03a facility characterization

3. Facility Characterization & Target Identification
April 29 – May 18, 2018
Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA
Mark Snell

Facility Characterization & Target Identification
Learning Objectives
After completing this module, you should be able to:
• Describe information useful in characterizing a facility
and operations to support PPS design and evaluation
• Identify targets to protect
• Demonstrate the use of selected theft categorization
tables
• Recognize the process for vital area identification
2

INFCIRC/225/Revision 5
• 3.44 State categorization and unacceptable radiological
consequence.
• 4.1 – 4.49 Attractiveness (Cat 1, 2, 3), levels of
protection for theft targets. Defines the facility, protected
area, limited area, vital area, inner area.
• 5.1 – 5.58 Attractiveness (URC / HRC) levels of
protection for sabotage targets (vital areas). Defines the
facility.
3

Facility Characterization Areas of Investigation
• Investigate anything that impacts performance of the
physical protection system
 Physical conditions
 Facility operations
 Facility policies and procedures
 Regulatory requirements
 Safety considerations
 Legal issues
 Corporate goals and objectives
4

Physical Conditions
• Site boundaries, fencing, barriers, weather, and
environment
• Buildings (construction materials for walls, ceilings and
floors), rooms, and access points
• Heating, ventilation, air conditioning, communication
paths and types, power distribution system,
environmentally controlled areas, and locations of
hazardous materials
• Consult drawings and then “Walk-Down” the facility
5

Facility Operations
• Operational activities
 Products and processes
 Operational hours
 Number of employees
 Visitors and vendors
 Senior executive location
• On-site location and movement of materials
 Material characteristics
 Storage and staging locations
 Shipping and receiving process
 Tracking mechanisms
6
Split into two slides with
more detail

Facility Policies and Procedures
• Written policies and procedures
 Facility and corporate documents
• Training policies and procedures
• Other indications of corporate culture
• Unwritten policies and practices
 Interview staff
 Observe routine work
7

Regulatory Requirements
• International agreements
• State and local requirements
• Regulatory authority
• Industry practice
• Building codes
8

Safety Considerations
• Safety regulations and requirements
 Safety requirements sometimes conflict with security
requirements
 Safety and security requirements must both be considered in
facility and process design
• Use safety documents for sabotage target analysis
9

Legal Issues
• Most complex and difficult
• Legal issues include:
 Security liability (provide reasonable security)
 Failure to protect (negligence liability)
 Overreaction (excessive force, invasion of privacy, guard
instructions and training)
 Labor / employment issues
(labor unions, work practices)
10

Corporate Goals and Objectives
• Management’s role in security
• Is security identified as a goal or objective?
• Determination of security culture
 Underlying assumptions (attractive target?)
 Espoused values (intent of management?)
 Visible artifacts
(equipment and practices?)
11

Other Information
• Political environment
• Surrounding community relations
• Facility and local law enforcement liaison
• Mutual aid agreements
• Local threat information
12

Targets—What Are They?
Target: Nuclear material, equipment, systems, or devices
that are subject to danger, risk of harm, or loss
• Theft Targets
 Nuclear or radioactive materials
• Sabotage Targets
 Nuclear or radioactive materials
 Process or support equipment needed to prevent unacceptable
radiological consequences
• Focus for this course will be on theft and sabotage of:
 Nuclear materials
 Nuclear facilities
13

State Physical Protection Regime Objectives*
• Protect against theft of nuclear material in use, storage,
and transport
• Ensure implementation of rapid and comprehensive
measures to locate and recover lost or stolen material
• Protect nuclear material and facilities against sabotage
• Mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of
sabotage
* Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
14

IAEA Significant Quantities
Significant quantity (SQ): The approximate amount of
nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a
nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded
15

