![2
on the ground of its nullity, and sought to have respondents restrained from continuing with the trial of petitioner due to such lack
of jurisdiction but the Chief of Constabulary ruled that he could not act on such complaint until the records of the trial were
forwarded to him for review. With such a ruling, and with the denial of two other motions by petitioner upon the court-martial
being convened anew on February 21, 1963, one to invalidate his arraignment on December 17, 1962, and the other to quash
the complaint based on the denial of due process and lack of jurisdiction, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was
filed with the lower court.2
As above noted, the lower court dismissed the petition due to its belief that, petitioner having been convicted in the
meanwhile, there being no restraining order, the matter had become moot and academic. As was set forth earlier, we differ, the
alleged lack of jurisdiction being too serious a matter to be thus summarily ignored.
The firm insistence on the part of petitioner that the general court-martial lacks jurisdiction on due process grounds, cannot
escape notice. The basic objection was the absence of a special order "designating respondents to compose a general court-
martial to convene and try the case of petitioner; ... ." It was expressly stipulated that the respondents were convened to try the
case of a certain Capt. Egmidio Jose and not that filed against petitioner. As a matter of fact, the opening paragraph of the
stipulation of facts made clear that he was arraigned on December 17, 1962 by respondents as a general court-martial appointed
precisely to try the above Capt. Jose solely "for the purpose of avoiding prescription pursuant to Article of War 38 of one of the
offenses with which the accused is charged ... ."
Is such a departure from what the law and regulations 3
prescribe offensive to the due process clause? If it were, then
petitioner should be sustained in his plea for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, as clearly the denial of the constitutional right
would oust respondents of jurisdiction, even on the assumption that they were vested with it originally. Our decisions to that
effect are impressive for their unanimity.
In Harden v. The Director of Prisons,4
Justice Tuason, speaking for the Court, explicitly announced that "deprivation of any
fundamental or constitutional rights" justify a proceeding for habeas corpus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Abriol v.
Homeres5
is even more categorical. In that case, the action of a lower court, denying the accused the opportunity to present
proof for his defense, his motion for dismissal failing, was held by this Court as a deprivation of his right to due process. As was
made clear by the opinion of Justice Ozaeta: "No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him
of that right. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary — as in the instant case — invokes the right,
and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without
hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas
corpusproceeding."6
A recent decision rendered barely a month ago, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals,7
is even more in point. Here,
again, habeas corpus was relied upon by petitioner whose constitutional rights were not respected, but, in addition, the special
civil actions of certiorari and mandamus were likewise availed of, in view of such consequent lack of jurisdiction. The stress
though in the opinion of Justice Sanchez was on habeas corpus. Thus: "The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas
corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is
illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was
violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant."
The due process concept rightfully referred to as "a vital and living force in our jurisprudence" calls for respect and
deference, otherwise the governmental action taken suffers from a fatal infirmity. As was so aptly expressed by the then Justice,
now Chief Justice, Concepcion: "... acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of
nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the
contrary notwithstanding." 8
The crucial question, then, is whether such failure to comply with the dictates of the applicable law insofar as convening a
valid court martial is concerned, amounts to a denial of due process. We hold that it does. There is such a denial not only under
the broad standard which delimits the scope and reach of the due process requirement, but also under one of the specific
elements of procedural due process.
It is to be admitted that there is no controlling and precise definition of due process which, at the most furnishes a standard
to which governmental action should conform in order to impress with the stamp of validity any deprivation of life, liberty or
property. A recent decision of this Court, in Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila 9
treated the matter thus: "It is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for
justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.'"]()
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- 1. 1 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-25133 September 28, 1968 S/SGT. JOSE SANTIAGO, petitioner-appellant, vs. LT. COL. CELSO ALIKPALA, ET AL., respondents-appellees. Floro A. Sarmiento and Noe Maines for petitioner-appellant. Cuadrato Palma and the Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees. FERNANDO, J.: The validity of a court-martial proceeding was challenged in the lower court on due process grounds to show lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner, a sergeant in the Philippine Army and the accused in a court-martial proceeding, through a writ of certiorari and prohibition, filed on April 17, 1963, with the lower court, sought to restrain respondents, the officers, constituting the court-martial, that was then in the process of trying petitioner for alleged violation of two provisions of the Articles of War, from continuing with the proceedings on the ground of its being without jurisdiction. There was likewise a plea for a restraining order, during the pendency of his petition, but it was unsuccessful. No response, either way, was deemed necessary by the then Presiding Judge of the lower court, now Justice Nicasio Yatco of the Court of Appeals, as petitioner had, in the meanwhile, been convicted by the court-martial. The lower court verdict, rendered on September 16, 1963, was one of dismissal, as in its opinion, "this case had already become moot and academic ... ." An appeal was taken to us, the same due process objections being raised. We think that the question before us is of such import and significance that an easy avoidance through the technicality of the "moot and academic" approach hardly recommends itself. For reasons to be more fully set forth, we find that such court-martial was not lawfully convened, and, consequently, devoid of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the lower court. There was a stipulation of facts submitted to the lower court on July 10, 1963, to the following effect: "That the arraignment of the petitioner on December 17, 1962 was for the purpose of avoiding prescription pursuant to Article of War 38 of one of the offenses with which the accused is charged since, as charged, same was allegedly committed on or about December 18, 1960; That prior to the said arraignment, no written summons or subpoena was issued addressed to the petitioner or his counsel, informing them of said arraignment; That instead of said written summons or subpoena Col. Eladio Samson, Constabulary Staff Judge Advocate called up First Sergeant Manuel Soriano at the Headquarters II Philippine Constabulary Zone, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna on December 16, 1962 by telephone with instructions to send the petitioner to HPC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, under escort, for arraignment and only for arraignment; That upon arrival in HPC, the petitioner was directed to proceed to the PC Officer's Clubhouse, where a General Court-Martial composed of the respondents, created to try the case of 'People vs. Capt. Egmidio Jose, for violation of Articles of War 96 and 97', pursuant to paragraph 10, Special Order No. 14, Headquarters Philippine Constabulary, dated 18 July 1962, ..., was to resume, as scheduled, the trial of 'People vs. Pfc. Numeriano Ohagan, for violation of Articles of War 64, 85, and 97'; That it was only at the time (December 17, 1962) that petitioner learned that he will be arraigned for alleged violation of Articles of War 85 and 97, after being informed by one of the respondents, Capt. Cuadrato Palma as Trial Judge Advocate why he was there; That prior to that arraignment on December 17, 1962 there was no special order published by the Headquarters Philippine Constabulary creating or directing the General Court- Martial composed of the respondents to arraign and try the case against the petitioner, there however was already an existing court trying another case; That the respondents relied on the first indorsement of the Acting Adjutant General, HPC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, dated December 14, 1962 and addressed to the Trial Judge Advocate of the General Court-martial ... directing the said Trial Judge Advocate to refer the case against petitioner to the above-mentioned court, ...; That the above paragraph 10, Special Order No. 14 dated 18 July 1962, does not contain the phrase 'and such other cases which may be referred to it,' but however said orders were amended only on 8 January 1963, to include such phrase, ... ." 1 It was further stipulated that petitioner's counsel did object to his arraignment asserting that a general court-martial then convened was without jurisdiction, as there was no special order designating respondents to compose a general court-martial for the purpose of trying petitioner, as petitioner was not furnished a copy of the charge sheet prior to his arraignment as required in the Manual for Court-Martial, except on the very day thereof, and as there was no written summons or subpoena served on either the petitioner, as accused, or the counsel. Respondents, acting as the general court-martial, overruled the above objections, and the Trial Judge Advocate was then ordered to proceed to read the charges and specifications against petitioner over the vigorous objections of counsel. It was shown, likewise, in the stipulation of facts, that the case, having been postponed to February 21, 1963, petitioner's counsel had in the meanwhile complained to the Chief of Constabulary against the proceedings
