This document is a preface to a global studies reader that introduces the concept of globalization through the lens of social media interactions and consumer goods. It notes how communicating online and visiting stores exposes people to global connections, as friends around the world engage on topics and products originate from multiple countries. The preface aims to provide a friendly introduction to thinking globally through everyday experiences.
1. THINKINGGLOBALLY
THINKINGGLOBALLY
AGlobalStudiesReader
EDITEDBY
MarkJuergensmeyer
UNIVERSITYOFCALIFORNIAPRESS
Berkeley Los Angeles London
University of California Press, one of the most distinguished
university
pressesintheUnitedStates,enricheslivesaroundtheworldbyadvanci
ng
scholarship in thehumanities, social sciences, andnatural
sciences. Its
activitiesaresupportedbytheUCPressFoundationandbyphilanthro
pic
contributionsfromindividualsandinstitutions.Formoreinformatio
n,visit
www.ucpress.edu.
UniversityofCaliforniaPress
12. DaniRodrik,“GlobalizationforWhom?”
fromHarvardMagazine
FurtherReading
15. DevelopmentandtheRoleofWomenintheGlobalEconomy
Competing views of development and the role of women in the
global
economy
AlvinY.So,“SocialChangeandDevelopment”
fromSocialChangeandDevelopment
MayraBuvinić,“WomeninPoverty:ANewGlobalUnderclass”
fromForeignPolicy
Kum-
KumBhavnani,JohnForan,PriyaA.Kurian,andDebashishMunshi,“
From
theEdgesofDevelopment”
fromOntheEdgesofDevelopment:CulturalInterventions
FurtherReading
16. TheHiddenGlobalEconomyofSexandDrugs
Illegaltraffickinginpeopleanddrugs,andtheglobalattemptstocontr
olthem
DavidShirk,“TheDrugWarinMexico”
fromTheDrugWarinMexico:ConfrontingaCommonThreat
EduardoPorter,“NumbersTellofFailureinDrugWar”
fromtheNewYorkTimes
KevinBales,“TheNewSlavery”
fromDisposablePeople:NewSlaveryintheGlobalEconomy
14. 18. GlobalCommunicationsandNewMedia
The role of new media—video, internet, and social
networking—in global
cultureandpolitics
YudhishthirRajIsar,“GlobalCultureandMedia”
fromTheEncyclopediaofGlobalStudies
MichaelCurtin,“MediaCapitalinChineseFilmandTelevision”
fromPlayingtotheWorld’sBiggestAudience:TheGlobalizationof
ChineseFilmandTV
NatanaJ.DeLong-Bas,“TheNewSocialMediaandtheArabSpring”
fromOxfordIslamicStudiesOnline
PippaNorris,“TheWorldwideDigitalDivide”
fromHarvardUniversityKennedySchoolofGovernment
FurtherReading
19. TheGlobalMovementforHumanRights
Transnationalnetworkssupportinghumanrightsandlegalprotection
forall
MichelineIshay,“GlobalizationandItsImpact”
17. Ipostsomethingaboutglobaltrade,IgetresponsesfromfriendsinChi
na
andBrazil.IfIputupalinkaboutinterfaithharmony,Igetappreciative
“likes” from friends in Indonesia, India, and Northern Ireland.
When I
commentaboutdomesticpolitics
intheUnitedStates,I’moftenpolitely
ignoredbymyfriendsintheotherpartoftheworld,whofindmylocal
obsessions as arcane as I view their postings on Eritrean
political
squabbles.ButwhenIpostalinktoawebsitethatportraysnothingbut
picturesofbouncingcats,Ireceiveappreciativenoticesfromaroundt
he
world.Everyone,itseems,lovesbouncingcats.
Itisnotjustthebouncingcatsthatareglobal,however.It’severything.
The very process of interaction and communication beyond
national
bordersisafeatureofourglobalizedworld.AnditisnotjustFacebook.
Everytimeyougoonline,yougoglobal.
Whenyouturnoffthecomputerandgotothestore,chancesareyou
willencounternotjustyourlocalmilieu.AtriptoWalmartisajourneyi
nto
theglobalarena.Andwhenyoubringhomeallthatstuffmadenotonlyi
18. n
China but also in myriad countries around the world, you are
literally
bringingglobalizationhome.Trythissimplepartygamewithyourfrie
nds.
Guessthecountryoneveryone’sclothinglabels,thenchecktoseewher
e
the t-shirts and jackets and everything else you and your friends
are
wearing were made—Bangladesh, Trinidad, Cambodia, Yemen,
or
wherever.Seehowmanycountriesarerepresented.Andthenimaginet
he
journeythattheclothinghadtomake,fromcottonfieldstotextilefacto
ries
toseaportsandcargocontainerstodistributioncenterstoretailstores
andeventuallytotheclosetsofyouandyourfriends.Perhapsthemost
globalareaofyourhouseisthatcloset.
Insomecases,youdonothave togoanywhere to findexamplesof
globalizationbecausetheycometoyou.Globalizationpermeatesthea
ir
thatyoubreathe—
19. includingtinyparticlesemittedfromvolcaniceruptions
half a world away. It affects your weather, as cycles of warming
and
coolingairreacttoglobalclimatechange.Andglobalizationispartoft
he
foodthatyoueat.ThisisobviousifyouhaveatasteforChinesetake-out
orpadThainoodlesorMexicanburritos.Butevenifyouareameat-and-
potatoeskindofpersonwholikesalittletomatosaladontheside,youar
e
enjoyingtheeffectsofglobalizationaboutfivehundredyearsago.Itw
as
then that potatoes and tomatoes, plants originally found only in
South
America,weretakenelsewherebyexplorerstobecomeapartofthefoo
d
habits in North America, Europe, and around the world. Their
dissemination was part of the extraordinary global diffusion of
plants,
germs, andcultures that followedEuropeancontactswith
theWestern
Hemisphere,beginningwithColumbusin1492.
Soglobalizationiswovenintothefabricofourdailylives.Tostudyitis
tofocusonthecentralfeatureoflifeinthetwenty-
firstcentury.Buthow
21. India,Germany,Denmark,Russia,theUnitedKingdom,Australia,Ca
nada,
andtheUnitedStates.Thefieldofglobalstudieshadarrived.
But what was in this new field of study? When the scholars
came
togetherinTokyoin2008,theirmaingoalsweretoanswerthisquestion
andtodefinethemajorfeaturesofthefieldofglobalstudies.Theycame
expectingtohavesomethingofafight.Afterall,eachoftheseprograms
haddevelopedindependentlyfromtheothers.Whenrepresentativeso
fall
these different programs came together, they did not know what
they
wouldfind,thinkingthatthefieldofglobalstudieswouldbedefinedva
stly
differentlyinTokyo,Leipzig,andMelbourne.Butasitturnedout,this
was
notthecase.Happily,therewasagreatdealofagreementattheoutset
regardingwhatthefieldofglobalstudiescontainedandhowtogoabout
studyingit.
Thefivecharacteristicsofglobalstudiesthatthescholarsagreedonat
22. that memorable founding meeting of the international Global
Studies
ConsortiuminTokyoarediscussedbelow.
Transnational.
ThescholarsinTokyoagreedthatthefieldofglobalstudies
focuses primarily on the analysis of events, activities, ideas,
trends,
processes, and phenomena that appear across national
boundaries and
cultural regions. These include activities such as economic
distribution
systems, and ideologies such as nationalism or religious beliefs.
The
scholarsusedthetermculturalregionsaswellasnations, since these
kinds of global flows of activity and ideas transcend the
limitations of
regions even when they are not the same as national boundaries.
Historically,muchoftheactivitythatwecall“transnational”mightm
ore
properlybecalled“transregional,”sinceitoccurredbeforetheconcep
tof
nationwasappliedtostates.
