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OneM2M 개요 및 보안
최종석
2016.3.18
목차
OneM2M 개요 및 보안
목차
I. Introduction
of OneM2M
II. OneM2M Security
Introduction
Detailed of CSE
Overview of Security
Detatils of Security Functions
3
1. Introduction
2. Detailed of CSE
I. Introduction of OneM2M
oneM2M 기술은 다양한 제품간 연결성을 바탕으로 새로운 제품 및 서비스로 손쉽게 확장 가능
IoT 플랫폼 보안 - OneM2M 플랫폼
WLAN
PAN
(Bluetooth)
Mobile Network
(LTE)WLAN/ZigBee
“내 손안의 우리 집” “즐겁고 편한 운전 환경”“편리한 건강 관리”
Smart Home Smart CarHealthcare
Common Service Layer
“플랫폼 공통화  고객의 가치 창조하는 새로운 M2M 서비스 창출 가능”
Module
Module Module Module Module Module
Module
Module
Module
Module
Module
Module
Module
Module
Module
I. Introduction of OneM2M
oneM2M Common Service Function oneM2M 핵심 요소 기술
스마트폰스마트가전
Access Networks (2G/3G/LTE/WiFi/ZigBee)
Common Service Functions
스마트
그리드
헬스케어스마트홈
보안
스마트카
자동차센서
식별 체계
Delivery
Handling
자원 탐색 데이터 관리 그룹 관리
위치 정보 네트워크 연동 장치 관리
데이터 서비스
부가 서비스
네트워크 서비스
• 데이터 탐색/저장/접근제어 기술
• 데이터 분석 기술 (Big Data)
• 위치 정보 제공 기술
• 원격 장치 관리 기술
• 액세스 네트워크 (3GPP) 연동 기술
• QoS, Multicast/Broadcast 제어 기술
공통 서비스
• 어플리케이션 보안성 제공
• 글로벌 식별 체계 및 Delivery Handling
Application
M2M
서비스
플랫폼
Access
Network
Device/
Module
M2M
주요 서비스
• 스마트 홈, 스마트 카
• 스마트 그리드, 헬스케어
WAN /
HAN
• Cellular Network (2G / 3G / LTE)
• Wi-Fi / ZigBee / Bluetooth
M2M Device/
Gateway
• Smart TV, Smart Phone
• Smart Meter, Health Sensor
• Smart Gateway
IoT 플랫폼 보안 - OneM2M 플랫폼
I. Introduction of OneM2M
IoT 플랫폼 보안
6
사물인터넷 플랫폼 보안 기술 정의 사례 2
OneM2M 보안 기술
– Privacy/Trust 관리 기술
– 인증/인가 기술
– 안전한 데이터 전송 기술
– 시스템 보안 기술
– Security Association 기술
Infrastructure
domain
Field
domain
Non-oneM2M
Device
Non-oneM2M
Device
Non-oneM2M
Device
Non-oneM2M
Device
To an
Infrastructure
Node of other
M2M Service
Providers
IN-AE Mca
Infrastructure
Node(IN)
IN-AE
IN-CSE
Mca
Middle
Node(IN)
MN-CSE
MN-AE
Mca
Middle
Node(IN)
Mca
Mca
Mca
MN-CSE
MN-AE
Application
Dedicated
Node
(ADN)
ADN-AE
Mca
Application
Service
Node
(ASN)
ASN-AE
ASN-CSE
Application
Dedicated
Node
(ADN)
ADN-AE
Mca
Application
Service
Node
(ASN)
ASN-AE
ASN-CSE
Mcc’
Mcn
Mcc
Mcc
Mcc
McnMcn Mcc
Mcc
Mcn Mcn
Link is out of scope
Application
Entity (AE)
Mca Reference Point
Mcn Reference Point
Common Services Entity (CSE)
Application and
Service Layer
Management
Communication
Management/
Delivery Handling
Data Management
& Repository
Device
Management
Discobery
Group
Management
Location
Network Service
Exposure/Service
Ex+Triggering
Registration Security
Service Charging &
Accounting
Subscription and
Notification
Underlying Network
Service Entity (NSE)
II. OneM2M Security
Common Service Functions
7
Application
Entity (AE)
Mca Reference Point
Mcn Reference Point
Common Services Entity (CSE)
Application and
Service Layer
Management
Device
Management
Discovery
Group
Management
Location
Network Service
Exposure/Service
Ex+Triggering
Registration Security
Underlying Network
Service Entity (NSE)
Mcc Reference Point
The services provided by the Common Services Layer in the M2M System.
Reside within a CSE and are referred to as Common Services Functions (CSFs).
The CSFs provide services to the AEs via the Mca Reference Point and to other
CSEs via Mcc reference point.
CSEs interact with the NSE via the Mcn reference point.
Communication
Management/
Delivery Handling
Data Management
& Repository
Service Charging &
Accounting
Subscription and
Notification
I. Introduction of OneM2M
Common Service Functions - ASM
8
The ASM CSF provides management capabilities for CSEs and AEs.
This includes capabilities to configure, troubleshoot and upgrade the functions of
the CSE, as well as to upgrade the AEs.
The management functions include :
• Configuration Function (CF): This function enables the configuration of the capabilities
and features of the CSE.
• Software Management Function (SMF): This function provides lifecycle management for
software components and associated artifacts (e.g. configuration files) for different
entities such as CSE and AE.
Application and Service Layer Management(ASM)
I. Introduction of OneM2M
Common Service Functions – CMDH, DMR
9
• The CMDH CSF provides communications with other CSEs, AEs and NSEs.
• The CMDH CSF decides at what time to use which communication connection
for delivering communications and, when needed and allowed, to buffer
communication requests so that they can be forwarded at a later time. This
processing in the CMDH CSF is carried out per the provisioned CMDH
policies and delivery handling parameters that can be specific to each request
for communication.
