Counseling Disposition Reflection WorksheetDirections

Counseling Disposition Reflection Worksheet
Directions: Review the dispositions document and select three
dispositions that you currently meet. Complete the chart by
listing the dispositions met as well as a description of how you
meet the disposition. Include a citation and paraphrase the
definition. Please note: you do not need to be actively
practicing to complete this worksheet.
Disposition and Definition
Description of how the disposition is met (75-100 words)
1.
2.
3.
Directions: Now that you have identified dispositions that you
currently meet, review the disposition document again and
consider any dispositions that you do not meet. Complete the
chart below by adding the two dispositions you do not meet as
well as a preliminary plan in regards to how you plan to
improve the identified dispositions.
Description of how you plan to improve the disposition
(75-100 words)
1.

2.
© 2016. Grand Canyon University. All Rights Reserved.
5Coalition Formation in Eastern Europe
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXXII, 1, February
2007 5
JAMES N. DRUCKMAN
ANDREW ROBERTS
Northwestern University
Communist Successor Parties
And Coalition Formation
In Eastern Europe
One of the most distinctive features of new democracies is the
presence of
political parties associated with the old, repressive regime. This
article investigates
whether or not the Eastern European variant of these parties,
which we call communist
successor parties (CSPs), has affected coalition pol itics. It finds
that CSPs do have
significant effects on the dynamics of coalition formation. CSPs
are less likely than
other parties to be included in governing coalitions; coalitions
that include CSPs are

more likely to be oversized (that is, to include superfluous
parties); and CSPs that
make it into government are penalized, insofar as they receive
less than their fair
share of governing portfolios. We attribute these results to the
salience of the regime
divide—the affective dislike of many citizens for the legacies of
communism. Our
results extend research on coalition behavior to Eastern
European contexts and show
how affective dislike combined with vote-seeking motivations
can affect governing
behavior.
How do coalitions form and function in new democracies? Most
existing theories suggest that coalition formation in these
countries
should be driven by the same factors as in established
democracies:
the size and ideology of parties and the institutional framework
in
which they operate (see Martin and Stevenson 2001 for a
summary of
theories).
In this article, we look at one significant fact about new
democracies
that may produce a different sort of coalition politics. Most new
democracies are distinguished by the presence of successors to
the
former ruling parties. These successors may simply be accepted
as
normal players in the democratic game, but there are good
reasons to
believe they will be treated differently by other parties. After
all, the

successor parties are associated with regimes that, at best,
restricted
fundamental human rights and, at worst, murdered or
imprisoned
significant portions of their countries’ populations. It is thus
reasonable
6 James N. Druckman and Andrew Roberts
to expect that these parties will be seen as more than si mply
bearers of
legislative strength and ideology.
To address this issue, we examine coalition politics in 15
Eastern
European countries. Specifically, we studied the effect on
coalition
formation of what we call communist successor parties (CSPs),
the
parties that are the organizational successors to the former
ruling
communist parties.
We focused on three aspects of coalition politics: Do CSPs
enter
government to the same extent as other parties? Do the
governments
that CSPs enter differ from governments composed of other
parties?
And are CSPs allocated a proportional share of ministries when
they
enter government? In all three cases, we found evidence that
CSPs are
treated differently than other parties, even when we controlled

for their
legislative strength and ideology.
We believe that these anomalies stem from a combination of
affective dislike on the part of voters and party activists for
CSPs and
the vote-seeking motivations of party leaders. Party leaders
appear to
follow the lead of their electorates and party activists in
shunning CSPs
or limiting the CSPs’ influence on politics.
Our findings are particularly interesting because there has been
relatively little study of coalition formation in new
democracies.
Consistent with recent institutional theories of coalition
behavior (for
example, Martin and Stevenson 2001 and Strøm, Budge, and
Laver
1994), the results imply that understanding coalitional politics
requires
contextual knowledge about the substance of national politics.
Specifically, our findings suggest that scholars should pay more
attention to the affective attitudes of party electorates and elites
toward
rival parties. In cases where there is strong affective dislike of a
particular party, vote-seeking motivations may be as, or perhaps
even
more, important than office- and policy-seeking motivations of
parties.
I. Communist Successor Parties
Few topics in postcommunist politics have been studied as
intensively as communist successor parties, the parties that are
the

organizational successors to the old ruling parties. A review of
the
literature on this topic reveals at least two books, two edited
volumes,
and 18 articles devoted exclusively to the comparative analysis
of these
parties.1 Taking into account articles devoted to individual
successor
parties or to the place of CSPs in party systems substantially
adds to
this total. No other type of party—liberal, agrarian, nationalist,
or even
extremist—has received comparable study.
Why have these parties attracted so much attention? In the first
place, it came as a surprise to many scholars that these parties
survived
and, in some cases, transformed themselves. It was assumed that
parties
so closely associated with a repressive dictatorship would
quickly fall
by the wayside when faced with genuine competition.2
Moreover, it seemed unlikely that these parties would be able to
change their ways, given the heavy baggage that they carried
from the
past. Scholars expected these parties to remain as authoritarian
and
ideologically extreme as they had always been. For this reason,
the
ability of CSPs to win elections, first in Lithuania and Poland
and later in

other countries, led many observers to worry about a possible
reversion to
nondemocratic politics. When the election of these parties did
not
portend a return to communism, scholars wanted to know how
some
of these parties were able to transform themselves into
democratic parties.
Finally, students of postcommunist politics were interested in
how citizens and politicians would react to these parties. CSPs
were
intimately connected with some of the most repressive regimes
in
human history. Would citizens be able to forgive and forget
after the
fall of communism? Or would they hold grudges against these
parties
for the destruction their predecessors had inflicted? How
important,
in short, were legacies of the past?
A survey of the literature devoted to these parties finds that it is
focused almost entirely on party development.3 Virtually all of
this
work addresses the same two questions: (1) What explains the
success
of CSPs, either in merely surviving or in winning elections? and
(2) What explains a CSP’s ability or inability to transform into
a normal
democratic party? Most of this literature can thus be classed as
addressing the causes of these parties rather than their effects.
Instead of revisiting this research, we ask a different, and in
some
sense, more-consequential question: do CSPs matter politically?

