The State System and the State Elite i There is one p relim in a ry p rob lem a b o u t the state w h ich is v e ry seldom considered, y e t w h ich requires attention i f the discussion o f its nature and role is to b e p ro p e rly focused. T h is is the fact that ‘the state* is n o t a th ing, th at it does not, as such, exist. What ‘the state’ stands for is a n u m b er o f p a rtic u la r institutions Which, together, constitute its reality, and w h ich in te ra ct as parts o f w h at m a y b e called th e state system. T h e point is b y no m eans acad em ic. F o r the treatm en t o f one part o f the state - u su ally the g overn m en t - as the state itse lf introduces a m ajor elem ent o f confusion in the discussion o f the nature and in cid en ce o f state power; a n d th a t confusion can have large p olitical consequences. T h u s, i f it is b elieved th a t the government is in fact the state, it m a y also be believed th at the assumption o f g o vern m en ta l p o w er is eq u iva len t to the a c q u i­ sition o f state p ow er. S u ch a belief, restin g as it does on vast assumptions a b o u t the n a tu re o f state p ow er, is fra u g h t w ith great risks and disappointm ents. T o understand th e n a tu re o f state power, it is necessary first o f a ll to distinguish, and then to relate, the various elem ents w h ich m ak e u p the state system. It is not very surp rising th a t g overn m en t a n d state should often ap pear as synonym ous. F o r it is the govern m en t w hich speaks on the state’s behalf. I t w as the state to w h ich W e b er was referring w h en he said, in a fam ous phrase, th at, in o rd er to be, it must ‘successfully c la im the m on op oly o f the legitim ate use o f p h ysical force w ithin a g iv en territory’ . B u t ‘the state’ cannot claim a n y th in g : o n ly th e govern m en t o f th e d a y , o r its duly em pow ered agents, can. M e n , it is often said, give their 50 The State in Capitalist Society allegia n ce n o t to the g overn m en t o f the d a y b u t to the state. But 7 the state, from this p o in t o f view , is a nebulous e n tity ; and - w h ile m en m a y choose to g iv e their a llegia n ce to it, it is to the ' g o vern m en t th a t th e y are req u ired to g ive th eir obedience. A defian ce o f its orders is a defiance o f the state, in whose name’' the g o vern m en t alon e m a y speak and for w hose actions it m usr assume u ltim a te responsibility. T h is, h ow ever, does n o t m ean th a t the g o vern m en t is neces- - sarily strong, e ith er in relation to oth er elem ents o f the state ' system or to forces outside it. O n the con trary, it m a y be very w eak, and p ro vid e a m ere fa ca d e for one or o th er o f these oi her elem ents a n d forces. In oth er words, the fa c t th at the govern- m ent does speak in the nam e o f the sta.

1. The State System and
the State Elite
i
There is one p relim in a ry p rob lem a b o u t the state w h ich
is v e ry
seldom considered, y e t w h ich requires attention i f the
discussion
o f its nature and role is to b e p ro p e rly focused. T h is is
the fact
that ‘the state* is n o t a th ing, th at it does not, as such, exist.
What ‘the state’ stands for is a n u m b er o f p a rtic u la r
institutions
Which, together, constitute its reality, and w h ich in te ra ct as
parts o f w h at m a y b e called th e state system.
T h e point is b y no m eans acad em ic. F o r the treatm en t o f
one
part o f the state - u su ally the g overn m en t - as the state
itse lf
introduces a m ajor elem ent o f confusion in the discussion o
f the
nature and in cid en ce o f state power; a n d th a t confusion
can
have large p olitical consequences. T h u s, i f it is b elieved th

2. a t the
government is in fact the state, it m a y also be believed th at
the
assumption o f g o vern m en ta l p o w er is eq u iva len t to
the a c q u i-
sition o f state p ow er. S u ch a belief, restin g as it does on
vast
assumptions a b o u t the n a tu re o f state p ow er, is fra u g h
t w ith
great risks and disappointm ents. T o understand th e n a tu re o
f
state power, it is necessary first o f a ll to distinguish, and then
to
relate, the various elem ents w h ich m ak e u p the state
system.
It is not very surp rising th a t g overn m en t a n d state should
often ap pear as synonym ous. F o r it is the govern m en t w
hich
speaks on the state’s behalf. I t w as the state to w h ich W e b
er
was referring w h en he said, in a fam ous phrase, th at, in o
rd er to
be, it must ‘successfully c la im the m on op oly o f the legitim
ate
use o f p h ysical force w ithin a g iv en territory’ . B u t ‘the
state’
cannot claim a n y th in g : o n ly th e govern m en t o f th e d
a y , o r its
duly em pow ered agents, can. M e n , it is often said, give their
50 The State in Capitalist Society
allegia n ce n o t to the g overn m en t o f the d a y b u t to the

3. state. But 7
the state, from this p o in t o f view , is a nebulous e n tity ;
and -
w h ile m en m a y choose to g iv e their a llegia n ce to it, it is
to the '
g o vern m en t th a t th e y are req u ired to g ive th eir
obedience. A
defian ce o f its orders is a defiance o f the state, in whose
name’'
the g o vern m en t alon e m a y speak and for w hose actions it
m usr
assume u ltim a te responsibility.
T h is, h ow ever, does n o t m ean th a t the g o vern m en t is
neces- -
sarily strong, e ith er in relation to oth er elem ents o f the
state '
system or to forces outside it. O n the con trary, it m a y be
very
w eak, and p ro vid e a m ere fa ca d e for one or o th er o f
these oi her
elem ents a n d forces. In oth er words, the fa c t th at the
govern-
m ent does speak in the nam e o f the state a n d is formally
invested w ith state p ow er, does n o t m ean th a t it
effectively
controls th a t p ow er. H o w far governm ents do control it is
one of
the m ajor questions to b e determ ined.
A second elem ent o f the state system w h ic h requires
investi-'
g a tio n is the adm in istrative one, w h ic h n o w extends far
beyond
the tra d itio n a l b u re a u c ra cy o f th e state, and w h ich
encompasses^

4. a larg e v a r ie ty o f bodies, often related to p a rtic u la r
ministerial
dep artm en ts, or en jo y in g a gre a te r or lesser degree o f
autonomy
- p u b lic corporations, cen tra l banks, re g u la to ry
commissions,
etc. - a n d concerned w ith the m an agem en t o f the
economic,
social, c u ltu ra l a n d o th e r activities in w h ic h the state
is now"
d ire ctly o r in d ire c tly in vo lved . T h e ex tra o rd in a ry
grow th of
this adm in istrative and b u rea u cra tic elem ent in a ll
societies,
in clu d in g a d van ced cap ita list ones, is o f course one o f
the most
ob vious features o f con tem p orary lif e ; a n d the relation
o f its ~
le a d in g m em bers to the g overnm ent a n d to society is
also
c ru c ia l to the determ in atio n o f the role o f th e state.
F o rm a lly, officialdom is a t the service o f the political
executive, its ob ed ien t instrum ent, the tool o f its w ill. In
actual'
fa c t it is n o th in g o f the kind. E veryw h ere a n d in ev
ita b ly the
a d m in istrative process is also p a rt o f the p o litical
process;
ad m in istration is a lw ays p o litical as w ell as e xecu tive,
at least at
the levels w h ere p o licy-m a k in g is relevan t, th a t is to
say in the
u p p e r layers o f adm in istrative life. T h a t this is so is not
neoesv?
sarily due to adm inistrators’ desire th a t it should be so. O n

5. the "
co n tra ry , m a n y o f them m a y w ell w ish to shun
‘politics’".,
a lto g eth er and to le a v e ‘p o litica l’ m atters to the
politicians;^
The State System and the State Elite 5i
or alternatively to ‘dep oliticise’ the issues under discussion. K
a r l
jviannheim once noted that ‘the fu n d am en tal tend ency o f a
ll
Bureaucratic th ough t is to tu rn a ll p roblem s o f politics
into
problems o f adm in istration ’ . 1 But this, for the most p a rt,
m erely
flieans that p o litical considerations, attitudes a n d
assumptions
Pit incorporated, consciously o r not, in to the ‘problem s o f
administration’ , and correspondin gly affect the n atu re o f
administrative a d vice and action . O fficia ls and adm
inistrators
cannot divest themselves o f a ll id eological clo th in g in the
advice w hich th e y tender to their p o litical masters, or in the
independent decisions w h ich th ey are in a position to take.
T h e
power w hich top c iv il servants a n d oth er state adm
inistrators
possess no dou b t varies from c o u n try to coun try, from d
e p a rt-
ment to departm en t, a n d from in d iv id u a l to in d iv id u
a l. B ut
nowhere do these m en not con trib u te d irectly and a p p re c
ia b ly to

6. the exercise o f state p ow er. I f the regim e is w eak,
[email protected] a rapid#-'
ministerial turnover, a n d w ith no p ossibility o f sustained
ininisterial direction, as h ap p en e d u n d er the F ren ch F
ourth
Republic, civil servants w ill step into the v a cu u m and p la y
an
often dom inant p a r t in decision-m aking. B u t even w here
the
political execu tive is strong and stable, top adm inistrators are
Still able to p la y a n im p orta n t role in c ritic a l areas o f
p o lic y b y
tendering a d vice w h ic h governm ents often find it v e ry
difficult,
for one reason or another, to discount. H o w ev er m uch a rg u
-
ment there m a y be over the n a tu re and extent o f b u rea u
cra tic
power in these societies, the ra n g e o f possibilities m ust
exclu d e
the idea th at top civil servants can b e red u ced to the role o f
m ere
instruments o f p o lic y . A s Professor M e y n a u d notes, ‘
the
establishment o f an absolute separation betw een the p olitical
and adm inistrative sectors has n ev e r represented m u ch m
ore
than a sim ple ju r id ic a l fiction o f w h ic h the id eological
conse-
quences are n o t n e g lig ib le ’ .2
Some o f these considerations a p p ly to a ll other elem ents o
f the
state system. T h e y a p p ly for instance to a third such elem
ent,
namely the m ilitary , to w h ich m ay, for present purposes, be

7. added the p ara -m ilita ry , secu rity and p olice forces o f the
state,
and w hich together form th a t b ran ch o f it m ain ly
concerned
with the ‘m an ag em en t o f violen ce’ .
1 K . M an n h eim , Ideology and Utopia, 1952, p. 105.
2 M ey n a u d , La Technocratic, p. 68.
52 Tke State in Capitalist Society
In m ost cap italist countries, this coercive a p p aratu s con-;-
stitues a vast, sp ra w lin g a n d resourceful establishm ent,
whose
professional leaders are m en o f h ig h status and grea t
influence!
inside the state system a n d in society. N ow h ere has the
inflation
o f the m ilita ry establishm ent been m ore m arked since the
second w o rld w a r th an in th e U n ited States, a co u n try
w h ich
h a d p revio u sly b een h ig h ly civ ilia n -o rie n ted .1 A n
d m u ch the
sam e kind o f inflation has also occu rred in the forces o f
‘internal
se cu rity’ , not o n ly in the U n ite d States; it is p r o b a b ly
the case:
th a t never before in a n y cap italist cou n try, save in Fascist
Italy
a n d N a z i G e rm a n y, has such a larg e proportion o f p
eop le been!
em ployed on p olice an d repressive duties o f one kind o r
another.

