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DNS / DNSSEC Workshop

  DNS Security - TSIG
        Hong Kong
    15-19 February 2011

     in conjunction with

    APRICOT 2011
DNS: Data Flow
Zone administrator
                      1!
                                     4!
 Zone file                 master         Caching forwarder


                 2!
                                3!                            5!

 Dynamic
 updates
                           slaves
                                                         resolver
DNS Vulnerabilities
Corrupting data!             Impersonating master!
                                                                  Cache impersonation!
 Zone administrator
                       1!
                                                4!
  Zone file                 master                      Caching forwarder


                  2!
                                    3!                                      5!

  Dynamic
  updates
                            slaves
                                                                        resolver
                                            Cache pollution by!
                                              Data spoofing!
      Unauthorized updates!



               Server protection!                        Data protection!
TSIG Protected Vulnerabilities
                               Impersonating master!
Zone administrator


 Zone file            master                           Caching forwarder




 Dynamic
 updates
                      slaves
                                                                      resolver


       Unauthorized updates!
What is TSIG - Transaction
               Signature?
•  A mechanism for protecting a message from a
   primary to secondary and vice versa

•  A keyed-hash is applied (like a digital signature)
   so recipient can verify message
   –  DNS question or answer
   –  & the timestamp


•  Based on a shared secret - both sender and
   receiver are configured with it
What is TSIG - Transaction
              Signature?
•  TSIG (RFC 2845)
  –  authorizing dynamic updates & zone transfers
  –  authentication of caching forwarders


•  Used in server configuration, not in zone
   file
TSIG example
                                                  verification!

                   AXFR!                            AXFR!


                   Sig ...!                        Sig ...!
                              Query: AXFR!



    Slave!                                         Master!
    KEY:
                                          KEY:

    %sgs!f23fv!                                    %sgs!f23fv!

                              Response: Zone!
     SOA !                                      SOA !
     …!                                         …!
     SOA!                                       SOA!

      Sig ...!                                   Sig ...!




    verification!



7
TSIG steps
    1.  Generate secret

    2.  Communicate secret

    3.  Configure servers

    4.  Test
8
TSIG - Names and Secrets
•  TSIG name
  –  A name is given to the key, the name is what
     is transmitted in the message (so receiver
     knows what key the sender used)


•  TSIG secret value
  –  A value determined during key generation
  –  Usually seen in Base64 encoding
TSIG – Generating a Secret
•  dnssec-keygen
  –  Simple tool to generate keys
  –  Used here to generate TSIG keys

   dnssec-keygen -a <algorithm> -b
    <bits> -n host <name of the key>!
TSIG – Generating a Secret
•  Example!

  > dnssec-keygen –a HMAC-MD5 –b 128 –n
    HOST ns1-ns2.pcx.net

  This will generate the key
  > Kns1-ns2.pcx.net.+157+15921

  >ls
   Kns1-ns2.pcx.net.+157+15921.key
   Kns1-ns2.pcx.net.+157+15921.private
TSIG – Generating a Secret
•  TSIG should never be put in zone files!!!
  –  might be confusing because it looks like RR:

  ns1-ns2.pcx.net. IN KEY 128 3 157 nEfRX9…bbPn7lyQtE=!
TSIG – Configuring Servers
•  Configuring the key
  –  in named.conf file, same syntax as for rndc
  – key { algorithm ...; secret ...;}
•  Making use of the key
  –  in named.conf file
  – server x { key ...; }!
  –  where 'x' is an IP number of the other server
Configuration Example –
                          named.conf
Primary server 10.33.40.46!    Secondary server 10.33.50.35	

key ns1-ns2.pcx. net {!         key ns1-ns2.pcx.net {!
      !algorithm hmac-md5;!           !algorithm hmac-md5;!
      !secret "APlaceToBe";!          !secret "APlaceToBe";!
};!                             };!
server 10.33.50.35 {!           server 10.33.40.46 {!
      !keys {ns1-ns2.pcx.net;};! keys {ns1-ns2.pcx.net;};!
};!                             };!
zone "my.zone.test." {!         zone "my.zone.test." {!
      !type master;!                  !type slave;!
      !file “db.myzone”;!             !file “myzone.backup”;!
      !allow-transfer {!              !masters {10.33.40.46;};!
      !key ns1-ns2..pcx.net ;};!};!
};!


You can save this in a file and refer to it in the named.conf
using ‘include’ statement:
include “/var/named/master/tsig-key-ns1-ns2”;
TSIG Testing : dig
     •  You can use dig to check TSIG
        configuration
       –  dig   @<server> <zone> AXFR -k <TSIG keyfile>!



     $ dig @127.0.0.1 example.net AXFR !
         -k Kns1-ns2.pcx.net.+157+15921.key!


     •  Wrong key will give “Transfer failed” and
        on the server the security-category will log
        this.