- 2. 2 on the ground of its nullity, and sought to have respondents restrained from continuing with the trial of petitioner due to such lack of jurisdiction but the Chief of Constabulary ruled that he could not act on such complaint until the records of the trial were forwarded to him for review. With such a ruling, and with the denial of two other motions by petitioner upon the court-martial being convened anew on February 21, 1963, one to invalidate his arraignment on December 17, 1962, and the other to quash the complaint based on the denial of due process and lack of jurisdiction, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed with the lower court.2 As above noted, the lower court dismissed the petition due to its belief that, petitioner having been convicted in the meanwhile, there being no restraining order, the matter had become moot and academic. As was set forth earlier, we differ, the alleged lack of jurisdiction being too serious a matter to be thus summarily ignored. The firm insistence on the part of petitioner that the general court-martial lacks jurisdiction on due process grounds, cannot escape notice. The basic objection was the absence of a special order "designating respondents to compose a general court- martial to convene and try the case of petitioner; ... ." It was expressly stipulated that the respondents were convened to try the case of a certain Capt. Egmidio Jose and not that filed against petitioner. As a matter of fact, the opening paragraph of the stipulation of facts made clear that he was arraigned on December 17, 1962 by respondents as a general court-martial appointed precisely to try the above Capt. Jose solely "for the purpose of avoiding prescription pursuant to Article of War 38 of one of the offenses with which the accused is charged ... ." Is such a departure from what the law and regulations 3 prescribe offensive to the due process clause? If it were, then petitioner should be sustained in his plea for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, as clearly the denial of the constitutional right would oust respondents of jurisdiction, even on the assumption that they were vested with it originally. Our decisions to that effect are impressive for their unanimity. In Harden v. The Director of Prisons,4 Justice Tuason, speaking for the Court, explicitly announced that "deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights" justify a proceeding for habeas corpus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Abriol v. Homeres5 is even more categorical. In that case, the action of a lower court, denying the accused the opportunity to present proof for his defense, his motion for dismissal failing, was held by this Court as a deprivation of his right to due process. As was made clear by the opinion of Justice Ozaeta: "No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary — as in the instant case — invokes the right, and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpusproceeding."6 A recent decision rendered barely a month ago, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals,7 is even more in point. Here, again, habeas corpus was relied upon by petitioner whose constitutional rights were not respected, but, in addition, the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus were likewise availed of, in view of such consequent lack of jurisdiction. The stress though in the opinion of Justice Sanchez was on habeas corpus. Thus: "The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant." The due process concept rightfully referred to as "a vital and living force in our jurisprudence" calls for respect and deference, otherwise the governmental action taken suffers from a fatal infirmity. As was so aptly expressed by the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion: "... acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding." 8 The crucial question, then, is whether such failure to comply with the dictates of the applicable law insofar as convening a valid court martial is concerned, amounts to a denial of due process. We hold that it does. There is such a denial not only under the broad standard which delimits the scope and reach of the due process requirement, but also under one of the specific elements of procedural due process. It is to be admitted that there is no controlling and precise definition of due process which, at the most furnishes a standard to which governmental action should conform in order to impress with the stamp of validity any deprivation of life, liberty or property. A recent decision of this Court, in Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila 9 treated the matter thus: "It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.'"
- 3. 3 Nor is such a reliance on the broad reach of due process the sole ground on which the lack of jurisdiction of the court- martial convened in this case could be predicated. Recently, stress was laid anew by us on the first requirement of procedural due process, namely, the existence of the court or tribunal clothed with judicial, or quasi-judicial, power to hear and determine the matter before it. 10 This is a requirement that goes back to Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, a decision rendered half a century ago. 11 There is the express admission in the statement of facts that respondents, as a court-martial, were not convened to try petitioner but someone else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence of a competent court or tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial of due process is therefore fatal to its assumed authority to try petitioner. The writ of certiorari and prohibition should have been granted and the lower court, to repeat, ought not to have dismissed his petition summarily. The significance of such insistence on a faithful compliance with the regular procedure of convening court-martials in accordance with law cannot be over-emphasized. As was pointed out by Justice Tuason in Ruffy v. The Chief of Staff, Philippine Army: 12 "Courts-martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities for the ordering of courts-martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander-in-Chief, independently of legislation. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary." Further on, his opinion continues: "Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives." 13 It is even more indispensable, therefore, that such quasi-judicial agencies, clothed with the solemn responsibility of depriving members of the Armed Forces of their liberties, even of their lives, as a matter of fact, should be held all the more strictly bound to manifest fidelity to the fundamental concept of fairness and the avoidance of arbitrariness for which due process stands as a living vital principle. If it were otherwise, then, abuses, even if not intended, might creep in, and the safeguards so carefully thrown about the freedom of an individual, ignored or disregarded. Against such an eventuality, the vigilance of the judiciary furnishes a shield. That is one of its grave responsibilities. Such a trust must be lived up to; such a task cannot be left undone. WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Court of September 6, 1963, dismissing the petition for certiorariand prohibition is reversed, and the writ of certiorari and prohibition granted, annulling the proceedings as well as the decision rendered by respondents as a court-martial and perpetually restraining them from taking any further action on the matter. Without pronouncement as to costs. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-19180 October 31, 1963 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioners-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellant. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: The National Development Company which is engaged in the shipping business under the name of "Philippine National Lines" is the owner of steamship "S.S. Doña Nati" whose local agent in Manila is A. V. Rocha. On August 4, 1960, the Collector of Customs sent a notice to C.F. Sharp & Company as alleged operator of the vessel informing it that said vessel was apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations in that it carried an unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in violation of Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Inserted in said notice is a note of the following tenor: "The above article was being carried away by Dr. Basilio de Leon y Mendez, official doctor of M/S "Doña Nati" who readily admitted ownership of the same." C.F. Sharp & Company was given 48 hours to show cause why no administrative fine should be imposed upon it for said violation. C.F. Sharp & Company, not being the agent or operator of the vessel, referred the notice to A. V. Rocha, the agent and operator thereof, who on August 8, 1960, answered the notice stating, among other things, that the television set referred to therein was