8. W h a te v e r m a y be the case in p ractice, the form al
constitu. :
tional position o f the adm in istrative a n d coercive elements
is tQ:
serve the state b y serving the govern m en t o f the day. In
contrast,
i t is n o t a t a ll the fo rm a l constitution al d u ty o f ju d g
es, at least!
in W estern -typ e p o litic a l systems, to serve the purposes o
f their
governm ents. T h e y are con stitution ally in d ep en d en t o f
the!
p o litic a l ex e c u tiv e a n d p rotected from it b y security
o f tenure
a n d oth er guarantees. Ind eed, the con cep t o f ju d ic ia l
in-
dep en dence is deem ed to en tail n o t m erely the freedom of
ju d g es from responsibility to th e p olitical executive, b u t
their
a ctiv e d u ty to p ro te ct the citizen against the p o litica l
executive
or its agents, and to act, in the state’s encou nter w ith members
o f society, as th e defenders o f the la tte r’s rights an d
liberties.
T h is, as w e sh all see, c a n m ean m a n y different things.
But in
a n y case, the ju d ic ia r y is an integral p a rt o f the state
system,
w h ic h affects, often p rofou n d ly, the exercise o f state pow
er.
So too, to a g rea ter or lesser degree, does a fifth elem ent o f
the
state system, n am ely the various units o f sub-central govern--
m ent. In one o f its aspects, sub-cen tral g o vern m en t
constitutes

9. an extension o f cen tral g overn m en t a n d adm inistration,
the
la tte r ’s a n ten n ae o r tentacles. In som e p o litic a l
systems it has'
indeed p r a c tic a lly no o th er function. I n the countries o f
ad-
va n ced cap italism , on the oth er h an d , sub -cen tral
government
is ra th er m ore th an a n adm in istrative device. In addition
to
b e in g agen ts o f the state these units o f g o ve rn m en t h
a v e also
tra d itio n a lly perform ed another function. T h e y h a v e
not only-
been the ch an nels o f co m m u n ication a n d adm in
istration from-
1 S e e M ills, The Power Elite, ch a p te r 8.
T he State System and the State Elite 53
the centre to the p erip h ery, b u t also the v o ice o f the p erip
h ery,
or o f p a rticu la r interests a t the p e rip h e ry ; th ey h a v e
been a
means o f o verco m in g lo ca l p articularities, b u t also
platform s
for their expression, instrum ents o f cen tra l con trol a n d o
b -
stacles to it. F o r a ll the centralisation o f p ow er, w hich is
a
major feature o f g o vern m en t in these countries, sub-central
organs o f governm ent, n o ta b ly in federal systems such as
th a t o f

10. the U nited States, h a v e rem a in ed p ow er structures in
their ow n
right, and therefore a b le to a ffe ct v e r y m arked ly th e
lives o f the
populations th ey h av e g overned .
■ M uch the sam e p o in t m a y be m ad e a b o u t the
representative
assem blies o f a d v a n c e d capitalism . N o w m ore th an
ever their
life revolves a rou n d the g o vern m e n t; a n d even w here,
as in the
United States, th e y are fo rm a lly indep en dent organs o f
constitutional an d p o litic a l p ow er, their relationship w ith
the
political execu tive can n o t be a p u rely c ritic a l or ob
structive one.
That relationship is o n e o f con flict and cooperation.
: ■ Nor is this a m atter o f division b etw een a pro-governm
ent
side and an a n ti-go vern m en t one. Both sides reflect this d u
a lity.
For opposition p arties can n ot b e w h o lly u n coop erative.
M e re ly
by taking p a rt in the w o rk o f the legislature, th ey h elp
the
government’ s business. T h is is one o f the m ain problem s o
f
revolutionary parties. A s th e y enter existin g p a rliam e n ta
ry
bodies, so are th ey also com p elled , h o w ever relu c ta n d y
, to take
a:share in their w ork w hich can n o t be p u re ly ob structive.
T h e y
may ju d g e the p ric e w o rth p a y in g . B u t b y en terin g
the p a r-

11. liamentary aren a th ey m ak e a t least a p a rtic u la r p o litic
a l g am e
possible, and m ust p la y it a cco rd in g to rules w h ich a re
not o f
their ow n choosing.
As for g overnm ent parties, th ey are seldom i f e ver single-
minded in th eir sup p ort o f th e p o litic a l e xecu tive a n d
a lto -
gether subservient to it. T h e y in clu d e p eop le w ho, b y
virtu e o f
their position a n d influence m ust b e persuaded, cajo led,
threatened o r b ou gh t off.
It is in the constitution ally-sanctioned perform ance o f this
cooperative and c ritic a l fu n ctio n th at legislative
assemblies h av e
a share in the exercise o f state p ow er. T h a t share is rather
less
extensive and exalted th an is often claim ed for these bodies.
But, as w ill be fu rth er a rg u ed presently, it is not, even in
an
jepoch o f executive d om in an ce, a n u n im p ortan t one.
54 The State in Capitalist Society
T h ese are the institutions - th e go vern m en t, the
administration
the m ilita r y and the p o lice, the ju d ic ia l bran ch , sub-
centra]
g o vern m en t a n d p a rlia m e n ta ry assemblies— w h ich
m ak e up
‘ the state’ , a n d w hose in terrelation sh ip shapes the form
o f the

12. state system. I t is these institutions in w h ich ‘ state p ow er’
lies-
an d it is th ro u g h them th a t this p ow er is w ield ed in
its different
m anifestations b y the p eop le w h o o c c u p y the lead in g
positions?
in ea ch o f these institutions - presidents, p rim e ministers
and
th eir m inisterial colleag u es; h igh civ il servants a n d other
state
adm in istrators; top m ilita ry m en ; ju d g e s o f the h igh er
courts-
som e at least o f the le a d in g m em bers o f p a rliam e n ta
ry as-
sem blies, th ough these are often the sam e m en as the senior
m em bers o f the p o litical e x ecu tive; and, a lo n g w a y
behind,
p a rtic u la rly in u n ita ry states, th e p o litical and
administrative-
leaders o f sub -cen tral units o f the state. T h e se are the
people
w h o constitute w h a t m a y be described as the state elite.
O f course, the state system is not synonym ous w ith the
p o litic a l system . T h e la tte r in clu des m a n y
institutions, fof
instance parties a n d pressure groups, w h ic h are o f major
im p o rta n ce in th e p o litic a l process, a n d w h ich v ita
lly affect the
o p eratio n o f the state system. A n d so do m a n y o th er
institutions
w h ic h are not ‘p o litic a l’ a t a ll, for instance, g ia n t
corporations,:
C h u rch es, th e mass m edia, etc. O b v io u s ly the m en w
ho head:
these institutions m a y w ield considerable p o w e r a n d

13. influence,
w h ich m ust be in tegrated in the analysis o f p o litical
power in
a d v a n c e d cap ita list societies.
Y e t w h ile there a re m a n y m en w h o h av e p o w e r
outside the-
state system an d w hose p ow er g re a tly affects it, th ey are
not the
a ctu a l repositories o f state p o w er; and for the purpose-of
an a ly sin g the role o f the state in these societies, it is
necessary to
trea t the state elite, w hich does w ield state p ow er, as a
distinct
and sep arate en tity. c
I t is p a rtic u la rly necessary to do so in a n a ly sin g the
relation-
ship o f the state to the econ om ically d o m in an t class. For
the:
first step in th a t analysis is to note the obvious b u t
fundamental:
fa c t th a t this class is in vo lve d in a relationship w ith the
state,
w h ich can n o t b e assumed, in the p olitical conditions w
hich are
ty p ic a l o f ad va n ced capitalism , to be th a t o f p rin cip
a l to agent*
I t m ay w ell be found th at the relationship is v e ry close
indeed
and th at the holders o f state p ow er are, for m an y different
The State System and the State Elite 55

14. reasons, the agents o f p riv a te econom ic p o w e r - th a t
those w ho
—eld that p o w er are also, therefore, a n d w ith o u t u n d u
ly
stretching the m ean in g o f w ords, an au th e n tic ‘ru lin g
class’ . B ut
tliis is precisely w h a t has to b e determined.
n
Writing in 1902, K a r l K a u ts k y o b served th a t ‘the cap
italist
eljss rules b u t does not g o ve rn ’ , th o u g h h e ad d ed im
m ed iately
that ‘it contents itse lf w ith ru lin g the g overn m en t’ . 1 T h
is is the
proposition w h ic h has to be tested. B ut it is o b viou sly true
th at
the capitalist class, as a class, does n o t a c tu a lly ‘g o v ern
’ . O n e
liiust go b a ck to isolated instances o f the early history o f
cap ital-
ishi, such as the com m ercial p atriciates o f cities lik e V e n
ic e and
iilibeck, to discover d irect and sovereign rule b y businessm
en.2
Apart from these cases, the cap italist class has g e n erally
confronted the state as a sep arate en tity - even, in the days
o f
its rise to p ow er, as an alien an d often hostile elem ent, often
under the con trol a n d in flu en ce o f a n established a n d
la n d -
owning class, w hose h old u p on the state p o w er h ad to be
broken
by revolution, as in F ran ce, o r b y erosion, as in E n g la n d
in the

15. nineteenth c e n tu ry ,8 th a t process o f erosion b ein g g re a
tly
facilitated, in the E nglish case, b y th e constitution al and
political changes w ro u g h t b y violen ce in th e seventeenth
century'.4
Nor has it com e to b e th e case, e ven in the. ep och o f a d
va n ce d
capitalism, th at businessmen h a v e themselves assumed the
major share o f go vern m en t. O n the oth er h a n d , th ey h
a v e
generally been w ell represented in the p o litic a l ex ecu tive a
n d in
other parts o f th e state system as w e ll; a n d this has been p
a r -
ticularly true in the recen t h istory o f a d v a n c e d
capitalism .
This entry o f businessmen in the state system has often been
greatly underestim ated. M a x W eb e r, for instance, b elieved
th a t
industrialists h ad n eith er the tim e nor the p a rtic u la r
qualities
1 K . K autsky, The Social Revolution, 1903, p. 13.
1 See, e.g. O . C . C o x , The Foundations o f Capitalism,
1959.
* See, e.g. J . D . K in g sley, Representative Bureaucracy,
1944.
^ P n which see, e .g . B arrin gto n M o o re J r , Social
Origins c f Dictatorship and
Democraty, chapter 1.

16. 56 The State in Capitalist Society
re q u ire d fo r p o litic a l l i f e ; 1 and Sch u m p eter w rote
o f the
‘industrialist an d m erch a n t’ th a t ‘there is surely no trace o
f any
m ystic g la m o u r a b o u t h im w h ich is w h a t counts in
the ruling ni
m en. T h e stock e xch a n g e is a p o o r substitute for the
Holy
G ra il ... A genius in the business office m a y be, and often
is
u tterly u n a b le outside o f it to say b oo to a goose - b oth
in the
d raw in g-room a n d on th e p latform . K n o w in g this h e
wants to
b e left alon e a n d to leav e politics a lo n e’ . 2 Less d ra m a
tic a lly bm
n o less defin itely, R a y m o n d A ro n has m ore rece n tly
written of
businessm en th a t ‘th ey h a v e govern ed neith er G erm a n
y, n0r
F ran ce, n o r even E n g la n d . T h e y ce rtain ly p la y e d
a decisne
role in th e m an agem en t o f th e m eans o f p rod u ction , in
social
life. B u t w h a t is ch aracteristic o f th em as a socially
dominant
class is th at, in the m ajo rity o f countries, th e y h a v e
not them-
selves w an te d to assum e p o litical functions’ .3 C
Businessmen themselves h av e often tended to stress their
remoteness from , even th eir distaste for, ‘p olitics’ ; and they
h a v e also tend ed to h av e a p oor view o f politician s as
m en who,

17. in the h allo w ed phrase, h a v e n ever h ad to m eet a p
ayroll and
w ho therefore-know v e ry little o f the real w o rld ■ y e t w
ho seek to
interfere in the affairs o f the h ard -h ead ed a n d p ra c tic a
l men
w hose business it is to m eet a p a yro ll, and w h o therefon
do
kn o w w h a t the w o rld is ab out. W h a t this m eans is th a
t business
m en, like adm in istrators, w ish to ‘dep oliticise’ h ig h ly <
on
tentious issues a n d to h a v e these issues ju d g e d a cco rd
in g to the
criteria fav o u red b y business. T h is m a y look like an
avoidance
o f politics a n d id e o lo g y : it is in fact their clandestin e
importation-
in to p u b lic affairs.
In a n y case, the notion o f businessmen as rem ote from
p olitical affairs, in a d irect a n d p erson al w ay , g re a tly
exagger->
ates th e ir relu cta n ce to seek p olitical p o w er; and
equally/:
underestim ates h o w often the search has been successful.
I n th e U n ite d States, businessmen w ere in fa c t the
largest:
single occu p a tio n a l grou p in cabinets from 1889 to 1949;
o f the
total n u m b er o f cab in et m em bers betw een these dates,
more::
th an 60 p er c e n t w ere businessmen o f one sort or a n o th
e r.4 Nor

18. 1 R .B e n d ix , M ax Weber; An Intellectual Portrait, i960, p .
436.
3 J . S ch um peter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,
1950, pp. 137-8 .
3 R . A ro n , La Lutte das Classes, 1964, p . 280.
* H . D . Lassw ell, et al., The Comparative Study o f E lite s,
1952, p. 30.
The State System and the State Elite 57
certainly w as the business m em bership o f A m e rica n
cabinets
jeSg marked in the E isenhow er years from 1953 to 1 9 6 1 .1
A s for
members o f British cabinets betw een 1886 and 1950, close to
one-third w ere businessmen, in clu d in g three p rim e
ministers -
jjbiiar L a w , B ald w in and C h a m b e r la in .2 N or a ga in
h av e
businessmen been a t a ll b a d ly represented in the C on serva
tive
cabinets w hich h eld office b etw een 1951 and 1964. A n d
w h ile
businessmen h ave, in this respect, done rath er less w e ll in
some
other ad va n ced cap ita list countries, n ow h ere has th eir rep
re -
sentation been negligible.
But the govern m en t itself is b y no m eans the o n ly p a rt o
f the
state system in w h ic h businessmen h a v e h ad a d irect
say.
Indeed, one o f the m ost n o tab le features o f a d v a n c e d

19. cap italism
is precisely w h a t m ig h t be called w ith o u t m uch e xagg
eration
their g row in g colon isation o f the u p p er reaches o f the a
d -
ministrative p a rt o f th a t system.
; State interven tion has gon e fu rth er and assumed m ore
elaborate institutional form s in F ran ce than a n y w h e re else
in
the capitalist w o rld .3 B u t b oth in the elab o ra tio n o f
the French
Plans and in th eir execution, m en b elo n gin g to the w orld
o f
business, a n d p a rtic u la rly o f b ig business, h av e
enjoyed a
marked, alm ost a n o verw h elm in g p repon d eran ce o ver a
n y
other o ccu p ation al or ‘section al’ g rou p . A s M r
Schonfield
Ihotes, ‘ in some w ays, the d evelo p m en t o f F ren ch p la n
n in g in the
:1950s can b e view ed as an a c t o f v o lu n ta ry collusion
betw een
senior civil servants a n d the senior m anagers o f b ig
business.
The politicians a n d the representatives o f organised lab o u r
.were both la rg e ly passed b y ’ .4
: M uch the sam e kind o f business p red om in an ce over
other
economic groups is to be foun d in the fin an cial and cred it
1 See, e.g. M ills, The Power Elite, pp. 232ft.
;:: * Lasswell, et at., The Comparative Study o f Elites, p. 30.
See also G uttsm an , The
British Political Elite, pp. g2ff.