Interdisciplinary. Since transnational phenomena are complex,
23. these are
examinedfrommanydisciplinarypointsofview. Ingeneral, the
fieldof
global studies does not keep strict disciplinary divisions among,
for
instance, sociological, historical, political, literary, or other
academic
fields.Rather,ittakesaproblem-
focusedapproach,lookingatsituations
suchasglobalwarmingortheriseofnewreligio-political
ideologiesas
specificcases.Tomakesenseof theseproblemareasrequiresmultiple
perspectives,whichmaybeeconomic,political,social,cultural,relig
ious,
ideological, or environmental. Scholars involved in global
studies often
workininterdisciplinaryteamsorfreelyusetermsandconceptsacross
fieldsofstudy.Thesescholarscomefromallfieldsofthesocialscience
s
(especiallyfromsociology,economics,politicalscience,andanthrop
ology).
And many of the fields are also related to the humanities,
including
particularlythefieldsofhistory,literature,religiousstudies,andthea
rts.
25. example of a global stratum of culture, education, technology,
and
economicactivityuponwhicharebasedmanyaspectsoftheglobalizat
ion
of the twenty-first century. Thus, to fully understand the
patterns of
globalizationtoday,itisnecessarytoprobetheirhistoricalprecedents
.
CriticalandMulticultural.
TheAmericanandEuropeanviewofglobalization
isnottheonlyone.Althoughmanyaspectsofcontemporaryglobalizat
ion
arebasedonEuropeancolonialprecedents,mostglobalstudiesschola
rs
donotacceptuncriticallythenotionthatpeopleintheWestshouldbeth
e
onlyonestobenefit
fromeconomic,political,andculturalglobalization.
Someglobalstudiesscholarsavoidusingthetermglobalizationtodes
cribe
theirsubjectofstudy,sincethetermsometimesisinterpretedtoimplyt
he
promotionofaWestern-
dominatedhegemonicprojectaimedatspreading
26. theacceptanceof laissez-faire liberal economics throughout
theworld.
Otherscholarsdescribetheirapproachas“criticalglobalizationstudi
es,”
implyingthattheirexaminationofglobalizationisnotintendedtopro
mote
or privilege Western economic models of globalization, but
rather to
understandit.
Tounderstandglobalizationwellrequiresviewingitfrommanycultur
al
perspectives—
fromAfricanandAsian,aswellasEuropeanandAmerican,
pointsofview.Scholarsofglobalstudiesacknowledgethatglobalizat
ion
andotherglobalissues,activities,andtrendscanbevieweddifferently
in
differentpartsoftheworldandfromdifferentsocio-
economiclevelswithin
eachlocality.Forthatreason,scholarsofglobalstudiessometimesspe
ak
of“manyglobalizations”or“multipleperspectivesonglobalstudies.
”This
positionacknowledgesthatthereisnodominantparadigmorperspecti
29. ’s
workforce;andthehiddeneconomyinvolvingtradeinsexandillicitdr
ugs.
We will also explore global environmental problems, including
climate
change,transnationaldiseasesandotherglobalhealthissues,andglob
al
communicationsandnewmedia,andendwithasectionontheroleofciv
il
society in theglobal future. In choosing the readings to explore
these
issues,Ihavetriedtoachieveabalanceamongdisciplinaryandcultura
l
perspectives.AndIhopeformyreaderstonotonlyunderstandthenatur
e
ofglobalproblems,butalsotoconsidersomeofthepossibilitiesinsolv
ing
them.
Sowhenyouenter the fieldofglobal studies, youareencountering
someofthemostsignificantaspectsofourcontemporaryworld.Youar
e
engagingwiththetransnationalissuesthathaveshapedtheregionsoft
he
world fromancient times to thepresentand thatareamong themost
32. hat
canaffectallareasoftheworld.Theseglobalactivitiescanbestudieda
s
onepart of theestablisheddisciplinesof sociology,
economics,political
science,history,religiousstudies,andthelike.Orglobalstudiescanb
ea
separatecourseorpartofawholenewprogramordepartment.
Asanacademicfield,globalstudiesisfairlynew.Itblossomedlargely
aftertheturnofthetwenty-
firstcentury.Buttheintellectualrootsofthe
fieldlieinthepioneeringworkofthemanydifferentscholarswhohave
thoughtgloballyovermanydecades.These thinkershaveattempted
to
understand how things are related and have explored the
connections
amongsocieties,polities,economies,andculturalsystemsthroughou
tthe
world.
Onecouldarguethatthefirstglobalstudiesscholarswereamongthe
foundersofthesocialsciences.Overahundredyearsagothepioneerin
g
GermansociologistMaxWeber(1864–
33. 1920)wroteaseriesofworkson
thereligionsofIndia,China,Judaism,andProtestantChristianity.We
ber
was interested in findingwhatwasdistinctiveabouteachof
them,and
what was similar among all of them. Weber also attempted to
discern
universal elements in the development of all societies. He
showed, for
example, that a certain kind of rational and legal authority and
its
associated bureaucratization was a globalizing process. Though
his
intellectualinterestswereEuropocentric,hiscuriosityspannedthegl
obe.
Other early social scientists were also global thinkers. The
French
sociologistÉmileDurkheim(1858–
1917)focusedfirstonsomethingvery
local: case studies of tribal societies. What he found, however,
was
35. admirers in
Westernsocieties.
Alloftheseearlythinkers,bothEuropeanandnon-European,focused
on twowaysof thinkingglobally: comparisonanduniversality. In
some
cases,theylookedatcomparativeandnon-
Westernexamplestodetermine
differences and similarities. In other studies, they adopted
intellectual
positions that assumed a universal applicability. Hence early
European
theoristssuchasWeberandMarxthoughtthatthesocialforcesthatwer
e
transforming Europe in the nineteenth century would eventually
have
relevanceglobally.Currentscholarshipinallareasofthehumanitiesa
nd
socialsciences—includingglobalstudies—
isindebtedtothesepioneering
scholars.
Butthespecificfocusonglobalizationitselfisfairlynew.Onlyrecentl
y
havescholarsbeguntoexaminetransnationalandglobalnetworks,flo
37. studies.TheanthropologistArjunAppaduraibroadenedtheundersta
nding
ofglobalperspectivesfromlandscapetoavarietyof“scapes”—
culturally
shaped understandings of the world. The political scientist
David Held
helpedtoformulatetheoriesofpoliticsinrelationtoglobalization.Wi
lliam
H.McNeill,AkiraIriye,andBruceMazlish,amongotherhistorians,h
elped
todevelopthesubfieldsofworldhistoryandglobalhistory.Economist
s
such as Joseph Stiglitz and Jagdish Bhagwati have analyzed
economic
interactions and changes in global terms. And in the field of
religious
studies,WilfredCantwellSmithandNinianSmartmovedbeyondthes
tudy
of particular religious traditions to the study of world theology
and
worldview analysis, respectively. Other scholars developed
analytic
approaches to describe new forms of global society: Mary
Kaldor
examinedanemergingglobalcivilsocietywhileKwameAnthonyApp
38. iah
andUlrichBeckhavedescribedwhattheyregardasacosmopolitanstra
nd
inthenewglobalorder.
By the firstdecadeof the twenty-first century, an
imposingbodyof
scholarlyliteratureandaflurryofnewjournals,bookseries,andschol
arly
conferencesandassociationsemergedunderthelabelofglobalstudie
s.
Thefieldhadarrived.Thisbookprovidesaroadmaptotheemergingfie
ld.
At the same time—to mix metaphors—it provides a sampling of
the
intellectualfeastthatthecurrentfieldprovides.