The Communication Management and Delivery Handling (CMDH)
Data Management and Repository (DMR)
• DMR CSF is responsible for providing data storage and mediation functions.
• Ability to store data in an organized fashion so it is discernible.
• Provides the means to aggregate data received from different entities.
• Ability to grant access to data from remote CSEs and AEs based on defined
access control policies, and trigger data processing based on data access.
• Ability to provide the means to perform data analytics on large amount of data
to allow service providers to provide value-added services.
I. Introduction of OneM2M
Common Service Functions – DMG
10
Device Management (DMG)
• The DMG CSF provides management of device capabilities on MNs (e.g.
M2M Gateways), ASNs and ADNs (e.g. M2M Devices), as well as devices that
reside within an M2M Area Network.
Discovery (DIG)
• The DIS CSF searches information about applications and services as
contained in attributes and resources.
I. Introduction of OneM2M
Common Service Functions – DIS, GMG, LOC
11
• The DIS CSF searches information about applications and services as
contained in attributes and resources.
• The result of a discovery request from an Originator depends upon the filter
criteria(e.g. a combination of keywords, identifiers, location and semantic
information) and is subject to access control policy allowed by M2M Service
Subscription.
Discovery (DIG)
Group Management (GMG)
• The GMG CSF is responsible for handling group related requests.
• The GMG CSF enables the M2M System to perform bulk operations on multiple
devices, applications or resources that are part of a group. In addition, the GMG
CSF supports bulk operations to multiple resources of interest and aggregates
the results.
• The Location (LOC) CSF allows AEs to obtain geographical location
information of Nodes (e.g. ASN, MN) for location-based services.
Location (LOC)
I. Introduction of OneM2M
Network Service Exposure, Service Execution and Triggering (NSSE)
Common Service Functions – NSSE, REG, SEC
12
• The NSSE CSF manages communication with the Underlying Networks for
obtaining network service functions on behalf of other CSFs, remote CSEs or
AEs.
• The NSSE CSF uses the Mcn reference point for communicating with the
Underlying Networks.
Registration (REG)
• The Registration (REG) CSF processes a request from an AE or another CSE
to register with a Registrar CSE in order to allow the registered entities to use
the services offered by the Registrar CSE.
The Security (SEC) CSF comprises the following functionalities:
• Sensitive data handling
• Security administration
• Security association establishment
• Access control including identification, authentication and authorization
• Identity management
Security (SEC)
I. Introduction of OneM2M
• The Service Charging and Accounting (SCA) CSF provides charging functions
for the Service Layer.
• The SCA CSF performs information recording corresponding to a chargeable
event based on the configured charging policies.
• The SCA CSF sends the charging information transformed from the specific
recorded information to the billing domain by the use of a standard or
proprietary interface for charging purposes.
Common Service Functions – SCA, SUB
13
Subscription and Notification (SUB)
• The SUB CSF manages subscriptions to resources, subject to access control
policies, and sends corresponding notifications to the address(es) where the
resource subscribers want to receive them.
Service Charging and Accounting (SCA)
I. Introduction of OneM2M
II. OneM2M Security
14
1. Overview of Security
2. Security Architecture
IoT 플랫폼 보안
15
사물인터넷 플랫폼 보안 기술 정의 사례 3
OneM2M Security Architecture
Security Services
Security API (Mca, Mcc) (not specified in the present document)
Security Functions Layer
Identification
And
Authentication
Authorization Identity
Management
Security
Association
Sensitive Data
Handling
Security
Administration
Secure Environment Abstraction Layer (not specified in the present document)
Secure Environments Layer
Secure Environment n
Sensitive Data Sensitive Functions
II. OneM2M Security
Security Layers
Security Function Layer
▪ a set of security functions that are exposed at reference point Mca
and Mcc.
Security Environment Abstraction Layer
▪ security capabilities such as key derivation, data encryption/
decryption, signature generation/verification, security credential
read/write from/to the Secure Environments, and so on.
Secure Environment Layer
▪ provide various security services related to sensitive data storage and
sensitive function execution.
Security Function Layer
Identification and Authentication
▪ identification and mutual authentication of CSEs and Aes
▪ validating if the identity supplied in the identification step is
associated with a trustworthy credential.
Authorization
▪ authorizing services and data access to authenticated entities
according to provisioned Access Control Policies (ACPs) and
assigned roles.
Identity Management
▪ oneM2M identities/identifiers to the requesting entity
Security Association
▪ Secure Connection via secure session establishment.
Sensitive Data Handling
▪ Sensitive Functions protection and secure storage.
Security Administration
▪ remote security provisioning
Identity Management
18
Identity Management function defines many M2M
M2M Identifiers
Application Entity Identifier(AE-ID)
Application Identifier(App-ID)
CSE-Identifier(CSE-ID)
M2M Node Identifier(M2M-Node-ID)
M2M Service Subscription Identifier(M2M-Sub-ID)
M2M Request Identifier(M2M-Request-ID)
M2M External Identifier(M2M-Ext-ID)
Underlying Network Identifier(UNetwork-ID)
Trigger Recipient Identifier(Trigger-Recipient-ID)
M2M Service Identifier(M2M-Sev-ID)
Service Role Identifier(SRole-ID)
M2M Service Profile Identifier(M2M-Service-Profile-ID)
III. OneM2M Identifiers
M2M Identifiers on OneM2M
19
Application Entity Identifier(AE-ID)
An Application Entity Identifier (AE-ID) uniquely identifies an AE
resident on an M2M Node.
AE-ID is globally unique within/outside M2M SP domain
Application Identifier(App-ID)
An Application Identifier (App-ID) uniquely identifies an M2M
Application in a given context.