- 4. 4 not a cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not required by law to be manifested. Rocha stated further: "If this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set for investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in its defense." The Collector of Customs replied to Rocha on August 9, 1960 stating that the television set in question was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his explanation satisfactory enough to exempt the vessel from liability for violating Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. In said letter, the collector imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel and ordered payment thereof within 48 hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue a warrant of seizure and detention against it if the fine is not paid. And considering that the Collector of Customs has exceeded his jurisdiction or committed a grave abuse of discretion in imposing the fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel without the benefit of an investigation or hearing as requested by A. V. Rocha, the National Development Company, as owner of the vessel, as well as A. V. Rocha as agent and operator thereof, filed the instant special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila against the official abovementioned. The court, finding the petition for injunction sufficient in form and substance, issued ex parte the writ prayed for upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,00.00. Respondent set up the following special defenses: (1) the court a quo has no jurisdiction to act on matters arising from violations of the Customs Law, but the Court of Tax Appeals; (2) assuming that it has, petitioners have not exhausted all available administrative remedies, one of which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs; (3) the requirements of administrative due process have already been complied with in that the written notice given by respondent to petitioner Rocha clearly specified the nature of the violation complained of and that the defense set up by Rocha constitute merely a legal issue which does not require further investigation; and (4) the investigation conducted by the customs authorities showed that the television set in question was unloaded by the ship's doctor without going thru the custom house as required by law and was not declared either in the ship's manifest or in the crew declaration list. On the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, the court a quo rendered decision setting aside the ruling of respondent which imposes a fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel Doña Nati payable within 48 hours from receipt thereof. The court stated that said ruling appears to be unjust and arbitrary because the party affected has not been accorded the investigation it requested from the Collector of Customs. Respondent interposed the present appeal. When the customs authorities found that the vessel Doña Nati carried on board an unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in violation of Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code, respondent sent a written notice to C. F. Sharp & Company, believing it to be the operator or agent of the vessel, and when the latter referred the notice to A. V. Rocha, the real operator of the vessel, for such step as he may deem necessary to be taken the latter answered the letter stating that the television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be manifested, and he added to his answer the following: "If this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set for investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in its defense. "Respondent, however, replied to this letter saying that said television was a cargo within the meaning of the law and so he does not find his explanation satisfactory and then and there imposed on the vessel a fine of P5,00.00. Respondent even went further. He ordered that said fine be paid within 48 hours from receipt with a threat that the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be issued if the fine will not be paid. Considering this to be a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners commenced the present action for certiorari before the court a quo. We find this action proper for it really appears that petitioner Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Under said section, in order that an imported article or merchandise may be considered a cargo that should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so established for the reason that there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of the law, among which are the personal effects of the members of the crew. The fact that the set in question was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. This is precisely what petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not only was he denied this chance, but respondent collector immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00. This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process. True it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar as the determination of any act or irregularity that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff and Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely administrative, where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded, but even in the administrative proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right enshrined in our Constitution. The right to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right. Indeed, our Constitution provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law", which clause epitomize the principle of justice which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. That this principle applies with equal force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated upon by this Court in the Ang Tibay case as follows:
- 5. 5 ... The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable case coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. ... There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. No only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. (Ang Tibay, et al. v. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 40 O.G., No. 11, Supp. p. 29). There is, therefore, no point in the contention that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the present case because what is here involved is not whether the imposition of the fine by the Collector of Customs on the operator of the ship is correct or not but whether he acted properly in imposing said fine without first giving the operator an opportunity to be heard. Here we said that he acted improvidently and so the action taken against him is in accordance with Rule 67 of our Rules of Court. Another point raised is that petitioners have brought this action prematurely for they have not yet exhausted all the administrative remedies available to them, one of which is to appeal the ruling to the Commissioner of Customs. This may be true, but such step we do not consider a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law as would prevent petitioners from taking the present action, for it is undisputed that respondent collector has acted in utter disregard of the principle of due process. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs. HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS; DR. NILO ROSAS, in his capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR. BIENVENIDO ICASIANO, in his capacity as the SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON CITY SCHOOLS and DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O. BAUTISTA, AURORA C. VALENZUELA and TERESITA V. DIMAGMALIW, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO, ERLINDA B. DE LEON, CLARISSA T. DIMAANO, WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA R. VIVAR, VICTORIA S. UBALDO, JENNIE L. DOGWE, NORMA L. RONGCALES, EDITA C. SEPTIMO, TERESITA E. EVANGELISTA, CATALINA R. FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG, MARILYNNA C. KU, MARISSA M. SAMSON, HENEDINA B.CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO, RUTH F. LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD, FELISA S. VILLACRUEL, MA. VIOLETA ELIZABETH Y. HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, ADRIANO S. VALENCIA and ELEUTERIO S. VARGAS, respondents. D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J.: Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in the absence of an independent, competent and impartial tribunal. Statement of the Case This principium is explained by this Court as it resolves this petition for review on certiorari assailing the May 21, 1993 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 29107 which affirmed the trial court’s decision,[3] as follows: “WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED. The Hon. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED substituted as respondent-appellant in place of former Secretary Isidro Cariño and henceforth this fact should be reflected in the title of this case. SO ORDERED.”[4]
- 6. 6 The Antecedent Facts The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as follows: “On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in talk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period September 26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things. On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations, to wit: 1. grave misconduct; 2. gross neglect of duty; 3. gross violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office regulations; 4. refusal to perform official duty; 5. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; 6. absence without leave (AWOL) At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive suspension. The charges were subsequently amended by DECS-NCR Regional Director Nilo Rosas on November 7, 1990 to include the specific dates when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the strike. Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990. Petitioner-appellees’ counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties. As he received no response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later, however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines. On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an injunctive suit (Civil Case No. 60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further investigating them and from rendering any decision in the administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a restraining order. They then amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. They alleged that the investigating committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove their innocence instead of requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff to adduce evidence to prove the charges against the teachers. On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia of the Ramon Magsaysay High School filed a motion to intervene, alleging that he was in the same situation as petitioners since he had likewise been charged and preventively suspended by respondent-appellant Cariño for the same grounds as the other petitioner-appellees and made to shoulder the burden of proving his innocence under the committee’s guidelines. The trial court granted his motion on June 3, 1991 and allowed him to intervene. On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General answered the petitioner for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of respondent DECS Secretary. In the main he contended that, in accordance with the doctrine of primary resort, the trial court should not interfere in the administrative proceedings. The Solicitor General also asked the trial court to reconsider its order of June 3, 1991, allowing petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia to intervene in the case. Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a decision on August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal. On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. Petitioner- appellees moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied on September 11, 1991. The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which, on February 18, 1992, issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court’s order of dismissal and reinstating petitioner-appellees’ action, even as it ordered the latter’s reinstatement pending decision of their case. Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court set the case for hearing. June 8, 1992, it issued a pre-trial order which reads:
- 7. 7 “As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez, let this case be set for pre-trial conference on June 17, 1992 at 1:30 p.m., so as to expedite the proceedings hereof. In which case, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño, as the principal respondent, is hereby ordered to PERSONALLY APPEAR before this Court on said date and time, with a warning that should he fail to show up on said date, the Court will declare him as IN DEFAULT. Stated otherwise, for the said Pre-Trial Conference, the Court will not recognize any representative of his.” By agreement of the parties, the trial conference was reset on June 26, 1992. However, Secretary Cariño failed to appear in court on the date set. It was explained that he had to attend a conference in Maragondon, Cavite. Instead, he was represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili. But the court just the same declared them as in default. The Solicitor General moved for a reconsideration, reiterating that Cariño could not personally come on June 26, 1992 because of prior commitment in Cavite. It was pointed out that Cariño was represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili, both of the DECS-NCR and that both had special powers of attorney. But the Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. In its order of July 15, 1992, the court stated: “The “Motion For Reconsideration” dated July 3, 1992 filed by the respondents thru counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. It appears too obvious that respondents simply did not want to comply with the lawful orders of the Court. The respondents having lost their standing in Court, the “Manifestation and Motion,” dated July 3, 1992 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby DENIED due course. SO ORDERED.” On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial court that Cariño had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. But the court failed to act on his motion. The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex parte with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence. On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in which it stated: “The Court is in full accord with petitioners’ contention that Rep. Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the “Magna Carta for Public School Teachers” is the primary law that governs the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against public school teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law. Respondents erred in believing and contending that Rep. Act. No. 4670 has already been superseded by the applicable provisions of Pres. Decree No. 807 and Exec. Order No. 292. Under the Rules of Statutory Construction, a special law, Rep. Act. No. 4670 in the case at bar, is not regarded as having been replaced by a general law, Pres. Decree No. 807, unless the intent to repeal or alter the same is manifest. A perusal of Pres. Decree No. 807 reveals no such intention exists, hence, Rep. Act No. 4670 stands. In the event that there is conflict between a special and a general law, the former shall prevail since it evidences the legislator’s intent more clearly than that of the general statute and must be taken as an exception to the General Act. The provision of Rep. Act No. 4670 therefore prevails over Pres. Decree No. 807 in the composition and selection of the members of the investigating committee. Consequently, the committee tasked to investigate the charges filed against petitioners was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment being violative of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act. No. 4670 hence all acts done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever. Anent petitioners’ claim that their dismissal was effected without any formal investigation, the Court, after consideration of the circumstances surrounding the case, finds such claim meritorious. Although it cannot be gain said that respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner, the same is not sufficient reason to detract from the necessity of basic fair play. The manner of dismissal of the teachers is tainted with illegality. It is a dismissal without due process. While there was a semblance of investigation conducted by the respondents their intention to dismiss petitioners was already manifest when it adopted a procedure provided for by law, by shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners, knowing fully well that the teachers would boycott the proceedings thereby giving them cause to render judgment ex-parte. The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and violative of the teacher’s right to due process. Due process must be observed in dismissing the teachers because it affects not only their position but also their means of livelihood. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED and all the questioned orders/decisions of the respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are hereby SET ASIDE. The reinstatement of all the petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority and promotional rights is hereby ORDERED. The payment, if any, of all the petitioners’ back salaries, allowances, bonuses, and other benefits and emoluments which may have accrued to them during the entire period of their preventive suspension and/or dismissal from the service is hereby likewise ORDERED. SO ORDERED.”[5]
- 8. 8 From this adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals raising the following grounds: “I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring appellants as in default. II. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the proper substitution of parties. III. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as ‘Magna Carta for Public School Teachers’, should govern the conduct of the investigations conducted. IV. The trial court seriously erred in ruling that the dismissal of the teachers are without due process.”[6] As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted against them. Hence, this petition for review.[7] The Issues Before us, petitioners raise the following issues: “I Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in effect that private respondents were denied due process of law. II Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in applying strictly the provision of R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the investigating committee. III Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and in affirming the trial court’s decision.”[8] These issues, all closely related, boil down to a single question: whether private respondents were denied due process of law. The Court’s Ruling The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with the Court of Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of law. Denial of Due Process At the outset, we must stress that we are tasked only to determine whether or not due process of law was observed in the administrative proceedings against herein private respondents. We note the Solicitor General’s extensive disquisition that government employees do not have the right to strike.[9] On this point, the Court, in the case of Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, [10] has recently pronounced, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado: “It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.” More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court explained the schoolteachers’ right to peaceful assembly vis-a- vis their right to mass protest: “Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time -- recess, after classes, weekends or holidays -- to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities
- 9. 9 within the bounds of law, no one -- not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court -- could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable.[12] In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already observed, the resolution of this case revolves around the question of due process of law, not on the right of government workers to strike. The issue is not whether private respondents may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity, their right to due process has been violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted out any penalty, due process must first be observed. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[13] The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670 read: “Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. – Every teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards at each stage of any disciplinary procedure and shall have: a. the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges; b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case; c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a representative of his choice and/or by his organization, adequate time being given to the teacher for the preparation of his defense; and c. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities. No publicity shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken against a teacher during the pendency of his case. Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.” The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of Policy of the statute; that is, to promote the “terms of employment and career prospects” of schoolteachers. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.[14] Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA 4670, because “all the teachers who were members of the various committees are members of either the Quezon City Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City Elementary Teachers Federation”[15] and are deemed to be the representatives of a teachers’ organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their