20. s Even here, how ever, th e notion o f ‘ p la n n in g ’ ou gh t
not to b e invested w ith too
positive a m eaning: see, e.g., J. Sheah an , Promotion and
Control o f Industry in Post-War
France, 1963, w h o notes th at ‘ th rough ou t the 1950’s, the F
ren ch technique o f
planning used a m ild system o f differential favours to secure
cooperation, but
attached n o d irect penalties to th e refusal to coo pe rate ’ (p.
18 1); th e sam e auth or
also describes F ren ch ‘ planners’ as a ‘gro u p o f w e ll
intentioned an d intelligent
people trying to help clarify altern atives for. go vern m en t an
d business’
:{p .i8 c).
4 Schonfield, Modem Capitalism, p. 128.
institutions o f the sta te,1 a n d in th e nationalised sector.8
The *
creation o f th a t sector has often been th o u g h t o f as rem
ovin g an
im p o rta n t a rea o f econom ic a ctiv ity from cap ita list
con trol and
influence. B u t q u ite a p a rt from a ll the o th e r forces
which
p reven t a subsidiary nationalised sector from b ein g ru n on
'
oth er th a n o rth od ox lines, there is also the fa c t th a t
business has
c arv e d o u t an extrem ely strong p la c e fo r itse lf in the
directing
organs o f th a t sector; or rather, th a t business has b een
invited I

21. b y governm ents, w h a tev er th eir p o litic a l coloration , to
assume
a m ajor role in the m an agem en t a n d control o f the public
sector.3 In com parison, representatives o f la b o u r h a v e
appeared
as v e ry p oor parents in d eed - not, it sh ould be ad d ed , th
a t the
e n try o f a grea te r n u m b er o f ‘safe’ trade u n ion
leaders would _
m ake m u ch difference to the orientation o f institutions
which -
are, in effect, an in tegral p a rt o f the cap ita list system.
T h e notion th a t businessmen are n o t d ire c tly in volved
in ’
g o vern m en t a n d adm inistration (and also in parliam
entary
assem blies1) is ob viou sly false. T h e y are thus in vo lve d ,
ever more
closely as the state becom es m ore closely co n cern ed with
econom ic life; w h erever the state ‘intervenes’ , there also, in
an
e xcep tio n ally strong position as com p ared w ith o th er
economic
groups, w ill businessmen be found to influ ence a n d even to
determ ine the n a tu re o f th at intervention.
It m a y rea d ily be gran ted th a t businessmen w h o enter
the
state system, in w h a tev er c a p a c ity , m a y n o t th ink o f
themselves
as representatives o f business in gen eral o r even less o f th
eir own
industries or firms in p a rtic u la r.5 B u t even th ou gh the
will to
th ink in ‘n a tio n a l’ terms m a y w ell be strong,

22. businessmen
in vo lved in govern m en t and adm inistration are not v e r y
likely,
a ll the sam e, to find m u ch m erit in policies w h ich a p p e
a r to run
1 F o r B ritain see, e.g. S. W ilson an d T .L u p t o n , ‘T h e
S o cial B ackgroun d and
C onnections o f “ T o p D ecision -M akers” in The
Manchester School o f Economic-f
and Social Studies, vol. 27, 1959.
2 See, e .g . Universities and Left Review, The Insiders ( n .d .)
; C . Jenkins, Power at the-:
Top, 1959; an d J. H ughes, Nationalised Industries in the M
ixed Economy, i960.
3 A ty p ic a l recen t exam ple bein g the appointm ent b y the
W ilson government
o f an e m in en t businessman, w ith no L a b o u r connections,
to head th e newly-
nationalised (or rath er re-nationalised) Steel C orporatio n .
11 See below , p . 66,
3 N o te , how ever, the conclusion reached b y a Senate
investigatin g committee^)
th at, in the Secon d W o rld W a r, ‘d o ilar-a -year m en (as th
ey w ere then called)
w ere “ persons w ith axes to g rin d ” and “ lobbyists” ’ (D .
G .B laisdell, AmeriaA-f
Democracy under Pressure, 1950, p . 190),
58 The State in Capitalist Society %
a

23. iW
S
i
The State System and the State Elite 59
counter to w h a t th ey co n ceive to be th e interests o f
business,
niuch less to m ake them selves the ad vocates o f such
policies,
Since th e y are alm ost b y defin ition m ost lik e ly to
believe such
policies to be in im ica l to th e ‘n a tio n a l interest’ . I t is m
uch
easier for businessmen, w h ere requ ired , to divest them selves
o f
stocks an d shares as a k in d o f rite de passage in to g
overnm ent
service th a n to divest them selves o f a p a rtic u la r view o
f the
World, a n d o f th e p la c e o f business in it.
N otw ithstanding the substantial p a rticip a tio n o f
businessmen in
the business o f the state, it is h o w ever true that th e y h ave
never
constituted, a n d do not constitute now , m ore th an a rela
tively
small m in ority o f th e state e lite as a w h o le. I t is in this
sense th a t
the econom ic elites o f a d v a n c e d cap ita list countries a
re not,
properly sp eakin g, a ‘g o v e rn in g ’ class, co m p a rab le to

24. pre-
industrial, a ristocratic a n d lan d o w n in g classes. In some
cases,
the latte r w ere a b le, alm ost, to dispense w ith a distinct and
fully a rticu la ted state m ach in e ry a n d w ere themselves p
racti-
cally the s ta te.1 C a p ita lis t econom ic elites h a v e not ach
ieved,
and in the n a tu re o f cap ita list society co u ld never ach
ieve, such
a position.
H owever, the sign ifican ce o f this rela tive distance o f
business-
men from the state system is m ark e d ly redu ced by the
social
composition o f the state elite proper. F o r businessmen b elon
g, in
economic and social terms, to the u p p e r and m id dle classes
-
and it is also from these classes th at th e m em bers o f the
state
■elite are p red o m in an tly , n o t to say overw h elm in gly, d
raw n .
T h e p attern is m onotonously sim ilar for a ll cap italist
countries
and applies n o t o n ly to th e adm in istrative, m ilitary and
judicial elites, w h ich are insulated from u niversal suffrage
and
political com p etition, b u t to the p o litical a n d e lective
ones as
1 T hu s, Professor H a b b a k u k w rites o f E n glan d in
the e ighteen th cen tu ry that
‘ the English landowners w ere the go vern in g class o f the
cou n try. M inisters were

25. draw n usually from the g r e a t fam ilies an d th ou gh th e p
ro p erty qualifications
imposed b y th e A c t o f 17 1 1 w ere easily eva d ed , the n
orm al social an d p o litica l
processes ensured th at most M P ’s cam e from lan d ed fam
ilies. L o c al governm ent
likewise was in th e hands, not o f a b u re a u cra cy, b u t o f
Justices o f the P eace, who
were generally landowners. T h e la n d ta x w as adm
inistered b y th e sam e class, and
even in those departm ents w h ich w ere staffed b y
professionals, the m ore im po rtan t
and dignified posts w ere often filled from lan d ow n in g fam
ilies’ (H .J . H a b b a ku k,
■England’ , in A .G o o d w in (ed .), The European Nobility in
the iSth Century, 1953,
pp. I i - 1 2 ) . L a n d e d fam ilies, it should also be noted,
predom in ated in the A rm y ,
the N a v y a n d th e C h u rc h .
6o The State in Capitalist Society
w ell, w h ich are not. E ve ryw h e re an d in all its elements
the
state system has retain ed, so cia lly speaking, a m ost
markedly:
u pp er- and m iddle-class ch ara cter, w ith a slow ly
diminishing
a ristocratic elem ent a t on e end, a n d a slow ly g row in g
working^:
class and low er-m iddle-class elem ent at the other. T h e area
of
recru itm en t is m uch m ore n arrow th a n is often
suggested. As

26. Professor D a h r e n d o r f notes, ‘ the “ m id d le class” th at
forms the
m ain recru itin g g rou n d o f the p ow er elite o f most
European
countries tod ay, often consists o f the top 5 p er cent o f the
o ccu p a tio n a l h ie ra rch y in terms o f prestige, incom e
and
in flu en ce’ . 1
O n e m ain reason fo r this bourgeois p red om in an ce in the
ap p o in tiv e institutions o f the state system has a lre a d y
been
discussed in relation to the econom ic a n d social hierarchies-
outside th a t system, n a m e ly th a t ch ildren b o rn o f u p
p er- antf
m iddle-class parents h av e a va stly b e tte r ch an ce o f
access than
oth er c h ild ren to the kind o f ed u catio n a n d tra in in g
w hich is-
requ ired for the ach ievem en t o f elite positions in the state
system . G re a tly u n eq u a l opportunities in ed u cation also
find
reflection in the recru itm en t to the state service, since
qualifies,-:
tions w h ic h are o n ly o b ta in ab le in institutions o f
higher
ed u cation a re a sine qua non for e n try into th a t service.
T h u s in F ran ce the m ain m eans o f entry to top
administrative;:
positions is the E cole N a tio n a le d ’A dm in istration . B u t
Professor:
M e y n a u d notes th a t in the y e a r 1962, fifty-six ou t o f
seventy-one
u niversity students w h o w ere successful in the exam inations
for;

27. adm ission to the E .N .A . belonged b y social origin to ‘la
partiei
la plus favorisee de la population*; and o f the twenty-two:
successful can didates from the civ il service itself, ten
belonged;
to the sam e class. O f the university students w ho presented
them selves, there w as not a single one w hose paren ts were:
w orkers or peasants. ‘ D ans l’ ensem ble,’ M e y n a u d
comments,
‘ la selection sociale de la h au te fonction p u b liq u e reste
essen-;
tiellem en t in eg alita ire. A u tre m en t dit, m algrć la reform
e de:
J945> “ đćm ocratisation ” dem eure tr£s lim itee.*2 T h e
same
1 D ah ren dorf, ‘R e ce n t C han ges in the C lass S tru cture o
f E u ropean Societies’,
p . 238.
2 M e y n a u d , La Technocratic, p . 51. A n o th e r w riter
notes th at for the years 1952-8,
a b o u t 60 p e r cen t o f the 547 successful candidates for
adm ission to the E.N .A.
belonged to ‘ les m ilieu x it la fo b les moins n om breu x et
les plus ćlevćs dans la;
h ićra rch ie sociale, fonctionnaires des categories A t et 2,
cadres et chefs d ’entreprisc'
The State System and the State Elite 61
alio true o f the F ren ch m ilita r y 1 a n d o f th e F ren ch
ju d ic ia r y .2
** Not o f course th a t F ra n ce is n o ta b ly m ore ‘ undem

28. ocratic* in
tjiis respect than oth er cap ita list countries. T h u s the b u lk
o f
British higher civ il servants has to a rem arkab le degree con-
tinued to be d raw n from a n a rro w ly restricted segm ent o
f the
ulation, m u ch o f it p u b lic school and O x b rid g e e d u c
a te d ;3
the same m arked upper- and m iddle-class bias has
remained evident in the h igh er reaches o f the British a rm y 4
anti the ju d ic ia ry . 6
The picture is n o t a p p re c ia b ly d ifferen t for th e U n ite
d
States, where the kind o f in e q u a lity o f ed u catio n al o p
p o rtu n ity
which was m entioned in the last c h a p te r has also h elped to
n a r ro w the area o f recru itm en t to the state service. A s
Professor
Matthews notes:
Those American political decision-makers6 for whom this
informa-
tion is available are, with very few exceptions, sons o f
professional
men, proprietors and officials, and farmers. A very small
minority
yiere sons o f wage-earners, low salaried workers, farm
labourers or
tenants ... the narrow base from which political decision-makers
appear to be recruited is clear.7
In the case o f the U n ite d States m ilitary it h as also been
noted th a t:

29. (A.Girard, La Rdussite Socials en France, 196 1, p . 308). See
also F .B o n an d M . A .
Burnier, Les Nouveaux Intellectuels, 1966; T . B. Bottom ore, ‘
H ig h e r C iv il S ervants in
France', in Transactions o f tke Second World Congress o f
Sociology, 1953; a n d P.
Lalumićre, L ’ lnspsction des Finances, 1959.
:; ? See; e.g. R . G irard et, L a Crise Militaire Franfaise 1945-
1962 , 1964, pp. 39-46.
Another writer notes, how ever, th at ‘ in regard to social
origins the cen tre o f g ra v ity
for the army officer corps as a w h ole, fo llo w in g a pattern
typical fo r a period o f low
military prestige, had p ro b a b ly sunk to th e low er-m id dle
class b y the late 1930s.
Yet in the higher grades the m id d le a n d u p pe r
bourgeoisie, a n d to a lesser degree
the noble aristocracy, w ere still w ell represented, th ough in d
eclin e’ (J. S . A m b ler,
ThtFrench Army in Politics 19 4 5-19 6 2 , p . 134).
r 4 See, e.g. G ira rd , La Rettssiie Sociale en France, p . 336.
•See, e.g. R .K . K e l s a l l , The Higher Civil Servants in
Britain, 19 55; W ilson an d
Lupton, ‘T o p D ecision M ak e rs’ , in The Manchester Sdt 'vt
o f Economics and Social
Studies, vol. 27, 1959; a n d ‘R e cru itm e n t to the C iv il S
ervice ’ , 6th R e p o rt o f the
Committee on Estim ates, H . C . 308, 1964-3.
4 Sec, e.g. J . H a rv ey an d K . H o od, The British State,
1958, p p . 1 1 2ff.
: ! No less than 76 p e r cen t o f ju d g e s in 1956 had been
educated a t p u b lic schools
(Glennerster and P ryk e, The Public Schools, p . 17). S ee also

30. ‘ W ell-B red L a w ’ in
The Sunday Times, 18 A u g u s t 1963.
• ‘ Political decision-m akers’ here includes ‘high level c ivil
servants’ .
: 1 D .R , M atthews, The Social Background o f Political
Decision-Makers, 1954,
PP-23-4 (italics in text).
62 The State in Capitalist Society
... on the whole, the high officers o f the arm y and navy have
beet
men o f the upper-middle rather than truly higher or definite ̂
lower classes. O n ly a very small percentage o f them are o f
working
class origin.1
A s for Su p rem e C o u r t Justices, it has b een rem arked
that; '
... throughout American history there has been an overwhelming
tendency for presidents to choose nominees for the Supreme
Conn
from among the socially advantaged families ... In the e arije,
history o f the C ourt he very likely was bom in the aristocratic
gentry class, although later he tended to come from the
professional
upper-middle class.2 . f f
T h e sam e kin d o f upper- and m iddle-class preponderance
is
y e t a g a in en cou n tered in F ed era l G e rm a n y:

31. ... while less than i per cent o f the present population of the
Federal republic [one writer notes] carries a ‘von’ in the family
name, the bearers o f aristocratic titles m ay actually have
increased
among senior civil, servants. Senior civil servants claiming
descent
from working-class families remain as conspicuous by their
absence
as ever.3
S im ila rly , Professor D a h r e n d o r f notes th a t:
... despite the break up o f the old monopoly and the
consequent
dwindling significance o f nobility, German elite groups from
1918
to the present [including the state elite] have been consistently
recruited to a disproportionately great extent from middle and
higher groups o f the service class and the middle class as well
al
from their own predecessors in elite positions.4
1 M ills, The Power Elite, p. 19a. Professor J a n o w itz also
notes th at ‘American;
m ilita ry leaders trad itio n a lly h a v e com e from the m o
re priv ileged strata’ (M.
J a n o w itz, The Professional Soldier, 1960, p. 69). H e also
adds th at ‘ however, recent,
trends in th eir so cial backgroun d su p p ly strikin g confirm
ation o f the decline o f the
re la tiv ely h ig h social origins o f the m ilitary, a n d its
transform ation into a man
so cially heterogenous g ro u p ’ (p. 89). B u t this ‘m ore so
cially heterogeneous group'
still leaves m en born in th e ‘ business, professional and m a n
age ria l’ classes with 4

32. crushin g p repon d eran ce ov er those horn in the ‘ w h ite c o
lla r’ an d ‘ worker* class
(see ibid., table 14, p. 9 1).
2 J . R . Schm idhauser, ‘T h e Justices o f the S uprem e C o
u rt - A Collect!«
P o rtra it’, in Midwest Journal o f Political Science, 1959,
vol. 3, p. 45.
8 L .J .E d in g e r , ‘ C o n tin u ity and C h a n ge in th e B
ackgroun d o f G erm an Decision:
M a k e rs’, in Western Political Quarterly, 1961, vol. 14, p. 27.
8 D ah ren dorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, p. 228.
The State System and the State Elite 63
And m u ch the sam e story is told fo r S w e d e n 1 a n d J a p
a n .8
W hile in e q u a lity o f ed u catio n al o p p o rtu n ity , based
on
social class, helps to a cco u n t fo r this p a ttern , there are o
th e r
factors w h ich co n trib u te to its form ation . H e re too, as
in the
case o f access to elite positions ou tside th e state system ,
there
js also the m a tte r o f connections. C e rta in ly , the m ore sp
ectacu -
lar forms o f nepotism a n d favouritism associated w ith a n
^ re g e n e ra te aristo cratic a n d pre-in du strial a ge are n o
t p a rt o f
the contem porary, m iddle-class, co m p etitive state s e r v ic e

33. : th e
partial lib era tio n o f th a t service from the aristocratic grip
w as
indeed one o f th e c ru c ia l aspects o f the extension o f
bourgeois
power in the state and society. B u t it w ou ld , a ll the sam e,
be
highly unrealistic to th ink th a t even in a n exam ination-
oriented
epoch m em bership o f a r e la tiv e ly n a rro w segm ent o f
the
population is n o t a distin ct a d v a n ta g e , not o n ly in
term s o f
entry into the h igh er levels o f the state service, b u t also, a n
d
hardly less im p o rta n t, o f ch an ces o f u p w a rd m ovem
ent inside
iti Such m em bership affords links o f kinship a n d
friendship,
and generally enhances a sense o f shared values, a ll o f w h
ich are
Helpful to a successful career. T w o F re n ch auth ors p u t
the p o in t
well, and w h at th e y s a y c a n scarcely be th o u g h t to a
p p ly
exclusively to F ra n ce :
If a student o f modest origin has successfully negotiated his
university course, the entrance examination o f the E .N .A . and
even,
why not, the final examination where the ‘cultural’ siftingis
perhaps
fflore severe than on entry, he w ill not, nevertheless, be on the
same level as the offspring o f great bourgeois families or o f
high
officials: the spirit o f caste and personal family relations will

34. constantly work against him when promotions are made (at the
“highest level, promotion is more uncertain than at lower ones)
.*
L_- Those w ho control a n d determ ine selection a n d prom
otion at
the highest level o f the state service are themselves most lik e
ly to
he.members o f the u p p e r and m id dle classes, b y social
origin or
“by virtue o f th eir o w n professional success, and a re lik e
ly to
. -l 'T he num ber o f workers’ sons am on g th e p o litico -b u
reau cratic top echelons has
diminished from ro p e r cen t in 1949 to 9 p e r cen t in 19 6 1,
whereas th e p ercen ta ge
of sons o f big businessmen w en t u p fro m 12 p e r cen t to
17 p e r cent (T h erb o m ,
Power vi the Kingdom o f Sweden, p. 59).
4 See, e.g. A begglen a n d M a n n a ri, 'L ea d e rs o f M od
ern J a p a n : S o cial O rigin s
and Mobility1.
* Bon and Burnier, Les jVouveaux Intellectuels, p . 165.
64 The State in Capitalist Society
c a r r y in th eir m inds a p a rtic u la r im a g e o f h ow a
h igh -r
c iv il servan t or m ilitary officer o u g h t to think, speak,
behave

35. a n d r e a c t; a n d th a t im a g e w ill b e d ra w n in terms o
f the class to-
w h ich th ey b elon g. N o d ou b t, the recruiters, a w a re o f
th e pres,
sures a n d dem ands o f a ‘m erito cratic’ a ge, m a y c o n sd
to correct th eir b ias; b u t th ey are p a rtic u la rly lik ely to
over.:
com e it in the case o f w orking-class can didates w h o g iv e
every
sign o f readiness and c a p a c ity to ad a p t and conform to
classi
san ction ed p atterns o f b eh av io u r and th o u g h t.1 ‘
Rough
diam on ds’ are n ow m ore a cce p ta b le th an in the past, b u
t they
should p re fe ra b ly show good prom ise o f ach ie vin g the
right
kin d o f smoothness.
M a x W e b e r claim ed th at the develo p m en t o f
bureaucracy
tended ‘ to elim in ate class p rivileges, w h ich in clu d e the
appropria-
tion o f m eans o f adm inistration and the ap p ro p ria tio n
of
a u th o rity as w ell as the o ccu p ation o f offices on a n
honorary ■
basis or as an a vo ca tio n b y virtu e o f w ea lth ’ . 2 B ut
this singularly
underestim ates the degree to w h ich existing class privileges
help
to restrict this process, even th ough th ey do not arrest it
a lto g eth er.
I t is u n d o u b te d ly true that a process o f social dilution
has

36. occu rred in the state service, and has b ro u g h t p eop le born
in the
w o rk in g classes, and even m ore com m on ly in the lower-
middle
classes, in to elite positions inside the state system. B ut to
speak
o f ‘ dem ocratisation ’ in this connection is som ew h at
misleading^
W h a t is in vo lve d here is rath er a process o f ‘
bourgeoisification*
o f the m ost able and thrusting recruits from the subordinate
classes. A s these recruits rise in the state h iera rch y , so do
they
b eco m e p a rt, in every sign ifican t sense, o f the social class
tpr
w h ic h th eir position, incom e a n d status gives them
access. As
w as a lre a d y noted a b o u t w orking-class recru itm en t
into the
econ o m ic elite, this kind o f dilution does not m ate ria lly
affect ;
th e class c h a ra c te r o f the state service and m a y in deed
strengths j
en it. M o re o ve r, such recru itm en t, b y fostering the b elief
that
to the talen ts’ usefully obscures the degree to w h ich they are
not.
ca p ita list societies are ru n on the p rin cip le o f ‘ the career
open
G iv e n the p a rtic u la r h ierarchies o f the existin g social
order, it
1 S ee also ch a p ter 5,

37. 2 M . W eb er, The Theory o f Sociai and Economic
Organisation, 1947, p . 340. :
The State System and the State Elite 65
is all b u t in e vita b le th a t recru its from the su b ord in ate
classes
ihto the u p p e r reach es o f the state system should, b y th e
v e r y
fact o f th eir e n try in to it, becom e p a rt o f the class w h
ich
continues to d o m in a te it. F o r it to be otherw ise, th e
present
intake w ou ld not o n ly h a v e to be v a stly increased: the
social
order itself w o u ld h a v e to be ra d ic a lly transform ed as
w ell, and
its class h ierarch ies dissolved.
Social dilution o f a n even m ore p ronou nced k in d th a n
in the
appointive institutions o f th e state system has also occu rred
in
those o f its institutions w hose staffing depends, d ire c tly o r
indirectly, on election, n a m ely the p o litical e x ecu tive and
parliam entary assemblies. T h u s, m en o f w orking-class o r
lower-middle-class o rigin h a v e n o t u n com m on ly m ad e
their
way into the cabinets o f a d va n ced cap ita list countries -
some o f
them have eve n b ecom e presidents a n d p rim e m in isters;
a n d an
enormous am ou nt o f person al p o w er has on occasion been
achieved b y a lto g eth er declassi in divid uals lik e H itle r

38. or
Mussolini.
W hat significance this has h a d for the politics o f ad va n
ced
capitalism w ill be considered later. B u t it m a y be noted a t
this
stage that m en d ra w n from the sub ordin ate classes h a v e
n ever
constituted m ore th an a m in ority o f those w ho h av e reach
ed
high p olitical office in these coun tries: the larg e m ajo rity
has
always belonged, b y social origin and previous occu p a tio n
, to
the upper a n d m id d le classes.1
To a som ew hat lesser degree, y e t still very m arked ly, this
has
also been the p a tte rn o f the legislatures o f ad va n ced cap
italist
countries. T h e g ro w th in representation o f w orking-class
parties
;:(save o f course in the U n ite d States) has b rou gh t into
these
assemblies, th o u g h still as a m in ority, m en (an d occasion
ally
women) w ho w ere not o n ly born in the w o rk in g classes
but
who, until th eir election , w ere them selves w orkers or at least
closely in volved in w orking-class life ; an d e ven bourgeois
1 See Lasswell et a i , The Comparative Study o f Elites, p. 30;
G uttsm an , The British
Political Elite, pp. 7gfF; M atth ew s, The Social Background o
f Political Decision-Makers,