Globalstudiesusesthetermtransnationalalot.Whatthismeansisthat
global studies focus not just on the activities and patterns that
are
international—amongnation-states—butalsoon those
thatexistbeyond
thebordersofnationsandregionsandstretchacrossthevariousareaso
f
theworld.This isonewayof thinkingofglobalactivity—not that it
41. activitythatwehavebeentalkingabout—
economic,demographic,social,
cultural, technological, and so on. Scholars such as Roland
Robertson
beganusingthetermglobalization inthe1980s.AndabookbyMartin
AlbrowandElizabethKingusedthetermglobalization initstitleinthe
early 1990s. What they meant by the term was the process of
social
change that involved transnational interactions in all aspects of
social,
economic, and technological relationships. Thus, the word
globalization
describesaprocess.
Theresultofglobalizationisamoreunifiedandinteractiveplanet—a
globalized world. Some scholars have called this globalized
society
“globality”ortheeraof“theglobal.”Theattitudethatpeopleadoptint
his
moreintenselyinteractiveworldcanbesaidtobeoneof“globalism,”o
r
“globalconsciousness,”oroneembracingthe“global
imaginary.”These
areallwaysofthinkingaboutthenewstateofglobalawarenessinaworl
d
42. where transnational activity is the norm and everyone is
affected by
everyoneelseeverywhereontheplanet.
Thesebroadglobaltrendsseemvast,andtheyare.Buttheyalsoare
feltonaverylocallevel.Therearepocketsofglobalism,forexample,in
neighborhoods that are multicultural and contain different
immigrant
communitiesthatinteractwithoneanother.Somecitiesaredescribeda
s
“global cities,” both because of their importance as global
nodes of
economicandculturalnetworksandbecausetheirownpopulationsare
a
tapestryofpeoplesfromdifferentpartsoftheworld.InLosAngeles,fo
r
instance,youcan findareas thatareentirelyFilipino,andotherareas
whereonlyVietnameseisspoken.LosAngelescontainsoneofthelarg
est
Mexicanpopulations intheworldandalsooneof the
largestgroupsof
Iranians.Inmanyways,itisasocialmicrocosmoftheworld,andyetall
43. of
theseimmigrantneighborhoodsinteractinacommonurbanlocale.
RolandRobertsoncoinedthetermglocaltodescribetheseexamplesof
globalism ina localsetting. Inhisdescription,glocalization isa
logical
extensionofglobalization.Itisthewaythatlocalcommunitiesareaffe
cted
by global trends. The appearance of big-box stores selling
Chinese-
manufacturedproductsinsleepyruraltownsofArkansasisoneexamp
leof
glocalization.AnInternetcaféthatIfoundonaremotesegmentoftheIn
ca
trailnearMachuPicchuinPeruisanother.
Atthesametimethatglobaltrendsinfluencelocalsettings,thereverse
canalsohappen:globalpatternscanbereinterpretedonalocallevel.T
he
spread of the McDonald’s fast-food franchise around the world
is an
example.When I visit theMcDonald’s inDelhi, I find thatnoneof
the
hamburgersare,infact,beefburgers;theyarechickenorveggieburger
s,
44. reflectingthepredominantlyvegetarianeatingcustomsofpeopleinIn
dia.
In Kyoto’s McDonald’s, you can get a Teriyaki McBurger; and
in the
McDonald’s restaurant in Milan, the sophisticated Italians may
choose
pastaratherthanfries.Sowhenglobalizationisglocalized,globalpatt
erns
canadapttolocalsituations.
In the readings in this section, these concepts of globalization
and
globalismareexploredbyseveralinfluentialscholarsinthefieldofglo
bal
studies.ThefirstessayisbyManfredSteger,anativeAustrianwhohel
ped
to create the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at
RMIT
University
inMelbourne,Australia.Steger’sbookGlobalization:AVery
ShortIntroductionisoneofthemostwidelyreadbooksonthetopic.Ina
n
excerptfromthisbook,Stegerdescribesthephenomenonofglobalizat
ion
in thepost–ColdWarera—that is, since roughly1990.Heargues
45. that
globalizationhas increasedevenmoresince the turnof thecentury
in
2000andtakesashisexampletheterroristactonSeptember11,2001.
Stegershowsthatthisincident,andthetechnology,media,andideolog
ical
elements related to it, exhibit the global interconnectedness of
our
contemporaryworld.
TheNewYorkTimescolumnistThomasFriedmanalsoagreesthatthe
era of globalization is relatively recent. In his calculation,
however, it
beginsaround1989,at theendof theColdWar,when theBerlinwall
tumbledandtheideologicalconfrontationbetweensocialistandcapit
alist
societieswasreplacedbyamorefluidandvariedconceptofworldorde
r.
InFriedman’sview,thewrestlingmatchesbetweentwohugelumberin
g
superpowershasbeen replacedby the sprints toeconomic
successby
leaner independent economies. And though previous periods of
globalizationinhistoryhaveshrunktheworldfromasize“large”toasi
ze
46. “medium,”thecurrenterashrinkstheworldtoasize“small.”
PaulJames,asociologistwhohelpeddeveloptheglobalstudiesprogra
m
at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia, tries to put this
global
phenomenoninorder.Hedescribesthevariousaspectsofglobalizatio
n
and the different approaches to studying it. In James’s
comprehensive
surveyofthefield,heshowsthatthestudyofglobalizationcomesfrom
all
themajordisciplinesofthesocialsciencesandhumanities.
Globalizationisabasicfeatureofmodernlife.Butisitalwaysgood?In
anessayfromForeignPolicy,StevenWeber,aprofessorofpoliticalsci
ence
anddirectoroftheInstituteforInternationalStudiesattheUniversityo
f
California,Berkeley,arguesthatglobalizationoftenseemstohavego
ne
bad.ThisisespeciallytrueforthosewhoexpectedAmerica’smilitarya
48. quite grasp the connection between the violent forces of
religious
fundamentalism and the more secular picture of a
technologically
sophisticated,rapidlyglobalizingworldthatIhadsoughttoconveyin
class
lecturesanddiscussions.“Iunderstandthat‘globalization’isacontes
ted
conceptthatreferstosometimescontradictorysocialprocesses,”abri
ght
historymajoratthebackoftheroomquipped,“buthowcanyousaythat
the TV image of a religious fanatic who denounces modernity
and
secularism from a mountain cave in Afghanistan perfectly
captures the
complexdynamicsofglobalization?Don’ttheseterribleactsofterrori
sm
suggest the opposite, namely, the growth of parochial forces
that
undermineglobalization?”Obviously,thestudentwasreferringtoSa
udi-
born Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, whose videotaped
49. statement
condemning theactivitiesof“international
infidels”hadbeenbroadcast
worldwideon7October.
Struckby thesenseof intellectualurgencythat fuelledmystudent’s
question,
Irealizedthatthestoryofglobalizationwouldremainelusive
withoutreal-
lifeexamplescapableofbreathingshape,colour,andsound
intoavagueconceptthathadbecomethebuzzwordofourtime.Hence,
before delving into necessary matters of definition and
analytical
clarification,weoughttoapproachoursubjectinlessabstractfashion.
I
suggest we begin our journey with a careful examination of the
aforementioned videotape. It will soon become fairly obvious
why a
deconstructionofthoseimagesprovidesimportantcluestothenaturea
nd
dynamicsofthephenomenonwehavecometocall“globalization.”
DECONSTRUCTINGOSAMABINLADEN
The infamous videotape bears no date, but experts estimate that
50. the
recordingwasmade lessthantwoweeksbefore itwasbroadcast.The
timing of its release appears to have been carefully planned so
as to
achievethemaximumeffectonthedaytheUnitedStatescommencedit
s
bombingcampaignagainstTalibanandAlQaeda(“TheBase”)forces
in
Afghanistan.AlthoughOsamabinLadenandhistoplieutenantsweret
hen
hidinginaremoteregionofthecountry,theyobviouslypossessedtheh
i-
tech equipment needed to record the statement. Moreover, Al
Qaeda
membersclearlyenjoyed immediateaccess tosophisticated
information
andtelecommunicationnetworksthatkepttheminformed—inreal-
time—of
relevantinternationaldevelopments.BinLadenmayhavedenounced
the
forcesofmodernitywithgreatconviction,butthesmoothoperationof
his
entire organization was entirely dependent on advanced forms
of
technologydevelopedinthelasttwodecadesofthe20thcentury.
