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Source
ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICE ADOPTION IN THE MNC:
A TRAIT ACTIVATION THEORY APPROACH
1
INTRODUCTION
A key concern in the MNC literature is the question regarding
the effectiveness of

organizational practice adoption by the different international
subsidiaries (e.g., Canato, Ravasi,
& Phillips, 2013; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Yu &
Zaheer, 2010). In MNCs,
organizational practices are used to share knowledge, best
practices, and operating policies across
subsidiaries (Canato, Ravasi, & Phillips, 2013; Yu & Zaheer,
2010). However, organizational
practice adoption is often hampered by different internal and
external contingencies (e.g., Jensen
& Szulanski, 2004; Kostova, 1999). Prior research identified a
number of factors that can affect
the adoption of practices across firms including the firm’s
institutional and relational contexts (e.g.,
Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002) and within firms
including characteristics of the knowledge
(Szulanski, 1996a) and the practices that are being shared (e.g.,
Canato, Ravasi, & Phillips, 2013;
Yu & Zaheer, 2010).
Our study is motivated by two observations: First, despite
longstanding calls for research
“to study individual-level variables, such as education,
expertise, orientation to change, and even

some personality variables” (Kostova & Roth, 2002: 230), there
is little explicit knowledge about
whether, when, and why some individuals are more willing than
others are to adopt organizational
practices. This is surprising since the extant research
(implicitly) acknowledges the important role
that individuals play in international subsidiaries by adopting or
rejecting the organizational
practices promoted by the MNC headquarters. For example,
Szulanski (1996b) and Jensen and
Szulanski (2004), who focused on the origins of the practices,
found support for the existence of
the “not invented here” syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1988). This
research revealed that when practices
originated in one department, people in another department had
a higher likelihood of rejecting
them. Other studies have examined the effects of cultural and
structural differences, and found that
2
the involvement of different nationalities or functions can
impede practice adoption (Mäkelä,
Andersson, & Seppälä, 2012). However, these studies do not
explain whether and when some

individuals are more willing than others are to adopt
organizational practices.
Second, although a common theme in the extant literature on
organizational practice
adoption is that the situational contexts matters (e.g., Canato,
Ravasi, & Phillips, 2013; Yu &
Zaheer, 2010), there is a lack of research into how
organizational controls influence practice
adoption behavior. This is an important shortcoming since MNC
research has long emphasized
that MNCs use the organizational controls to achieve certain
behaviors and outcomes (Baliga &
Jaeger, 1984; Doz & Prahalad, 1981; Prahalad & Doz, 1981).
In order to address these shortcomings in the existing literature,
we set out to examine how
managers’ personality traits influence their practice adoption
behavior in their different situational
contexts. While earlier studies have often used demographic
characteristics as proxies for
underlying psychological constructs, scholars have more
recently been able to increasingly also
capture the actual personality traits of managers (Nadkarni &
Herrmann, 2010). We follow these

studies and examine subsidiary managers’ stable personality
traits in organizational contexts that
MNC can alter. Specifically, we focus on individuals who are
being targeted as adopters of
organizational practices and their specific situational contexts
in the MNC, which are intended to
influence their behavior and achieve certain organizational
outcomes.
To develop our theoretical argumentation underlying your
hypotheses, we build on trait
activation theory (e.g., Tett & Burnett, 2003), and incorporate
arguments from situational strength
theory (e.g., Meyer, Dalal, & Bonaccio, 2009; Meyer, Dalal, &
Hermida, 2010) and organizational
control research (e.g., Sitkin, Cardinal, & Bijlsma-Frankema,
2010) as the triggers of trait
activation. According to trait activation theory, the effects of a
personality trait on the behavior of
3
an individual is dependent on how a trait is being activated.
Triggers, such as the situational context
or an external intervention, influence how personality traits
influence behavior. For example, a

situational context that becomes uncertain could activate
neurotic behavior causing a person
scoring high on neuroticism to behave differently than under
normal circumstances.
We focus in this paper on a unifying construct that captures
core dimensions of personality:
core self-evaluations (CSEs) of the subsidiary managers. As our
baseline hypothesis, we propose
that subsidiary managers’ CSE traits are positively related to
practice adoption. This is consistent
with prior research that has found CSE associated with a wide
range of positive organizational
effects (Chang, Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012b). We
argue, however, further that this
relationship is contingent upon the organizational context in
which the managers are situated.
Specifically, we argue that formal controls weaken the
relationship, because they create a rigid
behavioral context that limits behavioral variation and that can
even flip high-CSE individuals
from supporters to resistors. At the same time, we propose that
informal controls strengthen the
positive relationship between high CSE and practice adoption
because they empower high-CSE

managers, and appeal to their self-esteem and perceptions of
self-worth.
We test our hypotheses using a unique dataset covering 130
practice adoption situations in
a large European MNC. Surmounting the challenges commonly
associated with obtaining intimate
self-assessments from managers (e.g., Simsek, Heavey, &
Veiga, 2010), we were able to collect a
large-scale primary personality dataset covering an entire firm’s
management. This survey-based
dataset enables us to provide novel insights into how managers’
personality characteristics
influence their practice adoption behavior in different MNC
subsidiary contexts.
Our study makes three main contributions. First, we introduce
trait activation theory as a
novel theoretical lens for examining organizational practice
adoption. While our findings on the
4
positive effects of CSE on practice adoption are in line with
prior research on the generally positive
effects of CSE, the effect depends on how the CSE traits are

activated. We use trait activation
theory to theorize and show how activation can happen through
organizational controls. By
introducing trait activation theory to the study of organizational
practice adoption, we also add to
the prior research on the negative moderating effects of politics
and perceived leader effectiveness
on the generally positive outcomes of CSE by showing that
organizational controls also interact
with individual-level personality characteristics (Kacmar,
Collins, Harris, & Judge, 2009).
Second, we contribute to an improved understanding of the
effects of personality traits on
the behavior of senior and middle managers. Prior research has
tended to center either on front-
line employees and the effects of different personality traits on
their motivation, organizational
citizenship behavior, and job satisfaction, or on CEOs and the
effects of their personality
characteristics on firm-level outcomes, such as risk taking and
bold moves (Hiller & Hambrick,
2005). In this paper, we cover the middle ground by showing
that middle managers’ personalities
can have positive and negative effects on their behaviors

