3242015 httpsashford.waypointoutcomes.comassessment3862.docx

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https://ashford.waypointoutcomes.com/assessment/3862/preview
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Description:
Total Possible Score: 10.00
Distinguished - Clearly and accurately identifies the issue that i
s addressed in the argument.
Proficient - Accurately identifies the issue that is addressed in t
he argument. The identification is slightly unclear or imprecise.
Basic - Identifies the issue that is addressed in the argument. Th
e identification is unclear or imprecise.
Below Expectations - Misidentifies the issue that is addressed in
the argument. The identification is significantly unclear, impre
cise,
and/or inaccurate.
Non-Performance - The identification of the issue that is addres
sed in the argument is either nonexistent or lacks the component
s
described in the assignment instructions.
Distinguished - Accurately explains the argument and clearly id
entifies all relevant premises and conclusions.

Proficient - Accurately explains the argument and identifies mo
st relevant premises and conclusions.
Basic - Explains the argument and identifies some relevant prem
ises and conclusions. The explanation may be somewhat unclear
or inaccurate.
Below Expectations - Inaccurately and/or unclearly explains the
argument and identifies few or no relevant premises and
conclusions.
Non-Performance - The explanation of the argument and the ide
ntification of the relevant premises and conclusions are either
nonexistent or lack the components described in the assignment
instructions.
Distinguished - Accurately and clearly evaluates the argument.
The evaluation includes proper identification of inductive or
deductive reasoning as well as validity, soundness, and/or stren
gth where applicable.
Proficient - Accurately evaluates the argument. The evaluation i
ncludes proper identification of inductive or deductive reasonin
g as
well as validity, soundness, and/or strength where applicable. M
inor details are missing or unclear.
Basic - Evaluates the argument. The evaluation includes identifi
cation of inductive or deductive reasoning as well as validity,
soundness, and/or strength, but relevant details are missing, unc
lear, or inaccurate.
Below Expectations - Inaccurately and/or unclearly evaluates th
e argument. The evaluation may not identify inductive or deduct
ive
reasoning, validity, soundness, and/or strength.

Non-Performance - The evaluation of the argument is either non
existent or lacks the components described in the assignment
instructions.
Distinguished - Creates a clear counterargument with supporting
premises that are fully grounded in logical reasoning and/or fac
tual
evidence. The counterargument is strong if inductive, and valid
and sound if deductive.
Proficient - Creates a mostly clear counterargument with suppor
ting premises that are adequately grounded in logical reasoning
and/or factual evidence. The counterargument is strong if induct
ive, and valid and sound if deductive.
Basic - Creates a counterargument with supporting premises that
are partially grounded in logical reasoning and/or factual
evidence. The counter-argument contains relevant errors in the
use of induction or deduction, which somewhat compromise the
argument’s strength, validity, and/or soundness.
Below Expectations - Attempts to create a counterargument with
supporting premises; however, the counter-argument lacks logi
cal
reasoning and factual evidence and includes significant errors in
the use of induction or deduction, which compromise the
argument’s strength, validity, and/or soundness.
Non-Performance - The creation of a counterargument is either
nonexistent or lacks the components described in the assignment
instructions.
Distinguished - Clearly identifies a weakness in the original arg
ument and critiques that weakness using factual evidence and/or

PHI103.W5A1.10.2013
Identifies the Issue That Is Addressed in the Argument
Total: 1.00
Explains the Argument and Identifies the Premises and Conclusi
ons Total: 1.50
Evaluates the Argument’s Validity, Soundness, and/or Strength
Total: 1.50
Creates a Counterargument With Supporting Premises
Total: 1.50
Identifies a Weakness in the Original Argument and Critiques T
hat Weakness Total: 1.10
3/24/2015
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logical reasoning.
Proficient - Identifies a weakness in the original argument and c
ritiques that weakness using factual evidence and/or logical
reasoning. The identification and/or critique are slightly unclear
.
Basic - Identifies a weakness in the original argument and partia
lly critiques that weakness using logical reasoning and/or factua
l
evidence. The identification and/or critique are unclear or do no

