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External shocks and policy change in different coalition opportunity structures
Article in International Review of Public Administration · February 2019
DOI: 10.1080/12294659.2019.1577558
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2. 1
External Shocks and Policy Change in Different Coalition Opportunity
Structures
Changgeun Yun
Department of Public Administration
Ajou University
Suwon, South Korea 16499
cyun@ajou.ac.kr

3. 2
Abstract
Since its introduction in the late 1980s, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) has
undergone three revisions in 1993, 1998, and 2007. The 2007 revision has contributed to
expanding the applicability of the ACF to policy processes in both pluralistic and nonpluralistic
political systems by creating a new category of variables called the coalition opportunity
structure. Using a case study of nuclear energy in South Korea, which experienced a transition of
the coalition opportunity structure from authoritarian to pluralist in the late 1980s, this study
explores the mediating role of coalition opportunity structures in the relationship between an
external shock and policy change. The findings indicate that contrary to what the ACF predicts,
external shocks are exploited by a dominant coalition to further strengthen its power in the policy
process in an authoritarian structure. External shocks do not have the same effect on policy
subsystems in different coalition opportunity structures, and the relationship between an external
shock and policy change is not a simple stimulus-response reaction. In addition, by contrasting
the effect of an external shock in an authoritarian structure with that in a pluralist structure, this
study explores how an external shock can function as a pathway to policy change as the ACF
predicts.
Keywords: advocacy coalition framework; coalition opportunity structures; external shocks;
policy change; Korean nuclear energy

4. 3
External Shocks and Policy Change in Different Coalition Opportunity
Structures
Introduction
Since Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith introduced the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it has become one of the most promising and widely used
theoretical models for understanding the public policy process (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt,
Weible, & Sabatier, 2014; John, 2003; Schlager & Bloomquist, 1996; Weible, 2005). The ACF
initially emerged as an alternative to the stages model (Nohrstedt, 2009; Sabatier, 1998). The
main criticism of the stages model is that it does not identify any causal mechanisms for policy
development and neglects the historical and temporal dimension of change (Burton, 2006).
However, by revealing that policy evolution involves various interactions of coalitions in a
policy subsystem and recognizing the need to take a long-term view of policy change, the ACF
has attracted the attention of many scholars who are interested in a variety of causal drivers for
policy change over a period of a decade or more.
While the ACF is widely applied in policy process research, it has been criticized for
potentially not being applicable outside of U.S. and Western European contexts. So, Sabatier and
Weible (2007) amended the ACF by adding the new variable category of “coalition opportunity
structures (COS)”—institutional contexts of decision-making by policy actors—in order to make
the framework more useful in different institutional contexts. However, very little research has
been conducted to examine the role of COS in policy change. This has led to refinements that
now need to be further explored (Henry, Ingold, Nohrstedt, & Weible, 2014; Nohrstedt, 2005). In
this study, I try to shed some light on the mechanisms whereby COS mediate the relationship

5. 4
between an external shock and policy change by analyzing South Korean nuclear policy. The
history of nuclear energy use in South Korea dates back to the early 1950s, when the government
began to send young engineers and researchers to the U.S. and other developed countries to
acquire nuclear power technology. In the mid-1980s, South Korea experienced the transition
from a dictatorial and authoritarian political system to a democratic and pluralistic society.
Consequently, the COS related to Korean nuclear power policy also changed from authoritarian
to pluralist. In addition to the political change, three catastrophic global nuclear accidents
happened: the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and the
Fukushima accident in 2011. Therefore, Korean nuclear power policy can serve as a case for a
study exploring the mediating role of COS.
The subsequent discussion proceeds as follows. In the second section, I provide
overviews of COS and propose hypotheses about how an external shock can act as a pathway to
policy change. Next, the research methodology and data used in this study are explained. As a
case study, this research details the history of South Korean nuclear energy and briefly sketches
causal process tracing (CPT) as a case study design of causal inference. In the fourth and fifth
sections, I test the hypotheses by examining how global nuclear accidents influenced the nuclear
policy subsystem in authoritarian and pluralist South Korea. Finally, I conclude with a discussion
of the study’s limitations and suggestions for future research as well as the contribution this
study makes to the ACF literature.
Coalition opportunity structures and external shocks
An advocacy coalition is as an alliance of policy participants who are motivated to
translate their beliefs into actual policies. The ACF views policy making or policy change as a

6. 5
product of competition among at least two types of advocacy coalitions: dominant and minority.
A dominant coalition perpetually confronts the challenges of minorities’ pursuing their policy
goals and preferences. The replacement of a dominant coalition by minorities can lead to major
policy change.
The ACF identifies four paths to policy change: policy-oriented learning, external shock,
internal shock, and negotiated agreement (see Sabatier & Weible, 2007 for more details).
External shocks originate outside the policy subsystem and include disasters and changes in
socioeconomic conditions. They attract a high level of attention to policy agendas and trigger
increased discussion of a policy or ideas (Albright, 2011; Birkland, 2006; Sabatier & Weible,
2007). Public attention can cause the redistribution of critical political resources such as public
or financial support. This redistribution provides an opportunity for a minority coalition to take
the dominant position in a policy subsystem.
However, it should be noted that there is not a simple stimulus-response relationship
between external shocks and policy change (Nohrstedt, 2005). External shocks are a necessary
but not sufficient condition for major policy change. Although they serve as “focusing events,”
directing public attention toward an issue previously less known and/or unaddressed, external
shocks cannot generate policy change by themselves (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010). Minority
coalitions or proponents of policy change should skillfully exploit external shocks as an
opportunity to reflect their policy core beliefs in the policy process or even to defeat a dominant
coalition (Nohrstedt, 2009; Sabatier & Weible, 2007).
Coalition opportunity structures not only impact short-term constraints and resources but
also affect the relationship between external events and major policy change. COS are conceived
of as institutional and/or as arenas of a decision-making process and are measured by three