depending on the context.
Third, we contribute to an improved understanding of the
situational context of practice
adoption. Specifically, we enhance the understanding of the
effects of organizational controls. We
show that formal and informal controls can either strengthen or
weaken the influence of
individuals’ personality traits on practice adoption. Overall, our
study supports the emerging claim
that individuals’ personality traits and the interaction of those
traits with the organizational context
warrant further exploration not only at the top management
level (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) and
among front-line employees (Raffiee & Feng, 2014) but also on
other levels of the firm.
5
BACKGROUND
A key premise in the MNC literature is that organizational
practice adoption plays an
important role for a firms’ overall success (e.g., Kostova, 1999;
Kostova & Roth, 2002). We build
on Kostova and Roth’s definition of organizational practices as

the “routine use of knowledge for
conducting a particular function that has evolved over time
under the influence of the
organization’s history, people, interests and actions” (2002:
216). Such practices include
processes and routines individuals within the firm conduct when
performing specific activities.
We focus on practices that headquarters promote among
subsidiaries in a multinational
company setting and examine whether and when subsidiary
managers adopt those practices. A
long line of research suggests that fostering the adoption of
practices is a key task of corporate
headquarters (Campbell, Whitehead, Alexander, & Goold, 2014;
Collis, Young, & Goold, 2012;
Menz, Kunisch, & Collis, 2015). When the MNC headquarters
perceives an organizational practice
as useful, it works to ensure that the practice is adopted in the
firm´s subsidiaries, for example to
replace less-efficient practices (Szulanski, 1996b). Institutional
or practice theorists have also
sometimes labelled this as “coerced organizational practice
adoption” (e.g., Canato, Ravasi, &
Phillips, 2013; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Such coerced

practice adoption may be successful in
certain cases (Canato, Ravasi, & Phillips, 2013) and less so in
other cases.
As noted in the introduction, we focus on two important but
largely neglected aspects
related to organizational practice adoption by subsidiaries in
MNCs. First, we focus on subsidiary
managers who differ with respect to their personality traits,
which in turn can be expected to
influence their behavior. Second, we focus on organizational
controls, which are used to influence
the behaviors of subsidiary managers by the corporate
headquarters of the MNC in order to achieve
desired organizational outcomes.
6
Managers’ personality
One challenge in studying the effect of personality traits on
behavior is that different
research streams rely on different, albeit overlapping,
personality constructs. In an attempt to
resolve this problem, personality scholars have examined the
similarities and the boundaries of

various personality constructs in order to move research beyond
tangled approaches and isolated
studies toward an integrative construct (Judge & Bono, 2001;
Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen,
2002; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2003; Judge, Locke, &
Durham, 1997).
An important outcome of these efforts has been the development
of the construct of core
self-evaluation (CSE)1. When considered in isolation, self-
esteem refers to people’s fundamental
appraisals of themselves, their self-acceptance, self-liking, and
self-respect (Judge, Erez, & Bono,
1998; Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997; Judge, Locke, Durham, &
Kluger, 1998). Generalized self-
efficacy expresses individuals’ estimations of their own
capabilities to mobilize motivation, their
cognitive resources, and their ability to control life events
(Bandura, 1982). Locus of control refers
to how people perceive themselves within their environments. A
perception of an external locus
of control indicates that people believe they have little
influence on their environment, while a
perception of an internal locus of control indicates that they
believe they have a major influence

on their environment (Rotter, 1966). Neuroticism refers to an
individual’s insecurity, guilt,
timidity, general anxiety, self-doubt, and fear of novel
situations (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Judge,
Locke, & Durham, 1997; Judge, Locke, Durham, & Kluger,
1998).
1 Whether CSE is a theory in itself is an ongoing debate.
Proponents argue that it has moved beyond
the empirical meta-construct level (Bono and Judge, 2003) and
is a personality theory in itself. As
we do not intend to enter into this debate, we follow recent
research that assumes no need to
investigate all underlying theories to develop hypotheses
stemming from the CSE construct (Hiller
& Hambrick, 2005; Simsek et al., 2010). We therefore focus on
the latent meta-construct.
7
In summary, core self-evaluations are evaluations that people
make about themselves—
their worthiness and abilities—which vary from positive to
negative. These self-appraisals reflect
baseline assessments that are implicit in all of their other
beliefs and evaluations (Chang, Ferris,
Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012a; Judge & Bono, 2001; Judge,

Bono, Erez, & Locke, 2005; Judge,
Locke, & Durham, 1997).
While significant research efforts have focused on developing
and testing the CSE
construct in the field of psychology, organization and
management scholars have only recently
become interested in understanding the effect of individuals’
CSEs on organization-level outcomes
(cf., Chang, Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012a). In this
regard, CSE has been found to be
positively related to job satisfaction, perceptions of work, goal
setting, commitment, motivation,
performance, and front-line employees’ abilities to cope with
change (Chang, Ferris, Johnson,
Rosen, & Tan, 2012a; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Judge, Erez, &
Bono, 1998; Judge & Kammeyer-
Mueller, 2011; Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997; Judge, Locke,
Durham, & Kluger, 1998;
Kammeyer-Mueller, Judge, & Scott, 2009). In addition to non-
senior employees, researchers have
examined the role of CSE as part of CEOs’ and other top
executives’ personalities (e.g. Chang,
Rodgers, Shih, & Song, 2012; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005;
Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010; Resick,

Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009; Simsek, Heavey, &
Veiga, 2010). For example, studies
have found that high CSE is related to the propensity for risk
taking (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005),
the likelihood of adopting an entrepreneurial orientation
(Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010) and the
response to compensation schemes (Chang, Rodgers, Shih, &
Song, 2012). Prior research has also
shown that individuals with high CSE scores tend to be more
confident, proactive, and motivated
to act on behalf of the firm. However, extremely high scores can
eventually lead to overconfidence,
high risk taking, and performance volatility (Hiller &
Hambrick, 2005).
8
In this paper, we expand the scope of these studies from CEOs
and front-line employees to
middle managers. Specifically, we examine how subsidiary
managers’ CSEs relate to the adoption
of organizational practices. In addition, while some studies have
explicitly referred to the link
between personality traits and job behaviors (Erez & Judge,