t directly relate to weaknesses in the original argument.
Below Expectations - Attempts to identify a weakness in the ori
ginal argument and critique that weakness; however, the
identification and critique are unclear and/or do not relate to we
aknesses in the original argument.
Non-Performance - The identification of a weakness in the origi
nal argument and the critique of that weakness are either
nonexistent or lack the components described in the assignment
instructions.
Distinguished - Displays meticulous comprehension and organiz
ation of syntax and mechanics, such as spelling and grammar.
Written work contains no errors, and is very easy to understand.
Proficient - Displays comprehension and organization of syntax
and mechanics, such as spelling and grammar. Written work
contains only a few minor errors, and is mostly easy to understa
nd.
Basic - Displays basic comprehension of syntax and mechanics,
such as spelling and grammar. Written work contains a few
errors, which may slightly distract the reader.
Below Expectations - Fails to display basic comprehension of sy
ntax or mechanics, such as spelling and grammar. Written work
contains major errors, which distract the reader.
Non-Performance - The assignment is either nonexistent or lack
s the components described in the instructions.
Distinguished - The length of the paper is equivalent to the requ
ired number of words.
Proficient - The length of the paper is nearly equivalent to the r

equired number of words.
Basic - The length of the paper is equivalent to at least three qu
arters of the required number of words.
Below Expectations - The length of the paper is equivalent to at
least one half of the required number of words.
Distinguished - Accurately uses APA formatting consistently thr
oughout the paper, title page, and reference page.
Proficient - Exhibits APA formatting throughout the paper. How
ever, layout contains a few minor errors.
Basic - Exhibits basic knowledge of APA formatting throughout
the paper. However, layout does not meet all APA requirements
.
Below Expectations - Fails to exhibit basic knowledge of APA f
ormatting. There are frequent errors, making the layout difficult
to
distinguish as APA.
Distinguished - Uses more than the required number of scholarl
y sources, providing compelling evidence to support ideas. All
sources on the reference page are used and cited correctly withi
n the body of the assignment.
Proficient - Uses required number of scholarly sources to suppo
rt ideas. All sources on the reference page are used and cited

correctly within the body of the assignment.
Basic - Uses less than the required number of sources to support
ideas. Some sources may not be scholarly. Most sources on the
reference page are used within the body of the assignment. Citat
ions may not be formatted correctly.
Below Expectations - Uses inadequate number of sources that pr
ovide little or no support for ideas. Sources used may not be
scholarly. Most sources on the reference page are not used withi
n the body of the assignment. Citations are not formatted
correctly.
Written Communication: Control of Syntax and Mechanics
Total: 1.00
Word Requirement Total: 1.00
APA Formatting Total: 0.70
Resource Requirement Total: 0.70
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PHI 103: Informal Logic
Final Project Argument Options

For your Final Project, you will select one of the arguments
below to evaluate. You will also create a counter-
argument to the argument you choose. Refer to the Final
Project instructions in the online classroom for details.
Select the box of the argument of your choice to view the
excerpt. Navigate back to the main screen by
selecting “back to main.”

All Animals are Equal
by P. Singer
Wealth of Nations Book I
by A. Smith
The Problems of Philosophy
by B. Russell
On Liberty
By J. S. Mill
Second Treatise of
Government
by J. Locke
Alienated Labor
By K. Marx
Phaedo
By Plato
Applied Eugenics
By P. Popenoe and R.H.
Johnson
In Defense of Traditional
Marriage
By R. Anderson
The Case for Optimal

Pollution
By W. Baxter
The Social Responsibility of
Business
By M. Friedman
All Animals Are Equal
Click here to access this argument:
http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf
APA Citation:
Singer, P. (1989). All animals are equal. In T. Regan & P.
Singer (Eds.) Animal rights and human obligations (pp. 148-
162) [Acrobat Reader version]. Retrieved from
http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf
All Animals Are Equal by P. Singer Back to
Main
http://spot.colorado.edu/%7Eheathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.p
df
http://spot.colorado.edu/%7Eheathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.p
df

Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of
Labour
This division of labour, from which so many advantages are
derived, is not originally the effect of any
human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general
opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary,
though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain
propensity in human nature, which has in view no such
extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange
one thing for another.
Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in
human nature, of which no further account
can be given, or whether, as seems more probable, it be the
necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and
speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is
common to all men, and to be found in no other race
of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other
species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running
down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in
some sort of concert. Each turns her towards
his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his
companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is

not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence
of their passions in the same object at that
particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and
deliberate exchange of one bone for another with
another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal, by its gestures and
natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that
yours; I am willing to give this for that. When an animal wants
to obtain something either of a man, or of
another animal, it has no other means of persuasion, but to gain
the favour of those whose service it requires. A
puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours, by a
thousand attractions, to engage the attention of its
master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man
sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren,
and when he has no other means of engaging them to act
according to his inclinations, endeavours by every
servile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has
not time, however, to do this upon every
occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need of
the co-operation and assistance of great
multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the
friendship of a few persons. In almost every other
race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to
maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state