52. only three years, however, Al-Jazeera was offering its Middle
Eastern
audienceadizzyingarrayofprogrammes,transmittedaroundthecloc
kby
powerfulsatellitesputintoorbitbyEuropeanrocketsandAmericansp
ace
shuttles.
Indeed,thenetwork’smarketshareincreasedevenfurtherasaresult
ofthedramaticreductioninthepriceandsizeofsatellitedishes.Sudde
nly,
suchtechnologiesbecameaffordable,evenforlow-
incomeconsumers.By
theturnofthecentury,Al-
Jazeerabroadcastscouldbewatchedaroundthe
clockonallfivecontinents.In2001,thecompanyfurtherintensifiedit
s
global reach when its chief executives signed a lucrative
cooperation
agreement with CNN, the leading news network owned by the
giant
multinationalcorporationAOL-Time-
Warner.Afewmonthslater,whenthe
world’sattentionshiftedtothewarinAfghanistan,Al-
Jazeerahadalready
53. positioned itself as a truly global player, powerful enough to
rent
equipment to suchprominentnewsprovidersasReutersandABC,
sell
satellitetimetotheAssociatedPressandBBC,anddesignaninnovativ
e
Arabic-
languagebusinessnewschanneltogetherwithitsotherAmerican
networkpartner,CNBC.
Unhampered by national borders and geographical obstacles,
cooperation among these sprawling news networks had become
so
efficientthatCNNacquiredandbroadcastacopyoftheOsamabinLade
n
tapeonlyafewhoursafterithadbeendeliveredtotheAl-
Jazeeraofficein
Kabul.Caughtoffguardby the incredible speedof today’s
information
exchange,theBushadministrationaskedtheQatarigovernmentto“re
inin
Al-
Jazeera,”claimingthattheswiftairingofthebinLadentapewithout
priorconsultationwascontributingtotheriseofanti-
Americansentiments
54. intheArabworldandthusthreatenedtounderminetheUSwareffort.
However, not only was the perceived “damage” already done,
but
segmentsof thetape—includingthefull
textofbinLaden’sstatement—
couldbeviewedonlinebyanyonewithaccesstoacomputerandamode
m.
TheAl-
Jazeerawebsitequicklyattractedaninternationalaudienceasits
dailyhitcountskyrocketedtooversevenmillion.
Therecanbenodoubtthatitwastheexistenceofthischainofglobal
interdependencies and interconnections that made possible the
instant
broadcastofbinLaden’sspeechtoaglobalaudience.Atthesametime,
however, it must be emphasized that even those voices that
oppose
modernity cannot extricate themselves from the very process of
globalizationtheysodecry.Inordertospreadtheirmessageandrecruit
new sympathizers, antimodernizers must utilize the tools
provided by
globalization.ThisobvioustruthwasvisibleeveninbinLaden’sperso
nal
appearance.Thetapeshowsthathewaswearingcontemporarymilitar
y
57. expensiveaccessoryhavespeculatedabouttheoriginsofthetimepiec
ein
question.TheemergingconsensuspointstoaTimexproduct.Howeve
r,
giventhatTimexwatchesareasAmericanasapplepie,itseemsrather
ironic that the Al Qaeda leader should have chosen this
particular
chronometer.Afterall,TimexCorporation,originallytheWaterbury
Clock
Company,was founded in the1850s
inConnecticut’sNaugatuckValley,
known throughout the 19th century as the “Switzerland of
America.”
Today,thecompanyhasgonemultinational,maintainingcloserelatio
nsto
affiliated businesses and sales offices in 65 countries. The
corporation
employs 7,500 employees, located on four continents.
Thousands of
workers—mostlyfromlow-wagecountriesintheglobalSouth—
constitute
thedrivingforcebehindTimex’sglobalproductionprocess.
Ourbriefdeconstructionofsomeofthecentralimagesonthevideotape
makesiteasiertounderstandwhytheseeminglyanachronisticimages
58. of
anantimodernterroristinfrontofanAfghancavedo,infact,captureso
me
essential dynamics of globalization. Indeed, the tensions
between the
forces of particularism and those of universalism have reached
unprecedented levels only because interdependencies that
connect the
localtotheglobalhavebeengrowingfasterthanatanytimeinhistory.
TheriseofinternationalterroristorganizationslikeAlQaedarepresen
ts
butoneofthemanymanifestationsofglobalization.JustasbinLaden’
s
romantic ideology of a “pure Islam” is itself the result of the
modern
imagination,sohasourglobalagewithitsobsessionfortechnologyan
dits
mass-market commodities indelibly shaped the violent backlash
against
globalization.
OurdeconstructionofOsamabinLadenhasprovideduswithareal-life
59. exampleoftheintricate—andsometimescontradictory—
socialdynamicsof
globalization. We are now in a better position to tackle the
rather
demanding taskofassemblingaworkingdefinitionofglobalization
that
bringssomeanalyticalprecisiontoacontestedconceptthathasproven
to
benotoriouslyhardtopindown.
THEWORLDISTENYEARSOLD
ThomasFriedman
On the morning of December 8, 1997, the government of
Thailand
announcedthatitwasclosing56ofthecountry’s58topfinancehouses.
Almostovernight,theseprivatebankshadbeenbankruptedbythecras
hof
theThaicurrency,thebaht.Thefinancehouseshadborrowedheavilyi
n
U.S.dollarsandlentthosedollarsouttoThaibusinessesforthebuildin
gof
hotels,officeblocks,luxuryapartmentsandfactories.Thefinanceho
uses
60. allthoughttheyweresafebecausetheThaigovernmentwascommitted
to
keeping theThaibahtata fixedrateagainst thedollar.Butwhen the
government failed to do so, in the wake of massive global
speculation
against the baht—triggered by a dawning awareness that the
Thai
economy was not as strong as previously believed—the Thai
currency
plummetedby30percent.Thismeantthatbusinessesthathadborrowe
d
dollarshadtocomeupwith30percentmoreThaibahttopaybackeach
$1ofloans.Manybusinessescouldn’tpaythefinancehousesback,ma
ny
financehousescouldn’trepaytheirforeignlendersandthewholesyste
m
wentintogridlock,putting20,000white-
collaremployeesoutofwork.The
nextday, Ihappenedtobedrivingtoanappointment inBangkokdown
Asoke Street, Thailand’s equivalent of Wall Street, where most
of the
bankruptfinancehouseswerelocated.Asweslowlypassedeachoneof
63. Kremlin was
chronicallyshortofcash.
Without much of an economy to rely on for revenues, the
Russian
governmenthadbecomeheavilydependentontaxesfromcrudeoiland
othercommodityexportstofunditsoperatingbudget.Ithadalsobeco
me
dependentonforeignborrowers,whosemoneyRussia
luredbyoffering
ridiculousratesofinterestonvariousRussiangovernment-
issuedbonds.
AsRussia’seconomycontinuedtoslideinearly1998,theRussianshad
toraisetheinterestrateontheirrublebondsfrom20to50to70percent
tokeepattractingtheforeigners.Thehedgefundsandforeignbankske
pt
buying them, figuring thateven if
theRussiangovernmentcouldn’tpay
themback,theIMFwouldstepin,bailoutRussiaandtheforeignerswo
uld
get their money back. Some hedge funds and foreign banks not
only
64. continued to put their own money into Russia, but they went out
and
borrowedevenmoremoney,at5percent,andthenboughtRussianT-
bills
withitthatpaid20or30percent.AsGrandmawouldsay,“Suchadeal!”
