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- 1. Get Homework/Assignment Done Homeworkping.com Homework Help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Research Paper help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Online Tutoring https://www.homeworkping.com/ click here for freelancing tutoring sites ContemporaryChinaisanisland.Althoughitisnotsurroundedbywater(whichborders onlyitseasternflank),Chinaisborderedbyterrainthatisdifficulttotraverse invirtually any direction.There are some areasthatcan be traversed,buttounderstandChinawe mustbeginbyvisualizingthe mountains,junglesandwastelandsthatenclose it.Thisouter shell bothcontainsandprotectsChina. Internally,Chinamustbe dividedintotwo parts: the Chinese heartlandandthe nonChinese bufferregionssurroundingit. There isa line inChinacalledthe 15-inch isohyet,eastof whichmore than15 inchesof rainfall each yearand westof
- 2. whichthe annual rainfall isless.The vast majorityof Chinese liveeastandsouthof thisline,inthe regionknownasHan China-- the Chinese heartland.The region ishome to the ethnicHan, whomthe worldregardsas the Chinese.Itis importantto understandthatmore thana billionpeopleliveinthisarea,whichis abouthalf the size ofthe UnitedStates. The Chinese heartlandisdividedintotwoparts,northernandsouthern,whichinturnis representedbytwomaindialects,Mandarininthe northandCantonese inthe south.These dialectsshare a writingsystembutare almostmutuallyincomprehensiblewhen spoken.The Chinese heartlandisdefinedbytwomajorrivers -- the Yellow Riverinthe northand the Yangtze in the South,alongwitha thirdlesserriverinthe south,the Pearl.The heartlandis China’sagricultural region.However -- andthisisthe single mostimportantfactabout China-- it has aboutone-thirdthe arable landperpersonasthe restof the world.This pressure hasdefinedmodernChinese history -- bothintermsof livingwithitandtryingto move beyondit. A ringof non-Hanregionssurroundthis heartland -- Tibet,Xinjiangprovince (home of the MuslimUighurs),Inner Mongoliaandwhat iscommonlyreferred to as Manchuria (a historical name given to the regionnorthof NorthKoreathat nowconsistsof the Chinese provincesof Heilongjiang,JilinandLiaoning).These are the bufferregionsthathistorically
- 3. have beenunderChineserule when Chinawas strongand have brokenaway whenChinawasweak.Today,there isa great deal of Han settlementinthese regions,acause of friction,buttoday Han Chinais strong. These are alsothe regionswhere the historical threattoChinaoriginated.HanChinaisa regionfull of riversandrain.It istherefore alandof farmersand merchants.The surroundingareasare the land ofnomadsandhorsemen.Inthe 13 th century,the Mongols underGhenghisKhaninvadedandoccupiedpartsof Han Chinauntil the 15 th century,when the Han reassertedtheirauthority. Followingthisperiod,Chinese strategyremainedconstant:the slow andsystematic assertionof control overthese outerregionsinordertoprotectthe Han from incursionsby nomadiccavalry.Thisimperative drove Chinese foreignpolicy.Inspite of the imbalance of population,orperhapsbecause of it,Chinasaw itself asextremelyvulnerable tomilitary forcesmovingfromthe northand west.Defendingamassedpopulationof farmersagainst these forceswasdifficult.The easiestsolution,the one the Chinese chose,wastoreverse the order andimpose themselveson theirpotential conquerors. There wasanotherreason.Aside from providingbuffers,thesepossessions provideddefensible borders.With borderlandsundertheircontrol,China was stronglyanchored.Let’sconsider
- 4. the nature of China’sborder sequentially,startinginthe eastalong the southernborderwithVietnamand Myanmar. The borderwithVietnamis the onlyborderreadilytraversableby large armiesor masscommerce.Infact, as recentlyas1979, ChinaandVietnam foughta short borderwar,and there have beenpointsinhistorywhenChina has dominatedVietnam.However,the restof the southernborderwhere Yunnanprovince meetsLaosandMyanmar ishillyjungle,difficulttotraverse,withalmost no majorroads. Significantmovementacrossthisborderisalmostimpossible.DuringWorld War II,the UnitedStatesstruggledtobuildthe BurmaRoad to reachYunnan and supply ChiangKai-shek’sforces.The effortwassodifficultitbecame legendary.Chinaissecure in thisregion. HkakaboRazi,almost19,000 feethigh,marksthe borderbetweenChina,Myanmarand India.Atthispoint,China’ssouthwesternfrontierbegins,anchoredinthe Himalayas.More precisely,itiswhere Tibet,controlledbyChina,bordersIndiaandthe twoHimalayan states,Nepal andBhutan.Thisborderruns inalongarc pastPakistan,Tajikistanand Kyrgyzstan,endingatPikPobedy,a25,000-footmountainmarkingthe borderwithChina, KyrgyzstanandKazakhstan.Itis possible topassthroughthisborderregionwithdifficulty; historically,partsof ithave beenaccessible asa merchantroute.Onthe whole,however, the Himalayasare a barrierto substantial trade andcertainlytomilitaryforces.Indiaand China-- and Chinaand muchof Central Asia-- are sealedoff fromeachother. The one exceptionisthe nextsectionof the border,withKazakhstan.Thisareaispassable but hasrelativelylittletransport.Asthe transportexpands,thiswill be the mainroute
- 5. betweenChinaandthe restof Eurasia.Itisthe one land bridge fromthe Chinese islandthat can be used.The problemisdistance.The borderwithKazakhstanisalmostathousand milesfromthe firsttierof Han Chinese provinces,andthe route passesthroughsparsely populatedMuslimterritory,aregionthathas posedsignificantchallengestoChina. Importantly,the SilkRoadfromChinaran throughXinjiangandKazakhstanonitsway west.Itwas the onlywayto go. There is,finally,the longnorthernborderfirstwithMongoliaandthenwithRussia,running to the Pacific.Thisborderiscertainlypassable.Indeed,the onlysuccessfulinvasionof Chinatookplace whenMongol horsemenattackedfromMongolia,occupyingagooddeal of Han China.China’sbuffers -- InnerMongoliaandManchuria -- have protectedHanChina fromotherattacks. The Chinese have notattackednorthwardfortworeasons.First,there has historicallynotbeenmuchthere worthtaking.Second,north-southaccess isdifficult. Russiahas tworail linesrunningfromthe westtothe Pacific -- the famousTrans-Siberian Railroad(TSR) andthe Baikal-AmurMainline (BAM),whichconnectsthose twocitiesand tiesintothe TSR. Aside fromthat,there isno east-westgroundtransportationlinking Russia.There isalsono north-southtransportation.Whatappearsaccessible reallyisnot. The area in Russiathatis mostaccessible fromChinaisthe regionborderingthe Pacific,the area fromRussia’sVladivostoktoBlagoveschensk.Thisregionhasreasonable transport, populationandadvantagesforbothsides.If there were everaconflictbetweenChinaand Russia,thisisthe area that wouldbe at the centerof it. It isalsothe area,as you move southwardandaway fromthe Pacific,thatborderson the KoreanPeninsula,the areaof China’slastmajormilitaryconflict. Thenthere isthe Pacificcoast,whichhasnumerousharborsand hashistoricallyhad substantial coastal trade.Itisinterestingtonote that,apart fromthe attemptby the Mongolsto invade Japan,anda single majormaritime thrustbyChinaintothe IndianOcean -- primarilyfortrade and abandonedfairlyquickly -- Chinahasneverbeenamaritime