7. 6
variables: (1) the degree of consensus needed for major policy change, (2) the openness of the
political system, and (3) overlapping societal cleavages. The first variable represents the number
of people, organizations, and/or votes necessary to change existing policies. The openness of the
political system is measured by two subindicators: (a) the number of decision-making venues
and (b) the accessibility of each venue. Overlapping societal cleavages means that the degree of
societal conflict creates different conditions to carry out policy change, such as which policy is
adopted (Birkland, 1998; Sabatier & Weible, 2005; Nohrstedt, 2009).
Based on the first two variables, the ACF identifies four types of COS: pluralist,
corporatist, Westminster, and authoritarian executive (see Table 1). Pluralistic structure (e.g., the
U.S.) is characterized by a multitude of receptive decision-making venues and either a high or
medium degree of consensus for major policy change. By contrast, in an authoritarian executive
structure (e.g., North Korea), the policy process is monopolized by small elite groups, and the
decision-making process is centralized and exclusive. The Westminster structure (e.g., the UK) is
located between pluralistic and authoritarian structures and has modest norms for consensus and
compromise, along with less open but not centralized decision systems. Corporatist structures
like those in Norway and Sweden generally feature strong norms of agreement and emphasize a
supermajority for policy change, but have relatively restricted decision-making systems.
Table 1. Typology of coalition opportunity structures
Source: Sabatier & Weible (2007, p. 201)

8. 7
Not all external shocks lead to major policy change (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen,
2009). Only when external shocks are exploited by minority coalitions, is major policy change
feasible (Nohrstedt, 2009; Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010). That is, the effect of external shocks as a
path to policy change may vary depending on the characteristics of COS. First, the institutional
contexts enable or hinder proponents of policy change to form an advocacy coalition (Fischer,
2015; Kriesi, 1995; Müller & Strøm, 2003) by influencing transaction and information costs for
collaboration (Leifeld & Schneider, 2012; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Williamson, 1991). Second,
in a structure with a higher degree of consensus, coalitions have a strong incentive to coordinate
and compromise with others in order to secure as many allies as possible (Sabatier & Weible,
2007). So, when external shocks hit the policy subsystem, a dominant coalition attempts to
recruit more allies in order to avoid being dominated by challengers. By these means, minority
coalitions can participate in the policy process and cause a deviation from existing policies.
Third, the more decision-making venues there are, the more easily minority coalitions can
identify venues to let the public know their policy ideas exist as alternative solutions. Thus, when
there are more decision-making venues, minority coalitions are more likely to get involved in the
policy process and take advantage of external shocks to topple the status quo.
Finally, it matters how accessible the decision-making venues are. The ability to present
policy ideas to the subsystem is a necessary condition for a minority coalition to serve as an
alternative to the dominant coalition. If the dominant coalition monopolizes all decision-making
venues, any policy proposals of minority coalitions cannot be discussed in the policy process
even when external shocks show that something is wrong and needs to be addressed. The

9. 8
receptivity of a policy subsystem to change depends on whether a decision-making venue is
tolerant of change and open to minority coalitions.
To test the mediating effect of COS, this study investigates policy change in pluralistic
and authoritarian executive structures. A pluralistic structure has a multitude of easily accessible
decision-making venues and at least a medium degree of consensus, which together provide
minority coalitions with an opportunity to challenge the dominant one. On the other hand, in
authoritarian executive structures, the policy process is inaccessible to proponents of policy
change because of few and exclusive decision-making venues. In addition, it is very expensive
and even risky to form challenging coalitions in autocratic institutional settings. Thus, the ability
of minority coalitions to exploit external shocks for policy change is determined by COS, and the
following two hypotheses are formulated.
Hypothesis 1: In pluralist coalition opportunity structures, external shocks are
more likely to lead to policy change because proponents of policy change can
mobilize advocacy coalitions and exploit external shocks to defeat dominant
coalitions.
Hypothesis 2: In authoritarian executive coalition opportunity structures, external
shocks are less likely to cause policy change because it is not allowed for
proponents of policy change to exploit external shocks.
Research design and variable operationalization
Single case study and causal process tracing
To test the hypotheses, I employ causal process tracing (CPT) with a single case. First, a
single case study increases the strength of the inferences drawn from the outcomes because it is
better able than comparative case studies to control for the presence of other explanatory

