Contactless technologies such as RFID, NFC, and sensor networks are vulnerable to mafia and distance frauds. These frauds aim at successfully passing an authentication protocol by cheating on the actual distance between the prover and the verifier. Distance-bounding protocols have been designed to cope these security issues, but none of them properly resists to these two frauds without requiring additional memory and computation. The situation is even worse considering that just a few distance-bounding protocols are able to deal with the inherent background noise on the communication channels. This article introduces a noise-resilient distance-bounding protocol that resists to both mafia and distance frauds. The security of the protocol is analyzed against known attacks and illustrated by experimental results. The results demonstrate the significant advantage of the introduced lightweight design over the previous proposals. http://kaashivinfotech.com/ http://inplanttrainingchennai.com/ http://inplanttraining-in-chennai.com/ http://internshipinchennai.in/ http://inplant-training.org/ http://kernelmind.com/ http://inplanttraining-in-chennai.com/ http://inplanttrainingchennai.com/