- 6. power.Priorto the 19th century,ithad not faced enemiescapable of posinganaval threat and,as a result,ithadlittle interestinspendinglarge sumsof moneyonbuildinganavy. China,whenitcontrolsTibet,Xinjiang,InnerMongoliaandManchuria,isan insulatedstate. Han Chinahas onlyone pointof potential friction,inthe southeastwithVietnam.Otherthan that itis surroundedbynon-HanbufferregionsthatithaspoliticallyintegratedintoChina. There isa secondfrictionpointineasternManchuria,touchingonSiberiaandKorea.There is,finally,asingle openingintothe restof Eurasiaonthe Xinjiang-Kazakhborder. China’smostvulnerablepoint,sincethe arrival of Europeansinthe westernPacificinthe mid-19th century,hasbeenitscoast. Apartfrom Europeanencroachmentsinwhich commercial interestswere backedupbylimitedforce,Chinasuffereditsmostsignificant militaryencounter-- andlongand miserable war-- afterthe Japanese invadedand occupied large partsof easternChinaalongwithManchuriainthe 1930s. Despite the mismatchinmilitarypowerandmore thana dozenyearsof war,Japan still couldnotforce the Chinese governmenttocapitulate.The simplefactwasthat Han China,givenitssize and populationdensity,couldnotbe subdued.Nomatterhow manyvictoriesthe Japanese won,theycouldnot decisivelydefeatthe Chinese. Chinaishard to invade;givenitssize andpopulation,itisevenhardertooccupy.Thisalso makesithard for the Chinese toinvade others -- notutterlyimpossible,butquite difficult. Containingafifthof the world’spopulation,Chinacanwall itselfoff fromthe world,asitdid priorto the UnitedKingdom’sforcedentryinthe 19 th centuryand as itdid underMao Zedong.All of thismeansChinaisa great power,butone thathas to behave very differentlythanothergreatpowers. China’sGeopolitical Imperatives
- 7. Chinahas three overridinggeopolitical imperatives: 1. Maintaininternal unityinthe HanChinese regions. 2. Maintaincontrol of the bufferregions. 3. Protectthe coast fromforeignencroachment. MaintainingInternal Unity Chinaismore enclosedthananyothergreatpower.The size of itspopulation,coupledwith itssecure frontiersandrelative abundanceof resources,allowsittodevelopwithminimal intercourse withthe restof the world,if itchooses.Duringthe Maoistperiod,forexample, Chinabecame an insularnation,drivenprimarilybyinternal interestsandconsiderations, indifferentorhostiletothe restof the world.Itwassecure and,exceptforitsinvolvement inthe KoreanWar and itseffortstopacifyrestlessbufferregions,wasrelativelypeaceful. Internally,however,Chinaunderwentperiodic,self-generatedchaos. The weaknessof insularityforChinaispoverty.Giventhe ratioof arable landto population, a self-enclosedChinaisapoorChina.Its populationissopoorthat economicdevelopment drivenbydomesticdemand,nomatterhow limiteditmightbe,isimpossible.However,an isolatedChinaiseasiertomanage bya central government.The greatdangerinChinaisa rupture withinthe HanChinese nation.If thathappens,if the central governmentweakens, the peripheral regionswillspinoff,andChinawill thenbe vulnerabletoforeignerstaking advantage of Chinese weakness. For Chinato prosper,ithas to engage intrade,exportingsilk,silverandindustrial products. Historically,landtrade hasnotposeda problemforChina.The SilkRoadallowedforeign influencestocome intoChinaandthe resultingwealthcreatedadegree of instability.On the whole,however,itcouldbe managed. The dynamicof industrialismchangedboththe geographyof Chinesetrade andits consequences.Inthe mid-19th century,whenEurope -- ledbythe British -- compelledthe Chinese governmenttogive tradingconcessionstothe British,itopenedanew chapterin
- 8. Chinese history.Forthe firsttime,the Pacificcoastwasthe interface withthe world,not Central Asia.This,inturn,massivelydestabilizedChina. As trade betweenChinaandthe worldintensified,the Chinesewhowereengagedintrading increasedtheirwealthdramatically.Those inthe coastal provincesof China,the regionmost deeplyinvolvedintrading,became relativelywealthywhilethe Chinese inthe interior(not the bufferregions,whichwere alwayspoor,butthe non-coastal provincesof HanChina) remainedpoor,subsistence farmers. The central government was balancedbetween the divergentinterests of coastal Chinaand the interior.The coastal region,particularlyits newlyenriched leadership,hadan interestinmaintaining and intensifying relationswithEuropean powersandwiththe UnitedStatesand Japan.The more intense the trade,the wealthier the coastal leadership and the greaterthe disparitybetweenthe regions.Indue course, foreignersalliedwith
- 9. Chinese coastal merchantsandpoliticiansbecamemorepowerful inthe coastal regionsthan the central government.The worstgeopolitical nightmareof Chinacame true.China fragmented,breakingintoregions,some increasinglyunderthe control of foreigners, particularlyforeigncommercial interests.Beijinglostcontrol overthe country.Itshouldbe notedthat thiswasthe contextinwhichJapan invadedChina,whichmade Japan’sfailureto defeatChinaall the more extraordinary. Mao’s goal was threefold,Marxismaside.First,he wantedtorecentralizeChina -- reestablishing BeijingasChina’scapital andpolitical center.Second,he wantedtoendthe massive inequalitybetweenthe coastal regionandthe restof China.Third,he wantedto expel the foreignersfromChina.Inshort,he wantedtorecreate aunitedHan China. The central government was balancedbetween the divergentinterests of coastal Chinaand the interior.The coastal region,particularlyits newlyenriched leadership,hadan interestinmaintaining and intensifying relationswithEuropean powersandwiththe UnitedStatesand Japan.The more intense the trade,the wealthier the coastal leadership and the greaterthe disparitybetweenthe
- 10. regions.Indue course, foreignersalliedwith Chinese coastal merchantsandpoliticiansbecamemorepowerful inthe coastal regionsthan the central government.The worstgeopolitical nightmareof Chinacame true.China fragmented,breakingintoregions,some increasinglyunderthe control of foreigners, particularlyforeigncommercial interests.Beijinglostcontrol overthe country.Itshouldbe notedthat thiswasthe contextinwhichJapan invadedChina,whichmade Japan’sfailureto defeatChinaall the more extraordinary. Mao’s goal was threefold,Marxismaside.First,he wantedtorecentralizeChina -- reestablishing BeijingasChina’scapital andpolitical center.Second,he wantedtoendthe massive inequalitybetweenthe coastal regionandthe restof China.Third,he wantedto expel the foreignersfromChina.Inshort,he wantedtorecreate aunitedHan China. Mao firstattemptedtotriggeranuprisinginthe citiesin1927 but failedbecause the coalitionof Chinese interestsandforeignpowerswasimpossible tobreak.Insteadhe took the Long March to the interiorof China,where he raisedamassive peasantarmythatwas bothnationalistandegalitarianand,in1948, returnedto the coastal regionandexpelled the foreigners.Maore-enclosedChina,recentralizedit,andacceptedthe inevitable result. Chinabecame equal butextraordinarilypoor. China’sprimarygeopolitical issue isthis:Foritto developitmustengage ininternational trade.If itdoesthat, itmust use itscoastal citiesasaninterface withthe world.Whenthat happens,the coastal citiesandthe surroundingregionbecome increasinglywealthy.The 6/15/2008 © 2008 StrategicForecasting,Inc. 7 influenceof foreignersoverthisregionincreasesandthe interestsof foreignersandthe coastal Chinese converge andbegincompetingwiththe interestsof the central government. Chinaisconstantlychallengedbythe problemof how toavoidthisoutcome while engaging ininternational trade. ontrollingthe BufferRegions