- 10. 10 underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee. Contrary to petitioners’ asseverations,[16] RA 4670 is applicable to this case. It has not been expressly repealed by the general law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor has it been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that “repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co- exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.”[17] Thus, a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law, “unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law.”[18] The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents’ right to due process of law requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA 4670. Verba legis non est recedendum. Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a member of this Court, perceptively and correctly stated: “Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna Carta has been superseded by the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) and that pursuant to the latter law the head of a department, like the DECS secretary, or a regional director, like the respondent-appellant Nilo Rosas, can file administrative charges against a subordinate, investigate him and take disciplinary action against him if warranted by his findings. Respondent-appellants cite in support of their argument the following provisions of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807): Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. -- xxx xxx xxx b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities xxx shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction xxx . Sec. 38,. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. - a) Administrative Proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or the employee by the head of department or officer of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons. There is really no repugnance between the Civil Service Decree and the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Although the Civil Service Decree gives the head of department or the regional director jurisdiction to investigate and decide disciplinary matters, the fact is that such power is exercised through committees. In cases involving public school teachers, the Magna Carta provides that the committee be constituted as follows: Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. - Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, that where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education. Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS [s]ecretary nor the DECS-NCR regional director personally conducted the investigation but entrusted it to a committee composed of a division supervisor, secondary and elementary school teachers, and consultants. But there was no representative of a teachers organization. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the committee because the provision for the representation of a teachers organization is intended by law for the protection of the rights of teachers facing administrative charges. There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is in any way inconsistent with the Civil Service Decree insofar as procedures for investigation is concerned. To the contrary, the Civil Service Decree, [S]ec. 38(b) affirms the Magna Carta by providing that the respondent in an administrative case may ask for a “formal investigation,” which was what the teachers did in this case by questioning the absence of a representative of a teachers organization in the investigating committee. The administrative committee considered the teachers to have waived their right to a hearing after the latter’s counsel walked out of the preliminary hearing. The committee should not have made such a ruling because the walk out was staged in protest against the procedures of the committee and its refusal to give the teachers’ counsel a copy of the guidelines. The committee
- 11. 11 concluded its investigation and ordered the dismissal of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full access of the evidence against them and the opportunity to defend themselves. Its predisposition to find petitioner-appellees guilty of the charges was in fact noted by the Supreme Court when in its resolution in G.R. No. 101943 (Rosario Septimo v. Judge Martin Villarama, Jr.) it stated: The facts and issues in this case are similar to the facts and issues in Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. v. Hon. Carlos C. Ofilada, et al. G.R. No. 100206, August 22, 1961. As in the Cariño v. Ofilada case, the officials of the Department of Culture and Education are predisposed to summarily hold the petitioners guilty of the charges against them. In fact, in this case Secretary Cariño, without awaiting formal administrative procedures and on the basis of reports and “implied admissions” found the petitioners guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service in separate decisions dated May 16, 1991 and August 6, 1991. The teachers went to court. The Court dismissed the case.”[19] Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It is not our function “to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide.”[20] It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision setting aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private respondents and the payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their suspension or dismissal.[21] Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private respondents should, as a consequence, be reinstated[22] and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal.[23] This Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus AFFIRMED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 89687 September 26, 1990 MARIA B. LUPO, petitioner, vs ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD (AAB) (Department of Transportation & Communications Republic of the Philippines) and JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, respondents. Baga, Castronuevo, Balitaan & Associates for petitioner. PARAS, J.: In this petition for prohibition, petitioner seeks the issuance of an order or writ of prohibition which would direct public respondents Administrative Action Board and Chairman Onofre A. Villaluz to permanently desist from assuming jurisdiction over Adm. Case No. AAB-034-88 until the same is finally disposed of by the Telecoms Office, Region V at Legaspi City and to refrain from issuing orders setting the aforecited case for hearing. Petitioner substantially assails the Resolution dated September 30, 1988 of then Secretary Rainerio O. Reyes of the Department of Transportation and Communications which suspended her for one year and disqualified her for promotion for a period of one year and also, the Order of July 5, 1989 of Chairman Onofre A. Villaluz of the Administrative Action Board of said department which set Adm. Case No. AAB-034-88 for trial. The prefatory facts are: On November 5, 1987, Fructuoso B. Arroyo, OIC/CDO, Message Center and then CDO of Telecom Office stationed at Buhi, Camarines Sur, filed a complaint for Dishonesty Thru Falsification (Multiple) of Official Documents against Maria B. Lupo, herein petitioner, as Chief of Personnel Section, Telecom Office, Region V at Legaspi City. The complaint was based on the alleged exclusion of several names from the Certification (on the list of employees) submitted by petitioner in compliance with a Confidential Memorandum of Director Claro Morante.
- 12. 12 The aforesaid complaint was actually triggered off by the inquiry of Ignacio B. Arroyo, brother of complainant Fructuoso B. Arroyo, into the alleged illegal termination of the former's niece, Nenita Arroyo Noceda, as a daily wage clerk at Buhi Telecom Exchange in Camarines Sur, in violation of a contract previously entered into between a certain Gloria D. Palermo, lot donor and former Bureau Director Ceferino S. Carreon, donee of the lot. The lot is located at Sta. Clara, Buhi on which the Telecom Office was to be constructed. This inquiry of Ignacio B. Arroyo was dismissed for lack of merit on September 16, 1987. It appears that the basis for the complaint of Fructuoso Arroyo from whom Ignacio sought assistance was petitioner's exclusion of certain names of newly hired employees in Region V who appeared related to certain ranking officials of the region, for the purpose of keeping under wraps the appointment of said employees from Ignacio Arroyo who had previously complained of the alleged illegal termination of his niece Nenita A. Noceda. Petitioner had to falsify the list which she submitted in compliance with Regional Director Morante's Confidential Memorandum to the alleged prejudice of Noceda and for the purpose of protecting her future interest in the sense that those excluded (who should have been included) were close relatives of ranking officials of the Telecommunications Office of Region V. Telecom Investigator Florencio Calapano, acting on the unverified complaint of Fructuoso Arroyo, conducted an informal fact-finding inquiry and came out with a Memorandum recommending that petitioner be sternly warned that a repetition of a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more drastically and that the case should be considered closed. Based solely on the aforesaid Memorandum, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications handed down a Resolution on September 30, 1988 finding petitioner "guilty as charged" and suspending her for one year and disqualify her for promotion for a period of one year. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied. She thus appealed the resolution and order of denial of the motion for reconsideration to the Civil Service Commission for review, anchoring her appeal on lack of due process in the proceedings. On March 2, 1989 the Civil Service Commission, thru its Merit Systems Board, issued the Order setting aside the resolution of the Department of Transportation and Communications and remanding the case to the Telecom Office of Region V for further investigation to conform with the procedural requirements of due process. Instead of complying with the above order, respondent Chairman Villaluz of the AAB issued the Order of July 5, 1989 setting the case for trial on August 3, 1989. On August 2, 1989, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion informing respondent Villaluz that no formal charge had been instituted by the Telecommunications Office against her and respondents, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the case. Respondents denied said manifestation and motion for lack of merit in the Order of August 7, 1989 and again set the case for hearing on August 23, 1989. Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that respondent AAB never acquired jurisdiction over Adm. Case No. AAB-034-88 because of the absence of a formal charge against her and that the proceedings conducted by Regional Investigator Florencio Calapano was a mere fact- finding inquiry. Respondent Chairman of the AAB however, contends that the Order of the Merit Systems Board of the Civil Service Commission was rendered without lawful authority since petitioner's appeal to said Board was filed when the assailed resolution had already become final and executory; that the Board, not having acquired jurisdiction to entertain the appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period could not have legally rendered its decision in the said administrative case. Likewise, respondents claim that Regional Office No. V could no longer take cognizance of the case as per order of the Merit Systems Board for the reason that the decision had already become final and executory. Complaints against employees, like petitioner herein, who belong to the Civil Service Career System are still governed by P.D. No. 807. This mandate of P.D. No. 807 has been recognized and implemented by respondent Administrative Action Board when it declared in Office Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988 that the Board shall observe the pertinent civil service rules and policies designed to expedite action on cases referred to it. (Emphasis supplied) The pertinent provisions of the aforecited Civil Service Law read as follows: SECTION 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount, exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear any department or agency or and decide the case or it may deputize official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. (b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more
- 13. 13 than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the department head. (c) An investigation may be entrusted to regional director or similar officials who shall make the necessary report and recommendation to the chief of bureau or office or department within the period specified in Paragraph (d) of the following Section. (d) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal. SEC. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. — a) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the head of department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons. (b) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exist, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath, together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. (c) Although a respondent does not request a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless be conducted when from the allegations of the complaint and the answer of the respondent, including the supporting documents, the merits of the case cannot be decided judiciously without conducting such an investigation. . . . Petitioner's contentions appear meritorious. It should be noted that under Section 37 (b) as aforequoted, the decisions of heads of departments become final only in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary. In the case, therefore, of petitioner who had been made to suffer the penalty of suspension for one (1) year, such penalty should not have been implemented without the appeal to the Civil Service Commission for proper review. Notably, paragraph (a) of the above Section explicitly provides that the Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than 30 days, or fine in an amount exceeding 30 days' salary. Clearly, the enforcement of the penalty imposed upon petitioner under the resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications was premature. From the very start, the basis upon which this case was investigated had been defective and irregular. For, the letter-complaint of Fructuoso Arroyo was not verified and yet, the same was haphazardly made the basis of the informal inquiry. It should be stressed that par. (a) of Sec. 38 mandates that administrative proceedings may be commenced against an employee by the head of the department or office of equivalent rank or upon sworn written complaint of any other person. It should also be noted that under paragraph (b) of said Section, a respondent is given the option to elect a formal investigation of the charge against him if his answer is not found satisfactory. In the case of petitioner, it appears that when her answer to the unverified complaint was found unsatisfactory, she was never given a chance to decide whether or not to submit herself to a formal investigation. The Memorandum of Telecom Investigator Calapano to the Regional Director is merely recommendatory since it was only the outcome of a fact finding investigation based on the unverified complaint. Note that the informal investigation was only an inquiry into the alleged dishonest acts of petitioner in which case, the Memorandum could not be made as the basis for any final resolution of the case. The legal and proper procedure should have been for the Regional Director of Region V, the alter ego of the department secretary to initiate the formal complaint on the basis of the results of the inquiry of the Telecom Investigator. Instead of observing the mandatory rules on formal investigations as prescibed by PD No. 807, the DOTC Secretary cut corners and apparently railroaded this case by rendering the assailed resolution. Even the Telecom Investigator did not know what he was doing. He exceeded his authority by imposing in the Memorandum a penalty in the form of a warning to petitioner. His job was limited to an inquiry into the facts and a determination on whether or not a prima facie case existed. His findings were merely preparatory to the filing of the necessary formal administrative case by the Regional Director.
- 14. 14 It should be noted with alarm that the Telecom Director who was supposed to review the findings of the Telecom Investigator merely affixed his approval within the Memorandum (p. 7 of Memorandum), thus obviously indicating that he never reviewed the merits of the case. It appears highly irregular that Asst. Secretary Sibal of the DOTC, in his letter dated August 2, 1989 to Chairman Villaluz of the Administrative Action Board, informed the latter that his Office did not file any administrative complaint against petitioner nor had it filed a formal charge against her for whatever administrative offense. Note that even with this letter, Chairman Villaluz proceeded to order the hearing of this case. This is a clear indication that for lack of coordination among the DOTC authorities and the Regional Office, the mandatory requirements of due process to which petitioner was entitled were irreverently ignored. Thus, in the case of Jose Rizal College v. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 65482, December 1, 1987) this Court reiterated the "cardinal primary" requirements of due process in administrative proceedings and these are: (1) the right to a hearing which includes, the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support itself, (4) the evidence must be substantial, and substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable mind must accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the board or body should in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. (Emphasis supplied) Evidently, respondents denied petitioner her right to a formal and full-blown administrative proceedings which she never had. WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated September 30, 1988 of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications and the proceedings before the Administrative Action Board are hereby declared NULL and VOID. The Secretary of the DOTC is hereby directed to restore to petitioner's record of service the period which she served under suspension and to delete from her personnel file the period within which she was disqualified for promotion. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 93868 February 19, 1991 ARDELIZA MEDENILLA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, AMPARO DELLOSA, ROSALINDA JURIA and MARITA BURDEOS, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p This is a petition seeking the annulment of the resolutions issued by the Civil Service Commission which disapproved the appointment of the petitioner to the position of Supervising Human Manpower Development Officer. Petitioner Ardeliza Medenilla was a contractual employee of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) occupying the position of Public Relations Officer II. In 1987, Medenilla was detailed as Technical Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Manpower Management. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 124 dated January 30, 1987, a reorganization ensued within the DPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing pattern together with the guidelines on the selection and placement of personnel was issued. Included in the revised staffing pattern is the contested position of Supervising Human Resource Development Officer. On January 2, 1989, the petitioner was appointed to the disputed position.