39. pp. 23-4; D .L e m e r , The N a vi Elite, 1951, p. 6; L .D .E d in
g e r , ‘ P o st-T otalitarian
Leadership: Elites in th e G erm an F ed era l R e p u b lic ’ ,
in American Political Science
Review, i960, vol. 54, n o. 1, p . 70; A b c g g len and M a n a
ri, ‘ Leaders o f M od ern
Japan: Social O rigin s a n d M o b ility ’ in Economic
Development and Cultural Change,
vol. 9, no. r, P a rt a (O cto b e r i960), p. 116.
66 The State in Capitalist Society
p arties h ave u n d ergon e a certain process o f social
dilution.
N evertheless, these la tte r parties, w h ich h av e g en erally
domin-
ated p a rlia m e n ta ry assemblies, h a v e rem ained solidly u
p p er and;
m id dle class in their social com position, w ith businessmen
and
others connected w ith various lands o f p ro p e rty
ownership
constitutin g a sizea b le and often a v e ry substantial p a rt o
f them
m em b e rsh ip .1 In terms o f class, national p olitics (and for
that
m atter, sub -n ation al p olitics as w e ll) 2 has continu ed to b
e an
‘ a c tiv ity ’ in w h ic h the subordinate classes h av e p layed
a
d istin ctly sub sidiary role. M r G uttsm an w rites for B ritain
th a tf
... i f we ascend the political hierarchy from the voters

40. upwards,
we find that at each level - the membership o f political parties,
party activists, local political leaders, M .P .’ s, national leaders
-
the social character of the group is slightly less ‘representative’
and"
slightly more tilted in favour o f those who belong to the middle
and
upper levels o f our society.3
T h e tilt is in fact m u ch m ore than slig h t; and the p oin t
does-
n o t a p p ly a n y the less to oth er countries th a n to B
ritain.
W h a t the evidence con clu sively suggests is th a t in terms
of
social origin, ed u cation and class situation, the m en w ho
have
m an n ed all co m m a n d positions in the state system have
la rg e ly , a n d in m a n y cases overw h elm in gly, been d ra
w n from
the w o rld o f business a n d p ro p erty, or from the
professional7
m id d le classes. H e re as in e v e ry oth er field, m en a n d
women'
b o m into th e sub ordinate classes, w h ich form o f course
the;
vast m a jo rity o f th e p op u lation , h av e fared v e r y p o
o rly - and
n o t on ly, it must b e stressed, in those parts o f the state
system,
such as adm in istration, the m ilita ry a n d th e ju d ic ia r y ,
which
dep en d on ap pointm en t, b u t also in those parts o f it w
hich are:

41. exposed or w h ich a p p e a r to b e exposed to the vagaries of
universal suffrage a n d the fortunes o f com p etitive politics.
In an
ep och w h e n so m u ch is m ad e o f d em o cra cy, eq u a
lity, social,
1 See, e .g . G uttsm an , The British Political Elite, pp. 9 7 S ;
H . Berrington and S.E.
F in er, ‘ T h e B ritish H ouse o f C om m on s1, in
International Social Science Journal,*
1961, vol. 13, no. 4 , p p . 6 o iff ; J .B lo n d e l, Voters,
Parties and Leaders, 1963, chapters;
M .D o g a n , 'P o litic a l A sce n t in a Class S o ciety: Fren
ch D eputies 1870-1958', in
D .M a r v ic k (ed .), Political Decision-Makers, 196 1; G , B
raunthal,' The Federativni/;-
German Industry in Politics, 1961, pp. I52ff; T . F uku taki,
Man and Society in Japan,
1962, p . 1 17 .
2 See below , pp. 171 IT.
3 G uttsm an , The British Political Elite, p. 27.
The State System and the State Elite 67
mobility, classlessness a n d th e rest, it has rem ain ed a basic
fact
o f life in a d va n ce d cap ita list countries th a t the va st m
ajo rity o f
men and w om en in these countries has been governed,
represented, adm inistered, ju d g e d , a n d co m m an ded in
w ar b y
people d ra w n from oth er, eco n o m ica lly a n d so cia lly
superior

42. and r e la tiv e ly d istan t classes.
The Purpose and Role
of Governments
1
T h e reason for atta ch in g considerable im p ortan ce to the
social
com position o f the state elite in ad va n ced cap italist
countries
lies in th e strong presu m ption w hich this creates as to its
general
ou tlook, id eo lo gica l dispositions and p o litical bias. I n the
case of
the governm ents o f these countries, h ow ever, w e can do m
uch
m ore th a n m erely p resum e: after all, h a r d ly a d a y
goes b y in
w h ich p o litic a l leaders in ch arge o f the affairs o f their
coun try do-
n o t press u p on th e p u b lic their ideas and beliefs. M u c h
o f this
m a y con ceal as m u ch as it reveals. B ut a g re a t d ea l
remaiiis-
w h ich , togeth er w ith m u ch other evidence, n o ta b ly
what
governm ents a c tu a lly do, affords a clear v ie w o f w h a
t, in large
terms, th ey are ab out.
A t first sight, the p ictu re is one o f endless diversity
between
succeeding governm ents, and indeed inside each o f th em ; as

43. also b etw een governm ents o f differen t countries.
Presidents;;
p rim e m inisters a n d their colleagues h ave w o rn m an y
different;
p o litic a l labels (often w ild ly m islead in g), and b elon ged
to many
differen t p arties, o r occasion ally to none.
T h is diversity o f view s, attitudes, program m es and
policies,
on an infin ite n u m b er o f subjects, is certain ly v e r y
striking a iii
m akes for liv e p o litic a l d eb a te and com p etition . A n d
the
im pression o f diversity and conflict is furth er enh anced by
the::
insistence o f p a rty leaders, p a rtic u la rly at election tim e,
on the
w id e and alm ost im passable, or a ctu a lly im passable, g u
lf which
separates them from th eir opponents a n d com petitors.
T h e assertion o f such profound differences is a m atter of
g re a t im p ortan ce for the fun ction in g and legitim atio n o
f the
The Purpose and Role o f Governments 69
political system , since it suggests th at electors, b y vo tin g
fo r one
0r other o f the m ain com p eting parties, are m ak in g a ch
oice
between fu n d am en tal and in co m p a tib le alternatives, and
th a t

44. they a re therefore, as voters, d e cid in g n oth in g less th an
the
: future o f th eir coun try.
In a ctu al fact h ow ever, this p ictu re is in some cru cial w
ays
highly superficial an d m ystifying. F o r one o f the m ost im
p ortan t
aspects o f the p olitical life o f ad va n ced cap italism is
precisely
that the disagreem ents between those political leaders who
have
• generally been able to gain high office h av e ve ry seldom
been o f the
fundamental kind these leaders and oth er p eop le so often
suggest. W h a t is re ally striking a b o u t these p o litical
leaders a n d
■political office-holders, in relation to each other, is not their
many differences, b u t th e extent o f th e ir agreem ent on tru
ly
: fundamental issues - as th e y them selves, w hen occasion
re-
quires, h ave been w o n t to recognise, a n d as larg e num bers
o f
people am on g the p u b lic a t larg e, despite the p o litica l rh
etoric
to which they are subjected, recognise in the phrase ‘p oliticians
are all the sam e’ . 1 T h is is an exaggeration , o f course. B
ut it is an
exaggeration w ith a solid kernel o f truth, at least in relation
to
the kind o f m en w h o ten d to succeed ea ch oth er in office

45. in
advanced cap ita list countries. M arxists p u t th e sam e p oin t
; somewhat d ifferen tly w h en th ey say th a t these m en, w h
a tev er
: their p olitical labels or p a rty affiliations, are bourgeois p o
li-
ticians.
Th e basic sense in .which this is tru e is th a t the p o litical
office-holders o f ad va n ced cap ita lism have, w ith v e ry
few
exceptions, been agreed over w h a t L o rd B alfour, in a
classical
formulation, once called ‘the foundations o f society’ , m ean
in g
above all th e existin g econom ic and social system o f p riv
ate
■ ownership an d p riv a te ap p rop riation - M a r x ’s ‘m
ode o f
■production’ . B alfou r w as w ritin g ab o u t B ritain, and a b
o u t the
Whig and T o r y adm inistrations o f the nineteenth centu ry.
B u t
: his point applies e q u a lly w e ll to oth er cap ita list
countries, and
to the tw entieth cen tu ry as w ell as to the nineteenth.
For it is no m ore th an a m atter o f p la in p o litical history
th a t
1 As witnessed, for instance, b y th e n u m b e r o f p eop le in
countries like B ritain

46. and the U n ite d States w h o, w h en asked w h ether th ey b
elieve that there a re im -
portant differences betw een th e m ain com petin g parties,
tend to answer in the
7o The State in Capitalist Society
th e governm ents o f these countries h ave m ostly been
composed
o f m en w h o b eyo n d a ll th eir p o litical, social,
religious, cultural
a n d oth er differences a n d diversities, h av e a t least h ad
in
com m on a basic a n d u su a lly ex p licit b e lie f in the v a
lid ity and
virtues o f the cap ita list system, th ou gh this w as not w h a t
they
w o u ld necessarily call it; a n d those a m on g them w h o h
ave not
been p a rtic u la rly concerned w ith th a t system, or even
aware
th a t th ey w ere h elp in g to ru n a sp ecific econom ic
system, much
in the w a y th a t th ey w ere n o t a w a re o f the a ir th e y
breathed,
h av e a t least shared w ith th eir m ore ideologically-aw are
colleagu es o r com petitors a quite basic a n d unswerving
h ostility to a n y socialist a lte rn a tive to th a t system.
T h e r e h a v e , it is tru e, been occasions, w hose
significance will
be considered presen tly, w h en m en issued from working-
class
a n d fo rm a lly socialist p arties h a v e o ccu p ied

47. positions o f
g o ve rn m e n ta l p o w e r, either a lo n e o r m ore com m on
ly as:
m em bers o f coalitions, in m an y cap ita list countries. B u t
even-
th o u g h these m en h a v e q u ite often professed anti-
capitalist
convictions, th ey h ave n e v e r posed - a n d in deed h ave
for the
m ost p a rt n ever w ished to pose - a serious ch allen g e to
a
cap ita list system (or rath er, as m ost o f th em w o u ld h
ave it, a
‘ m ix ed eco n om y5) , w hose basic fra m ew o rk a n d
essential features
th ey h a v e acce p ted m u ch m ore re a d ily th an th eir
pronounce-
m ents in opposition, a n d even sometimes in office, w o u ld
have
ten d ed to suggest.
In this sense, the p a tte rn o f executive p o w e r has
remained
m u ch m ore consistent th a n the a ltern ation in office o f
govern--
m ents b ea rin g different labels and a ffectin g d ifferen t
colorations^
has m ad e it a p p e a r: cap ita list regim es h a v e m ain ly
been
go vern ed b y m en w h o h a v e eith er g en u in ely
believed in the
virtu es o f capitalism , or w h o , w h a te v er th eir
reservations as to
this o r th a t aspect o f it, h a v e accep ted it as fa r superior
to any
possible altern ative econom ic a n d social system, a n d w h o

48. have
therefore m ad e it their p rim e business to defend it. Alterna-
tively, these regim es h a v e been governed b y m en w ho,
even-
th o u g h th e y m ig h t c a ll them selves socialists, h av e
not found the
com m itm en t this m igh t be th ough t to en tail in the least
in-
co m p a tib le w ith the read y, even the eager, a ccep ta n ce o
f all
the essential features o f the system th ey cam e to administer.
. -
In fact, it cou ld even b e said th a t this basic accep tan ce o f
the
The Purpose and R ole o f Governments 71
capitalist order has been more p ronou nced in this cen tu ry th
an
in any previous ep och in the history o f capitalism . T h is is
not
; 0nly because it is m a in ly conservative p oliticians w ho h
ave
dominated the p o litical ex ecu tive o f th eir c o u n try; or
because
formally socialist p o litican s w h o h ave o ccu p ied office h
av e been
content to w ork the system ; b u t also because the v irtu a l
disappearance o f the lan ded interest a n d o f aristocracy as a
powerful econom ic, social a n d p o litic a l force, and th eir
assimilation into the ranks o f business, has rem oved one
strongly discord an t vo ice from the councils o f governm ent.