10. 9
variables and minimize the possibility of omitted variable bias. Second, in order to analyze the
mediating effect of COS in the causal link between external shocks and policy change, I apply
CPT. This method is used to identify and describe policy events, and to elaborate on the single or
multiple mechanisms by which they come about (Collier, 2011). In particular, if policy change
occurs through processes that are path dependent or rooted in strategic interaction where
statistical methods offer only limited causal claims, CPT can provide a rich account of how it
happens (Checkel, 2006; Hall, 2006; Kay & Baker, 2015). This study follows a three-step
procedure of CPT: (1) theorizing variables and empirical proxies, (2) collecting diagnostic
evidence, and (3) hypothesis testing (Kay & Baker, 2015). In the rest of this section, I describe
the history of South Korean nuclear policy as a case study, and then construct empirical proxies
for external shocks (i.e., independent variables), COS (i.e., intervening variables), and policy
change (i.e., dependent variable). In the following separate sections, evidence is gathered and
interpreted to test the hypotheses on the mediating role of COS.
Case: South Korean nuclear policy
The use of nuclear energy in South Korea dates back to the early 1950s. After its
liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 and the Korean War ceasefire in 1953, South
Korea emphasized the advancement of science and technology as a strategy for national
reconstruction, and the development of nuclear energy was identified as a principal national goal.
The history of Korean nuclear energy development is broadly classified into two stages:
preparation and operation. In the preparation stage from 1954 to 1968, Korea focused on
building the social and institutional foundation for peaceful use of nuclear power. In 1958, the
Atomic Energy Act of Korea (AEAK) was enacted to provide a legal foundation not only for

11. 10
nuclear development activities, but also for the regulation and licensing of nuclear power plants.
The Atomic Energy Department (AED) was established in 1959 as a government ministry to
organize and manage everything to do with the development of nuclear power. In 1961, the
South Korean government founded the Korea Electricity Power Corporation (KEPCO) and
assigned it the task of constructing and operating nuclear power plants.
The government also started a campaign to popularize the development of nuclear energy
as the path to prosperity (Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology & Korean Atomic
Energy Research Institute, 2009). Nuclear power was globally considered in the 1950s and 1960s
to be an economical energy source (Char & Csik, 1987; Nohrstedt, 2009). In this nuclear-
friendly atmosphere, the South Korean government formed a back-scratching alliance with
journalists in order to secure permanent and stable support of the public for nuclear energy.
Government-owned and pro-government mass media, such as TV, radio, and newspapers,
strengthened and maintained positive images of nuclear energy.
Since the first nuclear power plant (Kori-1) was ordered in 1969, the South Korean
nuclear industry has expanded continuously and rapidly, and South Korea has also built a
reputation as one of the leading countries in nuclear energy production. In 1978, the Kori-1 plant
was built and started to generate commercial-scale electricity, and Korea became the 21st
nation
in the world to operate a nuclear power plant. The construction of nuclear power plants
continued, and the 24th
nuclear power plant began commercial operation in 2015, at which time
Korea had the 6th
highest number of nuclear power plants in the world, generating 149.2 billion
kilowatt-hours (BkWh), slightly less than one-third of total national electricity consumption as of
2014 (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2016). Figure 1 shows a brief synopsis of the major events in the
development of nuclear energy (as well as COS in South Korea and global nuclear accidents).

12. 11
Figure 1. Nuclear policy and coalition opportunity structures in South Korea
External shocks and policy change in South Korean nuclear policy subsystem
The South Korean nuclear policy subsystem has been shocked by three catastrophic
global nuclear accidents: (1) the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, (2) the Chernobyl nuclear
accident in 1986, and (3) the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. These accidents were out of
the control of South Korea and had a huge and negative impact on the global nuclear industry. So,
these three accidents are operationalized as external shocks to the South Korean nuclear policy
subsystem.
Because the South Korean government established a pro-nuclear coalition and has
protected its dominant status in the policy subsystem, nuclear power plants have been steadily
constructed. In addition, the pro-nuclear coalition tried to extend old nuclear plants beyond their
planned life span. For example, the Korean government extended the 30-year life span of the
oldest plant (Kori-1) by 10 years to 2017, and had secretly prepared to extend it beyond 2027.
Thus, policy change in nuclear energy in South Korea can be measured by whether or not a

13. 12
nuclear power plant has been (or is planned to be) shut down, and/or whether there has been a
change in the core agenda of nuclear energy policy, such as from expansion to phasing-out.
Change in coalition opportunity structures in South Korea
After the Korean War (1950–53), South Korea was rapidly transformed into a strongly
anti-communist society, and the government was given massive coercive power, leading to the
emergence of an authoritarian dictatorship. After General Jung-hee Park staged a military coup
d’état in 1961, South Korea was under a military dictatorship in which the legislative and the
judiciary branches were subordinated to the executive, a condition that lasted until the late 1980s
(Jung & Kim, 2009; Kihl, 2005; Saxer, 2002).
As the military dictatorship continued, South Korean citizens’ desire for democracy led
to an upsurge of anti-authoritarian movements, and millions of citizens took to the streets in anti-
government protests in early 1987. The military regime eventually yielded to the public and on
June 29, 1987, proclaimed a democratization package including fair and direct presidential
elections, promotion of freedom of the press, and protection of human rights. The legislature and
the judiciary no longer had to act as a rubber stamp for the executive and were able to establish a
system of checks and balances. This transition from authoritarianism to pluralism is externally
visible. The Freedom House Index has annually estimated the degree of democracy in the world
by measuring political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2013).1
South Korea was
1
A seven-point scale is used to evaluate political rights and civil liberties. The highest ranking country (recorded as
1-1) is considered as having the highest degree of democracy. Countries with an average of 2.5 or less are
considered free, and those with ratings from 4.25 to 6.5 are classified as electoral authoritarian systems.