2001; Judge, Locke, & Durham,
1997), we contribute to the existing literature by showing how
the personality traits of middle
managers can be activated differently in different organizational
contexts.
Organizational controls
The extant MNC literature suggests that the corporate
headquarters use organizational
controls to influence the behaviors of subsidiary managers in
order to achieve certain
organizational outcomes (e.g., Ambos & Reitsperger, 2004;
Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007;
Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen, & Li, 2004; Doz & Prahalad,
1981). While prior research suggests
that these control mechanisms have to be tailored to the specific
subsidiaries to ensure the desired
effect (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984; Doz & Prahalad, 1981; Prahalad
& Doz, 1981), we shift focus to
the individuals and the behaviors of the people who are being
controlled.
In this context, we define organizational controls as a set of
mechanisms “through which
[headquarters] managers seek to align [subsidiary] employee
capabilities, activities, and

performance with organizational goals and aspirations” (Sitkin,
Cardinal, & Bijlsma-Frankema,
2010: 3). Building on an extensive body of prior research (e.g.,
Brenner & Ambos, 2013; Cardinal,
2001; Cardinal, Kreutzer, & Miller, 2017; Floyd & Lane, 2000;
Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991;
Kirsch, 1996; Kreutzer, Walter, & Cardinal, 2015; Lange, 2008;
Sitkin, Cardinal, & Bijlsma-
Frankema, 2010; Tannenbaum, 1956), we focus on two
fundamentally different types of
organizational controls: formal and informal controls.
9
Formal controls include means of direct behavioral control,
such as guidelines and rules,
as well as, defined goals and targets that focus on the results of
employee behavior (Eisenhardt,
1989; Kreutzer, Walter, & Cardinal, 2015; Ouchi, 1977). To
successfully apply formal controls,
headquarters must either be able to measure outputs (i.e., to set
and assess appropriate goals for
managers) or be sufficiently knowledgeable of the process in
order to direct managers to take the

right steps, or both (Eisenhardt, 1985; Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi,
1978). Formal controls have been the
focus of much of the literature on organization theory (Ambos
& Schlegelmilch, 2007; Ouchi,
1979; Thompson, 1967 ) and agency theory (Arrow, 1985;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; O'Donnell,
2000). Two often implicit but important assumptions in these
studies is that managers or agents
are self-interested, and that a certain amount of formal control
is necessary to align their actions
with the goals and objectives of headquarters.
Informal controls, in contrast, are aimed at creating alignment
through socialization
processes that reduce or eliminate goal conflicts between the
headquarters and subsidiary
managers (Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2010; Kreutzer, Walter, &
Cardinal, 2015). The research
interest in informal controls originates from the works of Ouchi
(1979; 1980; 1978), who used the
term “clan” to describe groups of individuals who cultivate and
share common norms and values,
develop a feeling of joint dependence, and consequently show a
high degree of goal alignment.

While clans generally achieve alignment through social
controls, research suggests that the
selection of individuals with a sense of self-control can have a
similar effect (Jaworski, 1988;
Manz, Mossholder, & Luthans, 1987). Thus, headquarters that
rely on informal controls try to
foster normative integration by developing and maintaining
processes that help create a shared set
of values.
10
HYPOTHESES
We now proceed to the theoretical argumentation underlying our
baseline hypothesis on
the effects of subsidiary managers’ CSEs on practice adoption
in those subsidiaries. Thereafter,
building on trait activation theory and the organizational control
literature, we theorize about how
formal and informal controls influence the activation of the CSE
trait.
Baseline hypothesis: The effect of managers’ core self-
evaluations on practice adoption
When theorizing on the effects of CSE, it is important to

recognize that CSE is not an
additive sum of the four traits nor decomposable to them, but
rather “a broad latent trait” that is
the “source of the four specific traits” (Simsek, Heavey, &
Veiga, 2010: 111). It cannot be broken
down into sub-components because a high (low) level of CSE
tends to be associated with high
(low) levels of all of the specific traits. The specific traits are
also closely correlated—for example,
self-esteem correlates with self-efficacy, self-efficacy correlates
with the locus of control, and all
three correlate with emotional stability. In other words, CSE is
“a broad personality trait [that]
captures the common elements embedded in self-esteem,
generalized self-efficacy, emotional
adjustment, and locus of control (Judge, Locke, and Durham,
1997; Judge et al., 2003)” (Simsek,
Heavey, & Veiga, 2010: 111).
Our baseline hypothesis is that managers with high levels of
CSE are more favorable
towards organizational practice adoption. We expect the
relationship between managers’ CSE and
practice adoption to be positive, especially because high levels
of CSE are associated with

individuals’ cognitive abilities, entrepreneurial attitudes, sense
of duty, and commitment. First,
higher cognitive ability of subsidiary managers fosters
organizational practice adoption. The extant
research associates high CSE with high cognitive ability
(Chang, Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan,
2012a). Higher cognitive ability can help managers better
understand the motivations underlying
11
a new practice and, thereby, enable them to implement that
practice more easily than those with
low CSE. Cognitive ability may also enable managers to more
easily understand how to optimally
adopt and tailor a new practice to the subsidiary so that the
corporate headquarters will be satisfied
and disruptions of routines at the subsidiary level will be
minimized.
Second, higher entrepreneurial attitude of subsidiary managers
nurtures practice adoption.
Prior research has found that high levels of CSE are associated
with entrepreneurial and pioneering
behaviors (Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010). Individuals with

high levels of CSE tend to have
higher self-efficacy and perceptions of an external locus of
control, which are typically associated
with entrepreneurial behaviors. When headquarters introduce
new practices to subsidiaries, the
outcomes may not be directly visible. However, entrepreneurial
managers can be expected to be
faster in recognizing the potential opportunities associated with
such practices as well as the
consequences for their departments. An entrepreneurial attitude
should support managers’ efforts
to find the most efficient solution.
Third, the sense of duty of subsidiary managers fosters
organizational practice adoption.
High-CSE individuals have a stronger sense of duty and tend to
feel more obliged to fulfill their
job requirements than individuals with low CSEs. Prior research
has established a link between
high CSE and the fulfillment of job duties, persistence, and
conscientiousness (Chang, Ferris,
Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012a; Gagné & Deci, 2005) as well as
acceptance of change (Wanberg
& Banas, 2000). A higher sense of duty and the desire to excel
in one’s own work can be expected

to lead high-CSE managers to take new practices proposed by
corporate headquarters more
seriously, accept them with less emotion, and implement them
more effectively due to their higher
cognitive and entrepreneurial capabilities.
12
Finally, higher commitment of subsidiary managers fosters
adoption. High-CSE managers are generally more committed to
their firms than low-CSE
individuals. High-CSE managers are also more emotionally
stable and confident in their own
abilities, which enables them to avoid behaviors that could harm
their firms. They may even
actively promote the firm in their own social contexts (Chang,
Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan,
2012a). Against this background, commitment to the firm can be
expected to translate to
commitment to organizational practices introduced by the
headquarters.
Based on these arguments, our baseline hypothesis is that
managers with high levels of