ButasGrandmawouldalsosay,“Ifitsoundstoogoodtobetrue,itusuall
y
is!”
Anditwas.TheAsian-triggeredslumpinoilpricesmadeitharderand
harderfortheRussiangovernmenttopaytheinterestandprincipalonit
s
T-
bills.AndwiththeIMFunderpressuretomakeloanstorescueThailand
,
KoreaandIndonesia,itresistedanyproposalsforputtingmorecashint
o
Russia—unlesstheRussians first
fulfilledtheirpromisestoreformtheir
economy,startingwithgettingtheirbiggestbusinessesandbankstopa
y
some taxes. On August 17 the Russian economic house of cards
came
tumbling down, dealing the markets a double whammy: Russia
65. both
devalued and unilaterally defaulted on its government bonds,
without
givinganywarningtoitscreditorsorarranginganyworkoutagreemen
t.
Thehedgefunds,banksandinvestmentbanksthatwereinvestedinRus
sia
beganpilingupmassive losses,andthose thathadborrowedmoneyto
magnifytheirbetsintheKremlincasinowerethreatenedwithbankrup
tcy.
Onthefaceofit,thecollapseoftheRussianeconomyshouldnothave
hadmuchimpactontheglobalsystem.Russia’seconomywassmallert
han
thatoftheNetherlands.Butthesystemwasnowmoreglobalthanever,
and just as crude oil prices were the transmission mechanism
from
SoutheastAsiatoRussia,thehedgefunds—
thehugeunregulatedpoolsof
privatecapital thatscourtheglobefor thebest investments—
werethe
transmissionmechanismfromRussiatoalltheotheremergingmarker
sin
theworld,particularlyBrazil.Thehedgefundsandothertradingfirms
,
67. T-
bonds,drovedowntheinterestthattheU.S.governmenthadtoofferon
themtoattractinvestorsandincreasedthespreadbetweenU.S.T-
bonds
andothercorporateandemergingmarketbonds.
The steep drop in the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds was then the
transmissionmechanismwhichcrippledmorehedgefundsandinvest
ment
banks. Take for instance Long-Term Capital Management, based
in
Greenwich, Connecticut. LTCM was the Mother of All Hedge
Funds.
Becausesomanyhedgefundswereattractedtothemarketplaceinthe
late1980s,thefieldbecamefiercelycompetitive.Everyonepouncedo
n
the same opportunities. In order to make money in such a
fiercely
competitiveworld,thehedgefundshadtoseekevermoreexoticbetswi
th
everlargerpoolsofcash.Toguidetheminplacingtherightbets,LTCM
drewontheworkoftwoNobelPrize–
68. winningbusinesseconomists,whose
research argued that the basic volatility of stocks and bonds
could be
estimatedfromhowtheyreactedinthepast.Usingcomputermodels,a
nd
borrowing heavily from different banks, LTCM put $120 billion
at risk
bettingonthedirectionthatcertainkeybondswouldtakeinthesummer
of1998.ItimplicitlybetthatthevalueofU.S.T-
bondswouldgodown,and
that thevalueof junkbondsandemergingmarketbondswouldgoup.
LTCM’scomputermodel,however,neveranticipatedsomething
likethe
globalcontagionthatwouldbesetoffinAugustbyRussia’scollapse,a
nd,
as a result, its bets turned out to be exactly wrong. When the
whole
investmentworldpanickedatonceanddecidedtorushintoU.S.T-
bonds,
theirvaluesoaredinsteadoffell,andthevalueofjunkbondsandemergi
ng
marketbondscollapsedinsteadofsoared.LTCMwaslikeawishbonet
hat
gotpulledapartfrombothends.Ithadtobebailedoutbyitsbankersto
preventitfromengaginginafiresaleofallitsstocksandbondsthatcoul
71. aboutthestateoftheworldtoday.Theslow,stable,chopped-
upColdWar
systemthathaddominatedinternationalaffairssince1945hadbeenfir
mly
replaced by a new, very greased, interconnected system called
globalization.Wearealloneriver. Ifwedidn’t fullyunderstandthat
in
1989,whentheBerlinWallcamedown,wesureunderstooditadecade
later.
. . .Fromthemid-1800stothe late1920stheworldexperienceda
similareraofglobalization. If youcompared thevolumesof
tradeand
capitalflowsacrossborders,relativetoGNPs,andtheflowoflaboracr
oss
borders, relative to populations, the period of globalization
preceding
WorldWarIwasquitesimilartotheonewearelivingthroughtoday.Gr
eat
Britain,whichwasthenthedominantglobalpower,wasahugeinvesto
rin
emerging markets, and fat cats in England, Europe and America
were
oftenbuffetedbyfinancialcrises,triggeredbysomethingthathappen
edin
72. Argentine railroad bonds, Latvian government bonds or German
governmentbonds.Therewerenocurrencycontrols,sonosoonerwast
he
transatlanticcableconnectedin1866thanbankingandfinancialcrise
sin
NewYorkwerequicklybeingtransmittedtoLondonorParis.Iwasona
panel once with John Monks, the head of the British Trades
Union
Congress,theAFL-
CIOofBritain,whoremarkedthattheagendaforthe
TUC’sfirstCongressinManchester,England,in1868,listedamongth
e
itemsthatneededtobediscussed:“Theneedtodealwithcompetitionfr
om
theAsiancolonies”and“Theneedtomatchtheeducationalandtrainin
g
standardsoftheUnitedStatesandGermany.”Inthosedays,peopleals
o
migratedmorethanweremember,and,otherthaninwartime,countrie
s
didnotrequirepassportsfortravelbefore1914.Allthoseimmigrants
who
floodedAmerica’sshorescamewithoutvisas.Whenyouputallofthes
e
factors together, alongwith the inventionsof the steamship,
73. telegraph,
railroadandeventuallytelephone, it issafetosaythatthis firsteraof
globalizationbeforeWorldWarIshranktheworldfromasize“large”t
oa
size“medium.”
Thisfirsteraofglobalizationandglobalfinancecapitalismwasbroke
n
apart by the successive hammer blows of World War I, the
Russian
Revolution and the Great Depression, which combined to
fracture the
worldbothphysicallyand ideologically.The formallydividedworld
that
emergedafterWorldWarIIwasthenfrozeninplacebytheColdWar.Th
e
ColdWarwasalsoaninternationalsystem.Itlastedroughlyfrom1945
to
1989,when,withthefalloftheBerlinWall,itwasreplacedbyanother
system:theneweraofglobalizationwearenowin.Callit“Globalizatio
n
RoundII.”Itturnsoutthattheroughlyseventy-five-
75. hundredsofmillionsofdollarsandrelativelyfewcountrieswereinvol
ved.
According to the IMF, in 1997 alone, private capital flows from
the
developedworldtoallemergingmarketstotaled$215billion.Thisne
w
era of globalization, compared to the one before World War I, is
turbocharged.
Buttoday’seraofglobalizationisnotonlydifferentindegree;insome
veryimportantwaysit isalsodifferent
inkind.AsTheEconomistonce
noted, the previous era of globalization was built around falling
transportationcosts.Thankstotheinventionoftherailroad,thesteams
hip
and the automobile, people could get to a lot more places faster
and
cheaperandtheycouldtradewithalotmoreplacesfasterandcheaper.
Today’s era of globalization is built around falling
telecommunications
costs—
thankstomicrochips,satellites,fiberopticsandtheInternet.These
79. TheRiseandFalloftheGreatPowers:EconomicChangeandMilitary
Conflictfrom1500to2000,FrancisFukuyama’sTheEndofHistoryan
d
the Last Man, the various essays and books of Robert D. Kaplan
and
SamuelP.Huntington’sTheClashofCivilizationsand
theRemakingof
WorldOrder.