14. 13
considered to be an electoral authoritarian system through the early and mid-1980s.2
However,
since the democratization movement of 1987, Korea has been ranked as a free country with
political pluralism and participation (Freedom House, 2013). So, by assuming that the change in
political opportunity structures also influences the institutional context of the policy subsystem in
the same direction, this study operationalizes the COS of South Korea before and after the 1987
democratization as authoritarian executive and pluralist, respectively (see Figure 1).
External shocks in an authoritarian executive structure
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident in 1979
The 1979 TMI accident attracted strong negative attention of the public and politicians to
nuclear energy. As a result, nuclear policies lost public support and their privileged status in the
policy process (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Nohrstedt, 2005; Wikdahl, 2008). After the accident,
most countries became reluctant to keep their nuclear power policies (Nelkin & Pollak, 1981;
Wikdahl, 2008), and some countries, such as Sweden, even decided to phase out their nuclear
power plants by 2010 (Nohrstedt, 2009). However, it should be noted that the TMI accident
destroyed the dominant position of a pro-nuclear coalition only in pluralistic or corporatist
structures in which anti-nuclear minorities were able to participate in the decision-making in the
policy subsystem.
Far from having no impact on nuclear policies in South Korea, the TMI accident
produced a result opposite to that in pluralistic structures. The South Korean nuclear energy
policy subsystem was monopolized by the government and the pro-nuclear coalition at that time,
2
Holding an election is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. An election can only function as an
indicator of democracy when it is competitive, free, and fair so that the public is given the ability to choose their
leader among candidates (Schumpeter, 1946; Sørensen, 2010).

15. 14
and the 1979 TMI accident was not enough to overturn the prevailing dogma that there was no
way to provide sufficient energy without relying on nuclear power (Sung & Hong, 1999). The
South Korean public were still of the opinion that the utility of nuclear power was greater than its
potential risk.
Meanwhile, on the recommendation of the pro-nuclear advocacy coalition, the Korean
Nuclear Safety Center (KNSC) was established in 1981 as a government agency. The South
Korean government and the pro-nuclear coalition convinced the public that with the
establishment of the agency, nuclear power plants in South Korea would be operated safely and
could avoid a nuclear accident. In other words, the KNSC as a subunit of the South Korean
government was intended to assuage public concern over nuclear power as well as to upgrade
nuclear safety. In this context, the ongoing construction of the second (Kori-2) and the third
(Wolsong-1) nuclear plants proceeded without any opposition, and within about two years after
the TMI accident, construction was started on four new nuclear plants and two more plants were
ordered (see Appendix 1). To construct the six additional plants, the Korean government
invested about 18% of the yearly budget (US$1,920 million in 1978 dollars) at that time
(Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology & Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute,
2009). In a nutshell, the monopoly status of the pro-nuclear coalition in the subsystem was not at
all affected by the accident.
The Chernobyl accident in 1986
It took about seven years for the world nuclear industry to show signs of recovery (Char
& Csik, 1987). As is evident from Figure 2, the number of nuclear plants on which construction
was begun each year began to increase, from 10 in 1984 to 20 in 1985. The next and more

16. 15
obvious statistic to show a rally is the annual number of plants to be connected to the grid.
Although there was a temporary fall-off immediately after the TMI accident, the number of new
connections to the grid increased in the early 1980s and reached its peak in 1984 and 1985, with
33 new annual connections. The catastrophic memory of the TMI accident seemed to be wiped
away. The 1986 Chernobyl accident, however, delivered a knockout blow to the world nuclear
industry. The numbers of annual construction starts and connections to the grid started to decline
sharply, and it appeared to be impossible for the world nuclear industry to regain its former glory
until the mid-2000s.
Source: The data on the numbers of NPPs starting construction and those connected to the grid worldwide are drawn
from Intenational Atomic Energy Agency (2011).
Note: The line graph with the right vertical axis and the bar graph with the left vertical axis present the number of
nuclear power plants under construction in the world and South Korea, respectively.
Figure 2. Nuclear power plants in the world and South Korea
Surprisingly, however, some countries were immune to the negative effect of the
Chernobyl accident, and South Korea was one of them. The Korean government continuously
constructed nuclear power plants in the 1980s and 1990s. Two plants began commercial
operations in 1986, and three other plants generated electricity in the late 1980s. Two more
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
TMI
Accident
Chernobyl
Accident World
South Korea
Number of new NPPs in Korea Construction Starts in the World Connections to the Grid in the World