15
TSIG Testing - TIME!
•  TSIG is time sensitive - to stop replays
  –  Message protection expires in 5 minutes
  –  Make sure time is synchronized
  –  For testing, set the time
  –  In operations, (secure) NTP is needed
Questions?




17

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Tsig 17022011

  • 1. DNS / DNSSEC Workshop DNS Security - TSIG Hong Kong 15-19 February 2011 in conjunction with APRICOT 2011
  • 2. DNS: Data Flow Zone administrator 1! 4! Zone file master Caching forwarder 2! 3! 5! Dynamic updates slaves resolver
  • 3. DNS Vulnerabilities Corrupting data! Impersonating master! Cache impersonation! Zone administrator 1! 4! Zone file master Caching forwarder 2! 3! 5! Dynamic updates slaves resolver Cache pollution by! Data spoofing! Unauthorized updates! Server protection! Data protection!
  • 4. TSIG Protected Vulnerabilities Impersonating master! Zone administrator Zone file master Caching forwarder Dynamic updates slaves resolver Unauthorized updates!
  • 5. What is TSIG - Transaction Signature? •  A mechanism for protecting a message from a primary to secondary and vice versa •  A keyed-hash is applied (like a digital signature) so recipient can verify message –  DNS question or answer –  & the timestamp •  Based on a shared secret - both sender and receiver are configured with it
  • 6. What is TSIG - Transaction Signature? •  TSIG (RFC 2845) –  authorizing dynamic updates & zone transfers –  authentication of caching forwarders •  Used in server configuration, not in zone file
  • 7. TSIG example verification! AXFR! AXFR! Sig ...! Sig ...! Query: AXFR! Slave! Master! KEY:
 KEY:
 %sgs!f23fv! %sgs!f23fv! Response: Zone! SOA ! SOA ! …! …! SOA! SOA! Sig ...! Sig ...! verification! 7
  • 8. TSIG steps 1.  Generate secret 2.  Communicate secret 3.  Configure servers 4.  Test 8
  • 9. TSIG - Names and Secrets •  TSIG name –  A name is given to the key, the name is what is transmitted in the message (so receiver knows what key the sender used) •  TSIG secret value –  A value determined during key generation –  Usually seen in Base64 encoding
  • 10. TSIG – Generating a Secret •  dnssec-keygen –  Simple tool to generate keys –  Used here to generate TSIG keys  dnssec-keygen -a <algorithm> -b <bits> -n host <name of the key>!
  • 11. TSIG – Generating a Secret •  Example! > dnssec-keygen –a HMAC-MD5 –b 128 –n HOST ns1-ns2.pcx.net This will generate the key > Kns1-ns2.pcx.net.+157+15921 >ls  Kns1-ns2.pcx.net.+157+15921.key  Kns1-ns2.pcx.net.+157+15921.private
  • 12. TSIG – Generating a Secret •  TSIG should never be put in zone files!!! –  might be confusing because it looks like RR: ns1-ns2.pcx.net. IN KEY 128 3 157 nEfRX9…bbPn7lyQtE=!
  • 13. TSIG – Configuring Servers •  Configuring the key –  in named.conf file, same syntax as for rndc – key { algorithm ...; secret ...;} •  Making use of the key –  in named.conf file – server x { key ...; }! –  where 'x' is an IP number of the other server
  • 14. Configuration Example – named.conf Primary server 10.33.40.46! Secondary server 10.33.50.35 key ns1-ns2.pcx. net {! key ns1-ns2.pcx.net {! !algorithm hmac-md5;! !algorithm hmac-md5;! !secret "APlaceToBe";! !secret "APlaceToBe";! };! };! server 10.33.50.35 {! server 10.33.40.46 {! !keys {ns1-ns2.pcx.net;};! keys {ns1-ns2.pcx.net;};! };! };! zone "my.zone.test." {! zone "my.zone.test." {! !type master;! !type slave;! !file “db.myzone”;! !file “myzone.backup”;! !allow-transfer {! !masters {10.33.40.46;};! !key ns1-ns2..pcx.net ;};!};! };! You can save this in a file and refer to it in the named.conf using ‘include’ statement: include “/var/named/master/tsig-key-ns1-ns2”;
  • 15. TSIG Testing : dig •  You can use dig to check TSIG configuration –  dig @<server> <zone> AXFR -k <TSIG keyfile>! $ dig @127.0.0.1 example.net AXFR ! -k Kns1-ns2.pcx.net.+157+15921.key! •  Wrong key will give “Transfer failed” and on the server the security-category will log this. 15
  • 16. TSIG Testing - TIME! •  TSIG is time sensitive - to stop replays –  Message protection expires in 5 minutes –  Make sure time is synchronized –  For testing, set the time –  In operations, (secure) NTP is needed