SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 24
Download to read offline
A
Minor Project Report
on
DDOS-Distributed denial of service
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the
degree of B.Sc in Computer Science.
Submitted by :Laxmi Chandolia
Enrolment No: 2013IMSCS009
Project Supervisor :Mr.vinod kumar( Assistent professer)
Department of Computer Science
School of Mathematics, Statistics and Computational Sciences
Central University of Rajasthan
May 2016
1
Certificate
This is to certify that this minor project entitled ”DDOS-Distributed
denial of service ” submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of B.Sc.
in Computer Science to the Central University of Rajasthan done by laxmi
chandolia, Enrolment No. 2013IMSCS009 is an authentic work carried
out by her at Department of Computer Science, Central University of
Rajasthan under my guidance. The matter embodied in this minor project
work has not been submitted earlier for award of any degree or diploma to
the best of my knowledge and belief.
Signature of the student Signature of the Mentor
Name: Laxmi chandolia Name: Mr.vinod kumar
Enrolment No.:2013IMSCS009 Department of C.S.
2
Declaration
This is to certify that the minor project report entitled ”DDOS-Distributed
denial of service ” is done by me is an authentic work carried out for the
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of intre-
gated M.Sc under the guidance of Mr.vinod kumar.The matter embodied
in this minor project work has not been submitted earlier for award of any
degree or diploma to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Signature of the student
Name: Laxmi chandolia
Enrolment No.:2013IMSCS009
3
Acknowledgement
I am thankful to my project supervisor Mr.vinod kumar for taking out
time from his busy schedule to help me out.
4
Abstract
With their ever increasing malicious capabilities and potential to infect a
vast majority of computers on the Internet, botnets are emerging as the sin-
gle biggest threat to Internet security. The aim of this project is to perform
a detailed analysis of botnets and the vulnerabilities exploited by them to
spread themselves and perform various malicious activities such as DDoS
attacks. DDoS attacks are without doubt the most potent form of attacks
carried out by botnets. In order to better understand this growing phe-
nomenon and develop effective counter measures, it is necessary to be able
to simulate DDoS attacks in a controlled environment. Simulating a DDoS
attack with control over various simulation and attack parameters will give
us insights into how attacks achieve stealth and avoid detection. A detailed
analysis of existing DDoS defense strategies and proposals combined with
the insights derived from simulation should enable us to come up with inno-
vative and feasible solutions to prevent and mitigate DDoS attacks carried
out using Botnets.
5
Table Of Content
Contents
1 Introduction 7
2 Process of DDos Attack 8
3 Famous documented DDoS attacks 13
4 Ddos Tools 15
5 Prevention of Ddos 17
6 Prevetion by recaptcha 21
7 Drawback of recaptcha 22
8 Ideas for improvement of recaptcha 23
9 References 24
6
Introduction
DDoS stands for Distributed Denial of Service attack. It is a form of attack
where a lot of zombie computers (infected computers that are under the
control of the attacker) are used to either directly or indirectly to flood the
targeted server(s) – victim, with a huge amount of information and choke it
in order to prevent legitimate users from accessing them (mostly web servers
that host websites). In most cases, the owners of the zombie computers may
not know that they are being utilized by attackers. In some cases, there is
only a periodic flooding of web servers with huge traffic in order to degrade
the service, instead of taking it down completely.
DoS attack is a malicious attempt by a single person or a group of people
to cause the victim, site, or node to deny service to its customers.
DoS vs DDoS
1. DoS:-when a single host attacks.
2. DDos:-when multiple hosts attacks simultaneously
Exhaust the victim’s resources:- network bandwidth, computing power,
or operating system data structures
7
Process of DDos Attack
1. build a network of computers
• discover vulnerable sites or hosts on the network
• exploit to gain access to these hosts
• install new programs (known as attack tools) on the compromised
hosts
• hosts that are running these attack tools are known as zombies
• many zombies together form what we call an army
• building an army is automated and not a difficult process nowa-
days
2. How to find Vulnerable Machines?
- Random scanning:
• infected machines probes IP addresses randomly and finds vulner-
able machines and tries to infect it
• creates large amount of traffic
• spreads very quickly but slows down as time passes
• E.g. Code-Red (CRv2) Worm
-Hit-list scanning:
• attacker first collects a list of large number of potentially vulner-
able machines before start scanning
• once found a machine attacker infects it and splits the list giving
half of the list to the compromised machine
• same procedure is carried for each infected machine.
• all machines in the list are compromised in a short interval of time
without generating significant scanning traffic
-Topological scanning:
• uses information contained on the victim machine in order to find
new targets
• looks for URLs in the disk of a machine that it wants to infect
• extremely accurate with performance matching the Hit-list scan-
ning technique
8
1. How to find Vulnerable Machines? -Local subnet scanning:
• acts behind a firewall
• looks for targets in its own local network
• can be used in conjunction with other scanning mechanisms
• creates large amount of traffic
-Permutation scanning:
• all machines share a common pseudorandom permutation list of
IP addresses
• based on certain criteria it starts scanning at some random point
or sequentially
• coordinated scanning with extremely good performance
• randomization mechanism allows high scanning speeds
• can be used with hit-list scanning to further improve the perfor-
mance (partitioned permutation scanning)
2. How to propagate Malicious Code?
-Central source propagation:
• this mechanism commonly uses HTTP, FTP, and remote-procedure
call (RPC) protocols
9
1. How to propagate Malicious Code?
-Back-chaining propagation:
• copying attack toolkit can be supported by simple port listeners
or by full intruder-installed Web servers, both of which use the
Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
2. How to propagate Malicious Code?
-Autonomous propagation:
• transfers the attack toolkit to the newly compromised system at
the exact moment that it breaks into that system
10
1. How to perform DDoS?
-after constructing the attack network, intruders use handler (master)
machines to specify type of attack and victim’s address
-they wait for appropriate time to start the attack
-either by remotely activating the attack to “wake up” simultaneously
or by programming ahead of time
-the agent machines (slaves) then begin sending a stream of attack
packets to the victim
-the victim’s system is flooded with useless load and exhaust its re-
sources
-the legitimate users are denied services due to lack of resources
-the DDoS attack is mostly automated using specifically crafted attack-
ing tools -There are mainly two kinds of DDoS attacks
• Typical DDoS attacks, and
• Distributed Reflector DoS (DRDoS) attacks
-Typical DDoS Attacks:
-DRDoS Attacks:
• slave zombies send a stream of packets with the victim’s IP address
as the source IP address to other uninfected machines (known as
reflectors)
• the reflectors then connects to the victim and sends greater volume
of traffic, because they believe that the victim was the host that
asked for it
11
• the attack is mounted by noncompromised machines without being
aware of the action
- A Corporate Structure Analogy
12
Famous documented DDoS attacks
• Apache2
-The client asks for a service by sending a request with many HTTP
headers resulting Apache Web server to crash
• ARP Poison:
-Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Poison attacks require the at-
tacker to have access to the victim’s LAN
-The attacker deludes the hosts of a specific LAN by providing them
with wrong MAC addresses for hosts with already-known IP addresses
-The network is monitored for ”arp who-has” requests
-As soon as such a request is received, the malevolent attacker tries to
respond as quickly as possible
• Back:
-This attack is launched against an apache Web server, which is flooded
with requests containing a large number of front-slash ( / ) characters
in the URL
-The server tries to process all these requests, it becomes unable to
process other legitimate requests and hence it denies service to its cus-
tomers.
• CrashIIS:
-Attacks a Microsoft Windows NT IIS Web server.
-The attacker sends the victim a malformed GET request, which can
crash the Web server.
• Land:
-In Land attacks, the attacker sends the victim a TCP SYN packet that
contains the same IP address as the source and destination addresses.
-Such a packet completely locks the victim’s system.
• Mailbomb:
-In a Mailbomb attack, the victim’s mail queue is flooded by an abun-
dance of messages, causing system failure.
13
• SYN Flood:
-The attacker sends an abundance of TCP SYN packets to the victim,
obliging it both to open a lot of TCP connections and to respond to
them.
-Then the attacker does not execute the third step of the three-way
handshake that follows, rendering the victim unable to accept any new
incoming connections, because its queue is full of half-open TCP con-
nections.
• DoSNuke:
-As a result, the target is weighed down, and the victim’s machine
could display a ”blue screen of death.”
• Ping of Death:
-Attacker creates a packet that contains more than 65,536 bytes -This
packet can cause different kinds of damage to the machine that receives
it, such as crashing and rebooting Process Table:
-This attack exploits the feature of some network services to generate
a new process each time a new TCP/IP connection is set up
-The attacker tries to make as many uncompleted connections to the
victim as possible in order to force the victim’s system to generate an
abundance of processes
• Smurf Attack:
-The victim is flooded with Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
”echo-reply” packets
-The attacker sends numerous ICMP ”echo-request” packets to the
broadcast address of many subnets. These packets contain the victim’s
address as the source IP address
• SSH Process Table:
-Like the Process Table attack, this attack makes hundreds of con-
nections to the victim with the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol without
completing the login process.
14
Ddos Tools
1. Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC):-
“Hacktivist” group Anonymous’ first tool of choice—Low Orbit Ion
Cannon (LOIC)—is a simple flooding tool that can generate massive
volume of TCP, UDP or HTTP traffic in order to subject a server to
a heavy network load. LOIC’s original developers, Praetox Technolo-
gies, intended the tool to be used by developers who wanted to subject
their own servers to a heavy network traffic load for testing purposes.
However, Anonymous picked up the open-source tool and used it to
launch coordinated DDoS attacks. Soon afterwards, LOIC was modi-
fied and given its “Hivemind” feature, allowing any LOIC user to point
a copy of LOIC at an IRC server, transferring control of it to a master
user who can then send commands over IRC to every connected LOIC
client simultaneously. In this configuration, users are able to launch
much more effective DDoS attacks than those of a group of lesscoordi-
nated LOIC users not operating simultaneously. In late 2011, however,
Anonymous stepped away from LOIC as its DDoS tool of choice, as
LOIC makes no effort to obscure its users’ IP addresses. This lack of
anonymity resulted in the arrest of various users around the world for
participating in LOIC attacks, with Anonymous broadcasting a clear
message across all of its IRC channels: “Do NOT use LOIC.”
2. High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC):- After Anonymous dropped LOIC as
its tool of choice, High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC) quickly took the
spotlight when it was used to target the United States Department of
Justice in response to its decision to take down Megaupload.com. At
its core, HOIC is also a simple application: a cross-platform basic script
for sending HTTP POST and GET requests wrapped in an easy-to-use
GUI. However, its effectiveness stems from add-on “booster” scripts—
text files that contain additional basic code interpreted by the main
application upon a user’s launch of an attack. Even though HOIC
does not directly employ any anonymity techniques, the use of booster
scripts allows a user to specify lists of target URLs and identifying
information for HOIC to cycle through as it generates its attack traffic.
That, in turn, makes HOIC attacks slightly harder to block. HOIC
continues to be used by Anonymous all over the world to launch DDoS
attacks, although Anonymous attacks are not limited to those involving
HOIC.
3. hping:- In addition to LOIC and HOIC, Anonymous and other hacking
15
groups and individuals have employed a variety of tools to launch DDoS
attacks, especially due to the Ion Cannons’ lack of anonymity. One such
tool, hping, is a fairly basic command line utility similar to the ping
utility. However, it offers more functionality than simply sending an
ICMP echo request that is the traditional use of ping. Hping can be
used to send large volumes of TCP traffic at a target while spoofing the
source IP addresses, making it appear to be random or even to originate
from a specific, user-defined source. As a powerful, well-rounded tool
(possessing some spoofing capabilities), hping remains among the tools
of choice for Anonymous.
4. Slowloris:- Besides straightforward, brute-force flood attacks, many of
the more intricate “low and slow” attack types have been wrapped up
into easyto-use tools, yielding denial-of-service attacks that are much
harder to detect. Slowloris, a tool developed by a gray hat hacker
who goes by the handle “RSnake,” is able to create a denial-of-service
condition for a server by using a very slow HTTP request. By sending
HTTP headers to the target site in tiny chunks as slow as possible
(waiting to send the next tiny chunk until just before the server would
time out the request), the server is forced to continue to wait for the
headers to arrive. If enough connections are opened to the server in
this fashion, it is quickly unable to handle legitimate requests
16
Prevention of Ddos
-There are two approaches to defense
• Preventive defense
• Reactive defense
• Preventive defense
-try to eliminate the possibility of DDoS attacks altogether
-enable potential victims to endure the attack without denying services
to legitimate clients
-Hosts should guard against illegitimate traffic from or toward the ma-
chine.
-keeping protocols and software up-to-date
-regular scanning of the machine to detect any ”anomalous” behavior
-monitoring access to the computer and applications, and installing se-
curity patches, firewall systems, virus scanners, and intrusion detection
systems automatically
-sensors to monitor the network traffic and send information to a server
in order to determine the ”health” of the network
• Preventive defense
-Securing the computer reduces the possibility of being not only a vic-
tim, but also a zombie
-these measures can never be 100-percent effective, but they certainly
decrease the frequency and strength of DDoS attacks
-Studying the attack methods can lead to recognizing loopholes in pro-
tocols
-adjust network gateways in order to filter input and output traffic
-reduce traffic with spoofed IP addresses on the network
-the IP address of output traffic should belong to the subnetwork,
whereas the source IP address of input traffic should Test the system
for possible drawbacks or failures and correct it -Two methods have
been proposed
1.create policies that increase the privileges of users according to their
behavior
17
2.increasing the effective resources to such a degree that DDoS effects
are limited - usually too expensive
• Difficulties in defending
-DDoS attacks flood victims with packets
-Any attempt of filtering the incoming flow means that legitimate traffic
will also be rejected
-Attack packets usually have spoofed IP addresses which makes it dif-
ficult to traceback the source of attacks
-there is the danger of characterizing a legitimate connection as an
attack
• Respond to the attack -by limiting the accepted traffic rate
-legitimate traffic is also blocked
-Filtering is efficient only if attackers’ detection is correct
-Right now there is no 100
-Developers are working on DDoS diversion systems
-e.g. Honeypots
18
• Honeypots
• low-interaction honeypots
-emulating services and operating systems
-easy and safe to implement
-attackers are not allowed to interact with the basic operating system,
but only with specific services
-what happens if the attack is not directed against the emulated ser-
vice?
• high-interaction honeypots
-honeynet is proposed
-honeynet is not a software solution that can be installed on a computer
but a whole architecture
-it is a network that is created to be attacked
-every activity is recorded and attackers are being trapped
-a Honeywall gateway allows incoming traffic, but controls outgoing
traffic using intrusion prevention technologies
-By studying the captured traffic, researchers can discover new methods
and tools and they can fully understand attackers’ tactics
-more complex to install and deploy and the risk is increased as attack-
ers interact with real operating systems and not with emulations
• Route Filter Techniques
-when routing protocols were designed, developers did not focus on
security, but effective routing mechanisms and routing loop avoidance
-by gaining access to a router, attackers could direct the traffic over
bottlenecks, view critical data, and modify them
-cryptographic authentication mitigates these threats
-routing filters are necessary for preventing critical routes and subnet-
works from being advertised and suspicious routes from being incorpo-
rated in routing tables
-attackers do not know the route toward critical servers and suspicious
routes are not used
19
• blackhole routing
-directs routing traffic to a null interface, where it is finally dropped
-can ignore traffic originating from IP addresses being attacked
-if the attackers IP addresses cannot be distinguished and all traffic is
blackholed, then legitimate traffic is dropped as well
• sinkhole routing
-involves routing suspicious traffic to a valid IP address where it can
be analyzed
-traffic that is found to be malicious is rejected (routed to a null inter-
face), otherwise it is routed to the next hop
• Route Filter Techniques
-filtering on source address
• best technique if we knew each time who the attacker is
• not always possible to detect each attacker especially with the huge
army of zombies
-filtering on services
• filter based on UDP port or TCP connection or ICMP messages
• not effective if the attack is directed toward a very common port or
service
-filtering on destination address
• reject all traffic toward selected victims
• legitimate traffic is also rejected
20
Prevetion by recaptcha
There are many different solutions to prevent bots from submitting web
forms, one of the most popular solutions is reCaptcha. reCaptcha actually
displays an image with some text in it and user has to enter the text to
submit the form successfully. It was difficult for bots to read the text on the
image. Google created a new reCaptcha called No Captcha reCaptcha. No
Captcha reCaptcha just displays a checkbox asking the user to check it if
he/she is not a bot. It might look very hackable but internally Google uses
advanced algorithms and methods to find if the user is a bot or not. It may
seem like a simple checkbox but it’s not a checkbox at all. Its a graphics
that behaves like a checkbox. Most bots don’t run JavaScript so they cannot
emulate it. But for the bots which can emulate, this is tracked down by
mouse movement and Google’s Adsense fraud click detection algorithms.
21
Drawback of recaptcha
• Main drawback is complexity of captchas. Captchas are getting more
and more complex or even unreal to deal with.
• Time consuming
• reCAPTCHA is Accepting Incorrect Words
22
Ideas for improvement of recaptcha
• if we are accesing any site ones, site should be save our ip address. and
allow the access that site allways not once.
• Use image recaptcha instead of using text reCaptcha.
• Use binary image recaptcha instead of using coloured image reCaptcha.
23
References
1. Distributed Denial Of Service Attacks :- http://www.slideshare.net
2. ”Distributed Denial of Service Attacks”, The Internet Protocol Journal
- Volume 7
3. for Reaserch On DDos :- https://en.wikipedia.org
4. Perfrom Of DDos Attack :- https://www.quora.com
5. Reseach paper of ”international association of computer science and
information security”
24