17. 16
plants were ordered in the year following the accident (see Appendix 1). In addition, the pro-
nuclear coalition exploited the Chernobyl accident and the slump of the global nuclear industry
in order to acquire core nuclear technology. The South Korean government made a contract with
the Combustion Engineering Company, one of the leading global nuclear companies at that time,
and demanded the transfer of nuclear technology. The global company had to accept the request
to survive in the depressed market (Hong, 2011; Sung & Hong, 1999).
Exploitation of external shocks by a dominant coalition in authoritarian structures
Evidence from the two cases lends considerable support to the prediction that an external
shock does not lead to policy change in authoritarian executive structures, supporting Hypothesis
2. In addition, the cases show the possibility that an external shock can be exploited by a
dominant coalition to further strengthen its ruling power in the policy subsystem. This
paradoxical consequence comes about due to certain features of the institutional context. First, in
an authoritarian executive structure, it is risky to publicly oppose a government and its policy.
The South Korean pro-nuclear coalition was founded and supported by the authoritarian
government, and there was no competitor to arouse public concern about existing policies and
challenge the status quo. Second, policy making is generally monopolized by the government
and its allies in an authoritarian system. The two nuclear accidents notwithstanding, the
government and the pro-nuclear coalition overestimated their ability to prevent an accident and
continued to increase investment in nuclear power (Sung & Hong, 1999). Finally, a country with
an authoritarian executive structure may manipulate public opinion in its favor. For example,
while other countries recognized the risks of nuclear power from the TMI accident in 1979 and
abandoned or suspended their nuclear policies (Nelkin & Pollak, 1981; Nohrstedt, 2005;

18. 17
Wikdahl, 2008), the South Korean government and the pro-nuclear coalition took advantage of
the 1979 oil crisis to overcome concerns about the TMI accident and even succeeded in
manipulating the South Korean public into accepting the necessity of nuclear power as a direct
substitute for oil. To sum up, the pro-nuclear coalition, supported by the authoritarian
government, was able to limit access to the policy process and even exploit global nuclear
accidents (Figure 3).
Figure 3. The formation of nuclear policy in authoritarian system
External shocks in a pluralist structure
Appearance of anti-nuclear movement
South Korea’s nuclear energy policies sometimes caused friction with local residents,
who complained about the meager compensation they received for being ejected due to the
building of nuclear power plants or other nuclear facilities. However, they did not and could not
object to nuclear power per se. Above all, they were prevented from participating in the process

19. 18
of deciding where a nuclear plant would be built, and opposition to nuclear energy was perceived
socially as being unpatriotic. These citizens had to sacrifice their livelihoods and move out of
their residences to make way for the construction.
The democratization of 1987 undermined the authoritarian and monopolistic structure of
the Korean nuclear policy subsystem. First of all, it stimulated the principle of no legitimacy
without citizen participation, and public opinion emerged as a new form of political authority,
through which criticism of and opposition to existing policies were heard in the policy-making
process. If opponents of nuclear power win the public’s consent, they can suspend or at least
delay pro-nuclear policies. In a democratic society, information on nuclear power can also be
produced and disseminated by anti-nuclear groups, highlighting negative aspects of nuclear
power such as radiation exposure, nuclear waste, and the likelihood of a catastrophic accident,
which had already occurred twice, in the U.S. and Ukraine. These shocking revelations, which
had been suppressed under the authoritarian executive regime, provoked public concern about
the risk of nuclear energy. In addition, the South Korean public perceived the uncomfortable
truth as more reliable and accurate than government reports harping on the expansion of nuclear
energy and withdrew their unconditional support for nuclear energy (Sungkyunkwan Research
Survey Center, 2003).
The Fukushima accident in 2011
The 2000s saw a so-called “nuclear renaissance,” when nuclear energy was again
spotlighted as a solution to rising fuel costs and the greenhouse effect.3
What is more, nuclear
3
Even several developed countries with strong anti-nuclear movements, such as Germany, Sweden, and Italy,
seemed to be moving away from their earlier decisions to phase out their nuclear plants and were discussing the
expansion of the use of nuclear power (Joskow & Parsons, 2012).

20. 19
energy again garnered overwhelming support from the Korean public, who believed at that
moment that nuclear power would be the best option to provide sufficient energy without
contributing to global warming (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2005). In this favorable
environment, the Korean government proposed a plan to move the share of nuclear capacity from
26% of electricity generation in 2006 to 41% in 2030 by constructing more new plants.4
In 2011, which was the 25th
anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, the nuclear
renaissance across the world quickly subsided in light of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima,
Japan. Germany and Switzerland announced plans to phase out nuclear power by 2022 and 2034,
respectively (Joskow & Parsons, 2012). The U.S. nuclear industry was also shaken by the shock.
More stringent regulatory requirements to raise the bar on safety standards were imposed on
owners of nuclear plants, which thereby increased the costs of building new plants and operating
existing ones (Joskow & Parsons, 2012; Schneider, Froggatt, & Thomas, 2011). When the
nuclear energy craze cooled down, citizens could again see the risks of nuclear power.
South Korea’s nuclear energy policy was no exception this time. The 2011 Fukushima
accident brought about a change in the policy environment surrounding nuclear power. First, the
accident caused a subtle but very significant change in the Korean public’s attitude toward
nuclear power. Although Korea is still considered to be the country with the strongest public
support for nuclear power (IPSOS Global Advisor, 2011; Squassoni, 2012), a closer look reveals
a loss of public support toward nuclear power and an ambivalent attitude of the Korean public.
As seen in the top graph in Figure 4, the proportion of Korean citizens who perceive nuclear
power as a necessary energy source was still high, about 72.5% in 2012, even though it had
declined from 89.4% in 2010. However, even in 2010, when the nuclear renaissance was in full
4
The construction of eight or nine more plants was planned to increase nuclear capacity (Ministry of Knowledge
Economy, 2008).