- 11. Priorto Mao’s rise,withthe central governmentweakenedandHanChinaengaged simultaneouslyinwarwithJapan,civil warand regionalism, the centerwasnotholding. While ManchuriawasunderChinese control,OuterMongoliawasunderSovietcontrol and extendingitsinfluence(Sovietpowermore thanMarxistideology)intoInnerMongolia,and Tibetand Xinjiangwere driftingaway. At the same time that Mao was fightingthe civil war,he wasalsolayingthe groundworkfor takingcontrol of the bufferregions.Interestingly,hisfirstmoveswere designedtoblock Sovietinterestsinthese regions.Maomovedtoconsolidate Chinesecommunistcontrol over Manchuria and InnerMongolia,effectivelyleveragingthe Sovietsout.Xinjianghadbeen underthe control of a regional warlord,YangZengxin.Shortlyafterthe endof the civil war, Mao movedtoforce himout and take overXinjiang.Finally,in1950 Mao movedagainst Tibet,whichhe securedin1951. The rapid-fire consolidationof the bufferregionsgave Maowhatall Chinese emperors sought,a Chinasecure frominvasion.ControllingTibetmeantthatIndiacouldnotmove across the Himalayasandestablishasecure base of operationsonthe TibetanPlateau. There couldbe skirmishesinthe Himalayas,butnoone couldpusha multidivisionalforce across those mountainsandkeepitsupplied.SolongasTibetwasin Chinese hands,the Indianscouldlive onthe otherside of the moon.Xinjiang,InnerMongoliaandManchuria bufferedChinafromthe SovietUnion.Maowas more of a geopoliticianthananideologue. He didnot trustthe Soviets.Withthe bufferstatesinhand,theywouldnotinvade China. The distances,the poortransportationandthe lack of resourcesmeantthat any Soviet invasionwouldrunintomassive logistical problemswell before itreachedHanChpopulatedregions, and become boggeddown -- justasthe Japanese had. Chinahad geopolitical issueswithVietnam, PakistanandAfghanistan,neighboringstates withwhichitshareda border,but the real problemforChinawouldcome inManchuriaor, more precisely,Korea.The Soviets,more thanthe Chinese,hadencouragedaNorthKorean invasionof SouthKorea.Itisdifficulttospeculate onJosephStalin’sthinking,butitworked out superblyforhim.The UnitedStatesintervened,defeatedthe NorthKoreanArmyand
- 12. drove to the Yalu,the riverborderwithChina.The Chinese,seeingthe well-armedandwelltrained Americanforce surge toits borders,decidedthatithadto blockitsadvance and attackedsouth.What resultedwasthree yearsof brutal warfare inwhichthe Chinese lost abouta millionmen.Fromthe Sovietpointofview,fightingbetweenChinaandthe United Stateswas the bestthingimaginable.ButfromStratfor’spointof view,whatitdemonstratedwasthe sensitivityof the Chinese toanyencroachmentontheirborderlands, theirbuffers,whichrepresentthe foundationof theirnationalsecurity. Protectingthe Coast Withthe bufferregionsundercontrol,the coastisChina’smostvulnerablepoint,butits vulnerabilityisnottoinvasion.Giventhe Japanese example,noone hasthe interestor forcesto try to invade mainlandChina,supplyanarmythere andhope to win.Invasionis not a meaningful threat. The coastal threattoChinaiseconomic,thoughmostwouldnotcall ita threat.As we saw, the BritishintrusionintoChinaculminatedinthe destabilizationof the country,the virtual collapse of the central governmentandcivil war.Itwasall causedby prosperity.Maohad His successor,DengXiaoping,washeirtoapowerful state incontrol of Chinaand the buffer regions.He alsofeltundertremendouspressurepoliticallytoimprove livingstandards,and he undoubtedlyunderstoodthattechnological gapswouldeventuallythreatenChinese national security.He tooka historicgamble.He knew thatChina’seconomycouldnot developonitsown.China’sinternaldemandforgoodswastooweakbecause the Chinese were toopoor. Denggambledthathe couldopenChinatoforeigninvestmentandreorientthe Chinese economyawayfromagriculture andheavyindustryandtowardexport-orientedindustries. By doingsohe wouldincrease livingstandards,importtechnology andtrainChina’s workforce.He wasbettingthatthe effortthistime wouldnotdestabilizeChina,create massive tensionsbetweenthe prosperouscoastal provincesandthe interior,foster regionalismor put the coastal regionsunderforeigncontrol.Dengbelievedhe couldavoid all that by maintainingastrongcentral government,basedonaloyal army and Communist Party apparatus.Hissuccessorshave struggledtomaintainthatloyaltytothe state and not
- 13. to foreigninvestors,whocanmake individualswealthy.Thatisthe betthat is currently beingplayedout. China’sGeopoliticsanditsCurrentPosition From a political andmilitarystandpoint,Chinahasachieveditsstrategicgoals.The buffer regionsare intactand Chinafacesno threatinEurasia.Itseesa Westernattempttoforce Chinaout of Tibetas an attemptto undermine Chinese nationalsecurity.ForChina, however,Tibetisaminorirritant;Chinahasno possible intentionof leavingTibet,the Tibetans cannot rise upand win,andno one isaboutto invade the region.Similarly,the Uighur MuslimsrepresentanirritantinXinjiangandnota directthreat.The Russianshave no interestinorcapabilityof invadingChina,andthe KoreanPeninsula doesnotrepresenta directthreatto the Chinese,certainlynotone theycouldnothandle. The greatestmilitarythreattoChinacomesfromthe U.S. Navy.The Chinese have become highlydependentonseaborne trade andthe U.S.Navyisina positiontoblockade China’s ports if itwished.Shouldthe UnitedStatesdothat,itwouldcripple China.Therefore, China’sprimarymilitaryinterestistomake sucha blockade impossible. It wouldtake several generationsforChinatobuilda surface navyable tocompete withthe U.S. Navy.Simplytrainingnaval aviatorstoconductcarrier-basedoperationseffectively wouldtake decades -- atleastuntil these traineesbecameadmiralsandcaptains.Andthis doesnottake intoaccount the time itwouldtake to buildanaircraftcarrier and carriercapable aircraft andmasterthe intricaciesof carrieroperations. For China,the primarymissionistoraise the price of a blockade sohighthat the Americans wouldnotattemptit.The meansforthat wouldbe land- andsubmarine-based-anti-ship missiles.The strategicsolutionisforChinatoconstruct a missile force sufficientlydispersed that itcannot be suppressedbythe UnitedStatesandwithsufficientrangetoengage the UnitedStatesat substantial distance,asfaras the central Pacific. Thismissile force wouldhave tobe able toidentifyandtrackpotential targetstobe effective.Therefore,iftheChinese are topursue thisstrategy,theymustalsodevelopa space-basedmaritimereconnaissancesystem.These are the technologiesthatthe Chinese