has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But
man has almost constant occasion for the help of
his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their
benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail
if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them
that it is for their own advantage to do for him
what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain
of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that
which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the
meaning of every such offer; and it is in this
manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of
those good offices which we stand in need of. It
is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their
humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to
From The Wealth of Nations by A. Smith Back to
Main
them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody
but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the
benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not
depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed

people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his
subsistence. But though this principle ultimately
provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has
occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with
them as he has occasion for them. The greater part of his
occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as
those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase.
With the money which one man gives him he
purchases food. The old clothes which another bestows upon
him he exchanges for other clothes which suit him
better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he
can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he
has occasion.
As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain
from one another the greater part of those
mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this
same trucking disposition which originally gives
occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or
shepherds, a particular person makes bows and
arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any
other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle
or for venison, with his companions; and he finds at last that he
can, in this manner, get more cattle and venison,
than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard

to his own interest, therefore, the making of
bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes
a sort of armourer. Another excels in making
the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses.
He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his
neighbours, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and
with venison, till at last he finds it his interest
to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become
a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a
third becomes a smith or a brazier; a fourth, a tanner or dresser
of hides or skins, the principal part of the
clothing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able to
exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his
own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for
such parts of the produce of other men's labour
as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply
himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate
and bring to perfection whatever talent of genius he may
possess for that particular species of business.
The difference of natural talents in different men, is, in reality,
much less than we are aware of; and the
very different genius which appears to distinguish men of
different professions, when grown up to maturity, is
not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the

division of labour. The difference between the
most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a
common street porter, for example, seems to arise not
so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education.
When they came in to the world, and for the first six
or eight years of their existence, they were, perhaps, very much
alike, and neither their parents nor play-fellows
could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or
soon after, they come to be employed in very
different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to
be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at
last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge
scarce any resemblance. But without the disposition
to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to
himself every necessary and conveniency of
life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to
perform, and the same work to do, and there could
have been no such difference of employment as could alone give
occasion to any great difference of talents.
As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents,
so remarkable among men of different
professions, so it is this same disposition which renders that
difference useful. Many tribes of animals,

acknowledged to be all of the same species, derive from nature
a much more remarkable distinction of genius,
than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take
place among men. By nature a philosopher is
not in genius and disposition half so different from a street
porter, as a mastiff is from a grey-hound, or a grey-
hound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's dog. Those
different tribes of animals, however, though all
of the same species are of scarce any use to one another. The
strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported
either by the swiftness of the greyhound, or by the sagacity of
the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd's
dog. The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for
want of the power or disposition to barter and
exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in
the least contribute to the better
accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each animal is
still obliged to support and defend itself,
separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage
from that variety of talents with which nature
has distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the
most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one
another; the different produces of their respective talents, by the
general disposition to truck, barter, and

exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock,
where every man may purchase whatever part of the
produce of other men's talents he has occasion for.
APA Citation:
Smith, A. (1776). Of the principle which gives occasion to the
division of labour. In The
wealth of nations (Book 1). Retrieved from
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3300/3300-
h/3300-h.htm#link2HCH0002
On Our Knowledge of Universals
We are all convinced that the sun will rise to-morrow. Why? Is
this belief a mere blind outcome of past
experience, or can it be justified as a reasonable belief?
It is obvious that if we are asked why we believe that the sun
will rise to-morrow, we shall naturally

answer 'Because it always has risen every day'. We have a firm
belief that it will rise in the future, because it
has risen in the past. If we are challenged as to why we believe
that it will continue to rise as heretofore, we
may appeal to the laws of motion: the earth, we shall say, is a
freely rotating body, and such bodies do not cease
to rotate unless something interferes from outside, and there is
nothing outside to interfere with the earth
between now and to-morrow. Of course it might be doubted
whether we are quite certain that there is nothing
outside to interfere, but this is not the interesting doubt. The
interesting doubt is as to whether the laws of
motion will remain in operation until to-morrow. If this doubt is
raised, we find ourselves in the same position
as when the doubt about the sunrise was first raised.
The only reason for believing that the laws of motion will
remain in operation is that they have operated
hitherto, so far as our knowledge of the past enables us to
judge. It is true that we have a greater body of
evidence from the past in favour of the laws of motion than we
have in favour of the sunrise, because the
sunrise is merely a particular case of fulfilment of the laws of
motion, and there are countless other particular
cases. But the real question is: Do any number of cases of a law