Research has not yet shown that these parties have had a
definite effect
on politics in the region. Did it matter that CSPs managed to
survive
or transform themselves in the countries of Eastern Europe? Did
they
actually affect the substance of politics in the region? In
essence, ours
is the “so what?” question. We focus specifically on the
dynamics of
government formation and portfolio allocation. These areas are
particularly good for tests of these questions because they have
bred a
large literature (giving us a baseline of comparison) and they
are readily
quantifiable.
We believe that these questions are significant not only because
their answers may provide a validation of previous work, but
also
because they have important consequences for governance in the
region.
Government formation and the allocation of portfolios have
been shown
in numerous studies to shape policy outcomes and general well -
being
(see, for example, Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994 and
Lijphart 1999). Thus, if CSPs alter the dynamics of coalition
politics,
then this influence could ultimately have profound effects on
the politics

of the region.
II. CSPs and Coalition Theory
Just as studies on Eastern European politics have paid scant
attention to how CSPs affect coalition governance, the literature
on
coalition behavior has given limited consideration to governing
dynamics in Eastern Europe, instead focusing largely on
Western
Europe (see, however, Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2001;
Druckman
and Roberts 2005, N.d., and Grzymala-Busse 2001). That said,
coalition
theory, more generally, provides reasons to expect CSPs to
matter.
Over the last 20 years, researchers have shown how various
external constraints affect coalition behavior (see, for example,
De
Winter 1995; Druckman and Thies 2002; Huber 1996; Laver and
Schofield 1990, 195–215; Martin and Stevenson 2001, 35–38;
and
Mershon 1996). Most of these constraints come from
institutions and
include such things as formation rules (for instance, investiture
rules),
cabinet operation rules (such as votes of no confidence),
legislative
rules (such as dissolution rules), and party rules.
Most relevant for us, given our interest in CSPs, is the impact
of
party rules. Strøm, Budge, and Laver (1994) explain that
Party leaders may declare that they will, or will not, form

particular coalitions. . . .
The systematic exclusion of certain parties from coalition
bargaining is the most
striking party constraint found with any regularity. . . . The
examples of the
Gaullists or Communists in the French Fourth Republic, Sinn
Féin in Ireland, or
the Italian Communists in the 1950s show that certain parties,
as a consequence
of their strong “antisystem” stance, can effectively be
discounted as members of
any potential government. (317)
CSPs in Eastern Europe differ from these parties insofar as they
have
generally not been systematically excluded from government
formation
(Strøm, Budge, and Laver focus on Western Europe; also see
Martin
and Stevenson 2001, 37, 46; and Mershon 1994, 57; 2002, 40–
41). Yet
the basic idea that specific types of parties can alter the
dynamics of
coalition bargaining extends to the case of CSPs. Indeed, Strøm,
Budge,
and Laver (1994, 317) even acknowledge that “Besides
antisystem
parties [with whom other parties refuse to bargain], taboos are
often
attached to parties associated with the previous political
regimes,

especially undemocratic ones.” These types of parties impose
incentives
“that change the calculus of the decision maker” (Laver and
Schofield
1990, 202).
In the case of CSPs, constraints come from the internal party
politics and party electorates of the nonsuccessor parties (see
Strøm
1990a). That is, party activists and voters of the other parties
may
oppose coalitions with CSPs for affective reasons unrelated to
party
strength and ideology. Party leaders will heed these preferences
because, in addition to pursuing office and policy, they pursue
votes
and need to maintain support from activists and voters.
The underlying reason for these attitudes is what a considerable
literature has referred to as the “regime divide”—the affective
dislike
of former opponents of communism for those associated in any
way
with the communist system (Kitschelt et al. 1999).4 The
brutality of
the communist regime is said to have led victims of the regime
to
visceral distaste for representatives of that regime. In societies
flat-
tened by communism—and thus lacking many of the political
cleavages
found in established democracies—the division between
supporters
and opponents of the old regime appears to be one of the
strongest
political cleavages. Just as the Civil War generated lasting

political
cleavages in the United States, the trauma of 40 years of
communism
should leave a lasting imprint on postcommunist politics.
This emotional distaste may be so great that it overwhelms the
desire of some CSPs to draw a thick line between themselves
and the
previous ruling parties and to present themselves as normal
players in
the democratic game.5 For many citizens, and even politicians,
the
mere thought of a CSP provokes a negative emotional reaction.
We
should add that such a reaction is not usually in response to the
current
ideology of the party—several of these parties have quite
moderate
ideologies—or to its legislative strength—none of these parties
dominates politics in the way that the former rulers did.
We believe there are two ways in which the regime divide might
affect coalition politics.6 First, it is possible that party elites
affectively
dislike CSPs so intensely that the elites sacrifice some of the
benefits
of office and policy in order to punish CSPs. This dislike may
reflect
instrumental consequences generated by intraparty politics.
Strøm,
Budge, and Laver (1994, 318) explain that “senior politicians
interact
with activists in their own parties. Party leaders may believe
that some
coalitions would be sufficiently detrimental to their recruitment
of

candidates or activists to be avoided under all circumstances. Or
they
may believe that the benefits of a potential coalition would be
outweighed by the costs their own activists would impose in
irate
retaliation. . . . [T]hese risks may induce party leaders to refrain
from
otherwise attractive coalitions [for example, with CSPs].”
Second, and perhaps more important, the regime divide may
work
through the general electorate. In addition to seeking office and
policy
outcomes, parties also seek to maximize the votes they receive
in
present and future elections (Strøm 1990a). If party electorates
are
sufficiently opposed to coalitions with CSPs for the affective
reasons
we mentioned, then party elites will likely follow the
electorates’ lead.
Elites will avoid such coalitions or find ways to distance
themselves
from CSPs or keep CSPs in check within such coalitions. All of
these
strategies are motivated by a desire to avoid losing votes in
future
elections.7
As evidence of this vote-seeking motivation, Grzymala-Busse
(2001) has shown that parties that form coalitions with CSPs are

