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DANE! 
E-Mail!Transport!Security!done!right 
and!https,!jabber,!PGP,!…! 
! 
Carsten!Strotmann!(Men!&!Mice)! 
Patrick!Koetter!(Sys4) 
1
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
SSL/TLS!world!today 
•a!(too)!large!number!of!certification!authorities! 
•whom!do!you!trust!(ultimately)?! 
•CA!security!can!be!breached! 
•Comodo,!DigiNotar,!GlobalSign!…! 
•False/Fake!certificates!have!been!issued! 
•National!Informatics!Centre!(India),!DigiNotar,!ANSSI!… 
2
TLS!and!E-Mail!Server 
•many!mail-server!try!to!use!TLS!encryption!when! 
sending!data!to!other!mail!servers! 
•no!human!in!reach!to!decide!if!the!certificate!is!not!good! 
•mail!is!send!anyway!(un-authenticated!or!un-encrypted)! 
•DANE!is!about!fixing!this 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
3
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
4
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
5 
STARTTLS?
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
STARTTLS! STARTTLS? 
TLS!and!SMTP 
6
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
7 
STARTTLS? 
STARTTLS! 
wrong server
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
8 
STARTTLS? 
STARTTLS! 
Men in the 
Middle 
STARTTLS? 
STARTTLS!
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
9 
STARTTLS? 
No! 
Men in the 
Middle 
No! 
STARTTLS?
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!!=!PGP 
TLS 
PGP 
10
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLSA/SMTP 
•Validation!of!TLS!certificates!via!DNS(SEC)! 
•the!hash!of!an!x509!cert!(or!the!full!certificate)! 
stored!in!DNS! 
•proof:!owner!of!the!domain!==!owner!of!the! 
certificate 
11
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLSA/SMTP 
•the!security-level!similar!to!domain-validated!x509! 
certificates! 
•TLSA!can!be!used!to!validate!self-signed!certificates! 
•TLSA!can!be!used!to!validate!X509!certificates!from! 
certification!authorities!(Symantec,!Comodo,!StartSSL,! 
CACert!…) 
12
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
13 
STARTTLS? 
STARTTLS! 
SMTP 
MTA 
SMTP 
MTA 
DNS 
TLS cert 
DNS
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
14 
STARTTLS? 
STARTTLS! 
SMTP 
MTA 
SMTP 
MTA 
DNS 
TLS cert 
DNS 
TLSA?
DNS DNS 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
15 
STARTTLS? 
STARTTLS! 
SMTP 
MTA 
SMTP 
MTA 
TLSA! 
DNSSEC 
check
DNS DNS 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
16 
STARTTLS! 
STARTTLS! 
SMTP 
MTA 
SMTP 
MTA
DNS DNS 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
17 
STARTTLS? 
NO! 
Man in the 
Middle 
SMTP 
MTA 
SMTP 
MTA 
TLSA?
DNS DNS 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
18 
STARTTLS? 
NO! 
Man in the 
Middle 
SMTP 
MTA 
SMTP 
MTA 
TLSA! 
DNSSEC 
check 
ALERT! 
MITM Attack
DNS DNS 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
19 
STARTTLS? 
STARTTLS! 
SMTP 
MTA 
SMTP 
MTA 
TLSA? 
Spoofed server
DNS DNS 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLS!and!SMTP 
20 
STARTTLS? 
SMTP 
MTA 
SMTP 
MTA 
TLSA! 
DNSSEC 
check 
ALERT! 
wrong 
server! 
STARTTLS! 
Spoofed server
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
Infrastructure!DNS 
•DNSSEC!validation!(caching!DNS!resolver)!! 
•BIND!9,!Unbound,!dnsmasq,!Windows!2012! 
•DNSSEC!signed!zones!(authoritative!DNS!Server)! 
•BIND!9,!NSD,!Knots,!Y.A.D.I.F.A.,!PowerDNS,!Bundy-DNS,! 