Whileallof theseworkscontained important truths, I thinknoneof
themreallycapturedthepost–
ColdWarworldinanyholisticway.Kaplan’s
reportingwasvividandhonest,buthetookthegrimmestcornersofthe
globeandovergeneralizedfromthemtothefateoftherestoftheworld.
Huntingtonsawculturalconflictsaroundtheworldandwildlyexpand
ed
that into an enduring, sharply defined clash of civilizations,
even
proclaimingthatthenextworldwar,ifthereisone,“willbeawarbetwe
en
civilizations.”IbelievebothKaplanandHuntingtonvastlyunderesti
mated
80. how the power of states, the lure of global markets, the
diffusion of
technology, the rise of networks and the spread of global norms
could
trumptheirblack-and-white(mostlyblack)projections.
BothKennedyandHuntingtontriedtodivinethefuturetoomuchfrom
thepastandthepastalone.Kennedytraced(quitebrilliantly)thedeclin
e
oftheSpanish,FrenchandBritishempires,butheconcludedbysugges
ting
that theAmericanempirewouldbethenext to fallbecauseof itsown
imperialoverreaching.HisimplicitmessagewasthattheendoftheCol
d
WarnotonlymeanttheendoftheSovietUnionbutwouldalsoheraldthe
declineoftheUnitedStates.IbelieveKennedydidnotappreciateenou
gh
thattherelativedeclineoftheUnitedStatesinthe1980s,whenhewas
writing,waspartofAmerica’spreparingitselfforandadjustingtothen
ew
globalizationsystem—
aprocessthatmuchoftherestoftheworldisgoing
throughonlynow.Kennedydidnotanticipatethatunderthepressureof
globalization America would slash its defense budget, shrink its
government,andshiftmoreandmorepowerstothefreemarketinways
82. captureinasinglecatchythought“TheOneBigThing,”thecentralmov
ing
part, theunderlyingmotor, thatwoulddrive internationalaffairs in
the
post–ColdWarworld—
eithertheclashofcivilizations,chaos,thedeclineof
empiresorthetriumphofliberalism.
...Ibelievethatifyouwanttounderstandthepost–ColdWarworld
youhavetostartbyunderstandingthatanewinternationalsystemhas
succeeded it—globalization.That is
“TheOneBigThing”peopleshould
focuson.Globalizationisnottheonlythinginfluencingeventsinthew
orld
today,buttotheextentthatthereisaNorthStarandaworldwideshapin
g
force,itisthissystem.Whatisnewisthesystem;whatisoldispower
politics,chaos,clashingcivilizationsandliberalism.Andwhatisthed
rama
ofthepost–
ColdWarworldistheinteractionbetweenthisnewsystemand
these old passions. It is a complex drama, with the final act still
not
written. That is why under the globalization system you will
find both
83. clashes of civilization and the homogenization of civilizations,
both
environmental disasters and amazing environmental rescues,
both the
triumphofliberal,free-
marketcapitalismandabacklashagainstit,both
thedurabilityofnation-
statesandtheriseofenormouslypowerfulnonstate
actors.
...Thepublisher...JonathanGalassicalledmeonedayandsaid,“I
was telling some friends of mine that you’re writing a book
about
globalizationandtheysaid,‘Oh,Friedman,helovesglobalization.’W
hat
wouldyousaytothat?”IansweredJonathanthatIfeelaboutglobalizati
on
alotlikeIfeelaboutthedawn.Generallyspeaking,Ithinkit’sagoodthi
ng
thatthesuncomesupeverymorning.Itdoesmoregoodthanharm.But
evenifIdidn’tmuchcareforthedawnthereisn’tmuchIcoulddoaboutit
.
Ididn’tstartglobalization,Ican’tstopit—
exceptatahugecosttohuman
development—
85. classic social theory had either been broken or segmented. The
social
sciencesandhumanitieswereinthemidstofaretreatfromgrandtheory
.
Therewasagrowingsuspicion,inpartinfluencedbyapoststructuralis
t
turn,ofanygeneralizingtheoreticalexplanationsofparticularpheno
mena.
This suspicion was paralleled by a claim made by some that the
postmodern condition could be characterized by the end of
grand
narratives of all kinds: nationalism, socialism, liberalism, and
by
implication,globalism.Althoughinthepast,approachestoanytheore
tical
field could be comfortably organized according to three
foundational
considerations—theoretical lineage, scholarly discipline, and
normative
orientation—
thiswaschanging.Bytheendofthe20thandintotheearly
21st century, those kinds of considerations remained useful by
way of
backgroundorientation,butthepatternofapproacheswasbecomingl
ess
86. obviousandwithmorecrossovers.
There is an irony in this retreat from generalizing theory that is
importanttonote.Itconcernsaparadoxthatisyettobeexplained.Atthe
sametimethatgeneralizingtheorylostitshold,ageneralizingcategor
yof
social relations gripped the imagination of both academic
analysts and
journalistic commentators—this, of course, was the category of
“the
global.” In this emerging imaginary, globalization was
understood as a
processof social interconnection, aprocess thatwas
indifferentways
connectingpeopleacrossplanetEarth.Globalizationasapracticeand
subjectivityconnectingthe(global)socialwholethusbecamethestan
dout
object of critical enquiry. In other words, globalization
demanded
generalizingattentionattheverymomentthatresidualideasthatanall
-
embracing theory might be found to explain such a phenomenon
was
effectively dashed. This has profound consequences for the
nature of
87. globalizationtheoryandhowwemightunderstanddifferentapproach
es...
.
EARLYAPPROACHESTOGLOBALIZATION
Although thereweresome isolatedarticlesacross the1960s
to1980s
directlyreferringtoglobalization—
withthemostprominentofthesebeing
by Theodore Levitt on the globalization of markets in 1983—
more
elaborateacademicapproachestoglobalizationlaggedbyadecadeors
o.
Theburgeoninganddominantjournalisticandbusinessdiscoursesoft
he
firstwaveofintenseattentionintothe1980stendedtobethinonanalysi
s
and thick on hyperbole. Most suggested that globalization was a
completelynewphenomenonsymbolizedbythetriumphofthecapital
ist
market.Levitt’swritingsignaledtheriseoftheglobalcorporationcarr
88. ied
byaworldwidecommunicationsrevolution.
It took a sociologist of religion and a couple of anthropologists
and
socialtheoristsinthe1990s—
scholarssuchasRolandRobertson,Jonathan
Friedman,ArjunAppadurai,andMikeFeatherstone—
towriteoreditthe
firstmajorexplorationsofglobalization-as-
such,contributionsthatmoved
beyondhyperboleorthindescription.JournalssuchasTheory,Cultur
eand
Societywereinthevanguardofthenewthinkingofthissecondwaveof
attention. Earlier work, such as that of Immanuel Wallerstein
and the
world-systems theorists, or Andre Gunder Frank and the
dependency
theorists,hadsignaledashiftawayfromclassicimperialismstudiesas
the
majorcarrierofworkonglobalizing relations.However, in relation
to
understanding globalization itself, this did not lead to
significant
developmentsintheory,exceptintherecognitionthatglobalizationw
89. asa
centuries-oldprocess.