punished more strongly at the polls than parties that do not.
Anecdotal
evidence supports this view as well. Consider the active
movement in
the Czech Republic, spanning from left to right, called “One
Doesn’t
Speak with Communists” or the recent mobilizations of the
Hungarian
Fidesz party and the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) against
the
vestiges of communism embodied in quite liberal CSPs. The
fact that
parties in many states of the region campaign on the
anticommunism
and anti-CSP issue even today, 15 years after the transition,
indicates
that the issue must still touch a nerve with voters.8
III. Hypotheses
Given this logic, we expect that the presence of CSPs and this
regime divide will affect at least three areas of coalition
formation.
The first is participation in government. While CSPs surely
desire to
participate in government, it is possible that they are rarely
invited to
join governments. This exclusion could occur because of some
combination of affective dislike, intraparty consequences,
and/or fear
of electoral consequences. Theories of the regime divide would
thus
predict that CSPs are less likely to serve in government, all
other things
being equal. The same conclusion could flow from a
consideration of

the CSPs themselves. If they are so rigid because of their
authoritarian
past that they are unable to compromise with other parties, then
they
will be less likely to participate in coalition governments.
It is important to consider the ceteris paribus clause here. Are
CSPs less likely to serve in government, all else being equal?
The
important control variable is party ideology. CSPs may be
discrimi-
nated against because they are extremists, that is, because they
have
not broken ties with the past and renounced the politics of the
old
regime. A number of theories of government formation argue
that
ideology matters for government participation (for instance,
Laver
1998). We wished to determine if the mere fact of being a CSP
leads to
decreased participation regardless of ideology. Does the CSP
variable
add any explanatory power above and beyond ideology? Are
these
parties excluded from power merely for being who they are? We
discuss
our test of this hypothesis in Section V.
The second possible effect of the regime divide is on cabinet
types. If there is intense affective dislike for CSPs, then they

might
only enter government as part of surplus majority coalitions.
This is
for two reasons. First, oversized coalitions help other parties to
distance
themselves from the former communists in the eyes of voters
and thus
minimize electoral punishment. Second, the inclusion of extra
parties
helps to moderate the possibly extreme or reactionary policy
proposals
of the CSPs and the concomitant uncertainty that a CSP may
bring to
governing (Dodd 1976; Riker 1962). The formation of an
oversized
coalition with the former communists was widely noted after the
Hungarian elections of 1994.9 We aimed to determine if this
tendency
toward oversized coalitions has more-general applicability. We
discuss
our test of this hypothesis in Section VI.
The third effect of CSPs is on the allocation of portfolios once a
coalition has formed. In Western Europe, coalition parties tend
to
receive portfolios in nearly one-to-one proportion to their seat
share,
with a slight small-party bias.10 Dislike for CSPs, however,
may lead
the successor parties to be compensated less than
proportionally, as
other parties try to put distance between themselves and the
former
communists for the benefit of their electorates or party activists.
Even
when CSPs form governments, they may have to offer their

coalition
partners excess portfolios in order to induce the other parties to
join
the government. On the other hand, the possible authoritarian
tendencies
of these parties may lead them to demand more than their
proportionate
share. We discuss our test of these hypotheses in Section VII.
One final note is that there are reasons to expect, contrary to
our
hypotheses, that CSPs are treated the same as other parties. If
other
parties care mainly about office and policy, as has been
emphasized in
many theories, then these parties have strong incentives to
negotiate
with CSPs as they would with other parties. There are likely to
be
costs to discriminating against CSPs, and parties concerned only
about
office or policy should try to avoid these costs.
Our null hypothesis is thus that CSPs are not treated
anomalously
in government formation. If we cannot reject the null, then we
are left
to conclude that the party-specific history of the CSPs in
Eastern
European politics is not a significant factor in explaining
government
formation in this region. We would view a rejection of the null

as
evidence consistent with how constraints stemming from party
rules
(Strøm, Budge, and Laver 1994) in general and Eastern
European CSPs
in particular shape coalition politics.
IV. Data
We tested these hypotheses with a new dataset that includes
government formation decisions in Eastern Europe. The Eastern
European data come from nearly all coalitions in the 15 Eastern
European countries listed in Table 1, starting with the first
democrati-
cally elected government in each country and continuing
through
2002.11 This sample thus includes all of the parliamentary
democracies
in Eastern Europe for the lifetime of their existence. We
collected the
bulk of these data from Keesing’s Contemporary Archives,
although in
a few instances we drew on country-specific sources, including
data
directly from the country’s legislative archives.
For each government, we identified all parties in government,
every party with at least one seat in parliament (at the point of
govern-
ment formation), whether or not the party served in the previous
government, the seat share of the party, whether or not the party
was a
communist successor party, the party type of each party, and the
partisan
affiliation of each minister.

To determine if a party was a CSP, we followed Bozóki and
Ishiyama (2002).12 We drew the party type variable from
Armingeon
and Careja’s (2004) work. This variable labels each party as one
of 17
types specified by Lane, McKay, and Newton (1997):
communist,
postcommunist, left-socialist, socialist, pensioners, greens,
agrarian,
liberal, religious, conservative, nationalist, ultra-right, ethnic,
regional,
alliance, protest, and no-label. We labeled a small number of
parties
not included in their dataset ourselves. We used the party types
as a
proxy for ideology in the absence of more-direct measures. We
should
note that CSP is not a party type but a separate dummy variable;
for
example, some CSPs are classified as “communists,” while
others are
“socialists.” (We will discuss the details shortly.)
For most of the article, our unit of analysis is the party, since
we
are interested in explaining the inclusion of a party in
government and
the proportion of portfolios each party receives. We also use the
TA
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en
t.
coalition as our unit when we consider the influence of CSPs on
cabinet
types. In total, there are 76 coalition governments, 593 parties
in the
legislature, and 256 parties in government. In Table 1, we
report, for
each Eastern European country, the number of governments, the
number
of parties in the legislature and government, the years of the
first and
most recent governments, and the frequency of CSPs in the

legislature
and in government.
V. Government Participation
Are CSPs discriminated against in government formation? Table
1
gives an indication of the prevalence of CSPs in Eastern
Europe. Of
the 593 parties that received legislative sets in our dataset, 62
(11%)
were CSPs. As far as government participation goes, CSPs
constituted
32 of 256 parties (13%) in government. On the surface there
does not
appear to be discrimination, but these results do not control for
party
size and ideology.
Table 2 is a cross-tabulation of CSP and party type. As
mentioned,
CSPs come from various different types (that is, party type
reflects
ideology, whereas CSP status reflects historical origin). The
table shows
that CSPs fall into five different party types: communist,
postcommunist, left-socialist, socialist, and ethnic. Note that
CSPs make
up only 31% (62/202) of these five party types (the other 69%
of these
party types are not CSPs). This distinction will later allow us to
control
for ideology. There are other parties that share the same
ideological
space but do not carry the historical baggage of the CSPs.