CSE show more compliance with, belief in, and commitment to
the adoption of organizational
practices than those with low CSE. In addition, they are more
confident, effective, and convincing
when introducing new practices to their staff. While we would
expect the relationship between
CSE and practice adoption to turn to negative at very high
levels of CSE, we do not expect
subsidiary managers to exhibit the high levels of CSE
documented in some studies of CEOs.
Therefore, we only expect to see a positive relationship between
subsidiary managers’ CSEs and
H1: Subsidiary managers’ core-self evaluations (CSEs) are
positively associated with
Trait activation: The moderating effects of formal and informal
controls
While our baseline hypothesis portrays subsidiary managers as
competent, confident, and
motivated actors, they also have their own agency. Therefore,
an understanding of the interplay
between managers’ personality traits and the organizational

context is central to understanding
their behavior. To examine this interplay, we use trait activation
theory to theorize on the
13
contingent effects of two distinct organizational controls on the
association between managers’
CSEs and organizational practice adoption.
Trait activation theory is useful for theorizing about whether
and when the CSE traits of
subsidiary managers are activated. It argues that the
personality-job performance relationship is
moderated by situational factors that affect whether certain
personality traits come into play (Tett
& Burnett, 2003). For example, Simsek et al. (2010) find that
the association between the CEO’s
CSE and the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation is contingent
upon the level of environmental
dynamism. This would seem to suggest that the CSE trait is
more likely to be activated in a specific
environmental context. Similarly, Chang, Rodgers, Shih, and
Song (2012) find that managers with
high CSEs “respond to incentive compensation with greater

perseverance, competitive strategy
focus, ethical behavior, and strategic risk taking during
organizational decline” but not during
periods of organizational growth (p. 1343). Although neither of
these studies used trait activation
theory to theorize on the effects of the context on managers’
psychological traits, their findings
would be consistent with the expectations of trait activation
theory.
Tett and Burnett (2003) suggested that five main situational
factors are generally relevant
for trait activation: (a) job demands, (b) distracters, (c)
constraints, (d) releasers, and (e)
facilitators. These factors operate on three levels:
organizational, social, and task. In this paper, we
focus on the interplay between the organizational and social
factors by examining the different
levers that headquarters can use to influence practice adoption.
As noted before, headquarters can
use different levers to influence the behavior of subsidiary
managers (Ambos & Reitsperger, 2004;
Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007; Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen,
& Li, 2004; Doz & Prahalad,
1981). In this context, we see the role of organizational controls

as the means “through which
managers seek to align employee capabilities, activities, and
performance with organizational
14
goals and aspirations” (Sitkin, Cardinal, & Bijlsma-Frankema,
2010: 3). Thus, the aim is not only
to “control” the behaviors of employees, but to also stretch,
support, guide, and empower them to
move towards common organizational goals (e.g., Ghoshal &
Bartlett, 1994; Gibson &
Birkinshaw, 2004). These control mechanisms must be tailored
to ensure the desired effect (Baliga
& Jaeger, 1984; Doz & Prahalad, 1981; Prahalad & Doz, 1981),
and they have to fit the
personalities and behaviors of the people who are affected.
In this paper we focus on formal controls and informal controls
as two distinct types of
organizational control (e.g., Brenner & Ambos, 2013; Cardinal,
2001; Cardinal, Kreutzer, &
Miller, 2017; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Gupta & Govindarajan,
1991; Kirsch, 1996; Kreutzer, Walter,
& Cardinal, 2015; Lange, 2008; Sitkin, Cardinal, & Bijlsma-

Frankema, 2010; Tannenbaum, 1956).
While formal controls can include job-related demands or
organizational constraints placed on
managers, informal controls operate on the social-structural
level, where they act as releasers or
facilitators rather than constraints. Prior research indicates that
charismatic leadership strengthens
the impact of the big five personality traits on employee
effectiveness in dynamic environments
(De Hoogh, Den Hartog, & Koopman, 2005), and that high-
quality social exchange relationships
(both leader-member exchange and team-member exchange)
tend to eliminate the distinguishable
positive effects of agreeableness and conscientiousness on
performance (Kamdar & Van Dyne,
2007). Moreover, prior work shows that politics and perceived
leader ineffectiveness can cause
high-CSE individuals to underperform low-CSE employees,
thereby leading to the deactivation of
the personality trait and a negative effect (Kacmar, Collins,
Harris, & Judge, 2009).
Accordingly, we argue that formal and informal controls create
different organizational
contexts that have different effects on how psychological traits,

such as those manifested in the
managers’ CSEs (i.e., self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy,
locus of control, and emotional
15
stability), are activated. Along these lines, we propose that the
relationship between managers’
CSEs and practice adoption is moderated by formal and
informal controls. More specifically, we
argue that formals controls negatively moderate the relationship
and that informal controls
positively moderate it. While formal controls tend to lead to
compliance and standardization of
behavior regardless of differences in individuals’ personality
traits, informal controls enable
entrepreneurial freedom, which allows high-CSE subsidiary
managers to excel. High-CSE
managers might even perceive formal controls as inflexible
straitjackets that are only necessary
for those who do not believe in the practices that they govern.
Therefore, despite high-CSE subsidiary managers’ overall
commitment to the organization
and their high motivation, we expect formal controls to have a

neutral or even negative effect on
their practice adoption behaviors. Formal rules could be viewed
as an additional burden and reduce
the entrepreneurial spirit of high-CSE subsidiary managers.
They could also be seen as a negative
signal indicating corporate headquarters’ lack of trust in the
subsidiary. Moreover, consistent with
situational strength theory (Meyer, Dalal, & Bonaccio, 2009;
Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010),
formal controls tend to lead to a reduction in personal freedom
to make decisions and reduce the
ability of individuals to deviate from a prescribed practice.
While this might not matter for less
entrepreneurial, low-CSE managers, high-CSE managers would
benefit from having more room
to initiate and perform tasks with an entrepreneurial spirit
(Chang, Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan,
2012a; Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010), which could be
expected to enhance their commitment
to practice adoption. Yet, formal controls provide individuals
with less freedom to act self-
confident, empowered, high-CSE individuals to oppose new
organizational practices, especially if
an attempt at coercive implementation through strict formal

controls signals that their own
judgments are not appreciated. As higher levels of formality
limit opportunities for deviation (i.e.,
16
opportunities to stand out by doing things better than others
do), we expect the commitment of
high-CSE managers to decline. Therefore, we argue that formal
controls negatively moderate the
association between managers’ CSE and organizational practice
adoption.
In contrast to formal controls, informal controls aim at
achieving alignment in a more subtle
matter by creating a shared understanding of purpose and
direction within the organization.
Therefore, informal controls have often been equated with clan
or social controls (Ouchi, 1979),
which could be expected to resonate with self-conscious, high-
CSE individuals. Informal controls
give high-CSE managers more degrees of freedom, as they are
less likely to constrain employee
behavior. Informal or social controls help align the values of
headquarters and subsidiary