The work of Wallerstein in the discipline of international
political
economycanherebeusedasanindicationofthedifficultyofcomingto
termswithissuesofglobalization.Insteadofexploringtheconsequen
cesof
processesofglobalization—
economic,ecological,cultural,andpolitical—
forunderstandingthecomplexitiesofcapitalism,Wallersteinrework
edthe
veritiesof aworld system’sunderstanding:namely, that
capitalismhad
gonethroughtwomajoroverlappingcyclesofdevelopment:
from1450,
andfrom1945tothepresent,suggestingthatcapitalismwasnowenteri
ng
atransitionphaseofterminalcrisis.Whatotherscalledglobalization,
he
said,wasjusttheepiphenomenonofthetransition.Herethesophistica
ted
criticofmainstreammodernizationtheorythusreducedglobalization
toa
reflection of the phases of capital. He limited its consequences
91. workstillstandsuptoscrutinytoday,andhecontinuestobeamajorfigu
re
inthefield.
Another key figure of this time, Arjun Appadurai, also followed
the
cultural turn,but insteadof takingacriticalmodernistpositionon
the
changing order of things as Robertson did, he headed down the
postmodernpathtoemphasizefluidity.Thekeycontributionforwhic
hheis
knownisthenotionofglobal“scapes,”unstructuredformationswithn
o
boundariesorregularities.Hedistinguisheddifferentformationsofw
hat
he called ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes,
financescapes, and
ideoscapes.Thisapproachwasavidlyusedforaperiodbeforeitlostits
standingasdifferentwritersrealizedthat,apartfromthecategoriesof
ethnoscapes and perhaps ideoscapes, his global landscape
focused too
narrowlyontheculturalpresentandtherecentpast.Broadercategorie
s
of analysis were needed to understand the unevenness of social
92. continuitiesanddiscontinuities.
APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFTHEDOMAINOFE
NQUIRY
Athirdwaveofattentionemergedacrosstheturnofthecenturyintothe
present. Journals such as Globalizations, Global Society, and
Global
Governanceemergedasthenumberofpublicationsexplodedinnumbe
r.
Oneofthemostimportantbroaderrenderingsofglobalizationcamefr
om
ajointlywrittenbookcalledGlobalTransformations(1999)byDavid
Held,
a political philosopher; Anthony McGrew, an international
relations
theorist;DavidGoldblatt,atheoristofenvironmentalpolitics;andJon
athan
Perraton,aneconomist.Interdisciplinarystudieshadbecomethekey.
As
signaledinthesubtitleofthebook,Politics,EconomicsandCulture,an
d
extendedinthechapterstructuretoincludeafocusonglobalizationan
d
environment,thisapproachworkedacrossthebroaddomainsofecono
93. my,
ecology,politics,andculture.SimilarlyJanAartScholteworkedacro
ssa
broad series of domains. In his case, the domains were
production,
governance, identity, and knowledge. And, when Chamsy el-
Ojeili and
PatrickHaydencametowritetheirbookCriticalTheoriesofGlobaliza
tion
(2006),lookingbackonmorethanadecadeofdevelopingapproachest
o
globalization they returned to the useful categorization of
economics,
politics,andculture.Inallofthesecases,however,therewasnoattemp
t
to develop a theory of globalization as such. Rather these and
other
relatedwriters—
writersasdiverseasJamesMittleman,GeorgeRitzer,Ulf
Hannerz, and Heikki Patomaki—sought to explore the
complexity of
globalizationacrossdifferentdomains.
In the domain of culture, for example, a penetrating critique of
the
94. dominantideologyofglobalizationbyManfredStegerjoinedwithoth
ersin
introducingthenotionof“globalism.”Initsmidrangeuse,globalismc
anbe
defined as the ideologies and/or subjectivities associated with
different
historicallydominantformationsofglobalextension.Stegerinhisear
lier
writingsfromtheearly1990sfocusedonglobalismasneoliberalism,b
ut
as his analysis developed, he came to distinguish different kinds
of
globalism,includingjusticeglobalisms,imperialglobalisms,andreli
gious
globalisms.Hehelpedustounderstandthatglobalismisthereforemuc
h
morethantheideologyassociatedwiththecontemporarydominantva
riant
ofglobalism—marketglobalismandideasofaborderlessworld.
APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFNORMATIVEORIE
NTATION
95. Other ways to differentiate approaches to globalization include
their
normativeorethicalorientationandtheirpoliticaldescriptivestance.
The
mostcitedcategorizationofdifferentkindsofapproachestoglobaliza
tion,
which comes from Global Transformations, a book mentioned
earlier,
combines both of these categorizations and posits what it calls
“three
broad schools of thought”: the hyperglobalists, the sceptics, and
the
transformationalists.Theyarenotactuallyschoolsatallbutorientatio
ns.
ThehyperglobalizersincludewriterssuchasKenichiOhmae(aneolib
eral)
and Martin Albrow (a critical theorist) who argue that a wave of
globalization ischanging theworld
fundamentallyandsupplantingolder
national sovereignties. The sceptics include Paul Hirst and
Grahame
Thompsonwhoarguethatwithcontemporaryso-
calledglobalizationwhat
we are witnessing is just another wave of internationalization.
The
96. transformationalists, including James Rosenau and Saskia
Sassen, who
suggestthatwhileintensifyingglobalizationischangingthenatureof
world
politics,culture,andeconomy,theprocessisuneven.
APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFSCHOLARLYDISC
IPLINE
With the realization in the 1990s that “the global” required
direct
attention, the taken-for-granted assumptions of fields of study
such as
internationalrelations,politics,andsociologycameunderdirectchal
lenge.
Ininternationalrelations,therealistemphasisonnation-
statesasblack-
boxentitiesinpoliticalinter-
relationcameunderconsiderablepressure,as
didtheemphasesofitscriticalcounterparts,includingevenMarxisma
nd
rationalism that had long recognized the long reach of both
material
processes and ideas across the world. International relations as
a
98. l
acrossthedomainsofsociallife.
APPROACHESUNDERSTOODINTERMSOFTHEORETICALLI
NEAGE
Adevelopingaversiontograndtheorydidnotmeanthattheoldtheoreti
cal
lineages became completely irrelevant, although it did mean
that
approaches associated with the classical social theories of Karl
Marx,
ÉmileDurkheim,andMaxWebertendedeithertodrawmorelooselyon
thosepastwritingsortoworkacrossthemsynthetically.Outofacritica
l
reading of the Durkheimian–Weberian tradition came the work
of such
writersasRolandRobertsonandAmericansociologistofglobalreligi
on,
MarkJuergensmeyer—
althoughitshouldbesaidthatRobertsonwasalso
influencedbyanopenversionofneo-
Marxisthistoricalmaterialism.Outof
theneo-
MarxistlineagecamethevariedworkofPaulHirst,MarkRupert,
99. Christopher Chase-Dunn, Tony McGrew, and via Karl Polanyi,
Ronnie
Munck.Third,severalwritersexplicitlysetouttoformulateapostclas
sical
synthesis. The most prominent of these writers was British
sociologist
AnthonyGiddens.Hehadbeenworkingacrossthe1980sand1990sona
grandtheoreticalapproachtothesocialcalledstructurationism;howe
ver,
by the time that he wrote in an elaborated way on globalization,
his
approachhadbecomelesstheoreticallyintegratedandmoredescripti
ve.
Hismajorpointbecamethatglobalizationiscomplex,shapesthewayt
hat
welive,andislinkedtotheexpansivedynamicoflatemodernity.
MarxistwriterJustinRosenbergimmediatelytookGiddenstotaskfor
theoreticalincoherence.Inparticular,hecriticizedatendencyinGidd
ens’s
writing(andinmanyotherwritersonglobalization)totreatglobalizati
on
and the extension of social relations across world space as both
the
explanationandtheoutcomeofaprocessofchange.Thatis,heaskedho
101. nature of globalization is now generally understood. In the
various
scholarlyapproaches,muchofthehyperbolehastendedtodropawaya
nd
thenormativeassessmentofglobalizationhasbecomemoresoberand
qualified. Scholarly approaches have tended to move away from
essentializing
thephenomenonasnecessarilygoodorbad.Similarly,at
leastinthescholarlyarena,therehasbeenasignificantmovebeyondth
e
reductive tendency to treat globalization only in terms of
economic
domain.