To determine the causes of government participation, we would,
ideally, examine the factors that lead to the creation of different
coalitions. This analysis would require specifying all of the
possible
coalitions that might form and then measuring all factors that
might
affect formation, including ideology and institutional variables
(Martin
and Stevenson 2001).
We did not have access to all of these variables, and thus we
conducted a more-exploratory analysis to determine if there is
any
basis for believing that CSPs are treated differently than other
parties.
Our dependent variable in these regressions is whether or not a
party
participated in government. Because our dependent variable is
dichoto-
mous, we used logit regressions in all of the analyses that
follow.
We identified a number of independent variables that might
affect
government participation. First, conventional theories of size
predict
that larger parties are more likely to participate in government
(Martin
and Stevenson 2001). To account for this possibility, one of our
TABLE 2
CSP Legislative Parties

Party Typea Not CSP CSP Total
Communist 1 (number) 8 9
11% (row %) 89% 100%
1% (column %) 13% 5%
Postcommunist 2 18 20
10% 90% 100%
1% 29% 10%
Left-socialist 14 1 15
93% 7% 100%
10% 2% 7%
Socialist 72 33 105
69% 31% 100%
51% 53% 52%
Ethnic 51 2 53
96% 4% 100%
36% 3% 26%
Total 140 62 202
69% 31% 100%
100% 100% 100%
aTable includes only the parties belonging to the 5 listed party
types. Not included
are the following other party types, comprising 391 parties:
Pensioners, Green,
Agrarian, Liberal, Religious, Conservative, Nationalist,
Ultraright, Regional, Alliance,

Protest, Non-Label/others, for a total of 17 types (and 593
legislative parties).
Source: Armingeon and Careja 2004.
independent variables is the seat share of each party in
parliament.13 A
second variable that might affect participation is incumbency
(Martin
and Stevenson 2001; Strøm, Budge, and Laver 1994). Parties
that have
served in the previous government are more likely to serve in
the current
government; they are part of the status quo.
Finally, we included a measure of party ideology. Most theories
of government formation postulate that parties are at least
partially
motivated by policy. Parties thus judge the suitability of
coalition
partners by their policy stances. As a result, a party’s ideology
will
help to determine whether or not it enters government. Our
measure of
ideology is less precise than those of other studies, which use
expert
judgments or analyses of party manifestos to pinpoint specific
ideological locations; such measures are not yet publicly
available for
Eastern Europe. We therefore sought to capture ideology with
Armingeon and Careja’s (2004) coding of party types for all
political

parties in Eastern Europe. As previously noted, this measure
classifies
all parties in Eastern Europe into one of 17 party types, and
each CSP
is classified into one of these party types. Because CSP itself is
not a
party type, when we added party type controls we were able to
control
for the ideology of CSPs (see Table 2).
We ran all analysis with and without the incumbency variable,
because including incumbency reduces the size of the data
(from 593
to 475 parties), since the initial governments are excluded.
Fortunately,
the results are virtually identical, regardless of whether or not
we
include incumbency; thus, in Table 3, we only present the
results that
include incumbency (since it is itself significant). We therefore
report
results with 475 cases rather than 593. We report one-tailed
tests
because we clearly predicted a negative relationship between
CSP,
our key variable, and government participation.
Model 1 tests whether or not seat share and incumbency states
predict participation in government. The results for both
variables are
highly significant and in the correct direction. Larger parties
and
incumbents are more likely to participate in government. In
Model 2, we
introduced the variable in which we are interested theoretically.
The

communist successor party variable is highly significant,
substantively
large, and, as expected, has a negative sign. CSPs are far less
likely to
serve in governments than are other parties with the same seat
share.
We next introduced controls for ideology, aiming to determine
if
the penalty for being a CSP is due to the party’s ideology or to
the
mere fact of being a CSP. In Model 3, we added dummy
variables for
all five party types of the CSPs (communist, postcommunist,
left-
socialist, socialist, and ethnic). The results indicate that the
CSP penalty
is robust to the addition of these ideological controls: the CSP
variable
emerges as both negative and significant, while four of the five
dummies
are insignificant (postcommunists are marginally
advantaged).14
To get a sense of the substantive impact of the CSP effect, we
conducted a simulation using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and
King
1999). Setting all other variables at their means, we found that
being a
CSP reduces a party’s chances of serving in government on
average by
19% (from 42% to 23%).15 This appears to us to be a quite
substantial
effect. In sum, we have found that communist successor parties
are
less likely than other parties to participate in government, even

when
we control for size, incumbency, and ideology.
TABLE 3
Determinants of Government Participation
Dependent Variable: Whether or not a given party participated
in government
(1 = participated, 0 = did not participate)
Model
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Legislative seat share 5.95** 6.57** 6.76***
(.99) (1.06) (1.1)
Incumbencya 1.37** 1.35** 1.34***
(.22) (.22) (.22)
CSP –0.70* –1.08**
(.41) (.52)
Communist party 0.085
(1.2)
Postcommunist party 1.11
(.86)
Left-socialist party –0.52
(.67)
Socialist party 0.26