Two Type
App-ID(Registered App-ID) : guarantee to be globally unique.
Non-Registered App-ID : not guarantee to be globally unique.
III. OneM2M Identifiers
M2M Identifiers on OneM2M
20
CSE-Identifier(CSE-ID)
A CSE shall be identified by a globally unique identifier, the CSE-ID,
when instantiated within an M2M Node in the M2M System.
The CSE-ID is globally unique, when used internally within/outside a
specific M2M SP domain.
The CSE-ID shall identify the CSE for the purpose of all interactions
from/to the CSE within the M2M System.
M2M Node Identifier(M2M-Node-ID)
An M2M Node, hosting a CSE and/or Application(s) shall be identified by
a globally unique identifier, the M2M-Node-ID.
The M2M System shall allow the M2M Service Provider to set the CSE-
ID and the M2M-Node-ID to the same value.
The M2M-Node-ID enables the M2M Service Provider to bind a CSE-ID
to a specific M2M Node.
Examples of allocating a globally unique M2M-Node-ID include the use of
Object Identity (OID) and IMEI. For details on OID,
III. OneM2M Identifiers
M2M Identifiers on OneM2M
21
M2M Service Subscription Identifier(M2M-Sub-ID)
The M2M-Sub-ID enables the M2M SP to bind application(s) to a
particular M2M Service Subscription between an M2M subscriber and
the M2M Service Provider.
The M2M-Sub-ID is unique for every M2M subscriber.
Characteristics:
belongs to the M2M Service Provider;
identifies the subscription to an M2M Service Provider;
enables communication with the M2M Service Provider;
can differ from the M2M Underlying Network Subscription Identifier.
There can be multiple M2M Service Subscription Identifiers per M2M
Underlying Network subscription. The M2M-Sub-ID shall not be
exposed over any interface.
III. OneM2M Identifiers
M2M Identifiers on OneM2M
22
M2M Request Identifier(M2M-Request-ID)
The M2M-Request-ID tracks a Request initiated by an AE over the Mca
reference point, and by a CSE over the Mcc reference point
To enable an AE to track Requests and corresponding Responses over
the Mca reference point, AEs shall include a distinct M2M Request
Identifier per request
M2M External Identifier(M2M-Ext-ID)
The M2M-Ext-ID is used by an M2M SP when services are requested
from the Underlying Network.
allows the Underlying Network to identify the M2M Device (e.g. ASN,
MN) associated with the CSE-ID.
For each CSE-ID, there is only one M2M-Ext-ID for a specific UNetwork-ID.
The mapping by the Underlying Network of the M2M-Ext-ID to the M2M Device is
Underlying Network specific.
The Underlying Network provider and the M2M SP collaborate for the assignment of
an M2M-Ext-ID to each CSE.
III. OneM2M Identifiers
M2M Identifiers on OneM2M
23
Underlying Network Identifier(UNetwork-ID)
The UNetwork-ID is used for identifying an Underlying Network.
UNetwork-ID is a static value and unique within a M2M Service Provider
domain.
For example, based on "policy", scheduling of traffic triggered by a
certain event category in certain time periods may be allowed over
Underlying Network "WLAN”.
Trigger Recipient Identifier(Trigger-Recipient-ID)
The Trigger-Recipient-ID is used to identify an instance of an ASN/MN-
CSE on an execution environment.
For example, when 3GPP device triggering is used, the Trigger-
Recipient-ID maps to the AppID
For pre-provisioned M2M-Ext-IDs, Trigger-Recipient-ID is provisioned at the
Infrastructure Node along with the M2M-Ext-ID and the associated CSE-ID.
For dynamic M2M-Ext-IDs, Trigger-Recipient-ID specific to the Underlying Network is
provisioned at each M2M device in the Field Domain. Such Trigger-Recipient-ID is
conveyed to the IN-CSE during CSE Registration
III. OneM2M Identifiers
M2M Identifiers on OneM2M
24
M2M Service Identifier(M2M-Sev-ID)
The M2M-Serv-ID is an identifier of a M2M Service offered by an
M2M SP.
It is an essential part of the M2M Service Subscription which stores a
set of M2M-Serv-IDs pertaining to the set of subscribed services.
Service Role Identifier(SRole-ID)
The Service Role Identifier shall be used for service access
authorization.
In each M2M Service, one or multiple M2M Service Role(s) shall be
defined by the M2M Service Provider.
An M2M Service Role is defined as a create permission pertaining to
resource types which are associated with M2M Service.
III. OneM2M Identifiers
M2M Identifiers on OneM2M
25
M2M Service Profile Identifier(M2M-Service-Profile-ID)
An M2M Service Profile Identifier defines M2M Service Roles as well
as applicable rules governing the AEs registering with M2M Nodes
and the AEs residing on these nodes.
Every M2M Service Profile is allocated an identifier so it can be
retrieved for verification purposes.