managers, thereby enhancing the positive effect of CSE. They
enable practice adoption when
headquarters and local managers have similar values and
objectives, even with fewer formal
controls. Informal controls can also be used to legitimize the
new practices in the eyes of the
subsidiary managers, such that “legitimacy” describes
perceptions or assumptions that an
organization’s actions are desirable and appropriate within a
cultural system of norms and beliefs
(Suchman, 1995). Without formal controls, the legitimacy of the
new practices is crucial for
building trust and fostering their acceptance (Sitkin & George,
2005). This, in turn, promotes
commitment from people with high CSE to practice adoption
because the firm’s practices fit their
own values. Hence, building on trait activation theory, we argue
that different types of
organizational controls can act as trait activation triggers that
either provide individual discretion
and enable or enhance the effect of CSE on organizational
practice adoption, or act as triggers that
limit individual discretion or even turn the effect of CSE
negative. Therefore, in line with trait

activation theory, we hypothesize that the relationship between
CSE and practice adoption is more
pronounced in the presence of informal controls than in the
presence of formal controls:
17
H2a: Formal controls negatively moderate the association
between subsidiary managers’
CSEs and the adoption of organizational practices such that the
association is weaker for
higher levels of formal control and stronger for lower levels of
formal control.
H2b: Informal controls positively moderate the association
between subsidiary managers’
CSEs and the adoption of organizational practices such that the
association is stronger for
higher levels of informal control and weaker for lower level of
informal control.
METHODS
Research design and data collection
In order to put the hypothesized relationships to an empirical
test, we utilized a single-firm
research design to minimize “noise” from differences among

firms. Due to our long-standing
collaboration with the company, we were able to obtain unique
detailed internal data on
organizational practice adoption in a large European insurance
firm. The firm had annual sales of
USD 7.7 billion in 2012. At the time, it was operating in six
European countries with one subsidiary
in each country. The corporate headquarters and one of the
subsidiaries were located in the same
country (the home market).
When we launched our investigation in 2013, the headquarters
was implementing
organizational practices in 24 units across the six subsidiaries.
These units included “Risk and
Capital Management,” “Accounting,” “Communications and
Brand Management,” and “IT
Operations.” All 24 units were present in all six subsidiaries
(with 10 exceptions), which leads to
a total of 134 subsidiary units. For each subsidiary unit, at least
one manager responsible for
adopting new practices was identified as a potential respondent.
In 24 units, two managers were
responsible for adopting new practices, and there were three in
one case. As we were interested in

the effects of managers’ CSEs on the adoption of new practices,
we included all of these managers
18
in our survey. This provided a total of 159 potential
respondents. Each manager was asked about
the degree of implementation and internalization of
organizational practices mandated by
headquarters.
Access to the company was negotiated through the chief
executive officer (CEO) and the
chief strategy officer (CSO), who also acted as the internal
sponsors of our research. Initial
interviews with four managers in various groups and positions
helped us to understand the research
setting and to develop the survey instrument. Data collection
took place in April and May 2013 by
means of an online survey. The survey was announced in an e-
mail from the CEO. Thereafter, the
survey was sent to all of the subsidiary unit managers by the
research team. This ensured a high
response rate, although not everyone responded. The research
team reminded those who had not

responded in two waves (first by e-mail and then by phone). In
29 cases, we received either no
response or an incomplete response. Therefore, our final data
set covered 130 observations (82%).
Variables and measurement
Practice adoption: In order to account for different adoption
behaviors, we considered two
levels of depth in organizational practice adoption (Collings &
Dick, 2011; Ford, 2011; Kostova,
1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Implementation refers to
compliance with an adoption mandate,
which leads to observable behavior that is in alignment with the
mandated action. Internalization
refers to belief in and commitment to a practice, which reflects
whether the managers consider
such practices valuable. Investigations of the effects of
personality on organizational practice
adoption require an understanding of each dimension. However,
since the results of these two
measures were quite similar, we report in our analysis only
results regarding implementation.
We used the scales developed by Kostova and Roth (2002),
which we adapted to fit the

specific context of the focal MNC. Accordingly, we measured
implementation using eight items,
19
and respondents were asked to use a seven-point Likert scale to
assess the extent to which practices
had been implemented in their departments (ranging from “no
extent” to “a very great extent”) (α
= 0.92). Respondents were asked to assess the extent to which
they agreed with each item using a
seven-point Likert scale (ranging from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree”) (α = 0.87).
Core self-evaluation (CSE): Following prior research (Simsek,
Heavey, & Veiga, 2010)
we used the established measure of CSE developed by Judge,
Erez, Bono, and Thoresen (2003).
We asked respondents about their level of agreement with 12
statements about themselves.
Respondents used a five-point Likert scale, ranging from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”
(α = 0.86), to indicate their responses.
Formal control: We followed the established literature on
strategic controls (Ambos &

Schlegelmilch, 2007; Brenner & Ambos, 2013; Cardinal, 2001;
Collis, Young, & Goold, 2007)
and measured formalization using four items on a seven-point
Likert scale. The items asked
respondents to indicate the degree and enforcement of
formalized procedures (α = 0.86).
Informal control: We followed an approach similar to that
adopted by Ghoshal and Bartlett
(1988) and Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen, and Li (2004) in
which we created an aggregate
measure that consisted of four components. Our goal was to
remove subjectivity. First, we asked
respondents whether they had mentors at the corporate
headquarters (coded 1 for “yes” and 0 for
“no”). Second, managers who had spent more than one year
working at corporate headquarters
were assigned a value of 1, while all others were coded 0.
Third, we recorded how often managers
visited corporate headquarters each year. Given that all
subsidiaries were less than two hours from
headquarters by car, train, or plane, we assigned a score of 1 for
managers who visited headquarters
at least once per month, while others received a score of 0. The
final component was participation

