1. The Precedent of Soviet Information
Policy and
the Need for Radiological Incident
Communication Plans
Simon Chernack
Risk Communication
4/5/11

2. Introduction
The disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was arguably the most
significant nuclear accident in modern history. The devastation of the incident was
exacerbated by poor risk communication andinsufficient policies for nuclear
accidents.While the disaster at Chernobyl occurred over two decades ago there are
still many facets of the risk communication response that can realistically inform
policy changes. Though the international community has made great strides in
redundant systems and reactor containment communicating effectively remains a
challenge. The literature surrounding nuclear incident management suggests that
the effective communication of risk and government response plays a large role in
the ability of the populace to recover from an incident.
Chernobyl Incident
On the 26th of April 1986 Reactor 4 at the Chernobylnuclear power plant
suffered a catastrophic failure; the resulting disaster is the worst nuclear disaster in
modern times. The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant occurred as
Soviet scientists were attempting to test the ability of the reactor to operate on
backup generator power. The test was called for after a previous test had
demonstrated that reactor turbines were running out of power too quickly (World
Nuclear Organization, 2011). Due to operator error’s including disabling
theemergency shutdown system the reactor quickly became unstable. When the test
operator’s realized that the reactor was dangerously unstable they tried to scram
the reactor by inserting control rods, which due to a design flaw actually caused an
increase in power (World Nuclear Organization, 2011). Increased power levels led
to rupturing of the fuel assemblies, jamming the control rods before they could be
fully lowered into the reactor. Consequently two explosions were reported in the
reactor, throwing nuclear fuel and debris into the air. This massive disaster
prompted Soviet authorities to launch a massive recovery operation to contain the
spread of dangerous radioactive contamination.
Response
As the reactors burned Soviet personnel began to flood the reactor with
water to try to maintain some form of cooling. In an effort to put out the raging fires
in the reactor boron, dolomite, sand and clay were dropped by helicopter into the
exposed core (Horner, 2009).Evacuation of the city of Pripyat (3 kilometers away)
did not begin until some 36 hours after the initial explosions. After the initial scene
was controlled a concrete sarcophagus was built around the destroyed reactor to
allow for continued operation of the other three reactors at the site. The ultimate
legacy of the Chernobyl disaster was an exclusion zone of some 4300 square
kilometers, the death of the 28 first responders on scene and thousands of cancer
cases (World Nuclear Organization, 2011). The true number of cancer deaths
related to Chernobyl remains an extremely contentious issue that will not be
explored here, as it only has a minor bearing on the risk communication question at
hand.

3. Crisis Communication-Soviet Information Sharing
One of the major failures in the response to the Chernobyl incident was the
deliberate withholding of information to the international community, Soviet
leadership and the citizenry of the USSR (Maret, 2011). Soviet citizens were given
no information on the catastrophe and were told by officials that the explosion that
had occurred was a steam discharge from the plant. Once it was decided that Pripyat
was to be evacuated residents were told that the move was temporary and they
would be returning to their homes “within a few days” (NOVA, 1989). The Soviet
response to the international community was similarly disingenuous; no official
statement was given until the 28th of April. Soviet leadership only released
information because Swedish nuclear plant employees had registered higher level of
radiation and deduced that it had come from the USSR. Information distribution
within the Soviet government was also weak. In the initial eight-hour period after
the disaster Soviet leadership received conflicting reports of the situation at
Chernobyl prompting Mikhail Gorbachev to send troops to measure radiation
(Horner, 2009).
As if to purposefully push citizens into harms way Soviet leadership also
encouraged the populace to go out and celebrate May Day in the Ukraine.
Government officials encouraged celebration knowing full well that radiation levels
were 1,000 times acceptable levels (Horner, 2009).
Critique of Soviet Response
The response of Soviet authorities to the Chernobyl disaster was a major
blow to Soviet prestige. By totally botching the risk communication on all levels
(internationally, locally) the Soviets tarnished their international reputation and
deepened distrust of the government, a sentiment that remains to this day. This
example of nuclear mismanagement is a very teachable example of how not to go
about managing a major disaster; it is especially poignant today in the wake of the
disaster at the Fukishima Daichi nuclear facility in Japan. The consequences of
Soviet mismanagement are far-reaching; by withholding information the Soviets
needlessly created a worldwide panic and exposed countless innocent people to
dangerous levels of radiation.
The poor handling of information at Chernobyl had far reaching effects not
limited to damaged Soviet prestige. Post Chernobyl disaster studies have found that
survivors suffered a high level of chronic stress that manifested itself in numerous
psychosomatic symptoms. One study in particular identified “inadequate and
insufficient information about radiation exposure” as a major cause for chronic
stress symptoms. Lack of information about financial compensation related to
surviving the Chernobyl incident was also cited as a cause for chronic stress illness
(Ginzburg & Reis, 1991).
Policy Proposal
With the world currently fixated on the disaster and radiological
contamination in Japan it is important that major changes be made in the way we
communicate information in a radiological emergency. In the United States the
problem must be addressed consistently across all levels of government from local
to federal. A set of best practices must be promulgated to adequately address the