belongs to the M2M Service Provider;
identifies the M2M Service Roles as well as applicable rules governing AEs
registering with an M2M node. The M2M Service Roles define the M2M Services
authorized for the M2M Service Profile
III. OneM2M Identifiers
Authorization
Access Control Policy
For access to ACP resource type
▪ Evaluate to “Permi” for at least one selfPrivileges attributes
For other resource type
▪ Evaluate to “Permit” for at least one privileges attributes
For access decision
▪ The Access control mechanism assembles the information
• Resource access request message
• Contextual information
Details of Authorization
Privilege and selfPrivileges attributes comprises a set of access control
rules
▪ acrs = { acr(1), acr(2), ..., acr(K) }
A Couple of parameters
▪ acr(k) = { acr(k)_accessControlOriginators,
acr(k)_accessControlOperations}
A 3-tuple of parameters
▪ acr(k) = { acr(k)_accessControlOriginators,
acr(k)_accessControlOperations,
acr(k)_accessControlContexts}
Details of parameters
Access decision
The overall result of the access decision algorithm is denoted here with
the variable name res_acrs:
▪ If the request matches the access control rules
• TRUE or 1
▪ Else
• FALSE or 0
Access Decision
32
OneM2M Security Functions Layer
Authorization Procedure
Policy Enforcement Point(PEP)
Policy Decision Point(PDP)
Policy Retrieval Point(PRP)
Policy Information Point(PIP)
PDP 가 인가를 하기 위
해 PRP,PIP에게 정보를
언어오는 단계
PDP 가 접근 허용여부
를 결정하는 단계
II. OneM2M Security
Description of the Access Decision Algorithm
ACPs as defined in XACML
an <accessControlPolicy> resource represents a set of access control
rules, acrs
▪ 1) If a decision is "Permit" for only a single access control rule
included in the privileges (or selfPrivileges) attribute of a single ACP,
the result is "Permit".
Decision of Access Control Rule
▪ res_acrs = res_acr(1) or res_acr(2) ... or res_acr(K)
• res_acr(i) = res_origs(i) and res_ops(i) and res_ctxts(i)
where i = 1...K.
Description of Access Control Rules
34
Description of Access Control Contexts
35
Details of Decision
36
AE Impersonation Prevention
Since several AEs can behave maliciously and pretend to be another
AE with their ID changed, Receiver CSE needs prevention mechanism
for AE impersonation.
Security Association
38
OneM2M Security Functions Layer
Authentication
• UN-SP : Underlying Network Service provider
• GBA : Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
• MEF : M2M enrolment function
• BSF : Bootstrap service function
• MAF : m2m authentication function
• RSPF : remote security provisioning framework
• SAEF : security association establishment framework
① Provisioned Symmetric Key
Security Association Establishment
Framework
 미리 제공된 대칭키를 이용하
여 end-points간의 association
진행
② Certificate-Based Security security
Association Establishment
Framework
 개인 서명키와 인증서, 공개키
를 이용하여 association
③ MAF Security security Association
Establishment Framework
 3rd party service provider에 의
해서 진행됨
셋 중에 하나 사용
Certificate-Based SAEF와 Symmetric Key-
Based SAEF는 Entity 간의 인증을 수행
MAF-Based SAEF는 3자간
인증을 수행
II. OneM2M Security
Security Association
39
All type of Association Establishment Frameworks
General description of SAEF
– Credential Configuration
• 사전 파라미터 설정 단계
– Association Configuration
• 상대방 정보 송수신
– Association Security Handshake
• 상호 인증
II. OneM2M Security
Based on Provisioned Symmetric Key
40
NOTE: The following font colours
differentiate the general topic that
the text relates to:
Blue italic text highlights details
specific to this particular Security
Association Establishment
Framework.
Purple italic text highlights technical
actions that may include steps not
specified by oneM2M.
Red italic text highlights security-
related properties.
Based on Certificate
41
NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the
general topic that the text relates to:
Blue italic text highlights details specific to this
particular Security Association Establishment
Framework.
Purple italic text highlights technical actions that
may include steps not specified by oneM2M.
Red italic text highlights security-related properties.
Based on MAF(M2M Authentication Function)
42
NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the
general topic that the text relates to:
Blue italic text highlights details specific to this
particular Security Association Establishment
Framework.
Purple italic text highlights technical actions that
may include steps not specified by oneM2M.
Red italic text highlights security-related
properties.
Sensitive Data Handling
This function provides data protection and secure storage.
▪ For the protection, oneM2M classfy the protection levels according to
the kinds of data.
Security Administration
For security administration
▪ oneM2M performs Remote Secuirty Provisioning Frameworks. They
consist of the three types
• Based on symmetric key
• Based on Certificate
• Based on GBA(General Bootstrapping Architecture)
Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks
45
OneM2M Security Framework
Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks
– Bootstrap Credential Configuration
– Bootstrap Instruction Configuration
– Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake
– Enrolment Key Generation
– Enrolment Phase
II. OneM2M Security
Based on Symmetric Key
46
NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the
general topic that the text relates to:
Blue italic text highlights details specific to this
particular Security Association Establishment
Framework.
Purple italic text highlights technical actions that
may include steps not specified by oneM2M.
Red italic text highlights security-related
properties.
Based on Certificate
47
NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the
general topic that the text relates to:
Blue italic text highlights details specific to this
particular Security Association Establishment
Framework.
Purple italic text highlights technical actions that
may include steps not specified by oneM2M.
Red italic text highlights security-related
properties.
Based on GBA
48
NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the
general topic that the text relates to:
Blue italic text highlights details specific to this
particular Security Association Establishment
Framework.
Purple italic text highlights technical actions that
may include steps not specified by oneM2M.
Red italic text highlights security-related
properties.