IAEA Categorization of Nuclear Material
16
Material Form Category I Category II Category IIIc
1. Plutoniuma Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg but more
than 500 g
500 g or less but more
than 15 g
2. Uranium-235 Unirradiatedb
- Uranium enriched to 20% 235U or
more
5 kg or more Less than 5 kg but more
than 1 kg
1 kg or less but more
than 15 g
- Uranium enriched to 10% 235U
but less than 20% 235 U
10 kg or more Less than 10 kg but more
than 1 kg
- Uranium enriched above natural
but less than 10% 235 U
10 kg or more
3. Uranium-233 Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg but more
than 500 g
500 g or less but more
than 15 g
4. Irradiated Fuel (The
categorization of irradiated fuel
in the table is based on
international transport
considerations. The State may
assign a different category for
domestic use, storage, and
transportation taking all relevant
factors into account.)
Depleted or natural
uranium, thorium or low-
enriched fuel (less than
10% fissile content)d/e
View in NSS-13
hardcopy
Note: This table is not to be used or interpreted independently of the text of the entire publication.
a All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.
b Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 Gy/h (100 rad/h) at 1 m unshielded.
c Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium; depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in accordance with prudent management practice.
d Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific circumstances, to assign a different category of physical protection.
e Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the
fuel exceeds 1 Gy/h (100 rad/h) at one meter unshielded.

Target Type—Sabotage
• Objective: Protect facilities from radiological sabotage
• Chernobyl accident provides illustration of potential
sabotage consequences
17

Radiological Sabotage
• No classification scheme has been adopted for sabotage
targets
• INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 specifies that PPS should protect
against unacceptable radiological consequences (URC)
 Specifies measures for PPS that protect against high radiological
consequences (HRC)
 Identifying what constitutes URC / HRC is the responsibility of
the State
• Possible basis for URC definition
 Quantitative (safety criteria)
 Qualitative (relative risk)
• PPS should protect against any sabotage scenarios that
exceed URC criterion 18

Types of URC / HRC Criteria
• Release- or dose-based criteria
 Maximum allowable release or dose
 Could make use of existing safety limits
 Requires detailed dispersion modeling
• Design limit criteria
 Specifies an unacceptable plant state that must be prevented (core
damage for example)
 Requires less analytical effort
 Is generally more conservative
• Analyzed condition criteria
 Requires protection against sabotage actions that would place plant in a
condition that has not been proven safe by safety analysis
 Requires less analytical effort
 Is generally more conservative
19
3 slides, provide examples, Mark or
John H could provide

Two Ways Sabotage Can Occur
• Directly
 Adversary applies energy directly to the nuclear / radioactive
material to cause dispersal
 Adversary must gain access to area in which material is located
 Example: Explosive or incendiary device used to disperse the
material
• Indirectly
 Adversary uses energy present in the material or process system
to cause dispersal
 Requires initiating a process upset condition and disabling the
systems designed to mitigate the upset
 Example: Disable primary cooling system (initiating event) and
backup cooling capability (mitigating systems), and allow
material to overheat
20

Direct and Indirect Sabotage
RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL
Direct Sabotage Indirect Sabotage
Initiating Event of
Malicious Origin
Disablement
Event
21

Sabotage Prevention
Vital Area: An area inside a protected area containing
equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear material, the
sabotage of which could directly or indirectly lead to high
radiological consequences
• INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 – Protect vital areas that contain:
 Inventories of nuclear or radioactive material with potential to
exceed HRC if dispersed (direct scenarios)
 A minimum set of equipment needed to prevent indirect
sabotage scenarios
22

Vital Area Example for Reactors
• Protect areas that ensure all critical safety functions can
be performed
 Reactivity control
• Control rod SCRAM components and systems
 Decay heat removal
• Heat removal system components, including control and coolant
source
 Process monitoring
• Instrumentation for pressure, coolant level, etc.
 Reactor coolant makeup
 Support functions
• Electrical power, switchgear, cooling, startup, and controls
• We will discuss vital areas again during Week 3
23

Key Takeaways
• To design a PPS, we need
 Facility information on physical conditions; facility operations;
policies, procedures, requirements; safety issues; legal issues;
and corporate goals and objectives
 Use sources such as design documents, layout drawings,
procedures manuals, operational records, environmental reports,
and safety analyses
• Two types of targets are considered in this course
 Theft targets (nuclear materials) (first two weeks of class)
 Sabotage targets (final exercise)
• Nuclear materials
• Equipment needed to prevent radiological release
24

03a facility characterization

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (8)

Similar to 03a facility characterization

Similar to 03a facility characterization (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

03a facility characterization