being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it
will be fulfilled in the future? If not, it becomes plain that we
have no ground whatever for expecting the sun to
rise to-morrow, or for expecting the bread we shall eat at our
next meal not to poison us, or for any of the other
scarcely conscious expectations that control our daily lives. It is
to be observed that all such expectations are
only probable; thus we have not to seek for a proof that they
must be fulfilled, but only for some reason in
favour of the view that they are likely to be fulfilled.
The belief that the sun will rise to-morrow might be falsified if
the earth came suddenly into contact
with a large body which destroyed its rotation; but the laws of
motion and the law of gravitation would not be
infringed by such an event. The business of science is to find
uniformities, such as the laws of motion and the
law of gravitation, to which, so far as our experience extends,
there are no exceptions. In this search science has
been remarkably successful, and it may be conceded that such
uniformities have held hitherto. This brings us
From The Problems of Philosophy by B. Russell Back to
Main

back to the question: Have we any reason, assuming that they
have always held in the past, to suppose that they
will hold in the future?
It must be conceded, to begin with, that the fact that two things
have been found often together and
never apart does not, by itself, suffice to prove demonstratively
that they will be found together in the next case
we examine. The most we can hope is that the oftener things are
found together, the more probable it becomes
that they will be found together another time, and that, if they
have been found together often enough, the
probability will amount almost to certainty. It can never quite
reach certainty, because we know that in spite of
frequent repetitions there sometimes is a failure at the last, as in
the case of the chicken whose neck is wrung.
Thus probability is all we ought to seek.
It might be urged, as against the view we are advocating, that
we know all natural phenomena to be
subject to the reign of law, and that sometimes, on the basis of
observation, we can see that only one law can
possibly fit the facts of the case. Now to this view there are two
answers. The first is that, even if some law
which has no exceptions applies to our case, we can never, in
practice, be sure that we have discovered that law

and not one to which there are exceptions. The second is that
the reign of law would seem to be itself only
probable, and that our belief that it will hold in the future, or in
unexamined cases in the past, is itself based
upon the very principle we are examining.
It should be noted that probability is always relative to certain
data. In our case, the data are merely the
known cases of coexistence of A and B. There may be other
data, which might be taken into account, which
would gravely alter the probability. For example, a man who
had seen a great many white swans might argue,
by our principle, that on the data it was probable that all swans
were white, and this might be a perfectly sound
argument. The argument is not disproved by the fact that some
swans are black, because a thing may very well
happen in spite of the fact that some data render it improbable.
In the case of the swans, a man might know that
colour is a very variable characteristic in many species of
animals, and that, therefore, an induction as to colour
is peculiarly liable to error. But this knowledge would be a
fresh datum, by no means proving that the
probability relatively to our previous data had been wrongly
estimated. The fact, therefore, that things often fail

to fulfil our expectations is no evidence that our expectations
will not probably be fulfilled in a given case or a
given class of cases. Thus our inductive principle is at any rate
not capable of being disproved by an appeal to
experience.
The general principles of science, such as the belief in the reign
of law, and the belief that every event
must have a cause, are as completely dependent upon the
inductive principle as are the beliefs of daily life All
such general principles are believed because mankind have
found innumerable instances of their truth and no
instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for
their truth in the future, unless the inductive
principle is assumed.
APA Citation:
Russell, B. (1912). On our knowledge of universals. In The
problems of philosophy.
Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-
h/5827-
h.htm#link2HCH0012

Applications
Consider, for example, the case of education. Is it not almost a
self-evident axiom, that the State should
require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of
every human being who is born its citizen? Yet
who is there that is not afraid to recognise and assert this truth?
Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of
the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now
stand, the father), after summoning a human
being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting
him to perform his part well in life towards others
and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to
be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in this
country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead
of his being required to make any exertion or
sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is left to his
choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis!
It still remains unrecognised, that to bring a child into existence

without a fair prospect of being able, not only
to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its
mind, is a moral crime, both against the
unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent
does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to
see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent.
Were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted,
there would be an end to the difficulties
about what the State should teach, and how it should teach,
which now convert the subject into a mere battle-
field for sects and parties, causing the time and labour which
should have been spent in educating, to be wasted
in quarrelling about education. If the government would make
up its mind to require for every child a good
education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It
might leave to parents to obtain the education
where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to
pay the school fees of the poorer class of
children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who
have no one else to pay for them. The
objections which are urged with reason against State education,
do not apply to the enforcement of education by
the State, but to the State's taking upon itself to direct that
education; which is a totally different thing. That the