20
in corporate training, which was coded 1 for managers who had
participated in corporate training
and 0 for all others. We calculated an aggregate measure from
these scores (0-4).
Control variables: To account for alternative explanations, we
used three sets of controls.
First, we controlled for both the institutional and relational
contexts (Kostova & Roth, 2002). For
the institutional context, we used subsidiary dummies to control
for effects that originated at the
six locations, five of which were in countries other than the
home country. In order to control for
the relational context, we asked each corporate manager
responsible for the rollout in the
subsidiary to indicate the frequency of communication with his
or her manager using a four-item
measure. This item was based on a seven-point Likert scale
ranging from “once every few months”
to “very often” (α = 0.86), which was developed by Nobel and
Birkinshaw (1998).
Second, we controlled for several practice characteristics. We
controlled for task

environment in order to account for the fact that some practices
allow more freedom in
implementation than others. We relied on the traditional
distinction between administrative and
entrepreneurial tasks (Chandler, 1962). Three experienced
researchers rated the task environments
independently. Deviations were discussed until all raters were
in full agreement. Administrative
practices were coded 0 and entrepreneurial practices were coded
1. We also controlled for
organizational practice size (i.e., the number of employees
involved in each case), as the relative
importance of a practice independence from corporate
headquarters might change as this variable
changes (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Nell & Ambos, 2013).
Moreover, we controlled for
organizational practice age because older practices might have
an administrative heritage that
affects the relations with corporate headquarters (Bouquet &
Birkinshaw, 2008).
Third, we controlled for managers’ demographic and
professional backgrounds. More
specifically, we controlled for the effect of the hierarchical
level in order to address any problems

21
that might stem from hubris (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007;
Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Resick,
Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009). Respondents were not
all on the same hierarchical level.
We chose them on the basis of their responsibility for adopting
organizational practices in the local
department, which meant that they could be higher or lower in
the hierarchy. We measured the
hierarchical level in terms of hierarchical distance from the
CEO (i.e., 1 for direct reports of the
CEO, 2 for one level below direct reports, etc.). In addition,
some researchers have proposed that
CSE is influenced by life experience and the development of
thinking processes (Judge, Locke, &
Durham, 1997). Therefore, we also controlled for respondents’
age to account for any impact from
life experiences and for respondents’ tenure in the firm to
control for potential influences on
thinking that might stem from the corporate context.
Fourth, although common method problems are often overstated
(Lindell & Whitney, 2001;

Spector, 2006), we took a number of precautions to alleviate
potential concerns (Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003). First, in order to
avoid consistency motives, we
separated the independent and dependent constructs in the
survey by inserting other questions
between those related to the independent and dependent
variables. Second, we used different scale
anchors for CSE (1-5) and implementation (1-7), and included
several reverse-coded items. Third,
to avoid social-desirability bias, we assured respondents that
their answers would be kept
confidential. In addition, we told them that answering questions
about CSE was voluntary and that
those questions had nothing to do with the other questions.
Fourth, to avoid potential ambiguity
stemming from item complexity, we tested the survey on four
managers in various positions.
Finally, we conducted the Harman’s single-factor test that
indicated no common method problems.
22
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

We applied multiple linear regression analyses with clustered,
robust, and standard errors
(as implemented in STATA 12.1) to control for the nesting
effect of idiosyncratic properties of
respondents who provided answers for more than one local
department (Moulton, 1986; Rogers,
1993). Prior to running the regressions, we carefully examined
the data for normality, linearity,
and equality of variance. We used the cubed value of
implementation, and the logarithms of
practice size, practice age, respondent age, and respondent
tenure to adjust for non-normality. To
reduce the effects of multicollinearity with respect to the
moderating variables, we performed z-
score transformations for formal control, informal control, and
CSE. We examined the variance
inflation factors (VIF), all of which were less than 3 and,
therefore, well below the recommended
threshold of 10 (Myers, 1990). A variance-decomposition
analysis with condition indices further
ensured us that multicollinearity was not a problem in our data.
Table 1 provides the descriptive
statistics and the correlation matrix.

------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here
------------------------------------------------------------------
Hypotheses testing
We used stepwise OLS regressions to test for the effects of
organizational practice adoption
on our dependent variable (see Table 2). All models are
significant (adjusted R-squared ranged
from 0.31 to 0.50) and include all control variables and
subsidiary dummies (not shown). In our
baseline model (Model 1), we find statistically significant
positive effects for subsidiary dummies
(p < 0.001) and the hierarchy level of individuals (p < 0.01). In
Model 2, which includes the direct
effects of the moderators, we find a negative but non-significant
direct effect of informal control
and a positive, statistically significant effect of formal control
(p < 0.001).
23
Hypothesis 1 states that there is a positive relationship between
CSE and practice adoption.
To test for this main effect, we add CSE into the regression in

Model 3. Consistent with the
hypothesis, we find a positive, statistically significant effect (p
< 0.001), which remains unchanged
in all of the following models. This provides support for
Hypothesis 1.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b outline the moderating effects of formal
and informal controls on
the relationship between CSE and practice adoption. To test
Hypothesis 2a, we add the moderation
term of formal controls into the regression (Model 4). The
coefficient is negative and statistically
significant at the p < 0.05 level. Moreover, the increase in R-
squared from Model 3 to Model 4 is
statistically significant (p < 0.05), which provides support for
Hypothesis 2a and suggests a
negative moderating effect of formal control on the CSE-
practice adoption relationship. To test
Hypothesis 2b, we introduce the informal controls moderator
into the model (after excluding the
formal control moderator; see Model 5). We find a statistically
significant, positive effect (p <
0.01) with an adjusted R-squared of 0.49. The increase in R-
squared from Model 3 to Model 5 is
also significant (p < 0.01), which supports Hypothesis 2b. In

Model 6, we include both moderation
effects, and find that the both the formal control (p < 0.1) and
informal control moderations (p <
0.05) are still significant, which provides further support for
Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1a and Figure 1b about here
------------------------------------------------------------------
To better interpret the moderation effects, we plot the
moderating effects following the
approach suggested by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003),
which has also been adopted in
similar studies (Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010; Zhang, 2006).
To do so, we conduct simple
regressions based on Models 4 and 5 for both formal and
informal controls. We set all values at
the mean with conditional values (mean +/- 1 standard
deviation) for formal and informal controls.
24
As shown in Figure 1a, the relationship between CSE and
practice adoption is steeper under
low levels of formal control and flatter when formal control is

high. In other words, people with
high CSE appear to be less effective at adopting practices when
they are surrounded by many
formalized procedures and more effective when they enjoy
behavioral freedom. In contrast, as
shown in Figure 1a, the slope for the relationship between CSE
and practice adoption is steeper
under conditions of high informal control. Accordingly, when
people have higher CSE, efforts to
establish a shared set of values and common views appear to be
beneficial for practice adoption.
Validity and reliability
We also conducted various additional tests to examine the
robustness of our results. First,
our data represents multiple hierarchical levels. The 130
observations about practice adoptions are
nested in 24 organizational departments. In order to account for
possible effects in this regard, we
used a multi-level model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We
included all variables from the final
regression model (Model 6) with practice as a random-effect
parameter. All previously reported
effects were maintained. A likelihood-ratio test comparing the
linear model to the multilevel model