(.31)
Ethnic party –0.25
(.38)
Constant –1.56** –1.56** –1.63***
(.17) (.17) (.20)
Log-likelihood –268.4 –267.1 –265.6
Observations 475 475 475
aThe number of cases reduces to 475 because we exclude all
first governments in
which there were no incumbents. Results are robust if we
instead include all first
governments without the incumbency variable.
Note: Entries are logit coefficients, with standard errors in
parentheses.
***p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .1, one-tailed tests.
VI. Cabinet Types
Although CSPs are discriminated against in government forma-
tion, some CSPs do ultimately enter cabinets. In this section, we
address
the question of what these cabinets look like: what sort of
cabinets do
CSPs enter? Most theories of government formation predict the
formation of some form of minimal winning coalition, but there
have
been several attempts to account for minority and oversized

coalitions
(see Martin and Stevenson 2001; Strøm 1990b; and Volden and
Carrubba 2004). What these theories explicitly do not
hypothesize is
that certain parties will tend to join one type of coalition more
than
others.
We argue, however, that the desire of most democratic parties
to
distance themselves from communist successor parties might
lead them
to be part of distinctive coalitions. In particular, CSPs should
more
commonly end up in oversized coalitions. Oversized coalitions
would
serve two purposes for non-CSPs. First, they would help protect
non-
CSPs’ reputations. Accountability is harder in large coalitions
because
of the difficulty in pinpointing responsibility. Parties that have
to enter
coalitions with the former communists might demand to add
extra
parties, so as not to look like they are too close to the CSPs.
Second,
extra parties would help to restrain the communists and promote
consensus in policymaking (and also lessen the uncertainty
involved
with predicting CSP behavior; see Dodd 1976 and Riker 1962).
The
more parties that are included in the coalition, the less influence
the
communists will have, since voting in the council of ministers
typically
gives each minister one vote.

Our data confirm this expectation. Table 4 shows the percentage
of cabinet types including and not including CSPs.16 A full
78% (25/
32) of governments with CSPs are oversized, compared to only
43%
(19/44) of governments without CSPs (z = 3.05; p < .01 for one-
tailed
difference-of-proportions test). While minimal winning
coalitions and
minority coalitions are common—constituting 56.5% (9/44 are
minority and 16/44 are minimal winning) of the total—in
governments
without CSPs, they are quite rare—only 21.5% (3/32 are
minority and
4/32 are minimal winning)—in governments that include a CSP.
These results raise an intriguing question: if coalitions add
surplus
parties to protect themselves against CSPs, then why do they
include
CSPs in the first place? We have some preliminary evidence
that
suggests that, in most cases, governing parties include CSPs
because
it is necessary if the parties hope to maintain a governing
majority. We
show this necessity by exploring the rate at which CSPs in
govern-
ment are pivotal. A party is pivotal when its removal changes a
majority
coalition to a minority coalition (Schofield and Laver 1985).
We found
that 69% (22/32) of the CSPs in government are pivotal,
compared to
only 39% (87/224) of non-CSPs in government (z = 3.21; p <

.01 for
two-tailed difference-of-proportions test). Moreover, nearly all
of the
ten nonpivotal CSPs in government belonged to exceptional
coalitions:
three of them belonged to minority coalitions in which no party
was
TABLE 4
Cabinet Types in Eastern Europe
Cabinet Type No CSPs in Government A CSP in Government
Total
Minority 20.5% (9) 9.0% (3) 16% (12)
Minimal Winning 36.0% (16) 12.5% (4) 26% (20)
Oversized 43.0% (19) 78.0% (25) 58% (44)
Total 100% (44) 100% (32) 100% (76)
pivotal by definition, and six of them belonged to near-unity
coalitions.
In the latter cases, parties controlled approximately 91% of the
legis-
lative seats, meaning that, to be pivotal, a particular party
would have
to be composed of a near majority itself.17
In short, we find that CSPs are usually included in governments
because they are necessary for a majority. Of course, one may

question
the desirability of having a majority when a minority without a
CSP is
sustainable (see, for example, Strøm 1990b). But there are good
reasons
why parties might prefer to join majority coalitions in transition
countries. Majorities should help coalitions to pass legislation.
In times
of major reforms, and particularly reforms with enormous
distribu-
tional consequences, parties would like the security of having a
reliable
majority in parliament. Also, parliamentary voting in new
democracies
tends to be unstable, and parties may not be able to discipline
their
members (Andrews 2002). There is also a high rate of party
switching
among members of parliament (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003; Shabad
and
Slomczynski 2004). This switching makes majorities even more
important, and we suspect it enables CSPs to enter
governments—
governments which, in turn, try to protect themselves from
CSPs by
forming oversized coalitions that dilute the visibility and
influence of
the former communists.18
VII. Ministerial Allocation
We now turn to our third dependent variable. The way that port-
folios are allocated to parties in a governing coalition has been
closely
studied in Western Europe. This research has revealed one of
the stron-

gest relations in political science. Gamson’s Law postulates that
each
coalition party receives portfolios in direct proportion to the
percentage
of seats that it contributes to the coalition (see Gamson
1961).19 For
example, a party with 30% of the seats in a coalition receives
about
30% of the portfolios.
It is not clear if Gamson’s Law is a universal law, applying in
all
contexts, or is specific to the circumstances of Western Europe.
One
possible challenge to the law comes from communist successor
parties
in Eastern Europe. If these parties behave differently or are
treated
differently than other parties, then this bias might show up in
the process
of portfolio allocation.
Indeed, the regime divide theory argues that rival parties harbor
negative feelings toward CSPs. This ill will may result in CSPs
being
undercompensated relative to proportionality. Other parties may
be
reluctant to grant CSPs their fair share of ministries. In turn,
CSPs
may be willing to sacrifice some of their fair share in order to
be allowed

into governments. On the other hand—and contrary to the
general
regime-divide theoretical framework—if CSPs maintain their
authori-
tarian ways from communism, then they might be expected to
demand
more than their fair share of portfolios. Winner-take-all norms
were
common under communism and might be expected to persist,
particu-
larly for successor parties. In this case, we would expect CSPs
to receive
more than their fair share of portfolios.
To test these possibilities, our dependent variable is the
percentage
of portfolios allocated to the party in question. Previous work
has
identified two independent variables that affect the percentage
of port-
folios that a party receives. One is the percentage of legislative
seats
that a party contributes to the coalition (a la Gamson’s Law;
see, for
example, Browne and Franklin 1973). We refer to this variable
as seat
share. The other variable is whether or not a party is a
formateur. There
remains controversy, however, about whether formateurs tend to
be
under- or overcompensated (see Ansolabehere et al. 2005;
Baron and
Ferejohn 1989; Harrington 1990; Morelli 1999; and Warwick
and
Druckman 2001, 2006). We add to these variables a new
variable indi-