More Related Content

What's hot

Time-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation for SDN Controller
Time-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation for SDN ControllerTime-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation for SDN Controller
Time-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation for SDN ControllerLippo Group Digital
 
Enhancing the impregnability of linux servers
Enhancing the impregnability of linux serversEnhancing the impregnability of linux servers
Enhancing the impregnability of linux serversIJNSA Journal
 
Honeypots - Tracking the Blackhat Community
Honeypots - Tracking the Blackhat CommunityHoneypots - Tracking the Blackhat Community
Honeypots - Tracking the Blackhat Communityamiable_indian
 
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM ijcseit
 
Denial of Service Attack Project
Denial of Service Attack ProjectDenial of Service Attack Project
Denial of Service Attack ProjectNadim Ebadi
 
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptx
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptxDdos and mitigation methods.pptx
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptxOzkan E
 
DDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT Devices
DDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT DevicesDDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT Devices
DDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT DevicesSeungjoo Kim
 
WHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack Group
WHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack GroupWHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack Group
WHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack GroupSymantec
 
Network And Application Layer Attacks
Network And Application Layer AttacksNetwork And Application Layer Attacks
Network And Application Layer AttacksArun Modi
 
A10 issa d do s 5-2014
A10 issa d do s 5-2014A10 issa d do s 5-2014
A10 issa d do s 5-2014Raleigh ISSA
 
Monitoring of traffic over the victim under tcp syn flood in a lan
Monitoring of traffic over the victim under tcp syn flood in a lanMonitoring of traffic over the victim under tcp syn flood in a lan
Monitoring of traffic over the victim under tcp syn flood in a laneSAT Publishing House
 
Lecture #1: Access Control : Various Cyber attacks and Latest Statistics
Lecture #1: Access Control : Various Cyber attacks and Latest StatisticsLecture #1: Access Control : Various Cyber attacks and Latest Statistics
Lecture #1: Access Control : Various Cyber attacks and Latest StatisticsDr. Ramchandra Mangrulkar
 
Dynamic Population Discovery for Lateral Movement (Using Machine Learning)
Dynamic Population Discovery for Lateral Movement (Using Machine Learning)Dynamic Population Discovery for Lateral Movement (Using Machine Learning)
Dynamic Population Discovery for Lateral Movement (Using Machine Learning)Rod Soto
 
Days of the Honeynet: Attacks, Tools, Incidents
Days of the Honeynet: Attacks, Tools, IncidentsDays of the Honeynet: Attacks, Tools, Incidents
Days of the Honeynet: Attacks, Tools, IncidentsAnton Chuvakin
 
