Economics 321 at Wesleyan requires an 80 minute group presentation on an academic journal we read through out the semester. This is the slideshow we used
2. Purpose of paper is to investigate an
“upward pricing pres-sure (“UPP”) tool for
analyzing unilateral competitive effects of
horizontal mergers on differentiated
products that is featured in the 2010
Guidelines.”
Willig, Robert. “Unilateral Competitive Effects of Mergers.” Page 19.
6. “Unilateral Competitive Effects of Mergers:
Upward Pricing Pressure, Product Quality,
and Other Extensions” by Robert Willig
Abstract
Upward Pricing Pressure 2010 Guidelines
The GUPPI, Marginal Cost Efficiencies and UPP Calibration
UPP With Merger Impacts on Product Quality
Multiproduct UPP Analysis
UPP Analysis of Partial Equity Stakes
Upward Market Power Pressure: Price Increases and Output Decreases
Conclusion
18. Willig’s Definition: “The diversion ratio
between goods 1 and 2 is the fraction of
the sales that a price rise suppresses of
good 1 that divert to good 2”.
Shapiro’s Definition: “If the price of Brand A
were to rise, what fraction of the customers
leaving Brand A would switch to Brand B?”
Willig, Robert. “Unilateral Competitive Effects of Mergers.” Page 26.
Shapiro, Carl . “Mergers with Differentiated Products.” Page
1.
19. Assume Coke and Pepsi Merge
Pre-Merger:
Pc = $1 Pp = $1.50
Qc = 10(-Pc + Pp) Qp = 7(-Pp + Pc)
What is the diversion ratio?
20. What happens when the diversion ratio is
1?
What does this mean?
Under what conditions should the firm
raise its post-merger price?
21.
22.
23. Pepsi/Coke in real life
Duopolistic Competition
Cross Elasticity of Demand
Brand Loyalty
27. Other firms and consumers reacting to the
merger is unaccounted for
Market Entry
Product Repositioning
28. Judges are not economists
Both sides estimate their own UPP
Ambiguity (3.8% of cases flagged between
1988 – 2005)
Good way to screen for potential anti-trust
cases
Wienberg, Matthew. “The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers.” Page 1.
29. Anheuser-Busch proposed $20.1 for
GrupoModelo
Projected to affect half of $80 billion sales in
market
DOJ feared “the deal could lead to higher
beer prices in this country because it would
reduce competition in the U.S. beer market.”
Assistant Attorney General cites “The big
folks were working hard to set price increases
and Modelo was a significant constraint.”
The Inquisitr. “Price of Beer Saved: Corona And Budweiser Merger Denied by
DOJ.” Page 1
30. Willig, Robert. “Unilateral Competitive Effects of
Mergers.” Pages 20 – 37.
The Inquisitr. “Price of Beer Saved: Corona And
Budweiser Merger Denied by DOJ.” Page 1.
Weinberg, Matthew. “The Price Effects of
Horizontal Mergers.” Pages 1 – 21.
CRA. “Scoring Unilateral Effects with the GUPPI.”
Pages 1 - 6.
Shapiro, Carl . “Mergers with Differentiated
Products.” Page 1 - 8.
Wiriadinata, Michael. “Economies of Scale, Scope
and Learning Curve.” Page 1.