whole or any large part of the education of the people should be
in State hands, I go as far as any one in
deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of
individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and
modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable
importance, diversity of education. A general State
education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be
exactly like one another; and as the mould in which it
casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the
government, whether this be a monarch, a
priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing
generation, in proportion as it is efficient and
successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by
natural tendency to one over the body. An
From On Liberty by J.S. Mill Back to
Main
education established and controlled by the State, should only
exist, if it exist at all, as one among many
competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example
and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain
standard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general
is in so backward a state that it could not or

would not provide for itself any proper institutions of
education, unless the government undertook the task;
then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils,
take upon itself the business of schools and
universities, as it may that of joint stock companies, when
private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking
great works of industry, does not exist in the country. But in
general, if the country contains a sufficient number
of persons qualified to provide education under government
auspices, the same persons would be able and
willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary
principle, under the assurance of remuneration
afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined
with State aid to those unable to defray the
expense.
The instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than
public examinations, extending to all
children, and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed
at which every child must be examined, to
ascertain if he (or she) is able to read. If a child proves unable,
the father, unless he has some sufficient ground
of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked
out, if necessary, by his labour, and the child
might be put to school at his expense. Once in every year the

examination should be renewed, with a gradually
extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal
acquisition, and what is more, retention, of a certain
minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory. Beyond
that minimum, there should be voluntary
examinations on all subjects, at which all who come up to a
certain standard of proficiency might claim a
certificate. To prevent the State from exercising, through these
arrangements, an improper influence over
opinion, the knowledge required for passing an examination
(beyond the merely instrumental parts of
knowledge, such as languages and their use) should, even in the
higher class of examinations, be confined to
facts and positive science exclusively. The examinations on
religion, politics, or other disputed topics, should
not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter
of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on
such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches. Under
this system, the rising generation would be no
worse off in regard to all disputed truths, than they are at
present; they would be brought up either churchmen or
dissenters as they now are, the state merely taking care that they
should be instructed churchmen, or instructed
dissenters. There would be nothing to hinder them from being

taught religion, if their parents chose, at the same
schools where they were taught other things. All attempts by the
state to bias the conclusions of its citizens on
disputed subjects, are evil; but it may very properly offer to
ascertain and certify that a person possesses the
knowledge, requisite to make his conclusions, on any given
subject, worth attending to. A student of philosophy
would be the better for being able to stand an examination both
in Locke and in Kant, whichever of the two he
takes up with, or even if with neither: and there is no reasonable
objection to examining an atheist in the
evidences of Christianity, provided he is not required to profess
a belief in them.
APA Citation:
Mill, J.S. (1859). Applications. In On liberty. Retrieved from
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm

Of the State of War
THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and
therefore declaring by word or action, not a
passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another
man's life, puts him in a state of war with him
against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has
exposed his life to the other's power to be taken
away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and
espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and
just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me
with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of
nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all
cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent
is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war
upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his
being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion;
because such men are not under the ties of the
commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and
violence, and so may be treated as beasts of
prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to
destroy him whenever he falls into their power.
And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into
his absolute power, does thereby put

himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood
as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I
have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his
power without my consent, would use me as he
pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he
had a fancy to it; for no body can desire to have
me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to
that which is against the right of my freedom,
i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such force is the only
security of my preservation; and reason bids me
look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who would take
away that freedom which is the fence to it; so
that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts
himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the
state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to
any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed
to have a design to take away every thing else, that freedom
being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in
the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging to
those of that society or commonwealth, must be
supposed to design to take away from them every thing else, and
so be looked on as in a state of war.
This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the
least hurt him, nor declared any design

upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to get him
in his power, as to take away his money, or
what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has
no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence
be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would
take away my liberty, would not, when he had
me in his power, take away every thing else. And therefore it is
lawful for me to treat him as one who has put
From Second Treatise of Government by J. Locke Back to
Main
himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to
that hazard does he justly expose himself,
whoever introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.
And here we have the plain difference between the state of
nature and the state of war, which however
some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of
peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation,
and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction,
are one from another. Men living together
according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with
authority to judge between them, is properly the
state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon

the person of another, where there is no common
superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and
it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the
right of war even against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and
a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot
harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am
worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me
but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for
my preservation, where it cannot interpose to
secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of
no reparation, permits me my own defence, and
the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the
aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common
judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where
the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a
common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature:
force without right, upon a man's person, makes
a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.
But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases
between those that are in society, and are
equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the
law; because then there lies open the remedy of
appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where
no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for