- 14. are focusingon.Anti-shipmissilesandspace-basedsystems,includinganti-satellite systemsdesignedtoblindthe Americans,representChina’smilitarycountertoitsonly significantmilitarythreat. Chinacouldalsouse those missilestoblockade Taiwanbyinterdictingshipsgoingtoand fromthe island.Butthe Chinese donothave the naval abilitytolanda sufficient amphibiousforce andsustainitingroundcombat.Nor do theyhave the abilitytoestablish air superiorityoverthe TaiwanStrait.Chinamightbe able toharassTaiwanbut itwill not invade it.Missiles,satellitesandsubmarinesconstitute China’snaval strategy. For China,the primaryproblemposedbyTaiwanisnaval.Taiwanispositionedinsucha waythat it can readilyserve asan airand naval base that couldisolate maritime movement betweenthe SouthChinaSeaandthe East ChinaSea,effectivelyleavingthe northern Chinese coastandShanghai isolated.Whenyouconsiderthe RyukyuIslandsthatstretch fromTaiwanto Japan and addthemto thismix,anon-naval powercouldblockadethe northernChinese coastif itheldTaiwan. Taiwanwouldnotbe important to Chinaunlessitbecame activelyhostileoralliedwithor occupiedbya hostile powersuchasthe UnitedStates.If thathappened,itsgeographical positionwouldpose anextremelyseriousproblemforChina.Taiwanisalsoanimportant symbolicissue toChinaanda wayto rallynationalism.AlthoughTaiwanpresentsno immediate threat,itdoespose potentialdangersthatChinacannotignore. There isone area in whichChinaisbeingmodestlyexpansionist -- Central Asiaand particularlyKazakhstan.Traditionallyaroute fortradingsilk,Kazakhstanisnow an area that can produce energy,badlyneededbyChina’sindustry.The Chinese have beenactive in developingcommercial relationswithKazakhstanandindevelopingroadsintoKazakhstan. These roadsare openingatradingroute that allowsoil toflow inone directionandindustrial goodsin another. In doingthis,the Chinese are challengingRussia’ssphere of influence inthe formerSoviet Union.The Russianshave beenpreparedtotolerate increasedChineseeconomicactivityin
- 15. the regionwhile beingwaryof China’sturningintoapolitical power.Kazakhstanhasbeen EuropeanRussia’shistorical bufferstate againstChinese expansionandithas beenunder Russiandomination.Thisregionmustbe watchedcarefully.If Russiabeginstofeel that Chinaisbecomingtooassertive inthisregion,itcouldrespondmilitarilytoChinese economicpower. Chinese-Russianrelationshave historicallybeencomplex.BeforeWorldWarII, the Soviets attemptedtomanipulate Chinesepolitics.AfterWorldWarII,relationsbetweenthe Soviet Unionand Chinawere neverasgoodas some thought,and sometimesthese relations became directlyhostile,asin1968, whenRussianandChinese troopsfoughtabattle along the Ussuri River.The Russianshave historicallyfearedaChinese moveintotheirPacific maritime provinces.The Chinesehave fearedaRussianmove intoManchuriaand beyond. Neitherof these thingshappenedbecause the logistical challengesinvolvedwere enormous and neitherhadanappetite forthe riskof fightingthe other.We wouldthinkthatthis cautionwill prevail undercurrentcircumstances.However,growingChineseinfluence in Kazakhstanisnot a minormatterfor the Russians,who maychoose to contestChinathere. If theydo, and itbecomesa seriousmatter,the secondarypressurepointforbothsides wouldbe inthe Pacificregion,complicatedbyproximitytoKorea. But these are onlytheoretical possibilities.The threatof an Americanblockade onChina’s coast, of usingTaiwanto isolate northernChina,of conflictoverKazakhstan -- all are possibilitiesthatthe Chinesemusttake intoaccountas theyplanforthe worst.Infact, the UnitedStatesdoesnothave an interest inblockadingChinaandthe ChineseandRussians are notgoingto escalate competitionoverKazakhstan. Chinadoesnothave a military-basedgeopoliticalproblem.Itisinitstraditional strong position,physicallysecure asitholdsitsbufferregions. Ithasachieveditthree strategic imperatives.Whatismostvulnerable atthispointisitsfirstimperative:the unityof Han China.That isnot threatenedmilitarily.Rather,the threattoitis economic. EconomicDimensionsofChineseGeopolitics
- 16. The problemof China,rootedingeopolitics,iseconomicanditpresentsitself intwoways. The firstis simple.Chinahasanexport-orientedeconomy.Itisinapositionof dependency. No matterhowlarge itscurrency reservesorhow advanceditstechnologyorhow cheapits laborforce,Chinadependsonthe willingnessandabilityof othercountriestoimportits goods-- as well asthe abilitytophysicallyshipthem.Anydisruptionof thisflow hasa directeffectonthe Chinese economy. The primaryreasonother countriesbuyChinesegoodsisprice.Theyare cheaperbecause of wage differentials.ShouldChinalose thatadvantage toothernationsorfor other reasons,itsabilitytoexportwoulddecline.Today,forexample,asenergypricesrise,the cost of productionrisesandthe relative importance of the wage differential decreases.Ata certainpoint,asChina’stradingpartnerssee it,the value of Chinese importsrelativetothe political costof closingdowntheirfactorieswill shift. Andall of thisisoutside of China’scontrol.Chinacannotcontrol the worldprice of oil.Itcan cut intoits cash reservestosubsidize those pricesformanufacturersbutthatwould essentiallybe transferringmoneybacktoconsumingnations. Itcancontrol risingwagesby imposingprice controls,butthatwouldcause internal instability.The centerof gravityof Chinaisthat it has become the industrial workshopof the worldand,assuch,it istotally dependentonthe worldtokeepbuying itsgoodsratherthan someone else’sgoods. There are otherissuesforChina,rangingfroma dysfunctionalfinancial systemtofarmland beingtakenoutof productionforfactories.These are all significantandaddtothe story. But ingeopoliticswe lookforthe centerof gravity,andforChinathe centerof gravityis that the more effective itbecomesatexporting,the more of ahostage itbecomestoits customers.Some observershave warnedthatChinamighttake itsmoneyoutof American banks.Unlikely,butassume itdid.WhatwouldChinadowithoutthe UnitedStatesasa customer? Chinahas placeditself inapositionwhereithasto keepitscustomershappy.Itstruggles againstthisrealitydaily,butthe factisthat the restof the worldis far lessdependenton