Order vs. Mad Science: Analyzing Black Hat Swarm Intelligence
Order vs. Mad Science: Analyzing Black Hat Swarm IntelligenceOrder vs. Mad Science: Analyzing Black Hat Swarm Intelligence
Order vs. Mad Science: Analyzing Black Hat Swarm IntelligencePriyanka Aash
 
Creating a fortress in your active directory environment
Creating a fortress in your active directory environmentCreating a fortress in your active directory environment
Creating a fortress in your active directory environmentDavid Rowe
 
INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEM
INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEMINTERNET SECURITY SYSTEM
INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEMBhushan Gajare
 

What's hot (20)

Time-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation for SDN Controller
Time-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation for SDN ControllerTime-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation for SDN Controller
Time-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation for SDN Controller
 
Aw36294299
Aw36294299Aw36294299
Aw36294299
 
Enhancing the impregnability of linux servers
Enhancing the impregnability of linux serversEnhancing the impregnability of linux servers
Enhancing the impregnability of linux servers
 
Honeypots - Tracking the Blackhat Community
Honeypots - Tracking the Blackhat CommunityHoneypots - Tracking the Blackhat Community
Honeypots - Tracking the Blackhat Community
 
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
 
Denial of Service Attack Project
Denial of Service Attack ProjectDenial of Service Attack Project
Denial of Service Attack Project
 
Unveiling-Patchwork
Unveiling-PatchworkUnveiling-Patchwork
Unveiling-Patchwork
 
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptx
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptxDdos and mitigation methods.pptx
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptx
 
DDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT Devices
DDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT DevicesDDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT Devices
DDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT Devices
 
WHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack Group
WHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack GroupWHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack Group
WHITE PAPER▶ Symantec Security Response Presents:The Waterbug Attack Group
 
Network And Application Layer Attacks
Network And Application Layer AttacksNetwork And Application Layer Attacks
Network And Application Layer Attacks
 
A10 issa d do s 5-2014
A10 issa d do s 5-2014A10 issa d do s 5-2014
A10 issa d do s 5-2014
 
Monitoring of traffic over the victim under tcp syn flood in a lan
Monitoring of traffic over the victim under tcp syn flood in a lanMonitoring of traffic over the victim under tcp syn flood in a lan
Monitoring of traffic over the victim under tcp syn flood in a lan
 
Lecture #1: Access Control : Various Cyber attacks and Latest Statistics
Lecture #1: Access Control : Various Cyber attacks and Latest StatisticsLecture #1: Access Control : Various Cyber attacks and Latest Statistics
Lecture #1: Access Control : Various Cyber attacks and Latest Statistics
 
Dynamic Population Discovery for Lateral Movement (Using Machine Learning)
Dynamic Population Discovery for Lateral Movement (Using Machine Learning)Dynamic Population Discovery for Lateral Movement (Using Machine Learning)
Dynamic Population Discovery for Lateral Movement (Using Machine Learning)
 
Days of the Honeynet: Attacks, Tools, Incidents
Days of the Honeynet: Attacks, Tools, IncidentsDays of the Honeynet: Attacks, Tools, Incidents
Days of the Honeynet: Attacks, Tools, Incidents
 
Order vs. Mad Science: Analyzing Black Hat Swarm Intelligence
Order vs. Mad Science: Analyzing Black Hat Swarm IntelligenceOrder vs. Mad Science: Analyzing Black Hat Swarm Intelligence
Order vs. Mad Science: Analyzing Black Hat Swarm Intelligence
 
Creating a fortress in your active directory environment
Creating a fortress in your active directory environmentCreating a fortress in your active directory environment
Creating a fortress in your active directory environment
 
dos attacks
dos attacksdos attacks
dos attacks
 
INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEM
INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEMINTERNET SECURITY SYSTEM
INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEM
 

Similar to Ddos- distributed denial of service

Whitepaper on DDoS Mitigation
Whitepaper on DDoS MitigationWhitepaper on DDoS Mitigation
Whitepaper on DDoS MitigationGaurav Bhatia
 
Protecting your business from ddos attacks
Protecting your business from ddos attacksProtecting your business from ddos attacks
Protecting your business from ddos attacksSaptha Wanniarachchi
 
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!PriyadharshiniHemaku
 
denialofservice.pdfdos attacck basic details with interactive design
denialofservice.pdfdos attacck basic details with interactive designdenialofservice.pdfdos attacck basic details with interactive design
denialofservice.pdfdos attacck basic details with interactive designperfetbyedshareen
 
MS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdf
MS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdfMS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdf
MS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdfssuser262297
 
Study of flooding based ddos attacks and their effect using deter testbed
Study of flooding based ddos attacks and their effect using deter testbedStudy of flooding based ddos attacks and their effect using deter testbed
Study of flooding based ddos attacks and their effect using deter testbedeSAT Journals
 
Study of flooding based d do s attacks and their effect using deter testbed
Study of flooding based d do s attacks and their effect using deter testbedStudy of flooding based d do s attacks and their effect using deter testbed
Study of flooding based d do s attacks and their effect using deter testbedeSAT Publishing House
 
Detection of application layer ddos attack using hidden semi markov model (20...
Detection of application layer ddos attack using hidden semi markov model (20...Detection of application layer ddos attack using hidden semi markov model (20...
Detection of application layer ddos attack using hidden semi markov model (20...Mumbai Academisc
 
Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1
Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1
Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1InfoSec Girls
 
types of cyber attack by taufiqurrahman.pptx
types of cyber attack by taufiqurrahman.pptxtypes of cyber attack by taufiqurrahman.pptx
types of cyber attack by taufiqurrahman.pptxtaufiq463421
 
Unlimited Attempts AllowedDetailsVirtual Labs Perpetrators of D.docx
Unlimited Attempts AllowedDetailsVirtual Labs Perpetrators of D.docxUnlimited Attempts AllowedDetailsVirtual Labs Perpetrators of D.docx
Unlimited Attempts AllowedDetailsVirtual Labs Perpetrators of D.docxjolleybendicty
 
Malware attack Social engineering attack
Malware attack  Social engineering attackMalware attack  Social engineering attack
Malware attack Social engineering attacktaufiq463421
 
A ROBUST MECHANISM FOR DEFENDING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS ON WEB...
A ROBUST MECHANISM FOR DEFENDING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS ON WEB...A ROBUST MECHANISM FOR DEFENDING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS ON WEB...
A ROBUST MECHANISM FOR DEFENDING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS ON WEB...IJNSA Journal
 
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISMDISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISMijcseit
 

Similar to Ddos- distributed denial of service (20)

DDoS Attacks
DDoS AttacksDDoS Attacks
DDoS Attacks
 
Whitepaper on DDoS Mitigation
Whitepaper on DDoS MitigationWhitepaper on DDoS Mitigation
Whitepaper on DDoS Mitigation
 