[Windows!2012]* 
21 
*!Windows!2012R2!does!not!support!the!TLSA-Record
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
Infrastructure!Mail 
•MTA!(Mailserver)!with!TLSA!Support!! 
•Postfix!2.11,!Exim!(in!development)! 
•TLS!certificates! 
•EV-certificate!(Extended!Validation)! 
•DV-certificate!(Domain!Validation)! 
•Self-signed!certificate 
22
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
BIND!9!DNSSEC 
•enable!DNSSEC!validation: 
options { 
… 
dnssec-validation auto; 
dnssec-lookaside auto; 
}; 
23
manual!TLSA-Record 
•manual!creation!of!a!TLSA!record!hash: 
$ openssl x509 -in mail.example.de.crt -outform DER | openssl sha256 (stdin)= 
8cb0fc6c527506a053f4f14c8464bebbd6dede2738d11468dd953d7d6a3021f1 
•TLSA!record: 
_25._tcp.mail.example.de. 3600 IN TLSA 3 0 1 ( 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
8cb0fc6c527506a053f4f14c8464bebbd6dede 
2738d11468dd953d7d6a3021f1 ) 
24
TLSA-Record!creation!with!tools 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
•TLSA!record!using!ldns-dane: 
$ ldns-dane create www.bund.de 443 
_443._tcp.www.bund.de. 3600 IN TLSA 3 0 1 
8f28b062eaa9f917042a63d35d99e017c68d89eaa314c49a3ef94b6e770b0a49 
•test!TLSA!Record!with!ldns-dane: 
$ ldns-dane verify www.bund.de 443 
77.87.229.48 dane-validated successfully 
25
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
test!TLSA-Record 
DNSSEC 
check OK 
shell> dig _25._tcp.mail.example.de. +dnssec +m 
; <<>> DiG 9.9.5 <<>> _25._tcp.mail.example.de TLSA +dnssec +m 
;; global options: +cmd 
;; Got answer: 
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 13973 
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0 
26 
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: 
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096 
;; QUESTION SECTION: 
;_25._tcp.mail.example.de. IN TLSA 
;; ANSWER SECTION: 
_25._tcp.mail.example.de. 3588 IN TLSA 3 1 1 ( 
8cb0fc6c527506a053f4f14c8464bebbd6dede 
2738d11468dd953d7d6a3021f1 ) 
_25._tcp.mail.example.de. 3588 IN RRSIG TLSA 8 5 3600 ( 
20140324063111 20140317121843 4390 example.de. 
RBgAAzQx3gks0KKJHuJ7qKd61jpY8E6dwDM6inPPa6Ee 
xV8OBnAzhF4RMKSabHF0LNwRzWqE5xNfPibMQFDoDRKJ 
/QiNgux/IXti3JqtH4BkT0w7Ooi+8DZsil9BTjg6WkaX 
1FuJ4rJ2r3hXS7eIOFWtOF7pPVPdIIaRB6xp+1A= ) 
;; Query time: 9 msec 
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1) 
;; WHEN: Mon Mar 17 19:29:45 CET 2014 
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 142 
TLSA 
Record 
DNSSEC 
signature
Postfix!configuration 
Postfix!configuration!for!TLSA!validation: 
shell> postconf -e "smtpd_use_tls = yes" 
shell> postconf -e "smtp_dns_support_level = dnssec" 
shell> postconf -e "smtp_tls_security_level = dane" 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
27
Postfix!log!(untrusted!TLS) 
Postfix!log!TLS!without!DNSSEC!TLSA!validation! 