want of positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to,
the state of war once begun, continues, with a
right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can,
until the aggressor offers peace, and desires
reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has
already done, and secure the innocent for the
future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges,
lies open, but the remedy is denied by a
manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the
laws to protect or indemnify the violence or
injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard to
imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever
violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to
administer justice, it is still violence and injury,
however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the
end whereof being to protect and redress the
innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all who are under
it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is
made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right
them, they are left to the only remedy in such
cases, an appeal to heaven.
To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to
heaven, and wherein every the least

difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide
between the contenders) is one great reason of
men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of
nature: for where there is an authority, a power
on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the
continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the
controversy is decided by that power.
APA Citation:
Locke, J. (1689). Of the state of war. In Second treatise of
government. Retrieved from
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm
Alienated Labor
Click here to access this argument:
http://www.yavanika.org/classes/reader/marx1.pdf

Note: The highlighted portions of the argument will be
particularly useful for this project.
APA Citation:
Marx, K. (1967). Alienated labor. From L. D. Easton & K. H.
Guddat (Eds. & Trans.) Writings of the young Marx on
philosophy and society (pp. 287-301). Retrieved from
Alienated Labor by K. Marx Back to
Main
Abbreviated Version of Socrates Final Argument in Phaedo
Socrates: I shall have to go back to those familiar words which
are in the mouth of every one, and first of all
assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and
greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be
able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the
immortality of the soul.
Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant
you this.

Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree
with me in the next step; for I cannot help thinking,
if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty should
there be such, that it can be beautiful only in as
far as it partakes of absolute beauty--and I should say the same
of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the
cause?
Yes, he said, I agree.
He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of
any other of those wise causes which are alleged;
and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour, or form, or
any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave all
that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and
perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my
own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence
and participation of beauty in whatever way or
manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I
stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things
become beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer
which I can give, either to myself or to another,
and to this I cling, in the persuasion that this principle will
never be overthrown, and that to myself or to anyone
who asks the question, I may safely reply, that by beauty
beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree

with me?
I do.
And that by greatness only great things become great and
greater, and by smallness the less become less?
True.
…
Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from
another point of view, and see whether you agree
with me:--There is a thing which you term heat, and another
thing which you term cold?
Certainly.
But are they the same as fire and snow?
Most assuredly not.
Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with
snow?
Yes.
From Phaedo by Plato Back to
Main
And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before
said, is under the influence of heat, they will not

remain snow and heat; but at the advance of the heat, the snow
will either retire or perish?
Very true, he replied.
And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or
perish; and when the fire is under the influence of
the cold, they will not remain as before, fire and cold.
That is true, he said.
…
Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:--not only do
essential opposites exclude one another, but also
concrete things, which, although not in themselves opposed,
contain opposites; these, I say, likewise reject the
idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and
when it approaches them they either perish or
withdraw. For example; will not the number three endure
annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into
an even number, while remaining three?
Very true, said Cebes.
…
Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render
the body alive?

The soul, he replied.
And is this always the case?
Yes, he said, of course.
Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing
life?
Yes, certainly.
And is there any opposite to life?
There is, he said.
And what is that?
Death.
Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the
opposite of what she brings.
Impossible, replied Cebes.
And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle
which repels the even?
The odd.
And that principle which repels the musical, or the just?
The unmusical, he said, and the unjust.
And what do we call the principle which does not admit of
death?

The immortal, he said.
And does the soul admit of death?
No.
Then the soul is immortal?
Yes, he said.
And may we say that this has been proven?
Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied.
Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be
imperishable?
Of course.
And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm
principle came attacking the snow, must not the
snow have retired whole and unmelted—for it could never have
perished, nor could it have remained and
admitted the heat?
True, he said.
Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable,
the fire when assailed by cold would not have
perished or have been extinguished, but would have gone away
unaffected?

Certainly, he said.
And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is
also imperishable, the soul when attacked by
death cannot perish; for the preceding argument shows that the
soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any
more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or
fire or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person
may say: 'But although the odd will not become even at the
approach of the even, why may not the odd perish
and the even take the place of the odd?' Now to him who makes
this objection, we cannot answer that the odd
principle is imperishable; for this has not been acknowledged,
but if this had been acknowledged, there would
have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the
even the odd principle and the number three
took their departure; and the same argument would have held
good of fire and heat and any other thing.
Very true.
And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is
also imperishable, then the soul will be
imperishable as well as immortal; but if not, some other proof
of her imperishableness will have to be given.
No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being

eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is
imperishable.
Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that God, and
the essential form of life, and the immortal in
general, will never perish.
Yes, all men, he said--that is true; and what is more, gods, if I
am not mistaken, as well as men.
Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the
soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable?
Most certainly.
Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may
be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at
the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound?
True.
Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and
imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another
world!
APA Citation:
Plato. (1689). Phaedo. Retrieved from
http://fulltextarchive.com/pdfs/Phaedo.pdf

http://fulltextarchive.com/pdfs/Phaedo.pdf
Excerpt from the book Applied Eugenics written in 1918 by P.
Popenoe and R. H. Johnson
There are now in the United States some 14,000,000 foreign-
born persons, together with other millions
of the sons and daughters of foreigners who although born on
American soil have as yet been little assimilated
to Americanism. This great body of aliens, representing perhaps
a fifth of the population, is not a pool to be
absorbed, but a continuous, inflowing stream, which until the
outbreak of the Great War was steadily increasing
in volume, and of which the fountain-head is so inexhaustible as
to appal the imagination. From the beginning
of the century, the inflow averaged little less than a million a
year, and while about one-fifth of this represented
a temporary migration, four-fifths of it meant a permanent
addition to the population of the New World.
The character of this stream will inevitably determine to a large
extent the future of the American nation. The

direct biological results, in race mixture, are important enough,
although not easy to define. The indirect results,
which are probably of no less importance to eugenics, are so
hard to follow that some students of the problem
do not even realize their existence.
The ancestors of all white Americans, of course, were
immigrants not so very many generations ago.
But the earlier immigration was relatively homogeneous and
stringently selected by the dangers of the voyage,
the hardships of life in a new country, and the equality of
opportunity where free competition drove the unfit to
the wall. There were few people of eminence in the families that
came to colonize North America, but there was
a high average of sturdy virtues, and a good deal of ability,
particularly in the Puritan and Huguenot invasions
and in a part of that of Virginia.
In the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, the number
of these "patriots and founders" was
greatly increased by the arrival of immigrants of similar racial
stocks from Ireland, Germany, Scandinavia, and
to a less extent from the other countries of northern and western
Europe. These arrivals added strength to the
United States, particularly as a large part of them settled on
farms.

This stream of immigration gradually dried up, but was
succeeded by a flood from a new source,—
southern and eastern Europe. Italians, Slavs, Poles, Magyars,
East European Hebrews, Finns, Portuguese,
Greeks, Roumanians and representatives of many other small
nationalities began to seek fortunes in America.
The earlier immigration had been made up largely of those who
sought escape from religious or political
tyranny and came to settle permanent homes. The newer
immigration was made up, on the whole, of those who
frankly sought wealth. The difference in the reason for coming
could not fail to mean a difference in selection
of the immigrants, quite apart from the change in the races.
From Applied Eugenics by P. Popenoe and R.H. Johnson Back
to
Main
Last of all began an immigration of Levantines, of Syrians,
Armenians, and other inhabitants of Asiatic
Turkey. Beyond this region lie the great nations of Asia,
"oversaturated" with population. So far there has been
little more than the threat of their overflow, but the threat is
certain to become a reality within a few years

unless prevented by legal restriction.
The eugenic results of immigration are partly indirect and partly
direct. Direct results follow if the
newcomers are assimilated,—a word which we shall use rather
narrowly to mean that free intermarriage takes
place between them and all parts of the older population. We
shall discuss the direct results first, the nature of
which depends largely on whether the newcomers are racially
homogeneous with the population already in the
country.
If they are like, the old and new will blend without difficulty.
The effects of the immigration then
depend on whether the immigrants are better or worse in
average quality than the older residents. If as good or
better, they are valuable additions; if inferior they are
biologically a detriment.
But if the new arrivals are different, if they represent a different
subspecies of Homo sapiens, the question is
more serious, for it involves the problem of crossing races
which are biologically more or less distinct. Genetics
can throw some light on this problem.
Waiving for the moment all question as to the relative quality of
two distinct races, what results are to be

expected from crossing? It (1) gives an increase of vigor which
diminishes in later generations and (2) produces
recombination of characters.
The first result may be disregarded, for the various races of man
are probably already much mixed, and
too closely related, to give rise to much hybrid vigor in crosses.
The second result will be favorable or unfavorable, depending
on the characters which go into the cross; and it
is not possible to predict the result in human matings, because
the various racial characters are so ill known. It
is, therefore, not worth while here to discuss at length genetic
theory. In general it may be said that some
valuable characters are likely to disappear, as the result of such
crosses, and less desirable ones to take their
place. The great bulk of the population resulting from such
racial crosses is likely to be more or less mongrel in
nature. Finally, some individuals will appear who combine the
good characters of the two races, without the bad
ones.
The net result will therefore probably be some distinct gain, but
a greater loss. There is danger that
complex and valuable traits of a race will be broken down in the
process of hybridization, and that it will take a