감사합니다
Q & A

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oneM2M security summary

  • 1. OneM2M 개요 및 보안 최종석 2016.3.18
  • 2. 목차 OneM2M 개요 및 보안 목차 I. Introduction of OneM2M II. OneM2M Security Introduction Detailed of CSE Overview of Security Detatils of Security Functions
  • 3. 3 1. Introduction 2. Detailed of CSE I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 4. oneM2M 기술은 다양한 제품간 연결성을 바탕으로 새로운 제품 및 서비스로 손쉽게 확장 가능 IoT 플랫폼 보안 - OneM2M 플랫폼 WLAN PAN (Bluetooth) Mobile Network (LTE)WLAN/ZigBee “내 손안의 우리 집” “즐겁고 편한 운전 환경”“편리한 건강 관리” Smart Home Smart CarHealthcare Common Service Layer “플랫폼 공통화  고객의 가치 창조하는 새로운 M2M 서비스 창출 가능” Module Module Module Module Module Module Module Module Module Module Module Module Module Module Module I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 5. oneM2M Common Service Function oneM2M 핵심 요소 기술 스마트폰스마트가전 Access Networks (2G/3G/LTE/WiFi/ZigBee) Common Service Functions 스마트 그리드 헬스케어스마트홈 보안 스마트카 자동차센서 식별 체계 Delivery Handling 자원 탐색 데이터 관리 그룹 관리 위치 정보 네트워크 연동 장치 관리 데이터 서비스 부가 서비스 네트워크 서비스 • 데이터 탐색/저장/접근제어 기술 • 데이터 분석 기술 (Big Data) • 위치 정보 제공 기술 • 원격 장치 관리 기술 • 액세스 네트워크 (3GPP) 연동 기술 • QoS, Multicast/Broadcast 제어 기술 공통 서비스 • 어플리케이션 보안성 제공 • 글로벌 식별 체계 및 Delivery Handling Application M2M 서비스 플랫폼 Access Network Device/ Module M2M 주요 서비스 • 스마트 홈, 스마트 카 • 스마트 그리드, 헬스케어 WAN / HAN • Cellular Network (2G / 3G / LTE) • Wi-Fi / ZigBee / Bluetooth M2M Device/ Gateway • Smart TV, Smart Phone • Smart Meter, Health Sensor • Smart Gateway IoT 플랫폼 보안 - OneM2M 플랫폼 I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 6. IoT 플랫폼 보안 6 사물인터넷 플랫폼 보안 기술 정의 사례 2 OneM2M 보안 기술 – Privacy/Trust 관리 기술 – 인증/인가 기술 – 안전한 데이터 전송 기술 – 시스템 보안 기술 – Security Association 기술 Infrastructure domain Field domain Non-oneM2M Device Non-oneM2M Device Non-oneM2M Device Non-oneM2M Device To an Infrastructure Node of other M2M Service Providers IN-AE Mca Infrastructure Node(IN) IN-AE IN-CSE Mca Middle Node(IN) MN-CSE MN-AE Mca Middle Node(IN) Mca Mca Mca MN-CSE MN-AE Application Dedicated Node (ADN) ADN-AE Mca Application Service Node (ASN) ASN-AE ASN-CSE Application Dedicated Node (ADN) ADN-AE Mca Application Service Node (ASN) ASN-AE ASN-CSE Mcc’ Mcn Mcc Mcc Mcc McnMcn Mcc Mcc Mcn Mcn Link is out of scope Application Entity (AE) Mca Reference Point Mcn Reference Point Common Services Entity (CSE) Application and Service Layer Management Communication Management/ Delivery Handling Data Management & Repository Device Management Discobery Group Management Location Network Service Exposure/Service Ex+Triggering Registration Security Service Charging & Accounting Subscription and Notification Underlying Network Service Entity (NSE) II. OneM2M Security
  • 7. Common Service Functions 7 Application Entity (AE) Mca Reference Point Mcn Reference Point Common Services Entity (CSE) Application and Service Layer Management Device Management Discovery Group Management Location Network Service Exposure/Service Ex+Triggering Registration Security Underlying Network Service Entity (NSE) Mcc Reference Point The services provided by the Common Services Layer in the M2M System. Reside within a CSE and are referred to as Common Services Functions (CSFs). The CSFs provide services to the AEs via the Mca Reference Point and to other CSEs via Mcc reference point. CSEs interact with the NSE via the Mcn reference point. Communication Management/ Delivery Handling Data Management & Repository Service Charging & Accounting Subscription and Notification I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 8. Common Service Functions - ASM 8 The ASM CSF provides management capabilities for CSEs and AEs. This includes capabilities to configure, troubleshoot and upgrade the functions of the CSE, as well as to upgrade the AEs. The management functions include : • Configuration Function (CF): This function enables the configuration of the capabilities and features of the CSE. • Software Management Function (SMF): This function provides lifecycle management for software components and associated artifacts (e.g. configuration files) for different entities such as CSE and AE. Application and Service Layer Management(ASM) I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 9. Common Service Functions – CMDH, DMR 9 • The CMDH CSF provides communications with other CSEs, AEs and NSEs. • The CMDH CSF decides at what time to use which communication connection for delivering communications and, when needed and allowed, to buffer communication requests so that they can be forwarded at a later time. This processing in the CMDH CSF is carried out per the provisioned CMDH policies and delivery handling parameters that can be specific to each request for communication. The Communication Management and Delivery Handling (CMDH) Data Management and Repository (DMR) • DMR CSF is responsible for providing data storage and mediation functions. • Ability to store data in an organized fashion so it is discernible. • Provides the means to aggregate data received from different entities. • Ability to grant access to data from remote CSEs and AEs based on defined access control policies, and trigger data processing based on data access. • Ability to provide the means to perform data analytics on large amount of data to allow service providers to provide value-added services. I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 10. Common Service Functions – DMG 10 Device Management (DMG) • The DMG CSF provides management of device capabilities on MNs (e.g. M2M Gateways), ASNs and ADNs (e.g. M2M Devices), as well as devices that reside within an M2M Area Network. Discovery (DIG) • The DIS CSF searches information about applications and services as contained in attributes and resources. I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 11. Common Service Functions – DIS, GMG, LOC 11 • The DIS CSF searches information about applications and services as contained in attributes and resources. • The result of a discovery request from an