cating whether or not a party is a communist successor party.
This is
the variable we are interested in theoretically.20
Following Warwick and Druckman (2001), we ran OLS regres-
sions without an intercept, although the results are robust to
alternative
specifications, such as including an intercept. Because we left
out the
intercept, we did not include main-effect dummy variables, as
this step
would have been akin to including an intercept. Thus, both the
formateur variable and the CSP variable are interacted with the
seat
share variable. If the CSP interaction term is significant, then
this result
indicates that CSPs are allocated portfolios nonproportionally.
TABLE 5
Portfolio Allocation in Eastern Europe
(standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent Variable: Party’s share of portfolios
Model
Independent Variable (4) (5) (6)
Seat contribution 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.94***
(.02) (.04) (.04)
Formateur status x Seat contribution 0.03 0.08*

(.04) (.05)
CSP x Seat contribution –0.17***
(0.04)
Observations 256 256 256
Note: Entries are OLS unstandardized slope coefficients, with
intercepts set equal to 0.
***p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .1, two-tailed tests.
Table 5 presents our regression results.21 (We report two-tailed
significance tests because of our dueling hypotheses about the
CSP
effect.) In Model 4, we included only the seat share variable.
The
variable is highly significant and nearly proportional (beta =
0.94).
Model 5 included the formateur interaction term. This variable
is
insignificant, indicating that formateurs are neither under- nor
over-
compensated relative to their seat shares. The seat share
variable
remains significant and substantively almost identical.
We next included the CSP interaction variable. Model 6 shows
that this variable is both highly significant and substantively
important.
The negative sign on the variable indicates that CSPs receive
less than
their proportional share of portfolios. The effect is also
substantively
important. Communist successor parties receive approximately
17%
less than their fair share of portfolios. We also see in this

regression
that, once we control for CSP status, formateurs receive a slight
bonus.
Thus, non-CSP formateurs take more than their share. This
pattern
differs from that found in Western Europe, a distinction we
have
explored in other work (see Druckman and Roberts 2005).
In short, CSPs are penalized in portfolio allocation. The fact
that
they are penalized lends itself to an important interpretation. At
the
outset of this section, we suggested two possible outcomes to
alloca-
tion: If CSPs act like their predecessors, then they will demand
over-
compensation. If they are the object of other parties’ disdain,
then CSPs
will be undercompensated. Our finding of undercompensation
indicates
that the decisive factor is not the CSPs themselves but the
attitude of
other parties toward them.
VIII. Time and Space
These results convince us that CSPs elicit distinctive coalition
dynamics in Eastern Europe, but there may also be variations
across
time or space. First, our theory is based on the affective dislike

of
voters and elites toward the former communists. It is likely that
these
emotions will diminish over time as memories fade and the
former
communists become accepted players in the democratic game.
To probe
this possibility, we reran our analyses, cutting our sample at its
midpoint
of 1996. We found that the two time periods looked very
similar. All of
the aspects of CSP discrimination we uncovered in the previous
analyses
appear both before and after 1996. (We experimented with
various other
time splits, and in no instance did we find a significant time
effect.)
While this result strikes us as surprising, it does correspond
with
qualitative observations of the region. In three of the most
recent
elections in the region (in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic),
a key—perhaps the dominant—element in the campaigns of
right-wing
parties was an evocation of the dangers or injustice of letting
CSPs
rule. The regime divide appears to have considerable power to
structure
politics even 15 years after the transition.
Eastern Europe also features considerable variation over space.
As Kitschelt et al. (1999) note, Eastern Europe exhibits
considerably
more spatial diversity than other regions in the world. Indeed,

many
analyses have divided the region into more-advanced and less-
advanced
halves (King 2000; Vachudova and Snyder 1997). By “more
advanced,”
we mean countries widely considered to have attained standards
of
democracy and development close to those of the established
democ-
racies of Western Europe. By contrast, “less-advanced”
countries have
significant shortcomings in the functioning of both democracy
and the
economy. The more-advanced countries entered the European
Union
(EU) in May 2004, they have been more democratic as measured
by
Freedom House, and they have higher incomes and higher
scores on
the World Bank’s Human Development Index. The less-
advanced coun-
tries did not enter the EU and have significantly lower ratings
on the
other measures.
For the purposes of our analyses, the key fact would be whether
or not attitudes toward the former communists differ between
these
two groups of countries. We do not have direct evidence on this
point,22
but we have some reason to believe that there are differences.

More-
advanced countries have a considerably larger middl e class,
which
sees communism as having limited its opportunities to attain
Western
standards of living. These individuals are thus more likely to
hold a
grudge against the CSPs and punish cooperation with them. In
less-
advanced countries, by contrast, the middle class is much
smaller, and
there is a much larger lower class whose position has worsened
since
the end of communism. As a result, there should be greater
acceptance
of the representatives of the old regime.
It is possible, of course, that we may witness the opposite
effects.
In less-advanced countries, the communist regime was typically
more
repressive than in the more-advanced ones. As a result, it is
possible
that CSPs will be viewed more negatively in less-advanced
countries
and discrimination will be more extreme there.
To test these ideas, we divided the sample into two groups. The
main variable we used to distinguish them was their average
Freedom
House score during the 1990s. Our advanced countries included
Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia; our non-advanced countries
included
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and
Slovakia.