49. T h is
does not m ean th a t aristocrats themselves h av e ceased to o
ccu p y
.office; but ra th er th a t w ith th e ‘ b ourgeoisification’ o f
aristo-
cracy, a g reater degree o f basic consensus on the natu re o f
the
economic a n d social order th a n ever before b ecam e
possible.
H owever, even i f w e leave o u t for the present the p a rtic u
la r
role o f form ally socialist pow er-holders, it m ust be stressed
again th a t this basic consensus betw een bourgeois p oliticians
does not p re clu d e genu in e a n d im p o rta n t differences
betw een
them, not on ly o n issues other th an the a ctu a l m an agem
en t o f
the econom ic system, b u t on th a t issue as w ell.
Thus, it has a lw a ys been possible to m ake an im portant
"distinction betw een parties a n d leaders, h ow ever com m
itted
they m ight b e to the p riv a te enterprise system , w h o stood
for a
large m easure o f state in terven tion in econom ic and social
life,
and those w h o b elieved in a lesser degree o f interven tion;
and
r the same distinction encom passes those parties a n d m en w
ho
> have believed th a t the state m ust assume a g reater degree o
f
responsibility for social a n d oth er kinds o f reform ; and
those

50. Who have w ished for less.
This q u a rrel betw een strong interventionists and th eir
opponents has been a n d rem ains a p erfectly genuin e one. N
o
doubt, no serious p o liticia n - h ow ever bourgeois and con -
vinced o f the virtues o f p riv a te enterprise - w ou ld now
w ish or
be able to dism antle the m ain structure o f state interven tion;
and indeed it is often the m ost cap italist-oriented politicians
: who see most clea rly h ow essential th a t structure o f
intervention
has become to th e m ain ten an ce o f capitalism . E ven so,
sufficient
differences endure a b o u t the desirable extent, the ch aracter
and
the incidence o f intervention, to m ake the d eb ate around
such
questions (and around m an y oth er ones as well) a serious and
7 2 The State in Capitalist Society
m ean in gfu l one, upon w hose ou tcom e depends m uch which
affects m an y aspects o f p u b lic p o licy a n d m an y in d
iv id u a l lives.
F ro m this p o in t o f view a t least, com p etition b etw een
these men
is b y no m eans a com p lete sham .
B u t the fa c t nevertheless rem ains th a t these differences and
controversies, even a t th eir m ost intense, h ave never been"
a llo w ed b y the p oliticians concerned to b rin g into
question the

51. v a lid ity o f the ‘free enterprise’ system itself; and even the
mošt
determ ined interventionists am on g them h a v e alw ays
conceived
th eir proposals a n d policies as a m eans, not o f eroding -
let
alon e su p p la n tin g - th e cap ita list system, b u t o f
ensuring its::
g re a te r strength a n d stability. T o a m uch larg er extent
than
a p p ea ra n ce a n d rh eto ric h a v e been m ad e to suggest,
the
politics o f a d va n ce d cap ita lism h av e been a b o u t
different
conceptions o f h o w to ru n the same econom ic a n d social
system,
a n d not a b o u t ra d ica lly differen t social systems. This
debate has:
n o t so fa r com e h igh on the p o litical agenda.
T h is consensus betw een p olitical office-holders is clearly
cru cia l. T h e id eological dispositions w h ich m ake the
consensus
possible m a y not, because o f various counter-pressures,
finally
d eterm ine h ow governm ents w ill a c t in every p a rticu la r
situa-:
tion. B u t the fa c t th a t governm ents a cce p t as b eyon d
question11
th e ca p ita list co n te x t in w h ic h th ey op erate is o f
absolutely
fu n d am e n tal im p ortan ce in sh ap ing their attitudes,
policies and
actions in rega rd to the specific issues and p roblem s w ith
which
th ey are confronted, and to the needs and conflicts o f civil

52. society. T h e g en eral com m itm en t deep ly colours the
specifies
response, an d affects n o t o n ly the solution envisaged for
the
p a rtic u la r p roblem p erceived , b u t the m ode o f
perception
itself; indeed, id eological com m itm en t m a y and often does
p re ve n t p ercep tio n a t a ll, and m akes im possible not
only
p rescription for the disease, b u t its location.
H o w ev er, p olitical office-holders themselves do not a t all
see
th eir com m itm en t to c ap ita list enterprise as in v o lv in g
any
elem ent o f class p a rtia lity . O n the co n trary, th ey are the
most
a rd en t and eloqu ent exponents o f the view o f the state,
and of
them selves, as a b o ve the battles o f civil society, as
classless, as
concerned a b o ve a ll to serve the w hole nation, the national
interest, as b ein g ch arg ed w ith the p a rtic u la r task o f
subduing
special interests and class-oriented dem ands for the supreme
The Purpose and Rote o f Governments 73
good o f all. In th eir thoughts a n d w ords, H e g e l’s
exalted v ie w o f
the state as th e em bod im en t a n d th e p ro te cto r o f the
w ho le o f
society, o f its h ig h e r reason, a n d o f its p erm an en t
interests,

53. lives a gain - p a rtic u la rly w hen th ey rath er than th eir
opponents
are in office. ‘ I b elon g to everyone a n d I b elon g to no o n
e’ ,
General de G a u lle said sh ortly after co m in g to p o w er in
1958,
and it w o u ld be absurd to d o u b t th a t this is in d eed h o
w the
general does see h im self - far, far a b o v e the interests o f
lesser
men, b e th e y cap italists, w age-earners, farm ers,
shopkeepers,
the sick, th e p oor, the y o u n g o r the old . O th e r p o litic
a l leaders
may not fin d it easy to present them selves in q u ite such g ra
n -
diose term s; b u t th ey do th eir best, and see them selves in m
u ch
the sam e guise as the general does, even w hen th ey a p p e a r
to
others to ex h ib it the m ost b la ta n t class bias in their
policies and
actions.
T h a t m ost p o litic a l leaders in positions o f p ow er do h
old
this v ie w o f their office, and o f them selves, w ith
sincerity an d
conviction need not, in g e n eral, be dou b ted . In d eed , to
dis-
miss their proclam ation s o f freedom from class bias as m
ere
hypocrisy leads to a dangerous u nderestim ation o f th e d e d
ic a -
tion and resolution w ith w hich such lead ers are likely to p
ursue

54. a task o f w hose n o b ility th ey are u tte rly persu aded. M
e n so
persuaded are not easily deflected from their purpose b y
appeals to reason or sentim ent o r evidence, p a rtic u la rly w
hen
matters o f g rea t m om ent are a t stake.
; O pponents o f cap italism believe it to b e a system w hose
very
nature n ow adays m akes im possible the o p tim u m u
tilisation o f
resources for r a tio n a l h u m a n ends; wrhose in h eren t ch
a ra cte r is
one o f com pulsion, dom in ation and p a ra sitic a l a p p r o p
r ia tio n ;
whose spirit and purpose fa ta lly corrode a ll h u m a n
relations;
; arid whose m ain ten an ce is to d a y the m ajo r ob stacle to
h um an
progress.
: Bourgeois p oliticians and govern m en ts v ie w the system
in
-precisely opposite terms - as most closely con gru en t w ith
Shuman n a tu re’ , as u n iq u ely c a p a b le o f co m b in in
g efficiency,
welfare and freedom , as the best m eans o f releasing h u m an
initiative and energy in socially b eneficent directions, an d as
■ providing th e necessary and o n ly possible basis for a
satisfactory
: social order.
; A n yw ay, w h y sp eak o f ‘cap ita lism ’ a t a ll, w ith its em
otive an d

55. The Purpose and R ole o f Governments 75
of lesser qualification s, oth er p o litical leaders and governm
ents
have taken th e sam e vie w , a n d seen cap italist enterprise as
a
necessary, desirable, to-be-assum ed elem ent o f th eir society,
q b e y wish, w ith ou t a d ou b t, to pursue m an y ends,
personal as
well as p u b lic. B u t a ll other ends are con dition ed b y, a n
d pass
through th e p rism of, th eir a ccep ta n ce o f and com m itm
en t to
the existing econom ic system.
G iven their v ie w o f th at system , it is easy to understand w
h y
governments should w ish to h elp business in e ve ry possible
w a y ,
yet do not a t a ll feel th a t this entails a n y degree o f bias
tow ards
particular classes, interests a n d groups. F or i f the nation al
interest is in fa c t in e x trica b ly b oun d u p w ith the
fortunes o f
capitalist enterprise, a p p a ren t p a rtia lity tow ards it is not
re ally
partiality a t all. O n the co n tra ry , in serving the interests o f
business a n d in h elp in g cap ita list enterprise to thrive, g o
v e rn -
ments are re a lly fu lfillin g th eir exalted role as g u ard ian
s o f the
good o f all. F ro m this standpoint, the m uch-derided phrase
‘What is good for G e n eral M otors is g o od for A m e ric a 5
is only

56. defective in th a t it tends to iden tify the interests o f one p a
r-
ticular enterprise w ith the n a tion a l interest. B ut i f G en
eral
Motors is taken to stand for the w o rld o f cap italist
enterprise as
a whole, the slogan is one to w h ic h governm ents in cap
italist
countries do subscribe, often ex p licitly . A n d th ey do so
because
they a ccep t the n otion th a t the econom ic ration ality o f
the
capitalist system is synonym ous w ith ra tio n a lity itself, a n
d th at
it provides the best possible set o f h u m an arrangem ents in
a
necessarily im p erfect w orld.
In this sense, the attitu d e o f p o litic a l office-holders to
businessmen as a d ass or as a social ty p e is o f rela tively
m in or
importance. T h e ir c ir d e o f relations, friends, form er
associates
and a cq u aintan ces is m uch m ore lik e ly to in clu d e
businessmen
than, say, trade union lead ers; and the fav o u ra b le view th
ey
take o f cap italist enterprise is also lik ely to m ak e them ta k
e a
sympathetic v ie w o f the m en w ho ru n it. T h u s
President
Eisenhower in 1952:
V. I believe in our dynamic system o f privately owned
businesses
and industries. T h ey have proven that they can supply not

57. only the
mightiest sinews o f war, but the highest standard o f living in
the
eWorld for the greatest number o f people But it requires
someone to
Take these things and to produce the extraordinary statistics
that the
The State in Capitalist Society
United States with 7 per cent o f the world’s population
produces 5(3
per cent o f the world’s manufactured goods. I f that someone
Is to
be given a name, I believe that his name is the American
business-
m an.1
P o litical leaders in coun tries less steeped in th e business
creed
a re not often q u ite so n a iv e ly gu sh in g; a n d even in
the United
States, presidents h a v e on occasion taken a less enthusiastic
v ie w o f those w h o m o n e o f th em (ad m itted ly lo n g
ago , and not
v e r y seriously) d en oun ced as ‘ m alefactors o f g re a t w
ealth ’ . It
m a y w ell be, indeed, th a t m an y p o litical leaders h ave
taken a
v e r y p o o r v ie w o f this or th a t section o f business, o r
even
considered business as a n inferior a ctiv ity, from w h ich
they felt

58. them selves far rem oved.
A ll this, h ow ever, is o f no serious consequence, given a
fu n d am en tal com m itm en t to the system o f w h ich
businessmen
are a n intrinsic an d m ajo r p a r t .2 Because o f th a t
commitment,
a n d because o f th e ir b e lie f that the n a tion a l interest is
in-
e x tr ic a b ly boun d u p w ith the h ealth and strength o f
capitalist
enterprise, governm ents n a tu ra lly seek to h elp business -
and
businessm en. T h o rstein V e b le n on ce w rote th a t ‘the
chief -
v ir tu a lly sole - con cern o f the constituted authorities in
any
d em o cra tic nation is a con cern a b o u t the p ro fita b le
business of
the n a tio n ’s substantial citizens’ .3 T h is is q u ite true, b u
t not
necessarily or at a ll because o f a n y p a rtic u la r p
redilection o f the
‘ constituted authorities’ for substantial citizens. T h e concern
goes w ith the gen eral com m itm ent.
1 S . E . H a rris, The Economics o f Political Parties, 196s, p .
5. O n com in g to office/
P resident John son p u t th e sam e p o in t som ew h at d
ifferen tly b u t, it m a y be sur-
m ised, w ith no less feelin g: ‘ W e think w e h a v e the best
system. W e think that
w h ere a cap italist can p u t u p a d o lla r, he c an get a
retu rn b n it. A manager can
g e t u p e a rly to w o rk an d w ith m o n ey an d m en he ca
n bu ild a better mousetrap.;

59. A la b o re r w h o is w o rth y o f his hire stands a c h a n ce
o f getting attention and maybe
a little profit-sharin g system , an d th e highest m in im u m
wages o f any nation inthe
w o rld ’ (R . E van s a n d R .N o v a k , Lyndon B , Johnson:
The Exercise < f Power, 1966.
P- 347>- _ :
8 N o te, e.g. President K e n n e d y ’s la ck o f enthusiasm for
businessmen in general
( A .M .S c h le s in g e r J r , A Thousand Days; John
F.Kennedy in the While House, i§>$,
p p . 6 3 i f f ) , b u t also his alm ost desperate concern to re a
ch accom m odation with
th e ‘ business co m m u n ity ’ , for w h ich see below , ch a p
te r 6.
8 T . V e b le n , Absentee Ownership, 1923, pp. 3 6 -7 .
The Purpose and Role o f Governments 77
I I
H e first and m ost im p o rta n t consequence o f the com m
itm en t
which governm ents in ad va n ced cap italist countries h ave to
the
orivate enterprise system and to its econom ic ratio n ality is
that
ft enormously lim its th eir freedom o f action in relation to a
multitude o f issues a n d problem s. R a y m o n d A r o n
has w ritten
that (il va de soi q u ’en regim e fonde sur la propriety des m
oyens