Originator depends upon the filter criteria(e.g. a combination of keywords, identifiers, location and semantic information) and is subject to access control policy allowed by M2M Service Subscription. Discovery (DIG) Group Management (GMG) • The GMG CSF is responsible for handling group related requests. • The GMG CSF enables the M2M System to perform bulk operations on multiple devices, applications or resources that are part of a group. In addition, the GMG CSF supports bulk operations to multiple resources of interest and aggregates the results. • The Location (LOC) CSF allows AEs to obtain geographical location information of Nodes (e.g. ASN, MN) for location-based services. Location (LOC) I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 12. Network Service Exposure, Service Execution and Triggering (NSSE) Common Service Functions – NSSE, REG, SEC 12 • The NSSE CSF manages communication with the Underlying Networks for obtaining network service functions on behalf of other CSFs, remote CSEs or AEs. • The NSSE CSF uses the Mcn reference point for communicating with the Underlying Networks. Registration (REG) • The Registration (REG) CSF processes a request from an AE or another CSE to register with a Registrar CSE in order to allow the registered entities to use the services offered by the Registrar CSE. The Security (SEC) CSF comprises the following functionalities: • Sensitive data handling • Security administration • Security association establishment • Access control including identification, authentication and authorization • Identity management Security (SEC) I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 13. • The Service Charging and Accounting (SCA) CSF provides charging functions for the Service Layer. • The SCA CSF performs information recording corresponding to a chargeable event based on the configured charging policies. • The SCA CSF sends the charging information transformed from the specific recorded information to the billing domain by the use of a standard or proprietary interface for charging purposes. Common Service Functions – SCA, SUB 13 Subscription and Notification (SUB) • The SUB CSF manages subscriptions to resources, subject to access control policies, and sends corresponding notifications to the address(es) where the resource subscribers want to receive them. Service Charging and Accounting (SCA) I. Introduction of OneM2M
  • 14. II. OneM2M Security 14 1. Overview of Security 2. Security Architecture
  • 15. IoT 플랫폼 보안 15 사물인터넷 플랫폼 보안 기술 정의 사례 3 OneM2M Security Architecture Security Services Security API (Mca, Mcc) (not specified in the present document) Security Functions Layer Identification And Authentication Authorization Identity Management Security Association Sensitive Data Handling Security Administration Secure Environment Abstraction Layer (not specified in the present document) Secure Environments Layer Secure Environment n Sensitive Data Sensitive Functions II. OneM2M Security
  • 16. Security Layers Security Function Layer ▪ a set of security functions that are exposed at reference point Mca and Mcc. Security Environment Abstraction Layer ▪ security capabilities such as key derivation, data encryption/ decryption, signature generation/verification, security credential read/write from/to the Secure Environments, and so on. Secure Environment Layer ▪ provide various security services related to sensitive data storage and sensitive function execution.
  • 17. Security Function Layer Identification and Authentication ▪ identification and mutual authentication of CSEs and Aes ▪ validating if the identity supplied in the identification step is associated with a trustworthy credential. Authorization ▪ authorizing services and data access to authenticated entities according to provisioned Access Control Policies (ACPs) and assigned roles. Identity Management ▪ oneM2M identities/identifiers to the requesting entity Security Association ▪ Secure Connection via secure session establishment. Sensitive Data Handling ▪ Sensitive Functions protection and secure storage. Security Administration ▪ remote security provisioning
  • 18. Identity Management 18 Identity Management function defines many M2M M2M Identifiers Application Entity Identifier(AE-ID) Application Identifier(App-ID) CSE-Identifier(CSE-ID) M2M Node Identifier(M2M-Node-ID) M2M Service Subscription Identifier(M2M-Sub-ID) M2M Request Identifier(M2M-Request-ID) M2M External Identifier(M2M-Ext-ID) Underlying Network Identifier(UNetwork-ID) Trigger Recipient Identifier(Trigger-Recipient-ID) M2M Service Identifier(M2M-Sev-ID) Service Role Identifier(SRole-ID) M2M Service Profile Identifier(M2M-Service-Profile-ID) III. OneM2M Identifiers
  • 19. M2M Identifiers on OneM2M 19 Application Entity Identifier(AE-ID) An Application Entity Identifier (AE-ID) uniquely identifies an AE resident on an M2M Node. AE-ID is globally unique within/outside M2M SP domain Application Identifier(App-ID) An Application Identifier (App-ID) uniquely identifies an M2M Application in a given context. Two Type App-ID(Registered App-ID) : guarantee to be globally unique. Non-Registered App-ID : not guarantee to be globally unique. III. OneM2M Identifiers
  • 20. M2M Identifiers on OneM2M 20 CSE-Identifier(CSE-ID) A CSE shall be identified by a globally unique identifier, the CSE-ID, when instantiated within an M2M Node in the M2M System. The CSE-ID is globally unique, when used internally within/outside a specific M2M SP domain. The CSE-ID shall identify the CSE for the purpose of all interactions from/to the CSE within the M2M System. M2M Node Identifier(M2M-Node-ID) An M2M Node, hosting a CSE and/or Application(s) shall be identified by a globally unique identifier, the M2M-Node-ID. The M2M System shall allow the M2M Service Provider to set the CSE- ID and the M2M-Node-ID to the same value. The M2M-Node-ID enables the M2M Service Provider to bind a CSE-ID to a specific M2M Node. Examples of allocating a globally unique M2M-Node-ID include the use of Object Identity (OID) and IMEI. For details on OID, III. OneM2M Identifiers