This division also corresponds to the first wave of accession to
the
EU, with the exception of Slovakia, which is classed as less
advanced
(the results are robust to classifying Slovakia as more
advanced).
To determine if CSPs are treated differently when it comes to
government formation in the two groups of countries, we added
two
variables to Table 3, Model 3: a dummy variable distinguishing
between
more-advanced and less-advanced countries, and an interaction
between
this more-advanced/less-advanced variable and the CSP
variable. The
interaction is marginally significant (p ≤ .15).
It is thus possible that the regime divide is stronger in the more-
advanced countries. Citizens of these countries might view the
old
regime as having impeded their development and thus wish to
punish
the successors to these parties. Citizens of less-advanced
countries are
less likely to harbor negative affect toward communism and
thus are
less likely to penalize parties associated with the old regime.
We
emphasize, however, that this supposition is quite speculative,
given
the marginal significance of the result. Also, when we turn to
cabinet
types and portfolio allocation, we find no significant differences
across
regions. Cabinets with CSPs have a higher likelihood of being

over-
sized than those that do not include CSPs, in both less-advanced
and
more-advanced countries, and portfolio allocation in both types
of
countries awards less than a proportional number of portfolios
to CSPs.23
IX. Conclusion
Although scholars of parliamentary government have often
recognized that the identity of individual parties matters for
coalition
formation, this fact has not often been included in quantitative
studies.
Preference has been given to the more analytically tractable
concepts
of legislative strength and ideology.
The experience of Eastern European countries provides an inter-
esting example of how party identity may matter for coalition
formation.
These countries have recently emerged from dictatorships that
have
left important scars on the polity. These scars remain fresh
because
representatives of the old regime continue to contest elections
in the
new regime. There are thus good reasons to believe that other
parties,
and particularly their electorates, will view communist
successor parties

not only in terms of their legislative strength and ideology, but
also in
terms of their identity as representatives of the old regime.
In this article, we have shown that this bias emerges in three
facets of government formation. Communist successor parties
are less
likely to enter government than other parties, and when they do
enter
government, they tend to be part of oversized coalitions and to
be
allocated less than their proportional share of portfolios. CSPs
do suffer
discrimination at the hands of other parties purely for what they
are.
While we do not have direct evidence on why CSPs suffer from
discrimination, these results appear to be consistent with
theories of
the regime divide in the region. The most plausible explanation
is that
the electorates of parties associated with the opposition to
commu-
nism still hold affective dislike for their former oppressors and
wish to
penalize them. Parties will presumably heed these preferences,
because
they would lose votes by doing otherwise.
The implication is that scholars researching other new democra-
cies may want to pay more attention to the coalition preferences
of
voters. It is in these countries that the affective feelings of
voters toward
particular parties are likely to be the strongest, and parties thus
face
considerable pressure to attend to these preferences.

This research validates both the suggestion of coalition theorists
that party identity may matter in coalition formation and the
idea that
vote-seeking plays an important role in parties’ decisions about
coalitions. Neither idea is new, but both have been neglected in
the
quantitative study of coalition politics. Our results suggest that
scholars
should pay more attention to affective dislike between
supporters of rival
parties and the consequences this bias has for parties that, in
addition to
seeking office and policy outcomes, worry about their future
electability.
We believe two extensions of this research to be especially
compelling (in addition to the aforementioned need to analyze
coalition
formation using Martin and Stevenson’s approach). First,
scholars
might ask if CSPs affect other facets of coalition government,
such as
government duration and, most important, policy choices.
Studies of
Western Europe suggest that the composition of governments
does
affect policy, but this influence has yet to be shown in Eastern
Europe.
The second extension would be to investigate whether or not
these
legacies of the old regime matter in other new democracies. Are

repre-
sentatives of the old regime penalized more generally, or are
our results
specific to the postcommunist world?
James N. Druckman ([email protected]) is Associate
Professor of Political Science and Andrew Roberts
([email protected]) is Assistant Professor of Political
Science, both at Northwestern University, 601 University Place,
Evanston, IL 60208.
NOTES
We thank Michael Parkin for research assistance and Lanny
Martin and the
reviewers for helpful comments. Druckman acknowledges
support from the University
of Minnesota McKnight Land-Grant Professorship and from
Northwestern University’s
AT&T Research Scholar Funds.
1. Among the comparative works on the topic are Bozóki and
Ishiyama 2002;
Curry and Urban 2003; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Grzymala-
Busse 1998, 2001, 2002a;
Ishiyama 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Ishiyama and
Bozóki 2001; Mahr
and Nagle 1995; Moraski and Loewenberg 1999; Orenstein
1998; Waller 1995; and
Ziblatt 1998. Many more articles focusing on individual CSPs
could be cited.
2. This expectation is frequently exaggerated. Even the most
repressive dicta-
torships serve some constituency that might be expected to
continue its support after a

democratic transition.
3. Exceptions include Bunce 2002; Grzymala-Busse 2001,
2002b; and Ishiyama
1999c. In fact, Grzymala-Busse’s (2001) article considers the
same issue as this article—
the effect of the communist legacy on coalition formation. Our
article extends her
work by taking a large-N approach, allowing the inclusion of
control variables, and
looking at additional aspects of coalition formation.
4. Kitschelt et al. (1999, 65) define the regime divide as the
phenomenon wherein
“memories about old-regime performance, periodically updated
by more recent events,
affect people’s orientation toward the pre-democratic
incumbents.” Grzymala-Busse
(2001, 85) calls it “the depth and character of the persisting
conflict between the
successors to the pre-1989 Communist parties and the parties
emerging from the
Communist-era opposition.”
5. All of the successor parties considered here have proclaimed,
rhetorically at
least, support for the democratic process.
6. Grzymala-Busse (2001) suggests an additional way, the
desire of parties to
build reputations. While we agree with this outlook, we believe
that this desire works

through the vote-seeking motivation that we emphasize, as
Grzymala-Busse herself
seems to suggest.
7. We would add the possibility that CSPs elicit distinctive
dynamics because
they behave differently than other parties, perhaps by retaining
their authoritarian
ways. We later discuss this possibility in more detail, but we do
not find any confir-
mation of it. It is worth noting that this expectation generates
predictions that are the
opposite of those suggested by the regime divide theory.
8. There are additional reasons why vote seeking might be
particularly
important in Eastern Europe. First, voters have punished
incumbents quite heavily in
the region. Vote losses in the double digits are the norm rather
than the exception for
sitting governments (Roberts 2006). Further, parties appear and
disappear with great
frequency in the region (Rose and Munro 2003). A single poor
election result is often
enough to push a party into oblivion. Parties thus have good
reason to weigh care-
fully the possibility of offending their electorates, even if they
are tempted by the
spoils of office and policy influence.
9. The Hungarian Socialist Party won 54% of the seats in this
election and
yet still entered a coalition with the second-place party, the
Alliance of Free Democrats.
10. As we will discuss later, there is an active debate about