(DANE): 
Mar 16 19:10:55 m3 postfix/qmgr[25923]: 2B1A680337: from=<root@myinfrastructure.org>, 
size=291, nrcpt=1 (queue active) 
Mar 16 19:11:03 m3 postfix/smtp[25929]: Untrusted TLS connection established to 
mail1.example.de[2001:db8:100::25]:25: TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA 
(256/256 bits) 
Mar 16 19:11:05 m3 postfix/smtp[25929]: 2B1A680337: to=<benutzer@example.de>, 
relay=mail1.example.de[2001:db8:100::25]:25, delay=16, delays=6.2/0.01/7.9/2.1, 
dsn=2.0.0, status=sent (250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as 3fn80C2DP5zTT) 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
Mar 16 19:11:05 m3 postfix/qmgr[25923]: 2B1A680337: removed 
28
Postfix!log! 
(DNSSEC!secured!TLS) 
Postfix!log!TLS!with!DNSSEC!TLSA!validation! 
(DANE): 
Mar 16 19:20:01 m3 postfix/qmgr[26122]: 8FBEE80337: from=<root@myinfrastructure.org>, 
size=285, nrcpt=1 (queue active) 
Mar 16 19:20:01 m3 postfix/smtp[26131]: Verified TLS connection established to 
mail.example.de[2001:db8:100::25]:25: TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 
bits) 
Mar 16 19:20:03 m3 postfix/smtp[26131]: 8FBEE80337: to=<benutzer@example.de>, 
relay=mail.example.de[2001:db8:100::25]:25, delay=149, delays=147/0.03/0.13/1.8, 
dsn=2.0.0, status=sent (250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as 3fn8BY3ltPzTT) 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
Mar 16 19:20:03 m3 postfix/qmgr[26122]: 8FBEE80337: removed 
29
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
DANE!TLSA!Benefits 
•authenticated!encrypted!connection!between!SMTP! 
server!!! 
•prevents!STARTTLS!"downgrade"!attacks! 
•secures!against!fake/spoofed!TLS/SSL!certificates! 
•no!CRL/OCSP!required!to!"revoke"!a!certificate!(just! 
replace!the!TLSA!record) 
30
Mail-ISP!deploys!DANE/SMTP 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
31
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLSA-Info!Webseite 
32 
http://tlsa.info
DANE!-!more!than!SMTP 
Prosody!Jabber!Server 
http://bridge.grumpy-troll.org/2014/05/xmpp-dane-with-prosody/ ! 
Gajim!Jabber!Client 
https://github.com/irl/gajim 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
TLSA!for!HTTPS! 
OPENPGPKEY!—!PGP!keys!in!DNS! 
IPSECKEY!—!IPSEC!keys!in!DNS! 
SSHFP!—!SSH!server!fingerprints! 
S/MIME! 
SRV!—!DNS!Service!Discovery 
33 
Standards 
Implementations
www.dnssec-validator.cz 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
34
? 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 35
Links!and!additional!information 
©!Men!&!Mice!!http://menandmice.com! 
DNSWorkshop 
http://dnsworkshop.org! 
Postfix!TLS!Readme! 
http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html! 
Wietse!Venema!"Postfix!2.11"!FOSDEM!2014! 
Video!-! 
https://fosdem.org/2014/schedule/ 
event/ 
postfix_lessons_learned_and_recent_dev 
elopments/! 
IETF!"DANE"!Workinggroup 
http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dane/! 
TLSA!RFC!6698 
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6698/! 
TLSA/SMTP!Draft 
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dane- 
smtp-with-dane/! 
c't!Magazin!Issue!11/2014!-!Page!194! 
"Geleitschutz"! 
c't!Magazin!Issue!18/2014!-!Page!162ff!"DANE! 
auf!Linux!Servern"!and!"DNSSEC!für!Clients!und! 
Client-Netze!einrichten"! 
TLSA!generator!webpage 
https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa! 
NLnetLabs!"ldns" 
https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ 
ldns/! 
"hash-slinger"!von!Paul!Wouters!(Red!Hat)! 
http://people.redhat.com/pwouters/ 
hash-slinger/! 
DNSSEC!Training! 
http://www.menandmice.com/support-training/ 
training/dnssec-workshop/ 
36

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