  • 21. M2M Identifiers on OneM2M 21 M2M Service Subscription Identifier(M2M-Sub-ID) The M2M-Sub-ID enables the M2M SP to bind application(s) to a particular M2M Service Subscription between an M2M subscriber and the M2M Service Provider. The M2M-Sub-ID is unique for every M2M subscriber. Characteristics: belongs to the M2M Service Provider; identifies the subscription to an M2M Service Provider; enables communication with the M2M Service Provider; can differ from the M2M Underlying Network Subscription Identifier. There can be multiple M2M Service Subscription Identifiers per M2M Underlying Network subscription. The M2M-Sub-ID shall not be exposed over any interface. III. OneM2M Identifiers
  • 22. M2M Identifiers on OneM2M 22 M2M Request Identifier(M2M-Request-ID) The M2M-Request-ID tracks a Request initiated by an AE over the Mca reference point, and by a CSE over the Mcc reference point To enable an AE to track Requests and corresponding Responses over the Mca reference point, AEs shall include a distinct M2M Request Identifier per request M2M External Identifier(M2M-Ext-ID) The M2M-Ext-ID is used by an M2M SP when services are requested from the Underlying Network. allows the Underlying Network to identify the M2M Device (e.g. ASN, MN) associated with the CSE-ID. For each CSE-ID, there is only one M2M-Ext-ID for a specific UNetwork-ID. The mapping by the Underlying Network of the M2M-Ext-ID to the M2M Device is Underlying Network specific. The Underlying Network provider and the M2M SP collaborate for the assignment of an M2M-Ext-ID to each CSE. III. OneM2M Identifiers
  • 23. M2M Identifiers on OneM2M 23 Underlying Network Identifier(UNetwork-ID) The UNetwork-ID is used for identifying an Underlying Network. UNetwork-ID is a static value and unique within a M2M Service Provider domain. For example, based on "policy", scheduling of traffic triggered by a certain event category in certain time periods may be allowed over Underlying Network "WLAN”. Trigger Recipient Identifier(Trigger-Recipient-ID) The Trigger-Recipient-ID is used to identify an instance of an ASN/MN- CSE on an execution environment. For example, when 3GPP device triggering is used, the Trigger- Recipient-ID maps to the AppID For pre-provisioned M2M-Ext-IDs, Trigger-Recipient-ID is provisioned at the Infrastructure Node along with the M2M-Ext-ID and the associated CSE-ID. For dynamic M2M-Ext-IDs, Trigger-Recipient-ID specific to the Underlying Network is provisioned at each M2M device in the Field Domain. Such Trigger-Recipient-ID is conveyed to the IN-CSE during CSE Registration III. OneM2M Identifiers
  • 24. M2M Identifiers on OneM2M 24 M2M Service Identifier(M2M-Sev-ID) The M2M-Serv-ID is an identifier of a M2M Service offered by an M2M SP. It is an essential part of the M2M Service Subscription which stores a set of M2M-Serv-IDs pertaining to the set of subscribed services. Service Role Identifier(SRole-ID) The Service Role Identifier shall be used for service access authorization. In each M2M Service, one or multiple M2M Service Role(s) shall be defined by the M2M Service Provider. An M2M Service Role is defined as a create permission pertaining to resource types which are associated with M2M Service. III. OneM2M Identifiers
  • 25. M2M Identifiers on OneM2M 25 M2M Service Profile Identifier(M2M-Service-Profile-ID) An M2M Service Profile Identifier defines M2M Service Roles as well as applicable rules governing the AEs registering with M2M Nodes and the AEs residing on these nodes. Every M2M Service Profile is allocated an identifier so it can be retrieved for verification purposes. belongs to the M2M Service Provider; identifies the M2M Service Roles as well as applicable rules governing AEs registering with an M2M node. The M2M Service Roles define the M2M Services authorized for the M2M Service Profile III. OneM2M Identifiers
  • 27. Access Control Policy For access to ACP resource type ▪ Evaluate to “Permi” for at least one selfPrivileges attributes For other resource type ▪ Evaluate to “Permit” for at least one privileges attributes For access decision ▪ The Access control mechanism assembles the information • Resource access request message • Contextual information
  • 28.
  • 29. Details of Authorization Privilege and selfPrivileges attributes comprises a set of access control rules ▪ acrs = { acr(1), acr(2), ..., acr(K) } A Couple of parameters ▪ acr(k) = { acr(k)_accessControlOriginators, acr(k)_accessControlOperations} A 3-tuple of parameters ▪ acr(k) = { acr(k)_accessControlOriginators, acr(k)_accessControlOperations, acr(k)_accessControlContexts}
  • 31. Access decision The overall result of the access decision algorithm is denoted here with the variable name res_acrs: ▪ If the request matches the access control rules • TRUE or 1 ▪ Else • FALSE or 0
  • 32. Access Decision 32 OneM2M Security Functions Layer Authorization Procedure Policy Enforcement Point(PEP) Policy Decision Point(PDP) Policy Retrieval Point(PRP) Policy Information Point(PIP) PDP 가 인가를 하기 위 해 PRP,PIP에게 정보를 언어오는 단계 PDP 가 접근 허용여부 를 결정하는 단계 II. OneM2M Security
  • 33. Description of the Access Decision Algorithm ACPs as defined in XACML an <accessControlPolicy> resource represents a set of access control rules, acrs ▪ 1) If a decision is "Permit" for only a single access control rule included in the privileges (or selfPrivileges) attribute of a single ACP, the result is "Permit". Decision of Access Control Rule ▪ res_acrs = res_acr(1) or res_acr(2) ... or res_acr(K) • res_acr(i) = res_origs(i) and res_ops(i) and res_ctxts(i) where i = 1...K.
  • 34. Description of Access Control Rules 34
  • 35. Description of Access Control Contexts 35
  • 37. AE Impersonation Prevention Since several AEs can behave maliciously and pretend to be another AE with their ID changed, Receiver CSE needs prevention mechanism for AE impersonation.