21. 20
swing, only a little more than one-fourth of the respondents answered yes to the question “Do
you support the building of a nuclear power plant near your home?”
Source: Data on public opinion are drawn from Korean Atomic Industrial Forum (2011) for the years 1993 to 2010,
and Kim (2012) for the years 2011 and 2012.
Note: The KAIF, sponsored by the Korean government, conducted polls to estimate public opinon about nuclear
power over the years, but it has not carried out a poll since the Fukushima accident in order to suppress negative
public opinion (Cho, 2013). Instead, Kim (2012) and Dong Ilbo estimated how public opinion had changed since the
shock using similar questions.
Figure 4. The trend of public opinion on nuclear power in Korea
Meanwhile, the bottom graph in Figure 4 also shows that since the 2011 Fukushima
accident, the Korean public has backed closing nuclear plants more strongly than building more
new plants, which is in stark contrast to the general public’s attitude during the nuclear
renaissance in the 2000s. In short, nuclear power has been downgraded by the Fukushima
accident from an inevitable energy source to a risky one which should be replaced by other, safer
energy sources in the long term (IPSOS Global Advisor, 2011).
External shocks as a pathway to policy change in pluralist structures

22. 21
South Korean nuclear policy was not immediately affected by the 2011 Fukushima
accident. The pro-nuclear coalition, including the South Korean government, wanted to maintain
the glory of the nuclear renaissance regardless of the loss of public support for nuclear power.
For example, one and a half years after the disaster, the South Korean government announced
that at least eight plants would be built by 2023 (Yonhap News Agency, 2012), a plan which had
been considered since the late 2000s. However, it should be noted that the dominant position of
the pro-nuclear coalition in the policy process was undermined by the Fukushima accident in the
pluralistic opportunity structure. Table 2 shows the composition of the anti-nuclear coalition and
changes in core aspects of the nuclear energy policy.
Table 2. Characteristics of Korea’s nuclear policy subsystem and advocacy coalitions
TYPE Pro-nuclear Coalition Anti-nuclear Coalition
Core Aspects of
Nuclear Energy
1954–68 Monopoly ·Korean Government – Start-up
1968–87 Monopoly
·Korean Government
·Gov’t-owned Research Institutes
·Media (TV, newspaper)
·Education Institutes/Universities
·Nuclear Industry
– Expansion
1987–2011
Limited
Participation
·Korean Government
·Gov’t-owned Research Institutes
·Media (TV, newspaper)
·Education Institutes/Universities
·Nuclear Industry
·Residents whose
community will be
affected by nuclear
facilities
·Environmental
organizations
Expansion
2011–
present
Competition
·Korean Government
·Gov’t-owned Research Institutes
·Media (TV, newspaper)
·Education Institutes/Universities
·Nuclear Industry
·Opposition party*
·Environmental
organizations
·Anti-nuclear civic
organizations
·Researchers
Maintenance of
the Status Quo/
Natural Phase-
out
* There was no change in the executive branch between the Fukushima accident in 2011 and the impeachment of
president Park Guen-hye in 2017.

23. 22
First, unlike in the authoritarian structure in which knowledge of nuclear energy had been
controlled by the pro-nuclear coalition, in the pluralistic structure anti-nuclear research groups
enjoy academic autonomy. Since the Fukushima accident, research groups outside the hierarchy
of the pro-nuclear coalition have focused on the risks of nuclear power, such as defects in
operating nuclear plants, the possibility of a domestic nuclear accident occurring, environmental
pollution by radiation leak, and costs associated with the shutdown of nuclear reactors. In
addition, research groups have torn down the barriers of expertise in nuclear technology, so
nonmembers of the pro-nuclear coalition are able to participate in the policy-making process.
Because of the dissemination of anti-nuclear information, the pro-nuclear coalition could no
longer control the image of nuclear energy (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Nelkin, 1979).
Second, by reducing the cost of information and collaboration, the pluralistic structure
encourages environmental organizations (e.g., Greenpeace and the Korean Federation for
Environmental Movement) and local residents to form alliances in opposition to pro-nuclear
policies, strengthening the capacity of an anti-nuclear coalition enough to challenge the dominant
pro-nuclear coalition. For example, given that citizen participation is necessary to legitimize the
policy process in a democratic society, environmentalists are able to access the policy process
through their allied local residents.
On the other hand, local residents can get resources such as nuclear expertise and
knowledge from environmental organizations so that they do not become overwhelmed by the
complexities of nuclear engineering in a debate with the pro-nuclear coalition (especially the
government).
Third, pluralistic structures help minority coalitions to establish successful venue-
shopping strategies to bring their policy issues to the public domain. In particular, minority