4. varied and special conditions present in a radiological emergency. Without codified
consistent policies regarding nuclear disaster communication responsible parties
will fall victim to inconsistent and unconvincing information sharing. Ultimately, a
written radiological communication should become a standard requirement across
levels of government.
Across Levels Government
Nominally the government of the United States exists “by the people, for the
people” a lesson that should not be lost on government spokesmen and incident
managers. It is vital that the government not restrict the flow of non-classified
information in a nuclear disaster. It is the right of the people to know, and the
ethical responsibility of the government to give an accurate statement regarding the
severity and risk of an incident. In a disaster people are less tolerant of complex
information, in communicating risk information to a frightened public emergency
managers must resist the urge to use jargon or purposefully obtuse language
(Sandman, 2006). Trusted government representatives must update emergency
information consistently at regular intervals, failure to do so will erode the public
trust so vital in a successful response to disaster. While the current literature
already cites consistency as an important aspect in disaster communication it is
worth restating, as it is immensely important in the midst of a crisis.
Federal Level
It is practically guaranteed that in the event of a nuclear incident the federal
government will be involved. Having an off the shelf radiological communication
strategy framework will significantly streamline the sharing of information at the
federal level. Current federal government documentation does explicitly mention
the establishment of a Joint Information Center and sharing among federal agencies
but fails to detail how information will be dispatched (FEMA, 1996). Federal plans
need to integrate all of the aforementioned recommendations: clear and concise
language as well as regular updates at established intervals. The federal government
also has the unique responsibility of disclosing a nuclear incident to the
international community. As the events of Chernobyl demonstrated the risk to
national reputation in addition to international relations can be mitigated by timely
and clear disclosure of a problem. Failure to properly inform the international
community sadly will draw little more than condemnation from the International
Atomic Energy Agency, however this does not mean that the United States is any
less bound to report an incident. As a major international power it is on the United
States to lead by example when it comes to disclosing nuclear incidents.
State Level
In emergency management the old saying that “every disaster is local” holds
true. The structure of the U.S. government puts a great deal of responsibility on the
state to appropriately respond to a disaster. A major aspect of the state response is
information sharing in the initial phase of the disaster. This responsibility should
serve as a major impetus for the development for state radiological disaster
communication plans. The ability of the state to “get in front” of a disaster by
providing information on level of risk, protective actions and a laymen’s explanation
of radiological contamination will aid greatly in a orderly response from the public.
State agencies should also be active in providing information on basic protective

5. actions that the public can engage in to mitigate the effects of radiological exposure.
State communication plans should be interoperable with federal plans, as they will
probably be folded together upon establishment of the JIC.
Local
Municipalities that contain nuclear power plants or other sources of
fissionable material should also prepare by creating their own more locally oriented
communication plans. Local level plans should contain information regarding fallout
shelters, evacuation routes, safe foods and places to seek medical attention. Local
communication plans should be consistent with state and federal guidance, though
they will focus far more on local conditions and response mechanisms. To create
buy-in from the public emergency management personnel should work on a
grassroots level to include the public in formulating crisis communication plans.
Incorporating the public will not only inform emergency managers on the concerns
of the public, it will also create a trust relationship that can be called upon in an
emergency.
Conclusion- An Appeal to Duty
The disaster at Chernobyl is seared in our collective memory as a traumatic
world event that seriously threatened the international community. One of the
biggest failures of Chernobyl (in the USSR) was the timely communication of
incident information at all levels. The consequences went far beyond simple ruffled
feathers. Thousands of people were exposed to high levels of radiation; the
survivors became physically and mentally ill with the stress of processing
inadequate information from officials. As easy as it is to attribute the errors in
communication at Chernobyl to Soviet malfeasance, present day crises indicate that
sophisticated democracies struggle with the same issues. The communication errors
that occurred in Japan are in many ways similar to the ones committed in the wake
of the Chernobyl disaster. If the issue of proper risk communication is not resolved
it will create runaway healthcare costs related both to radiation exposure and
mental health problems.