- 17. China’sexportsthanChinaisdependentonthe restof the world. Whichbringsus to the second,evenmore seriouspartof China’seconomicproblem.The firstgeopolitical imperative of Chinaistoensure the unityof Han China.The thirdisto protectthe coast. Deng’sbetwas thathe couldopenthe coast withoutdisruptingthe unity of Han China.Asinthe 19 th century,the coastal regionhasbecome wealthy.The interior has remainedextraordinarilypoor.The coastal regionisdeeplyenmeshedinthe global economy.The interiorisnot.Beijingisonce againbalancingbetweenthe coastandthe interior. The interestsof the coastal regionandthe interestsof importersandinvestorsare closely tiedto eachother.Beijing’sinterestisinmaintaininginternalstability.Aspressuresgrow,it will seektoincrease itscontrol of the political andeconomiclife of the coast.The interestof the interioristo have moneytransferredtoitfromthe coast. The interestof the coast isto holdon to itsmoney.Beijingwilltrytosatisfyboth,withoutlettingChinabreakapartand withoutresortingtoMao’sdraconianmeasures.Butthe worse the international economic situationbecomesthe lessdemandthere will be forChinese productsandthe lessroom there will be forChinatomaneuver. The secondpart of the problemderivesfromthe first.Assumingthatthe global economy doesnotdecline now,itwill atsome point.Whenitdoes,andChinese exportsfall dramatically,Beijingwill have tobalance betweenaninteriorhungryformoneyanda coastal regionthat ishurtingbadly.Itisimportanttorememberthatsomethinglike900 millionChineseliveinthe interiorwhileonlyabout400 millionlive inthe coastal region. Whenit comesto balancingpower,the interioristhe physical threattothe regime whilethe coast destabilizesthe distributionof wealth.The interiorhasmassonits side.The coasthas the international tradingsystemonits.Emperorshave stumbledoverless. Conclusion
- 18. Geopoliticsisbasedongeographyandpolitics.Politicsisbuiltontwofoundations:military and economic.The twointeractandsupporteach otherbut are ultimatelydistinct.For China,securingitsbufferregionsgenerallyeliminatesmilitaryproblems.Whatproblemsare leftforChinaare long-termissuesconcerningnortheasternManchuriaandthe balance of powerinthe Pacific. China’sgeopolitical problemiseconomic.Itsfirstgeopolitical imperative,maintainthe unity of Han China,anditsthird,protectthe coast,are bothmore deeplyaffectedbyeconomic considerationsthanmilitaryones.Itsinternalandexternalpolitical problemsflow from economics.The dramaticeconomicdevelopmentof the lastgenerationhasbeenruthlessly geographic.Thisdevelopmenthasbenefitedthe coastandleftthe interior -- the vastmajorityof Chinese -- behind.IthasalsoleftChinavulnerable toglobal economicforces that itcannot control and cannot accommodate.Thisisnotnew in Chinese history,butits usual resolutionisinregionalismandthe weakeningof the central government.Deng’s gamble isbeingplayedoutbyhissuccessors.He dealtthe hand.Theyhave to playit. The questionon the table iswhetherthe economicbasisof Chinaisa foundationora balancingact. If the former,itcan lasta longtime.If the latter,everyone fallsdown eventually.There appearstobe little evidence thatitisa foundation.Itexcludesmostof the Chinese fromthe game,people whoare makinglessthan$100 a month.That isa balancingact and itthreatensthe firstgeopolitical imperative of China:protectingthe unity of the Han Chinese. Introduction Peace inIR ‘You cannotsimultaneouslypreventandprepare forwar’ 2 Introduction MainstreamIR theoryhasbeenincrisis,if notanomie,forsome time.Looking at the discipline throughthe lensof asearch forpeace (one or many) underlines thisstate.Partlybecause of this,IRhas foundit verydifficulttoattract the attentionof those workinginotherdisciplines,thoughincreasinglyIRscholarshave
- 19. themselvesdrawnonotherdisciplines. 3 Eventhose workinginthe subdisciplines of peace andconflictstudies,forexample,anareawhere there has beena longstandingattempttodevelopanunderstandingof peace,have often turnedawayfrom IR theory – or refusedtoengage withitat all – because ithas failedtodevelopanaccount of peace,focusinginsteadonthe dynamicsof power,war,and assumingthe realistinherencyof violence inhumannature and international relations.Utopiananddystopianviewsof peace,relatingto contemporaryandfuture threatscalculatedfromthe pointof view of statesand officials,oftendelineate the intellectual extremesof alineartypologyof warand peace inherentinmainstreaminternationalthought.The peace inferredinthis typologyisconcernedwithabalance of powerbetweenstatesrather thanthe everydaylife of peopleinpost-conflictenvironments.Eventhe ambitiouspeacebuildingeffortsof the post-ColdWarenvironmentinplacesasdiverse asCambodia,DRCongo,the Balkans,East Timorand Afghanistanamongmanyothers testifytothis shortcoming.Yet,asErasmus andEinsteinfamouslypointedout, peace isboth separate andpreferable towar. Thisraisesthe questionof whatthe disciplidiscipline isfor,if notforpeace?For many,IR theorysimplyhasnotbeenambitiousenoughindevelopingan ‘agendaforpeace’inadditiontoinvestigatingthe causesof war.Axiomatically, Martin Wightonce wrote thatIR was subjecttoa povertyof ‘international theory’.He alsoarguedthat itsfocus isthe problemof survival. 4 Such argumentsare commonplace eveninthe contextof more critical theoretical contributionstoIR theory. 5 These usuallysupportthe argumentthatliberal polities,
- 20. notablyinthe Westerndevelopedworld,are domesticoasesof democratic peace,andobscure the possibility thatsuchliberal politiesare alsolikelytobe engagedina constantstruggle forsurvival,ora war for ‘peace’.How mightwar and peace coexistandwhysucha singularlackof ambitionforpeace?Thinking aboutpeace opensup suchdifficultquestions. Yet,manyapproachestoIR theoryroutinelyignorethe question –or problem– of peace:how it isconstitutedandone peace or many?Yet, even‘successful’empireshave developedan interestinanideological andself-interestedversionpeace, 6 whetheritwasa Pax Romana,Britannia,Soviet,American,religious,nationalist,liberal orneoliberalpeace Manyhoped that science would,asHobbeswrote,openthe wayforpeace.7 Hobbeswrote,inthe aftermathof a bloodycivil war,Leviathan(oftenheldupto be the epitome of tragicrealisminIR) toillustrate thatpeace wasplausiblein spite of hatred,scarcity,and violence.Of course,he alsodevelopedthe notionof the Leviathanas a wayto moderate the ‘natural state’of war. IR hasinstead focusedonthe latter(war as a natural state) ratherthan the former(peace asa natural state),despite the factthatso muchof the groundwork has beendone in peace and conflictstudies,anthropology,sociology,inthe arts,inbranchesof several otherdisciplines,suchaseconomicsorpsychology,andviathe more critical approachesto the discipline.The supposedFreudiandeathinstincthas seemedtoresonate more powerfullythroughthe disciplinethannotionsof peace. 8 Yet,as Fry has argueda vast range of anthropological andethnographic evidence showsthatpeace,conflictavoidance andaccommodationare the strongerimpulsesof humanculture. 9 War issignificantpartof Westernculture
