1. A reputational management case study of the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
Mark Bilawchuk
Advanced Practices in Digital Reputation Management

2. Overview
 Many stakeholders and organizations have taken
significant blows to their reputations as a result of the
drinking water crisis in Flint, Michigan
 This case study focuses primarily on Michigan’s
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)

3. Overview
 There are two phases to how the DEQ handled this
crisis
 Phase 1: Apr. 2015 - Jan. 2016
 From the time Flint begins using the Flint River as an alternate
water supply to the time an independent task force finds the
DEQ responsible for the crisis
 Phase 2: Jan. 2016 - Today
 Once the task force finds the DEQ responsible, the Director
resigns and Governor Rick Snyder hires a PR firm to handle
crisis management at the DEQ

4. Situational Analysis
 By 2011, Flint, Michigan has faced years of losing business,
people and money and is billions of dollars in debt
 Michigan Governor Rick Snyder appoints an Emergency
Manager to oversee city operations and finances
 In 2013 discussions begin about finding an alternative to
using expensive Detroit water as Flint’s water supply
 The decision is made to use water from Lake Huron, but
the pipeline from the lake will not be complete until 2016
 In the interim, Flint decides to a backup water source, the
Flint River and the city’s own water treatment plant
 The move was expected to save the city $5 million

5. Situational Analysis
 The DEQ provides recommendations and issues the
permits required to improve Flint’s water treatment
plant
 In April 2014 Flint switches water sources from Detroit
to the Flint River
 Water tested at the source
is safe to drink
 DEQ recommends Flint
monitor water for one year
before adding chemicals to
control corrosion
Play video

6. Timeline

7. Key stakeholders and audiences
 Michigan Governor Rick Snyder (R)
 Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
 Former and current mayor of Flint
 Emergency Managers
 Flint Water Researchers: Miguel Del Toral; Marc Edwards; Dr.
Mona Hanna-Attisha
 LeeAnne Walters, Flint resident and mother
 Residents of Flint, with and without lead pipes
 Residents of other municipalities with lead pipes
 Celebrities and social activists

8. Phase 1: Apr. 2015 - Jan. 2016
http://flintwaterstudy.org/

9. Strategic Considerations – Phase 1
 People started complaining about water quality
immediately after the switch from Detroit
 In the summer of 2014 three boil water advisories were
issued (E.coli and fecal coliform), water treated with
chlorine
 Jan. 2015, Flint water exceeded federal limits for
trihalomethanes, a cancer-causing by-product of the
chlorine treatment
 Mar. 2015, Flint rejects Detroit’s offer to switch back to
their water supply

10. Strategic Considerations – Phase 1
 Feb. 2015, Flint mom LeeAnne Walters complains to
City Council about suspected lead levels in her water,
contacts EPA
 EPA finds levels of lead in Walters home “alarming”
and sends a copy of a draft EPA memo to Walters who
shares it with the media
 Corrosion of the pipes caused lead, copper and iron to
leach into the Flint water supply
 No corrosion-control chemicals were being added to the
water as it was still being monitored

11. Strategic Considerations – Phase 1
 In Sep. 2015, the Hurley
Medical Centre in Flint finds
elevated levels of lead in
children, Flint issues a lead
advisory to its citizens
 Department of Health and Human Services confirms
results, a public health emergency is declared
 In Oct. 2015 Flint switches back to Detroit water
 The switch from Detroit to the Flint River was supposed to
save $5M for the City, however the return to Detroit water
alone cost over $9M

12. DEQ’s response - Phase 1
 The DEQ was silent for 10 months after public complaints
began
 DEQ sent conflicting messages, first stating Flint had an
“optimized corrosion-control program” then two months
later admitting Flint had no corrosion control in place
 DEQ disputed the findings of both Virginia Tech and Hurley
Medical Centre researchers, would not comment on leaked
EPA report and calls public response to the situation “near
hysteria”
 Eighteen months after the switch to the Flint River, DEQ
states “I believe now we have made a mistake”

13. Strategic approach – Phase 1
 When Flint first switched over to the Flint River, the DEQ
was not in command of the situation (City of Flint)
 When the DEQ did speak out (10 months into the crisis)
 it was only reactive, when prodded by journalists
 they believed the issue to be localized to a few homes with old
lead pipes
 they sent conflicting messages (e.g. Flint has a corrosion
control program vs. Flint is currently controlling corrosion)
 they either discredited or refused to comment on research
that disputed their own findings
 They allowed politics to dictate messaging, and allowed
Rick Snyder to be their spokesperson

14. Why this strategy was ineffective – Phase 1
 The DEQ allowed others to control the conversation
 When the DEQ finally was dragged into participating they
were defensive, passed blame, refused to apologize or
admit they made mistake
 They only spoke through traditional media, rather than
establish their own voice
 Whenever a DEQ statement was uncovered that
contradicts an earlier statement, they lost public trust
 When they disputed research that turned out to be
accurate, they lost public trust
 The DEQ was unwavering in their position until the task
force found them responsible

15. What impact did this have on stakeholders
 Citizens of Flint
 Governor Rick Snyder
 Independent researchers
 Virginia Tech
 Hurley Medical Center
 Other governing bodies
 EPA, City of Flint
 Other stakeholders
 Mayors, Emergency Managers, LeeAnne Walters, Social
Activists