Protecting your business from ddos attacks
Protecting your business from ddos attacksProtecting your business from ddos attacks
Protecting your business from ddos attacks
 
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
 
denialofservice.pdfdos attacck basic details with interactive design
denialofservice.pdfdos attacck basic details with interactive designdenialofservice.pdfdos attacck basic details with interactive design
denialofservice.pdfdos attacck basic details with interactive design
 
Cryptography and Network security # Lecture 3
Cryptography and Network security # Lecture 3Cryptography and Network security # Lecture 3
Cryptography and Network security # Lecture 3
 
Denial of service
Denial of serviceDenial of service
Denial of service
 
MS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdf
MS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdfMS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdf
MS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdf
 
Ix3615551559
Ix3615551559Ix3615551559
Ix3615551559
 
Study of flooding based ddos attacks and their effect using deter testbed
Study of flooding based ddos attacks and their effect using deter testbedStudy of flooding based ddos attacks and their effect using deter testbed
Study of flooding based ddos attacks and their effect using deter testbed
 
Study of flooding based d do s attacks and their effect using deter testbed
Study of flooding based d do s attacks and their effect using deter testbedStudy of flooding based d do s attacks and their effect using deter testbed
Study of flooding based d do s attacks and their effect using deter testbed
 
Detection of application layer ddos attack using hidden semi markov model (20...
Detection of application layer ddos attack using hidden semi markov model (20...Detection of application layer ddos attack using hidden semi markov model (20...
Detection of application layer ddos attack using hidden semi markov model (20...
 
Types of attack
Types of attackTypes of attack
Types of attack
 
Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1
Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1
Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1
 
UNIT 5 (2).pptx
UNIT 5 (2).pptxUNIT 5 (2).pptx
UNIT 5 (2).pptx
 
types of cyber attack by taufiqurrahman.pptx
types of cyber attack by taufiqurrahman.pptxtypes of cyber attack by taufiqurrahman.pptx
types of cyber attack by taufiqurrahman.pptx
 
Unlimited Attempts AllowedDetailsVirtual Labs Perpetrators of D.docx
Unlimited Attempts AllowedDetailsVirtual Labs Perpetrators of D.docxUnlimited Attempts AllowedDetailsVirtual Labs Perpetrators of D.docx
Unlimited Attempts AllowedDetailsVirtual Labs Perpetrators of D.docx
 
Malware attack Social engineering attack
Malware attack  Social engineering attackMalware attack  Social engineering attack
Malware attack Social engineering attack
 
A ROBUST MECHANISM FOR DEFENDING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS ON WEB...
A ROBUST MECHANISM FOR DEFENDING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS ON WEB...A ROBUST MECHANISM FOR DEFENDING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS ON WEB...
A ROBUST MECHANISM FOR DEFENDING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS ON WEB...
 
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISMDISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDOS) ATTACKS DETECTION MECHANISM
 

Recently uploaded

pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdfpdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdfJOHNBEBONYAP1
 
Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...
Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...
Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...Delhi Call girls
 
Busty Desi⚡Call Girls in Vasundhara Ghaziabad >༒8448380779 Escort Service
Busty Desi⚡Call Girls in Vasundhara Ghaziabad >༒8448380779 Escort ServiceBusty Desi⚡Call Girls in Vasundhara Ghaziabad >༒8448380779 Escort Service
Busty Desi⚡Call Girls in Vasundhara Ghaziabad >༒8448380779 Escort ServiceDelhi Call girls
 
Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune 6297143586 Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...
Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune  6297143586  Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune  6297143586  Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...
Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune 6297143586 Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...tanu pandey
 
Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...
Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...
Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...SUHANI PANDEY
 
All Time Service Available Call Girls Mg Road 👌 ⏭️ 6378878445
All Time Service Available Call Girls Mg Road 👌 ⏭️ 6378878445All Time Service Available Call Girls Mg Road 👌 ⏭️ 6378878445
All Time Service Available Call Girls Mg Road 👌 ⏭️ 6378878445ruhi
 
Sarola * Female Escorts Service in Pune | 8005736733 Independent Escorts & Da...
Sarola * Female Escorts Service in Pune | 8005736733 Independent Escorts & Da...Sarola * Female Escorts Service in Pune | 8005736733 Independent Escorts & Da...
Sarola * Female Escorts Service in Pune | 8005736733 Independent Escorts & Da...SUHANI PANDEY
 
2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs
2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs
2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge GraphsEleniIlkou
 
VIP Model Call Girls Hadapsar ( Pune ) Call ON 9905417584 Starting High Prof...
VIP Model Call Girls Hadapsar ( Pune ) Call ON 9905417584 Starting  High Prof...VIP Model Call Girls Hadapsar ( Pune ) Call ON 9905417584 Starting  High Prof...
VIP Model Call Girls Hadapsar ( Pune ) Call ON 9905417584 Starting High Prof...singhpriety023
 
Real Men Wear Diapers T Shirts sweatshirt
Real Men Wear Diapers T Shirts sweatshirtReal Men Wear Diapers T Shirts sweatshirt
Real Men Wear Diapers T Shirts sweatshirtrahman018755
 
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53APNIC
 
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查ydyuyu
 
best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...
best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...
best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...kajalverma014
 
Dubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls Dubai
Dubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls DubaiDubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls Dubai
Dubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls Dubaikojalkojal131
 
Wadgaon Sheri $ Call Girls Pune 10k @ I'm VIP Independent Escorts Girls 80057...
Wadgaon Sheri $ Call Girls Pune 10k @ I'm VIP Independent Escorts Girls 80057...Wadgaon Sheri $ Call Girls Pune 10k @ I'm VIP Independent Escorts Girls 80057...
Wadgaon Sheri $ Call Girls Pune 10k @ I'm VIP Independent Escorts Girls 80057...SUHANI PANDEY
 
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdfMatthew Sinclair
 
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋nirzagarg
 

Recently uploaded (20)

pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdfpdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
 
Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...
Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...
Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...
 
Busty Desi⚡Call Girls in Vasundhara Ghaziabad >༒8448380779 Escort Service
Busty Desi⚡Call Girls in Vasundhara Ghaziabad >༒8448380779 Escort ServiceBusty Desi⚡Call Girls in Vasundhara Ghaziabad >༒8448380779 Escort Service
Busty Desi⚡Call Girls in Vasundhara Ghaziabad >༒8448380779 Escort Service
 
valsad Escorts Service ☎️ 6378878445 ( Sakshi Sinha ) High Profile Call Girls...
valsad Escorts Service ☎️ 6378878445 ( Sakshi Sinha ) High Profile Call Girls...valsad Escorts Service ☎️ 6378878445 ( Sakshi Sinha ) High Profile Call Girls...
valsad Escorts Service ☎️ 6378878445 ( Sakshi Sinha ) High Profile Call Girls...
 
Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune 6297143586 Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...
Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune  6297143586  Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune  6297143586  Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...
Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune 6297143586 Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...
 
Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...
Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...
Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...
 
All Time Service Available Call Girls Mg Road 👌 ⏭️ 6378878445
All Time Service Available Call Girls Mg Road 👌 ⏭️ 6378878445All Time Service Available Call Girls Mg Road 👌 ⏭️ 6378878445
All Time Service Available Call Girls Mg Road 👌 ⏭️ 6378878445
 
📱Dehradun Call Girls Service 📱☎️ +91'905,3900,678 ☎️📱 Call Girls In Dehradun 📱
📱Dehradun Call Girls Service 📱☎️ +91'905,3900,678 ☎️📱 Call Girls In Dehradun 📱📱Dehradun Call Girls Service 📱☎️ +91'905,3900,678 ☎️📱 Call Girls In Dehradun 📱
📱Dehradun Call Girls Service 📱☎️ +91'905,3900,678 ☎️📱 Call Girls In Dehradun 📱
 
Sarola * Female Escorts Service in Pune | 8005736733 Independent Escorts & Da...
Sarola * Female Escorts Service in Pune | 8005736733 Independent Escorts & Da...Sarola * Female Escorts Service in Pune | 8005736733 Independent Escorts & Da...
Sarola * Female Escorts Service in Pune | 8005736733 Independent Escorts & Da...
 
2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs
2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs
2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs
 
VIP Model Call Girls Hadapsar ( Pune ) Call ON 9905417584 Starting High Prof...
VIP Model Call Girls Hadapsar ( Pune ) Call ON 9905417584 Starting  High Prof...VIP Model Call Girls Hadapsar ( Pune ) Call ON 9905417584 Starting  High Prof...
VIP Model Call Girls Hadapsar ( Pune ) Call ON 9905417584 Starting High Prof...
 
Real Men Wear Diapers T Shirts sweatshirt
Real Men Wear Diapers T Shirts sweatshirtReal Men Wear Diapers T Shirts sweatshirt
Real Men Wear Diapers T Shirts sweatshirt
 
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
 
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
 
best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...
best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...
best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...
 
Dubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls Dubai
Dubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls DubaiDubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls Dubai
Dubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls Dubai
 
Wadgaon Sheri $ Call Girls Pune 10k @ I'm VIP Independent Escorts Girls 80057...
Wadgaon Sheri $ Call Girls Pune 10k @ I'm VIP Independent Escorts Girls 80057...Wadgaon Sheri $ Call Girls Pune 10k @ I'm VIP Independent Escorts Girls 80057...
Wadgaon Sheri $ Call Girls Pune 10k @ I'm VIP Independent Escorts Girls 80057...
 
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
 
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
 
(INDIRA) Call Girl Pune Call Now 8250077686 Pune Escorts 24x7
(INDIRA) Call Girl Pune Call Now 8250077686 Pune Escorts 24x7(INDIRA) Call Girl Pune Call Now 8250077686 Pune Escorts 24x7
(INDIRA) Call Girl Pune Call Now 8250077686 Pune Escorts 24x7
 