- 21. as well asothers,butnot of all cultures. 10 Indeed,itisnotable thatinWestern settingswarmemorialsare frequent,particularlyforthe FirstandSecondWorld War, but peace israrelyrepresentedincivicspace unlessasa memorial of sacrifice duringwar. Similarlyinart,aspirationsforpeace are oftenrepresented throughdepictionsof warandviolence,suchasinPicasso’sGuernica(1937) or Goya’sThe Thirdof May, 1808: The Executionof the Defendersof Madrid (1814). Lorenzetti’sThe Allegoryof GoodGovernment(1338–40) and Rubens’ MinervaProtectsPax fromMars(1629–30) are notable exceptions.Further afieldone couldpointtothe OttomanTopkapi Palace’sGate of PeaceinIstanbul,andthe Gate of HeavenlyPeaceleadingintothe ImperialCityinBeijing (thoughthese were,of course,associatedwithbothdiplomacy andimperial wars) Peace can be seeninmore critical termsas botha processand a goal.This opensupa particularfocusonthe processbywhichpeace as a self-conscious and reflexivegoal maybe achieved.If peace istakenasa strategicgoal it wouldtendtowardsa focuson mutual preservationandnevermove beyond preliminarystagesrelatingtosecurity,butthere are further,more inspiring, possibilitiesThisbookexaminesthe implicationsof the multiple understandingsof this underdeveloped,butheavilycontested,conceptfromwithinthe different accounts of IR theory.IR theoryisdeployedinthisstudythroughfairlycrude representations,usingratherunashamedlythe orthodox approachof separating IRtheoryinto‘great debates’,andintoseparate theoriesof realism,idealism, pluralism,liberalism,Marxism,critical theory,constructivismandpoststructuralistapproaches,as well asvariousconnectedorsub-disciplines,suchas IPE or peace and conflictstudies.Itisclearthat there ismuch that isproblematic withthisapproach,but itprovidesamechanismthroughwhichtoview the implicationsfora conceptof peace,andthe theorisation,ontology,epistemology
- 22. and methodologysuggestedbyeachapproach.Thisconnectionbetweentheories,the waysof being, the knowledge systemsandresearchmethodologiesthey suggestallowsforthe possibilityof evaluatingeachtheoryintermsof the notionsof peace theyimply. Thisiscertainlynottodismissthe importance of mainstreamIR,butto cautionagainstitsrepresentationasa‘complete’discipline,whichitclearlyis not.Indeed,there isaseriousquestionastowhetheraspectsof orthodox approaches(bywhichI meanpositivistdebatesderivedfromrealism, liberalism and Marxism) toIR are anti-peace,sometimespurposively,andsometimescarelessly.The three main orthodox theoriesare oftentakentoofferdeterminist grand narratives:realismoffersanelite andnegative peace basedoninherency; liberalismoffersaone-size-fitsall progressive frameworkof mainlyelite governance withlittle recognitionof difference;andMarxismoffersgrassrootsemancipationfromdeterministstructures of the internationalpolitical economyvia violentrevolution.Yet,asthisstudyshows,inthe contextof peace otherpossiblenarrativesemerge Thisstudyis informedbyanattemptto establishabroader,interdisciplinary readingof peace and to embedthiswithinIR.Itisworthnotingthatpeace has preoccupiedabroadrange of thinkers,activists, politiciansandotherfiguresin variousways,oftentodo withan interestin,orcritique of,violence,influence, powerandpolitics.These include,toname buta few,Thucydides,Hobbes, Machiavelli,Kant,Locke,Paine,Jefferson,JohnStuartMill,Gandhi,Freud, Einstein,Lorenz,Mead,MartinLutherKing,Thoreau,Foucault,Galtung, Boulding,Freire,TolstoyandCamus.Manyotherpublicfigures,religious figures,cultural figures,politiciansandofficials,aswell asmanyobscuredfrom Westernpost-Enlightenmentthoughtbytheirlinguisticorcultural difference, alsoturnedtheirhandsto describingpeace. 11 Yet,there remainsa surprisinglack of an explicitdebate onpeace inIRtheory. Thisstudydoesnotclaimto coveror explainIRtheory comprehensively –it isalreadyperhapsover-ambitious –or to move beyonditsWesterncorpus(asit
- 23. probablyshould) butitendeavourstobe particularlysensitivetothe claimsof IR theoryaboutthe pros and consof evenhavingadebate aboutpeace.Itis inevitable inastudysuchas thisthatmuch emphasisison‘greattexts’andkey conceptsand theoretical categories(thoughthisisasyndrome thatthe author wouldprefertorefute).Laterchaptersdotry to avoidthis,inthe contextof the critical groundestablishedtomake thismove inearlierchapters. Whatis importanthere isthe attemptnotto rejectIR as a discipline,assome critical thinkersdointhe extremesof theirfrustrationwithitslimitations,buttoredevelopittoreflectthe everydayworld,itsproblems,andopportunitiesforawider peace ineverydaylife.Thisendeavouris a crucial part of the attempttoescape mainstreamIR’srigidandnarrow,post-Enlightenmentrepresentationof specific reductionistdiscoursesasreality,ratherthenexploringcontextual andcontingentinterpretations. Theoryindicatesthe possibilityforhumanactionand ethical andpractical potential, 12 meaningthatthe studyof peace mustbe a vital componentof engagementwithanytheory.The focusonpeace and itsdifferent conceptualisationsproposedinthisstudyallowsforthe disciplinetoredevelopa claimto legitimacywhichhaslongsince beenlostbyitsorthodoxy’soften slavishassumptionsaboutwar,strategy,andconflictandtheirorigins.It seeks to go beyondthe objectivistandlineardisplayof knowledge aboutwhoand whatis importantinIR (international elites,states,policymakersandofficials (normallymale),the rich,the West) andreintroduce the discoursesof peace,and itsmethods,asa central researcharea,specificallyintermsof understandingthe everydayindividual,socialandeveninternational responsibilities,thatorthodox IR has generallyabrogated. More thanever,researchandpolicyinformedbyacontextual understanding of peace isneeded,ratherthanmerelyafocusonfearreproducedbyworstcase
- 24. securityscenariosstemmingfromabalance of poweror terror derivedfrommilitary,political or economicanalytical frameworksthatassume violenceand greedto be endemic.Indeed,inthe contemporarycontextitisalsoclearthatany discussionof peace asopposedtowar andconflictmustalsoconnectwith researchand policyondevelopment,justice andenvironmental sustainability. These are the reasonswhy,forexample, the liberal peace –the mainconceptof peace incirculationtoday – is incrisis Much of the debate aboutwar that dominatesIRisalso indicative of assumptionsaboutwhatpeace isorshouldbe.Thisrangesfromthe pragmaticremoval of overtviolence,anethical peace,ideology,toadebate abouta self-sustaining peace.Anatol Rapoportconceptualised‘peace throughstrength’;‘balance of power’;‘collective security’;‘peace throughlaw’;‘personal orreligiouspacifism’;and‘revolutionary pacifism’. 14 HedleyBull sawpeace asthe absence of war inan international society, 15 thoughof course war wasthe keyguarantee for individualstate survival.These viewsrepresentthe mainstreamapproachesand indicate whythe creationof an explicitdebate aboutpeace isbothlongoverdue and vital inan internationalenvironmentinwhichmajorforeignpolicy decisionsseemtobe takeninmono-ideationalenvironmentwhere ideasmatter, but onlycertain,hegemonicideas Withthe exceptionof orthodox versionsof realismandMarxism, approaches to IR theoryofferaform of peace that many wouldrecognise aspersonally acceptable.Realismfailstooffermuchforthose interestedinpeace,unless peace isseenas Darwinian andan unreflexive,privilegedconceptonlyavailable to the powerful anda commonwealththeymaywantto create.Most realist analysisexpendsitsenergyinreactivediscussionsbaseduponthe inherencyof violence inhumannature,nowdiscreditedinotherdisciplines,
