
cussed, they are also understated by many who say, “Well, we
have al-
ways had globalization, and it is no big deal.” True, rapid
integration of
the world economy occurred in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth
centuries. We can go back to the end of the nineteenth century,
for in-
stance, and find that trade, capital flows, and migrations were
no less
then than they are today. If multinationals bother you, then just
think of
the great East India Company, which virtually paved the way
for the
British conquest of India, and the Dutch East Indies Company,
which
dominated Indonesia. Trade grew rapidly along with European
outward
expansion, as did settlements in the new areas opened up by
exploration
and conquest. Capital flowed profusely, financing the building
of rail-
ways in Africa and the extraction of minerals worldwide. Many
histori-
ans have noticed that the years spanning the two world wars
were an
interruption of the upward trends in the expansion of world
trade and
investment, and that it is possible to interpret the postwar
liberalization

WBS and Project Schedule for Proposed Project

WBS and Project Schedule for Proposed Project

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to WBS and Project Schedule for Proposed Project

Similar to WBS and Project Schedule for Proposed Project (20)

More from simonlbentley59018

More from simonlbentley59018 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

WBS and Project Schedule for Proposed Project