16. Social (media) activists
 Flint native Michael Moore
accuses government of
intentionally poisoning
people, calling first for the
resignation and then the
arrest of Snyder
 Celebrities have taken to
twitter calling for aid to
Flint and for Snyder’s
resignation (or arrest)

17. Social (media) activists
 Established hashtags on Twitter
 #FlintWaterCrisis (Social Media’s) (est. 5099/day)
 #ArrestGovSnyder (Moore’s) (est. 376/day)
 #FlintFWD (Snyder's) (est. 178/day)
 #JusticeForFlint (Event) (est. 88/day)

18. Bonus – An effective strategy for Phase 1
 Authority needed to be assumed by the DEQ and
coordinate messaging
 DEQ needed to (positively) influence operational
decisions within Flint
 A single source of truth for residents (e.g. the Flint
Water Response Team) should have been established
as complaints or conflicting test results first began
 Hire a professional to manage this crisis, which was
not done until January 2016

19. Phase 2: Jan. 2016 - Today
DEQ Director Resigns

20. Strategic Considerations – Phase 2
 The crisis has cost over $70M thus far, and is expected to cost
$230M to completely mitigate
 The Flint water crisis has lasted two years, and is still ongoing
 Flint is currently in a state of emergency
 An independent task force found the DEQ responsible for the
crisis, the Director resigned in Oct 2015
 There have been nine deaths reported due to waterborne
Legionnaires’ disease
 EPA takes over responsibility of managing water testing/
reporting in Flint
 In Jan. 2016 the DEQ hired a PR firm to help manage the crisis
 National media coverage and an ongoing conversation on social
media

21. DEQ’s response – Phase 2
 Establishes Flint Water
Response team
 Establishes 5-part strategy
 Establishes dedicated website

22. DEQ’s response – Phase 2
 Begins public programs
 Water bill refunds
 Water pickup locations
 Bottle recycling
 Water filters
 Snyder established new
hashtag #FlintFWD
 DEQ targets residents with
#Flint

23. Why Phase 2 was more effective
 Spoke with one authoritative voice
 The PR firm took over the messaging for the DEQ and
Governor on this issue
 Established the Flint Water Response Team
 Published a single source of truth (website) and speak
with one voice (e.g. #FlintFWD)
 Crisis comms influences operations
 The City of Flint and EPA defer to this website/campaign
 Researchers from Hurley Medical Centre and Virginia
Tech previously dismissed have been invited to
participate as subject matter experts on the response

24. The DEQ’s reputation today
 The DEQ is working towards rebuilding public trust
however the crisis in ongoing
 The EPA has taken over many of the environmental
and public safety responsibilities usually handled by
state DEQs
 Despite all that Governor Rick Snyder has done since
the task force found the DEQ responsible, he will
likely never recover from his decision to hire an
emergency manager for Flint
 The DEQ’s current role is to communicate with
citizens about public programs and resources in an
effort to rebuild public trust in the state of Michigan

25. Thank you for your time
For any questions or
comments please tweet
#FlintWaterCrisis to
@Mark_
The #FlintWaterCrisis is still ongoing

26. References
 How Flint's water crisis unfolded:
http://www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
 The poisoning of a city: http://mashable.com/2016/01/24/flint-water-
crisis/#taE92AnlZkqQ
 Financial emergency in Michigan:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_emergency_in_Michigan
 Failing Flint: Who knew what and when?:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nTpsMyNezPQ
 Exclusive: Michigan Legionnaires' deaths were preventable, official
says: http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/12/us/flint-michigan-legionnaires/
 Social media helping to put a spotlight on the Flint water crisis:
http://nbc25news.com/news/local/social-media-helping-to-put-a-
spotlight-on-the-flint-water-crisis-01-15-2016

27. References
 Flint makes the switch to use river for drinking water:
https://youtu.be/xmswRfQ_Bm0
 Flint Water Timeline:
http://cloudfront.mediamatters.org/static/uploader/image
/2016/02/03/flinttimeline1.png
 Flint Water Crisis:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flint_water_crisis
 Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder defends himself on Twitter as
Democrats attack:
http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/michigan/michigan-
gov-rick-snyder-defends-himself-as-democrats-attack_

28. References
 Hashtag.org:
https://www.hashtags.org/analytics/FlintWaterCrisis/
 With Flint water crisis center stage, Gov. Snyder hires
national PR firm: http://michiganradio.org/post/flint-
water-crisis-center-stage-gov-snyder-hires-national-pr-
firm#stream/0
 DEQ on Twitter: https://twitter.com/MichiganDEQ
 Rick Snyder on Twitter: https://twitter.com/onetoughnerd
 Gov. Snyder needs an emergency manager:
http://www.freep.com/story/news/columnists/rochelle-
riley/2016/03/19/gov-snyder-needs-emergency-
manager/81974704/

29. References
 MDEQ mistakes and deception make the Flint water crisis
http://flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-mdeq-
mistakes-deception-flint-water-crisis/
 State outlines initiatives to determine safe drinking levels
http://www.michigan.gov/flintwater/0,6092,7-345--375133--
,00.html
 DHHS provides list of steps being taken in Flint water crisis
http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/01/dhhs_provi
des_list_of_steps_be.html
 Gov. Rick Snyder: State's action plans designed to ensure Flint's
recovery and strong future
https://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277--379415--
,00.html
 Flint Water Advisory Task Force Final Report
http://flintwaterstudy.org/2016/03/flint-water-advisory-task-
force-final-report/