- 25. 16 whichare ultimatelytheirownundoing.Thisisnottosay that otherapproachesdo notalso sufferflaws,butthe focusonindividuals,society,justice,development,welfare norms, transnationalism,institutionalismorfunctionalismoffersanopportunity for a negotiationof aformof peace that mightbe more sustainable becauseitis more broadlyinclusive of actorsandissues.Inotherwords,parsimony,reductionismandrationalism run counterto a peace that engagesfullywiththe diversityof life anditsexperiences. Methodological considerations Anydiscussionof peace issusceptible touniversalism,idealismandrejectionism, andtocollapse underthe weightof itsownontological subjectivity.This studyisindebtedtoa genealogical approachthatcan be usedto challenge the commonassumptionof IRtheoriststhatpeace as a concept isontologically stable,intermsof representinganobjective truth(plausibleornot),legitimating the exercise of power,andrepresentingauniversal ethic. 17 To rehearse this,a genealogical approachallowsforaninvestigationof the subjectwithoutdeference toameta- narrative of powerandknowledge inordertounsettle the depictionof alinearprojectionfrom ‘origin’to‘truth’.The camouflagingof the subjective nature of peace disguisesideology,hegemony, dividingpracticesand marginalisation.Inaddition,itisimportanttonote the frameworkof negative or positive epistemologyof peace,asdevelopedbyRasmussen,whichindicatesan underlyingontological assumptionwithinIRtheoryasto whetherabroador narrow versionof peace isactuallypossible. 18 Many of the insightsdevelopedin thisstudyof IR theoryanditsapproachesto peace arise throughthe author’s readingof,andabout, and researchin,conflictresolution,peacekeepingand peacebuildinginthe contextof the manyconflictsof the post-warworld,the UN system,andthe manysubsequent‘operations’thathave takenplace aroundthe
- 26. world. The investigationof discoursesindicatesthe problematicdynamicsof positivistapproaches 19 and allowsfora deeperinterrogationreachingbeyondthe state than a traditional positivisttheoretical/empirical approach. 20 Thisenables an examinationof competingconceptsanddiscoursesof peace derivedfromIR theoryratherthan acceptingtheirorthodoxies.Peace,andinparticularthe liberal andrealistfoundationsof the liberal peace,canbe seenasa resultof multiple hegemoniesin IR. 21 Deployingtheseapproachesallowsforanidentificationof the keyflawscausedbythe limitedpeace projectsassociatedwithpeace inIR, and fora theoretical andpragmaticmove toputsome considerationof peace at the centre of whathas nowbecome an ‘inter-discipline’. For much of the existence of IR,the conceptof peace has been incrisis,even thoughon the discipline’sfoundingafterthe FirstWorldWar itwas hopedit wouldhelpdiscoverapost-warpeace dividend.Inthisitfailedafterthe First WorldWar, but it has beeninstrumental in developingaliberal discourse of peace afterthe SecondWorldWar, thoughthis initself hasbecome muchcontested(asitcertainly was duringthe ColdWar).Evenpeace researchhas been criticisedforhavingthe potential tobecome ‘acouncil of imperialism’ whereby tellingthe storyof ‘powerpolitics’meansthatresearchersparticipate and reaffirmitstenetsthrough disciplinaryresearchmethodsandthe continuing aspirationfora ‘KantianUniversity’. 22 Thiseffectivelycreatesa‘differend’ underlininghowinstitutionsandframeworksmayproduce injusticesevenwhen operatingingoodfaith.
- 27. 23 Thisrequiresthe unpackingof the ‘muscularobjectivism’ 24 that has dominatedIRinthe Westernacademyandpolicyworld, allowinganescape fromwhatcan be describedasa liberal–realistmethodology and ontologyconnectedtopositivistviewsof IR.The demandthatall knowledgeisnarrowly replicable andshouldbe confirmedandimplementedby‘research’inliberal institutions, organisations,agenciesanduniversitieswithout needfora broaderexplorationisnotadequate if IRisto contribute topeace. 2 Thus,underlyingthisstudyisthe notionof methodological pluralism, whichhas become a generallyacceptedobjectiveforresearchersacrossmany disciplines whowant to avoidparochial constraintsonhow researchengageswithsignificantdilemmas,and whoaccept the growingcallsformore creative approachesto examiningthe ‘greatquestions’of IR. 26 To gain a multidimensional understandingof peace asone of these greatquestions,one needsto unsettle mimetic approachesto representationthatdonotrecognise subjectivity,ratherthan tryingto replicate aneternal truthor reality. 27 IR theoryshouldfullyengagewith the differend –inwhich liesitsoftenunproblematisedclaimtobe able tointerpretthe other – that itsorthodoxymaybe guiltyof producing,andopenitself up to communicationandlearningacrossboundariesof knowledgeinordertofacilitate a‘peace dividend’ratherthana ‘peace differend’ The critiquedevelopedhere isnot‘irresponsiblepluralism’ as some would have it, 28 but an attemptto contribute tothe ongoingrepositioningof adiscipline nowincreasinglyconcernedwithIR’sconnectionswitheverydaylifeand
- 28. agency.In thiscontext,eachchapterof thisbookinterrogatesthe theoretical debatesinIRas well astheirtheoretical,methodological andepistemological implicationsforpeace.The nature of internationalorderisheavilycontestedin theoretical, methodological,ontological andepistemological terms,meaningthat the consensusonthe contemporaryliberal peace representsananomalousagreementratherthana broad-rangingconsensus Ratherthansupportthisunquestioningly,IRrequiresaresearchagendafor peace if itsinterdisciplinarycontributiontoknowledge –and speakingtruthto power 29 – isto be developed.IRneedstoengage broadlywithinterdisciplinary perspectives 30 on peace if itis to contribute tothe constructionof a framework that allowsforthe breadthanddepthrequiredforpeace tobe acceptedbyall, fromthe local to the global,andtherefore tobe sustainable.Like social anthropology,IRneedsto have an agendafor peace,notjustto deal withwar,violence,conflict,terrorismandpolitical orderat the domesticandinternational level,butalsoincorporatingthe interdisciplinaryworkthathasbeencarriedout inthe areasof transnationalismandglobalisation,political economy,development,identity,culture and society, gender,children,andthe environment,for example.Yetwhere socialanthropology,forexample,haselucidatedthis agendaclearly,IRhas beenmore reticent,despitethe claimsaboutpeace made on the foundingof the discipline. 31 As withanthropology, IRshould‘uncover 6 Introduction counterhegemonicandsilencedvoices,andtoexplore the mechanismsof their silencing’. 32 Of course,thishappensinthe variousareas,andespeciallyinthe