- 15. 15 On January 27, 1989, respondents Amparo Dellosa, Rosalinda Juria and Marita Burdeos together with Matilde Angeles, Catalina Espinas, Alicia Nercelles and Ramon Racela, all of whom are employees in the Human Resource Training and Material Development Division, Administrative and Manpower Management Service of the DPWH, jointly lodged a protest before the DPWH task force on reorganization contesting the appointment of the petitioner to the position. The protestants alleged that since they are next-in-rank employees, one of them should have been appointed to the said position. On August 2, 1989, the task force on reorganization dismissed the protest. The dispositive portion of its decision reads as follows: Premises considered, the Task Force on Reorganization Appeals finds the instant protest of Matilde Angeles, et al. without merit and hereby recommends to the Honorable Secretary that the appointment of Ardeliza Medenilla to the contested position of Supervising Human Resource Development Officer be upheld. (Rollo, p. 26) Not satisfied, the private respondents appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission. The Commission found: On the onset, it appears that protestee Medenilla does not possess the required qualifications for the position. . . . Moreover, her eligibility is PD 907, being a cum laude graduate. Let it be considered appropriate only for appointment to "second level positions" which require the application of knowledge and skills within the appointee's field of study. (Rollo, p. 28-29) xxx xxx xxx Further, it also appears that Medenilla is a contractual employee assigned or detailed with the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administrations and Manpower Management (the appointing authority) as Public Relations Officer II, while protestants are all permanent employee of the Division (Human Resources Planning) where the vancancy exist. Indeed, RA 6656 does not preclude the appointment of contractuals to a new staffing pattern, however, in the presence and availability of qualified permanent next-in-rank employees in the organization, the latter has to be preferred, unless a contractual employee possesses superior qualifications that could justify her appointment. However, in this case, we see no superior qualifications or any special reasons for preferring Medenilla over the protestants. (Rollo, p. 29) We find merit in the protest. While as earlier mentioned, the appointing authority is given the wide latitude of discretion, to sustain the appointment of Medenilla may give the appointing power unnecessary opportunities to act capriciously and thus thwart the natural and reasonable expectation of the officer next-in-rank to any vacant position, to be promoted to it As held in Millares v. Subido,G.R. No. L-23281, promulgated August 10, 1967, the Supreme Court held: We, therefore, hold that in the event of there occurring a vacancy, the officer next-in-rank must, as far as practicable and as the appointing authority sees it in his best judgment and estimation, be promoted . . . and that it is only in cases of promotion, where an employee other than the ranking one is promoted, is the appointing power under duty to give "special reason or reasons" for his action . . . . Again, the special reasons advanced by the appointing authority in this case is (sic) not enough. Considering further that appointee is not meeting the minimum qualification standards set by his own office, she could not be said to possess far superior qualification than those permanent next-in-rank employees of the Department. (Rollo, pp. 30-31) Thus, on February 28, 1990, the Commission promulgated the assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to disapprove the promotional appointment of Ardeliza Medenilla to the position of Supervising Human Manpower Development Officer. Accordingly, the appointing authority may choose from among protestants Amparo Dellosa, Marita Burdeos and Rosalinda Juria who to promote to the said position. The Civil Service Field Office is directed to implement this resolution accordingly." (Rollo, p. 31) The petitioner on March 23, 1990 filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. On May 30, 1990 a supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration was also filed. However, prior thereto, the Commission on May 23, 1990 denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent portions of the denial are: xxx xxx xxx
- 16. 16 2. Experience of Medenilla Medenilla alleges that the Commission failed to appreciate her 3 years and 8 months of experience directly relevant to Human Resource Development. Looking more deeply into her experience as reflected in her CS Form 212, we could not distinguish her experience directly relevant to the field of Human Resource Development. The certification of a certain Elvira H. Villania stated her duties in the Guthrie-Jensen Consultants, Inc. in her one (1) year and (7) months as Research and Publication Officer of working included "providing research assistance to our Management Consultants in drawing up performance appraisal system, merit promotion system and conducting development for our client-companies." Notwithstanding, assuming that her 1 year and 7 months experience in the company is relevant, yet, compared to the experience of the protestants in the field of Human Resource Development, said experience is obviously outweighed. There is no dispute that Medenilla has experience as a Researcher but said experience is basically on the field of journalism and information. (Rollo, p. 35) xxx xxx xxx 4. Education background and eligibility of Medenilla. . . . Notwithstanding, we are inclined to reconsider our position that the educational background is not relevant. AB may therefore be taken as a relevant degree for purposes of qualifying to the position. As such, her PD 907 eligibility may be considered appropriate." (Rollo, p. 37) xxx xxx xxx Granting for the sake of argument that the DPWH adhered to its rules relative to reorganization, is at this point, no longer material and controlling. What is now the issue is whether Medenilla indeed possesses superior qualifications over any of the protestants. (Rollo, p. 38) xxx xxx xxx The edge of 1.30% of Medenilla over Dellosa cannot be considered by this Commission significant enough to presume and declare that Medenilla possesses far superior qualifications over the protestant and to warrant the appointment of a contractual employee over a permanent employee of the Department. (Rollo, p. 39) Hence, this petition. The petitioner interposes the following grounds: I The resolutions were issued by the Respondent Commission, without giving notice to the petitioner of the existence of an appeal filed before the CSC, thereby denying the petitioner due process of law. II The Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in disapproving the appointment of the petitioner. Its function, is limited only to determine whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility and not whether another is more qualified than the petitioner. Without giving due course to the petition, the Court on July 10, 1990, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Commission from implementing the assailed resolutions. Anent the first ground, the petitioner contends that she was not notified by the Civil Service Commission of the existence of the appeal before it. The resolutions, therefore, were allegedly issued in violation of the petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed due process of law. The public respondent, on the other hand, advances the argument that what due process abhors is not lack of previous notice but the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. Since the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, she cannot now complain that she was deprived of due process. The petitioner's first contention is without merit.
- 17. 17 "Due process of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of the light in the matter involved." (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 590) The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is not always the cornerstone of due process. (Asprec v. Itchon, 16 SCRA 921 [1966]; Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110 [1974]; Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the President of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989). What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. (Tajonero v. Lamarosa, 110 SCRA 438 [1981]) In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. (see De Leon v. Comelec, 129 SCRA 117 [1984]) The second contention of the petitioner alleges that the Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion in disapproving her appointment. The public respondent views it otherwise. The Civil Service Commission asserts that being the Central Personnel Agency of the Government, it is the final arbiter on civil service matters. The Commission alleges, that, pursuant to RA 6656, the Commission is authorized to act on appeals by aggrieved employees in the course of reorganization and, therefore, it has the power to reverse or modify any decision brought before it on appeal. The petitioner's second contention is impressed with merit. The qualification standards for the contested position are as follows: EDUCATION EXPERIENCE CIVIL SERVICE REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ELIGIBILITY Bachelor's degree 2 years of Manpower-Youth relevant to the job experience in Development with at least human resource Officer 9 units in post development Manpower Development Officer Relevant RA 1080 Relevant Second Level Eligibility Career Service (Professional) First Grade Supervisor
- 18. 18 It is not disputed that the petitioner possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility and requisite educational background. The public respondent itself, in its resolution dated May 23, 1990, considered the petitioner's PD No. 907 eligibility appropriate for the position. (Rollo, p. 37) The controversy then centers on the experience of the petitioner. The Commission contends that the experience of Medenilla is basically in the field of journalism and not in Human Resource Development. The Commission also alleges that since the petitioner is merely a contractual employee, in the absence of superior qualifications, the private respondents must be preferred not only for the reason that they are permanent career service employees but most especially because they are next-in-rank to the disputed position. In support of its argument, the Commission cited in the disputed resolution, the case of Millares v. Subido, 20 SCRA 954 where this Court held: . . . A vacant position shall be filled by promotion of the ranking officer or employee. And only where, for special reason or reasons of which the affected officer or employee will be notified, this mode of recruitment on selection cannot be observed, that the position may be filled by transfer, or re-employment, or by getting from the certified list of appropriate eligibles, in that order. Finally, the public respondent advances the view that, since the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 now provides that the Commission shall "take appropriate action on all appointment" its authority, therefore, is no longer limited to the mere approval or disapproval of appointments submitted to it. A careful review of the records of the case, will reveal that the petitioner possesses the requisite experience for the contested position. The petitioner, not only was a cum laude graduate from the University of the Philippines, she has also acquired plenty of experience in the field of Human Resource Development, to wit: She was rated and ranked number one in the Trainor's