Case Number 39 Andy Grove of Intel: Entrepreneur Turned Executive Andy Grove, one of the three founders of Intel Corporation, was asked three questions by Peter F. Drucker in a 1986 interview. The three questions appear below along with Dr. Grove’s responses. QUESTION 1 If there were one thing to tell a young man or woman who starts out with their own new business and wants to build it, what is the one absolutely essential thing you would tell them? If I had one shot at getting something into a person’s mind or heart in this situation, it would be the concept of submerging their own self and putting it behind the interests of the enterprise. They should not put themselves ahead of the enterprise. And I can’t say that emphatically enough. Whatever problems I have seen all come from people wanting to succeed personally, wanting to be right personally, wanting to win an argument personally, wanting an organization change to propel them ahead personally, without considering what impact that desire or that change has on the organization. Particularly when you are in the small boat with a number of other people—close proximity and pressures are high and tension is high. Getting into the people’s mind that you won’t get there any faster by positioning yourself at the bow of the boat; you’ll only get there faster if you row faster and move the boat forward. If you can get this into the founding people’s hearts and minds, you have won automatically the majority of the battles that will come up. The only thing that matters is the enterprise. You cannot succeed if the enterprise does not succeed. And if the enterprise succeeds, there will be enough success to go around and you’ll get your share. So, my admonishment to any person in that situation is, Don’t put your ego ahead of the enterprise, because you will lose. What is right matters, not who is right. QUESTION 2 What did you have to learn to do and what did you have to learn not to do at the beginning, when the three of you sat down and began to build the company and the business? And then how did this change once the company was successful and very large? The job [initially] was very simple conceptually. You needed to do a certain number of things today, a certain number of things tomorrow, and a certain number of things by the end of the month. And unlike in a company like Intel today, where we are very preoccupied with the process of how to do things, we knew what to do and somebody went and did it. This lack of interest in the process of how you are doing things started to give way to more thought to the [formal] process maybe about three years into the life of the company. For the first three years, there was no game plan; people just did things that they were naturally attracted to, and very rarely did they collide. We only hired people with very specific skills; there was no training involved. We were concerned with people right from the very beginning of the company. The nature of the con ...

1. Case Number 39
Andy Grove of Intel: Entrepreneur Turned Executive
Andy Grove, one of the three founders of Intel Corporation, was
asked three questions by Peter F. Drucker in a 1986 interview.
The three questions appear below along with Dr. Grove’s
responses.
QUESTION 1
If there were one thing to tell a young man or woman who starts
out with their own new business and wants to build it, what is
the one absolutely essential thing you would tell them?
If I had one shot at getting something into a person’s mind or
heart in this situation, it would be the concept of submerging
their own self and putting it behind the interests of the
enterprise. They should not put themselves ahead of the
enterprise. And I can’t say that emphatically enough. Whatever
problems I have seen all come from people wanting to succeed
personally, wanting to be right personally, wanting to win an
argument personally, wanting an organization change to propel
them ahead personally, without considering what impact that
desire or that change has on the organization.
Particularly when you are in the small boat with a number of
other people—close proximity and pressures are high and
tension is high. Getting into the people’s mind that you won’t
get there any faster by positioning yourself at the bow of the
boat; you’ll only get there faster if you row faster and move the
boat forward. If you can get this into the founding people’s
hearts and minds, you have won automatically the majority of
the battles that will come up.
The only thing that matters is the enterprise. You cannot
succeed if the enterprise does not succeed. And if the enterprise
succeeds, there will be enough success to go around and you’ll
get your share. So, my admonishment to any person in that
situation is, Don’t put your ego ahead of the enterprise, because

2. you will lose. What is right matters, not who is right.
QUESTION 2
What did you have to learn to do and what did you have to learn
not to do at the beginning, when the three of you sat down and
began to build the company and the business? And then how did
this change once the company was successful and very large?
The job [initially] was very simple conceptually. You needed to
do a certain number of things today, a certain number of things
tomorrow, and a certain number of things by the end of the
month. And unlike in a company like Intel today, where we are
very preoccupied with the process of how to do things, we knew
what to do and somebody went and did it.
This lack of interest in the process of how you are doing things
started to give way to more thought to the [formal] process
maybe about three years into the life of the company. For the
first three years, there was no game plan; people just did things
that they were naturally attracted to, and very rarely did they
collide. We only hired people with very specific skills; there
was no training involved. We were concerned with people right
from the very beginning of the company. The nature of the
concern was very heavily skills-oriented and task-oriented,
rather than process-oriented or training-oriented or structure-
oriented.
Now, seventeen years later, my personal behavior is
substantially different because the company is substantially
bigger, more complex, and because I am seventeen years older.
The content of what I do now is substantially different.
Seventeen years ago I was buying equipment myself, running
experiments, and reducing the data. I was one step away from
silicon wafers and stuff like that at the time. Today, I am many
steps away from that. Today, I deal with abstractions but still
with people. People have been a constant.
I began with an instinctive way of how to hire, manage, and
communicate with a person. Then, I remember two milestones.
Intel started in 1968. We became aware of a growing need for