- 29. sub-disciplinesof IR.Where there have beeneffortstodeveloppeace asa concept,thisisby far counterbalancedbythe effortsfocusedonwar,terrorism or conflict.Conceptsof peace shouldbe acornerstone of IRinterdisciplinary investigationof international politicsandeverydaylife Forthe purposesof this study,peace is viewedfromanumberof perspectives.Itcanbe a specificconcept(one amongmany):itinfersan ontological and epistemological positionof beingatpeace,andknowingpeace;itinfersa methodological approachtoaccessingknowledge aboutpeace andaboutconstructingit;andit impliesatheoretical approach,inwhichpeace isaprocess and outcome definedbyaspecifictheory. The conceptsof peace What ispeace?Thiswouldseemtobe an obviousquestiondeservinganobvious answer. Yet,the reluctance toopenthisdebate couldbe merelyanoversight,it couldbe because the answeristoo obvioustowaste time uponit,or itcouldbe because once openedup,the debate uponpeace offersall kindof possibilities, liberal,illiberal orradical,andpossiblysubversive.Thisisnottosay that there isa conspiracyof silence whenitcomestopeace,because twoWorldWarsand the ColdWar wouldseemtohave settledthisbasicquestionof modernityin favourof the ‘liberal peace’,made up of a victor’speace at itsmostbasic level aninstitutionalpeace to provide internationalgovernanceandguarantees,aconstitutional peace toensure democracyand free-trade,andacivil peace toensure freedomandrightswithinsociety. 33 This,inAnglo-Americanterms,placesthe individualbeforethe state,thoughinContinental varietiesitseesthe individual as subordinate tothe state (a little noted,butsignificantpoint). 34 Both variations restupon a social contract betweenrepresentativesandcitizens.Yet,events
- 30. since 1989 indicate thatpeace isnotas itseems.There maybe a liberal consensusonpeace,but there are many technical,political,social,economicandintellectual issuesremaining,andthe very universalityof the post-ColdWarliberal peace isstill contestedintermsof components,andthe methodsusedtobuildit (frommilitaryinterventiontothe role of NGOs,international organisations, agenciesandinternationalfinancial institutions). One approachtothinkingaboutpeace thatis commonlyusedistolookback at its historical,international,uses.Thesegenerallyincludethe following:an Alexandrianpeace,whichdependeduponastringof militaryconquestsloosely linkedtogether;aPax Romana,whichdependedupontightcontrol of aterritorial empire,andalso includeda‘Carthaginianpeace’inwhichthe cityof Carthage was razedto the groundand strewnwithsaltto make sure it wouldnot re-emerge;anAugustine peace dependentuponthe adoptionandprotectionof a territorial versionof Catholicism,andthe notionof justwar;the Westphalian peace,dependentuponthe securityof statesandthe normsof territorial sovereignty;the Pax Britannia,dependentuponBritishdominationof the seas,on trade andloose allianceswith colonisedpeoples;the ParisPeace Treatyof 1919, dependentuponanembryonicinternationalorganisation,collectivesecurity,the self-determinationof some,anddemocracy;the UnitedNationssystem, dependentuponcollective securityandinternational cooperation,asocial peace entailingsocial justice,andthe liberal peace, includingupondemocratisation,free markets,humanrightsand the rule of law,development,and,perhapsmostof all,the supportbothnormative andmaterial,of the UnitedStatesanditsallies Thoughpeace was supposedtobe one of IR’skeyagendaswhenthe discipline wasfoundedin1919, and certainlywas explicitlypartof the maininstitutional frameworksof the modernera,IRas a disciplinetendstodeal withpeace implicitly,throughitstheoretical readingsof international order,of war,and history.The empirical eventsthatmarkIR tendto be associatedwithviolence, rather thanpeace.Evensuch an attemptas thisstudy,ambitiousthoughitmight seeminits attemptto recast IR theory,isindicativeof furtherandperhaps crucial weaknessesinboththe discipline anditsauthor’scapacitytospeakon
- 31. behalf of anythingotherthanthe developed,Eurocentricandenlighteneddiscourse of IR.Toattempt to speak on behalf of those fromothercultures,religionsandso-calledunderdevelopedregions, wouldassume the viabilityof sovereignman’sdiscourseof the liberal peace,whichisexactlywhatisthrown intodoubtby a considerationof peace.Mostthinkersina Western,developed contextassume thattheyknowpeace andwouldnevertake onan ontological positionthatviolenceisagoal,thoughit may be an acknowledgedside-effect. Thisadds the sheenof legitimacy,nottosay legality,inbothajuridical and normative sense tothe discipline,despiteitsverylimitedengagementwith peace The followingdynamicsare characteristicof the wayinwhichpeace isoften thoughtof and deployedinIR: 1 peace isalwaysaspiredtoand providesanoptimum, thoughidealistic,point of reference; 2 itis viewedasanachievable globalobjective,basedonuniversal norms; 3 itis viewedasageographicallyboundedframeworkdefinedbyterritory, culture,identityandnationalinterests; 4 itis presentedasanobjective truth,associatedwithcomplete legitimacy; 5 itis relatedtoa certainideologyorpolitical oreconomicframework(liberalism, neo-liberalism, democracy,communismorsocialism,etc.); 6 itis viewedasatemporal phase; 7 itis baseduponstate or collective security; 8 itis baseduponlocal,regional orglobal formsof governance,perhaps definedbyahegemonicactoror a specificmultilateral institution; 9 itis viewedasatop-downinstitutionalframeworkora bottom-upcivil society-orientedframework; 10 there needstobe little discussionof the conceptual underpinningsof peace because itisone ideal liberal form; 11 most thinkingaboutpeace inIRispredicatedonpreventingconflict,andat bestcreatingan externallysupportedpeace,not oncreatinga self-sustaining
- 32. peace. These dynamicshave meantthatthe mostimportantagendainIR has not been subjecttoa sustainedexamination.Eveninthe realmsof peace andconflict studies,the focushasbeenonpreventingviolence ratherthanon a sustained attemptto developaself-sustainingorder.Where attemptshave beenmade to reflectona viable worldorderina numberof differentquarters,the liberal peace has oftenemergedasthe mainblueprintapproach.Whatismost importantabout thistreatmentisthat as an objective pointof reference,itispossible forthe diplomat,politician,official of international organisations,regional organisationsorinternational agencies,tojudge whatisrightand wrongin termsof aspirations,processes,institutionsandmethods,intheirparticularareasof concern.The liberal peace isthe foil bywhichthe worldisnow judged,inits multiple dimensions,andthere hasbeenlittle intermsof the theorisationof alternative conceptsof peace. Howdoesinternational theorydevelopconceptsof peace?This happensonly indirectlyinmostcases.Implicitinthoughtandpractice relatingtothe international are multiple perspectivesonthe nature,scope andplausibilityof certain kindsof peace.What ismore,inthisage of globalisationthe deferral of adebate on peace infavourof reductive andexpedientdebatesonwar,power,conflict and violence,isdangerouslyanachronisticif IRtheoryisto be seenaspart of a broaderprojectleadingtoviable andsustainable formsof peaceewe hhjhj