Radiation and national security in australia koperski

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Radiation and national security in australia koperski

  1. 1. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Radiation and National Security in Australia Dr George Koperski Australian CBRN Data Centre 35 ARPS Adelaide October 2010
  2. 2. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Contents • Malevolent use of radioactive material • Radiation protection & source security nexus • COAG national security strategy • The Australian CBRN Data Centre • Technical Intelligence process • Summary
  3. 3. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Malevolent Use of Radioactive Material • Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Explosive Non-explosive • Radiological Exposure Device (RED) • Attack on facilities • Targeted radiation poisoning
  4. 4. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Radiation Protection & Source Security Nexus + Radiation Protection Source Security
  5. 5. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide COAG National Security Strategy • 2002 COAG agreed to national review of regulation, reporting & security re storage, sale & handling of hazmat (NH4NO3 , RBC) • 2005 NCTC developed the four-pronged National CBRN Security Strategy to cover prevention, preparedness, response & recovery (PPRR) related to potential/actual misuse of the materials • 2007 COAG agreed to recommendations of the Report on the Regulation and Control of Radiological Material to minimise risk of misuse of such material by terrorists - (R6) “Cradle to Grave” reg framework for security of rad sources - (R10) National radioactive source incident notification system - (R11) National radioactive source register • ARPANSA - lead agency for implementing and co- ordinating the response to COAG 2007 Recommendations • 2007 CoP for the Security of Radioactive Sources
  6. 6. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide The Australian CBRN Data Centre Opened 2 July 2007 by the Attorney General
  7. 7. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Enhancing Australia’s capability to prevent, prepare and respond to malicious use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents by providing technical intelligence products and services in order to support law enforcement and national security objectives Mission Statement The Australian CBRN Data Centre (ACBRNDC)
  8. 8. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Forensic and Data Centres National Manager Forensic & Data Centres Manager Forensic Operations Manager Business Support Manager Data Centres Australian Bomb Data Centre Australian CBRN Data Centre Australian Illicit Drugs Data Centre ILLEGAL USE OF MATERIALS
  9. 9. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide The Australian CBRN Data Centre ACBRNDC Director Biological Intelligence Radiological IntelligenceChemical Intelligence Administrative Officer Team Leader 3 Team Members Team Leader 3 Team Members Team Leader 3 Team Members Forensic Microbiologist Forensic Chemical Warfare Advisor F&DC Advisor / DSTO Liaison Database Administrator
  10. 10. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide ACBRNDC Stakeholders SE Asia International Law Enforcement AFP Forensic Australian Govt Agencies Jurisdictional CBRN Community Research AIC ACBRNDCACBRNDC
  11. 11. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide ACBRNDC Data Inflow •CBRN Incidents •Theft of CBRN material •Intelligence •Terrorist literature •Scientific literature •Australian CBRN infrastructure ACBRNDC
  12. 12. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide ACBRNDC Data Analysis • New CBR agents • New trends • Links between events or agents • Feasibility assessments • Impact assessments • Scenario evaluation • Recipes evaluation Products Warnings Intelligence assessments Policy advice Briefs Advice for preparedness
  13. 13. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide CBRN Terrorist/Intelligence Cycle Terrorist Cell deploy acquire disseminate plan produce Intelligence Indicators Forensic Investigation Technical & Forensic Intelligence INTERDICTIONINTERDICTION
  14. 14. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Forensic Intelligence Forensic evidence Technical Information Forensic Intelligence products Operational Intelligence Analysis
  15. 15. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO June 2010GICNT Jerusalem Technical Intelligence • Technical Intelligence is the process of adding value to information through analysis in order to provide insight and to influence decision making deductive vs inductive reasoning • Needs to be distinguished from Operational Intelligence Facts Conclusions Conclusions Facts
  16. 16. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Intelligence Indicators • Preparation often difficult to detect • Terrorist intent almost never advertised • Perpetrators unlikely to claim responsibility BUT • Indicators of planning, acquisition, production, dissemination and behaviour maybe present Shoko Asahara Bruce Ivins
  17. 17. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Indicators of Planning • Terrorist organisations recruiting from universities, laboratories, hospitals, industry • Connections/interest with facilities holding R/N material • Interest in R/N related infrastructure, materials and incidents • Interest in extremist literature • Recovery of periodicals, manuals or web resources
  18. 18. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Indicators of Acquisition • Diversion of R/N materials from supply chain • Purchase of specialised componentry • Purchase of materials known to be potentially dangerous • Fraudulent acquisition from commercial suppliers • Theft and illicit trafficking
  19. 19. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Indicators of Production • Modification of premises (e.g. taped windows, modification of ventilation systems) • Unusual or suspicious possession of: - PPE - Lead bricks - Radiation detectors • Recovery or evidence of acquisition of radiation sources & explosives
  20. 20. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Indicators of Dissemination • Presentation of people at health care facilities with - atypical symptoms - unusual lesions • Discovery of people/areas radiologically contaminated
  21. 21. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Suspicious behaviour • Unusual or out of the ordinary behaviour in individual or a group • Could come from an outsider or a trusted insider • No definitive indicators of suspicious behaviour - based on observations, subjective judgement, circumstances, ‘gut feeling’ that something is wrong
  22. 22. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide Summary • Clear potential exists for misuse of radioactive materials • Contemporary Radiation Safety has two inseparable components: radiation protection and security of radioactive material • COAG Recommendations form the basis for implementation of the security of radioactive material in Australia • Interagency cooperation nationwide is the necessary condition of the implementation of radioactive material security • Technical Intelligence (TI) assists the decision making process aimed at preventing, preparing for, and responding to malicious use of CBRN agents • The role of the ACBRNDC is to provide TI products and services in support of law enforcement and national security objectives focused on malicious use of CBRN agents
  23. 23. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO October 201035 ARPS Adelaide QUESTIONS ? Planning Planning Acquisition Acquisition Dissemination Dissemination CBRN CBRNEvent Event Suspicious Suspicious behaviour behaviour
  24. 24. UNCLASSIFIED FOUO cbrndc@afp.gov.au

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