Training Program (120 hours) conducted for the DPWH by the Phil-Tao, Inc., a private firm. Ms. Dellosa was ranked number 7, Mrs. Juria was ranked number 10; Mrs. Burdeos did not attend the seminar. This training program was undertaken to strengthen the capabilities of HRD personnel, and to make them more effective in the discharge of their functions. She is a recipient of a special commendation, given by Executive Director Remedios I. Rikken of the National Commission in the Role of Filipino Woman, for her efficiency and exemplary performance as a facilitator in the conduct of the workshops during the Second Congress of Women in Government. (Letter of Ms. Rikken addressed to Sec. Estuar attached as ANNEX "B".). She obtained in her on-going MBA studies at the De La Salle University, which she pursued as an entrance scholar, the highest grade of 4.0, equivalent to "Excellent" in 2 HRD related subjects –– Organizational Management –– which call for the integration of concepts with concrete experience. She participated in the preparation and dissemination of the corporate planning processes installed and institutionalized in the DPWH. Corporate Planning was introduced by Secretary Fiorello R. Estuar and is now being implemented in all government offices as instructed by the President. She conducted orientation/reorientation courses in DPWH Regional Offices on (a) Management By Objectives and Results Evaluation, the Performance Appraisal System, and (b) a specifically designed Performance Appraisal System for DPWH District Engineers and Division Chiefs, being officially used by the DPWH. She participated in the conceptualizing and drafting of the Department Order on the DPWH Incentives and Awards System, set up in compliance with RA No. 6713." (Rollo, p. 63) The public respondent failed to consider that the petitioner, in her one year and seven months experience with Guthrie-Jensen was engaged in research relating to performance appraisal systems and merit promotion systems which duties are all related to Human Resource Development. Precisely, it was because of her experience with Guthrie-Jensen that the petitioner was detailed from January 1987 until December 1988 in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Manpower Management, where she was asked to assist in human resource planning. The rejoinder filed during the proceedings before the Commission, by the Assistant Secretary for Administrative and Manpower Management, Carolina Mangawang, is very revealing. The disputed position requires of the holder of the office, skills in human
- 19. 19 resource developmental planning, research and statistics. The petitioner possesses these skills in more than appropriate quantities. The argument of the public respondent that the petitioner must possess superior qualifications in order to be preferred over the private respondents deserves no credit. It can be readily seen that the petitioner possesses superior qualifications. As earlier stated, she is a cum laude graduate of the University of the Philippines. She was ranked No. 1 in the department wide training program handled by a private firm. Two of the respondents were ranked way below while a third did not even participate. She was commended for exemplary performance as facilitator during the Second Congress of Women in Government. She received the highest grades from De la Salle University in her MBA studies. She helped draft the human resource program for the entire DPWH. Inspire of her being a new employee, she was assigned to conduct seminars on Performance Appraisal Systems and on Management by Objectives and Results for the DPWH. She was precisely drafted from a private firm to assist in human resource planning for the DPWH. Her work is apparently highly satisfactory as the top administrators of the DPWH not only appointed her but have asked the respondent Commission to validate the appointment. The respondents rely on Section 4 of R.A. 6656, which reads: xxx xxx xxx Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment to new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions or if there are not enough comparable positions, to position next lower in rank. Undoubtedly, old employees should be considered first. But it does not necessarily follow that they should then automatically be appointed. The preference given to permanent employees assumes that employees working in a Department for longer periods have gained not only superior skills but also greater dedication to the public service. This is not always true and the law, moreover, does not preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary talents into the government service. If, after considering all the current employees, the Department Secretary cannot find among them the person he needs to revive a moribund office or to upgrade second rate performance, there is nothing in the Civil Service Law to prevent him from reaching out to other Departments or to the private sector provided all his acts are bona fide for the best interest of the public service and the person chosen has the needed qualifications. In the present case, there is no indication that the petitioner was chosen for any other reason except to bring in a talented person with the necessary eligibilities and qualifications for important assignments in the Department. The reason behind P.D. No. 907 (which grants civil service eligibility to college graduates with at least cum laudehonors) of attracting honor graduates into the public service would be negated if they always have to start as Clerk I and wait for hundreds of deadwood above them to first go into retirement before they can hope for significant and fulfilling assignments. The Commission's reliance on the dictum in Millares v. Subido, 20 SCRA 954 [19671 is misplaced. The ruling inMillares has already been superseded by later decisions. We have already held in cases subsequent to Millares that the next-in-rank rule is not absolute; it only applies in cases of promotion (see Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34 [19691). And even in promotions, it can be disregarded for sound reasons made known to the next-in-rank. The appointing authority, under the Civil Service Law, is allowed to fill vacancies by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, and appointment of outsiders who have appropriate civil service eligibility, not necessarily in that order. (see Pineda v. Claudio, supra; Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986]) There is no legal fiat that a vacancy must be filled only by promotion; the appointing authority is given wide discretion to fill a vacancy from among the several alternatives provided for by law. In this case, the contested position was created in the course of reorganization. The position appears to be a new one. The applicability, therefore, of the next-in-rank rule does not come in clearly. Besides, as earlier stated, said rule is not absolute. There are valid exceptions. Granting for the sake of argument that the case involves a promotional appointment, the next-in-rank rule must give way to the exigencies of the public service. The intent of the Civil Service Laws not merely to bestow upon permanent employees the advantage arising from their long employment but most specially, it is to foster a more efficient public service. Any other factor must, therefore, yield to the demand for an effective government, which necessarily entails the appointment of competent, qualified and proficient personnel. The deliberation of this Court in the case of Aguilar v. Nieva, Jr., 40 SCRA 113 [19711 is illuminating, to wit: xxx xxx xxx . . . It is not enough that an aspirant is qualified and eligible or that he is next-in-rank or in line for promotion, albeit by passive prescription. It is just necessary, in order for public administration to be dynamic and responsive to the needs of the times, that the local executive be allowed the choice of men of its
- 20. 20 confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgment. (Emphasis supplied, p. 121) The point raised by the public respondent that, pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, it is authorized to revoke appointments, must necessarily fail. We have already ruled on several occasions that when the appointee is qualified, the Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment. It is not within its prerogative to revoke an appointee on the ground that substituting its judgment for that of the appointing power, another person has better qualifications for the job. Once the function is discharged, the participation of the Civil Service Commission in the appointment process ceases. The only purpose of attestation is to determine whether the appointee possesses the requisite civil service eligibility, no more than that is left for the Civil Service Commission to do. (see Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 [1986]; Central Bank of the Philippines v. CSC, 171 SCRA 744 [1989]; Secretary Oscar Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990; Gaspar v. CSC, G.R. No. 90799, October 18, 1990). The rationale of this doctrine is that the power of appointment is essentially discretionary. The discretion to be granted to the appointing authority, if not plenary must at least be sufficient. After all, not only is the appointing authority the officer primarily responsible for the administration of the office but he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the position (see Villegas v. Subido, 30 SCRA 498 [1969]). As between the Commission which only looks into paper qualifications and the appointing authority who views not only the listed qualifications but also the prospective appointees themselves, the work to be accomplished, the objectives of the Department, etc., the Court sustains the Department Head. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions issued by the Civil Service Commission dated February 28, 1990 and May 23, 1990 are SET ASIDE. The restraining order issued by this Court on July 10, 1990 is made permanent. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Homework Help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Math homework help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Research Paper help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Algebra Help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Calculus Help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Accounting help https://www.homeworkping.com/
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