long time to bring them together again. The old view that racial
crosses lead fatally to race degeneration is no
longer tenable, but the view recently advanced, that crosses are
advantageous, seems equally hasty. W. E. Castle
has cited the Pitcairn Islanders and the Boer-Hottentot
mulattoes of South Africa as evidence that wide crosses
are productive of no evil results. These cases may be admitted
to show that such a hybrid race may be
physically healthy, but in respect of mental traits they hardly do
more than suggest the conclusion we advanced
in our chapter on the Color Line, that such miscegenation is an
advantage to the inferior race and a disadvantage
to the superior one.
On the whole, we believe wide racial crosses should be looked
upon with suspicion by eugenists.
The colonizers of North America mostly belonged to the Nordic
race. The earlier immigrants to the United
States,—roughly, those who came here before the Civil War,—
belonged mostly to the same stock, and
therefore mixed with the early settlers without difficulty. The
advantages of this immigration were offset by no
impairment of racial homogeneity.

But the more recent immigration belongs mostly to other races,
principally the Mediterranean and
Alpine. Even if these immigrants were superior on the average
to the older population, it is clear that their
assimilation would not be an unmixed blessing, for the evil of
crossbreeding would partly offset the advantage
of the addition of valuable new traits. If, on the other hand, the
average of the new immigration is inferior in
quality, or in so far as it is inferior in quality, it is evident that
it must represent biologically an almost unmixed
evil; it not only brings in new undesirable traits, but injures the
desirable ones already here.
APA Citation:
Popenoe, P., & Johnson, R.H. (1918). Applied eugenics.
Retrieved from
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19560/19560-h/19560-
h.htm#Page_368
In Defense of Traditional Marriage
Click here to access the argument:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/in-defense-of-

traditional-
marriage/2013/03/20/d19a0c08-915a-11e2-bdea-
e32ad90da239_story.html
APA Citation:
Anderson, R. T. (2013, March 20). In defense of traditional
marriage. The Washington Post.
Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-
faith/in-defense-of-
traditional-marriage/2013/03/20/d19a0c08-915a-11e2-bdea-
In Defense of Traditional Marriage by R. Anderson Back to
Main
The Case for Optimal Pollution

http://hettingern.people.cofc.edu/Env_Ethics_Sp_2012/Baxter_
Case_for_Optimal_Pollution.pdf
APA Citation:
Baxter, W. (n.d.). The case for optimal pollution. Retrieved
from
Case_for_Optimal_Poll
ution.pdf
The Social Responsibility of Business
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/fried
man-soc-resp-
business.html
APA Citation:
Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The social responsibility of
business is to increase its
profits. The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved from
man-soc-resp-business.html

The Case for Optimal Pollution by W. Baxter Back to
Main
The Social Responsibility of Business by M. Friedman Back to
Main
Case_for_Optimal_Pollution.pdf
man-soc-resp-business.htmlAll Animals Are EqualClick here to
access this argument:
http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdfA
PA Citation:Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the
Division of LabourAPA Citation:Smith, A. (1776). Of the
principle which gives occasion to the division of labour. In The
wealth of nations (Book 1). Retrieved from
h.htm#link2HCH0002Russell, B. (1912). On our knowledge of
universals. In The problems of philosophy. Retrieved from
h.htm#link2HCH0012Mill, J.S. (1859). Applications. In On
liberty. Retrieved from
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htmOf
the State of WarLocke, J. (1689). Of the state of war. In Second
treatise of government. Retrieved from

h.htmAlienated LaborClick here to access this argument:
http://www.yavanika.org/classes/reader/marx1.pdfNote: The
highlighted portions of the argument will be particularly useful
for this project.Plato. (1689). Phaedo. Retrieved from
http://fulltextarchive.com/pdfs/Phaedo.pdfPopenoe, P., &
Johnson, R.H. (1918). Applied eugenics. Retrieved from
h.htm#Page_368Anderson, R. T. (2013, March 20). In defense
of traditional marriage. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
e32ad90da239_story.htmlBaxter, W. (n.d.). The case for optimal
pollution. Retrieved from
Case_for_Optimal_Pollution.pdfFriedman, M. (1970, September
13). The social responsibility of business is to increase its
profits. The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved from

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