whether formateurs
are advantaged or disadvantaged in portfolio allocation (see
Warwick and Druckman
2006).
11. We excluded caretaker governments, technocratic
(nonpartisan) govern-
ments, and single-party governments. We also included only
those governments that
passed an investiture vote (if one was held). A government ends
and another one
begins when an election occurs, the head of government
changes, the party member-
ship of the government changes, or the government resigns
(Warwick and Druckman
2001, 633). Data details are available from the authors.
12. Following all other work on the topic, we did not count the
puppet allies of
the communist party, such as the Polish Peasants’ Party.
Citizens surely realized that
these parties did not exercise any power, and thus the parties
should not have been
blamed for the regime’s crimes.
13. Martin and Stevenson (2001) have found that it is not size
per se that
affects entry into government but rather formateur status.
Parties that are formateurs
are more likely to enter government. Because all of the
formateurs in our dataset
entered government (that is, we coded only successful
formateurs, for the purposes
of portfolio allocation), we cannot test this possibility here.
Since, however, size is
related to formateur status—larger parties are more likely to be

formateurs—this
omission should not bias our results. Indeed, in our dataset, the
average seat share of
formateurs is 37% compared to 11% for nonformateurs.
14. We conducted several robustness checks on these results.
First, since our
data include different numbers of coalitions in each country
(e.g., one in Serbia, nine
in Poland), some countries may influence the results more than
others. We thus reran
our regressions using country weights, and we found no
substantive difference from
the results reported in Table 3. Second, participation by the
same parties in the same
coalition-formation episode is not independent. We thus ran
specifications that used
clustering on the formation episode and robust standard errors.
Again, we found no
difference in results using this specification. Third, we added
dummies for parties on
the far right—nationalist and ultra-rightist parties. Again, the
CSP variable remains
highly significant, although we did find that nationalists are
penalized as well.
Strangely, ultra-rightist parties are not treated differently.
Finally, we included an
interaction term between CSP and seat share, as the impact of
CSP status may depend
on seat share. The interaction term is marginally significant at
first (as CSPs grow

larger, they are advantaged relative to other parties), but the
significant effect disappears
when we control for incumbency. The main effect of CSPs
remains, despite these
controls.
15. Details, including standard errors, are available from the
authors.
16. There are no cases of multiple CSPs in governme nt. We also
conducted
regression analyses that control for the number of parties in the
coalition, the number
of parties in the legislature, and the types of parties in the
coalition. Even with the
inclusion of these controls, the presence of a CSP still makes a
coalition significantly
more likely to be oversized.
17. The one exception was the first Slovenian government,
which was neither
a minority nor a near-unity coalition, although it did control
68% of the legislative
seats. We also note that, among majority governments, 46.5%
(87/187) of non-CSPs
were pivotal, compared to 75% (22/29) of CSPs (z = 2.86, p <
.01 for a two-tailed
difference-of-proportions test).
18. Note two other points. First, CSPs are not more likely to be
pivot parties
when we control for party size. This result is of limited interest,
however, because it
simply reveals the tautology that larger parties are more likely
than smaller parties to
be pivotal. The fact is that when such larger parties are CSPs,

they are included,
presumably because of their pivotal status. In other cases, CSPs
tend not be included,
whereas other parties are. Second, we found that, in many cases,
a CSP in govern-
ment is the only pivotal party. Among majority coalitions, only
13% (11/87) of non-
CSPs are the single pivotal party in a coalition. The analogous
figure for CSPs is
59% (13/22).
19. There is typically some deviation from proportionality in
the form of a
small-party bias, such that small parties receive a bit more than
their share and large
parties, including the formateurs, receive less (see Warwick and
Druckman 2001,
2006).
20. We did not include controls for ideology or incumbency in
this analysis.
Prior work has not considered these variables, and we do not
see any reason why
they should affect portfolio allocation. Furthermore, ideology
controls would suffer
from multicollinearity with the CSP variable, as the ideologies
of CSPs that enter
government are much more limited than the types that receive
legislative seats. When
we regress the CSP interaction on the country dummy
interactions, the R2 is .89.
21. As in the analysis of participation, we also ran regressions
with country
weights to account for the fact that some countries have more
coalitions than others.

These weights do not affect the substantive results.
22. Ideal would be comparative public opinion data on attitudes
toward CSPs
as acceptable members of government. We would be particularly
interested in the
intensity of these feelings, as that would give us an idea of
whether or not there
would be electoral punishment for forming coalitions with
CSPs. We did find data
from the New Democracies Barometer on attitudes toward the
old regime in general
(Rose and Haerpfer 1996). These data indicate that advanced
countries are slightly
more likely to view the communist regime negatively, but the
differences are not
large.
23. In other work, we have found that the formateur effect
differs between the
two groups of countries; this finding does not have implications
for CSPs per se, however
(see Druckman and Roberts 2005).
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Counseling Disposition Reflection Worksheet
Directions: Review the dispositions document and select three
dispositions that you currently meet. Complete the chart by
listing the dispositions met as well as a description of how you
meet the disposition. Include a citation and paraphrase the
definition. Please note: you do not need to be actively
practicing to complete this worksheet.
Description of how the disposition is met (75-100 words)
1.
2.
3.

Directions: Now that you have identified dispositions that you
currently meet, review the disposition document again and
consider any dispositions that you do not meet. Complete the
chart below by adding the two dispositions you do not meet as
well as a preliminary plan in regards to how you plan to
improve the identified dispositions.
Description of how you plan to improve the disposition
(75-100 words)
1.
2.

Counseling Disposition Reflection WorksheetDirections

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