indicates that the null hypothesis (Prob > chi-bar-squared =
1.00) cannot be rejected, which
suggests no difference between the simple model and the
hierarchical model. This provides
additional support for our findings. As an additional robustness
check, we excluded all variables
that showed no significance in the final models and then re-ran
the regressions. All of the effects
remained consistent with the reported results.
DISCUSSION
Based on an analysis of organizational practice adoption by
subsidiary managers in the
subsidiaries of an MNC, our paper sheds light on the effects of
managers’ personality traits on
their practice adoption behavior. Specifically, we examined how
the personality traits of managers,
25
as captured by their CSE traits, affect practice adoption and
how the CSE traits can be activated in
different situational contexts. Consistent with prior research
pointing to the generally positive

effects of high CSE on individuals’ behavior (Chang, Ferris,
Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012a), we
found that, in general, high-CSE managers are more inclined to
adopt organizational practices
promoted by the headquarters. This is an interesting finding, as
a hypothesis regarding the opposite
effect could have also been put forward by arguing that more
confident subsidiary managers should
be unwilling to accept any guidance from the headquarters.
Moreover, trait activation theory
enabled us to theorize and show that the use of informal
controls further strengthens this
relationship. At the same time, we found that formal controls
have a negative, albeit statistically
non-significant, moderating effect.
Contributions to theory development
Our paper contributes to an improved understanding of
organizational practice adoption by
proposing trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003; Tett &
Guterman, 2000) as a novel
theoretical lens for analyzing practice adoption situations.
Moreover, we contribute to recent
interactionist accounts of the relative importance of situational
strength and the personality

characteristics of individuals in different situational contexts
(Judge & Zapata, 2015). Meyer,
Dalal, and Hermida (2010) built on prior work to coin the term
“situational strength,” which they
defined as the “implicit or explicit cues provided by external
entities regarding the desirability of
potential behaviors.” The leading idea in research on situational
strength is that, in some situations,
individuals can experience external pressure to behave in pre-
determined or specific ways that is
so strong that the relationship between a specific personality
trait and the behavior to which it
relates weakens or entirely disappears. This idea is consistent
with the idea of trait activation
26
theory, according to which situational contexts and clues can be
seen as triggers that activate
specific personality traits rather than disabling them.
The formal and informal characteristics of organizations have
been proposed as factors that
determine whether a situation is strong or weak (Forehand &
Gilmer, 1964; Meyer, Dalal, &

Bonaccio, 2009; Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010). Accordingly,
formal controls can be viewed as
representing a strong situational context in which there is no
space or degrees of freedom for
individual trait activation. Informal controls, on the other hand,
can be seen to represent a weak
situational context in which individual characteristics matter
even more and can be activated. This
is also evident in our empirical analyses. While formal controls
have a direct, positive effect on
practice adoption in our study, the moderating effect on CSE is
non-significant (and negative).
Informal controls, on the other hand, seem to enhance the
positive baseline relationship between
subsidiary managers’ CSE scores and their practice adoption.
Therefore, similar to Judge and
Zapata (2015), we find that trait activation theory interacts with
the theoretical conceptualization
of the effects of strong and weak situations.
Our paper builds on and extends the work of Judge and Zapata
(2015). They examine the
moderating effects of general interactionism (situation strength)
and specific interactionism (trait

activation) on the effects of the big five personality traits on job
performance by examining the
effects of managers’ CSEs on their practice adoption behaviors,
and the roles of formal and
informal controls as determinants of situation strength and as
trait activation triggers. Based on
our analysis of middle managers, we find that the nature of
organizational controls can act as a
trigger for trait activation and as a determinant of situational
strength. Formal controls seem to
create a strong situational context that standardizes behavior
and reduces the effects of individual
27
differences on practice adoption, while informal controls appear
to act as both trait activation
triggers and magnifiers in the context of organizational practice
adoption.
Through our analysis, we respond to the call by Judge and
Zapata (2015) for more empirical
work that examines the joint effects of individual traits and the
strength of the situational context
on performance outcomes. Moreover, we add to the extant
research on trait activation theory by

showing that, in addition to organizational politics and
perceived leader effectiveness, formal and
informal controls moderate the relationship between CSE and
performance (Kacmar, Collins,
Harris, & Judge, 2009).
Contributions to empirical research on organizational practice
adoption
Our paper also contributes to the extant empirical research on
adoption, by showing that subsidiary managers’ personality
traits affect their practice adoption
behaviors. Our findings indicate that when the MNC
headquarters promote the implementation of
new practices in the different subsidiaries, they would benefit
from considering the personalities
of the individuals involved. This finding supports recent calls
for more research on the micro-
foundations of knowledge transfer, and on organizational
routines and practices (Felin & Foss,
2009; Felin, Foss, & Ployhart, 2015; Foss & Pedersen, 2014;
Foss & Pedersen, 2004). Personality
traits in general and CSE in particular may help us better
understand and substantiate the relations

among practice transfer, motivation, ability, and interpersonal
similarities (Minbaeva, Pedersen,
Björkman, Hyeon Jeong, & Fey, 2002; Mäkelä, Andersson, &
Seppälä, 2012).
In addition, we contribute to an improved understanding of the
control mechanisms related
to practice adoption. Specifically, we enhance the understanding
of the interplay between
individual and organization-level controls. We show that formal
and informal controls either
reinforce or diminish the positive effects of individuals’
personality characteristics. Our study also
28
supports the recent work that has argued that understanding the
effects of CSE and its moderators
warrant further exploration in organizational contexts, not only
on the level of top management
(Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) or front-line employees (Raffiee &
Feng, 2014) but also when
examining middle managers. Prior research on the effects of
CSE has tended to focus either on
front-line employees and the positive effects of CSE on their
motivation, organizational citizenship

behavior, or job satisfaction, or on CEOs and the effects of high
levels of CSE on the likelihood
of engaging in risk taking and bold moves (Hiller & Hambrick,
2005). We cover the middle ground
by using a sample of managers to show that the effects of CSE
can be either positive or negative
depending on the trait activation triggers.
Limitations and future research
Although we exercised great care in designing our study, it has
several limitations, which
offer opportunities for future research. First, due to our single-
firm design, we were unable to
follow Judge and Zapata (2015) in capturing differences in
situational strength across industries.
For example, managers who work in insurance might have
personalities that systematically differ
from those in other industry contexts. Therefore, additional
research is needed to extend our
analyses to other industry contexts. Second, we used
organizational practice adoption as our main
dependent variable, acknowledging that a firm’s ultimate
performance is not necessarily a
consequence of successful adoption.