60. de production, les mesures prises p a r les legislateurs et les
ministres ne seront pas en opposition fon dam en tale a vec les
interets des proprietaries’ . 1 T h is proposition, he com m ents,
is
too obvious to be instructive. I t should perhaps be obvious. B
u t
it does not a p p e a r to be so to m ost W estern p o litical
scientists
who view the state as free from the inherent bias in fav o u r o
f
capitalist interests w h ic h Professor A r o n ’s proposition im
plies.
- That bias has im m ense p o licy im p lications. F o r the
resolution,
or at least the a llevia tio n o f a vast ra n g e o f econom ic
and
social problems requires p recisely th at governm ents should be
willing to a ct in ‘fu n d am e n tal opposition’ to these
interests.
Far from being a trivial m atter, th eir extrem e relu ctan ce to
do
so is one o f the largest o f all facts in the life o f these
societies.
Were it to be said a b o u t a go vern m en t th at th ou gh
faced w ith a
iyast criminal organisation it could not b e exp ected to a c t in
f̂undamental opposition to It, the ob servation w ou ld not be
thought uninstructive a b o u t its ch a ra cte r a n d role. T h e
sam e is
true of the proposition w h ic h Professor A ro n so casu ally
puts
forward and tosses aside.
,-0 n the other h an d , th a t proposition tends to obscure a
basic

61. aspect o f the state’ s role. F o r governm ents, actin g in the
nam e o f
the state, have in fa c t been co m p elled over th e years to a
c t
agamst some p ro p erty rights, to erode some m an ag eria l p
rero g a -
tives, to help redress somewhat the b a la n ce betw een cap ita l
a n d
labour,: between p ro p e rty and those w ho are subject to it. T
h is
is an aspect o f state in terven tion w h ich conservative w
riters
who lament the g ro w th o f ‘b u r e a u c r a c y ’ a n d w ho
dep lore state
1 R.Aron, ‘ Classe Sociale, Classe P o litiq u e , Classe D irig
ea n te ’, in Archixits
fyfopttnnesdeSociolegie, ig 6 o , v o l. i , no. 2, p p . 2 72-3.
78 The State in Capitalist Society
‘interferen ce’ in the affairs o f society re g u la rly overlook
B u re a u c ra c y is in d eed a p ro b lem and a dan ger, and
the experj
ence o f countries lik e the S o viet U n io n has a m p ly
shown
g re a tly unrestrained b u re a u c ra tic p ow er c a n h elp to
obstruct
the creation o f a socialist society w o rth y o f the name.
con cen tra tion u p o n th e evils o f b u re a u c ra cy in
capitalist
countries obscures (an d is often inten ded to obscure) the fact
th a t ‘b u re a u c ra tic ’ in terven tion has often been a means
.of

62. a llev ia tin g the evils p rod u ced b y u nrestrained p riv a te
economic
p ow er.
T h e state’ s ‘interferen ce’ w ith th a t p ow er is not in
‘funda.
m en tal opposition’ to the interests o f p r o p e r ty : it is
indeed part
o f th a t ‘ ransom ’ o f w h ic h Josep h C h a m b erla in
spoke in 1885
a n d w h ich , he said, w o u ld h av e to be p a id p recisely
for the
purpose o f maintaining the rights o f p ro p e rty in general.
In
insisting th a t the ‘ran som ’ b e paid , governm ents render
p ro p e rty a m ajor service, th o u g h the la tte r is seldom
grateful
for it. E ven so, it w o u ld not do to ign ore the fa c t th a t
even very
con servative governm ents in th e regim es o f a d van ced
capitalism-
h a v e often been forced, m ain ly as a result o f p o p u la r
pressure,
to ta k e a ctio n a gain st certain p ro p erty rights and
capitalist
prerogatives.
A s against this, h o w e ver, m ust b e set the v e ry positive
support?
w h ic h governm ents h ave g e n e rally sought to g iv e to
dominant
eco n o m ic interests.
C a p ita lis t enterprise, as w as noted in ch ap ter I , depends
to p
e ver gre a te r exten t on the bounties and d irect support o(

63. the state, a n d c a n o n ly preserve its ‘ p riv a te ’ character
on I
th e basis o f such p u b lic h elp. S ta te in terven tion in
economic. I
life in fact la r g e ly means in terven tion fo r the purpose, of
h e lp in g cap ita list enterprise. I n no field has the notion of
the
‘ w elfare state’ h ad a m ore precise a n d ap posite m eaning
than”
h ere: there are no m ore persistent and successful applicantsfor
p u b lic assistance th an th e p ro u d giants o f the p riv a te
enterprise
system.
N o r need th a t assistance be o f a d irect kind to b e o f
immense
v a lu e to cap italist interests. Because o f th e im p erative
require-
ments o f m odern life, the state m ust, w ith in the lim its
imposed:
u pon it b y the p re v a ilin g econom ic system, engage in
bastard
form s o f socialisation a n d assume responsibility for many
The Purpose and R ole o f Governments 79
■ c»j0ns and services w h ic h are b eyon d the scope and c a p
a -
c it ie s o f cap italist interests. A s it does so, h ow ever, w h
a t J e a n
aud calls ‘ the bias o f the system ’ ensures th a t these
=;. terests w ill a u to m a tica lly b enefit from state interven
tion.

64. Because o f the p riv a te ow nership a n d con trol o f a p
red om in an t
"part o f econom ic life, Professor M e y n a u d w rites:
all the measures taken by the state to develop and improve the
national economy always end up b y being o f the greatest
benefit to
those who control the levers o f command o f the production-
distribution sector: when the state cuts tunnels, builds roads,
opens
highways or reclaims swamps, it is first o f all the owners o f
the
-jiaghbouring lands who reap the rew ards...the concept o f the
‘bias
of the system’ makes it also possible to understand that the
measures
taken to remedy the derelictions, shortcomings and abuses o f
: capitalism result ultimately, where successful, in the
consolidation
■ of the regime. It matters little in this respect that these
measures
-should have been undertaken by men sympathetic or hostile to
“ c ap ita list interests: thus it is that laws designed to protect
the
- workers and directed against their exploitation by employers w
ill
-- be found useful to the latter by inducing them to make a
greater
e f f o r t to rationalise or mechanise the productive process.1

65. Governments m a y b e solely concerned w ith the b etter
-running o f ‘ the e co n o m y ’ . B u t the description o f the
system as
I ‘the economy’ is p a rt o f the id io m o f id eology, and
obscures the
T real process. F o r w h a t is b e in g im p ro ve d is a
capitalist econ o m y;
:,and this ensures th a t w h o ever m a y or m a y not g a in ,
cap italist
înterests are least lik ely to lose.
; ..The ‘bias o f the system ’ m a y b e g iv e n a gre a te r or
lesser
'-degree o f emphasis. B u t the id eo lo gica l dispositions o f
govern -
jnents have g en erally been o f a kind to m ak e m ore a cc e p
ta b le
Jo them the structu ral constraints im posed u p o n them b y
the
.system; and these dispositions h a v e also m ad e it easier for
them
to submit to the pressures to w h ic h th ey h ave b ee n
subjected
'by dominant interests.
Taxation offers a read y illustration o f the p o in t. A s w as
noted in chapter 2, the econ om ic system itself generates ex-
tremely powerful tendencies tow ards th e m ainten ance and
-enhancement o f the vast ineq ualities o f incom e and w e a
lth
. which are typ ical o f a ll a d va n ced cap italist societies. G
iv e n th a t

66. 1 J.M eynaud, Rapport sur la Ctasse Dirigeante Italisnne, 1964,
p p . 190 -1.
8o The Stale in Capitalist Society
e conom ic system, n o g o vern m en t c a n a ch ie ve
redistributive
m iracles. B u t th e lim its o f its pow ers in this field are
nevertheless
not fin a lly fixed - despite the system ’s tendencies to
inequality,
an d the fierce opposition o f the forces o f w ealth to
redistributive
taxation . A n d the fa c t th a t ta x atio n has not, over the
years,
affected m ore d eep ly th an it has the disparities o f incom e
an<j
w ea lth in these societies m ust to a m ajor exten t be
attributed to
the a ttitu d e o f governm ents tow ards in eq u a lity , to the
view they
take o f the co n flictin g claim s o f the rich and the poor, and
to
th eir accep ta n ce o f a n econom ic o rth od oxy w h ich has,
at any
p a rtic u la r m om en t o f tim e, d e clared ad d itio n a l
burdens on the
rich to b e fata l to ‘ business confidence5, ‘in d iv id u a l
initiative’
the propen sity to invest, etc.
T h e sam e considerations a p p ly to g overn m en t
intervention in
‘in du strial relations’ , th e consecrated euphem ism for the

67. p erm an en t conflict, n ow acu te, n ow subdu ed, b etw een
capital"
and lab o u r.
W h e n e ve r g overn m en t h a v e felt it in cu m b en t, as th
ey have
done m ore and m ore, to interven e d irectly in disputes
between
em ployers and w age-earners, the result o f th eir intervention
has
tended to be disadvan tageous to th e latter, not the former. On
in n u m era b le occasions, and in a ll cap ita list countries,
govern*
m ents h a v e p la y ed a decisive role in defeatin g strikes,
often by
the in vo ca tio n o f the coercive p o w e r o f the state and
the use of
n a k ed v io le n c e ; and the fa c t th a t they h a v e done so
in the name
o f the nation al interest, la w and order, constitution al
govern*-
m ent, the p rotection o f ‘ the p u b lic 5, etc., rath er th an
simply to'
sup p ort em ployers, has n o t m ade th at in terven tion a n y
the less
useful to these em ployers.
M o reo ver, the state, as the largest o f all em ployers, is now
ab le to influence the p a tte rn o f ‘ in dustrial relations’ by
the;
force o f its ow n exam p le a n d b e h av io u r: th a t
influence can
h a r d ly be said to h av e created new standards in the
employer*
em ployee relationship. N o r cou ld it h a v e been expected to
do

68. so, g iven the ‘ business-like’ spirit in w h ich the p u b lic
sector is
m an ag ed .
G overn m en ts are d eep ly in vo lved , on a p erm anent and:
in stitution alised basis, in th a t ‘ routinisation o f con flict,’
which
is an essential p a rt o f the p olitics o f ad va n ced capitalism
. They
enter th a t conflict in the guise o f a n eu tral and independent
The Purpose and. Role o f Governments 81
oarty, concerned to a ch ie ve n o t the o u trig h t defeat o f
one side
of the other b u t a ‘ reasonable* settlem ent betw een them . B
u t
the'state’s in terven tion in negotiations occurs in the sh ad ow
o f
its known a n d d e clared propen sity to invoke its pow ers o f
coercion, against one o f the parties in the dispute ra th e r
than
the other, i f ‘ co n c ilia tio n 1 procedures fail. T h ese
procedures
fdrm, in fact, a n a d d itio n a l elem en t o f restraint u p o n
organised
labour, and also serve th e useful purpose o f fu rth er d iv id in
g the
trade union ranks. T h e state does interpose its e lf betw een
the
‘two sides o f in d u stry1 - not, h ow ever, as a n eu tral b u t
as a
partisan.

69. jfo r is this n ow adays o n ly true w h e n indu strial disputes
actually occu r. O n e o f the m ost n o tab le features in the
recent
evolution o f a d v a n c e d cap italism is th e degree to w h
ich
governments h av e sought to p la c e n ew a n d fu rth er
inhibitions
upon organised la b o u r in order to p re v e n t it from
exercising
■what pressures it c a n on em ployers (and on the state as a m
ajor
employer) in the m atter o f w a g e claim s. W h a t th ey ten d
to
achieve, by such m eans as an ‘incom es p o lic y 1, or b y
deflation -
ary policies w h ich red u ce the d em a n d for lab o u r, is a
general
weakening o f the b a rg a in in g position o f w ag e-ea rn
ers.1 H ere
too, the policies a d o p ted a re p ro cla im ed to be essential
to the
national interest, the h ealth o f the econom y, the defence o f
the
currency, the good o f the w orkers, and so on. A n d there are
always trade u nion leaders w h o can be found to endorse b
oth
■the claims and the policies. B u t this does not ch an ge the
fact
that the m ain effect o f these p olicies is to leave w age-
earners in a
. weaker position vis-a-vis em ployers th a n w o u ld
otherwise be the
case. T h e purpose, in the eyes o f p o litic a l office-holders,
m ay be
all that it is said to b e; b ut the result, w ith u n fa ilin g regu