Ddos- distributed denial of service

  • 1. A Minor Project Report on DDOS-Distributed denial of service Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of B.Sc in Computer Science. Submitted by :Laxmi Chandolia Enrolment No: 2013IMSCS009 Project Supervisor :Mr.vinod kumar( Assistent professer) Department of Computer Science School of Mathematics, Statistics and Computational Sciences Central University of Rajasthan May 2016 1
  • 2. Certificate This is to certify that this minor project entitled ”DDOS-Distributed denial of service ” submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of B.Sc. in Computer Science to the Central University of Rajasthan done by laxmi chandolia, Enrolment No. 2013IMSCS009 is an authentic work carried out by her at Department of Computer Science, Central University of Rajasthan under my guidance. The matter embodied in this minor project work has not been submitted earlier for award of any degree or diploma to the best of my knowledge and belief. Signature of the student Signature of the Mentor Name: Laxmi chandolia Name: Mr.vinod kumar Enrolment No.:2013IMSCS009 Department of C.S. 2
  • 3. Declaration This is to certify that the minor project report entitled ”DDOS-Distributed denial of service ” is done by me is an authentic work carried out for the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of intre- gated M.Sc under the guidance of Mr.vinod kumar.The matter embodied in this minor project work has not been submitted earlier for award of any degree or diploma to the best of my knowledge and belief. Signature of the student Name: Laxmi chandolia Enrolment No.:2013IMSCS009 3
  • 4. Acknowledgement I am thankful to my project supervisor Mr.vinod kumar for taking out time from his busy schedule to help me out. 4
  • 5. Abstract With their ever increasing malicious capabilities and potential to infect a vast majority of computers on the Internet, botnets are emerging as the sin- gle biggest threat to Internet security. The aim of this project is to perform a detailed analysis of botnets and the vulnerabilities exploited by them to spread themselves and perform various malicious activities such as DDoS attacks. DDoS attacks are without doubt the most potent form of attacks carried out by botnets. In order to better understand this growing phe- nomenon and develop effective counter measures, it is necessary to be able to simulate DDoS attacks in a controlled environment. Simulating a DDoS attack with control over various simulation and attack parameters will give us insights into how attacks achieve stealth and avoid detection. A detailed analysis of existing DDoS defense strategies and proposals combined with the insights derived from simulation should enable us to come up with inno- vative and feasible solutions to prevent and mitigate DDoS attacks carried out using Botnets. 5
  • 6. Table Of Content Contents 1 Introduction 7 2 Process of DDos Attack 8 3 Famous documented DDoS attacks 13 4 Ddos Tools 15 5 Prevention of Ddos 17 6 Prevetion by recaptcha 21 7 Drawback of recaptcha 22 8 Ideas for improvement of recaptcha 23 9 References 24 6
  • 7. Introduction DDoS stands for Distributed Denial of Service attack. It is a form of attack where a lot of zombie computers (infected computers that are under the control of the attacker) are used to either directly or indirectly to flood the targeted server(s) – victim, with a huge amount of information and choke it in order to prevent legitimate users from accessing them (mostly web servers that host websites). In most cases, the owners of the zombie computers may not know that they are being utilized by attackers. In some cases, there is only a periodic flooding of web servers with huge traffic in order to degrade the service, instead of taking it down completely. DoS attack is a malicious attempt by a single person or a group of people to cause the victim, site, or node to deny service to its customers. DoS vs DDoS 1. DoS:-when a single host attacks. 2. DDos:-when multiple hosts attacks simultaneously Exhaust the victim’s resources:- network bandwidth, computing power, or operating system data structures 7
  • 8. Process of DDos Attack 1. build a network of computers • discover vulnerable sites or hosts on the network • exploit to gain access to these hosts • install new programs (known as attack tools) on the compromised hosts • hosts that are running these attack tools are known as zombies • many zombies together form what we call an army • building an army is automated and not a difficult process nowa- days 2. How to find Vulnerable Machines? - Random scanning: • infected machines probes IP addresses randomly and finds vulner- able machines and tries to infect it • creates large amount of traffic • spreads very quickly but slows down as time passes • E.g. Code-Red (CRv2) Worm -Hit-list scanning: • attacker first collects a list of large number of potentially vulner- able machines before start scanning • once found a machine attacker infects it and splits the list giving half of the list to the compromised machine • same procedure is carried for each infected machine. • all machines in the list are compromised in a short interval of time without generating significant scanning traffic -Topological scanning: • uses information contained on the victim machine in order to find new targets • looks for URLs in the disk of a machine that it wants to infect • extremely accurate with performance matching the Hit-list scan- ning technique 8
  • 9. 1. How to find Vulnerable Machines? -Local subnet scanning: • acts behind a firewall • looks for targets in its own local network • can be used in conjunction with other scanning mechanisms • creates large amount of traffic -Permutation scanning: • all machines share a common pseudorandom permutation list of IP addresses • based on certain criteria it starts scanning at some random point or sequentially • coordinated scanning with extremely good performance • randomization mechanism allows high scanning speeds • can be used with hit-list scanning to further improve the perfor- mance (partitioned permutation scanning) 2. How to propagate Malicious Code? -Central source propagation: • this mechanism commonly uses HTTP, FTP, and remote-procedure call (RPC) protocols 9
  • 10. 1. How to propagate Malicious Code? -Back-chaining propagation: • copying attack toolkit can be supported by simple port listeners or by full intruder-installed Web servers, both of which use the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) 2. How to propagate Malicious Code? -Autonomous propagation: • transfers the attack toolkit to the newly compromised system at the exact moment that it breaks into that system 10
  • 11. 1. How to perform DDoS? -after constructing the attack network, intruders use handler (master) machines to specify type of attack and victim’s address -they wait for appropriate time to start the attack -either by remotely activating the attack to “wake up” simultaneously or by programming ahead of time -the agent machines (slaves) then begin sending a stream of attack packets to the victim -the victim’s system is flooded with useless load and exhaust its re- sources -the legitimate users are denied services due to lack of resources -the DDoS attack is mostly automated using specifically crafted attack- ing tools -There are mainly two kinds of DDoS attacks • Typical DDoS attacks, and • Distributed Reflector DoS (DRDoS) attacks -Typical DDoS Attacks: -DRDoS Attacks: • slave zombies send a stream of packets with the victim’s IP address as the source IP address to other uninfected machines (known as reflectors) • the reflectors then connects to the victim and sends greater volume of traffic, because they believe that the victim was the host that asked for it 11
  • 12. • the attack is mounted by noncompromised machines without being aware of the action - A Corporate Structure Analogy 12
  • 13. Famous documented DDoS attacks • Apache2 -The client asks for a service by sending a request with many HTTP headers resulting Apache Web server to crash • ARP Poison: -Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Poison attacks require the at- tacker to have access to the victim’s LAN -The attacker deludes the hosts of a specific LAN by providing them with wrong MAC addresses for hosts with already-known IP addresses -The network is monitored for ”arp who-has” requests -As soon as such a request is received, the malevolent attacker tries to respond as quickly as possible • Back: -This attack is launched against an apache Web server, which is flooded with requests containing a large number of front-slash ( / ) characters in the URL -The server tries to process all these requests, it becomes unable to process other legitimate requests and hence it denies service to its cus- tomers. • CrashIIS: -Attacks a Microsoft Windows NT IIS Web server. -The attacker sends the victim a malformed GET request, which can crash the Web server. • Land: -In Land attacks, the attacker sends the victim a TCP SYN packet that contains the same IP address as the source and destination addresses. -Such a packet completely locks the victim’s system. • Mailbomb: -In a Mailbomb attack, the victim’s mail queue is flooded by an abun- dance of messages, causing system failure. 13
  • 14. • SYN Flood: -The attacker sends an abundance of TCP SYN packets to the victim, obliging it both to open a lot of TCP connections and to respond to them. -Then the attacker does not execute the third step of the three-way handshake that follows, rendering the victim unable to accept any new incoming connections, because its queue is full of half-open TCP con- nections. • DoSNuke: -As a result, the target is weighed down, and the victim’s machine could display a ”blue screen of death.” • Ping of Death: -Attacker creates a packet that contains more than 65,536 bytes -This packet can cause different kinds of damage to the machine that receives it, such as crashing and rebooting Process Table: -This attack exploits the feature of some network services to generate a new process each time a new TCP/IP connection is set up -The attacker tries to make as many uncompleted connections to the victim as possible in order to force the victim’s system to generate an abundance of processes • Smurf Attack: -The victim is flooded with Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ”echo-reply” packets -The attacker sends numerous ICMP ”echo-request” packets to the broadcast address of many subnets. These packets contain the victim’s address as the source IP address • SSH Process Table: -Like the Process Table attack, this attack makes hundreds of con- nections to the victim with the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol without completing the login process. 14