We regard the adoption of organizational practices as a way of
sharing complex forms of
knowledge, which could be expected to be beneficial for gaining
and sustaining competitive
advantage relative to other firms (Kostova & Roth, 2002).
However, they could also lead to
excessive standardization and homogenization of the practices
in the MNC, which could lead to
29
the loss of local discretion and adaptability. We encourage
scholars to extend our study by
examining the performance implications of the adoption of
organizational practices.
CONCLUSION
We introduce trait activation theory as a novel theoretical lens
to international business
research and test a conceptual model of how the personality
characteristics of individual managers,
measured in terms of their core self-evaluations (CSEs), affect
organizational practice adoption
and how practice adoption behavior is affected by different
types of organizational controls. Our

paper provides one of the first applications of trait activation
theory in the context of organizational
practice adoption and contributes to an improved understanding
of the interplay between trait
activation and situational strength theories in practice adoption
situations.
30
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37
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1 Practice adoption 22.78 8.80 -1.00
2 Relational context 3.42 1.41 -0.00 -1.00
3 Practice size (log) 2.37 1.84 -0.12 -0.35*** -1.00
4 Practice age (log) 1.77 0.89 -0.09 -0.20* -0.32*** -1.00
5 Hierarchy 2.12 0.57 -0.33*** -0.02 -0.07 -0.21* -1.00
6 Age (log) 3.89 0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.05 -0.24** -0.37*** -1.00
7 Tenure (log) 2.31 0.87 -0.02 -0.20* -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -
0.41*** -1.00
8 Formal control 4.12 1.46 -0.33*** -0.04 -0.01 -0.15† -0.00 -
0.06 -0.03 -1.00
9 Informal control 2.27 0.89 -0.04 -0.34*** -0.18* -0.12 -0.16†
-0.12 -0.23** -0.06 -1.00
10 CSE 4.12 0.45 -0.46*** -0.07 -0.01 -0.18* -0.29** -0.05 -
0.11 -0.09 -0.25** -1.00

38
Table 2: Regression models for hypothesized effects (H1, H2a,
and H2b)
Organizational practice adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 15.37 20.70 12.95 1.99 -1.36 -8.52
(0.61 ) (0.85 ) (0.40 ) (0.07 ) (-0.05 ) (-0.31 )
Controls
Subsidiary dummies S S S S S S
Relational context 0.78 0.83 0.79 † 0.79 † 0.64 0.66
(1.48 ) (1.62 ) (1.93 ) (2.00 ) (1.50 ) (1.56 )
Practice size (log) 0.01 -0.35 -0.30 -0.19 -0.47 -0.36
(0.01 ) (-0.82 ) (-0.73 ) (-0.48 ) (-1.43 ) (-1.19 )
Practice age (log) -0.13 -0.56 -0.12 -0.11 -0.20 -0.18
(-0.16 ) (-0.71 ) (-0.13 ) (-0.12 ) (-0.22 ) (-0.19 )
Hierarchy -3.78 ** -3.81 ** -2.84 -2.23 -3.12 † -2.62
(-2.68 ) (-2.70 ) (-1.68 ) (-1.33 ) (-1.93 ) (-1.63 )
Age (log) 2.59 1.29 2.70 5.03 6.75 8.19
(0.41 ) (0.21 ) (0.34 ) (0.67 ) (0.93 ) (1.21 )
Tenure (log) -1.14 -0.37 -0.40 -0.35 -0.69 -0.63
(-1.03 ) (-0.33 ) (-0.32 ) (-0.31 ) (-0.56 ) (-0.54 )
Main effects
Formal control 2.74 *** 2.55 *** 2.50 *** 2.35 *** 2.33 ***
(3.83 ) (3.23 ) (3.64 ) (3.48 ) (3.90 )
Informal control -0.04 -0.61 -0.41 -0.65 -0.50

(-0.06 ) (-0.81 ) (-0.53 ) (-0.95 ) (-0.69 )
CSE H1 + 2.84 *** 3.15 *** 2.74 *** 2.98 ***
(5.78 ) (7.12 ) (5.73 ) (6.14 )
CSE x formal control H2a - -1.33 * -1.01 †
(-2.40 ) (-1.98 )
CSE x informal control H2b + 1.69 ** 1.55 **
(3.55 ) (3.32 )
Observations 130 130 130 130 130 130
R-squared 0 .37 0 .44 0 .52 0 .53 0 .55 0 .56
Adjusted R-squared 0 .31 0 .40 0 .46 0 .47 0 .49 0 .50
Prob > F 0 .0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0 .0000
Δ R-squared (to Model 3) 0 .01* 0 .03**
Prob > F 0 .0251 0 .0018
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.
t-statistics in parentheses.
We included five subsidiary dummies.
39
Figure 1a: Illustration of moderation effects of formal controls
Figure 2b: Illustration of moderation effects of informal
controls
0
5

10
15
20
25
30
35
40
-3 STD -2 STD -1 STD Mean +1 STD +2 STD +3 STD
Pr
ac
tic
e
ad
op
tio
n
Core self-evaluation
Formal control
High
Low
0

5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
-3 STD -2 STD -1 STD Mean +1 STD +2 STD +3 STD
Pr
ac
tic
e
ad
op
tio
n
Core self-evaluation
Informal control
High

Low
AOT 265–200 Office Desktop Publishing
Learning Outcome Instructions
MODULE THREE
Learning Outcome Project: Create a Personal Portfolio Website
Complete the following assignment:
• Create a personal portfolio website using Google Sites
Learning Objective: Students will create an e-portfolio of their
personal, professional and academic
work.
Website Instructions:
• The web site should include a homepage, and at least two
subsidiary pages.
• Select a site theme, colors and fonts. (A professional look is
key!)
• Add a logo.
• Include a header and navigation area on each page (horizontal
navigation bar, sidebar and
footer).
• Add content of your choice, including text and images. There
should be text about personal,
professional and academic experience and accomplishments.

(You can use content from your
personal brochure, created in Module 2, to highlight your
personal, professional and academic
experience.)
• Optional: Add documents or videos that highlight your
professional experience.
• Submit your website using the Share Your Site feature.
o Send the email invitation to [email protected]
Module Three

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