  • 38. Security Association 38 OneM2M Security Functions Layer Authentication • UN-SP : Underlying Network Service provider • GBA : Generic Bootstrapping Architecture • MEF : M2M enrolment function • BSF : Bootstrap service function • MAF : m2m authentication function • RSPF : remote security provisioning framework • SAEF : security association establishment framework ① Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework  미리 제공된 대칭키를 이용하 여 end-points간의 association 진행 ② Certificate-Based Security security Association Establishment Framework  개인 서명키와 인증서, 공개키 를 이용하여 association ③ MAF Security security Association Establishment Framework  3rd party service provider에 의 해서 진행됨 셋 중에 하나 사용 Certificate-Based SAEF와 Symmetric Key- Based SAEF는 Entity 간의 인증을 수행 MAF-Based SAEF는 3자간 인증을 수행 II. OneM2M Security
  • 39. Security Association 39 All type of Association Establishment Frameworks General description of SAEF – Credential Configuration • 사전 파라미터 설정 단계 – Association Configuration • 상대방 정보 송수신 – Association Security Handshake • 상호 인증 II. OneM2M Security
  • 40. Based on Provisioned Symmetric Key 40 NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Security Association Establishment Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Red italic text highlights security- related properties.
  • 41. Based on Certificate 41 NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Security Association Establishment Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Red italic text highlights security-related properties.
  • 42. Based on MAF(M2M Authentication Function) 42 NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Security Association Establishment Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Red italic text highlights security-related properties.
  • 43. Sensitive Data Handling This function provides data protection and secure storage. ▪ For the protection, oneM2M classfy the protection levels according to the kinds of data.
  • 44. Security Administration For security administration ▪ oneM2M performs Remote Secuirty Provisioning Frameworks. They consist of the three types • Based on symmetric key • Based on Certificate • Based on GBA(General Bootstrapping Architecture)
  • 45. Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks 45 OneM2M Security Framework Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks – Bootstrap Credential Configuration – Bootstrap Instruction Configuration – Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake – Enrolment Key Generation – Enrolment Phase II. OneM2M Security
  • 46. Based on Symmetric Key 46 NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Security Association Establishment Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Red italic text highlights security-related properties.
  • 47. Based on Certificate 47 NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Security Association Establishment Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Red italic text highlights security-related properties.
  • 48. Based on GBA 48 NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Security Association Establishment Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Red italic text highlights security-related properties.

Editor's Notes

  1. The M2M-Request-ID tracks a Request initiated by an AE over the Mca reference point, and by a CSE over the Mcc reference point, if applicable, end to end. It is also included in the Response to the Request over the Mca or Mcc reference points. To enable an AE to track Requests and corresponding Responses over the Mca reference point, AEs shall include a distinct M2M Request Identifier per request over the Mca Reference point to the CSE for any initiated request. The CSE shall make such M2M Request Identifier unique by prepending the CSE-relative AE-ID (see clause 7.2) in front of it. If the CSE creates an M2M Request Identifier, then the CSE shall maintain a binding between the M2M Request Identifier received from the AE and the M2M Request Identifier it created in its interactions towards other peer CSEs. The CSE shall include the M2M Request Identifier received from the AE in its Response to the AE. This binding shall be maintained by the CSE until the Request message sequence is completed. Note that the Request initiated by the CSE could be the result of an application Request, or a request initiated autonomously by the CSE to fulfil a service. In case an IN-CSE needs to send a request to a receiving CSE that is not reachable over any of the underlying networks, the IN-CSE initiates the procedure for "waking up" the Node hosting the receiving CSE by using procedures such as device triggering over the Mcn reference point. For Device Triggering, the triggering reference number to co-relate device triggering response is independent of the M2M Request Identifier. An IN-CSE may use the same value of an M2M-Request-Identifier in an incoming request for the triggering reference number in its interaction with the underlying network. A CSE receiving a Request from a peer CSE shall include the received M2M Request Identifier in all additional Requests unspanned (i.e. 1:1) it has to generate (including propagation of the incoming Request) and that are associated with the incoming Request, where applicable. If a Receiver CSE receives a request from an Originator for which another request with the same Request Identifier is already pending, the request shall be rejected. Otherwise - even if the same Request Identifier was already used by the same Originaor sometime in the past, the request shall be treated as a new request.
  2. The UNetwork-ID is used for identifying an Underlying Network. UNetwork-ID is a static value and unique within a M2M Service Provider domain. One or more Underlying Networks may be available at an M2M Node offering different sets of capabilities, availability schedules etc. Based on the "policy" information at the Node and the capabilities offered by the available Underlying Networks, appropriate Underlying Network can be chosen by using UNetwork-ID. For example, based on "policy", scheduling of traffic triggered by a certain event category in certain time periods may be allowed over Underlying Network "WLAN" but may not be allowed over Underlying Network "2G Cellular".
  3. The M2M-Serv-ID is an identifier of a M2M Service offered by an M2M SP. It is an essential part of the M2M Service Subscription which stores a set of M2M-Serv-IDs pertaining to the set of subscribed services. Beyond the set of services depicted in the present document it shall be possible for an M2M Service Provider to offer other services. Those will be identified by means of M2M SP specific M2M-Serv-IDs.
  4. An M2M Service Profile Identifier defines M2M Service Roles (see annex G), as well as applicable rules governing the AEs registering with M2M Nodes and the AEs residing on these nodes. Every M2M Service Profile is allocated an identifier so it can be retrieved for verification purposes. The M2M-Service-Profile-ID enables the M2M Service Provider to bind AE(s), applicable rules to these AEs, as well as M2M Service Roles to M2M nodes. An M2M-Service-Profile-ID shall be allocated to every M2M Node. The M2M Service Profile Identifier has the following characteristics: belongs to the M2M Service Provider; identifies the M2M Service Roles as well as applicable rules governing AEs registering with an M2M node. The M2M Service Roles define the M2M Services authorized for the M2M Service Profile (see annex G).