24. 23
coalitions can use existing policy channels and institutional venues to take the dominant position
in a policy subsystem (Kitschelt, 1986) without finding or creating new venues. In democratized
South Korea, the executive branch is not the only institutional venue, and anti-nuclear coalitions
can appeal to different types of governing institutions capable of making decisions on the same
policy issue. For instance, after the executive’s announcement of the construction of eight
nuclear power plants, anti-nuclear coalitions attempted to expand the scope of the conflict by
involving the legislature (especially opposition parties) and the courts. The National Assembly
pointed out the lack of public consensus on building more nuclear plants and issued a statement
of concern on behalf of anti-nuclear coalitions. That is, if new nuclear plants are still opposed by
anti-nuclear coalitions, the executive will face a problem of financing the construction plan. In
addition to the legislature, the anti-nuclear coalition has recourse to one more institutional venue
to halt the plan: the judiciary. The executive had not provided local residents with full
information on its plan and had refused to hold a local referendum during the policy-making
process. This procedural defect served as ammunition for the anti-nuclear coalition, which sued
the government for the fault. The judiciary ruled against the executive, forcing it to gain
agreement on the building of nuclear power plants through a local referendum (Donga Ilbo,
2012).
Taken all together, the pluralistic structure attenuates the monopoly power of the pro-
nuclear coalition in South Korea’s nuclear policy subsystem by creating different open decision-
making venues, ensuring researchers’ academic autonomy, and decreasing the cost to form an
advocacy coalition. Thus, the anti-nuclear coalition could take advantage of the Fukushima
accident to make a change in the policy trend of increasing the number of nuclear plants. First, it
is no longer easy to build a nuclear plant. The executive branch began to construct nine nuclear

25. 24
plants in 2000–2010 and announced plans to build an additional eight plants in 2012. However,
these plans have been condemned by the anti-nuclear coalition, and construction has begun on
only four plants (Shin-Ulchin 1&2, and Shin-Kori 5&6) because of sunk costs.5
Second, the
oldest plant (Kori-1) was shut down in 2017, despite the opposition of the pro-nuclear coalition,
which had planned to extend its operation to 2027. Finally, and most importantly, the Korean
public recommended the Korean government to phase out nuclear energy—no more construction
of nuclear plants except ongoing projects (i.e., Shin-Kori 5&6) and no extension of current plants’
operation—through deliberative polling in October 2017.6
The Korean government immediately
declared it would respect this decision and announced in December 2017 that it would decrease
nuclear energy, but increase renewable energy (i.e., solar and wind power). All things considered,
the Fukushima accident shocked the South Korean nuclear policy subsystem and caused a policy
change from expansion to the gradual phasing-out of nuclear energy, supporting Hypothesis 1
that pluralistic opportunity structures mediate the effect of an external shock on policy change.
Conclusion and limitations
The Advocacy Coalition Framework has been revised and updated to become a more
sophisticated and better-understood model. In particular, the introduction of the coalition
opportunity structure variable in 2007 is a significant revision and allows the ACF to be
employed in a corporatist or authoritarian society as well as in a pluralistic society (Sabatier &
5
Their nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) and turbine generators (TG), which are worth about USD 1.25 billion,
or 24% of the total construction cost, had already been ordered before the accident (see Appendix 1).
6
In addition to the 2013 Fukushima nuclear accident, the Korean public was also shocked by an earthquake of Mw
5.8 in Gyeongju in Sep. 2016, where four nuclear plants were operated and two plants had been constructed. Also,
3.82 million people lived within a 30 km radius of the four plants. The Gyeongju earthquake alerted Korean citizens
to the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe like the 2013 Fukushima accident happening in South Korea. Even though
it is not investigated in this study, the 2013 Gyeongju earthquake is another variable causing policy change, by
influencing the deliberative polling in October 2017.

26. 25
Weible, 2007). Unfortunately, however, there have been few empirical studies testing the effect
of COS on policy process. As an attempt to fill the gap, this study analyzes the history of South
Korea’s nuclear energy policy and COS and finds that the effect of an external shock on policy
change is mediated by COS.
In the case of the nuclear energy policy in the authoritarian structure that existed prior to
the democratization movement in 1987, the policy subsystem was monopolized by the
government and its allies. Opponents of nuclear power were not allowed to form advocacy
coalitions and to challenge the government. The dominance of a government in the policy
process is the main criterion for identifying the statist type of policy network, which is
characterized by strong state intervention without the involvement of societal actors (Harman,
1996; Van Waarden, 1992). Statism may result from authoritarian characteristics of the political
system. Thus, in authoritarian structures, external shocks may not lead to policy change mainly
because minority coalitions, or even the public, are not allowed to challenge a government or the
dominant coalition backed by a government. Rather, this study shows that the dominant pro-
nuclear coalition can exploit external shocks in order to further strengthen its power in the policy
subsystem.
On the other hand, as the ACF expects, an external shock can serve as a pathway to
policy change in pluralistic structures. In the pluralistic structure that existed after the
democratization movement, the South Korean public was able to obtain information from anti-
nuclear research groups and pay more attention to the negative effects of nuclear energy
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1991). Public opinion is no longer manipulated by the government and
overwhelmed by the complexity of nuclear physics. In addition, the pluralistic structure reduces
the costs of information and collaboration so that proponents of policy change can easily form an