3. some kind of a formal training process in 1971. The way that
came about is that the person who headed our manufacturing
organization had a series of lunches with the production
operators and asked them what their concerns were. After three
or four lunches, he was absolutely astounded—he was expecting
to hear complaints about it being too hot or cold, or perhaps
that they wanted music piped in as they worked. But the
predominant complaint that came up during these lunches was
that they were not being trained for their jobs. So, the impetus
for formal training at Intel goes back to these lunches. And that
was not in my intuition. We went around to institute the
beginnings of a very sophisticated training program for
operators. And then the question came up, “Should we not do
this for managers also?”
In 1973, supervisors were saying, “you want us to do
performance assessments and other duties; show us how to do
them.” The demand for additional training, management training
this time, began again. I was forced to rethink the intuitive
techniques that we had started several years earlier.
I went through a gradual process. Things became more complex.
You go into a new company with everything in your head. I
went through a gradual realization; a shifting of tasks took
place gradually. The picture of my own role emerged relatively
early. I was the organizer and taskmaster. People in the initial
group almost immediately gravitated to roles that fit them. The
team built itself up almost. Roles that were needed gravitated to
appropriate team members.
If you don’t think through the roles of the key people very
early, you build up tribes and power struggles in the
organization, which in the early stages has to be deadly. New
people, subordinates, had a different way of operating than me.
I had some real conflict with those individuals. They were not
reaching for roles and colliding with the initial group but had a
different way of operating. As a result of insisting that their
way of operating prevail and by trying to exert power with the
others, we were led to a power struggle—a struggle that resulted

4. in our wasting substantial emotional energy. It was a very early
introduction to the responsibilities that I had to deal with,
responsibilities I did not want to deal with but had no choice.
The initial group was very willing to make changes with a little
bit of friction and a little bit of debate. Most of us had hungry
minds, the minds of a student, and the notion of getting into a
new area had more attraction than imposing your views in an
old area. And for the same reason we did not resist going out to
the customer.
My role was not so much as “going out” rather as being “major
domo” for people “coming in.” And that started relatively early.
Here is a self-respecting semiconductor-device person [me]
setting up tools for representatives of major corporations whose
biggest concerns at that time were not technical but had to do
with the viability of Intel as a company. I started doing this
work almost immediately. Our industry had promised all kinds
of things that it had not delivered upon. So, we had a very
skeptical customer base. So, we adopted as a corporate logo
Intel Delivers.
QUESTION 3
How did you go about developing yourself?
I get my nose into a new activity; I spend some amount of time
on it. I find that I put pressure on my time. At some point, I find
that something has to go. I begin to scan what I do. I look for
opportunities. I look for activities that I participate in that I
could stop participating in. For most of the things that have to
go I can find some substitute arrangement. For example, I
changed our management meeting from once each week to one
each two weeks.
In every case, the pressure is around time. I ask, “What am I
doing that I shouldn’t be doing?” I force myself to get
overloaded, and then I look at the whole stack for something to
throw out.
I look at what I do. Should I still be doing it? Am I doing it
well? Am I adding enough value to what I am doing? Is it more

5. worthwhile or less worthwhile than something else? I negotiate
with myself. Perhaps what happens is that I won’t immediately
stop something but I start the machinery to stop within a certain
period of time, such as six months.
QUESTIONS
What did Andy Grove do right as an entrepreneur? How about
as an executive once Intel grew into a complex company? What
lessons do you take away from Andy Grove’s experiences as a
cofounder and president of Intel Corporation?
Chapter 9
Document Analysis
1
Files are the Key
Aren’t always what they appear to be
Metadata can hold clues
Can be hidden in strange places
Can be attached to others with alternate data streams
File Identification
File extensions
Control behavior of files
Generally identify the type of file
But can easily be changed
File headers
Used by application to identify type of file
Not so easily changed (but can be)
Magic numbers (Linux/Unix)

6. File Metadata
MFT attributes
File header information
End of file marker (EOF)
Magic numbers
MFT Attributes
18 identifiable attributes plus user-identifiable attributes
Only a few are usable to the investigator
File name attribute
Object ID
Data attribute
MFT record does not go away when file is deleted
File Headers
Contains a string that identifies the file type
Human-readable files have human readable identifiers
Binary files have binary identifiers
But these are “rules of thumb” and not enforced
Provides the starting point for data carving utilities
Magic Numbers
Performs the same function as a header string
Used by Unix/Linux flavors
Magic numbers are humanly readable from a disk editor
Types of Metadata
File system metadata
Substantive metadata
Embedded metadata

7. External metadata
File System Metadata
Tells the file system how to find the file
Provides identifying information for each file
Security applications use metadata for managing permissions
Modify/Access/Create (MAC) data is maintained by the file
system
MAC Data
Is not always an accurate measure
Create dates only show when the file appeared on the system,
not when it was originally created
Copying a file to a system modifies the create date
Many utilities can be used to modify the create date
Any change to the file resets the modify date
Virtually any action will modify the access date
Embedded and Substantive Metadata
Applications generate metadata for the files they create and
modify
Many applications allow users to input custom metadata
Embedded/Substantive metadata may have different MAC data
than the system metadata
Not all of this information is available to the user
Temporary Files
Most applications use temporary files
Auto-save functions keep one or more copies
Undo or scratch files can keep several copies
Spooler files keep the raw data used to print a file
Auto-save or scratch files deleted when an application closes

8. are recoverable if not overwritten
Data Hiding
The Registry
Document metadata
Bad clusters
Alternate data streams
Unallocated space
The Registry
Several register key types allow long string variables to be
stored
Up to 16,383 characters can be stored in a single key
That’s about 6.5 pages of unformatted text
Multiple entries can be used to hold a single file
Document Metadata
Most applications such as iTunes and Microsoft Word allow
string variables in metadata fields
Several pages of text can be stored in the “Comments” field of
Microsoft Word
Bad Clusters
NTFS uses the bad clusters metafile to list clusters marked as
bad
Generally obsolete technology, so if there are bad clusters, you
should examine them
Alternate Data Streams
Files are linked to a valid host file through the streams
command

9. The Streams utility can find all streams in a file system
Unallocated Space
Utilities such as Slacker can take unallocated and slack space
and create a hidden volume in which data can be stored
The space still is mapped in the volume
A volume with a large discrepancy between reported space and
available space is suspect