70. la rity, is
to the detrim ent o f th e sub ordin ate classes. T h is is w h y
the
latter, in this as in m ost other instances, h ave good reason to
beware w hen the p o litic a l leaders o f ad va n ced cap
italist
countries invoke the n a tio n a l interest in defence o f th eir
policies - m ore lik e ly th an not they, the subordinate classes,
are about to be done. W age-earn ers h a v e alw ays h a d to
reck on
with a hostile state in th eir en cou nter w ith em ployers. B ut
now
1 See, e.g., K id ro n , Western Capitalism Since the War, p p .
ig o ff; ‘ Incom es P o licy
And the T ra d e U n ion s', in International Socialist Journal,
1964, v o l. I, n o 3 ; a n d ‘T h e
Campaign A gain st th e R ig h t to S trike’ , in ibid., 1964, v
ol. 1, n o. 1.
82 The State in Capitalist Society
m ore th a n ever th e y h a v e to reckon w ith its antagonism
, i ̂
p ractice, as a direct, p ervasive, and constant fact o f
economic
life. T h e ir im m ediate a n d d a ily op p on en t rem ains
the employer'
b u t governm ents an d th e state are n ow m uch m ore
closely
in volved in the en cou nter th a n in the past.
Q u ite n a tu ra lly , th is p a rtia lity o f governm ents
assumes Un-

71. even m ore specific, precise and organised ch ara cter in
relation-
to a ll m ovem ents, grou p ings and parties ded icated to the
transform ation o f ca p ita list societies in to socialist ones.
The
m an n er in w h ich governm ents h a v e expressed this
antagonism-
has g re a tly va rie d o ve r tim e, and betw een countries,
assuming
here a m ild er form , th ere a harsher on e; b u t the
antagonism
itse lf has b ee n a p erm a n en t fa c t in the h istory o f a ll
capitalist
countries: I n no field has th e u n d erly in g consensus
between
p o litic a l office-holders o f different p o litic a l affiliations,
and--
b etw een the governm ents o f different countries, been more
substantial and n o ta b le - th e leaders o f a ll governmental
parties, w h eth er in office o r in opposition, and including
n o m in a lly ‘socialist* ones, h a v e a lw a ys b een d eep ly
hostile tor"
th e socialist a n d m ilita n t left, o f w h a tev er denom
ination, and
governm ents them selves h a v e in fact b e en the m ajor p r
o ta g -
onists a gain st it, in th eir role o f protectors a n d saviours
of-
society from the perils o f left-w in g dissidence.
I n this instance too, lib e ra l-d em o cratic a n d p lu ralist
theorists, -
in th eir celeb ra tion o f th e p o litic a l com p etition w h
ich prevails
in th eir societies, a n d in th eir insistence on the p o litica l
neu

72. tra lity o f th e state, q u ite overlook th e fa c t th a t the
governments
o f a d v a n c e d cap ita list societies, far from ta k in g a
neutral view
o f socialist com p etition, do th eir level best to m ake it m ore
difficult;
I n som e countries, for instance F ed era l G e rm a n y ,
Communist
a n d o th er left-w in g parties a n d organisations are
suppressed
a ltogeth er, a n d m em bership m ad e a crim e p u n ish a b le
b y law; i
in others, such as the U n ite d States, left-w in g organisations,
of
w h ich the C om m u n ist P a rty is o n ly one, o p erate in
conditions"
o f such h arassm ent as to n a rro w rath er d rastically, in
their “
case, the n otion o f free p o litical com petition.
N o r is the state's h ostility less m arked in o th e r countries,
th o u g h it m a y assume different forms - for instance
electoral
m a n ip u la tio n as in F ran ce and I ta ly for the purp ose o f
robbing
their C om m u n ist parties o f the p a rlia m e n ta ry
representauon to
The Purpose and R ole o f Governments 83
their electo ra l strength entitles th em ; the engineering
of bias in the mass m edia, in so fa r as lies in the considerable
a n d
-■owing p ow er o f g overn m en ts; a n d also episodic b u t q

73. u ite
brutal repression o f left-w in g dissenters.
(jovernm ents, in o th er w ords, are d e e p ly concerned, w h a
t-
ever their p o litic a l coloration , th at the ‘d em o cra tic
process’
should operate w ith in a fra m e w o rk in w hich left-w in g
dissent
jayS as w eak a ro le as possible.
T he argum ent is n o t w h e th e r governm ents sh ould o r
should
not be n eu tral as b e tw e e n con servative a n d anti-
conservative
ideologies, m ovem ents, p arties a n d grou ps. T h a t
question is not
susceptible to resolution in term s o f such im p eratives. T h e
argument is rath er th a t the govern m en ts o f a d va n ced
cap italist
countries h ave never been thus n eu tral, a n d th a t th e y h a
v e for
■ the most p a rt used th e state p o w e r o n th e conservative
as against
the anti-conservative side. A n d the furth er a rgu m en t is th a
t
ju so doing th ey h av e , w h a te v e r o th er purposes th e y
m igh t h av e
- w ished to serve, afforded a m ost p reciou s elem ent o f p
rotection
to those classes a n d interests w hose p o w e r a n d
privileges socialist
dissent is p rim a rily in ten d ed to u n d erm in e and destroy.

74. T h o se
who believe in th e virtues o f a social o rd er w h ich
includes such
power and p rivileges w ill a p p la u d a n d support g o vern
m en ta l
partiality, and m ay even ask fo r m ore o f it. T h o se w h o do
not
will n o t T h e im p o rta n t p o in t is to see w h a t so m u ch
o f p o litic a l
analysis obscures, often from itself, n a m e ly th a t this is w
h a t
governments, in these coun tries, a c tu a lly d o .
The argum ent so fa r h as cen tered on som e o f the m ain
internal
■ consequences w h ich flo w fro m the com m itm en t o f
governm ents
to the capitalist system . B u t the external consequences o f th
a t
■commitment are no less d ire c t a n d im p ortan t.
Here, perhaps even m ore th a n in o th er fields, the purposes
which governm ents p ro cla im th eir wish to serve a re often
m ad e
to appear rem ote from specific econom ic concerns, let alon e
■ Capitalist interests. I t is the n a tio n a l interest, national
security,
/national indep en dence, honour, greatness, etc. th a t is th eir
: concern. B ut this n a tu ra lly inclu des a sound, h ealth y, th
rivin g
economic system ; and such a desirable state o f affairs
depends in
turn on the p rosperity o f cap italist enterprise. T h u s, b y
the sam e
mechanism w h ich operates in regard to hom e affairs, the

75. 6
Imperfect Competition
■■■ '■ #
m
m
D e m o c ra tic a n d p lu ralist th eory could n o t h a v e
gained the ,
d egree o f a scen dency w h ich it enjoys in a d va n ced
capitalist
societies i f it h a d n o t a t least b een based on one p la in ly
accurate
ob servation a b o u t them , n a m ely th a t th e y p e rm it
and even
e n co u ra g e a m u ltitu d e o f groups a n d associations to
orga n s
o p e n ly a n d freely a n d to com p ete w ith each oth er for
the ad
v a n c e m en t o f such purposes as th eir m em bers m a y
wish. With
exception s w h ic h m a in ly a ffe ct th e L eft, this is in deed
the case.
W h a t is w ro n g w ith p lu ralist-d em ocratic th eory is not
its
insistence on the fa c t o f com p etition b u t its cla im (very
often its;
im p lic it assum ption) th a t th e m ajor organised ‘interests’ in
these societies, a n d n o ta b ly c a p ita l a n d lab o u r, com
pete on

76. m o re or less eq u a l term s, a n d th a t none o f them is
therefore able
to a ch ieve a decisive a n d p e rm a n e n t a d va n tag e in
the process of
com p etition . T h is is w h ere id e o lo gy enters, a n d turns
observa-
tion into m yth . In previous chapters, it was show n th at
business;
p a rtic u la rly large-scale business, did enjoy such an
advantage!
inside the state system , b y virtu e o f the com position and
ideo-
lo g ic a l inclinations o f the state elite. In this ch ap ter, w e
shall
see th a t business enjoys a m assive superiority outside the
state
system as w e ll, in terms o f the im m ensely stronger
pressures
w h ic h , as co m p a red w ith la b o u r and a n y oth er
interest, it iš
a b le to exercise in the pursuit o f its purposes.
Im perfect Competition J47
I
One such form o f pressure, w h ic h p lu ralist ‘grou p
theorists’
tendto ig nore> *s m ore im p o rta n t an d effective th an a n y
oth er,
and business is u n iq u ely p la c e d to exercise it, w ith o u t
the need
o f organisation, cam p a ig n s a n d lo b b y in g . T h is is th
e pervasive

77. and perm anent pressure u p o n governm ents a n d the state
generated b y the p riv a te con trol o f co n cen tra ted
industrial,
commercial a n d fin an cia l resources. T h e existence o f
this m ajor
area o f indep en dent econom ic p o w e r is a fact w h ich no
g overn -
ment, w h a tev er its inclinations, c a n ign ore in the determ in
atio n
>0f its policies, n o t o n ly in re ga rd to econom ic m atters,
b u t to
most other m atters as w e ll. T h e ch a irm a n o f the
editorial b oard
of Fortune m ag a zin e said in 1952 th a t ‘ a n y president w
ho w ants
to seek a prosperous c o u n try depends o n the co rp o ra tio
n a t
least as m u ch - p r o b a b ly m ore th an - the corporation
depends
oil him. H is d ep en den ce is not u n lik e th a t o f K in g J o
h n o n the
janded barons a t R u n n ym e d e , w h ere M a g n a C a r ta
w as born’ . 1
The parallel m a y n o t be p erfect b u t the stress o n th e in d
ep en -
dent pow er o f business, a n d o n th e dep en dence o f g
overn m en t
upon it, is a ltogeth er ju stified , n o t on ly for the U n ite d
States b u t
for all other a d v a n c e d c ap ita list countries.
O f course, governm ents do h a v e the fo rm a l p o w e r to
im pose
; their w ill u p on business, to p re v e n t it, b y the exercise

78. o f
legitimate a u th o rity, from d o in g certain things a n d to
com p el it
to do certain o th er things. A n d this is in fact w h a t
governm ents
have often don e. B u t this, th ou gh true a n d im p ortan t, is
n o t a t
all the p oin t a t issue. Q u ite o b vio u sly, governm ents are
not
completely helpless in th e face o f business p ow er, nor is it
the case
that businessmen, h o w eve r la rg e the concerns w h ich th ey
run ,
jean openly d efy the state’s com m an d, disregard its rules and
flout the law . T h e p o in t is rath er th at the control b y
business o f
large and c ru c ia lly im p o rta n t areas o f econom ic life m
akes it
extremely difficult for governm ents to im pose u pon it policies
to
which it is firm ly opposed. O th e r interests, it m a y w ell be
said,
1 Vlilis, The Power Elite, p. :6 g. O r , as A lfred de G r a z ia
puts it, ‘w h oever controls
the grc it industries w ill have aw ful po litica l p o w er’
(Politics and Government,
1963, vol. 2, p. 56).
148 The State in Capitalist Society
are b y n o m eans helpless vis-d-vis th e ir govern m en t
either* th

79. too m a y oppose, sometim es successfully, th e purposes*
policies o f the state. B u t business, in the v e ry nature of
cap ita list system o f econom ic organisation, is im m easur^^
b etter p la c ed th an a n y oth er interest to do so effectively,
and to
cause governm ents to p a y m u ch g re a te r attention to its
"wishes
a n d susceptibilities th an to a n y b o d y else.
W ritin g a b o u t th e U n ite d States, Professor H ack er has
noted
in this co n n ection th a t:
... what Parsons and other liberals like to think o f as business
regulation is, despite the predictable complaints o f
businessmen '
more a paper tiger than an effective system o f economic
controls in
the public interest ... [and, he goes on] a few questions may be
asked about these supposed powers o f the national government.
Can
any public agency determine the level o f wages, o f prices, o f
profits?
C an it perhaps, more important, specify the level and direction
of
capital investment? C an any government bureau allocate raw
materials or control plant location? C an it in any w ay
guarantee
full employment or the rate o f economic growth ? Has any writ
of the
A nti-Trust Division actually broken up one o f our larger
corpbra-
tions in any appreciable w ay? T h e simple answer is that
measures
such as these are neither possible under the laws nor do we
know

80. w hat the reaction to them would be.1
E v e n for the U n ite d States this m a y w e ll underestim ate
the
in flu en ce w h ic h governm ents do h a v e, b y d ire ct a n d
indirect
in terve n tio n , on econom ic life ; and in m a n y oth er
capitalist
countries, w h ere a m ore positive p h ilosop hy o f
intervention has
g e n e ra lly com e to p re v a il, governm ents h a v e been ab
le to do
ra th er m ore th an w h a t is here suggested as possible.
N evertheless, the limits o f interven tion, at least in relation
to
business, a n d p a rtic u la rly against it, a re everyw h ere m
uch more
n a rro w and specific th an insistence o n th e form al powers
of
g o vern m en t w o u ld tend to suggest; and the a rea o f
decision-;'
m a k in g w h ic h is left to p riv a te enterprise is
correspondingly
g rea ter th a n is u su a lly co n v eyed b y the assiduously
propagated
im a g e o f a ‘ business co m m u n ity 5 c rib b ed and
confined by
b u re a u c ra tic a lly m eddlesom e governm ents and th eir
agents. -
E v e n governm ents w h ic h are determ ined to ‘ co n trol5
private;:
1 A .H a c k e r , ‘ S ociolo gy an d I d e o lo g y ’ , in M .B la
c k (ed.), The Social Theories <if