Ontheothersideoftheledger,ourcentralweaknessofunderstanding
goesbacktothecentralparadoxofglobalizationstudies—
theemergence
ofanaversiontogeneralizingtheoryatatimewhentheimportanceofa
generalizing category of relations came to the fore.
Globalization may
simply be the name given to a matrix of processes that extend
social
relations across world-space, but the way in which people live
those
relationsisincrediblycomplex,changing,anddifficulttoexplain.Th
102. us,we
remain in search of generalizing methodologies (not a singular
grand
theory)thatcansensitizeustothoseempiricalcomplexitieswhileena
bling
ustoabstractpatternsofchangeandcontinuity.
HOWGLOBALIZATIONWENTBAD
StevenWeber
Theworldtodayismoredangerousandlessorderlythanitwassuppose
d
tobe.Tenor15yearsago,thenaiveexpectationswerethatthe“endof
history”wasnear.Therealityhasbeentheopposite.Theworldhasmor
e
internationalterrorismandmorenuclearproliferationtodaythanitdi
din
1990. International institutions are weaker. The threats of
pandemic
disease and climate change are stronger. Cleavages of religious
and
104. thegears.ThecurrentU.S.
strategyistopushformoretrade,moreconnectivity,moremarkets,an
d
more openness. America does so for a good reason—it benefits
from
globalizationmorethananyothercountryintheworld.TheUnitedStat
es
acknowledges globalization’s dark side but attributes it merely
to
exploitative behavior by criminals, religious extremists, and
other
anachronistic elements that can be eliminated. The dark side of
globalization,Americasays,withverylittlesubtlety,canbemitigated
by
theexpansionofAmericanpower,sometimesunilaterallyandsometi
mes
throughmultilateralinstitutions,dependingonhowtheUnitedStatesl
ikes
it. In other words, America is aiming for a “flat,” globalized
world
coordinatedbyasinglesuperpower.
That’sniceworkifyoucangetit.ButtheUnitedStatesalmostcertainly
cannot.Notonlybecauseothercountrieswon’tletit,but,moreprofoun
dly,
105. because that line of thinking is faulty. The predominance of
American
powerhasmanybenefits,butthemanagementofglobalizationisnoton
e
ofthem.Themobilityof ideas,capital, technology,andpeople
ishardly
new.Buttherapidadvanceofglobalization’sevilsis.Mostofthatadva
nce
hastakenplacesince1990.Why?Becausewhatchangedprofoundlyin
the
1990swasthepolarityoftheinternationalsystem.Forthefirsttimein
modernhistory,globalizationwassuperimposedontoaworldwithasi
ngle
superpower.Whatwehavediscoveredinthepast15yearsisthatitisa
dangerousmixture.Thenegativeeffectsofglobalizationsince1990ar
e
nottheresultofglobalizationitself.TheyarethedarksideofAmerican
predominance.
THEDANGERSOFUNIPOLARITY
Astraightforwardpieceoflogicfrommarketeconomicshelpsexplain
why
106. unipolarity and globalization don’t mix. Monopolies, regardless
of who
holdsthem,arealmostalwaysbadforboththemarketandthemonopoli
st.
Weproposethreesimpleaxiomsof“globalizationunderunipolarity”t
hat
revealthesedangers.
Axiom1:
Aboveacertainthresholdofpower,therateatwhichnewglobal
problemsaregeneratedwillexceedtherateatwhicholdproblemsare
fixed. Power does two things in international politics: It
enhances the
capabilityofastatetodothings,butitalsoincreasesthenumberofthing
s
that a state must worry about. At a certain point, the latter starts
to
overtaketheformer.It’sthefamiliarlawofdiminishingreturns.Becau
se
powerful states have large spheres of influence and their
security and
economicintereststoucheveryregionoftheworld,theyarethreatened
by
theriskofthingsgoingwrong—
anywhere.Thatisparticularlytrueforthe
108. mightdoso.Buteveniftheydon’t,theresultisdistributedgovernance,
wheresomegreatpower is interested inmosteverypartof theworld
throughproductivecompetition.
Axiom2:
Inanincreasinglynetworkedworld,placesthatfallbetweenthe
networksareverydangerousplaces—
andtherewillbemoreungoverned
zones when there is only one network to join. The second axiom
acknowledgesthathighlyconnectednetworkscanbeefficient,robust
,and
resilienttoshocks.Butinahighlyconnectedworld,thepiecesthatfall
between the networks are increasingly shut off from the benefits
of
connectivity.Theseproblemsfesterintheformoffailedstates,mutate
like
pathogenic bacteria, and, in some cases, reconnect in
subterranean
networks suchasalQaeda.The trulydangerousplacesare thepoints
wherethesubterraneannetworkstouchthemainstreamofglobalpoliti
cs
andeconomics.WhatmadeAfghanistansodangerousundertheTaliba
109. n
wasnotthatitwasafailedstate.Itwasn’t.Itwasapartiallyfailedand
partially connected state that worked the interstices of
globalization
through the drug trade, counterfeiting, and terrorism. Can any
single
superpowermonitoralltheseamsandbackalleysofglobalization?Ha
rdly.
In fact, a lone hegemon is unlikely to look closely at these
problems,
becausemorepressingissuesarehappeningelsewhere,inplaceswher
e
tradeandtechnologyaregrowing.Bycontrast,aworldofseveralgreat
powersisamoreinterest-
richenvironmentinwhichnationsmustlookin
lessobviousplacestofindnewsourcesofadvantage.Insuchasystem,i
t’s
harderfortroublemakerstospringup,becausethecracksandseamsof
globalizationareheldtogetherbystrongerties.
Axiom 3: Without a real chance to find useful allies to counter a
superpower,opponentswilltrytoneutralizepower,bygoingundergro
und,
going nuclear, or going “bad.” Axiom 3 is a story about the
preferred
111. influence.Without
that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of
globalization
becomesthemosteffectivemeansofconstrainingAmericanpower.
SHARINGGLOBALIZATION’SBURDEN
The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by
the
combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United
States is
bearingmostof theburden.Considerthecaseofnuclearproliferation.
There’seffectivelyamarketoutthereforproliferation,withitsownsu
pply
(stateswillingtosharenucleartechnology)anddemand(statesthatba
dly
want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with
globalization
ratchetsupboththesupplyanddemand,tothedetrimentofU.S.nationa
l
security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war,
to
commenton the limits of conventionalmilitary force.Butmuchof
112. this
analysisisoverblown.TheUnitedStatesmaynotbeabletostabilizean
d
rebuild Iraq. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective
of a
government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In
Tehran,
Pyongyang,andmanyothercapitals,includingBeijing,thebottomlin
eis
simple:TheU.S.militarycould,withconventionalforce,endthosereg
imes
tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can
dream of
challengingU.S.conventionalmilitarypower.Buttheycancertainly
hope
todeterAmericafromusingit.Andthebestdeterrentyetinventedisthe
threatofnuclearretaliation.Before1989,statesthatfeltthreatenedby
theUnitedStatescouldturntotheSovietUnion’snuclearumbrellafor
protection.Now, they turn topeople
likeA.Q.Khan.Havingyourown
nuclearweaponusedtobealuxury.Today,itisfastbecominganecessit
y.
NorthKoreaistheclearestexample.Fewcountrieshaditworseduring
the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear-
armed
115. isalmostentirelyAmerica’sburden.Thesameis
true forglobalpublichealth.Globalization is turning theworld
intoan
enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease.
Humans
cannotoutsmartdisease,becauseitjustevolvestooquickly.Bacteriac
an
reproduceanewgeneration in less than30minutes,while it takesus
decadestocomeupwithanewgenerationofantibiotics.