27. 26
anti-nuclear coalition. Furthermore, the pluralistic structure provides different open decision-
making venues (e.g., the legislature and the court) through which anti-nuclear coalitions can find
successful venue-shopping strategies. The transition from authoritarian to pluralist structure in
South Korea attenuated the monopoly power of the pro-nuclear coalition, and the 2011
Fukushima accident shocked the policy subsystem and redistributed resources and public support,
allowing the anti-nuclear coalition to defeat the pro-nuclear policy. That is, coalitions for anti-
nuclear interests can exploit the 2011 Fukushima accident to attenuate (and/or defeat) pro-
nuclear policies (Nohrstedt, 2009; Sabatier & Weible, 2007).
In a case study, a selection of outlier cases which are not explained by a theory is more
useful for theory building than a selection of cases which confirm the prediction of a theory. This
study contributes to expanding the applicability of the theory to cases of no policy change by
examining why the policy change does not occur despite an external shock.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that this study is not free from biases, and the findings
should be considered preliminary, not exhaustive. First, the case of South Korea’s nuclear energy
policy is selected for the extreme values of the COS (i.e., transition from authoritarian to
pluralistic structure) in order to study the mediating role of the structure in stark or obvious
forms. This selection bias may thus cause overgeneralization. Second, the case lacks
representativeness of large and diverse populations. South Korea has its own political, social,
economic, and cultural characteristics, so only contingent generalization of the findings to
similar cases is possible. For example, a regime change and a transition of the COS are
correlated in South Korea, but may not be in other countries. Finally, this study does not control
for geographical features of the three accidents. For example, the Fukushima accident was taken

28. 27
more seriously because it occurred only 650 miles away from the Korean peninsula.7
Thus, the
Korean people and mass media have paid more attention to this most recent nuclear accident
then the two previous ones.
The ACF has been developed through efforts to apply the theory in analyzing various
policies in different political systems (Nohrstedt, 2011). The results of this study contribute to
the ACF literature by examining how COS mediate or hinder the relationship between external
shocks and policy change. I hope future researchers will explore COS more deeply in different
political contexts in order to overcome the limitations of this study and further develop the
theory.
7
Chernobyl is about 4,500 miles away from South Korea, and TMI 6,800 miles.

29. 28
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35. 34
Appendix 1. The operation and construction of Korean nuclear power plants
NAME
Order of
NSSS and TG*
Date of
Construction Start
Date of
Commercial Operation
Planned
Shutdown
1 Kori-1 1969 Apr. 1972 Apr. 1978 2017
2 Kori-2 1974 Dec. 1977 July 1983 2023
3 Wolsong-1 1975 Oct. 1977 Apr. 1983 2022 or 2036
4 Kori-3 1978 Oct. 1979 Sep. 1985 2025
5 Kori-4 1978 Apr. 1980 Apr. 1986
6 Yonggwang-1 1979 June 1981 Aug. 1986
7 Yonggwang-2 1979 Dec. 1981 June 1987
8 Ulchin-1 1980 Jan. 1983 Sep. 1988
9 Ulchin-2 1980 July 1983 Sep. 1989
10 Yonggwang-3 1987 Dec. 1989 Mar. 1995
11 Yonggwang-4 1987 May 1990 Jan. 1996
12 Wolsong-2 1990 June 1992 July 1997
13 Ulchin-3 1991 July 1993 Aug. 1998
14 Ulchin-4 1991 Nov. 1993 Dec. 1999
15 Wolsong-3 1992 Mar. 1994 July 1998
16 Wolsong-4 1992 July 1994 Oct. 1999
17 Yonggwang-5 1995 June 1997 May 2002
18 Yonggwang-6 1995 Nov. 1997 Dec. 2002
19 Ulchin-5 1996 Oct. 1999 July 2004
20 Ulchin-6 1996 Sep. 2000 Apr. 2005
21 Shin-Kori-1 2002 June 2006 Feb. 2011
22 Shin-Kori-2 2002 June 2007 July 2012
23 Shin-Wolsong-1 2002 Nov. 2007 July 2012
24 Shin-Wolsong-2 2002 Sep. 2008 July 2015
25 Shin-Kori-3 2006 Oct. 2008 (Oct. 2016)
26 Shin-Kori-4 2006 Aug. 2009 (Mar. 2017)
27 Shin-Ulchin-1 2009 July 2012 (Apr. 2018)
28 Shin-Ulchin-2 2009 June 2013 (Feb. 2019)
29 Shin-Kori-5 2014 (Sep. 2016) (Oct. 2021)
30 Shin-Kori-6 2014 (Sep. 2017) (Oct. 2022)
* Scheduled date in parentheses.
** The Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) consists of a reactor and all of the components necessary to produce
high pressure steam, which will be used to drive a turbine generator (TG).
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