  • 15. Ddos Tools 1. Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC):- “Hacktivist” group Anonymous’ first tool of choice—Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC)—is a simple flooding tool that can generate massive volume of TCP, UDP or HTTP traffic in order to subject a server to a heavy network load. LOIC’s original developers, Praetox Technolo- gies, intended the tool to be used by developers who wanted to subject their own servers to a heavy network traffic load for testing purposes. However, Anonymous picked up the open-source tool and used it to launch coordinated DDoS attacks. Soon afterwards, LOIC was modi- fied and given its “Hivemind” feature, allowing any LOIC user to point a copy of LOIC at an IRC server, transferring control of it to a master user who can then send commands over IRC to every connected LOIC client simultaneously. In this configuration, users are able to launch much more effective DDoS attacks than those of a group of lesscoordi- nated LOIC users not operating simultaneously. In late 2011, however, Anonymous stepped away from LOIC as its DDoS tool of choice, as LOIC makes no effort to obscure its users’ IP addresses. This lack of anonymity resulted in the arrest of various users around the world for participating in LOIC attacks, with Anonymous broadcasting a clear message across all of its IRC channels: “Do NOT use LOIC.” 2. High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC):- After Anonymous dropped LOIC as its tool of choice, High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC) quickly took the spotlight when it was used to target the United States Department of Justice in response to its decision to take down Megaupload.com. At its core, HOIC is also a simple application: a cross-platform basic script for sending HTTP POST and GET requests wrapped in an easy-to-use GUI. However, its effectiveness stems from add-on “booster” scripts— text files that contain additional basic code interpreted by the main application upon a user’s launch of an attack. Even though HOIC does not directly employ any anonymity techniques, the use of booster scripts allows a user to specify lists of target URLs and identifying information for HOIC to cycle through as it generates its attack traffic. That, in turn, makes HOIC attacks slightly harder to block. HOIC continues to be used by Anonymous all over the world to launch DDoS attacks, although Anonymous attacks are not limited to those involving HOIC. 3. hping:- In addition to LOIC and HOIC, Anonymous and other hacking 15
  • 16. groups and individuals have employed a variety of tools to launch DDoS attacks, especially due to the Ion Cannons’ lack of anonymity. One such tool, hping, is a fairly basic command line utility similar to the ping utility. However, it offers more functionality than simply sending an ICMP echo request that is the traditional use of ping. Hping can be used to send large volumes of TCP traffic at a target while spoofing the source IP addresses, making it appear to be random or even to originate from a specific, user-defined source. As a powerful, well-rounded tool (possessing some spoofing capabilities), hping remains among the tools of choice for Anonymous. 4. Slowloris:- Besides straightforward, brute-force flood attacks, many of the more intricate “low and slow” attack types have been wrapped up into easyto-use tools, yielding denial-of-service attacks that are much harder to detect. Slowloris, a tool developed by a gray hat hacker who goes by the handle “RSnake,” is able to create a denial-of-service condition for a server by using a very slow HTTP request. By sending HTTP headers to the target site in tiny chunks as slow as possible (waiting to send the next tiny chunk until just before the server would time out the request), the server is forced to continue to wait for the headers to arrive. If enough connections are opened to the server in this fashion, it is quickly unable to handle legitimate requests 16
  • 17. Prevention of Ddos -There are two approaches to defense • Preventive defense • Reactive defense • Preventive defense -try to eliminate the possibility of DDoS attacks altogether -enable potential victims to endure the attack without denying services to legitimate clients -Hosts should guard against illegitimate traffic from or toward the ma- chine. -keeping protocols and software up-to-date -regular scanning of the machine to detect any ”anomalous” behavior -monitoring access to the computer and applications, and installing se- curity patches, firewall systems, virus scanners, and intrusion detection systems automatically -sensors to monitor the network traffic and send information to a server in order to determine the ”health” of the network • Preventive defense -Securing the computer reduces the possibility of being not only a vic- tim, but also a zombie -these measures can never be 100-percent effective, but they certainly decrease the frequency and strength of DDoS attacks -Studying the attack methods can lead to recognizing loopholes in pro- tocols -adjust network gateways in order to filter input and output traffic -reduce traffic with spoofed IP addresses on the network -the IP address of output traffic should belong to the subnetwork, whereas the source IP address of input traffic should Test the system for possible drawbacks or failures and correct it -Two methods have been proposed 1.create policies that increase the privileges of users according to their behavior 17
  • 18. 2.increasing the effective resources to such a degree that DDoS effects are limited - usually too expensive • Difficulties in defending -DDoS attacks flood victims with packets -Any attempt of filtering the incoming flow means that legitimate traffic will also be rejected -Attack packets usually have spoofed IP addresses which makes it dif- ficult to traceback the source of attacks -there is the danger of characterizing a legitimate connection as an attack • Respond to the attack -by limiting the accepted traffic rate -legitimate traffic is also blocked -Filtering is efficient only if attackers’ detection is correct -Right now there is no 100 -Developers are working on DDoS diversion systems -e.g. Honeypots 18
  • 19. • Honeypots • low-interaction honeypots -emulating services and operating systems -easy and safe to implement -attackers are not allowed to interact with the basic operating system, but only with specific services -what happens if the attack is not directed against the emulated ser- vice? • high-interaction honeypots -honeynet is proposed -honeynet is not a software solution that can be installed on a computer but a whole architecture -it is a network that is created to be attacked -every activity is recorded and attackers are being trapped -a Honeywall gateway allows incoming traffic, but controls outgoing traffic using intrusion prevention technologies -By studying the captured traffic, researchers can discover new methods and tools and they can fully understand attackers’ tactics -more complex to install and deploy and the risk is increased as attack- ers interact with real operating systems and not with emulations • Route Filter Techniques -when routing protocols were designed, developers did not focus on security, but effective routing mechanisms and routing loop avoidance -by gaining access to a router, attackers could direct the traffic over bottlenecks, view critical data, and modify them -cryptographic authentication mitigates these threats -routing filters are necessary for preventing critical routes and subnet- works from being advertised and suspicious routes from being incorpo- rated in routing tables -attackers do not know the route toward critical servers and suspicious routes are not used 19
  • 20. • blackhole routing -directs routing traffic to a null interface, where it is finally dropped -can ignore traffic originating from IP addresses being attacked -if the attackers IP addresses cannot be distinguished and all traffic is blackholed, then legitimate traffic is dropped as well • sinkhole routing -involves routing suspicious traffic to a valid IP address where it can be analyzed -traffic that is found to be malicious is rejected (routed to a null inter- face), otherwise it is routed to the next hop • Route Filter Techniques -filtering on source address • best technique if we knew each time who the attacker is • not always possible to detect each attacker especially with the huge army of zombies -filtering on services • filter based on UDP port or TCP connection or ICMP messages • not effective if the attack is directed toward a very common port or service -filtering on destination address • reject all traffic toward selected victims • legitimate traffic is also rejected 20
  • 21. Prevetion by recaptcha There are many different solutions to prevent bots from submitting web forms, one of the most popular solutions is reCaptcha. reCaptcha actually displays an image with some text in it and user has to enter the text to submit the form successfully. It was difficult for bots to read the text on the image. Google created a new reCaptcha called No Captcha reCaptcha. No Captcha reCaptcha just displays a checkbox asking the user to check it if he/she is not a bot. It might look very hackable but internally Google uses advanced algorithms and methods to find if the user is a bot or not. It may seem like a simple checkbox but it’s not a checkbox at all. Its a graphics that behaves like a checkbox. Most bots don’t run JavaScript so they cannot emulate it. But for the bots which can emulate, this is tracked down by mouse movement and Google’s Adsense fraud click detection algorithms. 21
  • 22. Drawback of recaptcha • Main drawback is complexity of captchas. Captchas are getting more and more complex or even unreal to deal with. • Time consuming • reCAPTCHA is Accepting Incorrect Words 22
  • 23. Ideas for improvement of recaptcha • if we are accesing any site ones, site should be save our ip address. and allow the access that site allways not once. • Use image recaptcha instead of using text reCaptcha. • Use binary image recaptcha instead of using coloured image reCaptcha. 23
  • 24. References 1. Distributed Denial Of Service Attacks :- http://www.slideshare.net 2. ”Distributed Denial of Service Attacks”, The Internet Protocol Journal - Volume 7 3. for Reaserch On DDos :- https://en.wikipedia.org 4. Perfrom Of DDos Attack :- https://www.quora.com 5. Reseach paper of ”international association of computer science and information security” 24